Chong vs.

CA

GR No. 148280 | 10JUL2007

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

NATURE OF THE CASE

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA, affirming the RTC decision, denying
Chong’s MR.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Chong file complaint for annulment of contract and recovery of money against Sps De Guzman and
Fortune Devp. Corp before RTC.

Loreta Chong executed a SPA in favor of Agusto Chong (common law), latter sold subject lot to Sps De
Guzman for a sum of money, which Chong never received. Also, Chong claims that said sps rented a
house she owned and rented it to others without her consent.

Chong prayed the transfer of rights and assumption of obligation and Deed of sale be declared null and
void. RTC ruled in favor of the sps. CA affirmed.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

1. Whether trial court erred in granting respondent-spouses oral manifestation or motion for leave to
file an amended answer.

2. Whether Chong was deprived of due process when during the pre-trial, respondent-spouses failed
and refused to furnish her copies of the documents that they intended to present.

3. Whether the Transfer of Rights and Assumption of Obligation is unenforceable.

RULING OF SC

1. No. The trial court justifiably deemed it necessary for respondent-spouses to amend their answer in
order to sufficiently clarify the issues to be tried and thereby expedite the proceedings. In granting
respondent-spouses motion to file an amended answer, the trial court acted within its discretion
pursuant to “Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: The court shall consider - the necessity or
desirability of amendments to the pleadings.”

2. No. Although copies of the documents enumerated therein were not attached to the Pre-Trial Brief,
they were nonetheless previously attached to respondent-spouses Motion To Dismiss, Reply to
petitioners opposition to the motion to dismiss, and Amended Answer With Counterclaim, all of which
were copy furnished to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner can not now claim that she was denied
due process
3. No. Chong executed SPA in favor of Agusto Chong granting power to mortgage, encumber, sell and
dispose subject property.

One Rosario Cabelin filed complaint for sum of money against Chong and Agusto. Chong sought
assistance to sps to settle the case. All entered int a compromise agreement, Agusto acting as
atty-in-fact, executed Deed of Sale with right to repurchase the subject property to Rosario in
consideration of said sum. In addition, Agusto, Sps De Guzman et al jointly and severally promised to
pay the sum under promissory note.

Later on, Rosario demanded payment of remaining balance which sps agreed to pay, provided
petitioner will transfer her rights over subject lot to them. Subsequently, after payment, agusto
executed a Transfer of Rights and Assumption of Obligation in favor of sps.

That the SPA reveals that petitioner specifically authorized Augusto to sell the subject lot and to settle
her obligations to third persons. The Special Power of Attorney is a duly notarized document and, as
such, is entitled, by law, to full faith and credit upon its face.

In fine, the evidence on record sufficiently established that petitioners rights over the subject lot were
validly transferred to respondent-spouses in consideration of the latters payment of petitioners debts
to Rosario.

The President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. BTL Construction Corporation

G.R. No. 176439, February 26, 2007

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. COJCOLDS and BTL entered into a Construction Contract for the latter’s construction of the former’s
meeting house facility. However, due to bad weather conditions, power failures, and revisions in the
construction, the completion date of the Medina Project was extended.

2. BTL informed COJCOLDS that it suffered financial losses from another project and thereby requested
that it be allowed to: (a) bill COJCOLDS based on 95% and 100% completion of the Medina Project; and
(b) execute deeds of assignment in favor of its suppliers so that they may collect any eventual
payments directly from COJCOLDS. COJCOLDS granted said request which BTL, in turn, acknowledged.

3. BTL ceased its operations in the Medina Project because of its lack of funds to advance the cost of
labor necessary to complete the said project, as well as the supervening increase in the prices of
materials and other items for construction. Consequently, COJCOLDS terminated its Contract with BTL
on August 17, 2001 and, thereafter, engaged the services of another contractor, Vigor Construction
(Vigor), to complete the Medina Project.

4. BTL filed a complaint against COJCOLDS for damages

ISSUE OF THE CASE

What are their liabilities to each other?

RULING OF SC

I. Liabilities of COJCOLDS to BTL.

a. The 10% Retention Money and the Unpaid Balance of the Contract Price: Because the 10% retention
money should not be treated as a separate and distinct liability of COJCOLDS to BTL as it merely forms
part of the contract price. While COJCOLDS is bound to eventually return to BTL the amount of
P1,248,179.87 as retention money, the said amount should be automatically deducted from BTL’s
outstanding billings. Ultimately, COJCOLDS’s total liability to BTL should only be pegged at
P1,612,017.74, representing the unpaid balance of 98% of the contract price, inclusive of the 10%
retention money.

II. Liabilities of BTL to COJCOLDS.

a. Liquidated Damages Due to Delay: BTL’s liability to COJCOLDS for liquidated damages is a result of its
delay in the performance of its obligations under the Contract.

b. Cost Overrun: BTL should therefore reimburse COJCOLDS the said cost which the latter incurred
essentially because of BTL’s failure to complete the project as agreed upon.

c. Overpayments: Therefore obliged to return the same to COJCOLDS pursuant to Article 2154 of the
Civil Code which states that "[i]f something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was
unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises."

III. Mutual Liabilities: Attorney’s Fees- NONE , because neither party was shown to have acted in bad
faith in pursuing their respective claims against each other. The existence of bad faith is negated by the
fact that the CIAC, the CA, and the Court have all found the parties’ original claims to be partially
meritorious.
 Under Article 749 of the Civil Code,

the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to be valid, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It may
be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donor must know the acceptance
by the donee.

 the complete name of both the donor and the donee;

 the detailed description of the property, including pertinent info such as property title

number and technical description of the property;

 your intention and purpose why you are donating it to your loved one;

 signature of the person who will stand as witness to the donation; and

 notarial acknowledgement.

Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered applicable by
analogy.1âwphi1 Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit partition
for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty (20)
years are void.

Submit the following pertinent documents to any field office or branch of the BIR:

 Deed of Donation

 Proof of ownership of the property that you are going to donate

 Certificate of No Improvement

Per Republic Act 8424, the donation will be taxed at minimum 2% of the excess over P100,000. If you

will be donating more than once in a year, the donor’s tax will be based on the net total amount of the

gifts.
G. R. No. 132681. December 3, 2001 QUILALA V. ALCANTARA
H.
PDF AT DESKTOP!
FELOMINA ABELLANA vs. SPOUSES ROMEO PONCE and LUCILA PONCE and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of
BUTUAN CITY
G.R. No. 160488 | September 3, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

Felomina Abellana is the aunt of respondent Lucila Ponce; on 15 July 1981, Felomina bought a parcel of
agricultural land which she intended to give to her niece, Lucila. Because of this, the deed of sale
showed that it was Lucila who bought the land. However, Felomina remained in possession and
developed the same land and continued paying real property taxes relative to it. Meanwhile the
relationship of the aunt and niece turned sour, as the latter even threatened Felomina physically and
has become disrespectful. Because of this development, Felomina filed a case for revocation of implied
trust to recover the property and its legal title over it. On August 28, 2000, the trial court rendered a
decision holding that an implied trust existed between Felomina and Lucila, such that the latter is
merely holding the lot for the benefit of the former. It thus ordered the conveyance of the subject lot
in favor of Felomina. On appeal, the Court reversed the lower court’s decision and said that Felomina
wasn’t able to prove an implied trust.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was implied trust in the case at bar.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that it was Felomina and not Lucila who truly owned the parcel of land. The
lone testimony of Felomina is sufficient to prove her claim if it is credible. The presentation of the
brother of the seller who witnessed Felomina as the real buyer and paid the purchase price, debunks
the claim of Lucila.

In the instant case, a donation of an immovable was effected NOT on a public instrument as
required by law. Because it was only an oral donation, it is thus void. Unlike ordinary contracts (which
are perfected by the concurrence of the requisites of consent, object and cause pursuant to Article
1318 of the Civil Code), solemn contracts like donations are perfected only upon compliance with the
legal formalities under Articles 748 and 749. Otherwise stated, absent the solemnity requirements for
validity, the mere intention of the parties does not give rise to a contract. Hence, Felomina can still
recover title from Lucila. Dispensation of such solemnities would give rise to anomalous situations
where the formalities of a donation and a will in donations inter vivos , and donations mortis causa
respectively, would be done away with when the transfer of the property is made in favor of a child or
one to whom the donor stands in loco parentis . Such a scenario is clearly repugnant to the mandatory
nature of the law on donation.
 GARCIA v GATCHALIAN

FACTS:

1. This is an appeal taken by Pedro Reyes Garcia from the decision of the

Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceedings

- denying the allowance of the will of the late Gregorio Gatchalian,

on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not acknowledge

it before a notary public, as required by law.

2. On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the municipality of
Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs.

3. On April 2 of the same year, appellant filed a petition with the above named court for the probate of
said alleged will (Exhibit "C") wherein he was instituted as sole heir.

4. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and
Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein, opposed the petition on the ground, among others:

- that the will was procured by fraud; that the deceased did not intend the instrument signed
by him to be as his will;

- and that the deceased was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of
the alleged execution of said will.

5. After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the document Exhibit "C" to be the
authentic last will of the deceased but disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirement of Article 806 of the New Civil Code — that the will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

ISSUE:

WON the will was executed in accordance of Art 806 of the New Civil Code?

HELD:

NO

1. Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:

 Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of
Court.

2. We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal
provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also
by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity

- As the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the
same may not be probated.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

 Azuela v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 122880

April 12, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Felix Azuela who is the son of the cousin of the decedent, sought to admit to probate the
notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor,
Vart Prague. However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12
legitimate heirs” of the decedent. According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal
defects. She also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She
pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was
not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters of the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly executed and attested to in
accordance with law.

HELD:

Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment.

An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has
attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

The will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article
806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not
present any textual proof, much less one under oath that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses
executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides
for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent
of the testator.

Another critical defect examined by the Court which lead to its rejection is that, the
attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witness appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of
the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.
 Unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The intents of the two
classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signature on the left-hand portion signifies that
the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. While the signature to
the attestation clause, establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied.

 Forms in conveyancing – Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1528 or the Property Registration
Decree

CHAPTER XII

FORMS USED IN LAND REGISTRATION AND CONVEYANCING

Section 112. Forms in conveyancing. The Commissioner of Land Registration shall prepare convenient
blank forms as may be necessary to help facilitate the proceedings in land registration and shall take
charge of the printing of land title forms.

Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and other voluntary instruments,
whether affecting registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in the form of
public instruments shall be registerable: Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by the
person or persons executing the same in the presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise sign
thereon, and shall acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person or persons executing the
same before a notary public or other public officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where
the instrument so acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon
acknowledgment is written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of the Register
of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each page of the copy to be kept by the notary public,
except the page where the signatures already appear at the foot of the instrument, shall be signed on
the left margin thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses, and all
the ages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages shall be stated in the
acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or
encumbrance of two or more parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said
acknowledgment.