Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs CA
CITATION: 219 SCRA 115
G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993
FACTS: Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a
complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter
was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted
her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to
Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents. The
petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his
apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with
him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner
started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the
respondent in the apartment while he was in school and
drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the
petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou
to not live with him since he is already married to someone in
Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or
agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of
Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay
out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing
money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for
damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to
cause for damages.
HELD: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that when a
man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to
consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully
injures the woman. In that instance, the court found that
petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to
surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry
was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the
woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable
acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages
to the respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an
Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent
was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old.
Petitioner was allegedlythe lover of the respondent, and was
said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to
live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that the
petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her
family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However,
the marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and
maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the
petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision
was held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner
claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the
claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know
about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance
of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for
the damages incurred by the petitioner.
RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law.
However, since the respondent was proved to have a
good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be
taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a promise
of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages.
Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered”
her since she believed that his promise to marry was true, and
not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims
against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent
had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage
reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages
were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which
qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitioner.
Allied Banking Corporation vs. Bank of the Philippine
Islands
G.R. No. 188363, February 27, 2013
Facts: On October 10, 2002, a check was presented for deposit
and accepted at petitioner Allied Banking Corporation’s Kawit
branch in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to a certain
Mateo Management Group International herein referred as
MMGI. Subsequently, as the check was post-dated on October
9, 2003, it was withdrawn against the account of Marciano Silva
Jr. with respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands Bel-Air
Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to
respondent throught the Philippine Clearing House Corporation.
Thereafter, the check was cleared by respondent and petitioner
credited the account of MMGI with P1,000,000.00. Sometime in
October 2002, MMGI’s account was closed and all the funds in
such account were withdrawn. A month later, it was discovered
by Silva that there was a debit of P1,000,000.00 from his
account resulting to Silva’s complaint wherein respondent
credited his account with the aforesaid sum.
A complaint before the Arbitration Committee was filed by the
petitioner in which it asserts that respondent should solely bear
the entire face value of the check value due to its negligence in
failing to return the check to petitioner within the 24-hour
reglementary period as provided in Section 20.1 of the Clearing
House Rules and Regulatios of 2000. In its Answer with
Counterclaims, respondent charged petitioner with gross
negligence for accepting the post-dated check in the first place.
In addition, it contended that petitioner’s admitted negligence
was the sole and proximate cause of the loss suffered by
Marciano Silva Jr.
Issues:
(1) What does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance enunciate?
(2) Whether such doctrine will be applicable to the present case?
Held: On the first issue, the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is
that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine
necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the defendant
and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does
not apply except upon that assumption. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him
from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence
of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in
situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was
defendant’s failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the
last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate
cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.
As for the second issue, the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance should
be applicable to the present case. The evidence clearly shows
that the proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of the
subject check was the negligence of respondent who cleared a
post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility
without observing its own verification procedure. As correctly
found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent
exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it could have
easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date written on
the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could have
then promptly returned the check and with the check thus
dishonoured, petitioner would have not credited the amount
thereof to the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the
antecedent negligence of the petitioner in accepting the post-
dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from
respondent the amount credited to the payee’s account covering
the check.
Legal Philo
Law is evolutionary; it arises out of customs and traditions; and
it develops like language. This is a basic postulate in the
historical school of law.
Legal philosophy is rooted in the history of philosophy itself.
When one studies the philosophy of law, he is forced to study
the history of philosophy itself. Philosophy means "love of
wisdom." The ideal law or legal system is one that is rooted in
wisdom, reason and truth -- as against force, sanctions, and
power. Law and justice are all about wisdom, reason and truth.
There is a need to discuss the salient thoughts of the other
schools of legal philosophy which have emerged from the Greek
period, the Roman period, the Medieval period, the Reformation
period and the Modern period. They, too, have their individual
shares in and contributions to the growth and development of
the legal and philosophical systems of mankind.
Analita Inocencio v. Hospicio de San Jose
Facts: Hospicio de San Jose (HDSJ) leased a parcel of land to
German Inocencio (German). German then constructed two
buildings over the land which he subleased. Ramon, his son,
was designated to administer the properties). German died but
Ramon did not inform HDSJ. Nonetheless, Ramon collected
rentals from the sublessees and paid rent to HDSJ.
HDSJ acknowledged the existence of an implied lease between
Ramon and HDSJ, as the latter has been receiving rental
payments from the former. HDSJ informed Ramon that the
contract shall expire on 31 March 2001 and it has no intention
of renewing the same since Ramon did not inform HDSJ of the
sublease
HDSJ then demanded Ramon to vacate the property within 30
days. HDSJ also entered into lease agreements with other
parties.
HDSJ now filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. While
pending, Ramon passed away and substituted now by Analita
Inocencio, his wife.
MTC Ordered defendants to pay. RTC Ramon had no right to
sublease the property. CA Affirmed RTC. Merely modified the
award for damages. Hence, this Petition.
Issues: Whether the sublease is valid.
Ruling: Despite the non-transferability of the contract without
the consent of the lessor, HDSJ nonetheless acknowledged
that Ramon is its month-to-month lessee. Thus, German’s
death did not terminate the lease. (Validity of the lease to
Ramon).
Ramon likewise had the right to sublease the property
since the lease contract did not contain any
prohibitions on sublease, pursuant to Article 1650. Thus, the
sublease contracts entered into by Ramon were valid. (Validity
of sublease).
Inocencios claim ownership over the property since they claim
that these are separate and distinct from the land on which
they were built. Thus, they argue that they have a right to
lease the buildings to 3rd-parties, even after the termination of
the lease. Further, the Inocencios argue that when they
entered into lease contracts with tenants for the lease of
portions of the said buildings, these contracts were
independent contracts of lease over their own building and not
sub-leases of the parcel of land which they leased from
Respondent
The Court DISAGREES with the Inocencios by stating the
ruling in the case of Duellome v. Gotico:
The lease of a building includes the lease of the lot and
consequently, the rentals of the building include the rentals
of the lot. Accordingly, they pointed out that the ARGUMENT of
HDSJ is CORRECT when they stated the following:
When the Inocencios leased the buildings to third
parties, they also "leased" to the third parties the plot of
land on which the buildings stood — either by implied
transfer of the lease covering the plot of the land, or by
sublease. Either way, x x x the Inocencios themselves must
have a valid lease contract with [HDSJ] over the land.
However, when the lease contract x x x with HDSJ ended on
31March 2001, Ramon lost his status as lessee of the land, and
therefore, had no authority to transfer the lease or sublease
the land.