11. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING CO. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

TOPIC: CONCURRENCE OF EFFICIENT CAUSES

FACTS: In June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned
and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 oclock in the morning. Appellant Senen
Gavino was assigned by the appellant Manila Pilots Association (MPA) to conduct docking
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4. Gavino boarded the vessel with the
master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of
the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage
and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for
docking maneuvers. However, due to the miscommunication among the crew members, the
master, and the captain, the anchor of the vessel did not take hold property. Subsequently, the
bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The
vessel sustained
damage too.

ISSUE: Whether or not the master and the captain of the M/V PAVLODAR have solidary
liability

HELD: Yes, the negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabankov is no
less responsible for the collision. His unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship in the face of
troublous exigence constitutes negligence.

Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from
liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of
the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is
no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause
of the injury*.

*ITALICIZED PARTS WERE THE ONES MENTIONED IN THE LARGO BOOK 