G.R. No.

204926 December 3, 2014

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner,

vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the June 13, 2012 Decision and the December 5, 2012
1

Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122153, entitled "Dionisio Ugay v. Anacleto C. Mangaser, represented by his
2

Attorney-in-fact Eustaquio Dugenia, "a case of forcible entry and damages.

The Facts

On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Eustaquio Dugenia (petitioner), filed a complaint for
Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay (respondent) before the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union (MTC). In
his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La
Union, with an area of 10,632 square meters and covered by OCT No. RP-174 (FP-13 787) and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707; that on
October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a residential
house thereon without his knowledge and consent; that he referred the matter to the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa for conciliation, but no
settlement was reached, hence, a certification to file action was issued by the Lupon; and that demand letters were sent to respondent but he
still refused to vacate the premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial remedy. 3

Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up the following defenses, to wit: that he had been a resident of
Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached the age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of land in that place then
known as Sta. Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of land was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union due to a
survey made by the government; that he introduced more improvements on the property by cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put
up a "bahay kubo"; that in October 2006, he installed a fence made of "bolo" to secure the property; that in installing the fence, he was
guided by the concrete monuments which he knew to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner's property; that while he could not locate
some of the monuments, he based the boundaries on his recollection since he was around when these were installed; that he knew the
boundaries of petitioner's property because he knew the extent of the "iron mining" activities done by a company on the said property; that
petitioner was never in actual possession of the property occupied by him, and it was only on October 31, 2006 when he discovered the al
legccl intrusion; that it was not correct to say that he refused to vacate and surrender the premises despite receipt of the demand letters
because in his letter-reply, he assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the premises if he would only be shown to have intruded
into petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to him; and that instead of shmving the boundaries to him, petitioner filed an
action for forcible entry before the MTC.4

MTC Ruling

On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent. It stated that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied
by respondent was within his lot titled under OCT No. RP-174 (13 789). The MTC opined that petitioner could have presented a relocation
survey, which would have pinpointed the exact location of the house and fence put up by respondent, and resolved the issue once and for
all. It also explained that petitioner failed to prove his prior physical possession of the subject property. The OCT No. RP-174(13789)
6

registered under petitioner's name and the Tax Declaration were not proof of actual possession of the property. The dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff (petitioner) having failed to establish his case by preponderance of evidence, the complaint is hereby
DISMISSED. 7

RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union (RTC) and the case was raffled to Branch 33.

In its August 23, 2011 Decision, the RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. It relied on the cases of Barba v. Court
8

of Appeals and Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., which held that in ejectment cases, possession of the land did not only mean
9 10

actual or physical possession but also included the subject of the thing to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. The RTC stated that petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the property as evidenced by his
OCT No. RP-174(13 789) issued in March 1987 and tax declaration, dating back as early as 1995. It added that the boundaries of the
11

property were clearly indicated in the title, thus, there was no need to conduct a survey. As the owner, petitioner knew the exact metes and
bounds of his property so that when respondent intruded stealthily, he filed the subject suit. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
12

reads:
WHEREFORE, after a thorough perusal of the facts and evidence in this case, this Court reverses the decision of the MTC, Caba, La Union,
dated April 26, 2011 and rules in favor of plaintiffappellant (petitioner) and against defendant-appellee (respondent), ordering the latter and
all other persons claiming rights under him to:

1. VACATE the portion of the subject property encroached by him;

2. SURRENDER actual physical possession of the subject portion peacefully to plaintiff-appellant;

3. REMOVE all the improvements he introduced therein;

4. PAY attorney's fees in the amount Php20,000.00 to plaintiff-appellant, and pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 13

Undaunted, respondent appealed to the CA.

CA Ruling

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Citing Quizon v. Juan, it emphasized that petitioner must allege and prove that he
14

was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute. The word "possession," as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
meant nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. The CA wrote that petitioner was
not in physical possession despite the presentation of the OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax declarations. It reiterated that when the law
15

would speak of possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de
Jure. What petitioner proved was legal possession, not his prior physical possession. Furthermore, the CA stated that the RTC misquoted
Nunez v. SLTEAS Pheonix Solutions by giving the wrong notion of what kind of possession was contemplated in forcible entry cases. In
16

other words, physical possession was the crux in forcible entry, not possession that stemmed upon ownership. The dispositive portion of the
17

assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED, accordingly, the Decision dated August 23, 2011 and Order
dated October 25, 2011, of the RTC Branch 33, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 2029-BG are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the MTC dated April 26, 2011 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. 18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, dated July 6, 2012, but it was subsequently denied by the CA in a Resolution, dated December
19 20

5, 2012. It reads:

This Court, after a meticulous study of the arguments set forth in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent, finds no cogent reason
to revise, amend, much less reverse, the assailed Decision dated June 13, 2012. The Motion for Reconsideration is, thus, DENIED

SO ORDERED. 21

Hence, this petition, anchored on the following

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER WHICH
MAY ESTABLISH PRIOR POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY BY HEREIN PETITIONER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH
DIVISION, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS VALID. 22

Petitioner argues that in ejectment cases, possession of the land does not only mean actual or physical possession or occupation but also by
the fact that a land is subject to the action of one's will or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right; that the CA
should have considered OCT No. RP-174(13789) his tax declaration as proofs of prior physical possession over the property; and that the
issuance of the same are considered to by law as proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Petitioner cited
Tolentino, as one of the authors and experts in Civil law, stating that the "proper acts and formalities" refer to juridical acts, or the acquisition
of possession by sufficient title, inter vivas or mortis causa, onerous or lucrative. These are the acts which the law gives the force of acts of
possession.

Petitioner also avers that the December 5, 2012 CA Resolution was not valid as it did not state the legal basis required by the Constitution.

On May 28, 2013, respondent filed his Comment before this Court. He stated that the issues raised and the arguments presented by
23

petitioner have been thoroughly resolved and ruled upon by the CA. The appellate court did not err in reversing the RTC decision because
petitioner was never in prior physical possession of the property in dispute. Respondent asserts that he has been in prior, actual, continuous,
public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner of the property in dispute. 24

On March 28, 2014, petitioner filed his Reply, reiterating the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., where a party was able to
25 26

demonstrate that it had exercised acts of ownership over the property by having it titled in its name and by paying real property taxes on it.
Petitioner also laments the wrongful insistence of respondent that his possession over the property was one in the concept of an owner. To
petitioner's mind, respondent failed to adequately adduce evidence to show proof of his right to possess the property when his possession
came under attack with the filing of the subject case. 27

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that
they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year
from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. 28

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises, that is, to possession de
facto, not possession de Jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not
admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. 29

As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto,
not possession de Jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground
for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case." 30

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement in
31

forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent's position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established
for acquiring such right. The case of Quizon v. Juan, which surprisingly was relied on by the CA, also stressed this doctrine.
32

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are
donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason
33

for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his
34

will. Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was
35

leased to him except that he promised that he would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, inc., the subject parcel was acquired by the respondent by virtue of the June 4, 1999
36

Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The petitioner in the said case argued that,
aside from the admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, the respondent's claim of prior possession was
clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof since 1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and said: Although it
did not immediately put the same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in its name as
of February 27, 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon alongside the sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the
light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October
2003, petitioner hml already been occupying the land since 1999.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Hence, in that case, the Court ruled that such juridical acts were sufficient to establish the respondent's prior possession of the subject
property.

The case of Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., also involves an action for forcible entry. On June 11, 1981, David M.
37

Consunji, Inc. acquired a residential lot situated in Matin a, Davao City, which was covered by TCT No. T-82338. On June 13, 1981, it
transferred the said lot to respondent DMC. Alleging that the petitioner forcibly entered the property in December 1993, the respondent filed
on March 28, 1994 a complaint for forcible entry. One of the issues raised therein was whether respondent DMC had prior possession of the
subject property, to which the Court answered in the affirmative. It ruled that:
Prior possession of the lot by respondent's predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution and registration of public
instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the
premises and deprived the former of possession thereof.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the case at bench, the Court finds that pet1t1oner acquired possession of the subject property by juridical act, specifically, through the
issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987. 38

Before the Court continues any further, it must be determined first whether the issue of ownership is material and relevant in resolving the
issue of possession. The Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of
ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But
this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance - to determine the issue of possession and only if the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. 39

This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership should be provisionally determined in this case. First, the juridical act from which
the right of ownership of petitioner arise would be the registration of the free patent and the issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789).
Apparently, the Torrens title suggests ownership over the land. Second, respondent also asserts ownership over the land based on his prior,
actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner of the property in dispute. Because
40

there are conflicting claims of ownership, then it is proper to provisionally determine the issue of ownership to settle the issue of possession
de facto.

Returning to the case, this Court cannot agree with the CA that petitioner's OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax declarations should
absolutely be disregarded. The issuance of an original certificate of title to the petitioner evidences ownership and from it, a right to the
possession of the property flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to the
possession thereof. 41

Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel
of land, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in his actual or constructive possession. Together with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated 1995 onwards presented by
42

petitioner strengthens his claim of possession over the land before his dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent.

The CA was in error in citing the case of De Grano v. Lacaba to support its ruling. In that case, the respondent tried to prove prior
43

possession, by presenting only his tax declarations, tax receipt and a certification from the municipal assessor attesting that he had paid real
property tax from previous years. The Court did not give credence to his claim because tax declarations and realty tax payments are not
conclusive proof of possession. The situation in the present case differs because aside from presenting his tax declarations, the petitioner
submitted OCT No. RP-174(13 789) which is the best evidence of ownership from where his right to possession arises.

Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that he had prior, actual, continuous, public,
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of
ownership, the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of the subject property. When petitioner discovered the stealthy intrusion
of respondent over his registered prope1iy, he immediately filed a complaint with the Lupong Tagapamayapa and subsequently filed an
action for forcible entry with the MTC. Instead of taking the law into his own hands and forcefully expelling respondent from his property,
petitioner composed himself and followed the established legal procedure to regain possession of his land.

If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession, then it would create an absurd situation.
It would be putting premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens title holders, who spent months, or even years, in order to register their
land, and who religiously paid real property taxes thereon. They cannot immediately repossess their properties simply because they have to
prove their literal and physical possession of their property prior to the controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to resort to ordinary
civil procedure by filing either an accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria and undergo arduous and protracted litigation while the intruders
continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of another man's land. It will defeat the very purpose of the summary procedure of an action for
forcible entry.

The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of
possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the
authorities can speedily settle actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances. 44

As to the other requirements of an action for forcible entry, the Court agrees with the RTC that petitioner had sufficiently complied with them.
Petitioner proved that he was deprived of possession of the property by stealth. The complaint was also filed on October 30, 2007, within
1âwphi1

the one year reglementary period counted from the discovery of the stealthy entry by respondent to the property on October 31, 2006.

The second issue raised is the validity of the CA Resolution dated December 5, 2012. Petitioner alleges that the CA denied his
reconsideration without indicating its legal basis in violation of the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that
no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor. This requirement, however, was complied with when the CA, in its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
stated that it "finds no cogent reason to reverse, amend, much less reverse the assailed Decision, dated June 13, 2012." 45
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2012 Decision and the December 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
Bauang, La Union, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 141613 December 16, 2005

SENEN B. AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR and ANGEL B. AGUILAR, Respondents,

x-----------------------------------------------x

ALEJANDRO C. SANGALANG,

Intervenor-Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated June 11, 1999 and January
1 2

11, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 55750.

The parties in this case are brothers, except Alejandro Sangalang, herein intervenor-respondent. As will be subsequently discussed, this is
the second time that the brothers Aguilar seek the intervention of this Court regarding the same facts and the same subject matter. The first
was in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76351decided on October 29, 1993 against Senen B. Aguilar. It is time to writ finis to this family
3

wrangling.

On October 28, 1993, Senen and Virgilio purchased a house and lot located in Parañaque City, Metro Manila for the benefit of their father,
Maximiano Aguilar (now deceased). The brothers wanted their father to enjoy his retirement in a quiet neighborhood. On February 23, 1970,
they executed a written agreement stipulating that their shares in the house and lot would be equal; and that Senen would live with their
father on condition that he would pay the Social Security System (SSS) the remaining loan obligation of the former owners.

In 1974, their father died. Virgilio then demanded that Senen vacate the house and that the property be sold, the proceeds to be divided
between them. Senen refused to comply with Virgilio’s demand.

On January 12, 1979, Virgilio filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal at Pasay City for specific
performance. Virgilio prayed that Senen be compelled to sell the property so that the proceeds could be divided between them.

However, during the pre-trial, neither Senen nor his counsel appeared. Thus, Senen was declared as in default by the trial court and Virgilio
was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.

On July 26, 1979, the trial court rendered its Decision, declaring the brothers co-owners of the house and lot and are entitled to equal shares;
and ordering that the property be sold, the proceeds to be divided equally between them. The trial court also ordered Senen to vacate the
property and to pay Virgilio rentals with interests corresponding to the period from January 1975 until he leaves the premises.

On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 03933, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision.

Virgilio then filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 76351.

On October 29, 1993, this Court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6912-P dated 26 July 1971 is REINSTATED, with the modification that respondent
Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the premises in question within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, and to pay petitioner
Virgilio B. Aguilar, a monthly rental of ₱1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from the time he received the decision of the trial court
directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves the premises.

The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this decision, conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil Code and the
Rules of Court. This decision is final and executory.
SO ORDERED."

On March 27, 1995, Senen filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City, an action for legal redemption against Virgilio
and another brother, Angel, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-039. In his complaint, Senen alleged that while he knows that Virgilio sold his ½
share of the property to Angel in January 1989, however, he (Senen) was not furnished any written notice of the sale. Consequently, as a co-
owner, he has the right to redeem the property.

Meanwhile, on November 27, 1995, pursuant to this Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 76351, the property was sold at public auction to Alejandro
C. Sangalang, intervenor-respondent herein. Virgilio then received his share of the proceeds as well as the rental payments due from Senen.

By then, Virgilio had moved to California, USA. It was only on January 25, 1997 that he was served, through the Philippine Consulate in San
Francisco, a copy of Senen’s complaint in Civil Case No. 95-039.

On February 24, 1997, Virgilio filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action and forum shopping.

In an Order dated June 27, 1997, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 05-039 on the ground of laches, holding that Senen incurred a
delay of seven (7) years before asserting his right to redeem the property in question.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed Order of the trial court.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Senen’s complaint for legal redemption in Civil Case
No. 05-039 is barred by laches.

Legal redemption (retracto legal de comuneros) is a privilege created by law, partly by reason of public policy and partly for the benefit of the
redemptioner to afford him a way out of a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. 4

With respect to redemption by co-owners, in case the share of a co-owner is sold to a third person, the governing law is Article 1620 of the
Civil Code which provides:

"ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them are
sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable rate.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may
respectively have in the thing owned in common."

The purpose behind Article 1620 is to provide a method for terminating the co-ownership and consolidating the dominion in one sole owner. 5

Article 1623 of the same Code also provides:

"ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendee, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendee that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."

From the above provisions, the following are the requisites for the exercise of legal redemption: (1) There must be a co-ownership; (2) one of
the co-owners sold his right to a stranger; (3) the sale was made before the partition of the co-owned property; (4) the right of redemption
must be exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of thirty days to be counted from the time that he or they were notified in writing
by the vendee or by the co-owner vendor; and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed for the price of the sale.

In this case, the sale took place in January 1989. Petitioner admits that he has actual knowledge of the sale. However, he only asserted his
right to redeem the property in March 1995 by filing the instant complaint. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court ruled that this was
seven (7) years late.

Petitioner, however, now contends that there being no written notice to him of the sale by the vendee or vendor, the thirty-day redemption
period has not prescribed.

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. The old rule is that a written notice of the sale by the vendor to his co-owners is indispensable for the
latter to exercise their retracto legal de comuneros. More recently, however, we have relaxed the written notice requirement. Thus, in Si v.
6
Court of Appeals, we ruled that a co-owner with actual notice of the sale is not entitled to a written notice for such would be superfluous. The
7

law does not demand what is unnecessary.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which could or should have been done earlier
through the exercise of due diligence. Otherwise stated, laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
8

warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the
9

part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which
he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event, relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held
barred. 10

Petitioner has actual knowledge of the sale of Virgilio’s share to Angel in 1989. As provided by Article 1623, he has thirty days from such
actual knowledge within which to exercise his right to redeem the property. Inexplicably, petitioner did not take any action. He waited for
seven (7) years before filing his complaint. Definitely, such an unexplained delay is tantamount to laches. To be sure, to uphold his right
would unduly cause injury to respondent-intervenor, a purchaser in good faith and for value.

Moreover, by the time Senen filed Civil Case No. 95-039 for legal redemption, his right was no longer available to him. We have held that
after a property has been subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain
any right of pre-emption or redemption. 11

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55750 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187987 November 26, 2014

VICENTE TORRES, JR., CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS OF MARIANO VELEZ, NAMELY: ANITA CHIONG VELEZ, ROBERT
OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN CHIONG VELEZ AND TED CHIONG VELEZ,Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the petitioners assailing the 30 January 2009
1

Decision and 14 May 2009 Resolution of the Twentieth Division of the Corni of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02390, affirming the 15 October
2 3

2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC Cebu City) which dismissed the complaint for the declaration of nullity of deed
4

of sale against respondent Lorenzo Lapinid (Lapinid).

The facts as reviewed are the following:

On 4 February 2006, Vicente V. Torres, Jr. (Vicente), Mariano Velez (Mariano) and Carlos Velez (petitioners) filed a Complaint before RTC
5 6

Cebu City praying for the nullification of the sale of real property by respondent Jesus Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of
possession and ownership of the property; and the payment of damages.

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they, including Jesus, are co-owners of several parcels of land including the disputed Lot. No.
4389 located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu. Sometime in 1993, Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against the petitioners and
7

other co-owners before Branch 21 of RTC Cebu City. On 13 August 2001, a judgment was rendered based on a compromise agreement
signed by the parties wherein they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the said properties and receive the
proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-owners. However, the agreement was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized
seller. Pursuant totheir mandate, the petitioners inspected the property and discovered that Lapinid was occupying a specific portion of the
3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was pointed out by petitioner that as
a consequence of what they discovered, a forcible entry case was filed against Lapinid.

The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the sale of a definite portion of a co-owned property
without notice to the other co-owners is without force and effect. Further, the complainants prayed for payment of rental fees amounting to
₱1,000.00 per month from January 2004 or from the time of deprivation of property in addition to attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Answering the allegations, Jesus admitted that there was a partition case between him and the petitioners filed in 1993 involvingseveral
parcels of land including the contested Lot No. 4389. However, he insisted that as early as 6 November 1997, a motion 8 was signed by the
co-owners (including the petitioners) wherein Lot No. 4389 was agreed to be adjudicated to the co-owners belonging to the group of Jesus
and the other lots be divided to the other co-owners belonging to the group of Torres. Jesus further alleged that even prior to the partition and
motion, several coowners in his group had already sold their shares to him in various dates of 1985, 1990 and 2004. Thus, when the motion
9

was filed and signed by the parties on 6 November 1997, his rights asa majority co-owner (73%) of Lot No. 4389 became consolidated.
Jesus averred that it was unnecessary to give notice of the sale as the lot was already adjudicated in his favor. He clarified that he only
agreed with the 2001 Compromise Agreement believing that it only pertained to the remaining parcels of land excluding Lot No. 4389. 10

On his part, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was entered into between him and Jesus pertaining to a parcel of land with an area of 3000
square meters. However, he insistedon the validity of sale since Jesus showed him several deeds of sale making him a majority owner of Lot
No. 4389. He further denied that he acquired a specific and definite portion of the questioned property, citing as evidence the deed of sale
which does not mention any boundaries or specific portion. He explained that Jesus permitted him to occupy a portion notexceeding 3000
square meters conditioned on the result of the partition of the co-owners. 11

Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid admitted that such case was filed but the same was already dismissed by the Municipal
Trial Court of Carcar, Cebu. In that decision, it was ruled that the buyers, including Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof of
ownership was shown to them by Jesus before buying the property. 12

On 15 October 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint of petitioners in this wise: Therefore, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint. At
the same time, the Court NULLIFIES the site assignment made by Jesus Velez in the Deed of Sale, dated November 9, 1997, of Lorenzo
Lapinid’s portion, the exact location of which still has to be determined either by agreement of the co-owners or by the Court in proper
proceedings. 13

Aggrieved, petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which was denied through a 26 November 2007 Order of the
court. Thereafter, they filed a notice of appeal on 10 December 2007.
14 15

On 30 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It validated the sale and ruled that the compromise
16

agreement did not affect the validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid. It likewise dismissed the claim for rental
payments, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of the petitioners.

Upon appeal before this Court, the petitioners echo the same arguments posited before the lower courts. They argue that Lapinid, as the
successor-in-interest of Jesus, is also bound by the 2001 judgment based on compromise stating that the parcels of land must be sold jointly
by Jesus, Mariano and Vicente and the proceeds of the sale be divided among the coowners. To further strengthen their contention, they
advance the argument that since the portion sold was a definite and specific portion of a co-owned property, the entire deed of sale must be
declared null and void.

We deny the petition.

Admittedly, Jesus sold an area ofland to Lapinid on 9 November 1997. To simplify, the question now iswhether Jesus, as a co-owner, can
validly sell a portion of the property heco-owns in favor of another person. We answer in the affirmative.

A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and proindiviso share in the co-owned property. He has the right to alienate, assign
17

and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rightswill be affected. This is
evident from the provision of the Civil Code:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.

A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion
which is truly abstract. Hence, his co-owners have no right to enjoin a coowner who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or
18

substitute a third person in its enjoyment.

19

In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a
transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not
perfected, the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in
the property held in common. Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the
20

property.

Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the disposition in favor of Lapinid before partition was a concrete or
definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails.

In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before
21

partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he
disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected on the sale is
only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be
unaffected by the alienation. 22
As explained in Spouses Del Campo v. Court of Appeals: 23

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything atall in case a physically segregated
area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the coowner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of
sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had asco-owner, in an ideal
share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-
owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common. 24

Also worth noting is the pronouncement in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong: 25

x x x The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portionof the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a
wellestablished principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non
valet ut ago, valeat quantumvalere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have). (Italics theirs).
26

Consequently, whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete portion of the co-owned property, the sale remains validly executed.

The validity of sale being settled,it follows that the subsequent compromise agreement between the other co-owners did not affect the rights
of Lapinid as a co-owner.

Records show that on 13 August 2001, a judgment based on compromise agreement was rendered with regard to the previous partition case
involving the same parties pertaining to several parcels of land, including the disputed lot. The words of the compromise state that: COME
NOW[,] the parties and to this Honorable Court, most respectfully state that instead of partitioning the properties, subject matter of litigation,
that they will just sell the properties covered by TCT Nos. 25796, 25797 and 25798 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu and
divide the proceeds among themselves.

That Jesus Velez, Mariano Velez and Vicente Torres, Jr. are currently authorized to sell said properties, receive the proceeds thereof and
distribute them to the parties.
27

Be that as it may, the compromise agreement failed to defeat the already accrued right of ownership of Lapinid over the share sold by Jesus.
As early as 9 November 1997, Lapinid already became a co-owner of the property and thus, vested with all the rights enjoyed by the other
co-owners. The judgment based on the compromise agreement, which is to have the covered properties sold, is valid and effectual provided
as it does not affect the proportionate share of the non-consenting party. Accordingly, when the compromise agreement was executed
without Lapinid’s consent, said agreement could not have affected his ideal and undivided share. Petitioners cannot sell Lapinid’s share
absent his consent. Nemo dat quod non habet – "no one can give what he does not have." 28

This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent tothe sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. 29

We find unacceptable the argument that Lapinid must pay rental payments to the other co-owners. 1âwphi 1

As previously discussed, Lapinid,from the execution of sale, became a co-owner vested with rights to enjoy the property held in common.

Clearly specified in the Civil Code are the following rights:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The
purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall havethe full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rightsare involved. But the effect
of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.

Affirming these rights, the Court held in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals that: 30

x x x Each co-owner of property heldpro indivisoexercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-ownerexercises, together with his coparticipants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. From the foregoing, it is absurd to rule that Lapinid, who is already a co-owner, be ordered
31

to pay rental payments to his other co-owners. Lapinid’s right of enjoyment over the property owned in common must be respected despite
opposition and may notbe limited as long he uses the property to the purpose for which it isintended and he does not injure the interest of the
co-ownership.
Finally, we find no error on denial of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, in the absence of stipulation, are awarded only in
the following instances:

xxxx

1. When exemplary damages are awarded;

2. When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interests;

3. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

4. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid and demandable claim;

6. In actions for legal support;

7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

8. In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a cnme;

10. When at least double judicial costs arc awarded;

11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation should be
recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

Petitioners cite Jesus' act of selling a definite portion to Lapinid as the reason which forced them to litigate and file their complaint. However,
though the Court may not fault the complainants when they filed a complaint based on their perceived cause of action, they should have also
considered thoroughly that it is well within the rights of a co-owner to validly sell his ideal share pursuant to law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2009 and 14 May
2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183822 January 18, 2012

RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana, Petitioner,

vs.
Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and JUSTA AGUSTIN, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of
1

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its
Resolution dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the
2

Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.

The Factual Antecedents

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:

Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the
registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the
Laoag City Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa
Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square
meters more or less x x x.

2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of
Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five
(20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued.
Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses
Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject
property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion
of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to
occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and considering further the length of time that the defendants have been in possession, as
owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership
thereon, this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of
Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision states:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED. 3

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On
08 January 2008, the appellate court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal. It noted that his father engaged in a double sale
4

when he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner
was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after
their execution. The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October
5

1976, resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with
6

respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered. 7

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real property executed between
Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession
thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against respondents, the
appellate court concluded that respondents’ possession of the property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner – petitioner's father –
but was in the exercise of ownership. 8

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father’s sale of the properties to respondents as early as 1973. However, despite
knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties. The appellate court
9

rejected his contention that, as registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession thereof, compared to the
unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of the same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part
despite knowledge of the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents’ unregistered deed. In dismissing his appeal, the
10

CAconcluded that respondents’ possession was "not ... anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer"; hence "the complaint for ejectment must fail." The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
11

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 12

The Issues

Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT of appeals seriously erred in failing to consider the legal ownership of petitioner on the disputed
property to claim better right to possession.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO CO
VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED
BEFORE IT. 13

Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who between the parties has the right to possession of the
disputed properties -- petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered
Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties?

The Court's Ruling

We DENY the Petition.

Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to discuss the nature of an ejectment case for the recovery of
physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. A resolution of the issue would be relevant to the determination of who has the better
right to possession in this unlawful detainer case.

One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may
be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical
possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court." In ejectment
14

proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure. 15

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the
parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession,
adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of
the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. 16

In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed properties as owners, having acquired these from
petitioner's father through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed
properties, since they are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim of
ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system.
He asserts that, having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and consequently has the better right to
possession.

Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes
possession. Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to
17

possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by
respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and
notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.

Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al., which has facts and legal issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein
18

filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as
actual occupants of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal issue was who between
the two parties had the better right to possess the subject property.

This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the better right to possession of the disputed property based
on the following justification:

We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and
is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents
merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established
and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court
of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first
instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents'
argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is
a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be
altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 19

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of
20

Bartolome Boneo, et al., wherein we consistently held the age-old rule "that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to
21

possession thereof." 22

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an
established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in
the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner’s father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust
respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding.

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera, which reads thus:

23

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession
thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once
he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.

In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—
are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises,
that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable.
For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject
property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.

The statements in the complaint that respondents’ possession of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter
is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.

A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must
have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the
basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff,
the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents’ continued possession of the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father,
except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established when respondents’ possession of the properties became unlawful
– a requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.

In Canlas v. Tubil, we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:
24

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the
allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on
its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.
The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.

... ... ...

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful
detainer Complaint against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued
possession of the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the courts
correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.

We concur in the appellate court’s findings that petitioner’s father engaged in a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the
case show that it took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner
registered the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the
other hand, continued their possession of the properties, but without bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their
ownership.

We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court’s conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents
and oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of registration of respondents’ unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in
Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals : 25

(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to
registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],

Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the deed is the operative act to bind or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The Torrens
system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.]

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus,
the sale of the subject properties by petitioner’s father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner
came to know of the transaction.

We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the name of petitioner.
They allege, though, that the land title issued to him was an "act of fraud" on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral
26

attack against the Torrens title of petitioner – an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case. 1âwphi 1
It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Such attack must be direct and not by
27

a collateral proceeding. It is a well-established doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified,
28

enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is
29

possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.

Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to possession in relation to the issue of disputed
ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to
directly attack its validity, an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
1âwphi1

No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal
Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner – are AFFIRMED.

We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.