EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs.

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183053 - June 16, 2010
Petitioner: Emilio A.M. Suntay III
Respondent: Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

Ponente: J. NACHURA

FACTS:
On 1990, the decedent, Cristina, who is married to Dr. Federico, died intestate. In 1979,
their only son, Emilio I, predeceased both spouses. At the time of her death, Cristina was
survived by her husband and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner and respondent.
During his lifetime, Emilio I has three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel;
Margarita; and Emilio II. However, his marriage was subsequently annulled which led him to had
two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two different woman.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III and Nenita, they were brought up and were
adopted by the spouses Federico and Cristina and were acknowledged as natural children of
Emilio I. Meanwhile, respondent and her siblings lived with their mother separately from their
father and paternal grandparents.
Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor but
was opposed by Federico claiming that he should be given legal preference in the administration
of the estate of his wife. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably,
Federico filed a Manifestation nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedent’s estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better
right to the letters of administration. However, in the course of proceedings, Federico died.
Trial court appointed Emilio III as administrator however it was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Who is better qualified between petitioner and respondent to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate?

RULING:
Both petitioner and respondent are qualified to act as administrator over the estate of
the decedent. The court ruled that there shall be a joint administration by both of them of their
grandmother’s estate.

The rule under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, listing the order of preference in
the appointment of an administrator of an estate, is not absolute for it depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection
of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Hence, the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both petitioner and
respondent of their grandmother’s estate.
 SECOND DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE G.R. No. 183053

OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO- SUNTAY; EMILIO
A.M. SUNTAY III, Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Promulgated:

Respondent.
June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse between Spain and Portugal, deftly and
literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New World by issuing
the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another
family imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,[4] reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
95.[5]

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.

Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was
survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.

During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three
children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-
Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I
had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different
women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.

Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby,
nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child
of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by
the spouses Federico and Cristina.

As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was
annulled.[6] Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their
mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal grandparents.

Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights
over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of
visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a
manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of
her grandparents.

Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993,
adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.[7]

On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:

[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an estate of real and
personal properties, with a probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the
names, ages and residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1)
Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x;
(3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson
and a resident of x x x; and that as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no
debts or obligation at the time of her death.[8]

Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his
opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:

[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate

and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the
mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference
 in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from
their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in
the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,]
namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect the
integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was
already the one who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of
the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels
allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably,
Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as
administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the
one with a better right to the letters of administration.

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering
his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which
essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his
stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of
the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: [he] is
presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his
early age by involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was
established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father; the significant work experiences
outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor
[Federico] after his graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and
Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.[10]

In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.

After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence on their
respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001,
appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the

Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed

administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall
enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount
of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,
legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
 (3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court, and

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued
in his favor.

SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9,
2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said
court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel
Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals by certiorari to this
Court, raising the following issues:

A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION

6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE
APPLIES; and

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY

THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]

In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated, thus:

Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial and

documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the estate of the
decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be
appointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special proceedings.

Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondents

immediate] family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The root
cause of which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the
 proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of the
estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement.

The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the
wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home
in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the
surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.

As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is accorded

preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the
basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner
and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child. Such
nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set
aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed
away, in order to give effect to the order of preference mandated by law.
Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s]
intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors,
as well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared, academically and
by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of the position. While
[respondent], a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that
when it comes to management of real estate and the processing and payment of
debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established track record as a manager has
a decided edge and therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of
the estate.[14]

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate child of Emilio
I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate
mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely
nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as
administrator of the decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the administrator of the
decedents estate for the following reasons:[15]

1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos
appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the
decedent. The death of Federico before his appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate
rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;

2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III)
of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the next of kin referred to by Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an
heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992[16] of the Civil Code bars the
illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot
be preferred over respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the
decedent; and
 4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as Emilio III to
administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications
specified in Section 1,[17] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better
qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.

We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in the
administration of the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several
undisputed facts and circumstances:

1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to

the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;

2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule,[18] is
quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between
Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives;

3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina,
as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;

5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her
death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of
the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent,
considering that the CA even declared that under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse,
would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA
resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive
condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case
at bar.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment
of an administrator of an estate:
 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow,
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply
for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.[20] In the main, the attendant facts
and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-
administration between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who was likewise a
creditor of the decedents estate. In the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa
v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian[22] that:

[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the

interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not
rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs,
including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was
likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio
II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal
partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are
impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil
Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does
not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an
illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband
as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually
legally adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters
of administration.

We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law
concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the
eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed
that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998)
our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of
the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998.
The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis--
vis illegitimate children.[23]

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is
said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first
calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always
preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption
that the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in
default of anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or
affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to
charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of
humanity.[24]

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate
succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her
legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally
raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The
peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner,
overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from
making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in
the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the same issue remains good law:

[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the
evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate
had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the
stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is
liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If there is a controversy

before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above

mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the
heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by
the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed
to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.