SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO.

82585; 14 NOV 1988]

Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process
when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of
Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot
and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On
appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners'
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding
of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is
negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in
effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the
respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All
that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not
been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The
petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to
lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the
status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26,
1988 is LIFTED.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988]
Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by the President
FACTS: Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory
herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because
this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.
However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be
able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defence to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 136292, 373 SCRA 221 , January 15, 2002

PONENTE: PUNO

FACTS: Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in a Barangay in Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two
police officers flagged down the vehicle.

With appellant's alleged consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of galvanized conductor
wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage
wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the
wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days
in the Municipal jail.

In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. Thus, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by virtue thereof was valid.

RULING: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against
unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III.

The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
such right.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain
exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10
(4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); 12 and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances.

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be
complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter
cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured.

WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES; ALLOWED PROVIDED THE SAME WAS MADE AT CONSTRUCTIVE
BORDERS. — Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders'
like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.

"STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT POLICE CHECKPOINTS; NOT ILLEGAL PER SE; ROUTINE INSPECTIONS; NOT VIOLATIVE
OF RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES; LIMITATIONS; CASE AT BAR. — One such form of search of moving
vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per
se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A
checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not
regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this
instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4)
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. None of the foregoing
circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of
herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy
Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED.