Congress of the Philippines
Twelfth Congress
First Regular Session
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 June 7, 2002
AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known and cited as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to safeguard the integrity of
its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful
effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to defend the
same against acts or omissions detrimental to their development and preservation. In
view of the foregoing, the State needs to enhance further the efficacy of the law against
dangerous drugs, it being one of today's more serious social ills.
Toward this end, the government shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign
against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through
an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse
policies, programs, and projects. The government shall however aim to achieve a balance
in the national drug control program so that people with legitimate medical needs are not
prevented from being treated with adequate amounts of appropriate medications, which
include the use of dangerous drugs.
It is further declared the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or measures
to re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or
dangerous drug dependence through sustainable programs of treatment and
rehabilitation.
ARTICLE I
Definition of terms
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) Administer. – Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of any person,
with or without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation, ingestion or other means, or
of committing any act of indispensable assistance to a person in administering a
dangerous drug to himself/herself unless administered by a duly licensed practitioner for
purposes of medication.
(b) Board. - Refers to the Dangerous Drugs Board under Section 77, Article IX of this
Act.
(c) Centers. - Any of the treatment and rehabilitation centers for drug dependents referred
to in Section 34, Article VIII of this Act.
(d) Chemical Diversion. – The sale, distribution, supply or transport of legitimately
imported, in-transit, manufactured or procured controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, in diluted, mixtures or in concentrated form, to any person or entity engaged
in the manufacture of any dangerous drug, and shall include packaging, repackaging,
labeling, relabeling or concealment of such transaction through fraud, destruction of
documents, fraudulent use of permits, misdeclaration, use of front companies or mail
fraud.
(e) Clandestine Laboratory. – Any facility used for the illegal manufacture of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.
(f) Confirmatory Test. – An analytical test using a device, tool or equipment with a
different chemical or physical principle that is more specific which will validate and
confirm the result of the screening test.
(g) Controlled Delivery. – The investigative technique of allowing an unlawful or suspect
consignment of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
equipment or paraphernalia, or property believed to be derived directly or indirectly from
any offense, to pass into, through or out of the country under the supervision of an
authorized officer, with a view to gathering evidence to identify any person involved in
any dangerous drugs related offense, or to facilitate prosecution of that offense.
(h) Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Include those listed in Tables I and
II of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances as enumerated in the attached annex, which is an integral part of this Act.
(i) Cultivate or Culture. – Any act of knowingly planting, growing, raising, or permitting
the planting, growing or raising of any plant which is the source of a dangerous drug.
(j) Dangerous Drugs. – Include those listed in the Schedules annexed to the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules
annexed to the 1971 Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances as enumerated in the
attached annex which is an integral part of this Act.
(k) Deliver. – Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.
(l) Den, Dive or Resort. – A place where any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor
and essential chemical is administered, delivered, stored for illegal purposes, distributed,
sold or used in any form.
(m) Dispense. – Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or any
dangerous drug with or without the use of prescription.
(n) Drug Dependence. – As based on the World Health Organization definition, it is a
cluster of physiological, behavioral and cognitive phenomena of variable intensity, in
which the use of psychoactive drug takes on a high priority thereby involving, among
others, a strong desire or a sense of compulsion to take the substance and the difficulties
in controlling substance-taking behavior in terms of its onset, termination, or levels of
use.
(o) Drug Syndicate. – Any organized group of two (2) or more persons forming or joining
together with the intention of committing any offense prescribed under this Act.
(p) Employee of Den, Dive or Resort. – The caretaker, helper, watchman, lookout, and
other persons working in the den, dive or resort, employed by the maintainer, owner
and/or operator where any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical is administered, delivered, distributed, sold or used, with or without
compensation, in connection with the operation thereof.
(q) Financier. – Any person who pays for, raises or supplies money for, or underwrites
any of the illegal activities prescribed under this Act.
(r) Illegal Trafficking. – The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery, administration,
dispensation, manufacture, sale, trading, transportation, distribution, importation,
exportation and possession of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical.
(s) Instrument. – Any thing that is used in or intended to be used in any manner in the
commission of illegal drug trafficking or related offenses.
(t) Laboratory Equipment. – The paraphernalia, apparatus, materials or appliances when
used, intended for use or designed for use in the manufacture of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, such as reaction vessel,
preparative/purifying equipment, fermentors, separatory funnel, flask, heating mantle,
gas generator, or their substitute.
(u) Manufacture. – The production, preparation, compounding or processing of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, either directly or
indirectly or by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means
of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and shall
include any packaging or repackaging of such substances, design or configuration of its
form, or labeling or relabeling of its container; except that such terms do not include the
preparation, compounding, packaging or labeling of a drug or other substances by a duly
authorized practitioner as an incident to his/her administration or dispensation of such
drug or substance in the course of his/her professional practice including research,
teaching and chemical analysis of dangerous drugs or such substances that are not
intended for sale or for any other purpose.
(v) Cannabis or commonly known as "Marijuana" or "Indian Hemp" or by its any other
name. – Embraces every kind, class, genus, or specie of the plant Cannabis sativa
L. including, but not limited to, Cannabis americana, hashish, bhang, guaza,
churrus and ganjab, and embraces every kind, class and character of marijuana, whether
dried or fresh and flowering, flowering or fruiting tops, or any part or portion of the plant
and seeds thereof, and all its geographic varieties, whether as a reefer, resin, extract,
tincture or in any form whatsoever.
(w) Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or commonly known as "Ecstasy", or
by its any other name. – Refers to the drug having such chemical composition, including
any of its isomers or derivatives in any form.
(x) Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or commonly known as "Shabu", "Ice", "Meth", or
by its any other name. – Refers to the drug having such chemical composition, including
any of its isomers or derivatives in any form.
(y) Opium. – Refers to the coagulated juice of the opium poppy (Papaver somniferum L.)
and embraces every kind, class and character of opium, whether crude or prepared; the
ashes or refuse of the same; narcotic preparations thereof or therefrom; morphine or any
alkaloid of opium; preparations in which opium, morphine or any alkaloid of opium
enters as an ingredient; opium poppy; opium poppy straw; and leaves or wrappings of
opium leaves, whether prepared for use or not.
(z) Opium Poppy. – Refers to any part of the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L.,
Papaver setigerum DC, Papaver orientale, Papaver bracteatum and Papaver rhoeas, which
includes the seeds, straws, branches, leaves or any part thereof, or substances derived
therefrom, even for floral, decorative and culinary purposes.
(aa) PDEA. – Refers to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency under Section 82,
Article IX of this Act.
(bb) Person. – Any entity, natural or juridical, including among others, a corporation,
partnership, trust or estate, joint stock company, association, syndicate, joint venture or
other unincorporated organization or group capable of acquiring rights or entering into
obligations.
(cc) Planting of Evidence. – The willful act by any person of maliciously and
surreptitiously inserting, placing, adding or attaching directly or indirectly, through any
overt or covert act, whatever quantity of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor
and essential chemical in the person, house, effects or in the immediate vicinity of an
innocent individual for the purpose of implicating, incriminating or imputing the
commission of any violation of this Act.
(dd) Practitioner. – Any person who is a licensed physician, dentist, chemist, medical
technologist, nurse, midwife, veterinarian or pharmacist in the Philippines.
(ee) Protector/Coddler. – Any person who knowingly and willfully consents to the
unlawful acts provided for in this Act and uses his/her influence, power or position in
shielding, harboring, screening or facilitating the escape of any person he/she knows, or
has reasonable grounds to believe on or suspects, has violated the provisions of this Act
in order to prevent the arrest, prosecution and conviction of the violator.
(ff) Pusher. – Any person who sells, trades, administers, dispenses, delivers or gives away
to another, on any terms whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in transit or transports
dangerous drugs or who acts as a broker in any of such transactions, in violation of this
Act.
(gg) School. – Any educational institution, private or public, undertaking educational
operation for pupils/students pursuing certain studies at defined levels, receiving
instructions from teachers, usually located in a building or a group of buildings in a
particular physical or cyber site.
(hh) Screening Test. – A rapid test performed to establish potential/presumptive positive
result.
(ii) Sell. – Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration.
(jj) Trading. – Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not
limited to, text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant
messengers and chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for
money or any other consideration in violation of this Act.
(kk) Use. – Any act of injecting, intravenously or intramuscularly, of consuming, either
by chewing, smoking, sniffing, eating, swallowing, drinking or otherwise introducing into
the physiological system of the body, and of the dangerous drugs.
ARTICLE II
Unlawful Acts and Penalties
Section 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals.- .The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into the
Philippines any dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity and purity involved, including
any and all species of opium poppy or any part thereof or substances derived therefrom
even for floral, decorative and culinary purposes.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall import any controlled precursor and essential chemical.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized under this Act, shall import or bring into the Philippines
any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical through the use
of a diplomatic passport, diplomatic facilities or any other means involving his/her
official status intended to facilitate the unlawful entry of the same. In addition, the
diplomatic passport shall be confiscated and canceled.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any
person, who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities
prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a
"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential
chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation
of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires
within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed
in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners,
couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemical trade, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a
dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any
offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person
who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed
in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a
"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 6. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall
maintain a den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used or sold in any form.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person or group of
persons who shall maintain a den, dive, or resort where any controlled precursor and
essential chemical is used or sold in any form.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed in every case
where any dangerous drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to
use the same in such a place.
Should any dangerous drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the
same in such den, dive or resort, the penalty of death and a fine ranging from One
million (P1,000,000.00) to Fifteen million pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed on the
maintainer, owner and/or operator.
If such den, dive or resort is owned by a third person, the same shall be confiscated and
escheated in favor of the government: Provided, That the criminal complaint shall
specifically allege that such place is intentionally used in the furtherance of the
crime: Provided, further, That the prosecution shall prove such intent on the part of the
owner to use the property for such purpose: Provided, finally, That the owner shall be
included as an accused in the criminal complaint.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person
who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed
in this Section.
The penalty twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler"
of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 7. Employees and Visitors of a Den, Dive or Resort. - The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon:
(a) Any employee of a den, dive or resort, who is aware of the nature of the place
as such; and
(b) Any person who, not being included in the provisions of the next preceding,
paragraph, is aware of the nature of the place as such and shall knowingly visit
the same
Section 8. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the manufacture of any
dangerous drug.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall manufacture any controlled precursor and essential chemical.
The presence of any controlled precursor and essential chemical or laboratory equipment
in the clandestine laboratory is a prima facie proof of manufacture of any dangerous drug.
It shall be considered an aggravating circumstance if the clandestine laboratory is
undertaken or established under the following circumstances:
(a) Any phase of the manufacturing process was conducted in the presence or
with the help of minor/s:
(b) Any phase or manufacturing process was established or undertaken within
one hundred (100) meters of a residential, business, church or school premises;
(c) Any clandestine laboratory was secured or protected with booby traps;
(d) Any clandestine laboratory was concealed with legitimate business
operations; or
(e) Any employment of a practitioner, chemical engineer, public official or
foreigner.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any
person, who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities
prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a
"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 9. Illegal Chemical Diversion of Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall illegally divert any controlled precursor and essential chemical.
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

Section 10. Manufacture or Delivery of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus, and Other (7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy",
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic
deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver equipment,
acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs, knowing, or under
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to plant,
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain or conceal any dangerous drug and/or
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
controlled precursor and essential chemical in violation of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
be graduated as follows:
years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) shall be imposed if it will be used to inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise
introduce into the human body a dangerous drug in violation of this Act. (1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any
than fifty (50) grams;
person, who uses a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual to deliver such
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and
a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5)
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as,
thereof:
but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
(1) 10 grams or more of opium; having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine; five (hundred) 500) grams of marijuana; and

(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

 (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than
five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or
"ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or
if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in the case of
medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to carry such
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their
profession, the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or
intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be prima
facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to himself/herself,
injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated
Section 15 of this Act.
Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. – Any
person found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the
maximum penalties provided for in Section 11 of this Act, regardless of the quantity and
purity of such dangerous drugs.
Section 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. - The maximum penalty
provided for in Section 12 of this Act shall be imposed upon any person, who shall
possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting,
or introducing any dangerous drug into the body, during parties, social gatherings or
meetings, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to
be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a
penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any
dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested
is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided
for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
Section 16. Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous Drugs or are Sources Thereof.
- The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who shall plant, cultivate or culture marijuana, opium poppy or any
other plant regardless of quantity, which is or may hereafter be classified as a dangerous
drug or as a source from which any dangerous drug may be manufactured or
derived: Provided, That in the case of medical laboratories and medical research centers
which cultivate or culture marijuana, opium poppy and other plants, or materials of such
dangerous drugs for medical experiments and research purposes, or for the creation of
new types of medicine, the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines
for the proper cultivation, culture, handling, experimentation and disposal of such plants
and materials.
The land or portions thereof and/or greenhouses on which any of said plants is cultivated
or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the State, unless the owner
thereof can prove lack of knowledge of such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of
due diligence on his/her part. If the land involved is part of the public domain, the
maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon the offender.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any
person, who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities
prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a
"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 17. Maintenance and Keeping of Original Records of Transactions on Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging
from one (1) year and one (1) day to six (6) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
practitioner, manufacturer, wholesaler, importer, distributor, dealer or retailer who
violates or fails to comply with the maintenance and keeping of the original records of
transactions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical
in accordance with Section 40 of this Act.
An additional penalty shall be imposed through the revocation of the license to practice
his/her profession, in case of a practitioner, or of the business, in case of a manufacturer,
seller, importer, distributor, dealer or retailer.
Section 18. Unnecessary Prescription of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) and the additional penalty of the revocation of his/her license to practice
shall be imposed upon the practitioner, who shall prescribe any dangerous drug to any
person whose physical or physiological condition does not require the use or in the
dosage prescribed therein, as determined by the Board in consultation with recognized
competent experts who are authorized representatives of professional organizations of
practitioners, particularly those who are involved in the care of persons with severe pain.
Section 19. Unlawful Prescription of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall make or issue a prescription or any other writing purporting to be a
prescription for any dangerous drug.
Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act,
Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed for the unlawful
importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution,
transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous
drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with
it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds and
properties derived from the unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful
act was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the
unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed
without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the
Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the
proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or
held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be
manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the
forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days
upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income
derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or
transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the
release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this
Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the
confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property pending disposition, as
well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above
expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same
shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be
done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within
twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when
the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same
within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72)
hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four
(24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The
Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and
destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That
those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated,
used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative
sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction
or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s
in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction
over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a
minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to
personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not
constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or
fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or
his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or
destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a
member of the public attorney's office to represent the former;
(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the
representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor
shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall
request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the
PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt of the same; and
(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of
this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law
enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the
presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH)
and the accused/and or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the
PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of
seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be
implemented by the DOH.
Section 22. Grant of Compensation, Reward and Award. – The Board shall recommend to
the concerned government agency the grant of compensation, reward and award to any
person providing information and to law enforcers participating in the operation, which
results in the successful confiscation, seizure or surrender of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals.
Section 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. – Any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.
Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty
imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an Offender
Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. – Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the
contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime by an offender, and the
application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following
unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the
same as provided under this Act:
(a) Importation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used in any
form;
(d) Manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical; and
(e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs.
Section 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation,
Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties
Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public
office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates,
misapplies or fails to account for confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the proceeds or
properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in this Act.
Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the
trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or
material contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons found guilty of
trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and
perpetually disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the
government, its divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including government-owned
or –controlled corporations.
Section 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. – The maximum
penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to
absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of such
unlawful acts are government officials and employees.
Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. – Any person who is found guilty of
"planting" any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of death.
Section 30. Criminal Liability of Officers of Partnerships, Corporations, Associations or Other
Juridical Entities. – In case any violation of this Act is committed by a partnership,
corporation, association or any juridical entity, the partner, president, director, manager,
trustee, estate administrator, or officer who consents to or knowingly tolerates such
violation shall be held criminally liable as a co-principal.
The penalty provided for the offense under this Act shall be imposed upon the partner,
president, director, manager, trustee, estate administrator, or officer who knowingly
authorizes, tolerates or consents to the use of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment or
other facility, as an instrument in the importation, sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of dangerous drugs, or
chemical diversion, if such vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment or other instrument is
owned by or under the control or supervision of the partnership, corporation, association
or juridical entity to which they are affiliated.
Section 31. Additional Penalty if Offender is an Alien. – In addition to the penalties
prescribed in the unlawful act committed, any alien who violates such provisions of this
Act shall, after service of sentence, be deported immediately without further proceedings,
unless the penalty is death.
Section 32. Liability to a Person Violating Any Regulation Issued by the Board. – The penalty
of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine
ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person found violating any regulation duly issued by the Board
pursuant to this Act, in addition to the administrative sanctions imposed by the Board.
Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. – Notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any
person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who
voluntarily gives information about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16,
Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the offenses mentioned if committed by a
drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts, identities and arrest of all
or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against such persons as
described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or punishment for the offense with
reference to which his/her information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove
the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, That
the following conditions concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the
persons described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;
(4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence
available for the State other than the information and testimony of said
informant or witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay,
any condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the
State as further consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and
punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who
does not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which his/her
information or testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct evidence
available for the State except for the information and testimony of the said informant or
witness.
Section 34. Termination of the Grant of Immunity. – The immunity granted to the informant
or witness, as prescribed in Section 33 of this Act, shall not attach should it turn out
subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false, malicious or made only for
the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the persons described in
the preceding Section against whom such information or testimony is directed against. In
such case, the informant or witness shall be subject to prosecution and the enjoyment of
all rights and benefits previously accorded him under this Act or any other law, decree or
order shall be deemed terminated.
In case an informant or witness under this Act fails or refuses to testify without just
cause, and when lawfully obliged to do so, or should he/she violate any condition
accompanying such immunity as provided above, his/her immunity shall be removed
and he/she shall likewise be subject to contempt and/or criminal prosecution, as the case
may be, and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously accorded him under this
Act or in any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated.
In case the informant or witness referred to under this Act falls under the applicability of
this Section hereof, such individual cannot avail of the provisions under Article VIII of
this Act.
Section 35. Accessory Penalties. – A person convicted under this Act shall be disqualified to
exercise his/her civil rights such as but not limited to, the rights of parental authority or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, the rights to dispose of
such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos, and political rights such as but not
limited to, the right to vote and be voted for. Such rights shall also be suspended during
the pendency of an appeal from such conviction.
ARTICLE III
Dangerous Drugs Test and Record Requirements
Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. – Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH shall take steps
in setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing centers to further
reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the
type of the drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. Drug test certificates issued by accredited drug testing centers shall be valid for a
one-year period from the date of issue which may be used for other purposes. The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(a) Applicants for driver's license. – No driver's license shall be issued or renewed
to any person unless he/she presents a certification that he/she has undergone a
mandatory drug test and indicating thereon that he/she is free from the use of
dangerous drugs;
(b) Applicants for firearm's license and for permit to carry firearms outside of
residence. – All applicants for firearm's license and permit to carry firearms
outside of residence shall undergo a mandatory drug test to ensure that they are
free from the use of dangerous drugs: Provided, That all persons who by the
nature of their profession carry firearms shall undergo drug testing;
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. – Students of secondary and
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained
in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a
random drug testing: Provided, That all drug testing expenses whether in public
or private schools under this Section will be borne by the government;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. – Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be
subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work
rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of
reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for
use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of
the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(e) Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement
agencies. – Officers and members of the military, police and other law
enforcement agencies shall undergo an annual mandatory drug test;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and
one (1) day shall have to undergo a mandatory drug test; and
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be
positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15
of this Act.
Section 37. Issuance of False or Fraudulent Drug Test Results. – Any person authorized,
licensed or accredited under this Act and its implementing rules to conduct drug
examination or test, who issues false or fraudulent drug test results knowingly, willfully
or through gross negligence, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
An additional penalty shall be imposed through the revocation of the license to practice
his/her profession in case of a practitioner, and the closure of the drug testing center.
Section 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on Apprehended/Arrested Offenders. – Subject to
Section 15 of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of
this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four
(24) hours, if the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that
the person apprehended or arrested, on account of physical signs or symptoms or other
visible or outward manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. If found to
be positive, the results of the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in
any accredited analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometry equipment or some such modern and accepted method, if confirmed the
same shall be prima facie evidence that such person has used dangerous drugs, which is
without prejudice for the prosecution for other violations of the provisions of this
Act: Provided, That a positive screening laboratory test must be confirmed for it to be
valid in a court of law.
Section 39. Accreditation of Drug Testing Centers and Physicians. – The DOH shall be tasked
to license and accredit drug testing centers in each province and city in order to assure
their capacity, competence, integrity and stability to conduct the laboratory examinations
and tests provided in this Article, and appoint such technical and other personnel as may
be necessary for the effective implementation of this provision. The DOH shall also
accredit physicians who shall conduct the drug dependency examination of a drug
dependent as well as the after-care and follow-up program for the said drug dependent.
There shall be a control regulations, licensing and accreditation division under the
supervision of the DOH for this purpose.
For this purpose, the DOH shall establish, operate and maintain drug testing centers in
government hospitals, which must be provided at least with basic technologically
advanced equipment and materials, in order to conduct the laboratory examination and
tests herein provided, and appoint such qualified and duly trained technical and other
personnel as may be necessary for the effective implementation of this provision.
Section 40. Records Required for Transactions on Dangerous Drug and Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. –
a) Every pharmacist dealing in dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals shall maintain and keep an original record of sales,
purchases, acquisitions and deliveries of dangerous drugs, indicating therein the
following information:
(1) License number and address of the pharmacist;
(2) Name, address and license of the manufacturer, importer or
wholesaler from whom the dangerous drugs have been purchased;
(3) Quantity and name of the dangerous drugs purchased or acquired;
(4) Date of acquisition or purchase;
(5) Name, address and community tax certificate number of the buyer;
(6) Serial number of the prescription and the name of the physician,
dentist, veterinarian or practitioner issuing the same;
(7) Quantity and name of the dangerous drugs sold or delivered; and
(8) Date of sale or delivery.
A certified true copy of such record covering a period of six (6) months, duly
signed by the pharmacist or the owner of the drugstore, pharmacy or chemical
establishment, shall be forwarded to the Board within fifteen (15) days following
the last day of June and December of each year, with a copy thereof furnished
the city or municipal health officer concerned.
(b) A physician, dentist, veterinarian or practitioner authorized to prescribe any
dangerous drug shall issue the prescription therefor in one (1) original and two
(2) duplicate copies. The original, after the prescription has been filled, shall be
retained by the pharmacist for a period of one (1) year from the date of sale or
delivery of such drug. One (1) copy shall be retained by the buyer or by the
person to whom the drug is delivered until such drug is consumed, while the
second copy shall be retained by the person issuing the prescription.
For purposes of this Act, all prescriptions issued by physicians, dentists,
veterinarians or practitioners shall be written on forms exclusively issued by and
obtainable from the DOH. Such forms shall be made of a special kind of paper
and shall be distributed in such quantities and contain such information and
other data as the DOH may, by rules and regulations, require. Such forms shall
only be issued by the DOH through its authorized employees to licensed
physicians, dentists, veterinarians and practitioners in such quantities as the
Board may authorize. In emergency cases, however, as the Board may specify in
the public interest, a prescription need not be accomplished on such forms. The
prescribing physician, dentist, veterinarian or practitioner shall, within three (3)
days after issuing such prescription, inform the DOH of the same in writing. No
prescription once served by the drugstore or pharmacy be reused nor any
prescription once issued be refilled.
(c) All manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, importers, dealers and retailers
of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals shall
keep a record of all inventories, sales, purchases, acquisitions and deliveries of
the same as well as the names, addresses and licenses of the persons from whom
such items were purchased or acquired or to whom such items were sold or
delivered, the name and quantity of the same and the date of the transactions.
Such records may be subjected anytime for review by the Board.
ARTICLE IV
 Participation of the Family, Students, Teachers and School Authorities in the
Enforcement of this Act
Section 41. Involvement of the Family. – The family being the basic unit of the Filipino
society shall be primarily responsible for the education and awareness of the members of
the family on the ill effects of dangerous drugs and close monitoring of family members
who may be susceptible to drug abuse.
Section 42. Student Councils and Campus Organizations. – All elementary, secondary and
tertiary schools' student councils and campus organizations shall include in their
activities a program for the prevention of and deterrence in the use of dangerous drugs,
and referral for treatment and rehabilitation of students for drug dependence.
Section 43. School Curricula. – Instruction on drug abuse prevention and control shall be
integrated in the elementary, secondary and tertiary curricula of all public and private
schools, whether general, technical, vocational or agro-industrial as well as in non-
formal, informal and indigenous learning systems. Such instructions shall include:
(1) Adverse effects of the abuse and misuse of dangerous drugs on the person,
the family, the school and the community;
(2) Preventive measures against drug abuse;
(3) Health, socio-cultural, psychological, legal and economic dimensions and
implications of the drug problem;
(4) Steps to take when intervention on behalf of a drug dependent is needed, as
well as the services available for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug
dependents; and
(5) Misconceptions about the use of dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
the importance and safety of dangerous drugs for medical and therapeutic use as
well as the differentiation between medical patients and drug dependents in
order to avoid confusion and accidental stigmatization in the consciousness of
the students.
Section 44. Heads, Supervisors, and Teachers of Schools. – For the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of Article II of this Act, all school heads, supervisors and teachers shall be
deemed persons in authority and, as such, are hereby empowered to apprehend, arrest or
cause the apprehension or arrest of any person who shall violate any of the said
provisions, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. They shall be deemed
persons in authority if they are in the school or within its immediate vicinity, or even
beyond such immediate vicinity if they are in attendance at any school or class function
in their official capacity as school heads, supervisors, and teachers.
Any teacher or school employee, who discovers or finds that any person in the school or
within its immediate vicinity is liable for violating any of said provisions, shall have the
duty to report the same to the school head or immediate superior who shall, in turn,
report the matter to the proper authorities.
Failure to do so in either case, within a reasonable period from the time of discovery of
the violation shall, after due hearing, constitute sufficient cause for disciplinary action by
the school authorities.
Section 45. Publication and Distribution of Materials on Dangerous Drugs. – With the
assistance of the Board, the Secretary of the Department of Education (DepEd), the
Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and the Director-General of
the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) shall cause the
development, publication and distribution of information and support educational
materials on dangerous drugs to the students, the faculty, the parents, and the
community.
Section 46. Special Drug Education Center. – With the assistance of the Board, the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the National Youth
Commission (NYC), and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
shall establish in each of its provincial office a special education drug center for out-of-
school youth and street children. Such Center which shall be headed by the Provincial
Social. Welfare Development Officer shall sponsor drug prevention programs and
activities and information campaigns with the end in view of educating the out-of-school
youth and street children regarding the pernicious effects of drug abuse. The programs
initiated by the Center shall likewise be adopted in all public and private orphanage and
existing special centers for street children.
ARTICLE V
Promotion of a National Drug-Free Workplace Program With the Participation of
Private and Labor Sectors and the Department of Labor and Employment
Section 47. Drug-Free Workplace. – It is deemed a policy of the State to promote drug-free
workplaces using a tripartite approach. With the assistance of the Board, the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall develop, promote and implement a national
drug abuse prevention program in the workplace to be adopted by private companies
with ten (10) or more employees. Such program shall include the mandatory drafting and
adoption of company policies against drug use in the workplace in close consultation and
coordination with the DOLE, labor and employer organizations, human resource
development managers and other such private sector organizations.
Section 48. Guidelines for the National Drug-Free Workplace Program. – The Board and the
DOLE shall formulate the necessary guidelines for the implementation of the national
drug-free workplace program. The amount necessary for the implementation of which
shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
ARTICLE VI
Participation of the Private and Labor Sectors in the Enforcement of this Act
Section 49. Labor Organizations and the Private Sector. – All labor unions, federations,
associations, or organizations in cooperation with the respective private sector partners
shall include in their collective bargaining or any similar agreements, joint continuing
programs and information campaigns for the laborers similar to the programs provided
under Section 47 of this Act with the end in view of achieving a drug free workplace.
Section 50. Government Assistance. – The labor sector and the respective partners may, in
pursuit of the programs mentioned in the preceding Section, secure the technical
assistance, such as but not limited to, seminars and information dissemination campaigns
of the appropriate government and law enforcement agencies.
ARTICLE VII
Participation of Local Government Units
Section 51. Local Government Units' Assistance. – Local government units shall appropriate
a substantial portion of their respective annual budgets to assist in or enhance the
enforcement of this Act giving priority to preventive or educational programs and the
rehabilitation or treatment of drug dependents.
Section 52. Abatement of Drug Related Public Nuisances. – Any place or premises which
have been used on two or more occasions as the site of the unlawful sale or delivery of
dangerous drugs may be declared to be a public nuisance, and such nuisance may be
abated, pursuant to the following procedures:
(1) Any city or municipality may, by ordinance, create an administrative board
to hear complaints regarding the nuisances;
(2) any employee, officer, or resident of the city or municipality may bring a
complaint before the Board after giving not less than three (3) days written notice
of such complaint to the owner of the place or premises at his/her last known
address; and
(3) After hearing in which the Board may consider any evidence, including
evidence of the general reputation of the place or premises, and at which the
owner of the premises shall have an opportunity to present evidence in his/her
defense, the Board may declare the place or premises to be a public nuisance.
Section 53. Effect of Board Declaration. – If the Board declares a place or premises to be a
public nuisance, it may declare an order immediately prohibiting the conduct, operation,
or maintenance of any business or activity on the premises which is conducive to such
nuisance.
An order entered under this Section shall expire after one (1) year or at such earlier time
as stated in the order. The Board may bring a complaint seeking a permanent injunction
against any nuisance described under this Section.
This Article does not restrict the right of any person to proceed under the Civil Code
against any public nuisance.
ARTICLE VIII
Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents
Section 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation. – A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may,
by himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, apply to the Board or its duly recognized
representative, for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such
application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the
applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination by a DOH-accredited
physician results in the issuance of a certification that the applicant is a drug dependent,
he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center
designated by the Board for a period of not less than six (6) months: Provided, That a drug
dependent may be placed under the care of a DOH-accredited physician where there is
no Center near or accessible to the residence of the drug dependent or where said drug
dependent is below eighteen (18) years of age and is a first-time offender and non-
confinement in a Center will not pose a serious danger to his/her family or the
community.
Confinement in a Center for treatment and rehabilitation shall not exceed one (1) year,
after which time the Court, as well as the Board, shall be apprised by the head of the
treatment and rehabilitation center of the status of said drug dependent and determine
whether further confinement will be for the welfare of the drug dependent and his/her
family or the community.
Section 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. A
drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from
confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this act
subject to the following conditions:
(1) He/she has complied with the rules and regulations of the center, the
applicable rules and regulations of the Board, including the after-care and follow-
up program for at least eighteen (18) months following temporary discharge from
confinement in the Center or, in the case of a dependent placed under the care of
the DOH-accredited physician, the after-care program and follow-up schedule
formulated by the DSWD and approved by the Board: Provided, That capability-
building of local government social workers shall be undertaken by the DSWD;
(2) He/she has never been charged or convicted of any offense punishable under
this Act, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended; the Revised Penal Code, as amended; or any special penal laws;
(3) He/she has no record of escape from a Center: Provided, That had he/she
escaped, he/she surrendered by himself/herself or through his/her parent,
spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
within one (1) week from the date of the said escape; and
(4) He/she poses no serious danger to himself/herself, his/her family or the
community by his/her exemption from criminal liability.
Section 56. Temporary Release From the Center; After-Care and Follow-Up Treatment Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – Upon certification of the Center that the drug dependent
within the voluntary submission program may be temporarily released, the Court shall
order his/her release on condition that said drug dependent shall report to the DOH for
after-care and follow-up treatment, including urine testing, for a period not exceeding
eighteen (18) months under such terms and conditions that the Court may impose.
If during the period of after-care and follow-up, the drug dependent is certified to be
rehabilitated, he/she may be discharged by the Court, subject to the provisions of Section
55 of this Act, without prejudice to the outcome of any pending case filed in court.
However, should the DOH find that during the initial after-care and follow-up program
of eighteen (18) months, the drug dependent requires further treatment and rehabilitation
in the Center, he/she shall be recommitted to the Center for confinement. Thereafter,
he/she may again be certified for temporary release and ordered released for another
after-care and follow-up program pursuant to this Section.
Section 57. Probation and Community Service Under the Voluntary Submission Program. – A
drug dependent who is discharged as rehabilitated by the DOH-accredited Center
through the voluntary submission program, but does not qualify for exemption from
criminal liability under Section 55 of this Act, may be charged under the provisions of
this Act, but shall be placed on probation and undergo a community service in lieu of
imprisonment and/or fine in the discretion of the court, without prejudice to the outcome
of any pending case filed in court.
Such drug dependent shall undergo community service as part of his/her after-care and
follow-up program, which may be done in coordination with nongovernmental civil
organizations accredited by the DSWD, with the recommendation of the Board.
Section 58. Filing of Charges Against a Drug Dependent Who is Not Rehabilitated Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – A drug dependent, who is not rehabilitated after the
second commitment to the Center under the voluntary submission program, shall, upon
recommendation of the Board, be charged for violation of Section 15 of this Act and
prosecuted like any other offender. If convicted, he/she shall be credited for the period of
confinement and rehabilitation in the Center in the service of his/her sentence.
Section 59. Escape and Recommitment for Confinement and Rehabilitation Under the Voluntary
Submission Program. – Should a drug dependent under the voluntary submission program
escape from the Center, he/she may submit himself/herself for recommitment within one
(1) week therefrom, or his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity may, within said period, surrender him for
recommitment, in which case the corresponding order shall be issued by the Board.
Should the escapee fail to submit himself/herself or be surrendered after one (1) week,
the Board shall apply to the court for a recommitment order upon proof of previous
commitment or his/her voluntary submission by the Board, the court may issue an order
for recommitment within one (1) week.
If, subsequent to a recommitment, the dependent once again escapes from confinement,
he/she shall be charged for violation of Section 15 of this Act and he subjected under
section 61 of this Act, either upon order of the Board or upon order of the court, as the
case may be.
Section 60. Confidentiality of Records Under the Voluntary Submission Program. – Judicial and
medical records of drug dependents under the voluntary submission program shall be
confidential and shall not be used against him for any purpose, except to determine how
many times, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, he/she voluntarily submitted
himself/herself for confinement, treatment and rehabilitation or has been committed to a
Center under this program.
Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – Notwithstanding any law, rule and regulation to the
contrary, any person determined and found to be dependent on dangerous drugs shall,
upon petition by the Board or any of its authorized representative, be confined for
treatment and rehabilitation in any Center duly designated or accredited for the purpose.
A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs to
a Center may be filed by any person authorized by the Board with the Regional Trial
Court of the province or city where such person is found.
After the petition is filed, the court, by an order, shall immediately fix a date for the
hearing, and a copy of such order shall be served on the person alleged to be dependent
on dangerous drugs, and to the one having charge of him.
If after such hearing and the facts so warrant, the court shall order the drug dependent to
be examined by two (2) physicians accredited by the Board. If both physicians conclude
that the respondent is not a drug dependent, the court shall order his/her discharge. If
either physician finds him to be a dependent, the court shall conduct a hearing and
consider all relevant evidence which may be offered. If the court finds him a drug
dependent, it shall issue an order for his/her commitment to a treatment and
rehabilitation center under the supervision of the DOH. In any event, the order of
discharge or order of confinement or commitment shall be issued not later than fifteen
(15) days from the filing of the appropriate petition.
Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an Offense to Treatment
and Rehabilitation. – If a person charged with an offense where the imposable penalty is
imprisonment of less than six (6) years and one (1) day, and is found by the prosecutor or
by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the prosecutor or
the court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and transmit copies of
the record of the case to the Board.
In the event he Board determines, after medical examination, that public interest requires
that such drug dependent be committed to a center for treatment and rehabilitation, it
shall file a petition for his/her commitment with the regional trial court of the province or
city where he/she is being investigated or tried: Provided, That where a criminal case is
pending in court, such petition shall be filed in the said court. The court shall take judicial
notice of the prior proceedings in the case and shall proceed to hear the petition. If the
court finds him to be a drug dependent, it shall order his/her commitment to a Center for
treatment and rehabilitation. The head of said Center shall submit to the court every four
(4) months, or as often as the court may require, a written report on the progress of the
treatment. If the dependent is rehabilitated, as certified by the center and the Board,
he/she shall be returned to the court, which committed him, for his/her discharge
therefrom.
Thereafter, his/her prosecution for any offense punishable by law shall be instituted or
shall continue, as the case may be. In case of conviction, the judgment shall, if the
accused is certified by the treatment and rehabilitation center to have maintained good
behavior, indicate that he/she shall be given full credit for the period he/she was
confined in the Center: Provided, however, That when the offense is for violation of Section
15 of this Act and the accused is not a recidivist, the penalty thereof shall be deemed to
have been served in the Center upon his/her release therefrom after certification by the
Center and the Board that he/she is rehabilitated.
Section 63. Prescription of the Offense Charged Against a Drug Dependent Under the Compulsory
Submission Program. – The period of prescription of the offense charged against a drug
dependent under the compulsory submission program shall not run during the time that
the drug dependent is under confinement in a Center or otherwise under the treatment
and rehabilitation program approved by the Board.
Upon certification of the Center that he/she may temporarily be discharged from the said
Center, the court shall order his/her release on condition that he/she shall report to the
Board through the DOH for after-care and follow-up treatment for a period not exceeding
eighteen (18) months under such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Board.
If at anytime during the after-care and follow-up period, the Board certifies to his/her
complete rehabilitation, the court shall order his/her final discharge from confinement
and order for the immediate resumption of the trial of the case for which he/she is
originally charged. Should the Board through the DOH find at anytime during the after-
care and follow-up period that he/she requires further treatment and rehabilitation, it
shall report to the court, which shall order his/her recommitment to the Center.
Should the drug dependent, having been committed to a Center upon petition by the
Board escape therefrom, he/she may resubmit himself/herself for confinement within
one (1) week from the date of his/her escape; or his/her parent, spouse, guardian or
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity may, within the same
period, surrender him for recommitment. If, however, the drug dependent does not
resubmit himself/herself for confinement or he/she is not surrendered for recommitment,
the Board may apply with the court for the issuance of the recommitment order. Upon
proof of previous commitment, the court shall issue an order for recommitment. If,
subsequent to such recommitment, he/she should escape again, he/she shall no longer be
exempt from criminal liability for use of any dangerous drug.
A drug dependent committed under this particular Section who is finally discharged from
confinement shall be exempt from criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act, without
prejudice to the outcome of any pending case filed in court. On the other hand, a drug
dependent who is not rehabilitated after a second commitment to the Center shall, upon
conviction by the appropriate court, suffer the same penalties provided for under Section
15 of this Act again without prejudice to the outcome of any pending case filed in court.
Section 64. Confidentiality of Records Under the Compulsory Submission Program. – The
records of a drug dependent who was rehabilitated and discharged from the Center under
the compulsory submission program, or who was charged for violation of Section 15 of
this Act, shall be covered by Section 60 of this Act. However, the records of a drug
dependent who was not rehabilitated, or who escaped but did not surrender
himself/herself within the prescribed period, shall be forwarded to the court and their use
shall be determined by the court, taking into consideration public interest and the welfare
of the drug dependent.
Section 65. Duty of the Prosecutor in the Proceedings. – It shall be the duty of the provincial
or the city prosecutor or their assistants or state prosecutors to prepare the appropriate
petition in all proceedings arising from this Act.
Section 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. – An accused who is over
fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense mentioned in Section
11 of this Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment
should have been promulgated after having been found guilty of said offense, may be
given the benefits of a suspended sentence, subject to the following conditions:
(a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this
Act, or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised
Penal Code; or of any special penal laws;
(b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a
DOH-accredited physician; and
(c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended.
While under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative
surveillance of the Board, under such conditions that the court may impose for a period
ranging from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months.
Upon recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused under suspended
sentence to a Center, or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician for at least six (6)
months, with after-care and follow-up program for not more than eighteen (18) months.
In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of any
offense penalized under this Act, Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1179 shall apply, without prejudice to the application of the provisions of this Section.
Section 67. Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a First-Time
Minor Offender. – If the accused first time minor offender under suspended sentence
complies with the applicable rules and regulations of the Board, including confinement in
a Center, the court, upon a favorable recommendation of the Board for the final
discharge of the accused, shall discharge the accused and dismiss all proceedings.
Upon the dismissal of the proceedings against the accused, the court shall enter an order
to expunge all official records, other than the confidential record to be retained by the
DOJ relating to the case. Such an order, which shall be kept confidential, shall restore the
accused to his/her status prior to the case. He/she shall not be held thereafter to be guilty
of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made of
him for any purpose.
Section 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a First-Time Minor
Offender. – The privilege of suspended sentence shall be availed of only once by an
accused drug dependent who is a first-time offender over fifteen (15) years of age at the
time of the commission of the violation of Section 15 of this Act but not more than
eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated.
Section 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first-time
minor offender violates any of the conditions of his/her suspended sentence, the
applicable rules and regulations of the Board exercising supervision and rehabilitative
surveillance over him, including the rules and regulations of the Center should
confinement be required, the court shall pronounce judgment of conviction and he/she
shall serve sentence as any other convicted person.
Section 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of
Imprisonment. – Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place
the accused under probation, even if the sentence provided under this Act is higher than
that provided under existing law on probation, or impose community service in lieu of
imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall
be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons
and Parole and the Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of
the probation, the Board shall submit a written report to the court recommending
termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the court
shall issue such an order.
The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may
be determined by the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board
and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act. The completion of the
community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the
Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall render a report
on the manner of compliance of said community service. The court in its discretion may
require extension of the community service or order a final discharge.
In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64
of this Act.
If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the
Center by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the
sentence to be served.
Section 71. Records to be kept by the Department of Justice. – The DOJ shall keep a
confidential record of the proceedings on suspension of sentence and shall not be used for
any purpose other than to determine whether or not a person accused under this Act is a
first-time minor offender.
Section 72. Liability of a Person Who Violates the Confidentiality of Records. – The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years and a fine
ranging from One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), shall be
imposed upon any person who, having official custody of or access to the confidential
records of any drug dependent under voluntary submission programs, or anyone who,
having gained possession of said records, whether lawfully or not, reveals their content to
any person other than those charged with the prosecution of the offenses under this Act
and its implementation. The maximum penalty shall be imposed, in addition to absolute
perpetual disqualification from any public office, when the offender is a government
official or employee. Should the records be used for unlawful purposes, such as blackmail
of the drug dependent or the members of his/her family, the penalty imposed for the
crime of violation of confidentiality shall be in addition to whatever crime he/she may be
convicted of.
Section 73. Liability of a Parent, Spouse or Guardian Who Refuses to Cooperate with the Board
or any Concerned Agency. – Any parent, spouse or guardian who, without valid reason,
refuses to cooperate with the Board or any concerned agency in the treatment and
rehabilitation of a drug dependent who is a minor, or in any manner, prevents or delays
the after-care, follow-up or other programs for the welfare of the accused drug dependent,
whether under voluntary submission program or compulsory submission program, may
be cited for contempt by the court.
Section 74. Cost-Sharing in the Treatment and Rehabilitation of a Drug Dependent. – The
parent, spouse, guardian or any relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity of any
person who is confined under the voluntary submission program or compulsory
submission program shall be charged a certain percentage of the cost of his/her treatment
and rehabilitation, the guidelines of which shall be formulated by the DSWD taking into
consideration the economic status of the family of the person confined. The guidelines
therein formulated shall be implemented by a social worker of the local government unit.
Section 75. Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers. – The existing treatment and
rehabilitation centers for drug dependents operated and maintained by the NBI and the
PNP shall be operated, maintained and managed by the DOH in coordination with other
concerned agencies. For the purpose of enlarging the network of centers, the Board
through the DOH shall encourage, promote or whenever feasible, assist or support in the
establishment, operations and maintenance of private centers which shall be eligible to
receive grants, donations or subsidy from either government or private sources. It shall
also support the establishment of government-operated regional treatment and
rehabilitation centers depending upon the availability of funds. The national government,
through its appropriate agencies shall give priority funding for the increase of subsidy to
existing government drug rehabilitation centers, and shall establish at least one (1) drug
rehabilitation center in each province, depending on the availability of funds.
Section 76. The Duties and Responsibilities of the Department of health (DOH) Under this Act.
– The DOH shall:
(1) Oversee the monitor the integration, coordination and supervision of all drug
rehabilitation, intervention, after-care and follow-up programs, projects and
activities as well as the establishment, operations, maintenance and management
of privately-owned drug treatment rehabilitation centers and drug testing
networks and laboratories throughout the country in coordination with the
DSWD and other agencies;
(2) License, accredit, establish and maintain drug test network and laboratory,
initiate, conduct and support scientific research on drugs and drug control;
(3) Encourage, assist and accredit private centers, promulgate rules and
regulations setting minimum standards for their accreditation to assure their
competence, integrity and stability;
(4) Prescribe and promulgate rules and regulations governing the establishment
of such Centers as it may deem necessary after conducting a feasibility study
thereof;
(5) The DOH shall, without prejudice to the criminal prosecution of those found
guilty of violating this Act, order the closure of a Center for treatment and
rehabilitation of drug dependency when, after investigation it is found guilty of
violating the provisions of this Act or regulations issued by the Board; and
(6) Charge reasonable fees for drug dependency examinations, other medical and
legal services provided to the public, which shall accrue to the Board. All income
derived from these sources shall be part of the funds constituted as special funds
for the implementation of this Act under Section 87.
ARTICLE IX
Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
Section 77. The Dangerous Drugs Board. – The Board shall be the policy-making and
strategy-formulating body in the planning and formulation of policies and programs on
drug prevention and control. It shall develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated,
unified and balanced national drug abuse prevention and control strategy. It shall be
under the Office of the President.
Section 78. Composition of the Board. – The Board shall be composed of seventeen (17)
members wherein three (3) of which are permanent members, the other twelve (12)
members shall be in an ex officio capacity and the two (2) shall be regular members.
The three (3) permanent members, who shall possess at least seven-year training and
experience in the field of dangerous drugs and in any of the following fields: in law,
medicine, criminology, psychology or social work, shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines. The President shall designate a Chairman, who shall have the rank of a
secretary from among the three (3) permanent members who shall serve for six (6) years.
Of the two (2) other members, who shall both have the rank of undersecretary, one (1)
shall serve for four (4) years and the other for two (2) years. Thereafter, the persons
appointed to succeed such members shall hold office for a term of six (6) years and until
their successors shall have been duly appointed and qualified.
The other twelve (12) members who shall be ex officio members of the Board are the
following:
(1) Secretary of the Department of Justice or his/her representative;
(2) Secretary of the Department of Health or his/her representative;
(3) Secretary of the Department of National Defense or his/her representative;
(4) Secretary of the Department of Finance or his/her representative;
(5) Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment or his/her
representative;
(6) Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government or his/her
representative;
(7) Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or his/her
representative;
(8) Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs or his/her representative;
(9) Secretary of the Department of Education or his/her representative;
(10) Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education or his/her
representative;
(11) Chairman of the National Youth Commission;
(12) Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
Cabinet secretaries who are members of the Board may designate their duly authorized
and permanent representatives whose ranks shall in no case be lower than
undersecretary.
The two (2) regular members shall be as follows:
(a) The president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
(b) The chairman or president of a non-government organization involved in
dangerous drug campaign to be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
The Director of the NBI and the Chief of the PNP shall be the permanent consultants of
the Board, and shall attend all the meetings of the Board.
All members of the Board as well as its permanent consultants shall receive a per diem
for every meeting actually attended subject to the pertinent budgetary laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, honoraria and allowances: Provided, That where the
representative of an ex officio member or of the permanent consultant of the Board attends
a meeting in behalf of the latter, such representative shall be entitled to receive the per
diem.
Section 79. Meetings of the Board. – The Board shall meet once a week or as often as
necessary at the discretion of the Chairman or at the call of any four (4) other members.
The presence of nine (9) members shall constitute a quorum.
Section 80. Secretariat of the Board. – The Board shall recommend to the President of the
Philippines the appointment of an Executive Director, with the rank of an
undersecretary, who shall be the Secretary of the Board and administrative officer of its
secretariat, and shall perform such other duties that may be assigned to him/her. He/she
must possess adequate knowledge, training and experience in the field of dangerous
drugs, and in any of the following fields: law enforcement, law, medicine, criminology,
psychology or social work.
Two deputies executive director, for administration and operations, with the ranks of
assistant secretary, shall be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Board. They shall possess the same qualifications as those of the executive director. They
shall receive a salary corresponding to their position as prescribed by the Salary
Standardization Law as a Career Service Officer.
The existing secretariat of the Board shall be under the administrative control and
supervision of the Executive Director. It shall be composed of the following divisions,
namely: Policy Studies, Research and Statistics; Preventive Education, Training and
Information; Legal Affairs; and the Administrative and Financial Management.
Section 81. Powers and Duties of the Board. – The Board shall:
(a) Formulate, develop and establish a comprehensive, integrated, unified and
balanced national drug use prevention and control strategy;
(b) Promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act, including the manner of safekeeping, disposition, burning
or condemnation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical under its charge and custody, and prescribe administrative
remedies or sanctions for the violations of such rules and regulations;
(c) Conduct policy studies, program monitoring and evaluations and other
researches on drug prevention, control and enforcement;
(d) Initiate, conduct and support scientific, clinical, social, psychological,
physical and biological researches on dangerous drugs and dangerous drugs
prevention and control measures;
(e) Develop an educational program and information drive on the hazards and
prevention of illegal use of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical based on factual data, and disseminate the same to the general
public, for which purpose the Board shall endeavor to make the general public
aware of the hazards of any dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical by providing among others, literature, films, displays or
advertisements and by coordinating with all institutions of learning as well as
with all national and local enforcement agencies in planning and conducting its
educational campaign programs to be implemented by the appropriate
government agencies;
(f) Conduct continuing seminars for, and consultations with, and provide
information materials to judges and prosecutors in coordination with the Office
of the Court Administrator, in the case of judges, and the DOJ, in the case of
prosecutors, which aim to provide them with the current developments and
programs of the Board pertinent to its campaign against dangerous drugs and its
scientific researches on dangerous drugs, its prevention and control measures;
(g) Design special trainings in order to provide law enforcement officers,
members of the judiciary, and prosecutors, school authorities and personnel of
centers with knowledge and know-how in dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals control in coordination with the Supreme
Court to meet the objectives of the national drug control programs;
(h) Design and develop, in consultation and coordination with the DOH,
DSWD and other agencies involved in drugs control, treatment and
rehabilitation, both public and private, a national treatment and rehabilitation
program for drug dependents including a standard aftercare and community
service program for recovering drug dependents;
(i) Design and develop, jointly with the DOLE and in consultation with labor
and employer groups as well as nongovernment organizations a drug abuse
prevention program in the workplace that would include a provision for
employee assistance programs for emotionally-stressed employees;
(j) Initiate and authorize closure proceedings against non-accredited and/or
substandard rehabilitation centers based on verified reports of human rights
violations, subhuman conditions, inadequate medical training and assistance
and excessive fees for implementation by the PDEA;
(k) Prescribe and promulgate rules and regulations governing the establishment
of such centers, networks and laboratories as deemed necessary after conducting
a feasibility study in coordination with the DOH and other government agencies;
(l) Receive, gather, collect and evaluate all information on the importation,
exportation, production, manufacture, sale, stocks, seizures of and the estimated
need for any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
for which purpose the Board may require from any official, instrumentality or
agency of the government or any private person or enterprise dealing in, or
engaged in activities having to do with any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals such data or information as it may need to
implement this Act;
(m) Gather and prepare detailed statistics on the importation, exportation,
manufacture, stocks, seizures of and estimates need for any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals and such other statistical
data on said drugs as may be periodically required by the United Nations
Narcotics Drug Commission, the World Health Organization and other
international organizations in consonance with the country's international
commitments;
(n) Develop and maintain international networking coordination with
international drug control agencies and organizations, and implement the
provisions of international conventions and agreements thereon which have been
adopted and approved by the Congress of the Philippines;
(o) Require all government and private hospitals, clinics, doctors, dentists and
other practitioners to submit a report to it, in coordination with the PDEA,
about all dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals-
related cases to which they have attended for statistics and research purposes;
(p) Receive in trust legacies, gifts and donations of real and personal properties
of all kinds, to administer and dispose the same when necessary for the benefit of
government and private rehabilitation centers subject to limitations, directions
and instructions from the donors, if any;
(q) Issue guidelines as to the approval or disapproval of applications for
voluntary treatment, rehabilitation or confinement, wherein it shall issue the
necessary guidelines, rules and regulations pertaining to the application and its
enforcement;
(r) Formulate guidelines, in coordination with other government agencies, the
importation, distribution, production, manufacture, compounding, prescription,
dispensing and sale of, and other lawful acts in connection with any dangerous
drug, controlled precursors and essential chemicals and other similar or
analogous substances of such kind and in such quantity as it may deem
necessary according to the medical and research needs or requirements of the
country including diet pills containing ephedrine and other addictive chemicals
and determine the quantity and/or quality of dangerous drugs and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals to be imported, manufactured and held in
stock at any given time by authorized importer, manufacturer or distributor of
such drugs;
(s) Develop the utilization of a controlled delivery scheme in addressing the
transshipment of dangerous drugs into and out of the country to neutralize
transnational crime syndicates involved in illegal trafficking of any dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals;
(t) Recommend the revocation of the professional license of any practitioner who
is an owner, co-owner, lessee, or in the employ of the drug establishment, or
manager of a partnership, corporation, association, or any juridical entity
owning and/or controlling such drug establishment, and who knowingly
participates in, or consents to, tolerates, or abets the commission of the act of
violations as indicated in the preceding paragraph, all without prejudice to the
criminal prosecution of the person responsible for the said violation;
(u) Appoint such technical, administrative and other personnel as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of this Act, subject to the Civil Service
Law and its rules and regulations;
(v) Establish a regular and continuing consultation with concerned government
agencies and medical professional organizations to determine if balance exists in
policies, procedures, rules and regulations on dangerous drugs and to provide
recommendations on how the lawful use of dangerous drugs can be improved
and facilitated; and
(w) Submit an annual and periodic reports to the President, the Congress of the
Philippines and the Senate and House of Representatives committees concerned
as may be required from time to time, and perform such other functions as may
be authorized or required under existing laws and as directed by the President
himself/herself or as recommended by the congressional committees concerned.
Section 82. Creation of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). – To carry out the
provisions of this Act, the PDEA, which serves as the implementing arm of the Board,
and shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all the
provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as
provided in this Act.
The PDEA shall be headed by a Director General with the rank of Undersecretary, who
shall be responsible for the general administration and management of the Agency. The
Director General of the PDEA shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and
shall perform such other duties that may be assigned to him/her. He/she must possess
adequate knowledge, training and experience in the field of dangerous drugs, and in any
of the following fields: law enforcement, law, medicine, criminology, psychology or
social work.
The Director General of the PDEA shall be assisted in the performance of his/her duties
and responsibilities by two (2) deputies director general with the rank of Assistant
Secretary; one for Operations and the other one for Administration. The two (2) deputies
director general shall likewise be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Board. The two (2) deputies director general shall possess the
same qualifications as those of the Director General of the PDEA. The Director General
and the two (2) deputies director general shall receive the compensation and salaries as
prescribed by law.
Section 83. Organization of the PDEA. – The present Secretariat of the National Drug Law
Enforcement and Prevention Coordinating Center as created by Executive Order No. 61
shall be accordingly modified and absorbed by the PDEA.
The Director General of the PDEA shall be responsible for the necessary changes in the
organizational set-up which shall be submitted to the Board for approval.
For purposes of carrying out its duties and powers as provided for in the succeeding
Section of this Act, the PDEA shall have the following Services, namely: Intelligence and
Investigation; International Cooperation and Foreign Affairs; Preventive Education and
Community Involvement; Plans and Operations; Compliance; Legal and Prosecution;
Administrative and Human Resource; Financial Management; Logistics Management;
and Internal Affairs.
The PDEA shall establish and maintain regional offices in the different regions of the
country which shall be responsible for the implementation of this Act and the policies,
programs, and projects of said agency in their respective regions.
Section 84. Powers and Duties of the PDEA. – The PDEA shall:
(a) Implement or cause the efficient and effective implementation of the national
drug control strategy formulated by the Board thereby carrying out a national
drug campaign program which shall include drug law enforcement, control and
prevention campaign with the assistance of concerned government agencies;
(b) Undertake the enforcement of the provisions of Article II of this Act relative
to the unlawful acts and penalties involving any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical and investigate all violators and
other matters involved in the commission of any crime relative to the use, abuse
or trafficking of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical as provided for in this Act and the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1619;
(c) Administer oath, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum relative to the
conduct of investigation involving the violations of this Act;
(d) Arrest and apprehend as well as search all violators and seize or confiscate,
the effects or proceeds of the crimes as provided by law and take custody thereof,
for this purpose the prosecutors and enforcement agents are authorized to
possess firearms, in accordance with existing laws;
(e) Take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals seized, confiscated or surrendered to any
national, provincial or local law enforcement agency, if no longer needed for
purposes of evidence in court;
(f) Establish forensic laboratories in each PNP office in every province and city
in order to facilitate action on seize or confiscated drugs, thereby hastening its
destruction without delay;
(g) Recommend to the DOJ the forfeiture of properties and other assets of
persons and/or corporations found to be violating the provisions of this Act and
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Anti-Money-Laundering Act
of 2001;
(h) Prepare for prosecution or cause the filing of appropriate criminal and civil
cases for violation of all laws on dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, and other similar controlled substances, and assist, support
and coordinate with other government agencies for the proper and effective
prosecution of the same;
(i) Monitor and if warranted by circumstances, in coordination with the
Philippine Postal Office and the Bureau of Customs, inspect all air cargo
packages, parcels and mails in the central post office, which appear from the
package and address itself to be a possible importation of dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals, through on-line or cyber
shops via the internet or cyberspace;
(j) Conduct eradication programs to destroy wild or illegal growth of plants from
which dangerous drugs may be extracted;
(k) Initiate and undertake the formation of a nationwide organization which
shall coordinate and supervise all activities against drug abuse in every province,
city, municipality and barangay with the active and direct participation of all
such local government units and nongovernmental organizations, including the
citizenry, subject to the provisions of previously formulated programs of action
against dangerous drugs;
(l) Establish and maintain a national drug intelligence system in cooperation
with law enforcement agencies, other government agencies/offices and local
government units that will assist in its apprehension of big-time drug lords;
(m) Establish and maintain close coordination, cooperation and linkages with
international drug control and administration agencies and organizations, and
implement the applicable provisions of international conventions and
agreements related to dangerous drugs to which the Philippines is a signatory;
(n) Create and maintain an efficient special enforcement unit to conduct an
investigation, file charges and transmit evidence to the proper court, wherein
members of the said unit shall possess suitable and adequate firearms for their
protection in connection with the performance of their duties: Provided, That no
previous special permit for such possession shall be required;
(o) Require all government and private hospitals, clinics, doctors, dentists and
other practitioners to submit a report to it, in coordination with the Board, about
all dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals which
they have attended to for data and information purposes;
(p) Coordinate with the Board for the facilitation of the issuance of necessary
guidelines, rules and regulations for the proper implementation of this Act;
(q) Initiate and undertake a national campaign for drug prevention and drug
control programs, where it may enlist the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned and or –controlled corporations, in the anti-illegal drugs drive, which
may include the use of their respective personnel, facilities, and resources for a
more resolute detection and investigation of drug-related crimes and prosecution
of the drug traffickers; and
(r) Submit an annual and periodic reports to the Board as may be required from
time to time, and perform such other functions as may be authorized or required
under existing laws and as directed by the President himself/herself or as
recommended by the congressional committees concerned.
Section 85. The PDEA Academy. – Upon the approval of the Board, the PDEA Academy
shall be established either in Baguio or Tagaytay City, and in such other places as may be
necessary. The PDEA Academy shall be responsible in the recruitment and training of all
PDEA agents and personnel. The Board shall provide for the qualifications and
requirements of its recruits who must be at least twenty-one (21) years old, of proven
integrity and honesty and a Baccalaureate degree holder.
The graduates of the Academy shall later comprise the operating units of the PDEA after
the termination of the transition period of five (5) years during which all the intelligence
network and standard operating procedures of the PDEA has been set up and
operationalized.
The Academy shall be headed by a Superintendent, with the rank of Director. He/she
shall be appointed by the PDEA Director General.
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics
Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished;
however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the
PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the
Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is
sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall
have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original
mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by
the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated
in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and
other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original
mother agencies.
The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in
this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this
Act: Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5)
years to finally decide to join the PDEA.
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and
the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided,
however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad
hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the
PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately
transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of
Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.
ARTICLE X
Appropriations, Management of Funds and Annual Report
Section 87. Appropriations. – The amount necessary for the operation of the Board and
the PDEA shall be charged against the current year's appropriations of the Board, the
National Drug Law Enforcement and Prevention Coordinating Center, the Narcotics
Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and other drug abuse units of the
different law enforcement agencies integrated into the PDEA in order to carry out the
provisions of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued
implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
All receipts derived from fines, fees and other income authorized and imposed in this
Act, including ten percent (10%) of all unclaimed and forfeited sweepstakes and lotto
prizes but not less than twelve million pesos (P12,000,000.00) per year from the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), are hereby constituted as a special
account in the general fund for the implementation of this Act: Provided, That no amount
shall be disbursed to cover the operating expenses of the Board and other concerned
agencies: Provided, further, That at least fifty percent (50%) of all the funds shall be
reserved for assistance to government-owned and/or operated rehabilitation centers.
The fines shall be remitted to the Board by the court imposing such fines within thirty
(30) days from the finality of its decisions or orders. The unclaimed and forfeited prizes
shall be turned over to the Board by the PCSO within thirty (30) days after these are
collected and declared forfeited.
A portion of the funds generated by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) in the amount of Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) a month shall be set
aside for the purpose of establishing adequate drug rehabilitation centers in the country
and also for the maintenance and operations of such centers: Provided, That the said
amount shall be taken from the fifty percent (50%) share of the National Government in
the income of PAGCOR: Provided, further, That the said amount shall automatically be
remitted by PAGCOR to the Board. The amount shall, in turn, be disbursed by the
Dangerous Drugs Board, subject to the rules and regulations of the Commission on Audit
(COA).
The fund may be augmented by grants, donations, and endowment from various sources,
domestic or foreign, for purposes related to their functions, subject to the existing
guidelines set by the government.
Section 88. Management of Funds Under this Act; Annual Report by the Board and the PDEA. –
The Board shall manage the funds as it may deem proper for the attainment of the
objectives of this Act. In addition to the periodic reports as may be required under this
Act, the Chairman of the Board shall submit to the President of the Philippines and to the
presiding officers of both houses of Congress, within fifteen (15) days from the opening of
the regular session, an annual report on the dangerous drugs situation in the country
which shall include detailed account of the programs and projects undertaken, statistics
on crimes related to dangerous drugs, expenses incurred pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, recommended remedial legislation, if needed, and such other relevant facts as it may
deem proper to cite.
Section 89. Auditing the Accounts and Expenses of the Board and the PDEA. – All accounts
and expenses of the Board and the PDEA shall be audited by the COA or its duly
authorized representative.
ARTICLE XI
Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Cases
Section 90. Jurisdiction. – The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among
the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region
shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective
jurisdiction.
The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving
violations of this Act.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.
When the preliminary investigation is conducted by a public prosecutor and a probable
cause is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-
four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation
is conducted by a judge and a probable cause is found to exist, the corresponding
information shall be filed by the proper prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from the
date of receipt of the records of the case.
Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60)
days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be
rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for
resolution.
Section 91. Responsibility and Liability of Law Enforcement Agencies and other Government
Officials and Employees in Testifying as Prosecution Witnesses in Dangerous Drugs Cases. – Any
member of law enforcement agencies or any other government official and employee
who, after due notice, fails or refuses intentionally or negligently, to appear as a witness
for the prosecution in any proceedings, involving violations of this Act, without any valid
reason, shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), in addition to the administrative liability he/she may be meted out by
his/her immediate superior and/or appropriate body.
The immediate superior of the member of the law enforcement agency or any other
government employee mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be penalized with
imprisonment of not less than two (2) months and one (1) day but not more than six (6)
years and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual absolute disqualification from
public office if despite due notice to them and to the witness concerned, the former does
not exert reasonable effort to present the latter to the court.
The member of the law enforcement agency or any other government employee
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs shall not be transferred or re-assigned to any
other government office located in another territorial jurisdiction during the pendency of
the case in court. However, the concerned member of the law enforcement agency or
government employee may be transferred or re-assigned for compelling reasons: Provided,
That his/her immediate superior shall notify the court where the case is pending of the
order to transfer or re-assign, within twenty-four (24) hours from its approval; Provided,
further, That his/her immediate superior shall be penalized with imprisonment of not less
than two (2) months and one (1) day but not more than six (6) years and a fine of not less
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual absolute disqualification from public office,
should he/she fail to notify the court of such order to transfer or re-assign.
Prosecution and punishment under this Section shall be without prejudice to any liability
for violation of any existing law.
Section 92. Delay and Bungling in the Prosecution of Drug Cases. – Any government officer
or employee tasked with the prosecution of drug-related cases under this act, who,
through patent laxity, inexcusable neglect, unreasonable delay or deliberately causes the
unsuccessful prosecution and/or dismissal of the said drug cases, shall suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
without prejudice to his/her prosecution under the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
Section 93. Reclassification, Addition or Removal of Any Drug from the List of Dangerous Drugs.
– The Board shall have the power to reclassify, add to or remove from the list of
dangerous drugs. Proceedings to reclassify, add, or remove a drug or other substance may
be initiated by the PDEA, the DOH, or by petition from any interested party, including
the manufacturer of a drug, a medical society or association, a pharmacy association, a
public interest group concerned with drug abuse, a national or local government agency,
or an individual citizen. When a petition is received by the Board, it shall immediately
begin its own investigation of the drug. The PDEA also may begin an investigation of a
drug at any time based upon the information received from law enforcement laboratories,
national and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies, or other sources of
information.
The Board after notice and hearing shall consider the following factors with respect to
each substance proposed to be reclassified, added or removed from control:
(a) Its actual or relative potential for abuse;
(b) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect if known;
(c) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other
substance;
(d) Its history and current pattern of abuse;
(e) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse;
(f) Risk to public health; and
(g) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already
controlled under this Act.
The Board shall also take into accord the obligations and commitments to international
treaties, conventions and agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.
The Dangerous Drugs Board shall give notice to the general public of the public hearing
of the reclassification, addition to or removal from the list of any drug by publishing such
notice in any newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) weeks.
The effect of such reclassification, addition or removal shall be as follows:
(a) In case a dangerous drug is reclassified as precursors and essential chemicals,
the penalties for the violations of this Act involving the two latter categories of
drugs shall, in case of conviction, be imposed in all pending criminal
prosecutions;
(b) In case a precursors and essential chemicals is reclassified as dangerous drug,
the penalties for violations of the Act involving precursors and essential
chemicals shall, in case of conviction, be imposed in all pending criminal
prosecutions;
(c) In case of the addition of a new drug to the list of dangerous drugs and
precursors and essential chemicals, no criminal liability involving the same
under this Act shall arise until after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the last
publication of such notice;
(d) In case of removal of a drug from the list of dangerous drugs and precursors
and essential chemicals, all persons convicted and/or detained for the use
and/or possession of such a drug shall be automatically released and all pending
criminal prosecution involving such a drug under this Act shall forthwith be
dismissed; and
(e) The Board shall, within five (5) days from the date of its promulgation submit
to Congress a detailed reclassification, addition, or removal of any drug from the
list of dangerous drugs.
ARTICLE XII
Implementing Rules and Regulations
Section 94. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The present Board in consultation with
the DOH, DILG, DOJ, DepEd, DSWD, DOLE, PNP, NBI, PAGCOR and the PCSO
and all other concerned government agencies shall promulgate within sixty (60) days the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that shall be necessary to implement the provisions
of this Act.
ARTICLE XIII
Final Provisions
Section 95. Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven (7) Members from the Senate and seven (7)
Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be
appointed by the Senate President based on the proportional representation of the parties
or coalitions therein with at least two (2) Senators representing the Minority. The
Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker, also
based on proportional representation of the parties or coalitions therein with at least two
(2) Members representing the Minority.
The Committee shall be headed by the respective Chairpersons of the Senate Committee
on Public Order and Illegal Drugs and the House of Representatives Committee on
Dangerous Drugs.
Section 96. Powers and Functions of the Oversight Committee. – The Oversight Committee on
Dangerous Drugs shall, in aid of legislation, perform the following functions, among
others:
(a) To set the guidelines and overall framework to monitor and ensure the proper
implementation of this Act;
(b) To ensure transparency and require the submission of reports from
government agencies concerned on the conduct of programs, projects and
policies relating to the implementation of this act;
(c) To approve the budget for the programs of the Oversight Committee on
Dangerous Drugs and all disbursements therefrom, including compensation of
all personnel;
(d) To submit periodic reports to the President of the Philippines and Congress
on the implementation of the provisions of this Act;
(e) To determine inherent weaknesses in the law and recommend the necessary
remedial legislation or executive measures; and
(f) To perform such other duties, functions and responsibilities as may be
necessary to effectively attain the objectives of this Act.
Section 97. Adoption of Committee Rules and Regulations, and Funding. – The Oversight
Committee on Dangerous Drugs shall adopt its internal rules of procedure, conduct
hearings and receive testimonies, reports, and technical advice, invite or summon
by subpoena ad testificandum any public official, private citizen, or any other person to
testify before it, or require any person by subpoena duces tecum documents or other
materials as it may require consistent with the provisions of this Act.
The Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs shall be assisted by a secretariat to be
composed by personnel who may be seconded from the Senate and the House of
Representatives and may retain consultants.
To carry out the powers and functions of the Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs,
the initial sum of Twenty-five million pesos (P25,000,000.00) shall be charged against the
current appropriations of the Senate. Thereafter, such amount necessary for its continued
operations shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
The Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs shall exist for a period of ten (10) years
from the effectivity of this Act and may be extended by a joint concurrent resolution.
Section 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any law, rule
or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as
amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor
offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Section 99. Separability Clause. – If for any reason any section or provision of this Act, or
any portion thereof, or the application of such section, provision or portion thereof to any
person, group or circumstance is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of
this Act shall not be affected by such declaration and shall remain in force and effect.
Section 100. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby repealed
and all other laws, administrative orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 101. Amending Clause. – Republic Act No. 7659 is hereby amended accordingly.
Section 102. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days upon its publication
in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd) (Sgd)
FRANKLIN M. DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA, JR.
President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1858 and House Bill No. 4433 was 7. LYSERGIC ACID
finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 30, 2002 and May 8. 3, 4-METHYLENEDIOXYPHENYL-2 PROPANONE
29, 2002, respectively. 9. NOREPHEDRINE
10. 1-PHENYL-2-PROPANONE
11. PIPERONAL
(Sgd) (Sgd) 12. POTASSIUM PERMANGANATE
13. PSEUDOEPHEDRINE
OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO 14. SAFROLE
Secretary of the Senate Secretary General
House of Representatives
THE SALTS OF THE SUBSTANCES LISTED IN THIS TABLE WHENEVER THE
EXISTENCE OF SUCH SALTS IS POSSIBLE.

LIST OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE II

Approved: January 23, 2002
1. ACETONE
2. ANTHRANILIC ACID
3. ETHYL ETHER
(Sgd) 4. HYDROCHLORIC ACID
5. METHYL ETHYL KETONE
6. PHENYLACETIC ACID
GLORIA MACAPAGAL- 7. PIPERIDINE
ARROYO 8. SULPHURIC ACID
President of the Philippines 9. TOLUENE

THE SALTS OF THE SUBSTANCES LISTED IN THIS TABLE WHENEVER THE

ANNEX EXISTENCE OF SUCH SALTS IS POSSIBLE (THE SALTS OF HYDROCHLORIC
ACID AND SULPHURIC ACID ARE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED)
1988 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN
1961 UNITED NATIONS SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS AS
NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES
AMENDED BY THE 1972 PROTOCOL
LIST OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE I
LIST OF DRUGS INCLUDED IN SCHEDULE I
1. ACETIC ANHYDRIDE
1. Acetorphine
2. N-ACETYLANTHRANILIC ACID
2. Acetyl-alpha-methylfentanyl
3. EPHEDRINE
4. ERGOMETRINE 3. Acetylmethadol
5. ERGOTAMINE 4. Alfentanil
6. ISOSAFROLE 5. Allylprodine
6. Alphacetylmethadol 46. Etorphine
7. Alphameprodine 47. Etoxeridine
8. Alphamethadol 48. Fentanyl
9. Alpha-methylfentanyl 49. Furethidine
10. Alpha-methylthiofentanyl 50. Heroin
11. Alphaprodine 51. Hydrocodone
12. Anileridine 52. Hydromorphinol
13. Benzethidine 53. Hydromorphone
14. Benzylmorphine 54. Hydroxypethidine
15. Betacetylmethadol 55. Isomethadone
16. Beta-hydroxyfentanyl 56. Ketobemidone
17. Beta-hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl 57. Levomethorphan
18. Betameprodine 58. Levomoramide
19. Betamethadol 59. Levophenacylmorphan
20. Betaprodine 60. Levorphanol
21. Bezitramide 61. Metazocine
22. Cannabis and Cannabis resin and extracts and tinctures of cannabis 62. Methadone
23. Clonitazene 63. Methadone Intermediate
24. Coca leaf 64. Methyldesorphine
25. Cocaine 65. Methyldihydromorphine
26. Codoxime 66. 3-methylfentanyl
27. Concentrate of poppy straw 67. 3-methylthiofentanyl
28. Desomorphine 68. Metopon
29. Dextromoramide 69. Moramide intermediate
30. Diampromide 70. Morpheridine
31. Diethylthiambutene 71. Morphine
32. Difenoxin 72. Morphine methobromide
33. Dihydroetorphine 73. Morphine-N-oxide
34. Dihydromorphine 74. MPPP
35. Dihydromorphine* 75. Myrophine
36. Dimenoxadol 76. Nicomorphine
37. Dimepheptanol 77. Noracymethadol
38. Dimethylthiambutene 78. Norlevorphanol
39. Dioxaphetyl butyrate 79. Normethadone
40. Diphenoxylate 80. Normorphine
41. Dipipanone 81. Norpipanone
42. Drotebanol 82. Opium
43. Ecgonine 83. Oxycodone
44. Ethylmethylthiambutene 84. Oxymorphone
45. Etonitazene 85. Para-fluorofentanyl
 86. PEPAP LIST OF DRUGS INCLUDED IN SCHEDULE II
87. Pethidine
88. Pethidine intermediate A 1. Acetyldihydrocodeine
89. Pethidine intermediate B 2. Codeine
90. Pethidine intermediate C 3. Dextropropoxyphene
91. Phenadoxone 4. Dihydrocodeine
92. Phenampromide 5. Ethylmorphine
93. Phenazocine 6. Nicocodine
94. Phenomorphan 7. Nicodicodine
95. Phenoperidine 8. Norcodeine
96. Piminodine 9. Pholcodine
97. Piritramide 10. Propiram
98. Proheptazine
99. Properidine And the isomers, unless specifically excepted, of the drugs in this Schedule whenever the
100. Racemethorphan existence of such isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation.
101. Racemoramide
102. Racemorphan
103. Remifentanil The salts of the drugs listed in this Schedule, including the salts of the isomers as
104. Sufentanil provided above whenever the existence of such salts is possible.
105. Thebacon
106. Thebaine LIST OF DRUGS INCLUDED IN SCHEDULE III
107. Thiofentanyl
108. Tilidine
109. Trimeperidine 1. Preparations of : Acetyldihydrocodeine,
Codeine,
----- Dihydrocodeine,
Ethylmorphine,
Nicocodine,
*
Dextromethorphan (+)-3-methoxy-N-methylmorphinan and dextrorphan (+)-3-
Nicodicodine,
hydroxy-N-methylmorphinan are isomers specifically excluded from this Schedule.
Norcodeine and
Pholcodine
AND the isomers, unless specifically excepted, of the drugs in this Schedule whenever When compounded with one or more other ingredients and containin
the existence of such isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation; not more than milligrams of the drug per dosage unit and with a
concentration of not more than 2.5 per cent in undivided preparations
The esters and ethers, unless appearing in another Schedule, of the drugs in this Schedule
whenever the existence of such esters or ethers is possible; 2. Preparations of : Propiram containing not more than 100 milligrams of propiram per
dosage unit and compounded with at least the same amount of
The salts of the drugs listed in this Schedule, including the salts of esters, ethers and Methylcellulose.
isomers as provided above whenever the existence of such salts is possible.
 5. Beta-hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl
3. Preparations of : Dextropropoxyphene for oral use containing not more than 135
6. Beta-hydroxyfentanyl
milligrams of dextropropoxyphene base per dosage unit or with a
concentration of not more than 2.5 per cent in undivided preparations,7. Cannabis and Cannabis resin
provided that such preparations do not contain any substance 8. Desomorphine
controlled under the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971.9. Etorphine
10. Heroin
4. Preparations of : Cocaine containing not more than 0.1 per cent of cocaine calculated as 11. Ketobemidone
cocaine base; and 12. 3-methylfentanyl
13. 3-methylthiofentanyl
Preparations of:
14. MPPP
Opium or morphine containing not more than 0.2 per cent of
15. Para-fluorofentanyl
morphine calculated as anhydrous morphine base and compounded
16. PEPAP
with one or more other ingredients and in such a way that the drug
17. Thiofentanyl
cannot be recovered by readily applicable means or in a yield that
would constitute a risk to public health.
AND the salts of the drugs listed in this Schedule whenever the formation of such salts is
5. Preparations of : possible of
Difenoxin containing, per dosage unit, not more than 0.5 milligrams
difenoxin and a quantity of atropine sulfate equivalent to at least 5 per
cent of the dose of difenoxin. 1971 UNITED NATIONS SINGLE CONVENTION ON PSYCHOTROPIC
SUBSTANCES
6. Preparations of : Diphenoxylate containing per dosage unit, not more than 2.5
milligrams diphenoxylate calculated as base and a quantity of atropine LIST OF SUBSTANCES IN SCHEDULE I
sulfate equivalent to at least 1 per cent of the dose of diphenoxylate.

7. Preparations of : Pulvis ipecacuanhae et opii compositus BROLAMFETAMINE (DOB) (±)-4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-a-methylphenethylamine

10 per cent opium in powder Dimethoxybromoamphetamine

10 per cent ipecacuanha root, in powder well mixed with
80 per cent of any other powdered ingredient containing no CATHINONE (-)-(S)-2-Aminopropiophenone
drug.
DET 3-[2-(Diethylamino)ethyl)indole)
8. Preparations conforming to any of the formulas listed in this Schedule and mixtures such
preparations with any material which contains no drug. DMA (±)-2,5-DIMETHOXY-a-methylphenethylamine

LIST OF DRUGS INCLUDED IN SCHEDULE IV 2,5 Dimethoxyamphetamine

DMPH 3-(1,2-Dimethylhepty)-7,8,9,-10-tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-
1. Acetorphine
6H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-ol
2. Acetyl-alpha-methylfentanyl
3. Alpha-methylfentanyl
DMT 3-[2-(Dimethylamino)ethyl]indole
4. Alpha-methylthiofentanyl
DOET (±)-4-Ethyl-2,5-dimethoxy-a-phorethylamine PSILOCINE, PSILOTSIN 3-[2-(Dimethylamino)ethyl]indol-4-ol

2,5-Dimethoxy-4-ethylamphetamine PSILOCYBINE 3-[2-(Dimethylamino)ethyl]indol-4-yl

ETICYCLIDINE (PCE) N-Ethyl-1-phenylcyclohexylamine dihydrogen phosphate

ETRYPAMINE 3-(2-Aminobutyl)indole ROLICYCLIDINE (PHP, 1-(1-Phenylcyclohexyl)pyrrolidine

PCPY)
(+)-LYSERGIDE (LSD, LSD-25) 9,10-Didehydro-N,N-diethyl-6-methylergoline-8b-
carboxamide STP, DOM 2,5-Dimethoxy-a,4-dimethylphenethylamine

MDA (+)-N, a-Dimethyl-3,4-(methylene-dioxy)phenethylamine TENAMFETAMINE (MDA) a-Methyl-3,4-(methylenedioxy)phenethylamine

3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine Methylenedioxyamphetamine

MESCALINE 3,4,5-Trimethoxyphenethylamine TENOCYCLIDINE (TCP) 1-[1-(2-Thienyl)cyclohexyl]piperridine

METHCATHINONE 2-(Methylamino)-1-phenylpropan-1-one TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL - the following isomers and their stereochemical variants:

4-METHYLAMINOREX (+)-cis-2-Amino-4-methyl-5-phenyl-2-oxazoline 7,8,9,10-Tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-3-

pentyl-6H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-ol
MMDA 2-Methoxy-a-methyl-4,5-(methylenedioxy)phenethylamine
(9R,10aR)-8,9,10,10a-Tetrahydro-6,6,9-
5-Methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine trimethyl-3-pentyl-6H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-
ol
N-ETHYL MDA (+)-N-Ethyl-a-methyl-3,4(methylenedioxy)phenethylamine
(6aR,9R,10aR)-6a,9,10,10a-Tetrahydro-
3-4-Methylenedioxy-N-ethylamphetamine 6,6,9-trimethyl-3-pentyl-6H-
dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-ol
N-HYDROXY MDA (+)-N-[a-Methyl-3,4-(methylenedioxy)phenethyl]-
hydroxylamine
(6aR,10aR)-6a,7,10,10a-Tetrahydro-6,6,9-
PARAHEXYL 3-Hexyl-7,8,9,10-tetrahydro-6,6,-9-trimethyl-6H- trimethyl-3-pentyl-6H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-
dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-ol ol

PMA p-Methoxy-a-methylphenethylamine (6a,7,8,9-Tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-3-

pentyl-6H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-ol
Paramethoxyamphetamine
 3. BUTALBITAL
(6aR,10aR)-6a,7,8,9,10,10a-Hexahydro-
4. CATHINE (+)-norpseudo-ephedrine
6,6,dimethyl-9-methylene-3-pentyl-6H-
5. CYCLOBARBITAL
Dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-ol
6. FLUNITRAZEPAM
7. GLUTETHIMIDE
TMA (±)-3,4,5-Trimethoxy-a – methylphenethylamine
8. PENTAZOCINE
9. PENTOBARBITAL
3,4,5-Trimethoxyamphetamine
Substances in Schedule IV
4-MIA-(a-methyl-4-methylthiophenethylamine)
1. ALLOBARBITAL
The stereoisomers, unless specifically excepted, of substances in this Schedule, whenever 2. ALPRAZOLAM
the existence of such stereou\isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation. 3. AMFEPRAMONE 4. AMINOREX
5. BARBITAL
LIST OF SUBSTANCES IN SCHEDULE II 6. BENZFETAMINE(benzphetamine)
7. BROMAZEPAM
8. Butobarbital
1. AMFETAMINE (AMPHETAMINE)
9. BROTIZOLAM
2. DEXAMFETAMINE (DEXAMPHETAMINE)
10. CAMAZEPAM
3. FENETYLLINE
11. CHLORDIAZEPOXIDE
4. LEVAMFETAMINE (LEVAMPHETAMINE)
12. CLOBAZAM
5. LEVOMETHAMPHETAMINE
6. MECLOQUALONE 13. CLONAZEPAM
7. METAMFETAMINE (METHAMPHETAMINE) 14. CLORAZEPATE
8. METHAMPHETAMINE RACEMATE 15. CLOTIAZEPAM
9. METHAQUALONE 16. CLOXAZOLAM
10. METHYLPHENIDATE 17. DELORAZEPAM
11. PHENCYCLIDINE (PCP) 18. DIAZEPAM
12. PHENMETRAZINE 19. ESTAZOLAM
13. SECOBARBITAL 20. ETHCHLORVYNOL
14. DRONABINOL (delta-9-tetrahydro-cannabinol and its stereochemical 21. ETHINAMATE
variants) 22. ETHYL LOFLAZEPATE
15. ZIPEPROL 23. ETILAMFETAMINE(N-ethylampetamine)
16. 2C-B(4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine) 24. FENCAMFAMIN
25. FENPROPOREX
LIST OF SUBSTANCES IN SCHEDULE III 26. FLUDIAZEPAM
27. FLURAZEPAM
28. HALAZEPAM
1. AMOBARBITAL
29. HALOXAZOLAM
2. BUPRENORPHINE
30. KETAZOLAM
31. LEFETAMINE(SPA)
32. LOPRAZOLAM
33. LORAZEPAM
34. LORMETAZEPAM
35. MAZINDOL
36. MEDAZEPAM
37. MEFENOREX
38. MEPROBAMATE
39. MESOCARB
40. METHYLPHENOBARBITAL
41. METHYPRYLON
42. MIDAZOLAM
43. NIMETAZEPAM
44. NITRAZEPAM
45. NORDAZEPAM
46. OXAZEPAM
47. OXAZOLAM
48. PEMOLINE
49. PHENDIMETRAZINE
50. PHENOBARBITAL
51. PHENTERMINE
52. PINAZEPAM
53. PIPRADROL
54. PRAZEPAM
55. PYROVALERONE
56. SECBUTABARBITAL
57. TEMAZEPAM
58. TETRAZEPAM
59. TRIAZOLAM
60. VINYLBITAL GHB (Gamma-Hydroxyburic acid)
61. Zolpidem

RA 9165 – COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002

1) G.R. No. 172116 October 30, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ROGER VILLANUEVA, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00975,
dated December 20, 2005, affirming in toto the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon City, Branch 72, in Crim. Case No. 27159-MN finding appellant Roger
Villanueva y Huelva guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165 (2002), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00
and costs.
The Information dated July 11, 2002 against the appellant alleges:
That on or about the 9 day of July, 2002 in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro
th
Manila Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a private person and without authority of law, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in
consideration of the amount of P100.00 to poseur buyer One (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with net weight
0.21 gram, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave
positive result for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known "shabu",
a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.4
PO1 Ariosto Rana of the Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Group (DDEG), Northern
Police District, testified that at 8:00 p.m. of July 9, 2002, a confidential informant
informed them that appellant was selling shabu at Block 8, lot 2, Phase 2, Area 1, Dagat-
dagatan, Navotas.5 He immediately composed a team of police operatives to entrap the
appellant,6 with him posing as the poseur-buyer. After marking the P100.00 bill and
recording in the blotter its serial number, the team proceeded to the place and arrived
thereat around 9:30 p.m. He and the informant approached the appellant while the rest
strategically positioned themselves. The informant introduced him to the appellant, who
asked them if they wanted to buy shabu. Appellant got one plastic sachet from his pocket
containing a white crystalline substance. After appellant received the marked money,
Rana executed the prearranged signal and the team arrested the appellant. The
confiscated substance was submitted to the Northern Police District-Crime Laboratory
for examination,7 which yielded the following results:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A – one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "RVH BB"
containing 0.21 gram of white crystalline substance. xxx.
xxxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave
POSITIVE result to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug. x x x8
Denying the accusations against him, appellant testified that on the night of the alleged
commission of the crime, he was at home watching television. Thereafter, two policemen
knocked at the door looking for a certain person named Roger. When he identified
himself as Roger, he was immediately handcuffed and brought to the headquarters
without explanation. It was only later that he found out that he was being charged for
selling shabu.9
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Roger Villanueva y Huelva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for drug
pushing, penalized under Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 and he is hereby sentenced,
in view of the small quantity of shabu involved, to Life Imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500,000.00, and to pay the costs.
 The decks of shabu subjects of this case are forfeited in favor of the government
to be disposed of under the rules governing the same. OIC-Branch Clerk of Court
Enriqueta A. Marquez is hereby enjoined to immediately turn over the deck of
shabu to the proper authority for final disposition.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.10
Considering the penalty imposed, the case was directly appealed to this Court for
automatic review. However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo11 modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as direct appeals from the Regional
Trial Court to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was referred to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this petition.
The core issue for resolution is whether error attended the trial court’s findings, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165.
Appellant maintains that there was no entrapment and that he was arrested in his house
on the night of the alleged commission of the crime. While he admits that the resolution
of the case would boil down to the determination of who between the parties is more
credible, he insists that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
alone could not sustain a conviction; and that the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of PO1 Rana could not prevail over his constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence.13
In essence, what appellant puts at issue is the trial court’s appreciation of factual details
of the buy-bust operation or the entrapment. Suffice it to say that settled is the policy of
this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the factual findings of the trial
court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to assess
the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of
the witnesses’ deportment during the trial.14 In the instant case, we find no basis to
disregard the trial court’s factual findings.
Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable
doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same
quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden
of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial.
However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by
presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the
information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order
to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case.15
To sustain a conviction under a single prosecution witness, such testimony needs only to
establish sufficiently: 1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and 2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. Indeed, what is material is proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the substance seized as evidence.16 In this case, PO1 Rana, being the poseur-buyer, was
the most competent person to testify on the fact of sale and he did so to the satisfaction of
both the trial court and the appellate court.
Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that:
Contrary to appellant’s assertions, the prosecution has established with moral
certainty the presence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution for the
illegal sale of shabu. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that appellant was
caught in the very act of selling "shabu", a prohibited drug. PO1 Ariosto Rana,
the prosecution witness who acted as poseur-buyer, narrated in a clear and
straightforward manner the facts of sale. x x x
xxxx
What is more, the identities of the seller and the buyer together with the corpus
delict[i] of selling shabu have also been duly established. Poseur-buyer PO1
Ariosto Rana positively identified accused-appellant Roger Villanueva as the
person who sold to him one plastic sachet containing the white crystalline
substance. x x x
 xxxx
Then too, the regulated drug of shabu contained in a plastic sachet which the
appellant handed over to the buyer, was also duly proven before the trial court. x
xx
xxxx
Against these strong positive and substantial evidence, appellant could only say
that no buy-bust operation was conducted and, instead, insists that he was just a
victim of frame-up; that the policemen carried out an illegal search on the
premises of his house, planted evidence, and then charged him as a supplier of
drugs.
The contentions are without merit.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and
capturing felons in the execution of their criminal plan. The operation is
sanctioned by law and has consistently proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were
not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to the
operation deserve full faith and credit. Verily, here, from the evidence adduced,
We find no reason to depart from the general rule. We are one with the court a
quo’s conclusion that the prosecution was able to establish that a buy-bust
operation actually took place starting from the time the team composed of nine
(9) members proceeded to the target area at 9:00 p.m. for the initial negotiation
until the perfection of the sale at 9:30 p.m. the same night.17
Moreover, when the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to
falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have
performed their duties regularly;18 and as held in People v. Pacis,19 bare denials by the
accused cannot overcome this presumption.
All told, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the appellant
committed the crime charged. What remains to be determined is the correctness of the
penalty imposed on the felony committed.
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 reads:
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and
all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
In finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the trial court
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00). While it correctly imposed the said penalties,
we find the reason given therefor, that is, in view of the small quantity of shabu involved,
inaccurate.
Unlike under the repealed R.A. No. 6425 (1972) or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
where the imposable penalty depends on the quantity of the regulated drug involved, the
foregoing provision now imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) for the sale, trade, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution
and transportation of shabu,a dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity involved.20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00975, dated December 20, 2005, affirming in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 72, in Crim. Case No. 27159-MN finding
appellant Roger Villanueva y Huelva guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 and costs, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
2) G.R. No. 172953 April 30, 2008
JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its
lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness.
And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by
obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
In this Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez
(petitioner) assails the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as
its Resolution3 dated 30 May 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration. The
challenged decision has affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon City, Branch 525 which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a
prohibited drug.
The antecedent facts follow.
On the strength of a warrant6 of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City,
Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay
Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino
Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1
Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The search—
conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself,
his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets
of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,7 Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in
a criminal information whose inculpatory portion reads:
That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in
Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] "shabu" with an
aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing "shabu"
residue, without having been previously authorized by law to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Petitioner entered a negative plea.9 At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented
Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the
circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry
into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon
entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance
had previously been requested in executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the
rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody
flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the
search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with
suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and
two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by
Esternon—a discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner.10 On cross
examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its progress to
petitioner's mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search
being conducted by Esternon.11
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found
"behind" the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two
filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the
items recorded and marked.12 On cross, he admitted that it was he alone who conducted
the search because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the
house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which included the
pillow in which the two sachets of shabuwere kept;13 that he brought the seized items to
the Balogo Police Station for a "true inventory," then to the trial court14 and thereafter to
the laboratory.15
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on
the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the
laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the
five empty sachets, four were positive of containing residue of the same substance.16 She
further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the
afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but
rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the
laboratory.17
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure
conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of
the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily
interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos that petitioner's wife,
Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to
conduct the search of Sheila's body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone
except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila
was searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that
nothing was found on Sheila's body.18 Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other
bedroom together with her children.19
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to
the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the
mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him
to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him "sachet of
shabu" which according to him came from a pillow on the bed.20 Petitioner's account in
its entirety was corroborated in its material respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup
and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was
not in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by
Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady
officer.21Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the
plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of
the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was
left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets. 22
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve
years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.23 The
trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima
facie evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge
inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of
ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill
motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.24
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.25 In his Appeal Brief26 filed with the Court
of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court to certain irregularities in the
manner by which the search of his house was conducted. For its part, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed
for petitioner's conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show that the
members of the raiding team was improperly motivated to hurl false charges against him
and hence the presumption that they had regularly performed their duties should
prevail.27
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the
judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of
twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as maximum.28 Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court.29Hence, the instant
petition which raises substantially the same issues.
In its Comment,30 the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly
performed its duties in the conduct of the search.31 It points to petitioner's incredulous
claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the two
filled sachets was made in his and Licup's presence. It likewise notes that petitioner's bare
denial cannot defeat the positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not
suffice to overcome the prima facie existence of animus possidendi.
This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.
Prefatorily, although the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will
not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal. 32 In the
case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if properly appreciated, would warrant a
conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act
of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with
the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.33 Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug
be established beyond doubt.34 Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized
possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must
also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a
finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 35
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.36 It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.37
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable,
or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness.38 The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination39 and even substitution and
exchange.40 In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or
tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates
the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest
when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature
and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.41 Graham vs.
State42 positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed
as heroin—was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not
testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their
possession—was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the
white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking
powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the
state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.43
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in
fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at
any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that
applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness
if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of
the sachets of shabuallegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct
contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific
purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon
supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as
Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical
analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to establish the
circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might
then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very
same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?
The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering
that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is
crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by
Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own.
The same is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the
circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon, what she did with
them during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to
Arroyo for analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the
identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera
and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no
reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the
possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment.
This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the five sachets
allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the search
and seizure was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the
records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers from the
commencement of the search of petitioner's house until the submission of the seized
items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of
petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to the discovery of the two filled
sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally
telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding
team at the door of petitioner's house in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner
fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner
was sent out of his house on an errand when in the first place the police officers were in
fact apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance
because the two filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after
petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able to witness the
conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away.
It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to
him the items to be searched including the pillow from which the two filled sachets
allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human behavior that petitioner would
hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal drugs are concealed
therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the search of Sheila's body was brought
up by a member of the raiding team also raises serious doubts as to the necessity thereof.
The declaration of one of the police officers that he saw Sheila tuck something in her
underwear certainly diverted the attention of the members of petitioner's household away
from the search being conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled
sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise takes note of Esternon's suspicious
presence in the bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The
confluence of these circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the
prosecution's claim of regularity in the exercise of duty.
Moreover, Section 2144 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165
clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a
language too plain to require a different construction, it mandates that the officer
acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the
photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has
been served. Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the
close of the search of petitioner's house, he brought the seized items immediately to the
police station for the alleged purpose of making a "true inventory" thereof, but there
appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioner's house
when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and mark the seized items and
there and then prepare a seizure receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has
had enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant which means that it has had
as much time to prepare for its implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of
the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the same cannot benefit the
prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for Esternon's course of
action.
Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a
departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately
delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the same, 45 as required by
Rule 126, Section 1246 of the Rules of Court. People v. Go47 characterized this requirement
as mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by
interested parties.48 Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo49 declared that
the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary before police
officers can retain the property seized and without it, they would have no authority to
retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency.50 Mere
tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right because
it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very
purpose for the enactment.51
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal
procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the
evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The
presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary
proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth.52 Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption
of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.53 In the
present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed
under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden
of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength
of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable
whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless
and until the contrary is shown.54 In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability
hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006
affirming with modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying
reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y
Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately
released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Brion, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
7
Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.—The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to
Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof;
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloriede;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited
to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy,"
paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA),
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and
those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives,
without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by
the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if
the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10)
grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life
imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than
ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs
such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
 possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300)
grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams or marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12 years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or
other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy,"
PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
23
Records, p. 119. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Junie
Malillin y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Sec. 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and he is hereby
sentence[d] to suffer the penalty of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
Twenty (20) years and fine of P300,000.00.
The shabu recovered is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government and the same shall be turned over to the Board for proper
disposal without delay.
SO ORDERED.
28
Id. at 89. The Court of Appeals disposed of the appeal as follows:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that the
accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term ranging from twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years as maximum. In all other respects, the judgment appealed from is
hereby MAINTAINED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
44
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment.— x x x
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over the said items; x x x (emphasis ours).
46
SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court.— The officer
must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
3) G.R. No. 176350 August 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JHON-JHON ALEJANDRO y DELA CRUZ @ "NOGNOG," Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.: Exhibit "B" - Buy-bust Money

We resolve in this appeal the challenge to the May 31, 2006 decision1 of the Court of Exhibit "C" - Booking and Information Sheet
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01251. The CA affirmed the May 14, 2004
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 231, Pasay City, finding appellant Exhibit "D" - Request for Laboratory Examination
Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y dela Cruz (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Exhibit "E" - Physical Science Report
Drugs Act of 2002) and imposing on him the penalty of life imprisonment.
No. D-1331-02
BACKGROUND FACTS
C. Real Evidence x x x
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
Exhibit "F" - subject specimen
That on or about the 1st day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named xxxx
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a VI. Stipulation of Facts (Including those admitted or undisputed): The accused with
dangerous drug.3(emphases in the original) counsel and the Trial Prosecutor have agreed on the following:

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 During the pre-trial, the prosecution and Exhibits C, D, & E – admitted their existence only but not as to the source
the defense stipulated on the following:
xxxx
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
This pre-trial order shall control the course of the trial in this case, unless modified by the
xxxx Court to prevent manifest injustice. The trial prosecutor as well as the accused and
counsel have signed this pre-trial order to attest to the correctness thereof and their
III. Evidence of the Prosecution: conformity thereto which may accordingly be used in evidence in this case.5[emphases
ours]
A. Testimonial (witnesses) -
Thus, the defense admitted the existence of Exhibits "C" (Booking and Information
Sheet), "D" (Request for Laboratory Examination) and "E" (Physical Science Report No.
xxxx D-1331-02). The parties also agreed, during the pre-trial, to dispense with the testimony
of the forensic chemist, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Lourdeliza M. Gural.
B. Documentary
The prosecution presented, as its witnesses, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Jesus Tan and
Exhibit "A" - Affidavit of Arrest Police Officer 1 (PO1) Timothy Mengote. The appellant and Reggie Morilla took the
witness stand for the defense.
The evidence for the prosecution established that in the afternoon of September 1, 2002,
SPO1 Tan was in the office of the District Drug Enforcement Group, Southern Police
District, Taguig, Metro Manila, when a confidential informant called and told him about
the illegal drug activities of the appellant, alias "Nog-nog." Police Superintendent
(P/Supt.) Mariano Fegarido conducted a briefing, and then dispatched Senior Police
Officer 2 (SPO2) Nilo Banzuela, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)Alberto Sangalang,
Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlos Cachapero, SPO1 Tan, and PO1 Mengote, to meet with
the informant.6
At around 5:00 p.m., the police met with the informant at the Pio Del Pilar Elementary
School. Thereafter, SPO1 Tan, PO1 Mengote and the informant went to M. Dela Cruz
Street in Pasay City to conduct a surveillance.7 There, the informant pointed to a person
standing at the corner of Mary Luz Street and M. Dela Cruz Street, and identified him as
the appellant.8 They observed the appellant for about half an hour, and saw that there
were people approaching him. They also observed that there was an "exchange of goods"
between the appellant and the people who approached him.9 The police thereafter
returned to the station where they underwent another briefing and planned an
entrapment operation. Under the plan, PO1 Mengote was designated as the poseur-
buyer.10
SPO2 Banzuela, SPO1 Tan, SPO1 Sangalang, PO1 Mengote, PO3 Cachapero and the
informant returned to M. Dela Cruz Street to conduct the buy-bust operation. When they
arrived at the place at around 6:00 p.m., they saw the appellant sitting in front of a sari-
sari store. The informant introduced PO1 Mengote to the appellant as a buyer (i.e., a
"shabu scorer"). The appellant asked, "Magkano ba?" PO1 Mengote answered,
"Halagang piso." PO1 Mengote then gave the one hundred peso marked money to the
appellant. The appellant, in turn, pulled out a plastic sachet from his right pocket and
handed it to PO1 Mengote. Upon receiving the plastic sachet, PO1 Mengote made the
pre-arranged signal (i.e., wiped his face with a towel) to his companions. Immediately,
the other members of the buy-bust team approached the appellant. They introduced
themselves as police officers, recovered the buy-bust money from the appellant, and
arrested him. They then brought him and the confiscated items to the police station. 11 At
the police station, they forwarded the seized items to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory where they were examined by P/Insp. Gural.12
The laboratory examination, conducted by P/Insp. Gural on the confiscated specimen,
yielded the following result:
PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. D-1331-02
xxxx
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A – One (1) small brown staple wire-sealed evidence envelope with signature markings
containing one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "TM-1-
010902" containing 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance and marked as A-1.
xxxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result
to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A-1 contains Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 13
In his defense, the appellant submitted a different version of events. He testified that at
around 6:00 p.m. of September 1, 2002, he was in front of his grandmother’s store on
Mary Luz Street, Pasay City, when eight (8) policemen arrived. PO1 Mengote and SPO1
Tan approached and asked him about the whereabouts of a certain "Terio." When he
replied that he did not know where Terio was, the police brought him to the Pio Del Pilar
Elementary School in Makati City14 from where the police apparently received a text
message informing them that Terio was in Pasay City. The police and the appellant
returned to Mary Luz Street, and entered a house owned by Terio. Inside, they saw its
occupant, Enrico Yatco. The police searched the house for about half an hour.
Afterwards, they brought the appellant and Enrico to the Sothern Police District.15 At the
police station, PO1 Mengote and SPO1 Tan showed six (6) pieces of plastic sachets to the
appellant and forced him to admit ownership.16
Reggie’s testimony was summarized by the RTC as follows:
REGGIE MORILLA, the caretaker of the store owned by the accused’s grandmother,
testified that he has been living with the family of the accused for three (3) years already.
The family of the accused is located at 51 Mary Luz St., M. dela Cruz, Pasay City. On
September 1, 2002, he was inside the store while the accused was standing outside when
suddenly he heard a commotion. So he peeped through a hole in the store and saw two
policemen in civilian attire handcuffing the accused. He asked assistance from his
neighbors. Then he saw the accused being taken out of Mary Luz St. Later, they returned
the accused and they led the accused inside a house and then after thirty minutes, he was
brought out and was boarded inside an owner type jeep.17
The RTC, in its decision of May 14, 2004, found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
The RTC also ordered the appellant to pay a ₱500,000.00 fine.18
The records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Efren Mateo y Garcia,19 we endorsed the case and its records to
the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.20 The CA held that the appellant and his counsel
entered into a stipulation of facts whereby they agreed on the admissibility of the request
for laboratory examination of the submitted specimen and on the findings of P/Insp.
Gural. Hence, they cannot be allowed to question, on appeal, the identity and integrity of
the plastic sachet of shabu seized from the appellant by members of the entrapment team.
The CA added that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the
person who handed the plastic sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer.21
The CA further held that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties
in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence of improper motive on their part. It,
likewise, disregarded the appellant’s defense of denial, as it was "unsupported by reliable
corroborative evidence."22
In his brief, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime
charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
claims that the integrity of the seized item had been compromised due to the failure of the
apprehending police to mark it.23
The Office of the Solicitor General counters with the argument that the appellant cannot
now question the identity and integrity of the specimen confiscated from him as he
already entered into a stipulation regarding the admissibility of the request for laboratory
examination and on the result of this examination. In addition, the appellant failed to
impute any ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely testify against him. 24
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to ACQUIT the appellant, for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In doing so,
the prosecution must rest its case on its own merits and cannot merely rely on the
weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of
evidence, the defense does not even need to present any evidence in its behalf; the
presumption of innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted.25
Reasonable Doubt on the Corpus Delicti
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is
material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has
actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.26 In
prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and proof of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.27 To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and
integrity of the seized drug, the evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug
presented in court is the very same illicit drug actually recovered from the appellant;
otherwise, the prosecution for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails. 28
a. The Chain of Custody Rule and the "Marking" Requirement
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No.
9165, defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction."
In Junie Malillin y Lopez v. People,29 we explained the importance of establishing the
chain of custody of the confiscated drugs, in this wise:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable,
or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange.
In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.30
Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. "Marking" means the
placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature
on the items seized.31 Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, this Court has
consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs casts
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.32 Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings
as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.33
In the present case, the records do not show that the apprehending team marked the
seized items with their initials immediately upon confiscation. In Sanchez,34 we
explained that consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the
seized items be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately
upon confiscation. We clarified in People v. Manuel Resurreccion 35 that "[m]arking upon
immediate confiscation" does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police
station or office of the apprehending team. In the present case, the testimonies of the
apprehending officers do not indicate that they ever marked the seized items, either at the
place of seizure or at the police station. How the police could have omitted such a basic
and vital procedure in the initial handling of the seized drugs truly baffles us. Going back
to what we earlier discussed, succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings
as reference. If at the first instance or opportunity, the apprehending team did not mark
the seized item/s, then there is nothing to identify it later on as it passes from one hand to
another.
Curiously, the seized item already bore the markings "TM-1-010902" when it was
examined by the forensic chemist. In the absence, however, of specifics on how, when
and where this marking was done, and who witnessed the marking procedure, we cannot
accept this marking as compliance with the chain of custody requirement required by the
law. In People v. Ranilo Dela Cruz y Lizing,36 the Court reversed the accused’s
conviction for the failure of the police to mark the plastic sachet in the presence of the
accused or his representatives. People v. Zaida Kamad y Ambing,37 likewise, resulted in
an acquittal for the failure of the prosecution to provide specific details on how the
seized shabu was marked.
The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the confiscated drug from PO1
Mengote to the police station. To recall, after PO1 Mengote allegedly received the plastic
sachet from the appellant, he made the pre-arranged signal to his companions. The other
members of the buy-bust team approached the appellant, introduced themselves as police
officers, and arrested him. Thereafter, they brought him and the confiscated item to the
police station.
Notably, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person who
took custody of the seized item at the police station. Although the request for laboratory
examination was signed by P/Supt. Fegarido, the Chief of the District Drug Enforcement
Group, we cannot assume that he was the person who received the seized item from PO1
Mengote, in the absence of any testimony proving such fact.
For the succeeding links in the chain of custody, the evidence shows that the confiscated
item was forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory by one SPO2 Pepano, and then
received by a certain "Relos." P/Insp. Gural examined the submitted specimen, and
found it positive for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. As previously
discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the confiscated item after it left the
possession of PO1 Mengote. The police did not only fail to mark the specimen
immediately upon seizure; it likewise failed to identify the police officer to whose custody
the confiscated item was given at the police station. Thus, we cannot conclude with
certainty that the item seized from the appellant was the same as that presented for
laboratory examination and, later on, presented in court.
That the defense admitted the existence of the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh.
"C"), the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exh. "D") and Physical Science Report
No. D-1331-02 (Exh. "E") during the pre-trial did not amount to an admission of the
identity of the seized specimen. What the admissions proved were merely the existence
and authenticity of the request for laboratory examination and the result of this
examination, not the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of evidence.
Simply put, the admission regarding the existence of Exhibits "C," "D" and "E" has no
bearing on the question of whether the specimen submitted for chemical analysis was the
same as that seized from the appellant.38 To interpret the stipulations as an admission
that the appellant was the source of the specimen would be contrary to the pre-trial order
(stating that Exhibits "C", "D" and "E" were admitted as to their existence only and not
as to the source); it would also bind the appellant to an unceremonious withdrawal of his
plea of not guilty.
In like manner, the stipulation during the pre-trial regarding the non-presentation of the
forensic chemist, P/Insp. Gural, merely covers the handling of the specimen at the
forensic laboratory and the result of the examination, but not the manner the specimen
was handled before it came to the possession of the forensic chemist and after it left his
possession.39
b. Non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph 1,
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165 give us the procedures that
the apprehending team should observe in the handling of seized illegal drugs in order to
preserve their identity and integrity as evidence. As indicated by their mandatory terms,
strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is essential and the prosecution must
show compliance in every case.40
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This provision is further elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No.
9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.]
The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the apprehending or
buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its
IRR. PO1 Mengote narrated the police operation as follows:
PROSECUTOR BERNABE SOLIS:
Q: So [were] you able to locate him afterwards?
PO1 TIMOTHY MENGOTE:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was he at that time?
A: At that time, he was in front of a sari-sari store or M. dela Cruz St., sir. A: I executed the pre-arranged signal by wiping my face with a face towel, sir.

Q: What was he doing at that time? xxxx

A: He was just sitting there at that time, sir. Q: And did your colleagues respond to the pre-arranged signal?

xxxx A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do next? Q: What happened after that?

A: When we saw him, our asset introduced me to him as a "shabu scorer" sir. A: I properly introduced myself to Jhon Jhon as a police officer, sir.

xxxx xxxx

Q: So what was the reply of the accused? Q: Upon the arrival of your back-up team, what happened next?

A: He said, "Magkano ba?" and I answered, "Halagang piso" sir. A: They likewise introduced themselves as police officers and we recovered the buy bust
money which was taken from his right hand sir.
Q: What does "Piso" mean?
xxxx
A: ₱100.00 worth, sir.
Q: What happened next?
Q: After having conveyed your intention to buy ₱100.00 worth of shabu, what did the
accused do, if any? A: We apprised him of his rights, arrested him and brought him to our office sir.41

A: When I had given him the buy bust money, he pulled x x x the shabu out of his right
pocket pants, sir.
xxxx
Q: What did he do with the shabu which he pulled out of his right pocket?
A: He handed over the stuff to me, sir.
Q: And after this exchange of goods, what did you do if any?
From these exchanges, clearly it appears that the apprehending team did not photograph
or conduct a physical inventory of the item seized, whether at the place of seizure or at
the police station. The non-compliance by the apprehending team with the photograph
and physical inventory requirements under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR was also evident
in the testimony of another member of the buy-bust teams, PO1 Tan, who corroborated
PO1 Mengote’s testimony on material points. Notably, even the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest42 of the members of the entrapment team made no mention of any inventory or
photograph.
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure required by
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation
No. 7, Series of 1974.43 Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team,
having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives, who shall
be required to sign and be given copies of the inventory.
After the passage of R.A. No. 9165, the Court did not waver in ensuring that the
prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs were observed. In People v.
Rosemarie R. Salonga,44 we acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to
inventory and photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed the accused’s
conviction in Gutierrez,45 for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and
photograph the seized items without justifiable grounds. People v. Cantalejo46 also
resulted in an acquittal because no inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.
We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v. Erlinda Capuno y
Tison,47 People v. Jay Lorena y Labag,48 and People v. Arnold Martinez y Angeles, et
al.49
Lest the chain of custody rule be misunderstood, we clarify that non-compliance with the
prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and custody of
the items void and invalid; the seizure may still be held to be valid, provided that (a) there
is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are shown to have been properly preserved. These conditions,
however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not even attempt to
offer any justification for the failure of the police to follow the prescribed procedures in
the handling of the seized items. As we held in People v. Ronaldo De Guzman y
Danzil,50 the failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR
must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for the non-compliance must be
proven as a fact. The Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.
No Presumption of Regularity in
the Performance of Official Duties
In convicting the appellant of the crime charged, both the RTC and the CA relied on the
evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. However, this
presumption is not conclusive and cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The presumption of regularity, it must be emphasized, obtains
only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. Where the official
act in question is irregular on its face, no presumption of regularity can arise.51 Our
declaration in People v. Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta52 is particularly instructive:
It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The
presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of
the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official
duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular
on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. There is indeed merit in
the contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed
to the members of the buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said police operatives
had regularly performed their duty, but the theory is correct only where there is no
showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular. People v. Dulay and People v.
Ganenas in fact both suggest that the presumption of regularity is disputed where there is
deviation from the regular performance of duty. Suffice it to say at this point that the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is merely just that—a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence
cannot be regarded as binding truth.53
In the present case, the procedural lapses by the apprehending team in the handling of the
seized items – from their failure to mark it immediately upon confiscation, to their failure
to inventory and photograph it in the presence of the accused, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official,
without offering any justifiable ground – effectively negated the presumption of
regularity.
Conclusion
In fine, the totality of evidence presented in the present case does not support the
appellant's conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, since the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. The
prosecution’s failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the
chain of custody requirement of this Act compromised the identity of the item seized,
leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. In
accordance with the constitutional mandate that the guilt of the appellant must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, we hold – for failure to establish the required quantum of
evidence – that the presumption of innocence must prevail and acquittal should follow as
a matter of right.54
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 31, 2006
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01251. Appellant Jhon-Jhon
Alejandro y dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention, unless he is confined for another lawful cause.
On June 21, 2004 the Public Prosecutors Office of Rizal filed separate charges of
possession of dangerous drugs1before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rizal, Branch 2,
against the accused spouses Romeo in Criminal Case 7598 and Mercy Oniza in Criminal
Case 7599. The prosecution further charged the spouses with selling dangerous drugs in
Criminal Case 7600, all allegedly in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa The prosecution’s version is that at about 9:30 p.m. on June 16, 2004, PO1 Reynaldo M.
City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is Albarico, PO1 Fortunato P. Jiro III, and PO1 Jose Gordon Antonio of the Rodriguez
directed to report the action he has taken to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt Police Station in Rizal received information from a police asset that accused Mercy
of this Decision. Oniza was selling dangerous drugs at Phase 1-D Kasiglahan Village, Barangay San
Jose.2 They immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. After
SO ORDERED. coordinating its action with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the police team
proceeded to Kasiglahan Village on board an owner-type jeep. They brought with them
two pieces of pre-marked ₱100 bills.3
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
On arrival at the place, the team members positioned themselves at about 15 to 20 meters
WE CONCUR: from where they spotted Mercy Oniza and a male companion, later identified as her
accused husband Romeo Oniza. The police informant approached Mercy and initiated
the purchase. 4 He handed the two marked ₱100 bills to her which she in turn gave to
Romeo.5 After pocketing the money, the latter took out a plastic sachet of white
crystalline substance from his pocket and gave it to the informant. The latter then
4) G.R. No. 202709 July 3, 2013 scratched his head as a signal for the police officers to make an arrest.6

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, The police officers came out of concealment to arrest Mercy and Romeo.7 On seeing the
vs. police officers, however, the two quickly ran into their house, joined by Valentino
ROMEO ONIZA Y ONG AND MERCY ONIZA Y CABARLE, APPELLANTS. Cabarle (separately charged) who had earlier stood nearby, and locked the door behind
them. The officers rammed the door open to get in. They apprehended Mercy, Romeo,
DECISION and Valentino.8 Officer Jiro recovered four heat-sealed plastic sachets believed to contain
shabu from Mercy. Officer Albarico retrieved two marked ₱100 bills and a similar plastic
ABAD, J.: sachet from Romeo. Officer Antonio seized an identical sachet from Valentino. 9

This case is about the need to absolve the accused of the charges against them because of
the police officers’ outright failure without any justification to abide by the law governing
the conduct of seizure operations involving dangerous drugs.
The Facts and the Case
The police officers brought their three captives to the police station for investigation and
booking. Officer Jiro marked all the items the police seized and had these brought to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.10 After forensic
chemical analysis, the contents of the sachets proved to be shabu.11
The prosecution and the defense stipulated that the specimens that PO1 Annalee R.
Forro, a PNP forensic chemical officer, examined were methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu). They further stipulated, however, that Officer Forro "could not testify on the
source and origin of the subject specimens that she had examined."12 As a result, PO1
Forro did not testify and only her report was adduced by the prosecution as evidence.
The evidence for the accused shows, on the other hand, that at around 9:30 p.m. on June
16, 2004, the spouses Mercy and Romeo were asleep at their home when Mercy was
suddenly awakened by the voice of Belen Morales calling on her from outside the house.
As Mercy peeped through the window, Belen told her that the police had arrested and
mauled Mercy’s brother, Valentino. Mercy hurriedly ran out of the house to find out
what had happened to her brother.13
When Mercy got to where Valentino was, she saw some police officers forcibly getting
him into an owner-type jeep while Zenaida Cabarle, Mercy and Valentino’s mother, kept
pulling him out of the owner-type jeep. When Mercy approached Valentino, the police
officers told her to accompany him to the police station. This prompted her to shout for
her husband’s help.14
Meanwhile, when Romeo had awakened, he came out of the house, and saw two police
officers in black jackets, Albarico and Antonio, who approached him. They seized and
shoved him into the owner-type jeep to join Mercy and Valentino. Romeo noticed that
Valentino was grimacing in pain, having been beaten up by the police. 15
At the police station, the police officers asked their three captives to produce ₱30,000.00
in exchange for their release.16 Officer Antonio took out something from his pocket,
showed it to them, and told them that he would use it to press charges against them.
Afterwards, PO1 Antonio took Mercy to the kitchen room and hit her head with two
pieces of pot covers ("pinompyang").17
Nearly after five years of trial or on April 2, 2009 the RTC rendered a decision 18 that
found Romeo and Mercy guilty of possession of dangerous drugs in Criminal Cases 7598
and 7599, respectively, and imposed on them both the penalty of imprisonment of 12
years and 1 day to 20 years and a fine of ₱300,000.00. Further, the trial court found them
guilty of selling dangerous drugs in Criminal Case 7600 and imposed on them both the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00. The trial court, however,
acquitted Valentino of the separate charge of possession of dangerous drugs filed against
him in Criminal Case 7597.
On appeal in CA-G.R. CR-HC 04301, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgments
of conviction against Romeo and Mercy, hence, the present appeal to this Court.
Issue Presented
The issue presented in this case is whether or not the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Romeo and Mercy were in possession of and were selling
dangerous drugs when the team of police officers arrested them on June 16, 2004.
Ruling of the Court
The law prescribes certain procedures in keeping custody and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs like the shabu that the police supposedly confiscated from Romeo and
Mercy on June 16, 2004. Section 21 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 reads:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Compliance with the above, especially the required physical inventory and photograph of
the seized drugs in the presence of the accused, the media, and responsible government
functionaries, would be clear evidence that the police had carried out a legitimate buy-
bust operation. Here, the prosecution was unable to adduce such evidence, indicating
that the police officers did not at all comply with prescribed procedures. Worse, they
offered no excuse or explanation at the hearing of the case for their blatant omission of
what the law required of them.
Apart from the above, the prosecution carried the burden of establishing the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs that the police allegedly seized from the accused on the
night of June 16, 2004. It should establish the following links in that chain of custody of
the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.19
Still, jurisprudence has established a rare exception with respect to the first required
link—immediate seizure and marking of the seized items in the presence of the accused
and others20—namely, that (a) there must be justifiable grounds for non-compliance with
the procedures; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.
Here, the prosecution’s own evidence as recited by the CA and the RTC is that the police
officers did not make a physical inventory of the seized drugs nor did they take a picture
of the same in the presence of the accused, someone in the media, a Department of
Justice (DOJ) representative, and any elected public official.
All that Officer Albarico could say is that his companion, Officer Jiro, marked the plastic
sachets with the initials of the accused already at the police station and then turned over
the same to the desk officer who prepared the Request for Laboratory
Examination.21 Thus:
Pros. Gonzales : And after that, what, if any, did you do next?
PO1 Albarico : After arresting them, we brought them to our police station, sir.
Pros. Gonzales : And at the station, Mr. Witness, what happened to the items that you
said was [sic] recovered from the possession of accused Romeo?
PO1 Albarico : We have the pieces of evidence blottered, sir.
Pros. Gonzales : And thereafter, what happened to the evidence gathered, Mr. Witness?
PO1 Albarico : PO1 Jiro marked the evidence, sir.
xxxx
Pros. Gonzales : Mr. Witness, those substance[s] that were marked by PO1 Jiro, what
happened to them after the markings?
PO1 Albarico : After marking the pieces of evidence, he turned them over to the Desk
Officer and prepared a request for examination and those were brought to Camp Crame
for examination, sir.
xxxx
Pros. Gonzales : If you know, what was the result of the request for examination?
PO1 Albarico : As far as we know, it is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.
Yet, the police officers did not bother to offer any sort of reason or justification for their
failure to make an inventory and take pictures of the drugs immediately after their seizure
in the presence of the accused and the other persons designated by the law. Both the RTC
and the CA misapprehended the significance of such omission. It is imperative for the
prosecution to establish a justifiable cause for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements set by law.22The procedures outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 are not
merely empty formalities—these are safeguards against abuse,23 the most notorious of
which is its use as a tool for extortion.24
And what is the prosecution’s evidence that the substances, which the police chemist
examined and found to be shabu, were the same substances that the police officers
allegedly seized from Romeo and Mercy? No such evidence exists. As pointed out above,
the prosecution stipulated with the accused that the police chemist "could not testify on
the source and origin of the subject specimens that she had examined." No police officer
testified out of personal knowledge that the substances given to the police chemist and
examined by her were the very same substances seized from the accused.1âwphi1
In regard to the required presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media and an
elective official, the prosecution also did not bother to offer any justification, even a
hollow one, for failing to comply with such requirement. What is more, the police
officers could have easily coordinated with any elected barangay official in the conduct of
the police operation in the locality.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the February 23, 2012
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 04301, which affirmed the April 2,
2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Cases 7598, 7599, and 7600 and,
accordingly, ACQUITS the accused-appellants Romeo Oniza y Ong and Mercy Oniza y
Cabarle of the charges against them in those cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The National Police Commission is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE PO1 Reynaldo M.
Albarico, PO1 Fortunato P. Jiro III and PO1 Jose Gordon Antonio for the possible filing
of appropriate charges, if warranted.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE
both the above accused-appellants from custody unless they are detained for some other
lawful cause.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in its Decision dated
20 January 2009 (RTC Decision), found Climaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and
sentenced him to imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months with a
fine of ₱ 300,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL.1 In Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL,
the RTC found Climaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of
₱500,000.00. On appeal, the Special Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
its Decision dated 29 March 2011 (CA Decision), affirmed the RTC Decision. 2 Climaco
appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal in accordance with Section 3(c), Rule
122 of the Rules of Court.3

No costs. Prosecution’s Version

SO ORDERED. The prosecution’s version of events is summarized in the RTC Decision:4

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Vs. Peralta, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur. The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses in the persons of PO1 Alaindelon M.
Ignacio, who gave his testimony on 5 January 2005, 8 February 2006 and 2 August 2006;
and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa Huelgas, whose testimony was dispensed with on 5
January 2005 upon defense’s admission of the existence of the following: 1) Written
Request for Laboratory Examination as Exhibit "A"; 2) The Chemistry Report No. D-
5) G.R. No. 199403 June 13, 2012 1102-04 as Exhibit "B"; 3) 1 ½ white envelope as Exhibit "C"; 4) the existence of two (2)
plastic sachets with markings "GSC-1" as Exhibit "C-1"; and 5) another one with
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, markings "GSC-2" as Exhibit "C-2".
vs.
GOMER S. CLIMACO, Appellant. PO1 Ignacio testified that he is a member of the Philippine National Police since 15
October 1999 and was assigned at Intelligence Division, San Pedro Municipal Police
DECISION Station. As member of the Intelligence Division, he was tasked to conduct surveillance
operation and apprehend persons engaged in illegal drug activity. On 7 September 2004,
he was on 24-hour duty at PAC base located at United Bayanihan, San Pedro, Laguna.
CARPIO, J.:
At around 6:00 in the evening of the same day, PO1 Ignacio, SPO3 Samson, SPO4
Balverde, some members of the Laguna Special Operation Team, Members of the
The Case Provincial Intelligence and Investigation Division conducted a briefing regarding a drug
operation against a certain Gomer Climaco, No. 5 in the drug watch list in San Pedro,
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against appellant Gomer S. Climaco (Climaco) Laguna. During the briefing, PO1 Ignacio was tasked to act as the poseur-buyer and
for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive SPO4 Almeda as the overall team leader. The buy-bust money was prepared, which
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for illegal possession (Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL) and consist of P500.00 bill and some boodle money. The team was also armed with a
illegal sale (Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL) of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a Warrant of Arrest for illegal drugs issued by Judge Paño. After the briefing, the team
dangerous drug. proceeded to the target area. When they arrived, PO1 Ignacio saw the suspect standing in
front of his house. The other members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
Since PO1 Ignacio already knew the suspect, PO1 Ignacio just told Gomer that he would
buy shabu. Gomer entered his house and took something. When he came out, Gomer
showed to PO1 Ignacio the shabu. PO1 Ignacio scratched his head to signal the team that
item was shown to him and he would execute the buying of the shabu. After Gomer
asked for the money and PO1 Ignacio gave it to him, SPO3 Samson and the rest of the
team immediately moved in to effect the arrest of the suspect. Since he was caught in the
act, Gomer did not resist anymore. The team likewise showed Gomer his warrant of
arrest. PO1 Ignacio saw SPO3 Samson frisk and ask Gomer to empty his pockets. SPO3
Samson was able to recover another plastic sachet, which was inserted between Gomer’s
fingers. The plastic sachet, which was the product of the buy-bust, and the one recovered
from Gomer were turned over to SPO4 Teofilo Royena, who turned them over to the
Office of the Special Operation Group located at Brgy. Tubigan, Biñan, Laguna. The
plastic sachet product of the buy-bust was marked TR-B, which means Teofilo Royena
and the letter "B" means "Bust." While the plastic sachet recovered from Gomer was
marked TR-R, which means Teofilo Royena and the letter "R" means "Recovered". PO1
Ignacio identified the accused Gomer Climaco in open court. He likewise identified his
sworn statement. During the cross-examination, PO1 Ignacio admitted that he learned of
the warrant of arrest on 7 September 2004 only. It was SPO4 Valverde who instructed
PO Ignacio to conduct surveillance operation against Gomer, who was engaged in
rampant selling of shabu.5
Aside from the testimony of PO1 Alaindelon Ignacio (Ignacio), the following
documentary exhibits were offered for the prosecution: (1) Exhibit "A" – Letter dated 7
September 2004; (2) Exhibit "B" – Chemistry Report No. D-1102-04; (3) Exhibit "C" –
One-half white envelope; (4) Exhibit "C-1" – Plastic sachet with white crystalline
substance with markings "GSC-1"; (5) Exhibit "C-2" – Plastic sachet with white
crystalline susbtance with markings "GSC-2"; and (6) Exhibit "D" – Pinanumpaang
Salaysay of PO1 Ignacio.6
Defense’s Version
Appellant Climaco, on the other hand, presented three witnesses and denied the
prosecution’s allegations of sale and possession of shabu. The defense’s version of the
events, as narrated in the RTC Decision, is as follows:
The defense presented three (3) witnesses in the persons of the accused himself, Gomer S.
Climaco, who testified on 13 May 2008, Michael M. Basihan, who gave his testimony on
7 October 2008, and Cristina Gamboa Climaco, who gave her testimony on 25
November 2008.
Gomer S. Climaco testified that prior to 7 September 2004, he did not know SPO2
Wilfredo Samson and PO1 Alaindelon Ignacio. On 7 September 2004, Gomer, together
with his wife and five (5) children, were inside their house. When Gomer was feeding the
chicken in front of his yard, four (4) unidentified armed men suddenly arrived and frisked
him. When nothing was found in his possession, the men handcuffed and brought him to
the police station. At the police station, the men filed a case against him. Gomer denied
having sold and delivered shabu to a police poseur-buyer and that he was in possesion of
shabu. During the cross-examination, Gomer said that while he was being frisked by the
men, Gomer asked the men what was his violation. The men replied that somebody
bought shabu from him. Gomer told the men that he did nothing wrong, but the men
continued to handcuff him. Gomer was not aware that he was included in the list of top
20 illegal drug pushers. Gomer did not know of any ill motive on the part of the police
officer why he would be charged with so grave an offense. He did not file any case
against the police officer who arrested him.
Michael M. Basihan testified that Gomer Climaco was his neighbor in Bagong Silang.
On 7 September 2004, Michael went to Gomer’s manukan to gather guava fruits. When
he arrived there, Gomer was tending to his cocks. While he was gathering guava fruits,
Michael saw four (4) unidentified armed men suddenly barge into the premises and arrest
Gomer. After he was handcuffed, Gomer was made to board a vehicle where he was
brought to Jaka Subdivision. Michael could not remember whether it was morning or
evening when Gomer was arrested by unidentified armed men because the incident
happened a long time ago.
Cristina Gamboa Climaco testified that she is the wife of Gomer Climaco. She did not
know SPO2 Wilfredo Samson and PO1 Alaindelon Ignacio. On 7 September 2004, she
was inside their house taking care of her child. At around 3:00 in the afternoon of the
same day, Gomer arrived in their house, who just came from Barangay Cuyab. After
taking a bath, Gomer went outside of their house. While in front of their house, Gomer
called the person taking care of his chickens. Gomer and that person went to the back of
the house. Meanwhile, Cristina went inside the house. Although she was inside of the
house, Cristina could see Gomer and the person through the window. At around 4:00 in
the afternoon, Cristina saw four (4) unidentified armed men approach and ask something
from Gomer. After a few minutes, Gomer left the back of the house, while the men were
left standing there. Cristina went out the house and saw her husband go toward the
direction of St. Reymond. At around 6:00 in the evening, Cirstina went down from their
house to ask Michael if he saw Gomer. Michael told Cristina that he saw Gomer loaded
into a van by several men. During the cross-examination, Cristina said that she did not
know of any reason why SPO2 Samson and PO1 Ignacio would arrest her husband. 7
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC declared Climaco guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The dispositive portion of
the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL, the Court finds the accused, Gomer S.
Climaco, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 5 of R.A.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱ 500,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL, the Court finds the accused, Gomer S. Climaco,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 11 of R.A. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of three hundred thousand pesos (₱ 300,000.00).
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the plastic sachets subject matter of these cases, for said agency’s
appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that the elements for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of shabu were sufficiently established by the prosecution.9 The RTC held that Climaco’s
defense of frame-up is viewed with disfavor as it can be easily concocted.10 The RTC gave
full faith and credit to the testimony of PO1 Ignacio, and declared the police officers who
participated in the buy-bust operation were properly performing their duties because they
were not inspired by any improper motive.11
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the conviction of Climaco. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the judgment dated January 20, 2009 of the
RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 4911-SPL and 4912-SPL finding appellant Gomer S.
Climaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Rep. Act
No. 9165 is AFFIRMED.12
The CA declared that all the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs were proven.13 The CA found that based on the testimony of PO1
Ignacio, it was established that the chain of custody over the seized drugs was unbroken
from the arresting officers to SPO4 Royena, and then to the forensic chemist for
examination.14
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Ruling of this Court
We resolve to acquit Climaco for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
PO1 Ignacio, in his testimony, claimed that the dangerous drugs seized from Climaco
were marked by SPO4 Teofilo Royena as "TR-B" and "TR-R."15 However, the Chemistry
Report submitted to the trial court shows that the dangerous drugs examined and
confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu by the forensic chemist were
marked as "GSC1" and "GSC2."16 Since what was seized ("TR-B" and "TR-R") by PO1
Ignacio from Climaco at the time of the buy-bust operation was different from the
dangerous drugs submitted ("GSC1" and "GSC2") to the forensic chemist for review and
evaluation, the chain of custody over the dangerous drugs was broken and the integrity of
the evidence submitted to the trial court was not preserved, casting doubt on the guilt of
Climaco.
Constitutional Presumption of Innocence; Weight of Evidence
The Constitution guarantees the accused’s presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights (Article III) provides that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court likewise states that, in a criminal case, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding
possibility of error, which produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainly is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
"Chain of Custody" Over the Confiscated Items
The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment.17 Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be
proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti which means the "actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged."18 The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the
dangerous drug itself.
On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.19
In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to establish the corpus delicti. In People v.
Alcuizar,20 the Court held:
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This
requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic that renders it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution
either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity
and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant;
otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, 21 which
implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines "chain of custody"
as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.
In Malillin v. People,22 the Court explained the importance of the chain of custody:
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act
of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with
the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession
will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a
finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable,
or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is Q: Where were you when he placed the markings?
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange.
In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering – A: I was present, maam.
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not – dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. Q: Do you know what markings was made?

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest
when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature
and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham v.
State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance was later
analyzed as heroin – was handled by two police officers prior to examination who
however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the
time it was in their possession – was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court
pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have
been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or
testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came
into the posession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine
its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible.
A: He placed his initials TR which means Teofilo Royena and the letter B which means
bust, maam.
Q: I’m showing to you a plastic sachet with the markings TR-B, please go over this and
tell if this is the same item which you confiscated from the accused?
A: Yes, maam. This is the same.
PROS. CASANO: Your Honor, the brown envelope which contains the plastic sachet
has already been marked as Exhibit "C", the plastic sachet as Exhibit "C-1" and the
markings TR-B as Exhibit "C-2" (Continuing).

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in xxxx
fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood or at least the possibility, that at Q: Tell us the markings that was placed?
any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases – by accident or otherwise – in
A: It’s TR-R, the R means recovered, maam.
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that
applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more Q: How sure are you that the items marked by SPO4 Teofilo Royena TR-R was the same
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness item taken by SPO3 Samson from the accused?
if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with. A: Because there was a difference between the two plastic sachets, the items recovered by
SPO3 Samson was a little bit bigger, maam.
In this case, PO1 Ignacio, in his testimony, claimed that the substances seized from
Climaco during the buy-bust operation were marked as "TR-R" and "TR-B": Q: I’m showing to you a bigger plastic sachet with the markings TR- R, are you referring
to this?
Q: When SPO4 Almeida handed over the items to SPO4 Teofilo Royena, what if any did
SPO4 Royena do with the items? A: Yes, maam.23

A: He placed markings on it, maam. Based on the testimony of PO1 Ignacio, the substances retrieved from Climaco and
submitted to the court were contained in two (2) plastic sachets with the markings "TR-
R" and "TR-B." However, according to the Chemistry Report executed by Forensic
Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas on 8 September 2004, the plastic sachets submitted for
examination carried the markings "GSC-1" and "GSC-2," different from the plastic
sachets marked "TR-R" and "TR-B" containing the drugs retrieved from Climaco:
CHEMISTRY REPORT NUMBER: D-1102-04
xxxx
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A – One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, with markings "GSC1",
containing 0.35 gram of white crystalline substance and placed in a staple-sealed
transparent plastic bag. (Allegedly bought by the Police Poseur-Buyer)
B – One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, with markings "GSC2",
containing 0.14 gram of white crystalline substance and placed in a staple-sealed
transparent plastic bag. (Allegedly found from the posession of Glomer
Climaco)24
In addition, in the Index of Exhibits submitted by the Officer-in-Charge of the RTC,
Exhibit "C-1" was described as a "plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with
markings ‘GSC-1’" while Exhibit "C-2" was described as a "plastic sachet with white
crystalline substance with markings ‘GSC-2,’"25 contrary to the testimony of PO1 Ignacio
and the declaration of Prosecutor Casano that the specimens submitted to the court
carried the markings "TR-B" and "TR-R."
Likewise, in the handwritten Minutes dated 5 January 2005, Exhibit "C-1" was identified
as a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with marking "GSC-1," and Exhibit
"C-2" was identified as a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with marking
"GSC-2."26
Clearly, what was submitted to the trial court were plastic sachets bearing the markings
"GSC-1" and "GSC-2," instead of the plastic sachets bearing the markings "TR-R" and
"TR-B" that contained the substances recovered from Climaco. This fact is evident from
the RTC Decision, recognizing Exhibits "C-1" and "C-2" to bear the markings "GSC-1"
and "GSC-2," while acknowledging the testimony of PO1 Ignacio that the plastic sachets
containing the substances recovered from Climaco bore the markings "TR-R" and "TR-
B":
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses in the persons of x x x Forensic Chemist
Donna Villa Huelgas, whose testimony was dispensed with on 5 January 2005 upon
defense’s admission of the existence of the following: 1) Written Request for Laboratory
Examination as Exhibit "A"; 2) The Chemistry Report No. D-1102-04 as Exhibit "B"; 3)
1 ½ white envelope as Exhibit "C"; 4) the existence of two (2) plastic sachets with
markings "GSC-1" as Exhibit "C-1"; and 5) another one with markings "GSC-2" as
Exhibit "C-2".
xxxx
The plastic sachet product of the buy-bust was marked TR-B, which means Teofilo
Royena and the letter "B" means "Bust." While the plastic sachet recovered from Gomer
was marked TR-R, which means Teofilo Royena and the letter "R" means
"Recovered".27 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution did not explain why the markings of the plastic sachets containing the
alleged drugs, which were submitted to be "TR-B" and "TR-R," became "GSC-1" and
"GSC-2" in the Chemistry Report, Index of Exhibits and Minutes of the Hearing. In their
decisions, the RTC and CA were silent on the change of the markings. In fact, since the
markings are different, the presumption is that the substance in the plastic sachets marked
as "TR-B" and "TR-R" is different from the substance in the plastic sachets marked as
"GSC-1" and "GSC-2." There is no moral certainty that the substance taken from
appellant is the same dangerous drug submitted to the laboratory and the trial
court.1âwphi1
As held in Malillin v. People,28 to establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in
cases involving dangerous drugs, it is important that the substance illegally possessed in
the first place be the same substance offered in court as exhibit. This chain of custody
requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts are removed concerning the identity of the
evidence. When the identity of the dangerous drug recovered from the accused is not the
same dangerous drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, nor
the same dangerous drug presented to the court, the identity of the dangerous drug is not
preserved due to the broken chain of custody. With this, an element in the criminal cases
for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is not proven,
and the accused must then be acquitted based on reasonable doubt. For this reason,
Climaco must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt due to the broken chain of Senior Associate Justice
custody over the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from him. (Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 29 March 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03860 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna in Criminal Case Nos. 4911-SPL and 4912-SPL
dated 20 January 2009. We ACQUIT appellant Gomer S. Climaco based on reasonable 6) G.R. No. 195528 July 24, 2013
doubt and we ORDER his immediate release from detention, unless he is detained for
any other lawful cause.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
We DIRECT the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement this Decision and JOSE CLARA y BUHAIN, Accused-Appellant.
to report to this Court on the action taken within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
PEREZ, J.:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Joel Clara y Buhain (Joel) from the Decision 1 of
Senior Associate Justice
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of conviction rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.2
WE CONCUR:
The factual rendition of the prosecution follows:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Prosecution witness P03 Leonardo R. Ramos (P03 Ramos) narrated that he acted as a
poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted by their office, the District Anti-Illegal
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Drug Special Task Group (DAID-SOTG) of Quezon City on 12 September 2005.3 He
Associate Justice Associate Justice recalled that on or about 4:00 o’clock in afternoon of the said date, a male informant
came to their office with the information that a person named "Ningning" was selling
BIENVENIDO L. REYES drugs at 22-C Salvador Drive, Balonbato, Quezon City.4 Police team leader SPO2 Dante
Associate Justice D. Nagera (SPO2 Nagera) endorsed the matter to their Chief of Office Col. Gerardo B.
Ratuita (Col. Ratuita) for the conduct of a buy-bust operation.5 A buy-bust group was
created consisting of SPO2 Nagera, PO1 Peggy Lynne V. Vargas (PO1 Vargas), PO1
CERTIFICATION
Teresita B. Reyes (PO1 Reyes), PO1 Alexander A. Jimenez (PO1 Jimenez) and PO3
Ramos who was designated as the poseur-buyer.6During the briefing, it was agreed upon
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation that ₱200.00-worth of shabu would be bought from "Ningning" by PO3 Ramos. Before
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. leaving for their target, PO1 Reyes prepared a Pre-Operation Report and forwarded it to
the Tactical Operation Communication of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
ANTONIO T. CARPIO (PDEA) for coordination.7 At 8:00 o’clock in the evening, the team proceeded to the area
on board three vehicles: Nissan Sentra, Toyota Corolla and owner-type jeep.8 Upon their
arrival at 9:35 o’clock in the evening, PO3 Ramos and the informant knocked on the
door of the house while the rest of the team positioned themselves ten meters away.9 The
informant identified "Gigi" as the accused Joel, Ningning’s uncle.10 Initiating a
conversation, the informant introduced to Joel PO3 Ramos as a buyer of ₱200.00-peso
worth of illegal drug. When PO3 Ramos asked for Ningning, Joel answered that she was
upstairs. Joel asked for payment and PO3 Ramos handed the ₱200 marked money.11 Joel
went upstairs and called Ningning. Ningning opened the door and handed Joel a small
plastic sachet of shabu which in turn was handed to PO3 Ramos.12
Thereafter, PO3 Ramos touched his head as a pre-arranged signal to prompt the back-up
police officers of the consummation of the illegal sale. Immediately, the rest of the team
rushed to the place to arrest Joel.13 Joel tried to close the door to prevent the police
officers from entering the house but PO3 Ramos was able to grab him. SPO2 Nagera
quickly went upstairs to arrest Ningning but the latter was able to escape
apprehension.14 PO3 Ramos immediately frisked Joel inside the house but failed to
recover anything from him; the marked money was given to Ningning when Joel went
upstairs to get the plastic sachet.15
Joel was brought to the police station and was informed by PO1 Jimenez of his
constitutional rights as a consequence of his arrest.16 Afterwards, the small plastic sachet
recovered was marked by PO1 Jimenez inside the station and an inventory receipt was
prepared.17 PO3 Ramos clarified that the plastic sachet was in the possession of PO1
Jimenez from the place of arrest until arrival at the police station. PO3 Ramos added that
PO1 Jimenez was present at the time of arrest which explained his possession of the
plastic sachet containing shabu.18
Inside the courtroom, PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the one involved in the illegal
transaction.19 He also identified the small plastic sachet of shabu as the subject of the
illegal transaction through the marking "LRR" he placed on it. 20 He testified that he
brought the plastic sachet containing the specimen to the crime laboratory for
examination21where it was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, as
certified by the examining Forensic Chemist Engr. Leonard M. Jabonillo (Forensic
Chemist Jabonillo) of Central Police District Crime Laboratory in his Chemistry
Report.22
SPO2 Nagera was also called to the witness stand to present his version of the events.
However, some inconsistencies surfaced during his examination at the witness stand.
When asked about the gender of the informant who came to their office, he answered
that the informant was a female, contradicting the statement of PO3 Ramos.23 He also
differed from the statement of PO3 Ramos when he testified that only two modes of
transportation, instead of three, were used by the buy-bust team in proceeding to the
target area, one Nissan Maxima and one owner-type jeep.24 He also had difficulty in
identifying the accused inside the court room when he was asked upon by the prosecutor
to do so.25
Further contradiction was made when SPO2 Nagera narrated that PO3 Ramos was the
one holding the plastic sachet before it was turned over to PO1 Jimenez for
investigation.26 He also admitted in his cross examination that he never saw Ningning
during the entire buy-bust operation.27 Finally, when asked about on who placed the
initial "LRR" on the plastic sachet, he positively identified that it was the investigator
who put the same.28
PO1 Jimenez was also presented in court as a prosecution witness to give details of the
buy-bust operation. His version, however, also differed from the versions presented by
PO3 Ramos and SPO2 Nagera. He testified that the plastic sachet confiscated was
already marked by the apprehending officers when it was turned over to him for
investigation, a contradiction of the statements of both PO3 Ramos and SPO2 Nagera
that it was him who marked the plastic sachet with the initial "LRR."29 He positively
identified that he saw the item being marked by the apprehending officers in their office.30
The defense interposed denial.
Accused Joel denied any involvement in the buy-bust operation. He recalled that he was
inside his house sleeping between 9:00 to 10:00 o’clock in the evening of 12 September
2005 when five uniformed police officers entered his house.31 They got hold of his arm
and frisked him but failed to recover anything.32 The police officers did not inform him of
the reason for his arrest; neither did they recite his constitutional rights. Afterwards, he
was made to ride an owner type vehicle and was taken to the police station where he was
only asked for his name.33 He denied having sold drugs and having seen the marked
money and plastic sachet containing shabu.34
On cross examination, Joel was also inconsistent in portions of his testimony. He
testified that all of his siblings were in the province and his only companions in the house
at the time of the arrest were his nephew and niece.35However, when asked why the door
was still open at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, he replied that he was waiting for
his sister.36 He also contradicted his earlier statement that he was sleeping with his
nephew and niece downstairs when in his cross examination he said that his niece was
staying on the second floor of the house at the time of the arrival of the police officers. 37
Joel was eventually charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs punishable under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 before the Prosecutor’s Office of Quezon City. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
Criminal Case No. 05-136719
That on or about the 12th day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver,
transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, ZERO POINT ZERO
SEVEN (0.07) gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. 38
When arraigned, Joel pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.39
During pre-trial, it was agreed upon by both parties that Forensic Chemist Jabonillo had
no personal knowledge as to how the plastic sachet containing specimen positive for
illegal drug came to of police officers’ possession. The forensic chemist merely examined
the specimen and found it to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. As a
consequence of these stipulations, his testimony was dispensed with by the court.40
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court on 21 March 2007 found the accused guilty of the offense charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision41 reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered finding the accused JOEL CLARA Y
BUHAIN GUILTY beyond reasonable of the crime in violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 as
charged (for drug pushing) and he is sentenced to suffer the prescribed jail term of Life
Imprisonment and pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The shabu weighing 0.07 gram involved in this case is ordered transmitted to the PDEA
thru DDB for disposal in accordance with R.A. 9165.42
The trial court ruled that Joel directly dealt with the poseur buyer and participated in all
the stages of the illegal sale. It found conspiracy between Joel and Ningning. It pointed
out that Ningning was able to escape the police dragnet while Joel was being arrested
because of her familiarity as a drug operator with police operations.
The police operation and its coordination with the operatives of the PDEA would be
recognized by the appellate court as legally performed.43 On the contrary the
prosecution’s scenario that the police officers entered Joel’s residence and hauled him out
with no reason at all was found to be improbable.44
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the appellate court ruled that all the elements of
an illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present.45 First, Joel, as the seller of illegal drug,
was positively identified by the poseur buyer and the police officers; Second, the
confiscated white crystalline substance which was found by the PNP crime laboratory as
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug was presented
during trial; and Lastly, the illegal sale was for a consideration of ₱200.00 given by PO3
Ramos as poseur buyer. The appellate court further held that the non-presentation of the
marked money was not fatal since the prosecution witnesses were able to establish that
the ₱200.00 bill used to purchase the illegal drug was in the possession of Ningning who
was able to evade arrest.46
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence, we resolve to reverse the ruling of conviction and
render a judgment of acquittal in favor of the accused.
In his Brief, the accused-appellant contested his conviction due to the inconsistencies in
the prosecution’s presentation of a supposed buy-bust operation, coupled with its failure
to establish with certainty the chain of custody of evidence. He also argued against the
presumption of regularity of performance of duties. Finally, to substantiate his innocence,
he pointed out that he was not even the target person in the PDEA Coordination Report
and denied any conspiracy and involvement with such target person named "Ningning." 47
Inspite of the imperfect narration of events by the accused Joel, we are constrained to
render a judgment of acquittal due to the lapses of the prosecution that led to its failure to
discharge the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the
crime.
In order to successfully prosecute an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, A: He asked how much.
the following elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and Q: What was your answer?
the payment therefor.
A: I said ‘dos’.
It is basic in criminal prosecutions that an accused is presumed innocent of the charge
laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the Q: After informing him that you intend to buy dos of illegal drug, what happened?
burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of
evidence required.
A: I first asked where is Ningning.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that Q: What was the answer of Gigi?
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.48 It must rest on its
own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to A: He said that she was upstairs.
meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present
evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the presumption prevails and the accused Q: What happened after that?
should necessarily be acquitted.49
A: He asked for my money, sir.
In this case, the prosecution failed to overcome such presumption when it presented
inconsistent versions of an illegal sale. Q: Did you give the ₱200.00.

PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the seller who sold to him a small plastic sachet containing A: Yes sir, I gave the money.
shabu in exchange of two hundred pesos. We quote the relevant portions:
Q: After giving that money to Gigi, what happened after that?
FISCAL (to witness)
A: He called Ningning from up stair (sic).
Q: What happened there?
Q: Did Ningning go to the place where you were talking with Gigi at that time?
A: When we reached the house sir, we knocked at the door and alias Gigi open (sic) it.
A: No sir, she just open (sic) the door and handed the sachet of shabu.
xxxx
xxxx
Q: What was the conversation with you during that time?
Q: When he received that from Ningning at that time, what did you do?
A: The informant first introduced me to Gigi that I will be the one to buy shabu.
A: After Gigi got it he gave it to me, sir.
Q: What was the answer of Gigi at that time?
Q: Can you describe that item you received from Gigi that came from Ningning at that Q: Now, going [back] to the police station, other than searching, what other matters were
time? taken during the arrest?

A: Yes sir. A: The evidence that I was able to get from Ningning and it was the investigator who
marked it.
Q: Can you describe?
Q: Other than putting the initial on the transparent plastic sachet immediately after the
A: Yes sir, just a small plastic sachet. 50 arrest Mr. Witness, what was the SOP in a buy-bust operation, after taking or receiving
the item from the accused during the arrest?
PO3 Ramos initially testified that he placed his marking on the small plastic sachet he
was able to buy from Joel: A: We made the inventory receipt, sir.52 (Emphasis supplied)

Q: If that small plastic sachet is shown to you can you indentify the specimen? xxxx

A: Yes, sir. Q: x x x. You said that it was the investigator who made the marking in the transparent
plastic sachet, where were you when the marking was placed on it?
Q: Why?
A: I was in front of the investigator.
A: Because I placed my marking.
Q: What was the marking placed?
Q: What marking did you place?
A: LRR.53 (Emphasis supplied)
A: LRR.
xxxx
Q: Showing to you this transparent plastic sachet containing illegal drug, what can you
say about that, what is the relation of that transparent plastic sachet to the plastic sachet Q: You said that the investigator placed the marking in the transparent plastic sachet and
you have just mentioned? likewise he was the one who made the inventory receipt. In what particular place that he
prepared this particular document?
A: That is the sachet I was able to buy, sir.
A: At the area, sir.
Q: Where is the marking?
Q: What do you mean by area?
A: It was on top of the plastic sachet. (Emphasis supplied)
51

A: In front of the house of the accused, sir.

However, he would later present a new version on who marked the plastic sachet:
Q: What is the name of that investigator again?
A: Alexander Jimenez, sir.54 (Emphasis supplied)
The testimony of PO3 Ramos, which apparently was given as proof of all the elements
that constitute an illegal sale of drug is however, inconsistent on material points from the
recollection of events of PO3 Ramos, SPO2 Nagera and PO1 Jimenez regarding the
marking, handling and turnover of the plastic sachet containing the dangerous drug of
shabu.
SPO2 Nagera narrated that it was PO1 Jimenez who marked the plastic sachet after it
was handed by PO3 Ramos:
Q: What did the investigator do to shabu, Mr. Witness?
A: They placed their initial and prepared request for examination address to the Crime
Laboratory sir.55 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Q: Where was PO3 Ramos when that plastic sachet, when the police investigator put the
initial, Mr. Witness?
A: We were there sir.56 (Emphasis supplied)
However, PO1 Jimenez later testified that it was PO3 Ramos who marked the plastic
sachet in their office.
Q: Being the investigator you saw the item confiscated?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was it already marked when it was received by you?
A: It was already marked by the apprehending officers.
Q: Did you see it marked by the apprehending officer?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: In our office.57 (Emphasis supplied)
Contradictory statements were further made as to who between PO3 Ramos and PO1
Jimenez held the shabu from the time of the arrest until arrival at the police station. PO3
Ramos pointed to PO1 Jimenez in his direct examination:
Q: You said immediately after arresting and searching the accused in this case you said
that you brought the accused to the police station, who was in possession of the
transparent plastic sachet from where you received that transparent plastic sachet in
exchange to ₱200.00 going to the police station Mr. Witness?
A: The investigator, sir.
Q: You mean to say that investigator was present when the accused was arrested in this
case?
A: Yes sir, he was with us.58 (Emphasis supplied)
However, SPO2 Nagera pointed to PO3 Ramos as the one in possession:
Q: What about the shabu, who was holding it in going to the police station, Mr. Witness?
A: Ramos, sir.
Q: What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: It was turn (sic) over to the police investigator, sir.59 (Emphasis supplied)
The clear inconsistency in the presentation of facts is fatal. It creates doubts whether the
transaction really occurred or not. Though Joel’s denial as a defense is weak, such cannot
relieve the prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an
illegal transaction actually took place.60
Inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses referring to the events that transpired in the
buy-bust operation can overturn the judgment of conviction. As held in Zaragga v.
People,61 material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the
shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt
as to the identity of the corpus delicti. Prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the
identity of the shabu led to the acquittal of the accused in that case. 62
Inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect
of the crime do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility. If the cited inconsistency has
nothing to do with the elements of a crime, it does not stand as a ground to reverse a
conviction.63 However, in this case, the material inconsistencies are furthered by
inconsistencies of the police officers on minor details. Referring back to the narration of
circumstances of the buy-bust operation, SPO2 Nagera was asked about the gender of the
informant who went to their office to report about the illegal activities committed by
Ningning.1âwphi1 He readily answered that the informant was a female.64 PO3 Ramos in
turn, when asked to describe what happened in the afternoon before the buy-bust
operation, testified that a male informant came to their office to report about a person
selling illegal drugs.65
These conflicting statements of the prosecution effectively broke the chain of custody of
evidence of the sale of dangerous drug.
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
provides for the procedure to be observed in preserving the integrity of chain of custody:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for disposition in the
following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copy thereof. Provided, that the
physical inventory and the photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at least the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending team/officer, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
"Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and finally for destruction. Such record
of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.66
To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish
the following links, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.67.
The "objective test" in determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the
conduct of buy-bust operation provides that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a
complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation—from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of
sale.68 The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug,
the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully
induced to commit an offense.69
In view of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to present a clear
picture on how the police officers seized and marked the illegal drug recovered by the
apprehending officer and how the specimen was turned over by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer.
As to the first link of marking, the three police officers failed to agree on who among
them marked the plastic sachet, which is highly improbable if they really had a clear
grasp on what really transpired on the day of operation.
PO3 Ramos testified that he placed his marking on the small plastic sachet but recanted
his previous statement at the latter part of the examination and pointed out that it was the
investigator PO1 Jimenez who put the marking in front of him at the area of
arrest.70 SPO2 Nagera in his testimony confirmed that it was PO1 Jimenez who put
marking on the plastic sachet.71 However, PO1 Jimenez in his testimony clarified that the
item confiscated were already marked by the apprehending officers when it was turned
over to him in their office.72
Likewise, they cannot seem to agree on the second link on who among them held the
item confiscated from the time of arrest and confiscation until it was turned over to the
investigator and the place where it was turned over.
PO3 Ramos positively pointed that it was PO1 Jimenez who took possession of the item
from the time of the arrest until arrival at the police station.73 However, when SPO2
Nagera was asked, he pointed out that it was PO3 Ramos who held the item from the
time of the arrest until they reached the police where it was turned over to Jimenez for
investigation.74
In Malillin v. People,75 it was explained that the chain of custody rule includes testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.76
The inconsistent statements of the police officers generated doubt on whether the identity
of the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to marking and
inventory then given to the Jimenez for investigation and eventually submitted by PO3
Ramos for examination by the forensic chemist.
The prosecution cannot rely on the saving clause provided under Section 21(a) of the IRR
that non-compliance with the legal requirements shall not render void and invalid
seizures of and custody over said items. This saving clause is applicable only if
prosecution was able to prove the twin conditions of (a) existence of justifiable grounds
and (b) preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items. 77 The
procedural lapses in this case put to doubt the integrity of the items presented in court.
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is adamant in its argument that
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by police officers
conducting buy-bust operation.
We agree but with qualification.
In numerous cases, we were inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of public officers.78 However, this is not a hard-and-fast rule. It does
not mean that we straight away and without a blink of the eye rule on the regularity of
their performance of duties. We at all times harmonize the interest of the accused
alongside the interest of the State.
Inconsistencies committed by the police officers amounting to procedural lapses in
observing the chain of custody of evidence requirement effectively negated this
presumption. Their inaccurate recall of events amounted to irregularities that affected the
presumption and tilted the evidence in favor of the accused. The absence of improper
motive tends to sustain inexistence but does not absolutely rule out false charges.
In case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the
presumption of innocence of the accused, we rule that the latter must prevail as the law
imposes upon the prosecution the highest degree of proof of evidence to sustain
conviction.79
Due to foregoing flagrant inconsistencies in the testimonies of police officers which
directly constitute the recollection of events of buy-bust together and failure of observance
of chain of custody of evidence which effectively broke the links to sustain conviction, we
rule for the acquittal of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 4 August 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02714 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 21
March 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 103 of Quezon City is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant JOSE CLARA y BUHAIN is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention unless his continued
confinement is warranted for some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
7) G.R. No. 194445 March 12, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
vs.
ROGER POSADA y URBANO and EMILY POSADA y SARMIENTO, Accused.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
As we decide this appeal involving a couple who allegedly violated Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, we should bear in mind the words emanating from the pen of former Justice
Isagani A. Cruz:
We need only add that the active support of everyone is needed to bolster the campaign
of the government against the evil of drug addiction. The merchants of all prohibited
drugs, from the rich and powerful syndicates to the individual street "pushers," must be
hounded relentlessly and punished to the full extent of the law, subject only to the
inhibitions of the Bill of Rights.1
The Case
Accused-appellants Roger Posada (Roger) and Emily Posada (Emily) were convicted by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case No.
3490 for selling twelve (12) pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet, containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 0.4578 grams, in
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. 2
Roger was also convicted by the same RTC in Criminal Case No. 3489 for possession of
one piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue of a crystalline substance
(allegedly shabu), a piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small scissors, and fifteen (15)
pieces of used lighter – all of which are intended to be used for smoking or introducing
dangerous drugs into the body of a person, in violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.3
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accused-appellants filed an appeal before the Court
of Appeals (CA) which, via a Decision4 dated June 17, 2010, affirmed the RTC Decision
as to the accused-appellants' conviction in Criminal Case No. 3490 but acquitted Roger
in Criminal Case No. 3489 on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Now, the accused-appellants ask this Court for a complete exoneration from the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 3490 on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish
the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items and to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Antecedent Facts
According to the evidence of the prosecution, P/CI Gil Francis Tria (P/CI Tria), the
Chief of Police of Virac Municipal Police Station and representative of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), ordered surveillance on the activities of the accused-
appellants and a certain Johnjohn Urbano (Urbano). 5 As a result of the said surveillance,
PO1 Roldan Area (PO1 Area) was able to buy one sachet of shabu from Emily for
₱250.00 on August 2, 2005.6
Consequently, after the August 2, 2005 test-buy yielded positive result, P/CI Tria applied
for a search warrant, which the Honorable Jaime E. Contreras granted. 7 Thus, at
noontime of August 3, 2005, P/CI Tria and his team proceeded to Barangay Concepcion
and coordinated with Punong Barangay Antonio Asuncion, Jr. (Asuncion) in the
operation against the accused-appellants.8
When the team of P/CI Tria reached the place of operation, they found Emily standing
in front of her house. PO1 Area, who was the poseur-buyer, called her and when she
came near him, he told her that he would buy shabu. PO1 Area then handed to Emily
₱250.00, consisting of two pieces of ₱100.00 bill and one piece of ₱50.00 bill. After
receiving the money from PO1 Area, Emily immediately went to her house and got a
coin purse. When she returned at the scene of the operation, Emily gave PO1 Area one
sachet of shabu, which she got from the coin purse. Subsequently, Roger appeared and
handed to Emily 12 plastic sachets of shabu which Emily placed inside the coin purse. At
this point, PO1 Area identified himself as a police officer while giving the signal to his
team that the buy-bust turned positive. He arrested Emily while Roger ran away and
went inside their house. PO1 Area informed Emily of her constitutional rights, but the
latter failed to utter any word.9
While PO1 Area was holding the arm of Emily, who still had in her hands the coin purse
where she got the sachet of shabu and the buy-bust money, P/CI Tria took pictures of the
incident using his cellphone while the official photographer was also taking pictures.
After the search, a coin purse containing sachets of shabu and a bundle of money was
found in Emily's possession.10 PO1 Area then prepared a Receipt for Property Seized
(RPS).11Asuncion, Kagawad Eva Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and a certain Robert Vargas
(Vargas) witnessed the preparation of the said receipt.12
Meanwhile, when Roger left Emily at the scene of the buy-bust operation, he went inside
his house and closed the door. Armed with the search warrant, SPO1 Salvador Aldave,
Jr. (SPO1 Aldave) forced the door open. SPO1 Aldave was the first person to enter the
house, followed by the barangay officials and his fellow officers, SPO1 Roger Masagca
(SPO1 Masagca) and PO1 Ronnie Valeza (PO1 Valeza). The search warrant was shown
to Roger. In his presence and in the presence of Kagawad Jena Arcilla (Arcilla), the
raiding team recovered one piece of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet containing residue
of white crystalline substance, and one small pair of green scissors beside the bed inside a
room, and 15 pieces of used lighters from an improvised altar on top of a wooden table.
A search of Roger's pocket yielded two pieces of ₱50.00 bill and one piece of ₱100.00 bill.
SPO1 Aldave as the seizing officer prepared and signed an RPS. Asuncion, Arcilla and
Barangay Tanod Juan Gonzales (Gonzales) witnessed the preparation and signing of the
said RPS. Roger, however, refused to sign the same. The couple was then brought to the
police station.13
At the Virac Police Station, a body search on Emily resulted in the seizure of bills of
different denominations, totaling ₱2,720.00. Some of these bills were identified as those
bills photocopied and submitted to the Provincial Prosecution Office.14
On August 4, 2005, immediately after the operation and the execution of the search
warrant, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance marked with
initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing
white crystalline substance with sub-markings "R-1" to "R-12"; and one small size
crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for
laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by a certain PO2 Abanio
[Abaño] and Police Inspector Sta. Cruz, J. (P/Insp. Sta. Cruz). The sachet with the initial
"R" was the sachet of shabu sold to PO1 Area during the buy bust operation while the
sachets of shabu marked as "R-1" to "R-12" were the sachets of shabu which Roger handed
to Emily and which were found in the possession of Emily after PO1 Area identified
himself as a police officer.15
Subsequently, witness Police Senior Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen),
the forensic expert, received personally from the receiving clerk (PO2 Abanio) the above-
mentioned marked pieces of evidence. She then immediately conducted laboratory
examination, yielding a result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets (with markings "R-1" to
"R-12"), the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "R", the one
aluminum foil strip, and a small size plastic sachet contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride.16
The accused-appellants were subsequently charged in two separate Informations, 17 both
dated August 4, 2005, with violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, which were respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 3490 and Criminal Case
No. 3489. The Informations state as follows:
Criminal Case No. 3490
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Roger Posada y Urbano and Emily
Posada y Sarmiento of Violation of R.A. 9165 defined and penalized under Section 5 of
said Law, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of August 2005 at noontime along Imelda Blvd. in barangay
Concepcion, municipality (sic) of Virac, [P]rovince of Catanduanes, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused without the
authority of law, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 12
pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride[,] locally known as shabu[,] with a total weight of 0.9 gram [-] a
prohibited drug[,] and several marked money bills.18 [Emphasis supplied]
Criminal Case No. 3489
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Roger Posada y Urbano of Violation of
R.A. 9165 defined and penalized under Section 12 of said law, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of August 2005 in the afternoon in Barangay Concepcion,
municipality (sic) of Virac, province (sic) of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused without the authority of law did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and in control of one (1)
piece of teared plastic sachet containing residue of a crystalline substance[,] locally
known as shabu, (1) piece small aluminum foil, (1) piece small scissors (sic) and 15 pieces
of used lighter[,] which paraphernalia are (sic) fit or intended for smoking or introducing
any dangerous drug into the body of a person.19
However, the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490 was later amended,20 to reflect a
change in the weight of the seized drugs from 0.9 gram to 0.4578 gram.
Meanwhile, on the part of the accused-appellants, they simply denied the accusations
against them. Roger claimed that on April 3, 2005 (which was even a misleading date
since the event happened on August 3, 2005), at around 12 noon, he was putting his three
year-old child to sleep inside their house, while his wife Emily was washing their clothes
at his parents' house. He then peeped through the window jalousies when he heard his
wife calling out his name. He saw a policeman, later identified as PO1 Area, pulling
Emily towards the road. Roger claimed that PO1 Valeza later poked a gun at him,
preventing him to move from the window. Thereafter, the door of Roger's house was
forced open, allowing SPO1 Aldave, SPO1 Masagca, PO1 Valeza and Barangay Tanod
Vic Vargas (Vargas) to enter his house. Inside the house, PO1 Valeza allegedly took
down the jackets hanging on the wall and searched them; SPO1 Aldave took pictures
while Vargas and SPO1 Masagca went inside the room and searched the cabinets where
toys were kept. Roger further claims that nothing was found in his house. After the
search, Roger was brought to the patrol car where his wife Emily was taken.21
Meanwhile, Emily testified that on that fateful day of August 3, 2005, she was washing
clothes at her mother-in-law's house when a man, whom she could not identify,
approached her and asked her if she was Emily Posada. She alleged that the man
immediately held her hands, shouting "Police! Police!" after which police officers Tria
and Aldave arrived. Her picture was taken. Subsequently, she was brought to the patrol
car where her husband Roger later joined her. Both Roger and Emily were then
transported to the police station. Roger was placed behind bars while Emily was placed
at the detention cell of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).22
The couple claimed that the police officers did not inform them why they were brought to
the police station and subsequently detained. Emily denied that a buy-bust operation was
conducted against her, but she was aware of the search conducted in their house because
her husband informed her at the police station. Meanwhile, Roger also denied that the
police officers presented to him a search warrant. Likewise, both alleged that the money
taken from Emily's wallet were the proceeds of the sale of their chickens, which Roger
gave to Emily. The said money amounted to more or less ₱3,000.00.23
Issues
Considering that the accused-appellants did not file a supplemental brief and that
appellee People of the Philippines adopted its brief before the CA, we now rule on the
matter based on the issues24 which the accused-appellants raised in their brief before the
CA, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED
SEIZED ILLEGAL ITEMS.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.25
Our Ruling
While we give due credence to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
absent any showing that the elements of the crime have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied, we will take pains in taking a second hard look on the
issues the accused-appellants raised, considering they are husband and wife whose
imprisonment will greatly affect the children they will leave behind once they are
declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Now, we are going to discuss the case following the issues the accused-appellants raised.
The prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal
items.
The accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of
custody and integrity of the seized illegal items because:
(1) The apprehending officers allegedly failed to submit the seized illegal items to
the PNP Crime Laboratory Service for a qualitative and quantitative
examination within the mandatory 24-hour period from confiscation; and
(2) There is an alleged discrepancy as to the number of plastic sachets recovered
from the accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic chemist PSI
Clemen.
On the first factual issue, we find that the records of the case and the testimonies of
witnesses belie the accused-appellants' contention.
Based on the records, the buy-bust operation, the arrest of the accused-appellants and the
confiscation of the illegal items happened at around 12 noon of August 3, 2005. 26 PO1
Area received from Emily one sachet of shabu and after PO1 Area introduced himself and
arrested Emily, 12 more sachets of shabu were found in the possession of Emily. The said
12 sachets of shabu were inside a coin purse, with a bundle of money.27 PO1 Area
prepared on the same day an RPS28 in the presence of Asuncion, Kagawad Sarmiento
and Vargas.29 On August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory examination of a
piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing white crystalline
substance marked with initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings "R-1" to "R-12"; and
one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet. The request of P/CI
Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by PO2 Abanio and
P/Insp. Sta. Cruz on the same date.30
The accused-appellants wanted us to believe that a day had lapsed before P/CI Tria
submitted the illegal drugs to PNP Crime Laboratory Service, contrary to the mandate of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. They even cited the testimony of P/CI Tria where the latter
allegedly admitted submitting the subject seized items on August 4, 2005. However, a
close look at the testimony of P/CI Tria31 will reveal that nothing in it would show that
he submitted the alleged illegal drugs beyond the 24-hour reglementary period. In fact,
even the Laboratory Examination Request dated August 4, 2005 does not indicate
violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.32 Clearly, from the foregoing, the accused-
appellants failed to adduce any evidence to prove their contention. The age-old but
familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation applies33 in this case. The
accused-appellants' failure to show evidence that the police officers did not comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 gives us no other recourse but to respect the findings of trial
court and of the CA.
Furthermore, the CA is correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the police officers
as regards the timely submission of the subject illegal drugs since they are presumed to
have regularly performed their duties, unless there is evidence suggesting ill-motive on
the part of the police officers.34 In this case, the accused-appellants failed to contradict the
presumption. What goes against the accused-appellants is the fact that they have not
offered any evidence of ill-motive against the police officers. Emily even admitted that
she did not know PO1 Area, the poseur-buyer.35 Considering that there was no existing
relationship between the police officers and the accused-appellants, the former could not
be accused of improper motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellants. In People
v. Dumangay,36 we upheld the findings of the lower court on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties because there was no proof of ill-motive. Therein, the
accused-appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated defenses did not prevail over the trial
court's findings on the credibility of witnesses. The same may be said in the present case.
Finding the accused-appellants' arguments without a leg to stand on, the apprehending
police officers are presumed to have timely submitted the seized illegal items to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service for a qualitative and quantitative examination within the
mandatory 24-hour period from confiscation.
On the second factual issue, we find the accused-appellants' claim not supported by
evidence.
The accused-appellants alleged that the integrity of the seized illegal items was
compromised and their evidentiary value diminished because of the alleged discrepancy
between the number of plastic sachets recovered from the accused-appellants and those
submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen. They insisted that based on the Informations
in Criminal Case Nos. 3489 and 3490 and the testimonies of witnesses Asuncion37 and
SPO1 Aldave,38only fourteen (14) plastic sachets were recovered from the accused-
appellants, while PSI Clemen allegedly testified that a total of 15 sachets were submitted
for examination.39
However, a review of the defense-quoted testimony of PSI Clemen would show that she
received one piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking
"R",40 12 pieces small size heat-sealed marked as "R-1" to "R-12"41 and one small size ROLDAN AREA who acted as posuer (sic) buyer
crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet 42 – totaling to 15 items. PSI during the drug buy bust operation.
Clemen's testimony tallies with the Laboratory Examination Request (Exhibit "J") of
P/CI Tria. We reproduce Exhibit "J" below, to wit: "B" Twelve (12) pcs small size heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
Republic of the Philippines with markings R1-R12 found/confiscated from the
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION suspect during drug buy bust operation.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE "C" One (1) small size crumpled aluminum foil and small
size plastic sachet confiscated/found in the possession
Virac Municipal Police Station of suspect during the execution of search warrant
Virac, Catanduanes number 37 issued by Hon[.] Judge Jaime E[.] Contreras
of RTC Branch 43.
MEMORANDUM:
SUSPECT/S Roger Posada y Urbano
FOR : The Chief Emily Posada y Sarmiento
PNP Crime Laboratory Service
Camp Gen Simeon A Ola
John-John Bryan Urbano y Zafe
Legaspi City
COMPLAINANT Officer-in-Charge
Virac MPS
SUBJECT : Laboratory Examination request for
FACTS OF THE CASE: Evidence submitted for laboratory examination was bought and
DATE : 04 August 2005 others were confiscated by the PNP team of Virac during Buy Bust (sic) operation and
the effect/execution of search warrant number 37 on August 3, 2005 in [B]arangay
---------------------------------------------------------------------- Concepcion Virac, Catanduanes.

1. Request conduct laboratory examination on the accompanying specimen to determine
whether the white crystalline granules inside Thirteen (13) pcs small size transparent heat
seald (sic) plastic sachets are Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or SHABU and also
whether the one (1) pc small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size transparent
plastic sachet contains residue or granules of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
Shabu.
EXHIBIT QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION
"A" One (1) pc small size heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet sachet (sic) containing white crystalline
substance with marking initial "R" the initial of PO1
2. Request acknowledge reciept (sic) and furnish this office Laboratory examination
result as soon as possible for subsequent submission/filing same in court as supporting
documents to this case.
GIL FRANCIS G[.] TRIA
Pol Chief Inspector
Officer-in-Charge43
Based on the cited exhibit, we find that in Exhibit "A" we have the first item, marked
with "R". Under Exhibit "B", we have the next 12 items marked as "R-1" to "R-12".
Under Exhibit "C", we have the remaining two items submitted to the crime laboratory,
namely one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet confiscated
and found in the possession of Roger. All these items total to 15 items – consistent with
the testimony of PSI Clemen. Thus, evidence shows no discrepancy as to the number of
plastic sachets recovered from the accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic
chemist PSI Clemen.
Finally, we say that the prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of
the seized illegal items.
After PO1 Area arrested Emily and confiscated the 13 sachets of shabu (one bought by
PO1 Area from Emily and 12 found in Emily's coin purse after she received the same
from her husband Roger),44 P/CI Tria took pictures of the incident using his cellphone
while the official photographer was also taking pictures.45 Then PO1 Area prepared an
RPS,46 which Asuncion, Sarmiento and Vargas witnessed.47 Meanwhile, SPO1 Aldave,
seizing officer went inside the house of the accused-appellants, prepared and signed an
RPS after the raiding team found a piece of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet containing
residue of white crystalline substance, one small pair of green scissors beside the bed
inside a room, 15 pieces of used lighters, and two pieces of ₱50.00 bill and one piece of
₱100.00 bill. Asuncion, Arcilla and Gonzales witnessed the preparation and signing of
the said RPS.48 Thereafter, on August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory
examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing
white crystalline substance marked with initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings "R-
1" to "R-12"; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet.
The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received
by a certain PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz.49 Subsequently, witness PSI Clemen, the
forensic expert, received personally from PO2 Abanio the above-mentioned marked
pieces of evidence. She then immediately conducted a laboratory examination, yielding a
result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets (with markings "R-1" to "R-12"), the one heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "R" and the one aluminum foil strip
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.50 In open court, the above-mentioned pieces
of evidence were identified and marked.51
From the foregoing, the prosecution, without an iota of doubt, has established the chain
of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items. The Supreme Court in People v.
Sanchez,52 clearly discussed how chain of custody should be proven, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.53
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to present, not only the corpus delicti, but the
testimonies of the people involved in each link in the chain of custody.
The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants
sold 12 sachets of shabu, but it has proven the accused-appellants' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of possession of the same number of shabu in violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Before we proceed in discussing the guilt of the couple, we must first take into account a
discrepancy in the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490. In the said information, the
accused-appellants were charged for selling 12 pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet
of shabu. However, based on the evidence which the prosecution adduced, Emily sold to
PO1 Area one sachet of shabu, which was worth ₱250.00. Then, after she handed the one
sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer, Emily received additional 12 sachets of shabu from
her husband Roger and when PO1 Area informed the couple of the buy-bust, Emily had
in her possession the 12 sachets of shabu.54Subsequently, the confiscated sachets
of shabu were marked. The one sold to PO1 Area was marked with "R", while the 12
sachets of shabu Roger handed to Emily before their arrest were marked as "R-1" to "R-
12".55
The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather than separately charging Emily for the sale
of the one sachet of shabuand charging both Emily and Roger for possession of the 12
sachets of shabu, the public prosecutor lumped the charges together to sale of 12 sachets
of shabu. This is wrong. The Information is defective for charging the accused-appellants
of selling 12 sachets of shabu when, in fact, they should have been charged of selling one
sachet of shabu and possessing 12 sachets of shabu. From the evidence adduced, Emily
and Roger never sold the 12 sachets of shabu. They possessed them. Thus, they should
have not been convicted for selling the 12 sachets of shabu. However, this was exactly
what was done both by the trial court and the CA. Without basis in fact, they convicted
the couple for selling the 12 sachets of shabu.
Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective Information. An
Information is fatally defective when it is clear that it does not really charge an
offense56 or when an essential element of the crime has not been sufficiently alleged.57 In
the instant case, while the prosecution was able to allege the identity of the buyer and the
seller, it failed to particularly allege or identify in the Information the subject matter of
the sale or the corpus delicti. We must remember that one of the essential elements to
convict a person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify with certainty the corpus delicti.
Here, the prosecution took the liberty to lump together two sets of corpora delicti when it
should have separated the two in two different informations. To allow the prosecution to
do this is to deprive the accused-appellants of their right to be informed, not only of the
nature of the offense being charged, but of the essential element of the offense charged;
and in this case, the very corpus delicti of the crime.
Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or information, the court has no
other recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused. 58 Here, since there
exists ambiguity as to the identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense
charged, it follows that such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused-
appellants. Thus, from the foregoing discussion, we have no other choice but to acquit
the accused-appellants of sale of 12 sachets of shabu.
Truly, both the trial court and the CA were wrong in convicting the couple for selling 12
sachets of shabu because the prosecution failed to show that the husband and wife had
indeed sold the 12 sachets of shabu. Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 provides:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos ([₱]500,000.00) to Ten million pesos ([₱]10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
More, jurisprudence holds that the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs can
only be successful when the following elements are established, namely:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the
sale; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore..59
To our minds, while there was indeed a transaction between Emily and PO1 Area, the
prosecution failed to show that the subject matter of the sale to PO1 Area was the 12
sachets of shabu. Based on the testimony of PO1 Area, the 12 sachets of shabu were the
sachets of shabu which Roger handed to his wife Emily and were not sold, but which PO1
Area found in her possession after the latter identified himself as a police officer.
In People v. Paloma,60 we acquitted the accused for the prosecution's failure to prove the
crime of illegal sale of drugs, and we have set the standard in proving the same, to wit:
Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria, the prosecution must
clearly and adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment
of the consideration, and, finally, the accused's delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer,
whether the latter be the informant alone or the police officer. This proof is essential to
ensure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit the offense.61
In the instant case, PO1 Area's testimony showed no evidence that the transaction as to
the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu ever happened. Rather, PO1 Area adequately testified
on the fact that accused-appellant Roger handed the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily who
kept them in a coin purse. And after PO1 Area identified himself as a police operative, he
found the 12 sachets of shabu in Emily's possession.62 From the foregoing, while the
prosecution was able to prove the sale of one sachet of shabu, it is patently clear that it
never established with moral certainty all the elements of illegal sale of the 12 sachets
of shabu. And failure to show that indeed there was sale means failure to prove the guilt
of the accused for illegal sale of drugs, because what matters in the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is to show proof that the sale actually happened, coupled with the
presentation in court of corpus delicti.63 Here, the prosecution failed to prove the existence
of the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu and also to prove that the 12 sachets
of shabu presented in court were truly the subject matter of the sale between the accused-
appellants and PO1 Area.
Notwithstanding the above-discussion, we convict both Roger and Emily of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs despite the fact that they were charged for the sale of
illegal drugs, because possession is necessarily included in sale of illegal drugs.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged,
or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Since sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes possession of the same, the accused-
appellants should be convicted of possession. We have consistently ruled that possession
of prohibited or dangerous drugs is absorbed in the sale thereof.64 Then Associate Justice
Artemio Panganiban logically and clearly explained the rationale behind this ruling, to
wit:
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof,
except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the
prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended
for some future dealings or use by the seller.
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited
drugs.1âwphi1 It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale be identified
and presented in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could not be established
without a showing that the accused possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug
clearly indicates that possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable
in cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them away to another.65 (Citations
omitted)
For prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following
essential elements must be proven, namely: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possess the said drug."66
All these elements are obtaining and duly established in this case and we will discuss
them thoroughly below, since we are not ready to altogether exonerate the couple.
On Emily's Liability
To our minds, the testimony of PO1 Area is sufficient to establish concurrence of all the
elements necessary to convict Emily of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
PO1 Area vividly narrated the details of the buy-bust operation. He recounted how on
August 3, 2005 at around 12 noon, he acted as the poseur-buyer of shabu. He approached
Emily, who was then standing in front of their house, and told her that he would like to
buy shabu, and then gave her the ₱250.00. Emily then returned to her house and got a
coin purse. Upon returning, Emily handed to PO1 Area a piece of sachet
containing shabu. After receiving the sachet of shabu, PO1 Area saw Roger hand the 12
sachets of shabu to Emily who kept them in a coin purse. After paying for and receiving
the sachet of shabu from Emily, PO1 Area arrested the latter and found in her possession
the 12 sachets of shabu.67 From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the prosecution
established with moral certainty all the elements of illegal possession of shabu, that is:
PO1 Area found in Emily's physical and actual possession the 12 sachets of shabu; such
possession of the 12 sachets of shabu was not authorized; and since Emily put the 12
sachets of shabu in the purse after receiving them from her husband, she possessed the
same freely and consciously.
Furthermore, PO1 Area's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of the
following: (a) Barangay KagawadSarmiento who witnessed how PO1 Area caught Emily
doing the illegal act; (b) Barangay Captain Asuncion, Jr. who testified that he was with
the raiding team when the latter conducted the buy-bust operation and that he witnessed
how money changed hands; (c) P/CI Tria who witnessed the buy-bust operation and was
one of the arresting officers; (d) SPO1 Aldave who executed the search warrant; and
(e) Barangay Kagawad Arcilla who also accompanied the raiding team in the search of the
accused-appellants' house. All these witnesses completed all the angles of the buy-bust
operation and the search on Emily's person up to the finding that she possessed the 12
sachets of shabu. Indeed, considering all of the above-findings of facts, we cannot have
other conclusion but to find Emily guilty beyond reasonable doubt for possession of
prohibited drugs.
Indeed, every accused deserves a second look before conviction. This is the essence of the
constitutional presumption of innocence. In the present case, we did not only take a
second look at the facts and laws of this case because the accused-appellants are both
parents. We take a third, a fourth up to a seventh look to ensure that no child will be left
unattended because his parents were imprisoned based on false accusations. Thus, after
reviewing this case, the bare truth is Emily was found in possession of 12 sachets
of shabu on August 3, 2005.
On Roger's Liability
As to Roger, can we also convict him of possession of the same 12 sachets
of shabu considering that same had been found in the possession of his wife Emily?
We resolve in the affirmative.
In United States v. Juan,68 we have clarified the meaning of the words "having possession
of." We said that the said phrase included constructive possession, that is, "the relation
between the owner of the drug and the drug itself when the owner is not in actual
physical possession, but when it is still under his control and management and subject to
his disposition."69 In other words, in that case, we recognized the fact that a person
remains to be in possession of the prohibited drugs although he may not have or may
have lost physical possession of the same.
To elucidate, we must go back to the circumstances surrounding the Juan case. A
Chinaman named Lee See arrived at the Bay of Calbayog, Samar through the
steamer Ton-Yek. Upon disembarking, he went to the house of therein appellant Chan
Guy Juan, who was living in the town of Calbayog. Lee See and Chan Guy Juan had a
lengthy conversation. Chan Guy Juan then hired a certain Isidro Cabinico (Cabinico) to
go alongside of the steamer with his baroto, to carry and deliver to him a sack which
appellant Chan Guy Juan alleged was sugar. Cabinico went to Lee See to get the said
sack. However, on his way to the house of Chan Guy Juan, Cabinico was arrested by the
local authorities. Found in his possessions were a small amount of sugar and 28 cans of
opium. The opium was confiscated and separate criminal charges were instituted against
the two Chinamen and Cabinico. After a thorough investigation, the provincial fiscal
dismissed the case against Cabinico because he had no knowledge of the content of the
sack, while the two Chinamen were eventually convicted. Chan Guy Juan appealed his
conviction arguing that he did not have actual physical possession or control of the 28
cans of opium. But we held that both Chinese had constructive possession of the opium
and that they were both guilty as principals.70
Our ruling in Juan applies to the present case. Admittedly, the 12 sachets of shabu were
found in the possession of Emily. But PO1 Area saw Roger hand the same 12 sachets
of shabu to Emily. While Roger had lost physical possession of the said 12 sachets
of shabu, he had constructive possession of the same because they remain to be under his
control and management. In the Juan case, Lee See gave the physical possession of the
opium to Cabinico while Chan Guy Juan had not yet received the same opium from Lee
See, but both were held guilty of illegal possession of opium. Thus, we can liken the
instant case to that of Juan because while Roger had lost physical possession of the 12
sachets of shabu to Emily, he maintained constructive possession of the same.
Convicting both Emily and Roger of possession of illegal drugs deprives their children of
parents. But if we have to take care of our children and the family where each of us
belongs, we are obligated to put in jail all those, including fathers and mothers, who
peddle illegal drugs.
Finally, we cannot let this case pass us by without emphasizing the need for the public
prosecutor to properly evaluate all the pieces of evidence and file the proper information
to serve the ends of justice. The public prosecutor must exert all efforts so as not to deny
the People a remedy against those who sell prohibited drugs to the detriment of the
community and its children. Many drug cases are dismissed because of the prosecutor's
sloppy work and failure to file airtight cases. If only the prosecution properly files the
Information and prosecutes the same with precision, guilty drug pushers would be
punished to the extent allowed under the law, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 2010 is
MODIFIED. Accused-appellants ROGER POSADA and EMILY
POSADA ARE FOUND GUILTY OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWELVE (12)
SACHETS OF METHAMPETAMINE HYDROCHOLORIDE OR SHABU, WITH A
NET WEIGHT OF 0.4578 GRAMS AND ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO THE
INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY, AS
MINIMUM, TO FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS, AS
MAXIMUM AND A FINE OF ₱300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
8) G.R. No. 199219 April 3, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GERRY OCTAVIO Y FLORENDO and REYNALDO CARIÑO Y
MARTIR, Accused-Appellants.
VELASCO, JR.,*
 DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review of this Court is the appeal filed by Gerry Octavio (Octavio) and Reynaldo
Cariño (Cariño) assailing the 29 March 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03900. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 65, Makati City finding both accused guilty of violating Article II of
Republic
Act (R.A.) No.· 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
The Antecedents
On 21 August 2007, three (3) separate Informations were filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Makati City for violations of R.A No. 9165. The first information charges
Gerry Octavio y Florendo with violation of Section 5 thereof in the following manner:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-1580
That on or about the 16th day of August, 2007, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without the necessary license or prescription and without being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away
Php200.00 worth of [Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing zero point
zero two (0.02) gram, a dangerous drug.2
The second information charges the same accused with violation of Section 11 of the
same law allegedly committed as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-1581
That on or about the 16th day of August, 2007, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess and/or use dangerous drugs and
without any license or proper prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) each weighing zero point zero two (0.02)
gram or a total of zero point zero four (0.04) gram, which is a dangerous drug, in
violation of the aforesaid law.3
The third information charges Reynaldo Cariño y Martir (Cariño) of violating Section 11
of R.A. No. 9165, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-1582
That on or about the 16th day of August, 2007, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess and/or use dangerous drugs and
without any license or proper prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of
[Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride (Shabu) each weighing zero point zero two (0.02)
gram or a total of zero point zero four (0.04) gram, which is a dangerous drug, in
violation of the aforesaid law.4
Version of the Prosecution:
At around 7:00 o’clock in evening of 16 August 2007, an informant went to the Office of
the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) to report the alleged rampant illegal
drug trafficking activities of Gerry Octavio alias "Buboy" at Pateros Street, Barangay
Olympia, Makati City.5
On the basis of this report, an anti-narcotics team was formed to conduct a buy-bust
operation with MADAC operatives Danilo Baysa (Baysa) and Danilo Sumudlayon
(Sumudlayon) as the designated poseur-buyer and immediate back-up, respectively. Two
(2) pieces of One Hundred Peso bills were pre-marked to be utilized as buy-bust money.
Proper coordination was made with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
before the team, together with the asset, proceeded to the target area.6
Upon arrival at the designated area, the team spotted Octavio conversing with another
male person along an alley. MADAC operative Baysa and the asset approached the duo
while the rest of the team strategically positioned themselves. The asset, who was familiar
with the subject, introduced MADAC operative Baysa as a "scorer" or user of shabu. The
other male person, however, tried to convince MADAC operative Baysa to buy shabu
from him instead, at the same time showing two (2) pieces of small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. The subject then introduced his
companion to MADAC operative Baysa as alias "Nano" before asking him how much he
wanted to purchase. MADAC operative Baysa intimated that he needed ₱200.00 worth
of shabu, while simultaneously handing over the marked money to the subject who, in
turn, gave him one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing suspected
shabu.
The transaction having been consummated, MADAC operative Baysa executed the pre-
arranged signal to the rest of the team for assistance. Taking their cue, [PO1 Michelle V.
Gimena] (PO1 Gimena) and MADAC operative Sumudlayon rushed to the scene.
Meanwhile, MADAC operative Baysa introduced himself before effecting the arrest of
the subject, who was later identified as the herein accused Gerry Octavio y Florendo. A
routine body search upon his person yielded the marked money, two (2) pieces of small
plastic sachets containing suspected shabu and another two (2) ₱100 bills. MADAC
operative Sumudlayon, on the other hand, was able to arrest alias "Nano," who was later
identified as the herein accused Reynaldo Cariño y Martir. Two (2) pieces of heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing the same illegal substance were recovered from his
possession.
Thereafter, both of the accused, as well as the confiscated items were brought to the
SAID-SOTF office for further investigation and later to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
drug test and examination, respectively.7
Version of the Defense
Both accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Accused Cariño maintained
that at around 6:00 c’clock in the evening of 17August 2007, he was resting inside his
house when four (4) men suddenly entered. They asked him if he was Cesar Martir,
referring to his cousin who resided next door. When he did not respond, they handcuffed
and boarded him inside their vehicle. One of those on board was MADAC operative Ed
Monteza who previously invited him to the barangay hall in connection with an
investigation regarding persons suspected to be drug peddlers within the neighborhood.
Upon seeing him, MADAC Ed Monteza allegedly told his companions that they arrested
the wrong person ("Hindi iyan ang target natin.") Thus, the men returned to the house of
Cesar Martir but the latter was already nowhere in sight. They later proceeded to the
SAID-SOTF and MADAC office, passing through Pateros Street, Brgy. Olympia,
Makati City, where his co-accused Gerry Octavio was also arrested.
For his part, accused Octavio narrated that at around 6:30 o’clock in the evening of 16
August 2007, he was walking along Pateros Street on his way to the house of Sylvia
Lopez. Since he worked as a car painter, he was supposed to estimate the cost of
materials needed to repaint her vehicle. Along the way, he caught sight of an incoming
Mitsubishi L-300 van. When it stopped in front of him, two (2) armed men alighted
therefrom and wanted to know where he was going. They likewise accused him of using
illegal drugs ("Siguro i-iscore ka, ano?"). Although he denied the accusation, they
handcuffed and boarded him just the same inside their vehicle. Once inside, he saw
MADAC operative Eduardo Monteza who arrested him sometime in 2003. He likewise
saw his co-accused Reynaldo Cariño already on board the van. Upon arrival at the
SAID-SOTF office, the men asked if they knew the whereabouts of Cesar Martir. They
allegedly threatened to file charges against the accused if they refused to provide any
information about him. Since the accused were unable to give any information, an
investigator accordingly produced plastic sachets of shabu which were allegedly
recovered from them.8
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. After pre-
trial, trial on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
On 23 March 2009, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. In Criminal Case No. 07-1580, accused
Octavio was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00. In Criminal
Case No. 07-1581, he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen years (14) and eight (8) months as
maximum and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Cariño, for his part, was sentenced in
Criminal Case No. 07-1582 to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen years (14) and eight (8) months as maximum and to
pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.9
The RTC found that the prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the two accused for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. It
ruled that the evidence presented during the trial adequately established that a valid buy-
bust operation was conducted by the operatives of the MADAC, as well as the SAID-
SOTF, Makati City on 16 August 2007 upon proper coordination with the PDEA. 10 On
the other hand, accused Octavio and Cariño failed to present substantial evidence to
establish their defense of frame-up. The RTC ruled that frame-up, as advanced by the
herein accused, is generally looked upon with caution by the court because it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove. Like alibi, frame-up as a defense had invariably been
viewed with disfavor as it is common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions
arising from violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 11
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements of
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by
the prosecution. It found credible the statements of prosecution witnesses Baysa,
Sumudlayon and Barangay Captain Victor Del Prado (Barangay Captain Del Prado)
about what transpired during and after the buy-bust operation. Further, it ruled that the
prosecution has proven as unbroken the chain of custody of evidence. The CA likewise
upheld the findings of the trial court that the buy-bust operation conducted enjoyed the
presumption of regularity, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of the police
operatives who conducted the same.
The CA found accused-appellants’ defenses of denial and frame-up unconvincing and
lacked strong corroboration.12
ISSUE
Accused-appellants raised in their brief a lone error on the part of the appellate court, to
wit:
The court-a-quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.13
Our Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Accused-appellants submit that the trial court failed to consider the procedural flaws
committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165.14Accused-appellants allege that no
photograph was taken of the items seized from them. Further, Barangay Captain Del
Prado, an elected public official, was not present during the alleged buy-bust operation.
He was only asked to sign the inventory of the seized items shortly after his arrival at the
scene of the buy-bust operation. Thus, he has no personal knowledge as to whether the
drugs allegedly seized from the accused-appellants were indeed recovered from them.
Accused-appellants maintain that such failure created a cloud of doubt as to whether the
alleged shabu seized from them were the same ones forwarded by the apprehending
officers to the investigating officer, to the crime laboratory for examination and later
presented in court.15
Relevant to accused-appellants’ case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and
handling of the seized dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II,
R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
Clearly, there is nothing in the aforesaid law or its implementing rules which require the
presence of the elected public official during the buy-bust operation. It is enough that he
is present during the physical inventory immediately conducted after the seizure and
confiscation of the drugs and he signs the copies of the inventory and is given a copy
thereof.
During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Barangay Captain Del Prado
testified as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness, you mentioned it was evening time when Eduardo Monteza called you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the date again?
A: August 16 think.
Q: Am I correct to say that Eduardo Monteza called you up regarding the arrest of the
suspect in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you proceeded to the place, it was designated by Ed Monteza, the place you
would be?
A: They told me the site of apprehension because I know the place of operation, sir.
THE COURT:
Q: Where was the area of operation?
A: Pateros Street Barangay Olympia near Osmeña Street.
Q: You said that some items were shown to you, will you please enlighten us what are
these items?
A: I remember four (4) items in the inventory receipt that I signed, the first item consists
of five (5) transparent plastic sachets containing suspected shabu, one with marking
‘BUBOY’, the subject which was bought from Buboy, then 2 plastic sachets with marking
‘BUBOY’ 1 and 2, those recovered from the possession of the said @Buboy, then 2 items
with marking ‘NANO-1’ and ‘NANO-2’ recovered from accused Reynaldo.
Q: When you proceeded to the place, did you happen to see the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were they wearing at that time, if you can still remember?
A: I remember that Gerry was wearing sando and short.
Q: What’s the color of the sando?
A: I remember it’s white, sir.
Q: The short, what’s the color?
A: It’s maong shorts, sir.
Q: What about the other accused?
A: I remember he’s wearing white t-shirt, sir.
Q: And his lower garment?
A: I did not notice, sir, because they were then sitting.16
xxxx
In the aforesaid testimony, Barangay Captain Del Prado, not only positively identified
both accused but also identified the items contained in the inventory receipt. Such
testimony clearly established compliance with the requirement of Section 21with regard
to the presence and participation of the elected public official.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to
take a photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence.17 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.18 In other words, to be admissible in evidence,
the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of
the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting
officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for
determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For
as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the
procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not faithfully
observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.19
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.
Appellants bear the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with
in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their
duties20 Appellants in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive
on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers
deserve full faith and credit21 In fact, accused-appellants did not even questioned the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They anchored their appeal solely on the alleged
broken chain of the custody of the seized drugs.
Finally, we note and agree with the observation of the CA that the issue regarding the
break in the chain of custody of evidence was raised belatedly and only for the first time
on appeal.22 In People v. Mateo,23 this Court brushed aside the accused's belated
contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person was inadmissible because the
arresting officers failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will
remain unknown, because accused did not question during trial the safekeeping of the
items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in
the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal.
On the basis of the aforesaid disquisition, we find no reason to modify or set aside the
decision of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the 29 March 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03900 in is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
9) G.R. No. 193379 August 15, 2011
CESAR D. CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, accused-appellant Cesar D.
Castro (Castro) assails the January 6, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31793, as effectively reiterated in its August 10, 2010
Resolution,2 which affirmed in toto the July 11, 2008 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 16 in Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 10784-16. The RTC found
Castro guilty of violating Sec. 11, Art. II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Castro was charged with possession of shabu in an Information dated July 26, 2003, the
inculpatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of July 2003 in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu", a dangerous drug,
contained in one (1) plastic sachet, weighing more or less 0.1 gram including the plastic
sachet, without any license or authority, in violation of the aforecited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Castro pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense jointly stipulated as to the
identity of the accused, such that whenever the name Cesar Castro is mentioned, the
reference is to the accused thus charged in the information. They likewise stipulated on
the issue of whether or not the accused, when arrested on July 25, 2003, was in
possession of shabu and, if so, whether he was authorized.
Trial on the merits then ensued.
The trial court summarized the state’s evidence, as follows:
PO1 JONEL MANGAPIT testified that: On July 25, 2003, he was assigned in the
Intelligence and Operation Section of Laoag City Police Station at Barangay I, Laoag
City. At about 4:45, SPO2 Nestor Felipe informed them that he received a phone call
from a concerned citizen that a male person wearing green t-shirt and brown maong
bought shabu near the Iglesia Ni Cristo. Police Superintendent Pagdilao dispatched a
team of police officers composed of PO1 Inspector Aldos, SPO3 Lagundino, SPO2 Bal
and himself to verify the veracity of the report. They rode on the black Toyota Corolla …
and proceeded to the place. (The Iglesia Ni Kristo is farther west of the Police station of
Laoag City at Brgy. I, along Rizal Street). Upon reaching the Iglesia Ni Cristo church,
they saw a male person with the green description. They know his person as one of the
drug personalities. He was walking towards the east with his right hand placed on his
pocket. They were about ten (10) meters away from the accused. They approached him.
The accused panic upon recognizing them as policemen and brought something [out]
from his pocket and threw it at his back. The things thrown by the accused were plastic
sachets of shabu, lighter and a coin. They arrested the accused and he was informed of
his constitutional rights. He could not answer when he was asked whether or not he had
authority to possess illegal drug. They brought the accused to the police station and he
was indorsed to Investigation Section. The plastic sachet of shabu was turned over to the
Evidence Custodian, SPO2 Loreto Ancheta. x x x Police Officers Aldos and Bal also saw
the accused threw something in the manner he described. It was SPO2 Bal who picked
up the plastic sachet of shabu. The accused was facing east and their vehicle was facing
west. The accused was walking. He took hold of the accused. The thing that was thrown
was 1 meter away from the back of the accused. From his experience he knew that the
content of the plastic sachet thrown by the accused was shabu. (TSN April 13, 2004, pp.
2-10) On additional examination, he confirmed that he saw the accused making a motion
of bringing out from his front pants pocket his hands causing the dropping of an item. He
likewise confirmed that the item dropped was a sachet of shabu and it is the same item
that was picked up by SPO2 Bal. He received the sachet of shabu from Officer Bal and
turned over the same to the evidence custodian five to ten minutes after the operation.
SPO3 Lagundino and Senior Insp. Aldos were present when Officer Bal turned over the
shabu to him. He cannot remember if there was a Post Operation Report. (TSN, January
13, 2006, pp. 13-17)
SPO2 ERNESTO BAL testified that: In the afternoon of July 25, 2003, the complaint
desk officer received a telephone call informing that a male person wearing a green t-shirt
and a brown maong pants had just bought a shabu at Brgy. I near the Iglesia Ni Cristo.
The Chief of Police x x x dispatched them to verify the information. They rode in an
unmarked vehicle x x x. When they were at the Rizal Street, they saw a male person that
matched the description given coming from the house of the Valeriano family which is
southwest of Iglesia Ni Cristo. From a distance of about ten (10) to twelve (12) meters,
they saw the male person place his right hand into his right side pocket. When they got
near the male person, they noticed him removing his right hand from his pocket and he
threw something backward. They were more or less four (4) meters away from the
accused. PO1 Mangapit alighted and took hold of the accused. He also alighted, went to
PO1 Mangapit who told him to pick-up the thing which the accused threw. He picked-up
a plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance. He asked the accused if he
has license or permit to possess shabu. Accused Cesar Castro did not answer. They
brought the accused together with the plastic sachet to the police station and they
delivered the plastic sachet with crystalline substance to the evidence custodian. (TSN,
December 2, 2004, pp. 2-7) On cross examination, [he stated that] x x x When he picked
up the plastic sachet it was more or less half-meter from the accused. He heard PO1
Mangapit inform the accused of his constitutional rights. (ibid, pp. 11-24) The distance
between the police station and the Iglesia Ni Cristo is more or less 200 meters. (TSN,
March 17, 2006, p. 5) x x x He (the witness) did not mark the shabu. It was only the
evidence custodian who marked it. (ibid, p. 16)
SPO2 LORETO ANCHETA, evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP testified that:
In the afternoon of July 25, 2003, he received one (1) plastic sachet containing crystalline
substance from Officer Ernesto Bal. Upon receipt of the specimen, he placed markings on
the sachet of the crystalline substance. He prepared a request addressed to Chief of
Hospital of the Laoag City General Hospital for physical and ocular examination of the
specimen. The request was signed by P/Supt. Joel Pagdilao. He delivered the request and
the specimen to Dr. Eliezer John Asuncion and waited for the result of the physical and
ocular examination. Upon receipt of the result of the examination, he went back to the
office and prepared another request for laboratory examination addressed to the Regional
Chief Chemist PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Brigidier General Oscar Florendo
Parian, San Fernando, La Union. This was signed by P/Insp. Dominic Guerrero. He
brought the specimen and the letter request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Juan,
Laoag City. It was received by P/Insp. Valeriano Panem Laya II. (TSN, June 25, 2004,
pp. 10-16)
P/INSP. VALERIANO PANEM LAYA II, testified that: As a Forensic Officer, x x x he
also holds office at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Juan, Laoag City. He remembered
having received a specimen for examination with respect to a case against Cesar Castro
from Officer Loreto Ancheta (When he was asked where the specimen was, he handed to
the prosecutor the plastic sachet marked as Exhibit D). x x x The result of his
examination was that the specimen was positive for the presence of [shabu]. This is
contained in his Chemistry Report D-327-03. Exhibit E (TSN, February 18, 2005, pp. 10-
12) On cross examination he testified that: he weighed the specimen at San Fernando, La
Union. The weight was .08 gram and was indicated in his Report. He did not weigh the
representative sample. (ibid, p. 29)5
The defense presented in evidence the testimonies of accused Castro and one Rodolfo
Bunnao. The RTC also summarized them, as follows:
CESAR CASTRO x x x testified that: In the afternoon of July 25, 2003, he was at the
house of Crispin Valeriano to ask for the payment of his debt. Because Crispin Valeriano
has no money, he went home taking the southward direction to the national road west of
the Iglesia Ni Cristo. He was about to cross towards the other side of the road when a car
suddenly stopped in front of him and a policeman in the person of Ernesto Bal alighted x
x x. Ernesto Bal called for him and when he went near him Ernesto Bal immediately
searched his two (2) front pockets and x x x his back pockets but was not able to get
anything. He asked Ernest Bal why x x x. Bal told him that somebody called them telling
them that he went to the house of Crispin Valeriano to buy shabu. After he was searched
he was invited by Officer Bal to the police station to make a statement x x x. He
voluntarily went with them x x x. Officer Mangapit went out from the right side of the
car and went behind him. When he alighted from the car, Officer Mangapit asked him,
"What is this?" (holding something placed in a plastic) to which he answered, "I don’t
know." While inside their office, they undressed him and examined thoroughly even the
sleeves of his shirt as well as his pants. He claimed that the plastic is inside and longer
when Exhibit D was shown to him and that the same was 1/3 inch wider and longer.
After he was dressed-up, they placed him at the prison cell, where he resisted. He did not
see were PO Mangapit took the plastic sachet but the latter insisted that he took it from
the seat where he was seated. On cross examination, he testified that Police Officers Bal
and Mangapit were familiar to him x x x. After the police officers conducted the
investigation and charged him of possession of shabu, they brought him to the Office of
Mayor Roger Fariñas, a close relative of him. The policemen did not prepare any
document stating that they did not hurt him and nothing was lost. He did not protest
when they told him to strip. (TSN, August 24, 2007, pp. 3-14)
RODOLFO BUNNAO testified that: After eating at the kitchenette and went out, he
saw Cesar Castro west of the Iglesia Ni Cristo standing when all of the sudden, a black
car stopped and two (2) men alighted from the car, went near Cesar Castro and bodily
searched him. He knew the accused x x x. About one (1) minute after the search, they
brought him inside the car proceeding west. x x x On cross examination [he stated that] x
x x [o]n July 25, 2003, there was a cockfight in Laoag City x x x. He took his lunch at the
Modern Kitchenette after he borrowed cockfight money from Marcial Baracao east of the
GSIS. Modern Kitchenette is further west from the most western fence of the Iglesia Ni
Cristo. Two (2) men alighted from the black car one is the driver and the other one from
the passenger’s side. He knew for a fact that there is another man inside the car whom he
does not know x x x. (TSN, February 15, 2008, pp. 3-6)6
On the main finding that the corpus delicti has been established by the open court
narrations of the People’s witnesses and whose testimony bespoke of an unbroken chain
of custody, the RTC, in its Decision of July 11, 2008, found Castro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and after weighing carefully the evidence
presented by the prosecution and the defense, the Court finds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Considering that the weight of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride is less than 5 grams, he is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to TWENTY (20)
YEARS as maximum and a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00) in accordance with Section 11 of R.A. 9165.
SO ORDERED.7
Castro appealed to the CA. Following the submission of the Appellant’s Brief,8 the
Appellee’s Brief,9 and Reply Brief of Accused-Appellant,10 the CA rendered judgment
dismissing the appeal. Castro later moved for, but was denied, reconsideration.
The CA brushed aside Castro’s threshold defense line that he did not have, when
arrested, possession and custody of prohibited drug, the court stating in this regard that
illegal drug possession under the law includes both actual and constructive possessions.
Citing the testimony of Police Officer 1 (PO1) Mangapit, as corroborated by that of
Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Bal, the CA also declared that Castro, by his prior and
contemporaneous acts, had actual and constructive possession of, or, in fine, had the
intent to possess, the seized plastic sachet containing shabu, for the plastic sachet in
question was initially in Castro’s pants pocket but which he tossed to the ground upon
realizing that the ones about to accost him were police officers.
Anent allegations of non-compliance by the police officers of the requirements under Sec.
21 of RA 916511 on inventory and photographing of the seized shabu, the CA aptly held
that failure to literally comply with said requirements is not fatal to the prosecution, if
there is a clear showing that the identity and integrity of the seized shabu specimen have
been preserved, as in the case at bar. In net effect, the CA held that the chain of custody,
as the term is understood in drug-prosecution cases, has not been broken.
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant Castro imputes error on the part of the appellate
court respecting its conclusion about the corpus delicti having been established, it being
his contention that: (1) the crucial link in the chain of custody of the alleged seized shabu
had not been established; and (2) accused-appellant’s possession of the drug had
remained unproved. By questioning the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and the
weight the courts a quo gave their narration of events, accused-appellant veritably says
that he was a victim of frame-up.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
presentation and admission of the seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by
evidence to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent clams it to
be.12 This requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution as well as to
ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the
monitoring and tracking of the movements and custody of the seized prohibited item,
from the accused, to the police, to the forensic laboratory for examination, and to its
presentation in evidence in court.13 Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony
about every link in the chain or movements of the illegal drug, from the moment of
seizure until it is finally adduced in evidence. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that
a testimony about a perfect chain is almost always impossible to obtain.14
A circumspect review of the evidence extant on record shows that the chain of custody
rule has been sufficiently observed. The prosecution had proved with moral certainty,
thru the testimony of their key witnesses––i.e., SPO2 Bal, one of the apprehending
officers; SPO2 Ancheta, the evidence custodian; and Police Inspector Laya II, the
forensic officer––that what was seized from accused-appellant in the afternoon of July 25,
2003 near a church building in Laoag City was the very same item presented in court
after it was subjected to qualitative examination and was tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. In fine, the prosecution was able to establish that the
identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the seized prohibited drugs have not been
compromised from the time of its seizure at the time and place aforestated to its
presentation in evidence as part of the corpus delicti.
In a prosecution involving illegal possession of prohibited/dangerous drugs, the
following elements must be proved: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. As determined by
both the trial and appellate courts, the prosecution was able to establish, through
testimonial, documentary, and object evidence, the said elements.15 As a matter of settled
jurisprudence on illegal possession of drug cases, credence is usually accorded the
narration of the incident by the apprehending police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner.
Accused-appellant denies having had possession of the prohibited drug in question.
The accounts of arresting officers PO1 Mangapit and SPO2 Bal belie accused-appellant’s
gratuitous denial, both police officers testifying without any trace of hesitation that
accused-appellant had the sachet containing the shabu in his pocket until the moment he
threw it away. The fact that the plastic sachet containing shabu was already on the
ground when the arrest was effected is not, standing alone, an exculpating factor. What
the Court said in People v. De Leon is instructive:
Herein appellant was caught red-handed in the act of committing the offenses for which
he was charged. He made the sale in the presence of the police operatives, the poseur-
buyer and the informant. When he fled, he carried then threw the envelope containing
the regulated drugs inside the bedroom in full view of PO1 Libuton, the pursuing
arresting officer. There was therefore no need for a warrant to arrest and search the
person of appellant.16 1avvphi1
In the instant case, the arresting officers, having been furnished a description of accused-
appellant from a tipster, had a reason to suspect that petitioner is in possession of the
prohibited substance. Thereafter, they witnessed in plain view accused-appellant
throwing to the ground a plastic sachet containing a white substance. The very act of
throwing away the sachet, the contents of which were later determined to be shabu,
presupposes that accused-appellant had prior possession of it. Ergo, all the elements of
the crime have been met.
In People v. Isnani,17 the Court likewise ruled the admissibility of shabu which was
thrown outside the window by the appellant in that case.
Finally, accused-appellant’s allegation of frame-up or planting of evidence will not avail
him any, given the categorical testimonies of PO1 Mangapit and SPO2 Bal of the events
leading to accused-appellant’s apprehension and eventual custodial investigation. In the
absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by motives less
than proper, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be
interfered with by this Court.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The CA’s January 6, 2010
Decision and August 10, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 31793 are, accordingly,
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
11
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and /or
Surrendered Drugs xxx.––The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs x x x so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused x x x a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, further that non- compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
17
G.R. No. 133006, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 439, 545. The Court held:
To further strengthen the prosecution’s evidence, the two sachets of
shabu were presented before the trial court as Exhibits "B" to "B-3" and
"I" to "I-1". The first sachet was positively identified by PO3 Saradi as
the very same sachet with shabu sold and delivered to him by accused
Isnani who obtained the same from appellant. The other sachet
containing shabu was also positively identified by PO3 Morados as the
one he recovered above the waterlily leaves after appellant threw it
outside the window. (Emphasis supplied.)
10) G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section
23 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The
Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram]
of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea
of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-
making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal
branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the
denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to
be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it
"is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the
intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with
the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is
left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.
It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule
118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea
bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in
criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the
law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus
only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed.
However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged
with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this
case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No.
9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the
offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis
for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as
unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on
the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the
Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that
such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this
judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26,
2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:
 I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS
PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK
E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE
SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for being
procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded
as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot
be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for
declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover,
the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because:
(1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no
actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is
within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper
conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments
and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged
procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional
issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of
substantial and transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the
Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and
"harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and
spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of
thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that
"as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if
not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the
Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be
unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has
beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must
do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued
presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical
matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest
requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of
procedure as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon.
Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend
or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and
highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of
Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular
trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent
with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface.
In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme
Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953
which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after
July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this
Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do
so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is
obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to
"repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section
5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-
making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more
independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with
the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was
reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's
proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn,
Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to
the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in
Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies,
the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this
perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rulesinstead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided
in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule
14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge
Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of
legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of
R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1,
1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of
the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was
retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the
1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was
amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party
and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during
pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was
retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added,
stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining
and other matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered
during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to
a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which
are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those
which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is
frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if
a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and
jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule
deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on
provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of
the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent
part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute
the accused.43Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court
opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar
may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account
the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court
believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The
time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners
failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the
revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public
prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled
due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence,
apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and
the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite
criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates
in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He
is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of
time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove
the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage
of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew
the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the
accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not
take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing
right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused
to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against
the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of
the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance
of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction. 46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was
introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects
include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources
are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt
or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when
they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties
of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt,
and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks
posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting
completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions
to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither
create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement
an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should
a guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged
or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it
constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail
(except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party57and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor
has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The
reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely
simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a
criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to
examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether
to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a
plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed
as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-
trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution
does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only
basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the
former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on
record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said
motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well
as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that
the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must
disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on
the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of
plea is improper and irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt
any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory
provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
3
This repealed Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425 ("Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972"), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 ("Death Penalty Law"), which was approved on
December 13, 1993. It provided: SEC. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any
person charged under any provision of this Act where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.
41
Fabian v. Desierto, supra at 808-809. See also Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
(Sixth Division), supranote 23, at 517; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Judge
Laigo, et al., 768 Phil. 239, 269-270 (2015): Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 751
Phil. 123, 141-142 (2015); Land Bank of the Phils. v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 503
(2003); and Bernabe v. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933, 94 l (2002).
57
The State is the offended party in crimes under R.A. No. 9165. In People v.
Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 732 the Court ruled:
"x x x While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in
themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the
rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and
the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R.
No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect
is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a
result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family,
is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the
offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the
government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to
defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as
though he were the person directly injured by the offense (see United
States v. Samia, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the
 offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who
acts in behalf of the government."
Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 732. In Capati v. Dr. Ocampo (199
61
Phil. 230, 234 [1982], citing In Re: Hirsh's Estate SA. 2d 160, 163; 334 Pa. 172;
Words & Phrases, permanent edition, 26a.), the Court also held:
"It is well settled that the word 'may' is merely permissive and operates
to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the
term 'may be' connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. 'May' is
an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or
possibility."
11) G.R. No. 231989, September 04, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision2 of Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2010-1073
and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) guilty of violating
Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), committed as follows:
That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any
dangerous drugs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug,
with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the substance recovered from
his possession is a dangerous drug.
Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 3
On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also
indicted for illegal sale of shabu, committed as follows:
That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drugs, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell and/or offer for sale, and
give away to a PDEA Agent acting as poseur-buyer One (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug, in consideration of Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) consisting of one
piece five hundred peso bill, with Serial No. FZ386932, which was previously marked
and recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation.
Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 4
In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty.5 They were detained in the city
jail during the joint trial of the cases.6
The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, IO1 Nestle Carin,
IO2 Vincent Orcales, and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both
accused, Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense.
Version of the Prosecution
Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional
Office X of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a
confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the sale of
prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were directed by
their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust operation.
During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl Carin were assigned as the team
leader, the arresting officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-
buyer, respectively. The team prepared a P500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its serial
number entered in the PDEA blotter), the Coordination Form for the nearest police
station, and other related documents.
Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about 15 minutes before 10:00
p.m. and arrived in the target area at 10:00 p.m., more or less. IO1 Carin and the CI
alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1
Orellan and the other team members disembarked a few meters after and positioned
themselves in the area to observe. IO1 Carin and the CI turned at the comer and stopped
in front of a house. The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. " Gorres
came out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching
the television. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told
Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he
came out, he handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-
sealed transparent plastic of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him
with the buy-bust money.
After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan,
which was the pre-arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members,
immediately rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were
standing near the door. They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1
Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were
visibly surprised, of their arrest for selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put their
hands on their heads and to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to
them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both.
When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his
pocket. IOl Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money
and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it
contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug
was seized.
IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of
white substance, and a disposable lighter. IOl Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet
that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic
sachets. Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the
media and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1
Orellan in possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused
and prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence
and for the drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of the
case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was
not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public official
and the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses.
Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were taken.
The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens
to Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the sachets
of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic
Chemist, and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas7personally received the letter-requests and the
two pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. PSI Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening
and confirmatory tests on them. Based on her examination, only Lim was found positive
for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196
and 197-2010. With respect to the two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were
found to be positive ofshabu after a chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI
Caceres. Her findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres,
likewise, put her own marking on the cellophane containing the two sachets
of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence custodian. As to the buy-bust money,
the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office during the inquest.
Version of the Defense
Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina,
Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres was
watching the television. When the latter heard that somebody jumped over their gate, he
stood up to verify. Before he could reach the door, however, it was already forced opened
by the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian clothing. They entered the house,
pointed their firearms at him, instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his
ears, and handcuffed him. They inquired on where the shabu was, but he invoked his
innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of "Romy," he answered that he was
sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there and kicked the door open. Lim was
then surprised as a gun was pointed at his head. He questioned them on what was it all
about, but he was told to keep quiet. The men let him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim
was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA
Regional Office and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted,
albeit without the assistance of a counsel, ownership of the two sachets of shabu because
he was afraid that the police would imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in
drugs at the time of his arrest. Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the
PDEA agents but was acquitted in the case. Both Lim and Gorres acknowledged that
they did not have any quarrel with the PDEA agents and that neither do they have
grudges against them or vice-versa.
Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita,
Pasil, Kauswagan the night when the arrests were made. The following day, she returned
home and noticed that the door was opened and its lock was destroyed. She took pictures
of the damage and offered the same as exhibits for the defense, which the court admitted
as part of her testimony.
RTC Ruling
After trial, the RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale
of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator.
The fallo of the September 24, 2013 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:
1. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1073, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found
GUILTY of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve [12] years and one [1] day to
thirteen [13] years, and to pay Fine in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P300,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of Fine;
2. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found
GUILTY of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay the Fine in the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00].
3. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ELDIE GORRES y NAVE is hereby
ACQUITTED of the offense charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Warden of the BJMP having custody of ELDIE GORRES
y Nave, is hereby directed to immediately release him from detention unless he is being
charged of other crimes which will justify his continued incarceration.8
With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of
evidence favors the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and uncorroborated
denial of Lim. As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was able to establish
the identity of the buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller, and the delivery of
the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as simple, straightforward and without
any hesitation or prevarication as she detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust
transaction that occurred. Between the two conflicting versions that are poles apart, the
RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and no reason to disbelieve in
the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment preceding and pervading
the arrest of Lim. On the chain of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral
certainty that the PDEA operatives were able to preserve the integrity and probative
value of the seized items.
In so far as Gorres is concerned, the RTC opined that the evidence presented were not
strong enough to support the claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim
because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what the box contained. It also noted
Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM 196 & 197-2010, which indicated that Gorres was
"NEGATIVE" of the presence of any illicit drug based on his urine sample.
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the trial
court that the prosecution adequately established all the elements of illegal sale of a
dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented during the trial showed that a valid
buy-bust operation was conducted. Likewise, all the elements of illegal possession of a
dangerous drug was proven. Lim resorted to denial and could not present any proof or
justification that he was fully authorized by law to possess the same. The CA was
unconvinced with his contention that the prosecution failed to prove the identity and
integrity of the seized prohibited drugs. For the appellate court, it was able to
demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were not
compromised. The witnesses for the prosecution were able to testify on every link in the
chain of custody, establishing the crucial link in the chain from the time the seized items
were first discovered until they were brought for examination and offered in evidence in
court. Anent Lim's defense of denial and frame-up, the CA did not appreciate the same
due to lack of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by an
improper motive. Instead. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty was applied.
Before Us, both Lim and the People manifested that they would no longer file a
Supplemental Brief, taking into account the thorough and substantial discussions of the
issues in their respective appeal briefs before the CA.9 Essentially, Lim maintains that the
case records are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the
procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling

The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted based
on reasonable doubt.
At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No.
9165.10 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which
implements the law, defines chain of custody as-
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized
item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course
of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.11
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be
authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.12 To establish a chain of custody
sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational
basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. 13 In
other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which
the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims
it to be.14 Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established federal
evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not readily identifiable
and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more
stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged
with another or been contaminated or tampered with.15 This was adopted in Mallillin v.
People,16 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized
items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.17
Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating
officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and
submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.18
Seizure and marking of the illegal
drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the
investigating officer
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] 19
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.20
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other
modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a phyical
inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No.
10640, Senator Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired
and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said section resulted in the
ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and also,
in the conflicting decisions of the courts."21 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with
the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media
representatives are not always available in all comers of the Philippines, especially in
more remote areas. For another, there were instances where elected barangay officials
themselves were involved in the punishable acts apprehended. "22 In addition, "[t]he
requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is also very limiting.
Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were
apprehended."23
Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number
of acquittals in drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors
and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so
that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure [its] standard
implementation."24 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and
powerful local and international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have
the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers
makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It
makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory and photograph of
seized illegal drugs.
xxxx
Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did
not realize this in 2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required
to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the
preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where
the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where
the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the
inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.
It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal
drugs be allowed to be conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective
measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe location makes it more
probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly
conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.
Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the
seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforement officers could
justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the
phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people or
representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not
automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public
local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid
or scared.25
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated
items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security of
the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are
threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who have
the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault.26 The present case is not one of
those.
Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic
sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the
plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two
plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the marking and
physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.27 To ensure that they were not
interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by Lim to IO1 Carin and the one that
he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI
10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.28
Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the
DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items.29 In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.
The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:30
The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty
to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must
initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements
of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and
must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note
that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable
ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a
statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict
adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule,
since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence. 31
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical
inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s
such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting
for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the
punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of
a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period
required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of
the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention;
or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on
tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of
the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.32
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People
v. Ramos33requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under
Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the
prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were
unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a
flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts
to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily
given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust
operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full
well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section
21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their
non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest
efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances,
their actions were reasonable.34
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials
arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe
for them to wait at Lim's house.35 IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was
made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no
available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact
them.36 He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials
prior to their operation as they. might leak the confidential information.37 We are of the
view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient
attempt to comply with the law.
The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-bust
team to secure the presence of a barangay official during the operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO:
xxxx
 Q x x x Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay
official to witness the operation?
A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation,
Sir.
Q Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our
information.38
The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a
representative from the Department the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan, stated in his
Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to show that they tried to contact a DOJ
representative.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an
earnest effort to coordinate with and secure presence of the required witnesses. They also
failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in
Lim's house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten (10) members, and the
two accused were the only persons in the house.
It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of
Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR may be excused as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved applies
not just on arrest and/or seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation but also on
those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national penitentiary, checkpoint,
moving vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or those by virtue of a
consented search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident to a lawful arrest, or
application of plain view doctrine where time is of the essence and the arrest and/or
seizure is/are not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.
To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal
drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings.
Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and
Regulations directs:
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements
of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn
statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification
or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86
(a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be presented.39
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been
practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the
courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases,
the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state
their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers
must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have
taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized/confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn
statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the
case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further
preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable
cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may
exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of
arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with
Section 5,40
Rule 112, Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013
Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty of
violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an
entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and
Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte, for immediate implementation. The said
Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision the action he has taken.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, as
well as to the Head/Chief of the National Prosecution Service, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Public Attorney's Office, the Philippine National Police, the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Likewise, the Office of the Court
Administrator is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this Decision to all trial
courts, including the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Carpio, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, Tijam, Reyes, A., Jr., Gesmundo,
and Reyes, Jr. J., JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., On wellness leave
Leonen, and Caguioa, JJ., See separate concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part prior OSG action.
Endnotes:
29
Under the original provision of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, after seizure and
confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a
physical inventory and to photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4)
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. As amended by R.A. No. 10640, it is now mandated that the
conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence
of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof (See People v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 232300,
August, 2018; People v. Allingag, G.R. No. 233477, July 30, 2018; People v. Vicente Sipin y
De Castro, supra note 18; People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 219953, Apri123, 2018; and People v.
Mola, supra note 26).
40
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -(a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to
Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and
the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
The failure of law enforcement officers to comply with the chain of custody requirements
spelled out in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), as amended, coupled with a failure to
show justifiable grounds for their non compliance engenders reasonable doubt on the
guilt of persons from whom illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia were supposedly seized.
Acquittal must then ensue. This is especially true in arrests and seizures occasioned by
buy-bust operations, which, by definition, are preplanned, deliberately arranged or
calculated operations.
Asserting proper compliance with chain of custody requirements and the ensuing
acquittal of an accused due to the law enforcement officers' unjustified non-compliance-is
not a matter of calibrating jurisprudence. It is merely a matter of applying the clear text of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
I concur that the accused-appellant, Romy Lim, must be acquitted on account of
reasonable doubt.
I on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove
Conviction in criminal actions requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section
2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence spells out this requisite quantum of proof:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not
demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the immense
responsibility of establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from benevolence, it is
not merely engendered by abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises from a constitutional
imperative:
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused,
relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the
defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in
the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be
"presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional
presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution." Should the
prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused
must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:
We ruled in People v. Ganguso:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted.
This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an
acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof
as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest,
not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is
his innocence.1
II
The requisites that must be satisfied to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act are settled.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first
be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.2 (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted )
On the second element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, spells out requirements for the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia. Section 21 (1) to (3) stipulate requirements concerning custody prior to the
filing of a criminal case:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or tile media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
 properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be
submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by
the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the
subject iterm/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow
the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination
report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs
still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination
and certification[.] (Emphasis supplied )
People v. Nandi3 thus, summarized that four (4) links "should be established in the chain
of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court."4
People v. Morales y Midarasa5 explained that "failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section
21, Article II of RA 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to
establish the identity of the corpus delicti[.]"6 It "produce[s] doubts as to the origins of the
[seized paraphernalia]."7
Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the
seized items. Conversely, non-compliance with it tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim that an offense against the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.
Fidelity to chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics may
easily be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and detection through
methods that exceed human sensory perception (such as, specially trained canine units
and screening devices) are often needed to ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs. The
physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects facilitates their adulteration and
substitution. It also makes conducive the planting of evidence. In Mallillin v. People8
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they
are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the
links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other cases by accident or otherwise - in which similar
evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing.
Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.9 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Holgado, et al.,10 recognized that:
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement ... ensures the integrity of confiscated,
seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the
nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the
substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the
incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items
seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them.
Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating,
or tampering of evidence in any manner. "11
When the identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section 21, the
second element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remains wanting. It
follows then, that this non-compliance justifies an accused's acquittal. In People
v. Lorenzo:12
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be
sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited
drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first
place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same
degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 13 (Emphasis supplied )
III

As against the objective requirements imposed by statute, guarantees coming from the
prosecution concerning the identity and integrity of seized items are naturally designed to
advance the prosecution's own cause. These guarantees conveniently aim to knock two
targets with one blow. First, they insist on a showing of corpus delicti divorced from
statutory impositions and based on standards entirely the prosecution's own. Second,
they justify non-compliance by summarily pleading their own assurance. These self-
serving assertions cannot justify a conviction.
Even the customary presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
cannot suffice. People v. Kamad14 explained that the presumption of regularity applies only
when officers have shown compliance with "the standard conduct of official duty
required by law[.] "15 It is not a justification for dispensing with such compliance:
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the
seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption
of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or
statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance
thereof The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated
from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its
face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts
were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty.
We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the
seized and examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious
doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap
in the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the
accused must be acquitted.
From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution's failure to establish with
moral certainty all the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator
signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every
accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts
need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal
must forthwith issue.16 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted )
Jurisprudence has thus been definite on the consequence of non compliance. This Court
has categorically stated that whatever presumption there is concerning the regularity of
the manner by which officers gained and maintained custody of the seized items is
"negate[d]":17
In People v. Orteza, the Court did not hesitate to strike down the conviction of the therein
accused for failure of the police officers to observe the procedure laid down under the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Law, thus:
First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with the
proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any
apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should,
immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative,
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The
failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was
submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the
police officers.
....
IN FINE, the unjustified failure of the police officers to show that the integrity of the object
evidence-shabu was properly preserved negates the presumption of regularity accorded to acts
undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of their official duties.18 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act requires nothing less thari strict compliance.
Otherwise, the raison d'etre of the chain of custody requirement is compromised.
Precisely, deviations from it leave open the door for tampering, substitution and planting
of evidence.
Even the performance of acts which approximate compliance but do not strictly comply
with the Section 21 has been considered insufficient. People v. Magat,19 for example,
emphasized the inadequacy of merely marking the items supposedly seized: "Marking of
the seized drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and
unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165":20
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of the R.A. No. 9165, shows that
this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper
procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the
Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3,
Series of 1979 amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974.
In People v. Laxa, the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the
confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged apprehension of the appellant. One
policeman even admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for the seized drugs to ensure the integrity of the corpus delicti. Thru proper exhibit handling, storage,
first time in the police headquarters. The Court held that the deviation from the standard labeling and recording, the identity of the seized drugs is insulated from doubt from their confiscation
procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana up to their presentation in court .21 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
IV
Similarly, in People v. Kimura, the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the
alleged seized marijuana on the night the accused were arrested and to observe the The precision required in the custody of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia is affirmed
procedure in the seizure and custody of the drug as embodied in the aforementioned
by the amendments made to Section 21 by Republic Act No. 10640.
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Consequently, we held that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The differences between Section 21(1) as originally stated and as amended are shown
below:
In Zaragga v. People, involving a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the police failed to place
markings on the alleged seized shabu immediately after the accused were apprehended.
The buy-bust team also failed to prepare an inventory of the seized drugs which accused
had to sign, as required by the same Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of Republic Act No. 9165 Republic Act No . 10640
1979. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited
drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Confiscated, Seized, and/or
In all the foregoing cited cases, the Court acquitted the appellants due to the failure of Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
law enforcers to observe the procedures prescribed in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974, which are Essential Chemicals, Controlled Precursors and Essential
similar to the procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Marking of the seized drugs Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Chemicals,
alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal Laboratory Equipment. Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Laboratory Equipment. -
In the present case, although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic The PDEA shall take charge and have
sachets submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for examination, it was not custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources The PDEA shall take charge and
indubitably shown by the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the seized of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors have custody of all dangerous drugs,
drugs in the presence of appellant after their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to and essential chemicals, as well as plant sources of dangerous drugs,
whether the substances seized from appellant were the same ones subjected to laboratory instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory controlled precursors and essential
examination and presented in court. equipment so confiscated, seized and/or chemicals, as well as
surrendered, for proper disposition in the instruments/paraphernalia and/or
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in following manner: laboratory equipment so confiscated,
fact they have to be subjected to scientific analysis to determine their composition and seized and/or surrendered, for proper
nature. Congress deemed it wise to incorporate the jurisprudential safeguards in the present law in (1) The apprehending team having initial disposition in the following manner:
an unequivocal language to prevent any tampering, alteration or substitution, by accident or custody and control of the drugs
otherwise. The Court, in upholding the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, can do no less (1) The apprehending team having
than apply the present law which prescribes a more stringent standard in handling evidence than shall, immediately after seizure and initial custody and control of
that applied to criminal cases involving objects which are readily identifiable. confiscation, the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals,
R.A. No. 9165 had placed upon file law enforcers the duty to establish the chain of custody of the
physically inventory
and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel,
a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment
shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items
and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and /or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel,
with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media
who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof;
Provided, That the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizure;
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of
these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over
said items.
Section 21(1) was simultaneously relaxed and made more specific by Republic Act No.
10640.
It was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No.
9165, the use of the conjunctive 'and' indicated that Section 21 required the presence of
all of the following, in addition to "the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel":
First, a representative from the media;
Second, representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and
Third, any elected public official.
As amended by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21(1) uses the disjunctive 'or' (i.e., "with
an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media"). Thus, a representative from the media and a representative from the National
Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other.
Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a specification of locations where the physical
inventory and taking of photographs must be conducted (n.b., it uses the mandatory
"shall"). It now includes the following proviso:22
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. (Emphasis supplied )
Lescano v. People23 summarizes Section 21(1)'s requirements:
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2)
actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and
where these actions must be done. As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and
confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search
warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must
be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless
seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office QYou said that Romy Lim handed the sachet of shabu to you, what happened to that
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable." sachet of shabu, Ms. Witness?

Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the AI turned over it (sic) to IOl Orellan during the inventory.
physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the
person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third,
a representative of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to QWhere did he conduct the inventory?
the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items
were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his AAt our office.
or her counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a
representative of the media may be present in his or her place.24
QWhere?
V
AAt the PDEA Office, sir.
Set against the strict requirements of Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165, 25 this case
screams of glaring infringements.
Q... How did you know that?
"the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
ABecause I was there sir, during the inventory.
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same"
QThen, what did he do with the sachet of shabu Ms. Witness?
The prosecution's witnesses gave contradicting testimonies on the place where the
physical inventory was conducted. Intelligence Officer 1 Albert Orellan (Officer Orellan),
AHe put a marking.
the arresting officer, testified that he marked the seized items in the house of Romy Lim:
Pros. Vicente: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan] )
QHow did you know?
Q How did you know that the one bought and the one searched were not interchanged?
A I marked the item I recovered from Romy Lim, Sir.
ABecause I was present, sir.[27 (Emphasis supplied)
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (To the witness [Officer Orcales] )
Q How did Agent Orellan handle the evidence? The drugs he recovered and the buy-
Q Where did you mark it Mr. Witness, in what place?
bust item? And what did he do with it?
A At their house, Sir.26 (Emphasis supplied )
A He made an inventory.

Meanwhile, Intelligence Officer 1 Nestle N. Carin (Officer Carin), the poseur-buyer, and
Intelligence Officer 2 Vincent Cecil Orcales (Officer Orcales), the team leader of the buy- Q How about the marking?
bust operation, both testified that the inventory and marking happened in their office. A He made markings on it.
Because I was present, sir.
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (continuing to the witness [Officer Carin] )
Q How did you know?
 A I supervised them.
Q And where did Agent Orellan made the inventory?
A In the office.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Surprisingly, Officer Carin's testimony was corroborated by Officer Orellan in his
Affidavit when he narrated that they "brought the arrested suspects in [their] office and
conducted inventory."29
The taking of pictures was likewise not made immediately after seizure and confiscation.
In their separate testimonies, Officers Orellan and Carin stated:
Pros. Vicente: (continuing to the witness (Officer Orellan])
Q What else did you do at the office, Mr. Witness, did you take pictures?
A We asked them of their real identity Sir the two of them, and then we took pictures
together with the evidence seized from them.
Court:
These pictures IO1 Orellan were taken at the office?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
No pictures at the house of the accused?
A None, Your Honor.30 (Emphasis supplied)
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (continuing to the witness [Officer Carin])
....
Q Aside from markings what else did you do at the office?
A I took pictures during the inventory .31 (Emphasis supplied)
Although Officer Orcales testified that he took pictures "[i]in the house and also in the
office, "32 the only pictures in the records of the case were those taken in the PDEA
office.33
During cross-examination, Officer Carin reiterated that the inventory and the taking of
photographs were done in their office and not in Romy Lim's house.34
"in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
Moreover, not one of the third persons required by Section 21(1) prior to its amendment-
"a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official"-was present during the physical inventory and taking of photographs.
Instead, only accused-appellant Romy Lim and accused Eldie Gorres were present.
"who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof'
Since not one of the three required personalities were present during the operation, the
inventory was not signed. Even the two accused were not given a chance to sign the
shabu sachets that were allegedly found in their possession:
Atty. Demecillo: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan])
Q In this Inventory, no signature ofthe two accused?
A The accused did not sign, Sir.
Q Not also sign[ed] by a man from the DOJ?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Also from the media?
A None, Sir.
Q Also by an elected official?
A None, Sir.35
These infringements are fatal errors. The police operatives' conduct failed to dispel all
reasonable doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly obtained from accused-
appellant. The buy-bust team failed to account for the handling and safeguarding of the
shabu from the moment it was purportedly taken from accused-appellant.
What is critical, however, is not the conduct of an inventory per se. Rather, it is the
certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused are the exact same items
ultimately adduced as evidence before courts. People v. Nandi36 requires the ensuring of
four (4) links in the custody of seized items: from the accused to the apprehending
officers; from the apprehending officers to investigating officers; from investigating
officers to forensic chemists; and, from forensic chemists to courts. The endpoints in each
link (e.g., the accused and the apprehending officer in the first link, the forensic chemist
and the court in the fourth link) are preordained. What is precarious is not each of these
end points but the transitions or transfers of seized items from one point to another.
Section 21(1)'s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof.
Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where
the seizure was done (or at a location as practicably close to it) minimizes, if not
eliminates, room for adulteration or the planting of evidence. The presence of the accused
(or a representative) and of third-party witnesses, coupled with their attestations on the
written inventory, ensures that the items delivered to the investigating officer are the
items which have actually been inventoried.
The prosecution's case could have benefitted from the presence of the third-party
witnesses required by Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Indeed,
the requirement that the inventory and photographing be done "immediately after the
seizure and confiscation" necessarily means that the required witnesses must also be
present during the seizure or confiscation. People v. Mendoza37 confirms this and
characterized the presence of these witnesses as an "insulating presence [against] the evils
of switching, 'planting' or contamination ":38
The consequences of the failure of the arresting lawmen to comply with the requirements
of Section 21(1) ... were dire as far as the Prosecution was concerned. Without the
insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or
any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils
of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared
their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of
the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody. 39
In blatant disregard of statutory requirements, not one of the three (3) insulating
witnesses required by Section 21(1) was shown to be present during the arrest, seizure,
physical inventory and taking of pictures.
The Court should not lose sight of how accused-appellant's apprehension was supposedly
occasioned by a buy-bust operation. This operation was allegedly prompted by anterior
information supplied by an unidentified confidential informant.40 Acting on the
information, Regional Director Lt. Col. Edwin Layese supposedly organized a ten-
person buy-bust team41 and briefed them on the operation. Thereafter, the team claims to
have managed to prepare the P500.00 bill buy-bust money, a Coordination Form, and
other documents.42 All these happened from the time they were informed by their
confidential informant at 8:00pm up to the time they were dispatched for the operation at
around 9:45 pm.43
While the team managed to secure preliminaries, it utterly failed at observing Section
21(1)'s requirements. Certainly, if the buy-bust team was so fastidious at preparatory
tasks, it should have been just as diligent with observing specific statutory demands that
our legal system has long considered to be critical in securing convictions. It could not
have been bothered to even have one third-party witness present.
With the buy-bust team's almost two-hour briefing period and the preparation of the
necessary documents, the prosecution appears to have been diligently prepared. How the
buy-bust team can be so lax in actually carrying out its calculated operation can only
raise suspicions. That diligence is the most consummate reason for not condoning the
buy-bust team's inadequacies.
The prosecution likewise failed to account for the third link-from the investigating officers
to the forensic chemists. Officer Orellan testified that he did not know the person who
received the seized items from him in the crime laboratory.
Atty. Demecillo: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan] )
Q Who was the person who received the drugs you delivered in the crime lab?
A I cannot exactly remember who was that officer who received that request Sir but I
am sure that he is one of the personnel of the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q You know Forensic Chemist Charity Peralta Caceres?
A I only heard her name to be one of the forensic chemists in the crime lab, Sir.
Q Usually you have not seen her?
A I saw her but we were not friends, Sir.
 Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,as
Q But that evening of October 20, she was not the very person who received the sachet long as the integrity and the evidentiary value ofthe seized items are properly preserved
of shabu for examination? by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
A Only the receiving clerk, Sir. custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
To sanction non-compliance, two requisites must be satisfied. First, the prosecution must
identify and prove "justifiable grounds." Second, it must show that, despite non-
Q Not personally Caceres?
compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly
A No, Sir.
preserved. To satisfy the second requirement, the prosecution must establish that positive
steps were observed to ensure such preservation. The prosecution cannot rely on broad
justifications and sweeping guarantees that the integrity and evidentiary value of seized
Q After delivering these sachets of shabu, you went home?
items were preserved.
A I went back to our office, Sir.
The prosecution presented the following reasons of the buy-bust team as "justifiable
grounds" why they failed to have the required witnesses present during their operation:
Q From there, you did not know anymore what happened to the sachet of shabu you
First, the operation was conducted late at night; Second, it was raining during their
delivered for examination?
operation; Third, it was unsafe for the team "to wait at Lim's house "46; Fourth, they
A I don't know, Sir.44
exerted effort to contact the barangay officials and a media representative to no
His statements were corroborated by the testimony of Officer Orcales who stated that he
avail.47 The Ponencia added that "[t]he time constraints and the urgency of the police
was with Officer Orellan when the latter gave the seized items to the crime laboratory
action understandably prevented the law enforcers from ensuring the attendance of the
personnel. He confirmed that the person who received it was not Chemist Caceres and
required witnesses, who were not improbably at a more pressing engagement when their
that he did not know who it was.45
presence was requested. "48 According to the Ponencia, "there was no genuine and
sufficient attempt to comply with the law. "49
This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or
tampering of the seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist, especially since the
I join Justice Diosdado Peralta m finding these explanations inadequate.
amount was as little as 0.02 grams. Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may not
be the same items allegedly seized by the buy-bust team from accused-appellant. The
First, the testimony of team-leader Officer Orcales negates any allegation of effort that
doubt that the break created should have been enough to acquit accused-appellant.
the buy-bust team made to secure the presence of a barangay official in their operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO: (To the witness [Officer Orcales])
VI

Section 21(1), as amended, now also includes a proviso that leaves room for ....
noncompliance under "justifiable grounds":
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as Q Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay official
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved to witness the operation?
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied) A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation,
This proviso was taken from the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act Sir.
No. 9165:

Q Why?
 A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our
information.50
Assuming that the buy-bust team has reason not to trust the barangay officials, they could
have contacted any other elected official. The presence of barangay officials is not
particularly required. What Section 21(1) requires is the presence of any elected officiaL
Second, the prosecution failed to explain why they did not contact a representative of the
Department of Justice. Officer Orellan, in his Affidavit, mentioned that they only tried to
coordinate with the barangay officials and the media.51 The testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses were bereft of any statement that could show that they tried to
contact a representative of the Department of Justice-one of the three required witnesses.
Third, the buy-bust team did not specifically state the kind of effort they made in trying to
contact the required witnesses. A general statement that they exerted earnest effort to
coordinate with them is not enough. They should narrate the steps they carried out in
getting the presence of a Department of Justice representative, a media representative,
and an elected official. Otherwise, it will be easy to abuse non-compliance with Section
21(1) since a sweeping statement of "earnest effort" is enough justify non-compliance.
Fourth, the prosecution failed to state the basis why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in
waiting for the representatives in Lim's house. To reiterate, they were composed of at
least ten members. They outnumber the two accused, who were the only persons in the
house. They were able to control the accused's movement when they ordered them "to
put their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor."52 Moreover, when frisked, the
agents did not find any concealed weapon in the body of the two accused. How the
PDEA agents could have felt "unsafe" in this situation is questionable, at the very least.
Finally, there was no urgency involved and, certainly, the team was not under any time
limit in conducting the buy-bust operation and in apprehending the accused-appellant. As
pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in his Reflections, there could have
been no urgency or time constraint considering that the supposed sale of drugs happened
at Lim's house.53 The team knew exactly where the sale happens. They could have
conducted their operation in another day-not late at night or when it was raining-and
with the presence of the required witnesses. This could have also allowed them to
conduct surveillance to confirm the information they received that accused-appellant was
indeed selling illegal drugs.
As farcical as the buy-bust team's excuses are, it would be equally farcical for us to
condone it.
VII
The prosecution offers nothing more than sweeping excuses and self serving assurances.
It would have itself profit from the buy-bust team's own inadequacies. We cannot be a
party to this profligacy.
Rather than rely on the courts' licentious tolerance and bank on favorable
accommodations, our police officers should be exemplary. They should adhere to the
highest standards, consistently deliver commendable results, and remain beyond
reproach. Section 21's requirements are but a bare minimum. Police officers should be
more than adept at satisfying them.
At stake are some of the most sacrosanct pillars of our constitutional order and justice
system: due process, the right to be presumed innocent, the threshold of proof beyond
reasonable doubt and the duty of the prosecution to build its case upon its own merits.
We cannot let these ideals fall by the wayside, jettisoned in favor of considerations of
convenience and to facilitate piecemeal convictions for ostensible wrongdoing.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt hearkens to our individual consciences. I
cannot accept that the severe consequences arising from criminal conviction will be
meted upon persons whose guilt could have clearly been established by police officers'
mere adherence to a bare minimum. Certainly, it is not too much to ask that our law
enforcement officers observe what the law mandates. The steps we now require outlined in
the able ponencia of my esteemed colleague Justice Diosdado Peralta is definitely a step
forward.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that the Decision dated February 23, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, be REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda must be ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Endnotes:
22
This is not entirely novel. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9165 already I stated it. Nevertheless, even if it has been previously stated elsewhere,
it now takes on a greater significance . It is no longer expressed merely in an
administrative rule, but in a statute.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur.
I agree with the ponencia that accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) should be
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken link in the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs supposedly seized from him.
The facts are simple:
On October 19, 2010, at around 8:00 p.m., Intelligence Officer 1 Albert Orellan (IO1
Orellan) and his team were at the Regional Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) when they received information from a confidential informant (CI) that
Lim had engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in his house at Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon,
Cagayan de Oro City. The team immediately prepared to conduct a buy-bust operation
and coordinated with the nearest police station. They then left to conduct the buy-bust
operation and reached the target area at around 10:00 p.m., or two hours after they
received the information from the CI.
Upon reaching the target area, the poseur-buyer and the CI knocked at the door of Lim's
house. Eldie Gorres (Gorres), Lim's stepson, came out and invited them to enter. Inside
the house, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television while the supposed
sale of shabu happened between Gorres and the poseur-buyer. After the supposed
consummation of the sale, the police officers barged into the house and arrested Lim and
Gorres. The two were then prosecuted for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165.
At the outset, it is important to stress that jurisprudence is well-settled that in all
prosecutions for violation ofR.A. 9165, the following elements must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The existence of dangerous drugs is a
condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs, they being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.1 What is material is the proof that
the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.2 Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a
crime has been actually committed.3
In dangerous drugs cases, it is essential in establishing the corpus delicti that the procedure
provided in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is followed. The said section provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done
under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24)
hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.]
Furthermore, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. 9165 (IRR) filled in the details as to where the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items could be done: i.e., at the place of seizure, at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, thus:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure and confiscation in the
presence of the accused, with (l) an elected public official, (2) a representative of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and (3) a representative of the media, all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In buy-bust situations, or warrantless arrests, the physical inventory and photographing
are allowed to be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable. But even in these alternative places,
such inventory and photographing are still required to be done in the presence of the
accused and the aforementioned witnesses.
I submit that the phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the
physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if this is not practicable can
the inventory and photographing then be done as soon as the apprehending team reaches
the nearest police station or the nearest office. There can be no other meaning to the plain
import of this requirement. By the same token, however, this also means that the required
witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension - a
requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the
buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the apprehending
team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them said witnesses.
In other words, while the physical inventory and photographing are allowed to be done
"at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures," this does not dispense with the
requirement of having all the required witnesses to be physically present at the time or
near the place of apprehension. The reason is simple, it is at the time of arrest - or at the
time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" - that the presence of the three witnesses is
most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would
insulate against the police practice of planting evidence.
The presence of the witnesses at the place and time of arrest and seizure is required
because " [w]hile buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if carried out with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is well to recall that x x x by the very
nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures x x x the ease
with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands
of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals,
the possibility of abuse is great."4
In this connection, it is well to point out that recent jurisprudence is clear that
the procedure enshrined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.5For indeed, however noble the
purpose or necessary the exigencies of our campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is
still a governmental action that must always be executed within the boundaries of law.
Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza,6 without the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of
the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of R.A. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachets that were evidence of
the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of
the accused.7
Thus, it is compliance with this most fhndamental requirement - the presence of the
"insulating" witnesses - that the pernicious practice of planting of evidence is greatly
minimized if not foreclosed altogether. Stated otherwise, this is the first and foremost
requirement provided by Section 21 to ensure the preservation of the "integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs" in a buy-bust situation whose nature, as already
explained, is that it is a planned operation.
To reiterate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of
the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such
that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can
be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated
drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the
representative of the DOJ, the media representative, and the elected public official, when
they could easily do so - and "calling them in" to the police station to witness the
inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already
been finished - does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent
or insulate against the planting of drugs. I thuencourage the Court to send a strong
message that faithful compliance with this most important requirement bringing them to
a place near the intended place of arrest - should be strictly complied with.
In this regard, showing how the drugs transferred hands from the accused to the poseur-
buyer, from the poseur-buyer to the investigator and from the investigator to the crime
laboratory - much like in this case - without showing compliance with the inventory and
photographing as witnessed by the three required witnesses is not enough to ensure the
integrity of the seized drugs. Indeed, without such witnessing, the drugs could already
have been planted - an d the marking, and the transfer from one to another (as usually
testified to by the apprehending officers) only proves the chain of custody
of planted drugs.
I am not unaware that there is now a saving clause in Section 21, introduced by R.A.
10640, which is the portion that states: "noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items."
The requirements referred to that need not be complied with if there are justifiable
grounds are only in respect of the conduct of the physical inventory and the
photographing in the presence of the accused, with an elected public official, and a
representative of the DOJ, and the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Again, the plain language of this last proviso in Section 21 of R.A. 10640 simply means
that the failure of the apprehending officer/team to physically inventory and photograph
the drugs at the place of arrest and/or to have the DOJ or media representative and
elected public official witness the same can be excused (i.e., these shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items) so long as there are justifiable
grounds for not complying with these requirements and "as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team."
Thus, it has been held that, as a general rule, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 is mandatory.8 The Court may allow noncompliance with the requirement
only in exceptional cases,9 where the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of
justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.10 If these two elements are present, the seizures and custody over the
confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid.
It has also been emphasized that for the saving clause to be triggered, the prosecution
must first recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers and justify the
same.11 Breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21 committed by the police
officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti had been compromised.12
In cases involving procedural lapses of the police officers, proving the identity of
the corpus delictidespite noncompliance with Section 21 requires the saving clause to be
successfully triggered.
For this purpose, the prosecution must satisfy its two-pronged requirement: first,
credibly justify the noncompliance, and second, show that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item were properly preserved.13 This interpretation on
when the saving clause is triggered is not novel. In Valencia v. People,14 the Court held:
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case, the
prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance,
and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved.
Further, the non-compliance with the procedures must be justified by the State's agents
themselves. The arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply
with the procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain
why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable
ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that
may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own
convenience.15 (Citations omitted)
In the case of People v. Barte,16 the Court pronounced that the State has the duty to
credibly explain the noncompliance of the provisions of Section 21:
When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in
the confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust operation, the State has the obligation
to credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus delicti is
doubtful, and the accused should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.17
In People v. Ismael,18 the accused was acquitted because "the prosecution failed to: (1)
overcome the presumption of innocence which appellant enjoys; (2) prove the corpus
delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (4)
offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were not complied
with."19
Likewise, in People v. Reyes :
20
Under the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, a
saving mechanism has been provided to ensure that not every case of noncompliance
with the procedures for the preservation of the chain of custody will irretrievably
prejudice the Prosecution's case against the accused. To warrant the application of this
saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must recognize the lapse or lapses, and
justify or explain them. Such justification or explanation would be the basis for
applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the Prosecution did not concede such lapses, and
did not even tender any token justification or explanation for them. The failure to justify
or explain underscored the doubt and suspicion about the integrity of the evidence of
the corpus delicti. With the chain of custody having been compromised, the accused
deserves acquittal. x x x21 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Conformably with these disquisitions, I thus express my full support over the institution
by the ponenciaof the following mandatory policies before a case for violation of R.A.
9165, as amended by R.A. 10640, may be filed:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers
must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing
officers must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the
steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized/confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn
statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately
file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for
further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non)
existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court
may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order
(or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable
cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.22
To my mind, the Court, through the said policies, actually achieves two laudable
objectives, namely: (1) ensuring that the cases filed before the courts are not poorly
prepared, thus ultimately leading to the decongestion of court dockets, and (2) further
protection of the citizens from fabricated suits.
In connection with the case at hand, I therefore fully concur with the ponencia as it acquits
Lim of the crime charged. In particular, I wholly agree with the ponencia as it holds that
the explanations put forth by the apprehending team -that it was late at night, it was
raining, and that there were simply no available elected official and representatives from
the media and DOJ despite their unsubstantiatedclaim that they exerted efforts to
contact them - are simply unacceptable.
As the ponencia itself pointed out, "[i]t must be alleged and proved that the presence of the
three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was
not obtained due to reason/s such as:"23
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2)
their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her
behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to
be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face
the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints nd urgency of
the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law
enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders
could escape.24
Verily, none of the above reasons - or any such justifications similar to the
aforementioned - wa s present in this case.
It is important to note that (1) the report of the CI came in around 8:00 p.m.; (2) the
police officers immediately arranged a buy-bust operation; and (3) they arrived at Lim's
house at about 15 minutes before 10:00 p.m. While the vigor exerted by the police
officers was commendable, it must be pointed out that Lim was supposedly selling
drugs at his house. In fact, Lim "was sitting on the sofa while watching the television"
when the CI and the poseur-buyer arrived. There was thus no issue with regard to
urgency and time constraints, as Lim was not a flight risk nor was his supposed
commission of the crime bound to a limited period oftime. To reiterate, Lim was
supposedly continuously committing the crime at his own residence. The police officers
could have, for instance, proceeded with the operation the following day when the
presence of the three witnesses - as required by law - could have been obtained.
At this point, it is imperative to discuss that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by the police officers could not justify the police officers'
noncompliance with the requirements of law. Verily, the said presumption could not
supply the acts which were not done by the police officers. The presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties is simply that - a presumption - which can be overturned if
evidence is presented to prove that the public officers were not properly performing their
duty or they were inspired by improper motive.25 It is not uncommon, therefore that
cases will rely on the presumption when there is no showing of improper motive on the
part of the police.
To my mind, however, notwithstanding a lack of showing of improper motive, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official
duty.26 As applied to drugs cases, I believe that the presumption shall only arise when
there is a showing that the apprehending officer/team followed the requirements of
Section 21, or when the saving clause is successfully triggered.
Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law is fundamentally
unsound because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs ofirregularity.27 In People v.
Enriquez,28 the Court held:
x x x [A]ny divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the
said conditions, the non compliance is an irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable
doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.29 (Emphasis supplied )
Thus, in case of noncompliance with Section 21, the Court cannot rely on the
presumption of regularity to say that the guilt of the accused was established beyond
reasonable doubt. The discussion in People v. Sanchez30 is instructive:
The court apparently banked also on the presumption of regularity in the performance
that a police officer like SPO2 Sevilla enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity
and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. Admittedly, the defense
did not adduce any evidence showing that SPO2 Sevilla had any motive to falsify. The
regularity of the performance of his duties, however, leaves much to be desired given the
lapses in his handling of the allegedly confiscated drugs as heretofore shown.
An effect of this lapse, as we held in Lopez v. People, is to negate the presumption that
official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. Any taint of
irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable.
There can be no ifs and buts regarding this consequence considering the effect of the
evidentiary presumption of regularity on the constitutional presumption of
innocence.31 (Citation omitted)
What further militates against according the police the presumption of regularity is the
fact that even the pertinent internal guidelines of the police (some as early as 1999,
predating R.A. 9165) require photographing and inventory during the conduct of a buy-
bust operation.
Under the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual32 (PNPDEM), the
conduct of buy-bust operations requires the following:
ANTI-DRUG OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
xxxx
V. SPECIFIC RULES
x x xx
B. Conduct of Operation: (As far as practicable, all operations must be officer led )
1. Buy-Bust Operation in the conduct ofbuy-bust operation, the following are the
procedures to be observed:
a. Record time of jump-off in unit's logbook;
b. Alertness and security shall at all times be observed[;]
c. Actual and timely coordination with the nearest PNP territorial units must be made;
d. Area security and dragnet or pursuit operation must be provided[;]
e. Use of necessary and reasonable force only in case of suspect's resistance:
f. If buy-bust money is dusted with ultra violet powder make sure that suspect ge[t] hold
of the same and his palm/s contaminated with the powder before giving the pre-arranged
signal and arresting the suspects;
g. In pre-positioning of the team members, the designated arresting elements must clearly
and actually observe the negotiation/transaction between suspect and the poseur-buyer;
h. Arrest suspect in a defensive manner anticipating possible resistance with the use of
deadly weapons which maybe concealed in his body, vehicle or in a place within arms[']
reach;
i. After lawful arrest, search the body and vehicle, if any, of the suspect for other
concealed evidence or deadly weapon;
j. Appraise suspect of his constitutional rights loudly and clearly after having been
secured with handcuffs;
k. Take actual inventorv of the seized evidence by means of weighing and/or physical
counting, as the case may be;
I. Prepare a detailed receipt of the confiscated evidencefor issuance to the possessor
(suspect) thereof;
m. The seizing officer (normally the poseur-buyer) and the evidence custodian must
mark the evidence with their initials and also indicate the date, time and place the
evidence was confiscated/seized;
n. Take photographs of the evidence while in the process of taking the inventory,
especially during weighing, and if possible under existing conditions, the registered
weight of the evidence on the scale must be focused by the camera; and
o. Only the evidence custodian shall secure and preserve the evidence in an evidence bag
or in appropriate container and thereafter deliver the same to the PNP CLG for
laboratory examination. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Chapter 4, Rule 37 of the 2013 Revised Philippine National Police (PNP) Operational
Procedures33applicable during the pre-amendment of Section 21 provides:
37.3 Handling, Custody and Disposition of Evidence
a. In the handling, custody and disposition of evidence, the provision of
Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR shall be strictly observed.
b. The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
personls from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
c. The physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
d. Photographs of the pieces of evidence must be taken upon discovery
without moving or altering its position in the place where it was
situated, kept or hidden, including the process of recording the
inventory and the weighing of dangerous drugs, and if possible under
existing conditions, with the registered weight of the evidence on the
scale focused by the camera, in the presence of persons required, as
 provided under Section 21, Art II, RA 9165. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Further, the Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operation and
Investigation34 (2014 AIDSOTF Manual) similarly requires strict compliance with the
provisions:
Section 2-6 Handling, Custody and Disposition of Drug and Non-Drug Evidence
2.33 During handling, custody and disposition of evidence, provisions of Section 21,
RA 9165 and its IRR as amended by RA 10640 shall be strictly observed.
2.34 Photographs of pieces of evidence must be taken immediately upon discovery of
such, without moving or altering its original position including the process of recording
the inventory and the weighing of illegal drugs in the presence of required witnesses, as
stipulated in Section 21, Art II, RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640. xxxx
a. Drug Evidence.
1) Upon seizure or confiscation of illegal drugs or CPECs, laboratory equipment,
apparatus and paraphernalia, the operating Unit's Seizing Officer/Inventory
Officer must conduct the physical inventory, markings and photograph the same
in the place of operation in the presence of:
(a) The suspect/s or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel;
(b) With an elected Public Official; and
(c) Any representatives from the Department of Justice or Media who shall affix
their signatures and who shall be given copies of the inventory.
2) For seized or recovered drugs covered by Search Warrants, the inventory must be
conducted in the place where the Search Warrant was served.
3) For warrantless seizures like buy-bust operations, inventory and taking of
photographs should be done at the nearest Police Station or Office of the
apprehending Officer or Team.
4) If procedures during the inventory were not properly observed, as stipulated
in Section 21, RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640, law enforcers must make a
justification in writing for non-observance of the same to prove that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Under Sections Section 3-1(3.1)(b)(6) and (3.1)(b)(7) of the 2014 AIDSOTF
Manual, strict compliance is similarly demanded from police officers, thus:
6) During the actual physical inventory, the Seizing Officer must mark, and photograph
the seized/recovered pieces of evidence in accordance with the provision of Section
21 of RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640 in the presence of:
(a) The suspect or person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized
or his/her representative or counsel;
(b) With an elected Public Official; and
(c) Any representatives from the Department of Justice or Media who shall affix their
signatures and who shall be given copies of the inventory.
(Note: The presence of the above-mentioned witnesses shall only be required
during the physical inventory of the confiscated items. If in case, witnesses
mentioned above are absent, same should be recorded in the report.
7) In warrantless searches and seizures like buy-bust operations, the inventory and
taking of photographs shall be made at the nearest Police Station or Office of the
Apprehending Officer or Team whichever is practicable, however, concerned police
personnel must execute a written explanation to justify, non-compliance of the
prescribed rules on inventory under Section 21, RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied )
The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui 35 that it will not presume to set an a
priori basis of what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry out
in their entrapment operations. However, given the police operational procedures, it
strains credulity why the police officers could not have (1) ensured the presence ofthe
required witnesses, or at the very least (2) marked, photographed, and physically
inventoried the seized items pursuant to the provisions of their own operational
procedures.36
To my mind, therefore, while no a priori basis for the conduct of a valid buy-bust
operation is set, the noncompliance of the police with their own procedures implicates
(1) the operation of the saving clause and (2) the appreciation of the presumption of
regularity.
With this in mind, anything short of observance and compliance by the PDEA and police
authorities with the positive requirements of the law, and even with their own internal
procedures, means that they have not performed their duties. If they did, then it would
not be difficult for the prosecution to acknowledge the lapses and justify the same - it
needs merely to present the justification in writing required to be executed by the police
under Sections 2-6(2.33)(a)(4) and 3-1(3.1)(b)(7) of the 2014 AIDSOTF Manual. After
which, the court can proceed to determine whether the prosecution had credibly
explained the noncompliance so as to comply with the first prong of the saving
mechanism. I submit that without a justification being offered, the finding that the
integrity and probative weight of the seized items are preserved can only satisfy the
second prong and will not trigger the saving clause.
It then becomes error to fill the lacuna in the prosecution's evidence with the presumption
of regularity, when there clearly is no established fact from which the presumption may
arise. As such, the evidence of the State has not overturned the presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused.37
Based on these premises, I vote to GRANT the instant appeal and REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2017 finding accused-
appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5
and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
12) G.R. No. 219175
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
AMRODING MACUD y DIMAAMPAO,, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before the Court is the appeal1 of accused Amroding Macud y Dimaampao a.k.a.
"Ambro" (Macud) seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06239. The CA affirmed the Judgment 3 dated
April 30, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 164, Pasig City in Criminal
Case No. 17847-D. The RTC convicted Macud of violating Section 5 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs At of 2002, as amended.
The Facts
Through an Amended Information dated January 31, 2012, Macud and his co-accused,
Mohammad Khair M.Bayabao a.k.a. "Khali]" (Bayabao), were charged with the offense
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs penalized under Section 5 of RA No. 9165, allegedly
committed in the following manner:
On or about January 10, 2012, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, and not being lawfully authorized to sell,
possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to Police Officer Lorenzo S. Catarata, a police
poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance weighing eight (8) centigrams (0.08 gram) marked as "CATS 1-10-12 with
signature", which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a dangerous drugs, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.4
Bayabao was not arrested and, to this day, remains at large.
During the arraignment, Macud (assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office)
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5 After the pretrial proceedings were conducted,
trial on the merits ensued.6
The Prosecution's Evidence
The prosecution's case revolves around its claim that the charge against Macud arose
from a legitimate buy-bust operation. It presented as its witnesses (1) Police Officer 2
Lorenzo S. Catarata (P02 Catarata), (2) Police Chief Inspector Lourdeliza G. Cejes (PCI
Cejes), (3) Police Officer 2 Jay Santos Francisco (P02 Francisco), and (4) Police Officer 2
Jeffrey Male (P02 Male).
P02 Catarata testified on the acts constituting the offense charged and leading to the
apprehension of Macud. He narrated that, at about 6:00 p.m. of January 10, 2012, the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG) of Pasig City,
led by Police Chief Inspector Joel Q. Quintero (PCI Quintero), held a briefing for the
conduct of a buy-bust operation at Vicper Compound, Barangay Malinao, Pasig
City.7 The operation was supposedly in response to confidential information received by
the SAID-SOTO that illegal drug activities were being done in the area. A team was
formed to conduct the operation, which included P02 Catara, P02 Francisco, P02 Male,
and three other police officers.8 P02 Catarata was to act as the poseur-buyer and was
given a ₱500.00 bill on which he placed the mark "CATS," representing his surname.9
Accompanied by their informant, the team proceeded to and arrived at the Vicper
Compound at about 8:20 p.m. of the same day. As the other team members spread out
and positioned themselves, P02 Catarata and the infonnant proceeded to the house of on
"Khalil" (later identified as the co-accused Bayabao). When they approached the house,
they saw Macud standing outside of it and inquired if "Khalil" was inside because they
wanted to buy "tres" or ₱300.00 worth of shabu. In reply, Macud nodded and asked for
the money, P02 Catarata then gave the marked ₱500.00 bill to Macud. After receiving the
money, Macud went upstairs to the second floor of the house where '"Khalil" was. P02
Catarata claimed that he heard Macud and "Khalil" talking but did not understand what
they said as they were speaking in their vernacular. He then saw Macud hand over to
"Khalil" the ₱500.00 bill, and "Khalil" in tum gave Macud a small plastic sachet. Macud
thereafter went downstairs and gave the plastic sachet to P02 Catarata. It was at this
point that P02 Catarata arrested Macud, introduced himself as a police officer, and read
Macud his rights. The other team members tried to chase "Khalil" but he was able to flee,
allegedly with the marked ₱ 500.00 bill.10
P02 Catarata further testified on what he did with the plastic sachet that Macud gave him
after the buy-bust operation. He claimed that, immediately after arresting Macud, he
placed the mark "CATS 1-10-12" and his signature on the single heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and then prepared the Inventory of
Seized Evidence, which Macud refused to sign.11 . P02 Catarata and the team thereafter
brought Macud and the plastic sachet, first, to the police station for the preparation of
documents, and· second, to the Crime Laboratory Office in Marikina City for the
examination of Macud and the contents of the plastic sachet.12
PCI Cejes testified on the delivery and receipt of the plastic sachet and the examination
of its contents. She stated that she was the Forensic Chemist assigned at the Crime
Laboratory Office in Marikina City. At about 11: 15 p.m. of January 10, 2012, she
received from P02 Francisco a Request for Laboratory Examination of a specimen
contained in one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked "CATS 1-10-12" with
signature, along with the mentioned specimen. She proceeded with the laboratory
examination of the spicemen, which she marked as "Exhibit A, D-0010- 2012E LGC,"
and found that it tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She then
prepared Physical Science Report No. D- 0010-2012E where she listed her findings on
the submitted specimen.13
The testimonies of P02 Francisco and P02 Male were dispensed with after the
prosecution and the defense agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
As to P02 Francisco:
1. That he was the investigator in the present case;
2. That, as investigator, he prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report of the accused, the Request for Laboratory Examination of the
specimen, and the Request for Drug Test of the accused;
3. That he took pictures of the accused and the seized evidence at the
police station;
4. That he delivered the Request for Laboratory Examination and the
specimen subject of the request, and the Request for Drug Test of the
accused to the Crime Laboratory Office in Marikina City; and
5. That he has no personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the arrest of the accused and the origin and source of the spicemen.14
As to P02 Male:
1. That he was the police officer who coordinated with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).15
In addition to the above testimonies, the prosecution offered the
following documentary and object evidence:16
• Exhibit A and its Request for Laboratory Examination dated
submarkings January 10, 201217
• Exhibit B Improvised brown envelope with markings "D-10-
2012 E LGC"
• Exhibit B- l One (l) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.08 gram of white crystalline substance, with
markings "CA TS 1-10-12" and signature
• Exhibit C and its Physical· Sciences Report. No. DD-0010-
Submarkings 2012E18
• Exhibit D and its Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-
Aresto19 Submarkings
• Exhibit E and its Inventory of Seized Evidence20 submarkings
• Exhibit F Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the accused21
• Exhibit G Photograph of the · accused after he was arrested22
• Exhibit H Photograph of one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 0.08 gram of white crystalline
substance, with markings "CATS 1-10-12" and signature23
• Exhibit I Request for Drug Test24
• Exhibit J and its Request for Laboratory
Examination25 submarkings
• Exhibit L Pre-Operation Report26
• Exhibit M Coordination Sheet 27
The Accused's Evidence
Macud denied the charges against him and raised as defense frame up/extortion by the
police officers.
Macud stated that he earned a living by selling toys in the market. On January 10, 2012,
at about 8:20 p.m., he was walking along Vieros Street on his way to the market when he
saw five men entering an alley that led to the Vicper Compound. One of the men asked if
he knew "Cali" to which he replied "no;" the men then continued walking. A few seconds
after, a commotion ensued but he continued on his way. Suddenly, two of the five men
returned, held him, and ordered him to join them to their office for questioning. The men
then brought him to the Pasig City Motorpool where they frisked him and demanded
₱50,000.00 from him, otherwise, they threatened to file a case against him. When Macud
replied that he had no such amount, he was brought to Marikina City for drug test and
medical examination. Thereafter, he was detained in jail for about 21 days until he '18
was transferred to Nagpayong.28
Macud claimed that he does not know the men and saw them for the first time only
during their encounter on January 10, 2012. He said that prior to his arrest, he had been
living at Vicper Compound for about three months29and he previously came from
Mindanao.30
Ruling of the RTC and the CA
The RTC found that the prosecution's evidence sufficiently established that Macud
committed the offense charged. Macud was caught in flagrante delicto illegally
selling shabu, a dangerous drug. Accordingly, it rendered judgment finding Macud guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and sentenced
him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.31
As mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC's guilty verdict after finding Macud's appeal
unmeritorious. Like the RTC, the CA found that the prosecution's evidence sufficiently
established that the elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and that
Macud was liable therefor.32
The CA did not agree with Macud's contention that the police officers' failure to comply
with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 on the custody and disposition of the seized drugs
tainted the buy-bust operation and rendered the evidence inadmissible. Lt declared that
there was substantial compliance with the procedure to establish an unbroken chain of
custody which preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence.33
Moreover, the CA did not find credible Macud’s claim of frame up/extortion by the
police officers. This claim was uncorroborated and unsupported by any proof of ill
motive on the part of the police officers why they would falsely testily against Macud.
The CA considered Macud’s defense as a mere alibi which cannot stand against the clear
and positive testimony of P02 Catarata who was performing his job when he caught
Macud illegally selling shabu.34
The Appeal
Through the present appeal, Macud seeks the reversal of his conviction by claiming that
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.35 He alleges that no legitimate buy-
bust operation was conducted; instead, what transpired was an extortion attempt. In
support of this allegation, he refers to the failure of the police officers to comply with the
procedural requirements under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 and of the prosecution to
present the marked money used in the alleged buy-bust operation.36
The People, represented by the Solicitor General, disagrees and contends that all the
elements of the offense charged were duly proved.37 It claimed that Macud was a1Tested
through a valid buy-bust operation where he was caught in flagrante selling shabu. Hence,
the appeal must be denied and the conviction affirmed.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the appeal and reverses the CA
Decision that affirmed Macud’s conviction for the offense charged. We find that the
integrity and relevance of the prosecution's evidence have been compromised by the
failure of the police to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drug subject of the
crime charged and, thus, insufficient to support Macud’s conviction therefor.
The preservt1tion of the chain of
custody is essential in a successful
prosecution for the illegal sale of
dangerous drug
In every criminal prosecution, the Constitution affords the accused presumption of
innocence until his or her guilt for the crime charged is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.38 The prosecution bears the burden of overcoming this presumption and proving
the liability of the accused by presenting evidence showing that all the elements of the
crime charged are present.39
To sustain a conviction for the offense, of illegal sale of dangerous drug as penalized
under Section 5 of RA No. 9165, the following elements must be established:
"l) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor."40
At this point, we address Macud’s contention that the failure to present the marked
₱500.00 bill used in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The failure to present the marked money in evidence, by itself, is not material since its
absence will not necessarily disprove the transaction. "[N]either law nor jurisprudence
requires the presentation of [the] money used in [the] buy-bust operation."41 We declared
in People v. Rebotazowhat evidence has to be presented in prosecuting a violation of
Section 5 of RA No. 9165:
in prosecuting a case for the sale of dangerous drugs, the failure to present marked money
does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, as long as the sale of
dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court.42 (Emphasis supplied)
Evidence must be shown that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the
presentation of the corpus delicti, i.e.,the body or substance of the crime establishing its
commission.43 In a charge for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti is the
dangerous drug subject of the transaction.44
Section 21 of RA No. 9165 provides a special rule on the handling of items seized and
confiscated in dangerous drugs cases. It establishes a chain of custody rule which aims to
preserve the integrity of the items to be used in prosecutions under the law. 45 The
adoption of a special rule in the handling of the dangerous drugs in particular is
necessitated by the nature of the dangerous drug itself which is likely to be tampered,
altered, contaminated, or substituted. As the Court explained in Mallillin v. People46 –
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in
fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that
at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been
tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases-by accident or
otherwise-in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item
with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has
either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with.47 (Emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence identified four critical links in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs,
to wit: ''first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal dn1g seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court."48
With regard the first two links, Section 21 (1) of RA No. 916549 prescribes the procedure
to be observed immediately after the seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs. It
reads:
SEC. 21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physicallyinventory and Photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
The law requires that, immediately after the seizure and confiscation of the dangerous
drugs, the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs
shall physicallyinventory and photograph the same. Bothacts must be done in the
presence of the following persons:
1. the accused or his/her representative or counsel;
2. a representative from the media;
3. a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and
4. any elected public official.
The witnesses shall then sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.
The above procedure is supplemented by the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of RA No. 9165.50 Under Section 21 (a) of the IRR, the physical inventory and
photograph of the items seized shall be conducted where the search warrant is served;
otherwise, in case of warrantless seizures, these' shall be' conducted at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.51
Despite the mandatory language of the law, rigid compliance with the above procedure is
not expected. For this reason, the last proviso of Section 21(a) of the IRR states that "non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items." The prosecution must thus be able to explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses and to prove as facts the grounds raised to justify non-
compliance.52 Moreover, it must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence must have been preserved.53
There was a break in the chain of
custody of the seized dangerous drug
which the prosecution failed to
explain
The Court now proceeds to determine whether the laws and rules discussed have been
complied with in the present case.
The chain of custody began with P02 Catarata who testified that he received from Macud
a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance after he indicated interest to buy
₱300.00 worth of shabu and handed over the marked ₱500.00 bill. Upon receipt of the
plastic sachet, P02 Catarata said he arrested Macud and promptly prepared the Inventory
of Seized Evidence.
According to P02 Catarata, he had custody of the plastic sachet from the time Macud
gave it to him up to the time it was turned over to the Criminal Laboratory Ot1ice in
Marikina for examination:
PROS. MADAMBA:
Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, you are the one who is in custody of the transparent plastic
sachet at the time that you arrest [sic] the accused?
[P02 CATARATA]
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: At the time you were at the office[,] who is in custody of the evidence?
A: From the start when I was able to confiscate it [sic] was in my custody until it was
delivered to the Crime Laboratory.
Q: So who gave the specimen to the Crime Laboratory?
A: I was the one.54 (Emphasis supplied)
P02 Catarata's testimony, however, is contradicted by that of PCI Cejes - the forensic
chemist in the Crime Laboratory Office, who stated that she received both the Request
for Laboratory Examination and the specimen, not from P02 Catarata, but from P02
Francisco:
[PROS. MADAMBA:]
Q: On that day, did you receive any document and specimens [sic] with regard to this
case?
[PCI CEJES]
A: Yes, ma'am. I received request for laboratory examination from [P02] Francisco
from the Pasig City Police Station and together with the request is one heat sealed
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Q: Please show to us the evidence that it was received by your office?
A: There is a stamp receipt located at the lower portion of the document and in that
stamp receipt indicates the case number and the date and time received and the person
who delivered. It was P02 Francisco, and my name is written in the received by [sic]
portion, PCI Cejes.
xxxx
Q: You said it was not you who put the stamp mark receipt?
A: It was the duty recording clerk. The specimen was given to me by P02 Francisco and
I instructed the ... (discontinued).
COURT:
Q: The request for laboratory examination?
A: The specimen, Your Honor, one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet.
xxxx
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROS. MADAMBA:
Q: What is your standard operating procedure upon receiving the specimen, subject of
the request for laboratory examination?
A: Upon receiving the request for laboratory examination and the specimen, the duty
recording clerk will record the documents that would be received by the office and he will
put the stamp receipt and be will write entries that document, while the specimen will be
handed over the forensic chemist who is the duty officer for that particular case
Q. Do you know the person why he put your name PCI Cejes as received by? No, witness may answer. The prosecution is asking who handed the Request for
Laboratory Examination.
ATTY. AMPONG III:
A: Perhaps, it was Francisco.
She will be incompetent.
PROS. MADAMBA:
PROS. MADAMBA:
Q: But a while ago, when you were asked who went with you to the Crime Laboratory,
If she knows. you didn't mention Francisco, Mr. Witness?

COURT: A: Yes, ma'am

Witness may answer. Q: But now you remember it was P02 Francisco who handed over this document?

A: Because, I am the duty forensic chemist and I was the one who received the Specimen A: Yes, ma'am.
from P02 Francisco.
Q: How about the specimen who handed that specimen?
xxxx
A: i was the one, we were together in going to the Crime Laboratory.
Q: Who received the specimen, subject of your laboratory examination, one heat scaled
plastic sachet? xxxx

A: I was the one, from P02 Francisco.55 (Emphasis supplied) [CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. AMPONG]

Later in his testimony, P02 Catarata was asked to clarify who turned over what item to Q: In fact, after that the Request for Laboratory Examination was shown to you and
PCI Cejes: you saw in this stamp receipt the name of P02 Francisco, that was the only time that
you said P02 Francisco accompanied you to the Crime Laboratory, isn't it.
Q: Mr. Witness, as you mentioned a while ago, you're carrying that specimen from your
office to the Crime Laboratory in Marikina and what about this document who handed A: Yes, sir.
over this to the Marikina Crime Laboratory personnel, if you can remember?
xxxx
ATTY. AMPONG:
Q: What is that something that P02 Francisco handed to the receiving officer?
I believe, Your Honor, it [has] already been answered.
A: Document, sir.
COURT:
Q: He was the one who handed that document but you were the one who handed the
plastic sachet to the receiving officer, correct?
A: Yes, sir.56 (Emphasis supplied)
While no one is expected to have a perfect memory, we find more credible PCT Cejes'
straightforward and consistent statement that it was P02 Francisco who handed her both
the document entitled Request for Laboratory Examination and the specimen subject of
the request, i.e., the plastic sachet with shabu. Indeed, this was among the facts that the
parties stipulated on with regard the testimony of P02 Francisco:
x x x (4) that he was the one who delivered the request for laboratory examination
together with the specimen stated thereon, and the request for drug test to the Crime
Laboratory Service in Marikina City; x x x57
There is thus a break in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug that was never
explained by the prosecution, even when the opportunity to do so arose. Nothing in
the records showed when, how, and why the custody of the plastic sachet was
transferred from P02 Catarata to P02 Francisco. We emphasized in Mallillin v.
People58 how the chain of custody must be explained:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what ha1.mencd to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. (Emphasis supplied)
It may nevertheless be argued that the identity and integrity of the cotpus delicti was
preserved, since the plastic sachet that P02 Catarata, P02 Francisco, PCI Cejes had all
bore the marking "CATS 1-10-12" and P02 Catarata's signature, suggesting that they all
handed the same item that was seized from Macud. Though such an explanation is
plausible, we note that there are other significant lapses in the prosecution's evidence that
- viewed as a whole - cast reasonable doubt on its case against Macud.
There was an unjustified failure to
comply with the procedure
prescribed under Section 21, RA No.
9165
The prosecution never contested that the police officers failed to comply with Section
21(1) of RA No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of its IRR. The lapses constituted of the
following:
first, the absence of a representative of the media, the DOJ, and any elected public official
to witness the marking and physical inventory of the seized drugs; and
second, although the marking and physical inventory of the seized drugs were done
immediately after the arrest, the photograph was done after the operation and in the
police station by P02 Francisco,59 also without the requisite persons who should have
witnessed the act.
When asked to explain why there was failure to comply with the procedural
requirements, P02 Catarata simply said that doing so could compromise the buy-bust
operation:
COURT:
Q: Mr. Witness, why in the inventory receipt there is no representative from PDEA, from
barangay, Department of Justice and media?
WITNESS:
A: We have no companion, your Honor.
COURT:
Q: You did not coordinate with the barangay of Vicper Compound?
A:Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q: Why?
WITNESS:
A: Because if we will coordinate it might compromise the operation, your Honor.
COURT:
Witness, you're [excused].60 (Emphasis supplied)
We find this justification insufficient. Other than P02 Catarata's bare allegation that
coordination with the local officials could have compromised the buy-bust operation, the
prosecution offered no factual evidence to substantiate this claim. Even if the claim were
true, there is no requirement under the law that the elected public official who should
witness the operation must be one of those elected in the same locality where the
operation is conducted so as not to compromise the police operation in the area. This is
clear from the wordings of the law itself which says "any elected public official."61
We cannot even declare that there was substantial compliance with the law in this case as
the police officers invited no other person to witness the procedures that were
done after the buy-bust operation, i.e., the marking, inventory, and photography of the
seized drugs. There was no representative of the media or the DOJ and no allegation that
these people could similarly compromise the operation if they had been informed of and
present before, during, and after the operation.
The presence of the persons who should witness the post-operation procedures is
necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of
illegitimacy or irregularity.62 The insulating presence of such witnesses would have
preserved an unbroken chain of custody.63 We have noted in several cases that a buy-bust
operation is susceptible to abuse, and the only way to prevent this is to ensure that the
procedural safeguards provided by the law are strictly observed. In the present case, not
only have the prescribed procedures not been followed, but also (and more importantly)
the lapses not justifiably explained. In People v. Dela Cruz64 where there was a similar
failure to comply with Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the Court declared:
x x x This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of and custody
over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same. We
resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant as
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required
quantum of evidence, appellants acquittal is in order.65
As in Dela Cruz, and in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the acquittal of Macud in
order.
The prosecution cannot rely on the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions
and the weakness of the defense's
evidence to bolster its case
Any doubt on the conduct of the police operations cannot be resolved in the prosecution's
favor by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
The failure to observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the regularity
accorded to police officers.66 Moreover, to allow the presumption to prevail
notwithstanding clear lapses on the part of the police is to negate the safeguards precisely
placed by the law to ensure that no abuse is committed.
Macud may not have offered much by way of defense; he simply denied the charges and
claimed that it was nothing but an extortion attempt by the police.1âwphi1 Nevertheless,
the prosecution cannot rely on the weaknesses of the defense's evidence to bolster its case.
"If the prosecution cannot establish, in the first place, the [accused’s] guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the need for the defense to adduce evidence in its behalf in fact never
arises. "67
We recognize the pernicious effects of dangerous drugs in our society, but the efforts to
defeat or eradicate these cannot trample on the constitution rights of individuals,
particularly those at the margins of our society who are prone to abuse at the hands of the
armed and uniformed men of the State. Time and again, we have· exhorted courts ''to be
extra vigilant in trying drug cases, lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties for. drug offenses."68 This case in particular exhibits how a miniscule
amount - 0.08 gram - of drugs could have cost a man his liberty for a lifetime due a
bungled up buy-bust operation.
We thus end our ruling by reiterating our words in People v. Holgado:69
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act
No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of
prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving
small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane
to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of
drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective
and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these
nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to
attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial
arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting
our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug
menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the
leadership of these cartels.
WHEREFORE, prem1ses considered, the Decision dated July 31, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06239 is REVERSED and SETASIDE. Accused-
appellant Amroding Macud y Dimaampao is hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this
Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to the Director Gei1eral
of Philippine National Police and the Director General of Philippine Drugs Enforcement
Agency for their information.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
49
Section 21(1) was subsequently amended by RA No. 10640 in 2014 and now
reads as follows:
SEC. 21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.- The PDLT shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant source or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
I. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory
of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person.ls from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public
official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service: or the
media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventor; and be
given a copy thereof': Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the warrant is served:
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in any case of
warrantless seizure: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizure and custody over said items.
50
In light of the amendments introduced by RA No. 10640 the PDEA has
revised its guidelines on the IRR of RA No. 9165, See Guidelines on the
implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165 as amended by Republic Act No. 104602 and the Amendment to the
Guidelines.
The relevant portion of the guidelines as amended, states:
A. Marking Inventory and Photograph; Chain of Custody
Implementing Paragraph "a" of the IRR.
A.1 The apprehending or seizing officer having initial custody and
control of the seized or confiscated dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, mark, inventory and
photograph the same in the following manner:
A.1.1 The marking; physical inventory and photograph of the
seized/ confiscated items shall be conducted where the search
warrant is served.
A.1.2. The marking is the placing by the apprehending officer
or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the
item/s seized.
A.1.3. In warrantless seizures, the marking of the seized items
in the presence of the violator shall be done immediately at the
place where the drugs were seized or at the nearest police
station or nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable. The physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted in the same nearest police
station or nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable.
A.1.4. In cases when the execution of search warrant is
preceded by warrantless seizures, the marking, inventory and
photograph of the items recovered from the search warrant shall
be performed separately from the marking, inventory and
photograph of the items seized from warrantless seizures.
A.1.5. The physical inventory and photograph of the seized/
confiscated items shall be done in the presence of the suspect or
his representative or counsel, with elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the
media, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
of the seized or confiscated items and be given copy thereof. In
case of their refusal to sign, it shall be stated "refused to sign"
above their names in the certificate of inventory of the
apprehending or seizing officer.
A.1.6. A representative of the NPS is anyone from its
employees, while the media representative is any media
practitioner. The elected public official is any incumbent public
official regardless of the place where he/she is elected.
A.1.7 To prevent switching or contamination, the seized items,
which are fungible and indistinct in character, and which have
been marked after the seizure, shall be sealed in a container or
evidence bag and signed by the apprehending/ seizing officer
for submission to the forensic laboratory for examination.
A.1.8. In case of seizure of plant sources at the plantation site,
where it is not physically possible to count or weigh the seizure
as a complete entity, the seizing officer shall estimate its count
or gross weight or net weight, as the case may be. If it is safe
and practicable, marking, inventory and photograph of the
seized plant sources may be performed at 'the plantation site.
Representative samples of prescribed quantity pursuant to
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, as amended, and/or
Board Regulation No. I, Series of 2007, as amended, shall be
taken from the site after the seizure for laboratory examination,
and retained for presentation as the corpus delicti of the
seized/confiscated plant sources following the chain of custody
of evidence.
A.1.9. Noncompliance, under justifiable grounds, with the
requirements of Section 21(1) of RA No. 9165, as amended,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over
the items provided the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/ team.
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of
noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of RA
No. 9165, a5 amended, shall he clearly stated in the sworn
 statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary vs.
value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG, Accused-Appellant
coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant
to Section 86(a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of RA No. 9165 DECISION
shall be presented.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A.1.11. The chain of custody of evidence shall indicate the time
and place of marking, the names of officers who marked,
This is an appeal from the June 14, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
inventoried, photographed and sealed the seized items, who
G.R. CR H.C. No. 00902, which affirmed the August 31, 2010 Judgment2 of Branch 12,
took custody and received the evidence from one officer to
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Criminal Case Nos. 5021 (19952) and
another within the chain, and further indicating the time and
5022 (19953), finding appellant Salim Ismael y Radang (Salim) guilty beyond reasonable
date every time the transfer of custody of the same evidence
doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165),
were made in the course of safekeeping until submitted to
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In Criminal Case
laboratory personnel for forensic laboratory examination. The
No. 5021 (19952), Salim was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
latter shall continue the chain as required in paragraph B.5
pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165;
below.
and in Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953), he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years and pay a fine of
51
In People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 241 (2008), the Court noted that, despite the ₱300,000.00 for illegal possession of shabu under Section 11 of the said law.
distinction made by Section 21 (a) of the TRR on the venue where the physical 1
inventory and photography shall be made, "nothing prevents the apprehending
Factual Antecedents
officer/team from immediately conducting the physical inventory and
photography of the items at the place where they were seized, as it is more in
keeping with the law's intent of preserving their integrity and evidentiary value." Salim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling
and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The twin
61
REPUBLIC ACT No. 9165, Section 21. The Guidelines on the IRR of Section Informations3 instituted therefor alleged:
21 of RA No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640 now clarifies that:
In Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952)
A.1.6. A representative of the NPS is anyone from its employees, while
the media representative is any media practitioner. The elected public That on or about August 25, 2003, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
official is any incumbent public official regardless of the place where jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by
he/she is elected. (Emphasis supplied) law to sell, deliver, transport, distribute or give away to another any dangerous drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver to SPO1 Roberto
Alberto Santiago, PNP, Culianan Police Station, who acted as poseur buyer, one (1)
small size transparent plastic pack containing white crystalline substance as certified to by
PO1 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan as METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE
13) G.R. No. 208093 (SHABU), said accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953)
That on or about August 25, 2003, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
under his custody and control, two (2) small size heat-sealed transparent plastic packs
each containing white crystalline substance as certified to by PO1 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan
asMETHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU), said accused knowing the
same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on July 6, 2004, Salim, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Upon termination of the joint pre-trial conference, trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
Culled from the records were the following operative facts:
4 City] with SPO1 Santiago keeping personal custody of the items confiscated from [him].
On August 25, 2003, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant
reported to SPO4 Menardo Araneta [SPO4 Araneta], Chief of the Intelligence Division
of the Culianan Police Station4 [at Zamboanga City], that a certain "Ismael Salim" was
engaged in selling shabu at Barangay Talabaan near the Muslim [c]emetery [in that city.
To verify the report, SPO4 Araneta instructed the said informant to [monitor] the area.
After the informant confim1ed that the said Ismael Salim was indeed selling illegal drugs
in the reported area, SPO4 Araneta formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO1
Enriquez, SPO1 Eduardo N. Rodriguez (SPO1 Rodriguez), SPO1 Roberto A. Santiago
(SPO1 Santiago) and PO2 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan (PO2 Tan). It was then agreed that
SPO1 Santiago would act as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez as back-up. For the
purpose, SPO4 Araneta gave SPO1 Santiago a [₱100] bill bearing Serial No. M419145 as
marked money [to be used] in the buy-bust operation.
Upon arrival at Barangay Talabaan, the team parked their service vehicle along the road.
SPO1 Santiago, the confidential informant and SPO1 Rodriguez alighted from the
vehicle and walked towards the [area fronting] the Muslim cemetery. As they approached
the area, the informant pointed to a man wearing a brown T-shirt and black short pants
with white towel around his neck [whom he identified] as appellant Ismael Salim, the
target of the operation.
SPO1 Santiago then [walked] towards appellant and [told] the latter that he [wanted] to
buy shabu; to this appellant replied "how much?" SPO1 Santiago answered that he
[wanted to buy ₱100.00 worth of the shabu, and gave appellant] the ₱100.00 marked
money; [whereupon appellant] took from his left pocket one plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance [which he] handed over to SPO1 Santiago.
Upon seeing the exchange, SPO1 Rodriguez, who was positioned [some 10] meters
away, rushed in and arrested appellant[.] SPO1 Rodriguez made a precautionary search
of appellant's body for any concealed weapon[, and found none]. Instead, SPO1
Rodriguez found, tucked inside [appellant's left front pocket the ₱100.00] marked money
and two (2) more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance wrapped in a
golden cigarette paper.
The police officers then brought appellant to the Culianan Police Station [in Zamboanga
At the [police] station, the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of
the buy-bust operation, the two (2) plastic sachets also containing white crystalline
substance[, and the ₱100.00] marked money bearing Serial No. M419145 recovered from
appellant's left pocket, were respectively turned over by SPO1 Santiago and SPO1
Rodriguez to the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz [PO3 Napalcruz], who likewise
turned [these over] to the Duty Investigator, [PO2 Tan]. PO2 Tan then placed his initial
"RDT" on the items recovered from appellant.
PO2 Tan also prepared a request to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory 9, [at]
Zamboanga City for laboratory examination of the plastic sachet containing the white
crystalline substance subject of the sale between appellant and SPO1 Santiago, and the
other two (2) plastic sachet[s] found inside appellant's pocket by SPO1 Rodriguez.
After conducting qualitative examination on the said specimens, Police Chief Inspector
[PCI] Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist [Forensic Chemist Diestro], issued
Chemistry Report No. D-367-2003 dated August 25, 2003, finding [the above-mentioned]
plastic sachets positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) a dangerous drug.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. Appellant denied both charges; he
denied selling shabu to SPO1 Santiago, just as he denied having shabu in his possession
when he was arrested on August 25, 2003.
According to appellant, on August 25, 2003, he went to a store to buy cellphone load so
that he could call his wife. After buying the cellphone load, he went back to his house on
board a sikad-sikad, a bicycle-driven vehicle with a sidecar. When he was about 160
meters away from the Muslim cemetery in Barangay Talabaan, he was arrested by five
persons in civilian attire who introduced themselves as police officers. The police officers
conducted a search on his person but did not find any dangerous dn1gs. Thereafter, he
was brought to Culianan Police Station where he was detained for two days. Appellant
insisted that he never sold shabu to the police officers who arrested him. He said that the
first time he saw the alleged shabu was when it was presented before the trial court. He
denied that the police officers had confiscated a cellular phone from him. He also
asserted that all these police officers took away from him was his money and that he had
never met the said police officers prior to his arrest.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 31, 2010, the RTC of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 rendered its Judgment
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Sections 5 and
11,Article II of RA 9165.
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez
who conducted the buy-bust operation against appellant; it rejected appellant's defense of
denial and frame-up. The RTC noted that the defense of frame-up is easily concocted and
is commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the comprehensive dangerous drugs act.5 Moreover, other than the self-
serving statements of appellant, no clear and convincing exculpatory evidence was
presented in the present case.
The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING; this Court hereby finds the
accused herein, SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both
cases, for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and hereby sentences the
said accused, in Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952) for Violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00), and in Criminal Case No. 5022
(19953) for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to suffer the
penalty of Imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The dangerous drugs seized and recovered from the accused in these cases are hereby
ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed in accordance
with the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 and its in1plementing rules and
guidelines.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Dissatisfied with the RTC's verdict, appellant appealed to the CA, but on June 14, 2013,
the CA affirmed in toto the RTC's Judgment. The CA held that the elements of both
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs had been duly proven in the instant
case. The CA joined the RTC in giving full credence to the testimonies of the
aforementioned police officers, as they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, no evidence to the contrary having been adduced in the twin cases.
Moreover, the CA found that in these cases, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs had not at all been compromised, but were in fact duly preserved.
The CA disposed as fol1ows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region,
Branch 12, Zamboanga City finding accused-appellant Salim Ismael y Radang guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.7
Taking exception to the CA's Decision, appellant instituted the present appeal before this
Court and in his Appellant's Brief8 argues that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WHEN [HIS] GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.9
It is appellant's contention that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt
because the prosecution: (1) failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs
allegedly seized from him and; (2) likewise failed to comply with the strict requirements
of Section 21 of RA 9165.
Our Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, 1he prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.10 What is important is that the sale transaction of
drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is properly presented as
evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.
On the other hand, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
be established: "[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession
was not authorized by law; and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being
in possession of dangerous drugs."11
In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug
seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost
importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been
duly preserved. "The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."12
After a careful examination of the records of the case, we find that the prosecution failed
to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs in violation of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165.
The pertinent provisions of Section 21 state:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment-The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Similarly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) further elaborate on the proper
procedure to be followed in Section 21(a) of RA 9165. It states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
inm1ediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirement" under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items;
In Mallillin v. People,13 the Court explained the chain of custody rule as follows:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent clain1s it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it RSP II Ivan C. Mendoza, Jr.:
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses Q: You are telling the Honorable Court that instead of finding concealed weapon, yon x
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the x x found two small sized heat-sealed transparent plastic bag[s]?
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same. (Emphasis supplied) A: Yes, sir.

The first link in the chain is the marking of the seized drug. We have previously held that: Q: Where [were] these two small[-]sized heat-sealed transparent plastic [packs] found?

x x x Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that A: [In] his left-front pocket.
the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from Q: Were they wrapped further in another piece of paper or were they just found in that
pocket?
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or contamination of evidence.14
A: [They were] wrapped in a [golden-colored] cigarette paper.
It is important that the seized drugs be immediately marked, if possible, as soon as they
are seized from the accused. Q: Would you x x x be able to remember that [golden- colored] cigarette paper? The
wrapper of plastic pack?
Furthermore, in People v. Gonzales,15 the Court explained that:
A: Yes, sir.
The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or
related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items Q: Why will you be able to remember it?
by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other
identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator A: Because I turned it over to the desk officer and the desk officer turned it over to the
immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, investigator, the investigator marked it.
because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as
reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or Q: Who is the investigator?
related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are
disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, A: PO2 Rodolfo Tan.
planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon
confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the
Q: So did you see anything that the investigator Rodolfo Tan do in that golden paper?
preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. (Emphasis supplied)
A: He marked his initial [sic].
In this case, SPO1 Rodriguez testified on the seizure of the sachets of shabu he found in
appellant's possession alter the latter was arrested. SPO1 Rodriguez shared the details of
how the seized drugs were handled following its confiscation as follows: Q: Ah, you saw him [mark] an initial?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you see him [mark] on the paper? A: At that time it was PO3 Floro Napalcruz.

A: RDT. Q: Did you notice anything that he did with the specimen that you turnover [sic] to him,
if any?
Q: And do you know the meaning of RDT?
COURT: You are referring to the desk officer?
A: Yes, Rodolfo Dagalea Tan. 16

RSPII IVAN C. MENDOZA, JR.: Yes, Your Honor.

The testimony of SPO l Rodriguez on the chain of custody of the seized drugs leaves
much to be desired. It is evident that there was a break in the very first link of the chain A: During that time, Your Honor, I gave to him the, [sic] which I buy from him [sic] the
when he failed to mark the sachet'3 of shabu immediately upon seizing them from the one (1) piece of transparent small sachet of shabu then after that I get [sic] out from the
appellant. According to SPO1 Rodriguez, after finding sachets of shabu in appellant's office.17
possession, he turned the drugs over to the desk officer. SPO1 Rodriguez did not even
explain why he failed to mark or why he could not have marked the seized items During cross-examination, SPO1 Santiago reiterated that he did not mark the seized
immediately upon confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving the seized drugs. The sachets were marked after they were received by PO2 Tan.
items from SPO1 Rodriguez, in turn handed them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk
officer was not presented in court thereby creating another break in the chain of custody. Q: Now, you said that this plastic sachet taken from the suspect, you turned it over to the
Again, no explanation was offered for the non-presentation of the desk officer or why he desk officer of the police station?
himself did not mark the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly
from the desk officer, of the seized chugs that the same were marked at the police station.
This means that from the time the drugs were seized from appellant until the time PO2 A: Yes, sir.
Tan marked the same, there was already a significant gap in the chain of custody.
Because of this gap, there is no certainty that the sachets of drugs presented as evidence Q: After turning it over, you left?
in the trial court were the same drugs found in appellant's possession.
A: Yes, sir.
SPO1 Santiago, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, was presented to corroborate
the testimony of SPO1 Rodriguez. However, his testimony likewise showed that the Q: You do not know what happened to the sachet?
arresting officers did not mark the seized drugs immediately after the arrest and in the
presence of the appellant. Similarly, no explanation was given for the lapse. SPO1 A: Yes, sir.
Santiago testified as follows:
Q: You did not place your markings there?
Q: So what did you do with the small transparent sachet after police officer Rodriguez
came to assist you?
A: None, sir.18

A: After the arrest of a certain Ismael we proceeded to our police station when we
arrived there I turnover [sic] the transparent sachet to our desk officer.
Q: Who was the desk officer?
It is clear from the above that SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the
seized drugs immediately after they were confiscated from appellant. No explanations
were given why markings were not immediately made. At this stage in the chain, there
was already a significant break such that there can be no assurance against switching,
planting, or contamination. The Court has previously held that, "failure to mark the A: Yes, Sir.
drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution
evidence warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt." 19 Q: How?

Both arresting officers testified that they turned over the sachets of shabu to a desk officer A: Through my initial, Sir.
in the person of PO3 Napalcruz at the police station. Notably, PO3 Napalcruz was not
presented in court to testify on the circumstances surrounding the alleged receipt of the Q: What initial?
seized drugs. This failure to present PO3 Napalcruz is another fatal defect in an already
broken chain of custody. Every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show
how it was handled and preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching or A: RDT
replacement.
Q: What does RDT stands [sic] for?
After PO3 Napalcruz, the seized drugs were then turned over to PO2 Tan. It was only at
this point that marking was done on the seized drugs. He revealed in his testimony the A: It stands for my name Rodolfo Dagalea Tan.20
following:
In fine, PO2 Tan claimed during his direct examination that he received the seized items
4th ACP RAY Z. BONGABONG: from the desk officer.

Q: [After the apprehension] of the accused in this case, what happened?
A: SPO1 Roberto Santiago turned over to the Desk Officer one (1) small size heat-sealed
transparent plastic pack containing shabu, allegedly a buy[-]bust stuff confiscated from the
subject person and marked money while SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez turned over two (2)
small size heat[-]sealed transparent plastic packs allegedly confiscated from the
possession of the subject person during a body search conducted and one (1) Nokia
cellphone 3310 and cash money of ₱710.00.
During cross-examination, however, PO2 Tan contradicted his previous statement on
who turned over the sachets of shabu to him, viz.:
ATTY. EDGARDO D. GONZALES:
Q: Santiago told you that he was the poseur buyer?
A: Yes, Sir.

x x xx Q: He turned over to you, what?

Q: You as investigator of the case what did you do, if any, upon the turn over of those A: He turned over to me small size heat[-]sealed transparent plastic pack containing
items? white crystalline substance, containing shabu.

A: I prepared a request for laboratory examination addressed to the Chief PNP Crime x x xx
Laboratory 9, R. T. Lim Boulevard, this City.
Q: You also identified two other pieces of sachet, correct, Sir?
Q: This small heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet if you can see this again, will you be
able to identify the same?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Who turned over to you?
A: SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez.21
Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized item
subject of the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the illegal
possession case. This is material considering that the imposable penalty for illegal
possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the seized drug.
Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting
officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence
of the appellant. This requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It
must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of the accused to assure that
the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to comply with
this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs
were likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break
in the chain tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity
of the seized drugs became highly questionable.
To recap, based on the evidence of the prosecution, it is clear that no markings were
made immediately after the arrest of the appellant.1âwphi1 The seized drugs were
allegedly turned over to desk officer PO3 Napalcruz but the prosecution did not bother to
present him to testify on the identity of the items he received from SPO1 Rodriguez and
SPO1 Santiago. PO3 Napalcruz supposedly turned over the drugs to PO2 Tan who
marked the same at the police station. During his direct testimony, PO2 Tan claimed that
he received the drugs from PO3 Napalcruz. However, during his cross-examination, PO2
Tan contradicted himself when he admitted receipt of the seized drugs from SPO1
Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez. Aside from these glaring infirmities, there was no
inventory made, or photographs taken, of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused
or his representative, or in the presence of any representative from the media,
Department of Justice or any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a
copy of the inventory as required by RA 9165 and its IRR.
Lastly, we note that the trial court, in its November 12, 2007 Order, already denied the
admission of Exhibits ''B-1" and "B-2" or the dn1gs subject of the illegal possession case.
The relevant portions of the Order are as follows:
Plaintiff's Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" however are DENIED admission on the grounds that
Exhibit "B-1" submitted by the prosecution in evidence is merely a cigarette foil, whereas
Exhibit "B-2" is a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.0135 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride which are inconsistent with its offer that Exhibits "B-1"
and "B-2" are two (2) plastic heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing shabu with
a total weight of 0.0310 gram.22
Surprisingly, however, the trial court rendered a verdict convicting the appellant of
violating Section 11, RA 9165 on illegal possession of dangerous drugs based on the same
pieces of evidence it previously denied.
In sum, we find that the prosecution failed to: (1) overcome the presumption of
innocence which appellai1t enjoys; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any explanation why the
provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were not complied with. This Court is thus
constrained to acquit the appellant based on reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed June 14, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR HC No. 00902, which affirmed the August 31, 2010
Judgment of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in Criminal Case Nos.
5021 (19952) and 5022 (19953) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, appellant Salim R. Ismael is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the
Court of the date of his release or reason for his continued confinement within five days
from notice.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
14) G.R. No. 223142
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ROLANDO SANTOS ZARAGOZA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Rolando Santos y Zaragoza (Santos) seeking
the reversal and setting aside of the 6 August 2014 Decision1 and 2 March 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, Fourth Division (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No.
05851, affirming the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan
City, in Criminal Case Nos. C-82010 and C-82011 finding him guilty of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, respectively.
THE FACTS
Accused-appellant Santos was charged before the RTC of Caloocan City with three (3)
counts of violation of certain provisions of R.A. No. 9165, viz:
Crim. Case No. C-82009 (Violation of Sec. 6, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 21st day of August, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously maintain in his
house at 21 Tagaytay St., Caloocan City, a drug den, dive or resort where dangerous
drugs are habitually dispensed for use by the customers and addicts.4
Crim. Case No. C-82010 (Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 21st day of August, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody, and control dried crushed leaves and seeds wrapped in a newsprint
and contained in transparent plastic "tea bag" marked "ELS-21-8-09-06" weighing 1.0022
grams, when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive result to the tests for
Marijuana, a dangerous drug.5
Crim. Case No. C-82011 (Violation of Sec. 12, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 21st day of August, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his
possession, custody, and control several strips of used aluminum foil in a transparent
plastic bag, several pieces of used plastic sachet in a transparent "tea bag," and a plastic
tube intended for sniffing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.6
In relation to Criminal Case No. C-82009 where Santos was charged for maintaining a
drug den, Imee Baltazar Loquinario-Flores (LoquinarioFlores) who was found inside the
house of Santos during the service of the search warrant, was charged with violation of
Sec. 7, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.7
When arraigned, both Santos and Loquinario-Flores pleaded not guilty.8 Joint trial of the
cases thereafter ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution tried to prove its cases against Santos through the testimony of Special
Investigator Elson Saul (Saul), Agents Jerome Bomediano (Bomediano), Henry
Kanapi (Kanapi) and Atty. Fatima Liwalug (Atty. Liwalug), all from the Reaction, Arrest
and Interdiction Division (RAID) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and
Nicanor Cruz, Jr. (Cruz), of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division (FCD).
Prior to the application on 20 August 2009 by Atty. Liwalug for a search warrant before
the RTC, Manila, the RAID-NBI received information from their confidential informant
that there was a group of individuals at Tagaytay St., Caloocan City, selling drugs and
using minors as runners. After Atty. Liwalug interviewed the informant, she, along with
an NBI team and the technical staff of Imbestigador, a GMA Channel 7 investigative
program, went to the reported area to conduct surveillance. The actual surveillance,
where videos were taken of the buying, selling, and use of drugs in the different houses
on Tagaytay St., lasted for two weeks. During the first test-buy, Bomediano was able to
buy shabu from Santos alias "Rolando Tabo." Two informants were used by the NBI for
the surveillance but the spy camera was attached to only one of them. The informants
were able to buy drugs from Santos and to use them inside his house.9
The first video,10 taken by the staff of Imbestigador, showed the informants going inside a
makeshift house on Tagaytay St. which, according to one of the informants, was owned
by Santos. He was shown standing in front of a table while preparing the paraphernalia
to sniff shabu. Also shown in the video was Jenny Coyocot, the adopted daughter of
Santos, who, according to the informant, sold foil for the price of ₱2.00 per strip. The
second video11depicted Erwin Ganata Ayon telling Jack, one of the occupants in Santos'
house, "pasok kami sa bahay ni Tabo."12The videos were turned over by Mean de Chavez
of Imbestigador to Atty. Liwalug.13
On 21 August 2009, Kanapi, Saul, Bomediano, and SI Junnel Malaluan, armed with a
search warrant,14 proceeded to the house of Santos on Tagaytay St. Kanapi and Malaluan
guarded the perimeter of Santos' house to ensure that no one could exit from or enter the
house during the service of the search warrant. Previous to the service of the warrant, the
NBI RAID coordinated15 with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the officials of the
barangay, and the media.16
Saul knocked on the door of Santos' house. When nobody answered despite several
minutes of waiting, the NBI team broke open the door. Saul, Bomediano, Malaluan, and
the Imbestigator team proceeded to the second floor where they found a person who
identified himself as Rolando Santos. Saul told Santos that the team was from the NBI
and that they were to serve a search warrant on him, which copy was actually shown to
Santos. The team waited for the representatives from the DOJ and the barangay before
conducting the search.17
During the conduct of the search at the living room on the second floor of the house, Saul
found inside the bedroom and beside the bed of Santos several used and unused foil strips
either crumpled or rolled, the size of a cigarette stick. The foil strips,18 numbering
fourteen, were found inside a baby powder container.19 He also found unused small
plastic sachets.20 Saul placed the foil and plastic sachets on the center table in the living
room. When Saul frisked Santos, he found marijuana leaves wrapped in paper on the
right pocket of his pants. Saul informed Santos of his constitutional rights and placed the
marijuana leaves on top of the center table. Saul searched the rooms on the second floor
but found nothing. From a trash can in the kitchen, Saul found used small transparent
sachets which he also placed on the center table. Loquinario-Flores, who was caught on
video selling to the informant aluminum foil to be used with drugs, and two minor
children were found on the first floor of the house. The children admitted that they were
part of a gang in the area.21
Santos, Assistant City Prosecutor Darwin Cañete, Kagawad Magno Flores, and media
representative Eugene Lalaan of lmbestigador witnessed the inventory22 of the seized items
by Saul and when he marked them. Santos, Loquinario-Flores, and the two minors were
brought to the NBI office. When Saul returned to the NBI office after the operation, he
submitted the seized items to the NBI forensic chemist. A joint affidavit of arrest23 was
thereafter executed by Saul, Malaluan, Bomediano, and Kanapi.24
The testimony of Cruz, the forensic chemist, was dispensed with after the parties agreed
to stipulate on the matters he would testify and after a short cross-examination by the
defense.
Version of the Defense
The version of the defense was established through the testimony of Loquinario-Flores,
Santos, and Renamel Destriza (Destriza).
On 21 August 2009 at about 3:00 p.m., while Santos was alone at home playing his
guitar, the NBI team armed with long firearms suddenly arrived looking for a certain
Roland Tabo. Santos was made to lie face down and thereafter was frisked. The team
took Santos' money amounting to ₱140.00 and his house was searched in the presence of
a kagawad from Quezon City but the search team found nothing. As a result, the team
brought out foil, lighters, and marijuana and took pictures. Loquinario-Flores was inside
the house that time as she was called by Destriza to help bring down from the second
floor an elderly who was hit by the door when the NBI team forcibly opened it.
Loquinario-Flores was no longer allowed to leave while Destriza, who was carrying a
child that time, was allowed to go out of the house. Santos, Loquinario-Flores, and the
other persons arrested were brought to the NBI office. It was only during the inquest held
the following day that Santos was informed that he was being charged of violating the
provisions of R.A. No. 9165 and allowed to see the items allegedly seized from him. 25
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC26 ruled that the entry in the house of Santos by the NBI team and the
subsequent confiscation of the paraphernalia and marijuana were valid and legal since
the team had a search warrant. Moreover, it held that the search was conducted
following proper procedure. Thus, the R TC resolved the cases as follows:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds the accused Rolando Santos y
Zaragoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 6, 11 and 12,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon him the following:
(1) In Crim. Case No. C-82009, the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00);
(2) In Crim. Case No. C-82010, the penalty of Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00); and
(3) In Crim. Case No. C-82011, the penalty of Imprisonment of six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00).
Further, in Crim. Case No. C-82012, accused Imee Baltazar Loquinario-Flores was
likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 7 of the above-
cited law and imposes upon her the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00).
The drugs and drug paraphernalia subject matter of these cases are hereby confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
The Ruling of the CA
Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, Santos appealed before the Court of
Appeals.
In Criminal Case No. C-82009, the CA, Fourth Division27 ruled that the RTC should not
have given much weight to the video footages because these were not identified and
authenticated by the confidential informant who took them. It held that the prosecution
failed to present any witness who had personal knowledge and who could have testified
that Santos' house was a drug den. The team, on the other hand, failed to show that
Santos or any other person was committing illegal activities inside the house. It found
that the testimony of the confidential informant was essential and indispensable for the
conviction of Santos because the NBI agents did not have any personal knowledge as to
the alleged illegal activities in the house that would characterize it as a drug den. 28
In Criminal Case No. C-82012, because of its ruling that the prosecution failed to
establish that Santos was maintaining a drug den, the CA held that it necessarily followed
that Loquinario-Flores, pursuant to Sec. 11 (a), Rule 12229 of the Rules of Court, must be
exonerated of the charge against her for violating Sec. 7, Art. II of R.A. 9165. Despite the
fact that Loquinario-Flores did not appeal, the CA relied on the dictum that everything in
an appealed case is open for review by the appellate court.30
In Criminal Case Nos. C-82010 and C-82011, the CA held that the prosecution was able
to show the guilt of Santos beyond reasonable doubt. It held that the testimony of Saul
was straightforward and that there was no proof that he had ill motive to testify against
Santos. On the other hand, it found the defense of frame-up put up by Santos was self-
serving which failed to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution;
and that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Kanapi and Bomediano were on
trivial and immaterial details that do not affect their credibility.31 Hence, the appeal of
Santos was decided as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 26
September 2012 of the lower court is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-82010 finding the appellant Rolando Santos y
Zaragoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED;
2. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-82011 finding the appellant Rolando Santos y
Zaragoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia under Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED;
3. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-82009 finding the appellant Rolando Santos y
Zaragoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of maintaining a Drug Den under
Section 6, Article II of RA 9165 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Rolando
Santos y Zaragoza is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. C-82009 for
insufficiency of evidence.
4. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-82012 finding the accused Imee Baltazar
Lquinario-Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Visiting a Drug Den
under Section 7, Article II of RA 9165 is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. She is
hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. C-82012 for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Santos sought for a partial reconsideration32 of the decision of the CA insofar as it
affirmed his conviction in Crim. Case Nos. C-82010 and C-82011. Finding no persuasive
grounds or substantial bases to reconsider, however, the CA denied the motion.33
ISSUES
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND RESONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING ITS
FAILURE TO PROVE THE INTEGRITY AND IDENTITY OF THE ALLEGED
CONFISCATED DRUGS.
OUR RULING
The appeal is without merit.
It bears to stress that while an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until
proven guilty, the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own strength and not rely
on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.34The Court firmly holds that the
prosecution was able to successfully discharge its burden of overcoming the constitutional
presumption of innocence of Santos and in proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in
Crim. Case Nos. C-82010 and C-82011.
The findings of the trial court and the appellate
court as to the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses are binding and conclusive upon the Court.
Santos claimed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were indecisive,
conflicting, and contradictory; as opposed to the version of the defense which was
consistent, straightforward, and complementary with each other.35
To justify his claim, Santos averred that when Saul first testified he stated that the second
floor of the house had a living room, kitchen, and two rooms. It was when Saul allegedly
frisked Santos that he found several used and unused aluminum foil and a sachet of
marijuana, but nothing was found inside the two rooms. When Saul was again put on the
witness stand, he allegedly admitted that the five disposable lighters and the strips of
aluminum foil were found inside Santos' bedroom.36
Contrary to the claim of Santos, the testimonies of Saul were not inconsistent with each
other. When first put on the stand, Saul admitted that he found the strips of aluminum
foil in the living room; and that when he frisked Santos he found in the right pocket of his
pants the marijuana leaves wrapped in paper.37 Clearly, Saul was forthright in stating
where he found the used and unused aluminum foil and the marijuana. Saul never
claimed that the strips of aluminum foil were found on the body of Santos.
When Saul testified again, he described in detail that the strips of aluminum foil were
found inside a plastic baby powder container.38 Although Saul claimed that he found
these in the bedroom of Santos, the Court took note of the fact that in most houses in
urban areas, the living room is also used as the bedroom. What is important is that Saul
was consistent that he found the strips of aluminum foil on the second floor of the house
where the living room and bedroom were located.
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or
building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge
and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict.39 The truth that the
strips of aluminum foil were found in the house of Santos and the marijuana in his body,
had not been successfully controverted by him. In fact, there was but the lame defense of
frame-up offered by Santos to overcome the presumption. Enlightening at this point is the
jurisprudence in People v. Lagman, 40 viz:
It held that illegal possession of regulated drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused
had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes
not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists
when the drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of
the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another.41
The contention of Santos that the members of the raiding team gave an altogether
different account as to who actually witnessed the implementation of the search
warrant,42 is a trivial and inconsequential matter that does not affect the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. These matters do not deal with the central fact of the crime.
Besides, it has been held, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions
in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses' credibility but even enhance
their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.43
In stark contrast, the defense of denial proffered by Santos cannot prevail over the
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. A defense of denial which is
unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and
self-serving deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over convincing, straightforward, and probable testimony on affirmative
matters.44 Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility
with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense.45
Equally important is that it is the general rule that "the factual findings of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions on the credibility of the witnesses on which said
findings were anchored are accorded great respect. This great respect rests in the trial
court's first-hand access to the evidence presented during the trial, and in its direct
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while they testify on the occurrences and
events attested to."46 Settled also is the rule that factual findings of the appellate court
affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing
that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.47 Let it
be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review and it
is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.48The Court had assiduously reviewed
the records but found nothing to qualify these cases as falling within the exception to the
general rule.
Santos asserted that the search warrant was only for an undetermined amount of shabu;
thus, the discovery of the incriminating items other than that described in the warrant
must result from bodily search or seized in plain view to be admissible in evidence. 49
The assertion of Santos has no merit considering that he did not question the
admissibility of the seized items as evidence against him during the trial of these cases. It
was only when he appealed the decision of the RTC before the CA that he raised the
issue as to the admissibility of the seized items. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is
that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the lower
court.50
There was an unbroken chain in the custody of the seized drugs and paraphernalia.
It was the position of Santos that there was doubt as to the whether the marijuana and
paraphernalia seized from him were the very same objects offered in court as corpus
delicti. He claimed that there was no explanation given regarding the items confiscated
from Santos from the time these were seized until their turnover for laboratory
examination.51
"Corpus delicti is the 'actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.' In
illegal drug cases, it refers to the illegal drug item itself. "52
The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) - the policy making and strategy formulating body
in the planning and formulation of policies and programs on drug prevention and control
tasked to develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified, and balanced national
drug abuse prevention and control strategy53 - has expressly defined chain of custody
involving dangerous drugs and other substances in the following terms in Sec. l(b) of
DDB Regulation No. I, Series of 2002,54 to wit:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.55
The exacting requirement as to the chain of custody of seized drugs and paraphernalia is
highlighted in R.A. No. 9165 as follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
On the one hand, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) settles the proper
procedure to be followed in Sec. 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, viz:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirement" under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links that should be established
in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission
of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 56
On the first link, jurisprudence dictates that '"(M)arking' is the placing by the
apprehending officer of some distinguishing signs with his/her initials and signature on
the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous drugs seized upon apprehension are
the same dangerous drugs subjected to inventory and photography when these activities
are undertaken at the police station or at some other practicable venue rather than at the
place of arrest. Consistency with the 'chain of custody' rule requires that the 'marking' of
the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (I) in the presence of the
apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation.57
Saul testified that after he gathered the drug paraphernalia and the marijuana which he
confiscated from Santos, he prepared the inventory of seized items/property58 in the
presence of Santos, and the respective representatives of the DOJ, media, and the
barangay. In addition to the inventory, he marked the confiscated items as follows:
1. five (5) pieces of disposable lighters "ELS-21-8-09"
2. several pieces or strips of unused aluminum foil "ELS-21-8-09-01"
3. several pieces/strips of used aluminum foil "ELS-21-8-09-02"
4. several pieces unused small plastic sachet "ELS-21-8-09-03"
5. several pieces used small plastic sachet "ELS-21-8-09-04"
6. one (1) improvised plastic pipe "ELS-21-8-09-05"
7. undetermined amount of marijuana leaves and seed wrapped m newspaper "ELS-21-8-
09-06"
Anent the second and third links, on the same day that Saul arrived at the NBI RAID
office after the service of the search warrant, he forthwith prepared the disposition
form59 for the turnover of the seized items to the FCD. The seized items were received by
the FCD on 21 August 2009 at 11:05 p.m. A certification60 dated 21 August 2009 was
likewise issued by the FCD confirming that the confiscated items marked as "ELS-21-8-
09- 02", "ELS-21-8-09-04", and "ELS-21-8-09-05" yielded positive results for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and positive results for marijuana for "ELS-21-8-09-
06". On 25 August 2009, the FCD released its Dangerous Drugs Report Nos. DDM-09-
0861 and DD-09-47.62
On the fourth link, the testimony of Cruz was dispensed with after the parties had agreed
to stipulate on the following facts:
That he is an expert witness, and as such is of the receipt of a letter request dated 21
August 2009;
That attached to the letter request were several pieces/strips of used aluminum foil
marked as ELS-21-8-09-02; several pieces of used small plastic sachet marked as ELS-21-
8-09-04; one (1) improvised plastic pipe marked as ELS-21-8-09-05, and undetermined
amount of marijuana leaves and seed wrapped in a newspaper marked as ELS-21-8-09-
06;
That he conducted laboratory examination on the specimen submitted to their office, the
result of which he reduced into writing as evidenced by Dangerous Drugs Report No.
DDM-09-08, stating that upon examination conducted on the dried crushed leaves and
seeds wrapped in a newsprint gave positive results for "marijuana" and by Dangerous
Drugs Report No. DDM-09-47, stating that upon examinations conducted on the several
strips of used aluminum foil in a transparent plastic bag; several pieces of used plastic
sachets in a transparent "tea bag" and a plastic sachet tube gave positive results for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, respectively;
That he issued a Certification dated 21 August 2009 to the effect that he conducted
examination upon the above-mentioned specimen submitted to their office.63
As opposed therefore, to the claim of Santos, there was no significant gap in the chain of
custody of the seized items. Moreover, the assertion of Santos that the forensic chemist
did not testify to explain the measures undertaken to preserve the integrity and identity of
the substance examined until their presentation in court,64 has no merit. As earlier
mentioned, both the prosecution and the defense had agreed to dispense with the
testimony of the forensic chemist upon stipulation on certain facts. Moreover, the defense
counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the forensic chemist but, as revealed by the
records, his cross-examination never dealt on matters pertaining to the measures carried
out by the NBI team to maintain the integrity of the confiscated items.
In the same vein, it needs to be stressed that Cruz is a public officer; thus, his reports
carried the presumption of regularity.1awp++i1 Besides, Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.65 It
necessarily follows that the findings of Cruz as contained in Dangerous Drugs Report
Nos. DDM-09-08 and DDM-09-47 were conclusive in view of the failure of the defense
to present evidence showing the contrary.
Noteworthy, the legal teaching in our jurisprudence is that "the integrity of the evidence
is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of
showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the
presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties." 66 Santos had miserably
failed in presenting any evidence that would justify a finding that the NBI team had ill
motive in tampering with the evidence in order to hold him liable for these grave
offenses.
The prosecution was able to fully discharge its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt its charges
against Santos.
In Crim. Case No. C-82010, Santos was charged with and convicted of violation of Sec.
11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165,67 the elements of which are as follows: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object, which is identified to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.68
Saul testified that when he frisked Santos, he found marijuana in the right pocket of his
pants. Santos did not offer any explanation on why he was in possession of the marijuana
or if he was authorized by law to possess the dangerous drug. Based on the Dangerous
Drugs Report No. DDM-09-08, the dried crushed leaves and seeds wrapped in
newspaper and contained in the transparent plastic tea bag marked as "ELS-21-8-09-06"
and which gave a positive result for marijuana, had a net weight of 1.0022 grams.
Pursuant to Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and a fine ranging from Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00), shall be
imposed if the quantity of marijuana is less than three hundred (300) grams. Thus, the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) as imposed by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA, is hereby sustained.
In Crim. Case No. C-82011, Santos was convicted of violation of Sec. 12, Art. II of R.A.
No. 9165,69 its elements being as follows: (1) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and
(2) such possession is not authorized by law.70
Saul testified that when he served the search warrant on Santos at his house on 21 August
2009, he found thereat several strips of used aluminum foil in a transparent plastic bag,
several pieces of used plastic sachet in a transparent tea bag, and a plastic tube intended
for sniffing shabu, which he respectively marked "ELS-21-8-09-01 ," "ELS-21-8-09-04,"
and "ELS-21-8- 09-05." Similar to the marijuana, Santos failed to justify his possession of
these items. Significantly, Dangerous Drugs Report No. DD-09-47 showed that the
examination made on the washings of these confiscated items yielded positive results for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Pursuant to Sec. 12, Art. 11 of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years, and a fine ranging from Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) shall be imposed for violation
of this provision of the Act. Finding no error in the penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years, and a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00)
imposed by the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, the Court hereby maintains the
same.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 6 August 2014 Decision and 2 March 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Fourth Division in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 05851 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
29
Section l l. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;
xxx
54
Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment
pursuant to Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA No. 9165 in relation to
Section 81 (b ), Article IX of R.A. No. 9165.
67
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to
Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not
limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or
"ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
 trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine
(LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to
Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred
thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than
fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life
imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand
pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5)
grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine,
heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or
three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five (hundred)
500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (I) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand
pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(₱400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than
five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or
"ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives,
without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
69
Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia/or Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging room Ten
thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or have
under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in the
case of medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to carry
such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of
their profession, the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines
thereof. The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the
preceding paragraph shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked,
consumed, administered to himself/herself, injected, ingested or used a
dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Section 15 of this Act.
15) G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No. 9165)that are the
property of a third person are subject to be returned to the lawful ownerwho is not liable
for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not release such objects pending trial and
before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
City,charged RichardBrodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of
Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 91651 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory
portion of the information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each other, they
not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell,
trade, deliver and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with
Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets with
recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a
dangerous drug.2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City, filed another information charging only Brodett with a violation of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the
information alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent capsules
containing white powdery substance contained in one self-sealing transparent
plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when subjected to
laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as "Ecstasy", a
dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery
substance with total recorded net weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected
to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a
dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery
substance, placed in a light-yellow folded paper, with total recorded net weight
of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves with
total recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug. 3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a
MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence. He averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal non-drug effects from
him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551;and that
PDEArefused to return his personal effects despite repeated demands for their return. He
prayed that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to himupon
verification.4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and
Objection,5 proposingthereby that the delivery to the RTC of the listedpersonal effects for
safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the
Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the
City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the instrument
in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the
vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or custodian is
hereby directed to: (1) photograph the abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning
the same to its rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return should be fully
documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused,
Richard S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was denied on February
17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. The Order of the Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition
for certiorari, claiming that the orders of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8 dismissing the petition for
certiorari thusly:
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and
registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not
appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any
crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason
why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument
of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis.
The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a
contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to
remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the
required literal interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person
may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
Issues
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord with applicable
laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the CA
gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car, registered under the name of Myra
S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from accused Brodettduring a legitimate anti-
illegal operation and should not be released from the custody of the law;that the Motion
to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a
third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her
ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation
to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.
In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any question of
law that warranted a review by the Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly and
unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such
proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act;
that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person must still prove in the
trial court that he has no knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that PDEA
failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor the release of
the car to Ms.Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over
the offense has the power to order upon conviction of an accusedthe seizure of (a) the
instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and other effects that are
the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the
accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or the right to
possession of property through his unlawful act.12 As justification for thesecond, to return
to the convict from whom thecontraband was taken, in one way or another,is not prudent
or proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the
contraband again.13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has theright to
dispose of property used in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an
accessory penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third
person not liable for the offense that it was used as the instrument to commit.14
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are
absolutely divested and shall pass to the Government.15 But it is required that the
property to be forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can be said to be
within its jurisdiction.16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection with a
criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal
property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which
has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat which
has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. 17 If the
search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous weapons or
anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission of an
offense.18 Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property
seized is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to the
person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of course,19 except if it is
contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order the return of property held solely
as evidence should the Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such property can be made only when the
case is finally terminated.21
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter of
disposing of property claimed as evidence,22 and this discretion extends even to the
manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims the property was wrongfully taken
from him.23 In particular, the trial court has the power to return property held as evidence
to its rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the
Government.24 Property used as evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings
to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other
proceedings.25
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who
was not charged either in connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs
involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the
RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-
related cases pertains to "all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act,
including but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the
instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they
are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the law
exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a
third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and
registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not
appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any
crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason
why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous,
the court has no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. The
Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being
called only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or
construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application.
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument
of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis.
The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a
contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to
remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the
required literal interpretation is not consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a
person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act, including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential chemicals,is Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful
Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed
for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution, transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of
dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with
it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived
from unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained
thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was
committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act,
but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay
pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the
Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the
proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or
held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be
manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the
forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days
upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income
derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or
transferred and the same shall be in custodialegis and no bond shall be admitted for the
release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this
Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the
confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property pending disposition, as
well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above
expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of
R. A. No. 9165relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments
of the unlawful act is similar to that ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of theCrime. –
Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of
the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but
those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal Codein People v.
Jose,28 concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused
when they committed theforcible abduction with rape, although the car did not belong to
any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an
instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third
person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court
below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car
should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of
the tools and instruments belonging to a third person,therefore, there must be an
indictment charging such third person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice.
Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the
third person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not sufficient ground
for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and Objection
submitted on August 27, 2009 in the RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the listed
personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial,
would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible evidentiary
value. The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car because
it appeared to bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs, and, as
such, was the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable
laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the
car should not be released from the custody of the law because it had been seized from
accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to
Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third
person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her
ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation
to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. It insists
that the car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the pendency of
the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-Drug Evidence
on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial
was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that pointof the proceedings
was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived
therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165
during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court.Section 20 further
expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom should remain in
custodialegis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code
and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The
determination of whetheror not the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the
unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was
to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for
the duration of the trial in the RTCas being in custodialegisisprimarily intended to
preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it before the
judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.
Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not enough, for
mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such,
the RTC’s assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention with the express language of Section
20 of R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or reverse the
decision of the CA. It appears thaton August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision
on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting
both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug
evidence except the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain of custody is
fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot merely rely on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official function in view of the glaring blunder in the handling of the
corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to the
presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and
JOSEPH should be as it is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal
Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE
JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos.
09-208 and 09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. All the non-drug evidence except
the buy bust money and the genuine money are ordered returned to the accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the genuine money
confiscated from both accused are ordered escheated in favor of the government and
accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper disposition. (emphasis
supplied)33
The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition for review as to
render further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to
perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation and forfeiture of
non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in
order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165.34 This the Court must now do in view of the question about the confiscation and
forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of repetition in the future.35 1âwphi1
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the
provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs
or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even
if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision to all trial
courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
16) G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from
the Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and Resolution2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth
Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by
the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman -
Visayas, in an Information3 dated 14 February 2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA
CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and qualified to such public position
as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security
Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after having beenarrested by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive
for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as
"Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents
and special investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas
Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon
Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00
a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of
Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers
for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when
the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police
Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met
"James" who demanded from them ₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for
the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO
to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While
at the NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her
to bring the money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the
complainants.1âwphi1 A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment
operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and
Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a
pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount
demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the
forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic
chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug
testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in
the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-
TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified
that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by
NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied.
He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample,
to no avail.
THE RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision 4 dated 6 June
2007, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article
II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a
period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation
of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine
test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for
itsadmission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted
despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional
right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding
the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.
THE RULING OF THE CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked
prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug testing conducted under
circumstancessimilar to his would violate a person’s right to privacy. The appellate court
nevertheless denied the motion.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the
use of hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances
surrounding his arrest and drug test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment,6 saying that
"petitioner’s arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorariunder
Rule 45, as they involve questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his
arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the
proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by direct evidence; and the manner
in which the laboratory examination was conducted was grounded on a valid and
existing law.
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of
whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any
existing law or jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with the Resolution7 ordering him to submit
clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and
Resolution. Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law,
the pertinent provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found
to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a
penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any
dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from
Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00):
Provided,That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to
have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under
Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section
15 were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug
test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower
court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required
to extract urine because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a
statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation
by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended
or arrested for any crime.The phrase must be read in context and understood in
consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended
for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for,
among others, the "importation,"9 "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation",10"manufacture"11 and "possession"12 of dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties,
social gatherings or meetings"13 ; being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort";14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort";15 "illegal chemical diversion of
controlled precursors and essential chemicals"16 ; "manufacture or delivery"17 or
"possession"18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of
dangerous drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or
"unlawful"21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of plantsclassified as dangerous
drugs or are sources thereof";22 and "maintenance and keeping of original records of
transactions on dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled precursors and essential
chemicals."23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for
any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note thataccused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the
law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated
above instead of charging and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties.
The essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez24 as follows:
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession
of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165,
withregard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of
law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous
drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed
under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping
withthe intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first
time offenders of drug use, provided thatthere is a positive confirmatory test result as
required under Sec. 15.The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the
possession of residue isimprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty
under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of
residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and
provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on
the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs.
Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of
custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165
or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec.
14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed
on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the
possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facieevidence
that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec.
15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus
calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper
discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs isonly and solely in the
form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of
dangerous drugs.In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the
filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done
when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in
the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A.
9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons
apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of thisprovision
would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,25 to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness
a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to
have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest.26 However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest."27
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable
exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been
allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the
principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513
[1987]) The essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that
is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo,
213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero,
378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical
examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs.
Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu
Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced todetermine its identity
with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308
[1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs.
Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the
extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v.
People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the
enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and
confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in
that case were also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the
petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited
drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was inadmissible in evidence, since
it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not
an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material." The situation in
Gutangwas categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from
testimonial compulsion since what was sought tobe examined came from the body of the
accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to
unearth undisclosedfacts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not
compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when
they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in
evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of
credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the
culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case.1awp++i1 First, Gutang was arrested in
relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other
pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case,
though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken;
and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidencethat was used as basis for his
conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for
drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his
rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his
urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all
arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track
down offenders intheir laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the
reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to
purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly
transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police
force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by
the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
17) G.R. No. 198450
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA a.k.a. FERNAMDO RANCHE
ABANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and
related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be
presented against the accused. Their observance is the key to the successful prosecution
of illegal possession or illegal sale of dangerous drugs."1
At issue in this case is whether appellant Fernando Ranche Havana a.k.a. Fernando
Ranche Abana did in fact sell or deliver to an alleged poseur-buyer some 0.03 gram of the
banned substance Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu" on the
late afternoon of November 4, 2005. The appellant insists that he never did. The
prosecution asserts the contrary.
On appeal is the May 31, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00688, affirming the February 28, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 58 finding Fernando Havana y Ranche a.k.a Fernando
Abruia y Ranche (appellant) guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.
Factual Antecedents
In an Information4 dated November 18, 2005, the appellant was charged with illegal sale
of dangerous drugs committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of November, 2005, at about 6:30 p.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent and without authority of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give
away to a poseur[-]buyer the following:
One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance
containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as "SHABU", a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Appellant put in a negative plea. Trial then followed.
The prosecution’s case is essentially erected upon the testimonies of PO2 Miguel R.
Enriquez6 (PO2 Enriquez), SPO1 Rogelio J. Cañete, Jr. (SPO1 Cañete), and Police Chief
Inspector Mutchit G. Salinas (PCI Salinas), all members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), Police Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City and documentary exhibits
pertaining to the buy-bust operation. The combined testimonies and the documentary
exhibits tended to establish these facts:
On the afternoon of November 4, 2005, a civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police
Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City and reported to the duty officer SPO1 Vicente R.
Espenido, Jr. (SPO1 Espenido) that the appellant was actively engaged in the illegal drug
trade at Sitio Mangga, Punta Princesa, Cebu City. SPO1 Espenido immediately
assembled a buy-bust team, with him as the team leader, the civilian asset and with PO2
Enriquez, SPO1 Cañete, and SPO1 Jasper C. Nuñez (PO2 Nuñez) as back-up. The
police team designated the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided
him with a P100.00 marked money bill, with its serial number (SN003332) noted in the
police blotter,7 to be used for the purpose of buying shabu from appellant. The buy-bust
operation was allegedly coordinated with the Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA).8 When the police team reached the target area, the "civilian informant"
went to the house of appellant and called the latter. Hidden from view, some 15 meters
away from the house, the back-up operatives, PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Cañete, saw the
civilian informant talking with the appellant. Not long after, they saw the "civilian
informant" handling over the marked P100.00 bill to the appellant, who in exchange gave
to the former a plastic pack containing 0.03 gram white crystalline substance which these
two suspected as shabu. The "civilian informant" then placed a face towel on his left
shoulder to signal that the sale had been consummated. SPO1 Espenido and his two
companions rushed towards the "civilian informant" and the appellant and arrested the
latter after apprising him of his constitutional rights. SPO1 Espenido recovered the
P100.00 marked money from the appellant while the plastic pack was given by the
"civilian informant" to SPO1 Espenido.
The appellant was taken to the police station for investigation. The P100.00 marked
money and the plastic pack containing the suspected shabu were turned over to SPO2
Nuñez who marked the plastic pack with "FA" the initials of herein appellant. He then
prepared a letter requesting for examination9 of the item seized from the appellant
addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory. PCI Salinas, a forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory of Brgy. Apas, Cebu City, testified that he conducted a laboratory
examination of the recovered specimen10 that yielded "positive result for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug."11
The appellant denied that he was a shabu-seller; he also denied that he was arrested in a
buy-bust operation.1âwphi1 He claimed that on that evening of November 4, 2005 he was
eating bread when SPO2 Nuñez barged inside his house, handcuffed him and brought
him to the police precinct. He claimed that he was mistaken for his neighbor "Narding"
the real shabu-seller. His daughter, Maria Theresa, corroborated him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC ruling. The appellate court held that the non-
submission of the pre-operation report to the PDEA did not at all render the buy-bust
operation irregular. What it held as important is that the police officers were able to call
the PDEA prior to the operation. The CA was convinced that all the elements of the
offense charged were established by the prosecution. The CA held that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated item had been preserved, despite the fact that the
police officers did not strictly adhere to the procedure outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165
which governs the so-called "buy-bust" operations. It held that the police officers
regularly performed their functions. Thus, in its Decision of May 31, 2010, the CA
decreed dispositively –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision
dated February 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-75283, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of his conviction faulting the
courts below for convicting him of the crime charged. He questions in his Supplemental
Brief: (1) the lack of pre-coordination with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust operation,
(2) the non-presentation in court of the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer, (3)
the non-compliance by the police officers with the prescribed procedure under Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 and lastly, the dubious chain of custody of the subject shabu.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmance of the appealed
Decision arguing that the essential elements of the offense charged had been adequately
established and that the appellant’s bare denial cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimonies of the police operatives who are presumed to have performed
their duties regularly.
Our Ruling
The appeal is well-taken.
Prefatorily, we stress again that generally, the trial court’s findings of fact, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight, and will not be disturbed on
appeal.13 Even as this Court must defer to this salutary rule, it must likewise pay homage
to a higher duty which is to dispense real, conscientious and honest-to-goodness justice
by conducting a thorough examination of the entire records of the case based on the
settled principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review on all
questions including those not raised by the parties.14
The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation report to the
PDEA after the buy-bust operation violates RA 9165; and that the non-presentation of
the unnamed "civilian informant" who allegedly brokered the transaction with him casts
serious doubts on the factuality of the buy-bust operation.15
There is no merit in this contention.
We held in People v. Abedin16 that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation; that in fact,
even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust
operation.17 Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in
prosecuting drug-related cases.18 Informers are almost always never presented in court
because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless their
testimony is absolutely essential to the conviction of the accused, their testimony may be
dispensed with since their narrations would be merely corroborative to the testimonies of
the buy-bust team.
Adherence to the chain of custody rule not established.
In this ultimate recourse, appellant focuses his principal argument on the alleged failure
of the prosecution to establish a continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized
illegal drug and the lack of integrity of the evidence in view of the police officers’ non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
"In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."19 The dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence beyond
reasonable doubt plus the fact of its delivery and/or sale are both vital and essential to a
judgment of conviction in a criminal case.20 And more than just the fact of sale, "[o]f
prime importance therefore x x x is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise
established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, it must be established with
unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the
accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that in ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed."21
The Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody
as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping,
to presentation in court for destruction."
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable,
or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness. The same standard obtains in case the evidence is susceptible
of alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other
words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering –without
regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not – dictates the level of strictness
in the application of the chain or custody rule.22
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, we find that the prosecution utterly failed to
establish convincingly the chain of custody of the alleged seized plastic pack subject
matter hereof. In fact only PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Cañete testified in respect to the
identity of the alleged evidence. However, from their testimonies, the prosecution was
not able to account for the linkages in the chain while the plastic pack was not or no
longer in their respective possession.
While both witnesses testified that after the sale and apprehension of the appellant, the
poseur-buyer turned over the subject pack of shabu to their team leader SPO1 Espenido,
there is no record as to what happened after the turn-over. SPO1 Espenido to whom the
specimen was allegedly surrendered by the poseur-buyer was not presented in court to
identify the person to whom it was given thereafter and the condition thereof while it was
in his possession and control. The prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation for
his non-presentation as a witness. This is a significant gap in the chain of custody of the
illegal stuff.
The prosecution’s cause is also marred by confusion and uncertainty regarding the
possessor of the pack of shabu when it was brought to the police station. By PO2
Enriquez’s account, it was SPO2 Nuñez who was in possession of the same – an account
which is at loggerheads with the claim of SPO1 Cañete that he was in custody and
possession thereof and that he personally brought the same to the police station. These
police officers cannot seem to agree on a point over which there could hardly be a
disagreement. It must be observed that SPO2 Nuñez who had supposedly taken custody
of the substance following PO2 Enriquez’s account was likewise not presented in court to
testify. Worse, the prosecution did not even try to reconcile this inconsistency. Moreover,
the prosecution failed to show how, when and from whom SPO2 Nuñez or SPO1 Cañete
received the evidence. There was no evidence on how they came into possession of the
pack of shabu. Again, this is a clear missing link in the chain of custody of the specimen
after it left the hands of SPO1 Espenido.
We also take note that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the
person to whom the specimen was given at the police station. All that has been said is
that the investigator, SPO2 Nuñez, marked the specimen. But this statement did not
necessarily mean that he was the same officer who received the same from either PO2
Enriquez or SPO1 Cañete. In fact, there is a total want of evidence tending to prove that
fact. It must be recalled that SPO2 Nuñez did not take the witness stand to identify the
specific marking on the alleged specimen; neither did the prosecution adduce conclusive
proof as to the author of the handwriting affixed therein and admit the same as his own
handwriting.
True, PO2 Enriquez claimed that he personally delivered to the crime laboratory the
specimen attached to the letter-request; nonetheless, he did not categorically testify that
the substance presented in court was the very same substance delivered to the crime
laboratory for analysis. In fact, going by the records neither of the two police officers
testified that the substance delivered to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis and
later presented in court was the same substance seized from the appellant.
Nor can the prosecution gain from the testimony of the forensic chemist PCI Salinas. The
records show that there is nothing positive and convincingly clear from the testimony of
PCI Salinas. She did not at all categorically and straightforwardly assert that the alleged
chemical substance that was submitted for laboratory examination and thereafter
presented in court was the very same substance allegedly recovered from the appellant. If
anything, the sum and substance of her testimony is that the alleged pack
of shabu submitted to her for laboratory examination showed that it was positive for
methamphetylane hydrochloride or shabu. She never testified where the substance came
from. Her testimony was limited only on the result of the examination she conducted and
not on the source of the substance.
"[W]hile the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in reality it is not,
‘as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.’"23 As such, what is of
utmost importance "is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." 24 In
the case at bench, this Court finds it exceedingly difficult to believe that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the drug have been properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
The inexplicable failure of the police officers to testify as to what they did with the
alleged drug while in their respective possession resulted in a breach or break in the chain
of custody of the drug. In some cases,25 the Court declared that the failure of the
prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete
chain of custody of the shabu plus the irregular manner which plagued the handling of the
evidence before the same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the
government to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case.
Here, apart from the utter failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of
custody, yet another procedural lapse casts further uncertainty about the identity and
integrity of the subject shabu. We refer to the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with
the most rudimentary procedural safeguards relative to the custody and disposition of the
seized item under Section 21(1),26 Article II of RA 9165. Here, the alleged apprehending
team after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug, and after immediately
seizing and confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor
did it ever photograph the same in the presence of the appellant from whom the alleged
item was confiscated. There was no physical inventory and photograph of the item
allegedly seized from appellant. Neither was there any explanation offered for such
failure.
While this Court in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict compliance with the
requisite under Section 21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations27 can be applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity of
the illegal drug are properly preserved as we stressed in People v. Guru.28 In the case at bar,
the evidentiary value and integrity of the alleged illegal drug had been thoroughly
compromised. Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the item in view of the
broken linkages in the chain of custody. In this light, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty accorded the buy-bust team by the courts below cannot arise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R
CR-HC No. 00688 dated May 31, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
Fernando Ranche Havana a.k.a. Fernando Ranche Abana is hereby ACQUITTED of
the charge, his guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE the accused from custody, unless he is held for another lawful
cause.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
26
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/ paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
27
Section 21(a): The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
18) G.R. No. 206590
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial
importance must be given to "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused."1
This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 that aft1rmed in toto the April 12, 2007 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Branch 3, in Criminal Case Nos.
2079 and 2078, finding Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sections 5 (illegal sale of a dangerous drug) and 11 (illegal possession
of a dangerous drug), Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, respectively, and
imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 for
selling shabu, and the indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum, for
possessing 0.53gram of shabu.
Factual Antecedents
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2078 contained the following accusatory
allegations against appellant:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:30 o'clock in the morning at
Jetty, Brgy. Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused who acted without the necessary
pennit from proper authorities whatsoever, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
folonioμsly hi:i.ve in her possession, control and custody eleven (11) x x x sachets
(containing] Methamphdamme Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu" weighing
0.53 [gram], a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 4
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2079 charged appellant in the following manner:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning at
Jetty, Brgy. Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who acted without the necessary permit
or authority whatsoever, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell,
deliver and dispense one (1) pc. small heat sealed sachet of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu" weighing 0.06 [gram], a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.5
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of ''not guilty" in both cases. Joint trial then
ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
Based on the testimonies of SP03 Victorino de Dios (SP03 De Dios), SP03 Rolando G.
Salamida (SP03 Sa1amida), P02 Rex Isip (P02 Isip), SP04 Josefina Bandoy (SP04
Bandoy), P/Insp. Eleazar Barber, Jr. (PI Barber), PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto (PSI Cruto ),
and the documentary exhibits, the following facts emerged:
PI Barber of the PNP6 Guiuan Police Station directed SP03 De Dios to conduct a
surveillance on appellant after receiving several reports that she was peddling prohibited
drugs. Three weeks later, SP03 De Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in
illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed for and was issued a search warrant. However, prior
to implementing the search warrant, PI Barber decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-
buy" designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer and giving him ₱200.00 marked money
for the operation.
On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of
appellant and asked her if they could buy shabu. The sale was consummated when
appellant took the marked money from SP03 De Dios after giving him a sachet
of shabu. SP03 De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text message about the
successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI Barber and his team of police officers who were
positioned 100 meters away n1shed towards the house of appellant. He also instructed
SP03 De Dios and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to witness the
search of the house. When he arrived together with a ko,gawad and a media
representative, SP03 Salamida read the search warrant to appellant.
During the search of the house, SP04 Bandoy found a tin foil under the mattress. SP03
De Dios took it from SP04 Bandoy and gave it to SP03 Salamida who found seven
sachets of shabu inside, in addition to the four sachets of shabu found inside the right
pocket of the short pants of appellant. The search of the house also revealed several drug
paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was prepared and the same was signed by
the Barangay Chairman, P02 Isip, SP04 Bandoy, and appellant. The sachets of shabu were
brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for qualitative examination. The results of the examination verified that the
seized sachets contained shabu.
Version of Appellant
Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on March 24, 2004,
somebody forcibly kicked the front door of her house and tried to break it open. When
she opened the door, PI Barber pushed her aside and told his companions to move
quickly. They went directly to her room; when P02 Isip emerged therefrom seconds later,
he was holding a substance that looked like tawas. SP03 De Dios and SP03 Salamida
went in and out of her house. She maintained that the search warrant was shown to her
only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were planted. She argued that the police
officers fabricated the charges against her since her family had a quarrel with a police
officer named Riza1ina Cuantero regarding the fence separating their houses.
The Ruling of the' Regional Trial Court
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu. It declared that the prosecution ably established the elements of
illegal sale and possession of shabu through the testimonies of its witnesses who arrested
appellant after selling a sachet of the illegal drug in a "test-buy operation" and for
possessing 11 sachets of the same drug in her house after enforcing a search watrant
immediately thereafter. Appellant had no evidence that she had license or authority to
possess the shabu.
The RTC ruled that the evidence sufficiently established the chain of custody of the
sachets of shabu from the time they were bought from appellant and/or seized from her
house, to its turn over to the PDEA and submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. The RTC rejected appellant's defense of denial and frame-up in view of her
positive identification by eyewitnesses as the criminal offender.
The RTC therefore sentenced appellant to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00 for the illegal sale of shabu. It also sentenced appellant to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum and a fine of ₱300,000 for illegal
possession of shabu.
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. In her Brief, 7 she assailed the validity
of the search warrant claiming that it was not issued by the RTC upon determination of
probable cause. She argued that the "'confirmatory test-buy" conducted by the poseur
buyer and the confidential asset was not valid since they forced her to engage in a drug
sale. She maintained that the shabu presented during trial was inadmissible in evidence
due to several gaps in its chain of custody.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Brief for the Appellee8 praying for the
affirmance of the appealed Decision. It argued that the evidence on which the RTC based
its determination of probable cause was sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant.
It asserted that the "test-buy operation" was an entrapment and not an inducement. The
OSG maintained that the shabu confiscated from appellant was admissible in evidence
since the prosecution established the proper chain of custody.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of unauthorized sale and
possession of shabu. The CA ruled that all the elements for the sale of shabu were
established during the "test-buy operation". It held that the illegal sale of shabu was
proven by SP03 De Dios who participated in said operation as the designated poseur
buyer. His offer to buy shabu with marked money and appellant's acceptance by
delivering the illegal drug consummated the offense. The CA likewise declared that the
elements for possession of shabu were present in the case against appellant. After
appellant's arrest for illegal sale of shabu, a valid search resulted in the discovery of 11
sachets of shabu inside her house, which were under her possession and control. She did
not have legal authority to possess the same and failed to overcome the presumption that
she consciously knew she was in possession of the illegal drug discovered in her home.
The CA noted that the examination by the trial judge established probable cause in
issuing the search warrant, The deposition of P03 Salamida shows that he had personal
knowledge of appellant's drug activities, and the same served as basis for the finding of
probable cause for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
The CA was not swayed by appellant's contention that the "test-buy operation" amounted
to instigation since it is settled jurisprudence that a "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount
to inducement or instigation. The CA was also unconvinced by appellant's claim that the
proof against her was inadmissible since the prosecution failed to show strict compliance
with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules on the custody and disposition of
the evidence.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9 On July 15, 2013,10 the Court notified the parties to
file their supplemental briefs. However, appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief
since she had extensively argued her cause in her appellants' brief.11 For its part, the OSG
manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief since its appellee's brief filed in the
CA had already discussed and refuted the arguments raised by appellant.12
Our Ruling
The RTC Issued A Search Warrant After
Finding Probable Case
Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant. She claims that PI Barber had no personal knowledge of her alleged drug
dealings.
There is no merit in this contention.
Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched."13 The probable cause must be "determined personally by the
judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."14 Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does
it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is
concerned only with the question of whether the affiant has reasonable wounds to believe
that the accused committed or is committing the crime charged.15
Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrar1t after deposing two
witnesses, namely PI Barber and SP03 Salamida. In particular, the disposition of SP03
Salamida shows that he had personal knowledge of appellant's drug pushing activities
which served as basis for the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant. Thus, whether or not PI Barber had personal knowledge of the illegal drug
activities committed by appellant will not adversely affect the findings of probable cause
for the purpose of issuance of search warrant.
Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does
not constitute instigation.
Appellant argues that the "confirmatory test-buy" by the police officers was not valid
since she was induced by the' designated poseur buyer, SP03 De Dios, and the
confidential informant to sell the seized shabu.
There is no merit in this argument.
In inducement or instigation - the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator
and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute
him. The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the
offense and himself becomes a co-principal. ['This is distinguished from entrapment
wherein] ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing the
lawbreaker inflagrante delicto.16
The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law. It does
not amount to instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the
poseur buyer merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.17 The police received an
intelligence report that appellant habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur
buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction with appellant. There was
no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, appellant still deserves an acquittal as will be
discussed below.
The chain of custody of evidence was not established
Appellant impugns the prosecution's failure to establish the charges of illegal sale and
possession of shabu against her due to the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable
integrity of the evidence in view of non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA
9165.
There is merit in this protestation.
The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements: "(1) the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor."18 On the other hand, the offense of illegal
possession of shabu has the following elements: "(l) the accused is in possession of an item
or an object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug." 19 In
the prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there must be proof that these
offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti.20
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of [ shabu,] conviction cannot be sustained if
there is a persistent doubt on the identity of said drug. The identity of the [shabu] must be
established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or
sale are present, the fact that the [shabu] illegally possessed and sold x xx is the
same [shabu] offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree
of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.21
"The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."22
Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction."23 In People v.
Havana,24 the Court expounded on the custodial chain procedure in this wise:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable,
or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness. The same standard obtains in case the evidence is susceptible
of alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other
words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -without
regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness
in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be
established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist
to the court.25
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the items after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial
link. It is vital that the seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers
thereof will use the markings as reference.26 The chain of custody rule also requires that
the marking of the seized contraband be done "(l) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation."27
In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items
with their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While
P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police station,28 no
evidence was presented to show that the marking was accomplished in the presence of
appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on said items was never identified. None
of the police officers admitted placing the markings. There was therefore a complete
absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings.
While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates
a case of warrantless searches and seizures.29 Here, the police officers secured a search
warrant prior to their operation. They therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to
prepare for its implementation. However, the police officers failed to mark immediately
the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house in spite of an Inventory of
Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the said house. The failure of the
arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately after confiscation
constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody.
The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to the investigating officer in
the police station constitutes the second link in the chain of custody.1âwphi1 In this
regard, the Court takes note that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to
identify the person to whom the seized items were turned over at the police station.
While SP03 Salamida was identified as the property custodian of the police station, this
does not necessarily mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is nothing in the
records to substantiate this presumption. This total want of evidence gains importance
considering that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses identified
the shabu presented during trial as the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the second
link in the chain of custody is missing.
The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist in
the crime laboratory is the third link in the chain of custody. While the seized shabu was
turned over by PI Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any personal knowledge of the
manner it was handled therein. He also did not identify the police officer in whose
custody the seized sachets of shabu were placed at the PDEA. He left it to the
responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the crime laboratory. The
request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the police officer who
delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO1 Asis, but he was not presented to testify that
the shabu delivered to the crime laboratory was the same shabu confiscated from
appellant. There is a third break in the chain of custody.
Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI Cruto. His
testimony is not clear and positive since he failed to assert that the alleged packs of
chemical substance presented for laboratory examination and tested positive
for shabu were the very same substance allegedly recovered from appellant. His testimony
was limited to the result of the examination he conducted and not on the source of the
substance.
From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What we
have here are individual links with breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly
woven or tied together. The so-called links in the chain of custody show that the
seized shabu was not handled properly starting from the actual seizure, to its turnover in
the police station and the PDEA, as well as its transfer to the crime laboratory for
examination. The Court therefore cannot conclude with moral certainty that
the shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory
examination and then presented in court.
It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. In reality
however, this rarely occurs. The legal standard that must therefore be observed "is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."30 Here, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated shabu. There are just too many breaks and gaps to the effect that a chain of
custody could not be established at all. Failure of the prosecution to offer testimony to
establish a substantially complete chain of custody of the shabu and the inappropriate
manner of handling the evidence prior to its offer in court diminishes the government's
chance of successfully prosecuting a drug case.31
Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody,
another procedural lapse casts farther uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
subject shabu. This refers to the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the most
basic procedural safeguards relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item
under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165, which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Corollarily, Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides as follows:
Section 2l(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and a public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
farther, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody
over said items.
In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized
items at the place where the search warrant was served in the presence of a representative
of the Department of Justice, nor did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant
after their initial custody and control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and
confiscating the same. Neither was an explanation offered for such failure. While this
directive of rigid compliance has been tempered in certain cases, "such liberality, as stated
in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only when the evidentiary
value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved." 32 Such an exception does
not obtain in this case. "Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the [shabu] in
view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. [Thus,] the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty accorded to the [apprehending officers] by the courts Along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez y Acosta (Leo) who was charged for illegal
below cannot arise."33 possession of shabu, the accused-appellant was charged under an Information 6 that reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- The above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 dated June 23, 2011 is REVERSED and SET dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there
ASIDE. Appellant Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give away, distribute and sell to a customer for
her guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt. P300.00 pesos one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline
substance (shabu) weighing 0.20 gram, which when examined were found positive for
The Superintendent for the Correctional Institute for Women is hereby ORDERED to Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-
immediately RELEASE the appellant from custody, unless she is held for another lawful cited law.
cause.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
SO ORDERED.
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits thereafter
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ensued.
Associate Justice
The prosecution’s version of events is summarized below.
WE CONCUR:
On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of
the Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig (Taguig police) received information
from an asset that a certain "Zaida" was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu at Purok IV,
Silverio Compound in Parañaque City. The Taguig police formed a buy-bust team
19) G.R. No. 174198 January 19, 2010 composed of P/Insp. Antonio Parillas,7 PO3 Christopher Maulit8 (PO3 Maulit), PO1
Manfoste,9 SPO2 Arthur Velasco, and SPO2 Ernesto Sanchez10 (SPO2 Sanchez), as
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, members. SPO2 Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso
vs. bills for use as marked money.
ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING, Accused-Appellant.
After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around
DECISION 10:00 p.m. of October 16, 2002 to the target area where they immediately saw the
accused-appellant and Leo. The asset and SPO2 Sanchez approached the two while the
BRION, J.: rest of the buy-bust team watched from a distance. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez
as a buyer of shabu and the accused-appellant asked him how much he would buy. SPO2
We review the decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 Sanchez asked for ₱300.00 worth of shabu and gave the marked money; the accused-
which affirmed in toto the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, appellant thereafter handed him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected to be
Parañaque City4 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 finding Zaida5 Kamad y Ambing shabu. SPO2 Sanchez lighted a cigarette to give the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust
(accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Section team to approach. SPO2 Sanchez arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous the ₱300.00 marked money. The buy-bust team arrested Leo who was found in
Drugs Act of 2002. possession of one (1) plastic sachet also suspected to contain shabu.
The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets
to their office for investigation. The recovered plastic sachets, marked as "ES-1-161009"
and "ES-2-161002," were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative
examination; the tests yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.11
The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.
The accused-appellant12 denied the charge and claimed that she and Leo were framed-up.
At around 2:30 p.m. of October 16, 2002, the accused-appellant and Leo went to Leo’s
cousin’s house. Since Leo’s cousin was not yet at home, she and Leo waited. After
waiting for an hour, four (4) men wearing civilian clothes and carrying firearms entered
the house and introduced themselves as police officers. The accused-appellant and Leo
were frisked, but nothing was found in their possession. The police officers asked the
accused-appellant where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling shabu.
Afterwards, she and Leo were taken to the police headquarters where they were again
frisked and asked the same question to which they gave the same response. The police
detained Leo and the accused-appellant for about a day and later brought them to the
Prosecutor’s Office for inquest without showing them any shabu.
The RTC Ruling
After consideration of the evidence, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding both accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences Zaida Kamad to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 …
xxxx
SO ORDERED.13
The accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA, attacking the RTC’s
reliance on the presumption of regularity that the RTC found to have attended the
conduct of the buy-bust operation by the police. She argued that no presumption of
regularity could arise considering that the police violated NAPOLCOM rules by using an
asset; the rules prohibit the deputation of private persons as PNP civilian agents. 14 The
accused-appellant also pointed out the material inconsistencies in the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that cast doubt on their credibility, namely: (a) the uncertainty of
SPO2 Sanchez regarding the time the buy-bust team was dispatched to the target area; (b)
the confusion of PO3 Maulit on the identity of the team leader of the buy-bust team; (c)
the admitted mistake of PO3 Maulit that only the recovered plastic sachet was marked
"ES" (standing for the initials of SPO2 Sanchez), while the marked money was marked
"MF" (standing for the initials of P/Insp. Mariano F. Fegarido as commanding officer);
and (d) the contradictory statements of PO3 Maulit who testified that it was Leo who
sold the shabu and that of SPO2 Sanchez who testified that it was the accused-appellant
who sold him the shabu.
The CA Ruling
The CA rejected the defense arguments and affirmed in toto the RTC findings. The CA
ruled that the prosecution satisfactorily established the accused-appellant’s guilt based on
the positive testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the conduct of the buy-bust operation; his
testimony bore badges of truth. Accordingly, the CA found the accused-appellant’s
uncorroborated denial undeserving of any weight. The CA brushed aside as a minor
inconsistency the uncertainty in the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the time the buy-bust
operation took place. The CA also brushed aside the violation of the NAPOLCOM rules
on the ground that the accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto for illegal sale
of shabu committed in the presence of the prosecution witnesses who were police officers.
Moreover, the CA held that the use of assets to aid police officers in buy-bust operations
has been judicially recognized. The CA found that while the asset brokered the shabu
transaction, he had no role in the apprehension of the accused-appellant and in the search
and seizure of the shabu from the accused-appellant.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of
shabu.
The Court’s Ruling
We draw attention at the outset to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case; the
appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to
correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.15 We find the present appeal meritorious on the basis of such review.
As a general rule, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA,
are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however,
admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct
and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied.16 After due consideration of the records of this case, the
evidence adduced, and the applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that a deviation
from the general rule is warranted.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.17 Proof of the corpus delicti in a
buy-bust situation requires evidence, not only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but
evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined are the same drugs presented in
court. This is a condition sine qua non for conviction as the drugs are the main subject of
the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be
proven for the crime to exist. As we discuss below, the special characteristics of
prohibited drugs necessitate their strict identification by the prosecution.18
Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the
testimony of SPO2 Sanchez that the sale of the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant
took place, we find that both the RTC and the CA failed to consider the following
infirmities in the prosecution’s case: (1) the serious lapses in the RA 9165 procedure
committed by the buy-bust team in handling the seized shabu; and (2) the failure of the
police to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling the seized shabu, resulting in
the prosecution’s failure to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the same shabu
seized from the accused-appellant on October 16, 2002.
Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
In People v. Garcia,19 we emphasized the prosecution’s duty to adduce evidence proving
compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedure laid down under
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. This provision reads:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
[emphasis supplied]
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides
further details on how RA 9165 is to be applied, and provides too for a saving mechanism
in case no strict compliance with the requirements took place. Section 21(a) states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug’s
unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.20 Hence, the rules on
the measures to be observed during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer
of the drugs for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
In this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of the seized shabu.
The records show that his testimony and the identification he made in court constitute
the totality of the prosecution’s evidence on how the police handled and preserved the
integrity of the seized shabu. Significantly, SPO2 Sanchez merely stated in his testimony
that:
Q: What else transpired when Zaida gave something to you and you, being the
poseur buyer, gave the money to Zaida?
A: We brought them to our office.
xxxx
 Q: What did you do with those plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance?
A: We brought them to the SPD Crime Lab for examination.21
Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked although
the evidence shows that the shabu was marked as "ES-1-161009" before it was sent to a
forensic laboratory. His testimony also failed to state whether the marking of the shabu
was done immediately after its seizure (as Section 21 of RA 9165 requires) or during the
investigation. His testimony likewise failed to disclose if a physical inventory and
photography of the seized items had taken place, or if they had, whether these were
undertaken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, or a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and of an elective official.
In sum, his testimony failed to show how the integrity and evidentiary value of the
item seized had been preserved; no explanation was ever given by SPO2 Sanchez to
justify the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedures. In
fact, the records clearly reveal that the prosecution did not even acknowledge the
procedural lapses committed by the buy-bust team in the handling of the seized shabu.
The consequences of the above omissions must necessarily be grave for the prosecution
under the rule that penal laws, such as RA 9165, are strictly construed against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.22 One consequence is to produce doubts
on the origins of the illegal drug presented in court,23 thus leading to the prosecution’s
failure to establish the corpus delicti.24 Unless excused by the saving mechanism, the
acquittal of the accused must follow.
The non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule
Separately from Section 21 violations, we also find the prosecution fatally remiss in
establishing an unbroken link in the chain of custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is
simply incomplete in establishing the necessary links in the handling of the seized
prohibited drug from the time of its seizure until its presentation in court.
In Mallillin v. People,25 we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes
sufficient compliance with this rule:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witnesses' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same. [emphasis supplied]26
We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia,27 People v. Gum-Oyen,28 People v.
Denoman29 and People v. Coreche30 where we recognized the following links that must
be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
(a) The first link in the chain of custody
We observe that SPO2 Sanchez’ testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was
handled immediately after the accused-appellant’s arrest. Although the records show that
SPO2 Sanchez testified that he actually seized the shabu when he arrested the accused-
appellant, he never disclosed the identity of the person/s who had custody and
possession of the shabu after its seizure, nor that he retained possession of the shabu from
the place of the arrest until they reached the police station.
SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the
person/s who made the markings on the two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered
shabu seized from the accused-appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.
(b) The second link in the chain of custody
We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez’ testimony regarding the post-arrest police
investigation failed to provide particulars on whether the shabu was turned over to the
investigator. The records only identify the name of the investigator as one SPO1 Nuestro
before whom SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated
October 17, 2002.31 Thus, a big gap exists on who had custody and possession of the
shabu prior to, during and immediately after the police investigation, and how
the shabu was stored, preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure up to its
receipt by the forensic laboratory.
(c) The third link in the chain of custody
The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence
adduced by the prosecution consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 200232 of
Police Superintendent Mariano F. Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police District Drug
Enforcement Group and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr.
Richard Allan B. Mangalip as the forensic chemist.33
These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings
"ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-161002" were sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1)
small brown envelope bearing unidentified signatures. On the same day, the PNP Crime
Laboratory received this letter-request along with the submitted specimens. The
specimens were then subjected to qualitative examination which yielded positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the
seized shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also fail to clearly identify the person
who received the shabu at the forensic laboratory pursuant to the letter-request dated
October 17, 2002, and who exercised custody and possession of the shabu after it was
examined and before it was presented in court. Neither was there any evidence adduced
showing how the seized shabu was handled, stored and safeguarded pending its
presentation in court.
(d) The fourth link in the chain of custody
The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecution’s evidence in
this case. Although the forensic chemist was presented in court, we find that his offered
testimony related to a shabu specimen other than that seized in the buy-bust operation of October
16, 2002. Specifically, his testimony pertained to shabu seized by the police on October
12, 2002. This is borne by the following exchanges:
FISCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he
is the one who cause [sic] the examination of the physical evidence subject of this
case containing with white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet
weighing 0.20 grams and 0.30 grams with markings of EBC and EBC-1 that I
reduced findings after the examination conducted.
xxxx
Q And with the cause of the performance of your duties, were you able to
receive a letter request relevant to this case specifically a drug test request, dated
October 12, 2002 from PS/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon. Do you have the letter
request with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q The witness presented to this representation the letter request dated October
12, 2002 for purposes of identification, respectfully request that it be marked in
evidence as Exhibit A. In this Exhibit A Mr. Officer, were you able to receive the
evidence submitted specifically a small brown stapled wire envelope with
signature containing with white crystalline substance inside and with markings
EBC- 12/10/02 and EBC-1 12/10/02. After you received this specimen what
action did you take or do?
A Upon receiving, I read and understand the content of the letter request after
which, I stamped and marked the letter request and then record it on the logbook
and after recording it on the logbook, I performed the test for determination of
the presence of dangerous drug on the specimen.
xxxx
Q Now, after those tests conducted what was the result of the examination?
A It gives positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or otherwise
known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q At this juncture your Honor, the witness handed with this representation a
brown envelope with markings D-1487-02, and the signature and the date 12
October 02, now Mr. Witness tell us who placed these markings on this brown
envelope?
A I am the one who personally made the markings, sir.
Q And in the face of this brown envelope there is a printed name PO1 Edwin
Plopinio and the signature and the date 12 October 2002. Do you know who
placed who placed those markings?
A I have no idea.
Q At this juncture your Honor, this representation proceeded to open the brown
envelope. May I respectfully request that this brown envelope be marked in
evidence as Exhibit B. And inside this brown envelope are three pieces of plastic
sachets inside which are white crystalline substance with markings EPC 12
October 02 and EPC-1 12 October 02. May I respectfully request that these
plastic sachets with white substance inside be marked in evidence as Exhibit B-1
and B-2. And in these plastic sachets with white crystalline inside is a masking
tape with the signature and letters are RAM, do you know who placed those
letters?
A I am the one who placed that markings sir.
Q And what RAM stands for?
A That stands for my name Richard Allan Mangalip sir.
Q You mentioned that you reduced your findings in writing, do you have the
official finding with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q At this juncture the witness handed to this representation the physical science
report no. D-1487-2 for purposes of identification respectfully request that this
specimen be marked in evidence as Exhibit C. And in this Exhibit C, there is a
signature above the typewritten name Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, do
you whose signature is this Mr. Witness? 34 [Emphasis supplied]
A That is my signature sir.
Q Respectfully request that the signature appearing in Exhibit C be marked in
evidence as Exhibit C-1. You stated earlier that you cause the weight of the
white crystalline substance in this plastic sachet, what the weights of this white
crystalline substance?
A For the specimen A, it is .20 grams and the specimen B, it is .30 gram.
Q May I respectfully request that this weight indicated in this physical science
report now mark in evidence as Exhibit C-2. I have no further questions to the
witness your Honor.
xxxx
Aside from the different dates of seizure, we note that the shabu identified and presented
in court as evidence through the testimony of the forensic chemist, showed characteristics
distinct from the shabu from the buy-bust sale of October 16, 2002:
First, there were different markings made on the plastic sachets of the shabu
recovered on October 12, 2002. As testified to, one plastic sachet of shabu was
marked, "EBC 12 October 02," while the other plastic sachet of shabu was
marked, "EBC-1 12 October 02";35
Second, there was a different sealed brown envelope used where a printed name
and signature of one "PO1 Edwin Plopino" and the date "12 October 2002" were
written; 36
Third, the examination of the shabu by the PNP Crime Laboratory was made
pursuant to a different letter-request for examination dated October 12, 2002
written by one P/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon;37 and
Fourth, the results of the shabu testified to by the forensic chemist in court was
contained in a different forensic laboratory report known as Physical Science
Report No. D-1487-2.38
We highlight these characteristics because they are different from the documentary
evidence the prosecution formally offered39 consisting of the letter-request dated October
17, 200240 and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02.41 The testimonies of SPO2
Sanchez and PO3 Maulit as well as the submitted documentary evidence referred to the
plastic sachets of shabu through their markings of "ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-161002."42
From all these, we find it obvious that some mistake must have been made in the
presentation of the prosecution’s evidence. The prosecution, however, left the
discrepancies fully unexplained. To reiterate, the forensic chemist testified to a specimen
dated October 12, 2002, or one secured way before the buy-bust of October 16, 2002, but
marked as evidence documents relating to the specimen of October 16, 2002. Strangely,
even the defense disregarded the discrepancies. In his comment on the offer of evidence,
the defense simply stated, among others, by way of stipulation, that "the forensic
chemical officer only conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen he examined
and not the quantitative examination."43 Coming immediately after the offer of evidence
that mentioned the plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances with markings
"ES-1 16/10/02" and "ES-2 16/10/02," and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-
02,44 the defense was clearly sleeping on its feet when it reacted to the prosecution’s offer
of evidence.
But the defense was not alone in glossing over the discrepancies between the testimony
for the prosecution and the offered evidence, as both the RTC and CA also failed to
notice the glaring flaws in the prosecution’s evidence. Apparently, because the parties did
not point out these discrepancies while the appellate court did not closely review the
records of the proceedings, the discrepancies were not taken into account in the decision
now under review.
These observations bring us full circle to our opening statement under the Court’s ruling
on the kind and extent of review that an appellate court undertakes in a criminal case; the
appeal opens the whole case for review, with the appellate court charged with the duty to
cite and appreciate the errors it may find in the appealed judgment, whether these errors
are assigned or unassigned. This is one such instance where we are duty bound to rectify
errors that, although unnoticed below and unassigned by the parties, are clearly reflected
in the records of the case.
The Conclusion
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu
and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute
authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the
performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that
the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law;
where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise.45 In light of the
flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the
seized and examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious
doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the
gap in the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which
the accused must be acquitted.1avvphi1
From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution’s failure to establish with
moral certainty all the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator
signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every
accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts
need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal
must forthwith issue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the March
28, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 affirming the
decision of conviction dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259,
Parañaque City in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-appellant ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING is
hereby declared ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this
Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
receipt.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
20) G.R. No. 213607
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GLEN PIAD y BORI, RENATO VILLAROSA y PLATINO and NILO DA
VIS y ARTIGA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the January 22, 2014 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04780, which affirmed the September 24, 2009 Joint Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 164, Pasig City (RTC), finding accused-appellant Glen
Piad (Piad) guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, as amended, in Criminal Case Nos. 14086-D and 14087-D; and accused-appellants
Renato Villarosa (Villarosa), Agustin Carbo (Carbo) and Nilo Davis (Davis) all guilty of
violation of Sections 13 and 14, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in Criminal Case Nos. 14088-
D and 14089-D.
Accused-appellant Piad was charged in two (2) informations with the crimes of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs weighing 0.05 gram and illegal possession of dangerous drugs
weighing 0.06 gram. While accused-appellant Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were charged
in two (2) informations with the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a
party weighing 0.03 gram and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party.
On August 8, 2005, Piad, Villarosa and Carbo were arraigned and they pleaded "Not
Guilty." Davis, however, was not arraigned because he had jumped bail.3
Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. On May 15, 2008, after Davis was arrested, he
was arraigned and, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges
against him.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented PO1 Larry Arevalo (PO1 Arevalo), PO1 Joseph Bayot (PO1
Bayot), Forensic Chemist PSI Stella Ebuen (PSI Ebuen), PO2 Clarence Nipales (PO2
Nipales), and P/Insp. Donald Sabio (P/Insp. Sabio), as its witnesses. Their combined
testimonies tended to prove the following:
On April 23, 2005, the Special Operations Task Force, Pasig City Police Station, Pasig
City, received information from a confidential informant that a certain "Gamay," who
was later identified as Piad, was selling drugs along Ortigas Bridge, Pasig City. P/Insp.
Sabio led the team, composed of PO1 Arevalo, PO1 San Agustin, PO1 Bayot, PO1
Danilo Pacurib, PO2 Nipales, and PO1 Bibit, to conduct a buy-bust operation. PO1
Arevalo was assigned as poseur-buyer and was provided with the marked money -
P150.00 in P100.00 and P50.00 peso bills. The Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) issued a certificate of coordination authorizing the team to proceed with
the operation.
Around 6:45 o’clock in the afternoon, the team arrived at the house of Piad in Lifehomes
Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig City. The back-up team took up position about 5 meters
away from Piad’s house. The confidential informant, with PO1 Arevalo, knocked on the
door. When Piad opened the door, the confidential informant introduced PO1 Arevalo as
a buyer of shabu. Piad asked PO1 Arevalo how much he wanted and the latter answered
P150.00. Thereafter, Piad closed the door and returned after a few seconds.
Upon opening the door again, PO1 Arevalo noticed that a group of male individuals
were inside the house. PO1 Arevalo handed to Piad the P150.00 marked money. In turn,
Piad handed to PO1 Arevalo a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. After the transaction was completed, PO1 Arevalo immediately grabbed
Piad’s right arm and introduced himself as a police officer. Piad, however, struggled to
free himself. PO1 Arevalo was eventually forced to enter the house amidst the struggle.
The back-up team followed suit and entered the house.
After arresting him, PO1 Arevalo asked Piad to bring out the marked money. Piad
complied. PO1 Arevalo also asked him about the source of the drugs he sold. Piad pulled
out a metal box from his pocket and it revealed two (2) other plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance. PO1 Arevalo marked all the items confiscated from Piad at
the place of the arrest. Meanwhile, the back-up team saw Villarosa, Davis and Carbo
inside the house, sitting on the floor. They were surrounded by three (3) sachets of white
crystalline substance (one was heat sealed, while the other two were unsealed), aluminum
foil, a tooter and disposable lighters. The items were confiscated and were marked by
PO1 Bayot thereat.
The team brought Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis to the police headquarters. There,
PO2 Pacurib, PO1 Bayot and PO1 Arevalo executed a joint affidavit on their arrest.
P/Insp. Sabio prepared the requests for laboratory examination and drug test, which
were brought by SPO1 Bayot to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory. PSI Ebuen
examined the confiscated items which tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Evidence of the Defense
The defense presented Piad, her sister Maria Zennette Piad (Maria), Villarosa, Carbo, and
Davis as its witnesses. They all testified to establish the following:
On April 23, 2005, Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis were celebrating a birthday party in
the house of Piad. Between 1:00 o’clock and 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a tricycle and
a vehicle stopped in front of the house at Pilar Apartment, Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City.
Two (2) armed men in civilian clothes alighted from the vehicle, while another armed
man alighted from the tricycle. All of them suddenly entered the house of Piad, where the
accused-appellants were having a drinking spree. Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis were
then ordered to lie down on the floor facing downwards. Thereafter, the armed men
searched the house. Subsequently, the accused-appellants were handcuffed and brought
to the police station. Piad claimed that the police officers were asking P20,000.00 in
exchange for their freedom; while Carbo claimed that the officers were demanding
P10,000.00 for their release.
The RTC Ruling
In its Joint Decision, dated September 24, 2009, the RTC found Piad guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
while Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during parties and illegal possession of
drug paraphernalia during parties.
The RTC held that all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs were established
because PO1 Arevalo handed the marked money to Piad, who, in turn, handed the
plastic sachet, which was confirmed to contain 0.05 gram of shabu. The elements of the
crime of illegal possession of drugs were also established because two (2) more sachets
of shabu weighing 0.06 gram were found in the metal container inside the pocket of Piad
immediately after his arrest.
As to Villarosa, Carbo and Davis, the RTC found that they committed the crime of
illegal possession of drugs and paraphernalia during a party because they were
surrounded by plastic sachets containing 0.03 gram of shabu and different drug
paraphernalia when the team found them. The elements of such crimes were clearly
proven because they were in a proximate company of at least two persons and without
any legal authority to possess such illicit items.
The RTC did not give credence to the defense of denial and frame up put up by the
accused because their testimonies were inconsistent and self-serving. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE:
1. In Criminal Case No. 14086-D, the Court finds the accused Glen Piad alias
Gamay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. 9165, and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) with the accessory
penalties provided for under Section 35 of said R.A. 9165.
2. In Criminal Case No. 14087-D, the Court finds the accused Glen Piad alias
Gamay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. 9165, and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to sixteen
(16) years, as maximum, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php300,000.00) with all the accessory penalties under the law.
3. In Criminal Case No. 14088-D, their guilt having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, accused Renato Villarosa y Platino, Agustin Carbo y Pavillon
and Nilo Davis y Artiga are hereby CONVICTED of violation of Section 13,
Article II of R.A. 9165 for possessing methylamphetamine hydrochloride
weighing less than five grams in the proximate company of at least two persons
without legal authority and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty
(20) years as maximum, and fine of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php400,000.00) each.
4. In Criminal Case No. 14089-D their guilt having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, accused Renato Villarosa y Platino, Agustin Carbo y Pavillon
and Nilo Davis y Artiga are hereby CONVICTED of violation of Section 14,
 Article II of R.A. 9165 for possessing paraphernalia for dangerous drug in the
proximate company of at least two persons without legal authority and hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6)
months and one (1) day, as minimum, to four (4) years, as maximum, and fine
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) each.
HOWEVER, the four (4) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance or shabu
(Exhs. H, H-1, H-2, and J) and the illegal drug paraphernalia (Exhs. I, K, L, M, N, O, P)
are hereby ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for
destruction and proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis filed their notices of appeal.5 Subsequently,
Carbo withdrew his appeal,6 which was granted by the CA in its Resolution,7 dated
October 21, 2011.
In their Appellants’ Brief,8 Piad, Villarosa and Davis argued that the chain of custody
rule was not complied with because PSI Ebuen did not testify on the condition of the
confiscated items; that it was not shown how the said items were brought before the
court; and that no photograph was taken or an inventory of the seized items was
conducted.
In its Appellee’s Brief,9 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that Section
21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 required only
substantial compliance as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the items were
preserved; and that the testimony of the police officers showed that the items were
properly handled.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated January 22, 2014, the CA affirmed the conviction of Piad,
Villarosa and Davis. The CA held that all the elements of the crimes charged were indeed
proven. As to the chain of custody, the appellate court enumerated in detail how the
prosecution was able to establish its compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. As the
chain of custody of the seized items was sufficiently established not to have been broken,
then the admissibility and credibility of the said items were appreciated. The CA disposed
the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The RTC Decision in Criminal Cases Nos.
14086-D, 14087-D, 14088-D and 14089-D, finding accused-appellants guilty of the crimes
charged is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
In its Resolution,11 dated November 19, 2014, the Court required the parties to submit
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired.
In its Manifestation and Motion,12 dated January 8, 2015, the OSG manifested that it
would no longer submit a supplemental brief because its Brief for the Appellee, dated
February 10, 2012, before the CA had extensively and exhaustively discussed all the
issues and arguments raised by the accused-appellants.
In their Manifestation (in lieu of Supplemental Brief),13 dated February 4, 2015, the
accused-appellants manifested that they would no longer file a supplemental brief
considering that no new issues material to the case were raised.
In his Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal,14 Villarosa signified his intention
to withdraw his appeal, adding that he understood the consequences of his action. In its
Resolution,15 dated April 8, 2015, the Court granted Villarosa’s motion to withdraw his
appeal.
Meanwhile, in a letter, dated January 13, 2015, the Bureau of Corrections informed the
Court that there was no record of confinement of Davis in all the prison facilities of the
said Bureau. In the same resolution, dated April 8, 2015, the Court required the Clerk of
Court of the RTC to confirm the confinement of Davis within ten (10) days from notice.
In her Manifestation/Compliance,16 dated May 29, 2015, the RTC Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Rachel G. Matalang (Atty. Matalang), reported that Davis was never
committed in any detention or prison facility as he posted bail under a surety bond from
Summit Guaranty and Insurance Company, Inc. on May 6, 2005 during the pendency of
the trial; that on November 12, 2009, during the promulgation of the judgment, Davis
and his counsel appeared before the trial court and manifested that he would file a notice
of appeal; that no warrant of arrest or commitment order was issued against him; and
that she could not confirm the confinement of Davis.
In its Resolution,17 dated July 8, 2015, the Court required Davis, the OSG and Summit
Guaranty and Insurance Company, Inc., to comment on the manifestation of Atty.
Matalang.
In its Comment,18 dated October 16, 2015, the OSG asserted that when Davis jumped
bail on August 8, 2005, the RTC should have immediately cancelled his bailbond; that he
should have been placed under custody after the promulgation of the judgment; and that
he had become a fugitive from justice who had lost his standing to appeal.
In its Manifestation,19 dated December 8, 2015, the Public Attorney’s Office informed the
Court that, despite earnest efforts to locate Davis and the surety company, they were not
able to determine their whereabouts; and that his wife informed the office that Davis had
received the July 8, 2015 Resolution of the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal lacks merit and Davis has lost his right to appeal.
Elements of the crimes charged were duly established by the prosecution
After a review of the records of the case, the Court holds that Piad was properly
convicted of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It was proven that, on April 23,
2005, the police went to his house to conduct a buy-bust operation; that PO1 Arevalo
acted as the poseur-buyer; and that when PO1 Arevalo gave the marked money to Piad,
the latter handed to him a small plastic sachet. A laboratory examination confirmed that
the plastic sachet contained 0.05 gram of shabu. Clearly, all the elements of the said crime
were established.
The prosecution was also able to prove that Piad committed the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. When he was arrested in flagrante delicto, he was asked
about the source of his drugs. He then brought out a metal box, which contained two (2)
more sachets. It was confirmed in a laboratory test that these sachets contained 0.06 gram
of shabu.
With respect to the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a party and the
crime of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party, the prosecution also
established that after the arrest of Piad, the team found Villarosa, Carbo and Davis sitting
on the floor and surrounded by one (1) heat-sealed sachet and two (2) unsealed sachets.
A laboratory report showed that these sachets contained a total of 0.03 gram
of shabu. The said persons were also found with an aluminum foil, a tooter and
disposable lighters, which were considered drug paraphernalia. As correctly held by the
RTC, the elements of such crimes were proven because there was a proximate company
of at least two (2) persons without any legal authority to possess the illicit items, citing
Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165.20
Substantial compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule
The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity
of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of
the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the
court.21 Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165
provides:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the law requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect adherence" as long
as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.22
In this case, the CA meticulously assessed how the prosecution complied with the chain
of custody rule. When Piad was arrested, PO1 Arevalo marked the confiscated drugs at
the crime scene. Likewise, when Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were arrested, PO1 Bayot
immediately marked the seized items at the crime scene. The items were brought to the
Pasig City Police Station where PO1 Bayot was designated as evidence custodian.
P/Insp. Sabio then prepared the requests for laboratory examination and drug test, which
were brought by PO1 Bayot, together with the drugs, to the Eastern Police District Crime
Laboratory. PSI Ebuen, received the confiscated items for examination. The said items
tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Based on the foregoing, the Court
is satisfied that there was substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.
Davis lost his standing to appeal
Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. If the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. 23 In case bail is
granted, the accused must appear whenever the court requires his presence; otherwise, his
bail shall be forfeited.24
When a person is finally convicted by the trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, When Discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial
court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court.
xxx
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman. xxx
Here, Davis was charged with the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during
a party and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party.1avvphi1 Both offenses
did not have a prescribed penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, thus,
bail was a matter of right. Accordingly, Davis secured a surety bond with Summit
Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc. on May 6, 2005.
On August 8, 2005, Davis failed to appear before the RTC which considered him to have
jumped bail. At that point, the RTC should have cancelled the bailbond of Davis with
Summit Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc. Although he was subsequently arrested
and arraigned on May 15, 2008, it is alarming that no record of Davis’ confinement in
any detention facility was ever found.25
When the R TC promulgated its decision for conviction, Davis and his counsel were
present in the courtroom. Yet, they did not file any motion for bail pending appeal before
the RTC or the CAI° Nonetheless, any motion for bail pending appeal should have been
denied because Davis violated the conditions of his previous bail. 26 Necessarily, as he
previously jumped bail and no bail pending appeal was secured, the R TC should have
immediately issued a warrant of arrest against him.
In the same manner, the CA should not have entertained the appeal of Davis. Once an
accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or flees to a
foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.27 As no such surrender was made in this case, in the eyes of the law, Davis is a
fugitive from justice and, therefore, not entitled to seek relief from the courts.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision, dated September 24, 2009, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 164, Pasig City in Criminal Case Nos. 14086-D, 14087-D, 14088-D and
14089-D is AFFIRMED in toto.
For failure to submit to this Court's jurisdiction, the appeal filed by Nilo Davis y Artiga is
deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 164, Pasig
City, is hereby ORDERED to issue a warrant of arrest for the immediate apprehension
and service of sentence of Nilo Davis y Artiga.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta with Associate Justice
Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez,
concurring; rollo, pp. 2-17.

20
Sec. 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings. – The maximum penalty provided for in Section 12 of this Act shall be
imposed upon any person, who shall possess or have under his/her control any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit of intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body, during parties, social gatherings or meetings, or in
the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.

26
Sec. 5. xxx

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six

(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accuse, of the
following or other similar circumstances:

xxx

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;

xxx

II. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS (ART 247 TO 266)

ART 246- PARRICIDE

1.) [G.R. No. 115686. December 2, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. PEDRO MALABAGO y VILLAESPIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City,
Branch 10 which imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant, Pedro Malabago y
Villaespin, in Criminal Case No. 6598, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Pedro Malabago guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of PARRICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code. With reluctance and a heavy heart therefore, inspired by the personal feeling
and view of the undersigned with respect to the wisdom of the penalty of death for any
crime, the court finds itself with no other alternative but to impose the penalty provided for
by the express mandate of the law which is now restored under Republic Act No. 7659.
The accused (Pedro Malabago y Villaespin) is hereby sentenced to DEATH for the terrible
crime he has committed and, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00
conformable to the recent jurisprudence on the matter (People v. Sison, 189 SCRA 643).
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED
DIPOLOG CITY, Philippines, this 10th day of May 1994.
(Sgd.)
WILFREDO C. OCHOTORENA
Acting Presiding Judge1
In an information dated January 7, 1994, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of
parricide committed as follows:
That in the evening, on or about the 5th day of January 1994, at Barangay Gulayon,
Dipolog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack and strike with a bolo one Letecia R. Malabago,
his lawfully wedded wife, hitting the latter on her face and neck, which caused the victims
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim, in the amount
of P30,000.00 as death indemnity, and also moral and exemplary damages in the amounts
to be established during the trial.2
The following facts were established by the prosecution: On January 5, 1994, at about 7:00
in the evening, Guillerma Romano, appellants mother-in-law, was tending her sari-sari
store in Barangay Gulayon, Dipolog City. The Store and its premises were lit by a kerosene
lamp and the fluorescent light from the adjoining house of Dodong Opulentisima.
Guillermas daugther. Letecia Romano Malabago, arrived and sat on one of the benches
outside the store. She had just come from selling some jackfruit. Allandel, Letecias
fourteen-year old son, appeared and sat on the bench facing her. He listened to his mother
and grandmother who were conversing. A few minutes later, accused-appellant came and
interrupted his wife and mother-in-laws conversation. He and Letecia began arguing.
Guillerma turned away but heard the couples altercation over money and appellants
jealousy of someone. Suddenly, Guillerma heard a loud sound and she thought that
appellant slapped Letecia on the face. Letecia cried out Agay! Looking out the store
window, Guillerma saw Letecias face bloodied with a slash along her right ear. Appellant
was facing Letecia, and with a bolo in his hand, struck her again, this time hitting the lower
left side of her face, from the lips down to the neck. Letecia fell to the ground. Guillerma
rushed towards her daughter and shouted for help.3 She was lifeless.
Appellant fled to Dodong Opulentisimas house. Dodong Opulentisima later called the
police. They came, fetched appellant and brought him to their station.4 On investigation,
the police found a bloodied bolo in the pineapple plantation near appellants house.5
Letecia was found to have died of cardio-respiratory arrest; shock hemorrhage, massive;
hack wounds, multiple.6
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime. He claimed that on January 5, 1994, he
was in the poblacion of Dipolog City. He alleged he did not know who hacked his wife
and had no means of finding the culprit because he was placed in jail after her killing.7 He
claimed through his son, Allandel, as defense witness, that Guillerma testified against him
because she was against their marriage. He was then jobless.8 The proccedings show that
Guillerma, together with her husband, catalino, and appellants and Letecias three children
namely, Allandel, Aljun and Alex later signed as affidavit of desistance and moved to
dismiss the case against him.9
The trial court upheld the prosecution and on May 10, 1994 convicted accused-appellant
of parricide and sentenced him to death pursuant to republic Act No. 7659.
Before us appellant assigns the following errors:
I qualifying circumstance.
The sentence of death imposed by the trial court on the appellant is an unconstitutional
penalty for being violative of fundamental human rights and is, thus, null and void.
II
The judgment of conviction is null and void for having been rendered by a trial court ousted
of jurisdiction because of the grave violations of the appellants rights to due process
committed by no less that the presiding judge himself as shown by his conduct at trial.
III
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction, it
nevertheless gravely erred in convicting the appellant of parricide considering that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as demonstrated by:
(a) The prosecutions failure to prove the legitimate marital relation between appellant
and the victim;
(b) The prosecutions failure to prove the fact and cause of death;
(c) The prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody over the alleged
instrument of death;
IV
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction, it
nevertheless gravely erred in convicting the appellant when it arbitrarily and selectively
gave full weight and credence only to Guillerma Romanos inculpatory but inconsistent
and inadmissible testimony and disregarded her exculpatory statements.
V deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate. However, oral
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction, it
nevertheless gravely erred in peremptorily dismissing the appellants defense of alibi as
inherently weak.
VI
Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the trial court
nevertheless gravely erred in appreciating the existence of treachery as an aggravating and
VII
Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the trial court
nevertheless gravely erred in refusing to consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of the appellant, despite the prosecutions failure to contradict and
challenge the appellants claim of this mitigator.
VIII
Assuming without conceding that it was not ousted of jurisdiction, the trial court
nevertheless gravely erred in awarding civil indemnity arising from the death of Letecia
Malabago considering that the prosecution failed to prove said death as a fact during
trial.10
We affirm the trial courts findings with modification
The crime of parricide defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act 765911 states:
Art. 246. Parricide. -- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.12
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.13 In the
case at parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to.14
Guillerma Romano testified on direct examination that:
PROSECUTOR MAH:
Q On January 5, 1994 at about 7:00 in the evening, can you still recall where you were at A To file a complaint against Pedro malabago y Villaespin, 42 years old and a resident of
that particular time? Gulayon, Dipolog City,

A I was in my store. Q What is your complaint against said person?

Q While you were in your store at that particular time and date, can you still remember if A He hacked to death my daughter who is his wife with the use of a bolo.
there was an unusual incident [that] happened?
Q How many times did the suspect hack his wife, Letecia R. Malabago?
A Yes, sir.
A Twice, hitting the victim on the right side of her face and on the neck resulting in her
Q Please tell us what that incident was about? instanteneous death.

A At that moment, I heard a loud sound (paka). xxx xxx x x x.16

Q Did you investigate what that loud sound [was] all about? Appellant did not object to Guillermas testimony and sworn statement that he and Letecia
were husband and wife.17 Appellant himelf corroborated Guillermas testimony, to wit:
A I did not mind because they are husband and wife.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q What was that loud sound about?
Q You are Pedro Malabago, the accused herein?
A I thought it was a slap on the face but she was nit by a bolo.
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that incident about?
Q What is your relation to the late Letecia Romano Malabago?
A There was an altercation between husband and wife.
A She was my wife, your honor.
Q After the altercation between husband and wife, what happened?
Q You mean to say you were legally married to Letecia Romano Malabago?
A I saw the hacking two times and I saw blood.
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was hacked?
Q Who solemnized the marriages?
A My daugther Letecia was hacked by Pedro Malabago.
A Mayor Barinaga, your honor.
xxx xxx x x x.15
Q When?
Guillerma Romanos testimony on direct examination affirmed the narration in her
affidavit taken the day after the incident. The affidavit was adopted by the prosecution as A In the year 1970, your honor.
its Exhibit A and it reads in part:
Q Who were the witnesses, could you still remember?
Q What is your purpose in coming to the Office of the Investigator of the Dipolog City
Police? A I can only remember Sergio Vidal, your honor.

Q But then you were legally married by civil ceremony officiated by Mayor Barinaga?
A Yes, your honor. A Yes, your honor.

xxx xxx x x x.18 xxx xxx x x x.23

The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased is an admission against Appellant affirmed on cross examination that his wife died as a result of the hacking, thus:
his penal interest. It is a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husbands and wife have FISCAL MAH: (to the witness)
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.19 Q Mr. Witness, you know Letecia Malabago because she was your wife?
Appellant alleges that the prosecution failed to establish the fact and cause of Letecias A Yes, sir.
death because Dr. Dominador Celemin, the City Health Officer who signed the death
certificate, did not personally examine her cadaver.20 It is content that the consent of the Q Where is she now?
death certificate issued by Dr. Celemin is hearsay.21
A She is already buried in the cemetery.
Letecias death certificate is not the only proof of her death. Guillerma, in her affidavit,
Q You mean to say she is already dead?
stated that her daughter died as a result of the hack wounds.22 Called also as a hostile
witness to the defense, she testified: A Yes, sir.
COURT Q What was the cause of her death?
Q At the time, you actually saw the accused hacked (sic) the bolo to (sic) your daughter? A She was hacked, sir.
A Yes, you honor. Q Hacked by whom?
Q In fact, you witnessed the blood oozing on the face of your daughter? A I do not know who hacked my wife.
A Yes, your honor. xxx xxx x x x.24
Q In other words, you actually saw the accused herein hack the bolo to your daughter, am Accused-appellant also claims that the trial court showed partiality to the prosecution by
I right? unduly interfering in the presentation of evidence. By asking questions, the judge allegedly
elicited prejudicial admissions from witnesses without affording appellants counsel the
A Yes, your honor.
right to examine them on their answers to the court, in violation of appellants
Q And the cause of death of your daughter was hacking of Pedro Malabago? constitutional right to due process and right against self-incrimination.25

A Yes, your honor.
Q I have observed a while ago while you were testifying, you were crying. Why?
A Because of worries that Pedro had done to my daughter.
Q You mean to say, you cried because your daughter was killed by her husband?
The records disclosed that the questions the trial judge propounded were made mainly to
clarify what the prosecution and defense witnesses had testified on direct and cross
examinations. The essential elements of the crime of parricide like appellantss marriage to
Letecia, the cause of Letecias death and appellants participation therein were facts already
established by the prosecution in its evidence in chief. Using his discretion, the trial judge
questioned the witnesses to clear up obscurities in their testimonies ans sworn
statements.26 The wise use of such discretion cannot be assailed as a specie of bias.
A judge is called upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy before him. He may properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of
time27 and clarify obscure and incomplete details after the witness had given direct
testimony.28 After all, the judge is the arbiter and he ought to satisfy himself as to the
respective merits of the claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due
process.29 In the case at bar, the trial judge had strong reasons to question the material
witnesses who executed affidavits of desistance contradicting their previous stance. If to
the mind of the parties, the trial judge was unduly interfering in their presentation of
evidence, they were free to manifest their objection. They were likewise free to ask redirect
questions from their witness after interrogation by the trial court. In the instant case,
however, they never manifested that the questions of the trial judge had traversed the
allowable parameters. Even assuming that some of the questions were incriminating, we
cannot hold that the witnesses were compelled to incriminate themselves. The records
show they answered the questions of the court freely and voluntarily and without any
objection from their respective counsels.
The prosecution evidence is based solely on the testimony of Guillerma Romano.
Nonetheless, her testimony is clear, spontaneous and straightforward. Her inconsistencies
are minor and inconsequential and they are not incongruous with her credibility.30 Her
testimony was not eroded even when she was presented by the defense as a hostile witness.
She admittedly signed the affidavit of desistance for the sake of her three grandchildren
and this is understandable in light of the circumstances of the case. Allandel and his
brothers pled that she withdraw the complaint because they did not want their father to be
in prison.31 Deep in her heart, however, Guillerma wanted justice for her daughter and
thus, she testified for the prosecution.32 The fact that she objected to her daughters
marriage to appellant is too flimsy a reason to impel her to testify against the father of her
grandchildren.
We agree with the trial court that appellants defense of alibi is weak and unconvincing.
Appellant was positively identified as the one who hacked his wife to death. Moreover, it
was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on that fateful evening.
The poblacion of Dipolog City is merely four kilometers from Barangay Gulayon and this
distance may be traversed within a few minutes by motorized vehicle.33
Be that as it may, we find that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a) the
employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from
defensive and rataliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend
himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the offender.34 It is true that appellant hacked his wife who was
then unarmed and had no opportunity to defend herself. However, the evidence does not
show that appellant deliberately and consciously employed this particular mode of attack
to ensure the killing of the victim. The unembroidered facts reveal that appellant hacked
his wife in the midst of a sudden, unscripted heated argument. This precludes the idea that
appellant priorly planned to kill his wife. Indeed, appellant was not carrying his bolo at
that time. The bolo was hanging in its usual place on one of the posts of the sari-sari store.35
Treachery, to be appreciated, must spark an attack that is deliberate, sudden and
unexpected not where it is prefaced by an unforeseen heated argument with the victim
standing face to face with her assailant.36
The trial court also erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. In answer to questions by the trial court, appellant declared:
COURT: (to the witness)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you have suspects as to the alleged killers of your wife?
A I have no suspect, your honor.
Q Because you denied killing your wife, you did not surrender to the police authorities?
A I surrendered because I was accused of killing my wife.
Q Immediately after the incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was it placed in the police blotter that you surrendered?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you give the name of the person or police officer to whom you surrendered?
A I forgot the name, your honor.
Q Are you telling the truth?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx x x x.37
Appellant testified that he voluntarily surrendered to the police when they fetched him at
Dodong Opulentisimas house. The prosecution did not dispute appellants claim of
voluntarily surrender. Guillerma herself testified that without any resistance, appellant
went with the police when they fetched him at Dodongs house.38 Indeed, appellant did
not escape after Dodong Opulentisima called the police. Instead, he voluntarily placed
himself at the disposal of the police authorities.
In the absence of an aggravating circumstance39 and the presence of a mitigating
circumstance the penalty imposable to appellant is reclusion perpetua.40 Considering the
death of the victim, a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 must be awarded to her heirs.
In light of the above disquisitions, the Court need not resolve the alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, as amended. Nonetheless, the Court expresses its
appreciation to the scholarly arguments of our amici curiae, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino
and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on the constitutional aspects of R.A. No. 7659, as
amended. Death not being the lis mota of the instant case, the Court has to await for more
appropriate case to pass upon the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, as amended.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is affirmed with the modification that
the penalty of death imposed by the Regional Trial court of Dipolog City, Branch 10 on
accused-appellant Pedro Malabago y Villaespin in Criminal Case No. 6598 is reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., join Justice Padilla in his dissenting opinion.
Padilla J., see Dissenting Opinion.
2.) [G.R. No. 148327. June 12, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO DESALISA Y
PAYOS (At Large) and ROMEO DESALISA Y PAYOS, accused, ROMEO
DESALISA Y PAYOS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
One usual drinking spree on the night of July 7, 1996 in Carmona, Cavite turned into a
bloody mess for Richard Oracion, a 40-year-old construction worker who bled to his
untimely death due to multiple stab wounds.
On review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite in Crim. Case
No. B-97-33, dated April 30, 1999, finding appellant Romeo Desalisa y Payos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and imposing upon him the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
In an Information[2] dated January 13, 1997, accused Renato Desalisa y Payos and Romeo
Desalisa y Payos were charged with the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about July 7, 1996 in the Municipality of Carmona, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
then armed with a bolo, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab
one RICHARD ORACION y LOPEZ with the use of said bolo, thereby inflicting upon
the latter multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Richard Oracion.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant Romeo Desalisa y Payos pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and was tried
for the crime of murder, while co-accused Renato Desalisa y Payos remained at-large
throughout the duration of the trial.
Accused Renato Desalisa and Romeo Desalisa are brothers. The victim Richard Oracion
is their neighbor at Silverio, Cabilang Baybay, Carmona, Cavite.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 5:50 p.m. of July 7, 1996, the victim
and some of his co-workers, including accused Renato and one named Teddy had a
drinking spree in front of the victims house at the Silverio Compound, Cabilang Baybay,
Carmona, Cavite. Later, the victim escorted Teddy to the latters home nearby. Renato
followed suit. Ladella, the victims wife, also joined them at Teddys house where the
drinking continued. While drinking, the victim and Renato had a heated exchange of
words regarding each others capability to do each others job, they being co-workers at the
Fil-Estate.[3] Before the argument could turn for the worse, Renato went home. In his
mothers house, he called Madge Oracion, the victims son, on the pretext that he would
place his bet in a numbers game called ending. Once Madge was inside the house, Renato
did not place any bet. Instead, he twisted Madges arm who managed to free himself from
Renatos grip. Immediately, Madge reported to the victim the incident. Enraged, the victim
with his wife rushed to Renatos mothers house and confronted Renato. Armed with a
bladed weapon, Renato suddenly came out of the house and stabbed the victim in the
stomach. A few moments later, accused Romeo joined the fray and stabbed the victim at
his back.[4]
Severely injured, the victim ran away but was followed by Renato and Romeo who
continued hitting him with their weapons. Ladella who rushed to the help of her husband
was likewise hacked by Romeo, hitting her between her eyes and on her right hand.[5] As
Romeo was poised to hit Ladella again, she ran for safety and found refuge in the house of
a certain Shirley,[6] thus leaving the helpless victim to the mercy of Renato and Romeo.
They were later joined by another brother Ramon who continued ganging up on him.[7]
Ladella shouted for help but nobody came to her aid. She looked for her husband as she
lost sight of him when she ran away. She found him later sprawled on the ground behind
their house.[8] Someone helped her bring her husband to the Pagamutang Bayan in
Carmona where he was pronounced dead on arrival.[9]
Dr. Erwin Escal who conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of Richard
testified that the victim died due to hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds.
The victim suffered from blood loss caused by the stab wounds which produced the shock
that led to his death. The multiple stab wounds and hacking wounds caused the fatal
injuries sustained by the victim, especially those that penetrated his abdominal cavity, liver,
intestines and their blood vessels. He deduced that two different instruments, a bolo and a
knife, were used in inflicting the blows, judging from the size, shape and depth of the
wounds sustained. He also called as defense wounds those found in the upper extremities
of the victim, i.e., palm and forearms, and opined that these came from a frontal attack
and the victims parrying of the blows of the assailant. The autopsy report[10] by Dr. Escal,
dated July 8, 1996, reveals that the victim sustained one abrasion and 21 stab wounds
inflicted through the use of bladed weapons.[11]
The defense presents a different version, which is as follows:
Guadalupe Payos Desalisa, mother of the accused, was inside her house with her son
Renato. Richard and his wife Ladella, together with their son Madge, suddenly appeared
and were shouting. Guadalupe, followed by Renato, met Richard at the door. In an instant,
Richard drew a bolo from his back and thrusted the same towards Renato. To prevent his
mother from being hit, Renato pushed her but her head hit a chair and she lost
consciousness.[12]
At that same time, appellant Romeo was in his own house attending to their children when
he heard shouts coming from the outside. He went outside and saw Renato and Richard
arguing in front of his mothers house. With his wife Myrna, they immediately proceeded
to his mothers house. On their way, they met Pedro Diaz alias Payat, brother of Ladella,
together with a certain Egay. As Diaz and Romeo drew near, Diaz swung his bolo towards
Romeo who was able to wrest the same from Diaz. Romeo threw the bolo in his yard, and
proceeded to his mothers house. Upon reaching and finding no one in his mothers house,
Romeo and his wife went back home. Romeo was later arrested at around 7:00 p.m., that
same evening of July 7, 1996.[13]
The defense assails the trial courts judgment of conviction. It argues that there were two
(2) incidents that simultaneously occurred on July 7, 1996 at Silvestre Compound,
Cabilang Baybay, Carmona, Cavite, at about 6:30 p.m. The first is the killing of Richard
Oracion allegedly committed by accused Renato Desalisa who remains at-large as of the
conclusion of the trial, and second is the altercation between accused-appellant Romeo
Desalisa and Pedro Diaz. The defense submits that accused-appellant did not participate
in the killing of Richard Oracion because at nearly that same time, he was defending
himself from Pedro Diaz.[14]
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, counters that accused-appellant Romeo
Desalisas guilt has been sufficiently established by the positive testimony of two (2)
eyewitnesses. These two (2) eyewitnesses are the victims wife Ladella Oracion and their
son, Madge Oracion.[15]
Appellant Romeo Desalisas defense is that of denial. In support of his defense, he alleged
that he was inside his house when the incident happened. He said he was then preparing
milk for his children when he heard noises coming from outside his house. He immediately
went out of the house and proceeded to his mothers house where he saw Renato and
Richard engaged in an argument at the front door. While on his way to his mothers house,
Pedro Diaz blocked his path and attempted to hack him with a bolo. He wrestled the bolo
away from Diaz and threw it in his yard and proceeded to his mothers house. Nobody was
there when he reached it.
This Court has consistently held that positive identification cannot be overcome by alibi
and denial.[16] In the case at bar, two (2) relatives of the victim, namely his wife Ladella
and his son Madge, have positively identified appellant Romeo and accused Renato as the
ones who attacked, hacked and stabbed the hapless victim to death. No evidence was
presented showing ill-motive on the part of Ladella and her son to point to Romeo as one
of the perpetrators of the crime charged. In the absence of a proof of improper motive, their
testimonies are not affected by their relationship to the victim.[17] Relationship of the
prosecution witnesses to the victim does not necessarily categorize the former as biased
and interested and thus tarnish their testimonies.[18] In fact, the witnesses relationship to
the victim makes their testimonies even more reliable. It is highly doubtful that the wife
and son of the victim would aid in the prosecution of the appellant simply because they
wanted someone, i.e., anyone, to answer for the murder of their loved one. Indeed, it can
not be lightly supposed that relatives of the victim would callously violate their conscience
to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be
innocent thereof.[19]
The continuing case law is that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove
not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity
through clear and convincing evidence.[20] In the instant case, appellant was admittedly
within the immediate vicinity of the place of the crime. He was in his house when the
incident happened, and that he immediately went out when he heard the noises coming
from his mothers house. It was at this time when the hapless victim was stabbed and hacked
to death. On cross-examination, he stated that when he went out of his house, he saw
Ladella Oracion, wife of the victim, coming out from his mothers yard and shouting for
help. He was then more or less eleven (11) meters away from where he saw Ladella.[21]
Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the place of the crime and commit
it. His alibi must fail.
The defense also makes much fuss of the alleged inconsistent and contradictory statements
of prosecution witness Ladella Oracion. It impugns the credibility of witness Ladella, and
argues that she is capable of telling a lie as shown in the discrepancy between her affidavit
and testimony on the identities of the persons engaged in the argument during their
drinking spree, whether they were the victim and Renato, or Teddy and Renato; and her
alleged inconsistent statements during her cross-examination on which hand, right or left,
made a thrust when accused-appellant hacked her.[22] These alleged discrepancies dwell
on minor and trivial matters which do not impair the integrity of the evidence for the
prosecution as a whole nor reflect on the honesty of the witness. They can even enhance
the truthfulness of her testimony as they erase any suspicion of it being rehearsed. [23]
We likewise uphold the ruling of the trial court that the killing was attended by treachery
as the victim was caught unaware of the unexpected attack by the two accused. The attack
was sudden and the victim was unable to defend himself. The victim sustained twenty-one
(21) stab wounds. Of these wounds, wound no. 9 penetrated the right lobe of the liver;
wound no. 10 penetrated and severed the liver and stomach; and wound no. 11 penetrated
and severed the intestines and their blood vessels. In addition, as shown in the chart[24]
prepared by Dr. Erwin M. Escal who conducted the autopsy, the victim sustained injuries
not only in the frontal area but at the back of the body as well, particularly wounds nos. 4,
5, 6, 7 and 8. The victim also sustained injuries at the back of his left arm (wounds nos. 18
and 19) and at the back of both legs (wounds nos. 21 and 22). Ladella Oracion testified
that while Renato was frontally assaulting the victim with a bladed weapon, Romeo was
stabbing the victim at the back.[25] Hence, it was clearly impossible on the part of the
victim to defend himself. The circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery.[26]
Likewise, the trial court is correct in ruling that the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, as alleged in the Information cannot be appreciated because of the absence
of direct evidence of planning and preparation to kill the victim.[27]
We come to the award of damages. We reduce the award of the trial court from P42,500.00
to P19,050.00 because it is only the latter amount which is supported by receipts.[28] The
total amount of P19,050.00 consisted of P16,300.00 for funeral services (Loyola de Mesa
Funeral Parlor), P2,400.00 for interment services (South Felipe Parish Cemetery), and
P350.00 for church services (South Felipe Parish Church).[29] Lastly, we reduce the award
of moral damages and civil indemnity from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 each.[30]
IN VIEW THEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite in Crim.
Case No. B-97-33, dated April 30, 1999, finding accused-appellant Romeo Desalisa y
Payos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and imposing upon him the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P19,050.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
3.) G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his
wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within
his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x
x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression
and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit
within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy
expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case
Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved
together since then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over
the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband,
the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in
Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape
and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-
appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information
in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the
latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the
latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August
18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by
the trial court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant
was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15
averring that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the original informations
for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November
15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998
and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-
affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal
informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to
both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters
MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following
events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the
laborers. They got married after a year of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was
born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in
several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses
except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with
the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill
business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's
dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He
would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the
businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not
acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while
KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She
shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998,
KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week.28 On
Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store
and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-
appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course,
responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.30 However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in
bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would
resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint
that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their
businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay
in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on
her goal of providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-
appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter
were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro
City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about
their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m.
before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at
the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched
television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the
accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom
in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she
did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near
the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the
c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."36

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain
due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier.
He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on
the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to
the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK
stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his
own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in
penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the
spouses' bedroom,43 KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM
lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me,
have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room.45
MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom
and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly
put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this
is a family trouble," before closing it again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry,
MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then
kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once
more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK
crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her
mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened
to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up
in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and
covered herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To
prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his
arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when
the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but
she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced
her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what
happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex
with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family
store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant
did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting
for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the
rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already
fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that
she preferred to sleep with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go
with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his
comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.55

He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became
infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he
exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he
grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa,
don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled,
"[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the
family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and
went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother
resonate with the creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled
KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my
body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic].
I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted
her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short
pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered:
"[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then
retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried
upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm,
reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM
and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls
asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is
a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to
that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's
laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while
she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life.
Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal
properties and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the
accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that
on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met
an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left
the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October
12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM
to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the
truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated
the above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within
the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up
truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon,
loading sacks of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-
appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while
the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around
4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow
the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to
Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around
and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-
appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City
where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa
while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge
because he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the
possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to
do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries
in their bank account showed the balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after
only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66
Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually
detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's
graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised
when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request
as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had
also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee,
not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer
ask for his permission whenever she went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant
several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know
as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National
Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other
priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted
her or them about it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2,
1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch
a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She
got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head
with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK
thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted
out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody
young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and
was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to
her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through
because the accused-appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal
separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before
the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter
obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the
prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and
genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to
testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-
appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The
trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to
the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC
ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case
as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case,
[P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held
that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment
of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the
amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim
herself and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish,
beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not
negate the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove
rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and
wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing
physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK
such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not
indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim
was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses
only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind
would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she
stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about
it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that
it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the
time of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place
where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal
portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified
the parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a
Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April
16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that
he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the
presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going
with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up
resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate
and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride
capture' whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby
a man abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but
rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to
protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a
man raped his wife, he was merely using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was
justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of
her father until she marries to become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted
an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying
and marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and
the law denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him
to bring order within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon
marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract,
sue another, own personal property or write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the
irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption
rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for
by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America
(USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his
wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife.93 In those
jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a
woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim.
Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as
basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was
endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege
was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he
will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for
its abolition for being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape
laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the
application of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a
court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree,
judgment or written agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of
Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack
of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision,
which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the
exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We
therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual
intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any
argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual
act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates
the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other
than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband
the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should
not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If
a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should
seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x
x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law
doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the
woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these
doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the
common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or
demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition
as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District
of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states
granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally
or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now.
It appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered
to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of
Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of
rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106
Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major
instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The
Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as
a vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed, among
others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue,
by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against
women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure,
through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against
women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined
the principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14
of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to
adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international law such as the
CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997,
R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The
law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes
against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive
proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape
and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife
as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That
the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void
ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in
defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to
the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations
of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No.
650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino
impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and
penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never
agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband
who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years
of private practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at
stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband
from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence
that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill
expanding the definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam
Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual
rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband
for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction
there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second
paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this
jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for
something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have
the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically
House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is
marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault.
So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in
the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers
to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already
stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual
assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual assault
was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral
conference committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from
reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital
rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of
punishing the husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do
not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x
x x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not
excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be
implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the
House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says,
that because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape.
Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains
she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the
husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all
it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because
parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is
you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming.
It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with
rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not
mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving
your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba
yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have
another classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this
rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband
can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood
that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove
marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the
one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it
is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at
his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that
if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are
my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean,
we can face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or
creating a new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the
fact that he is husband is not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The
only disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two
suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation
or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the
husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living
under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is
present, then that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on
marital rape, it does not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in
anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the
wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal
impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as
defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to
the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has
evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated
into having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed
against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married.
It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.113

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A.
No. 9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be
committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to,
the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-
personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23%
incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced
physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual
violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied
consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual
intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual,
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting
couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and
wife unless the contrary is proved.

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman
or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently
from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or
lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex obligation between husband and wife.116
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent
shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof,
forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
same room with the abuser;
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory
evolved have already been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights
between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various
international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the
CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination
of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.117
One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that
marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's
body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or
at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN
General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms
of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified
'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the
following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering,
sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape,
female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal
violence and violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who
has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords himself.
He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act
without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international
commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital
activities121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule
sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous
and mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife
excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It
is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual
communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time
it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship.124
When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious
urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty
purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who
feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual
intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation.125 But he cannot and should not
demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of
the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws126 ordains that
similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a)
rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the
victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime
shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those
committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their
husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married
rape victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped
by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the
argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not
be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She
can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot
unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not
divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human
rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor
provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and
apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and
unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or
stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims
and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital
rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband.
The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases
should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his
accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established
legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and
found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-
appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim.
Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the
offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony
of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their
reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is
credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the
complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity
to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially
during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with
arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the
entire records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the
Court found no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and
spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered
neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained
consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination
and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the
allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite
her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their
conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate
his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she
rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy
transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-
appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She
reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance
or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her,
rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading
but he never desisted.133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise
unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night,
KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the
beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go
with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom,
the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-
appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could
do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the
children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual
intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do
that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted
me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant
removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as
he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must
be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat
or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her Q So, what did you do after that?
through force and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by
the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the
witness is sobbing)
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
(Direct Examination)

A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
ATTY. LARGO:

Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you
remember what happened?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.

A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.

xx xx

Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?

Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?

A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
Q So after that what else did he do?

A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking
her lap which means that he wanted to have sex." A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I
wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony. xxxx

ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.) A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137

Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on (Cross-Examination)
you and held your two hands?

ATTY. AMARGA;
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."

Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your
Q How did you say that to your husband? panty?

A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well." A Yes, Sir.

Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now? Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to
you he normally do that if he have sex with you?

xxxx
A Yes, Sir.

A I shouted when I uttered that words.

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?

xxxx
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want
to have sex with him at that time.
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty? On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

A Yes, Sir. (Direct Examination)

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time? ATTY. LARGO

A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs. Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?

xxxx A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.

Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
nightgown?

A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I
A No, Sir. cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."

Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face? Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?

A He raised my duster [sic] up. A It was tom.

Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]? Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?

A No, only on the breast level.138 A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and
succeeded in having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping
her hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK.
His actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed
his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay
with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their
bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises
dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom
on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual
intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was
customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such
act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was
about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the
same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the
consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when
it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that
point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit
him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of
rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much
more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-
appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on
to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she
repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be
just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind141 or
is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into
submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties
or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of
blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical
certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do
not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary
circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy,
the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted
by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied
based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the
absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent.147
Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and
forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.

The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative
value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape
is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can
testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative
value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the
rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the
circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM
heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the
night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their
conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-
appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently
cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and
rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-
appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal
knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and
physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM
saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her
conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical
outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the
sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the

credibility of a witness.

MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while
her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they
and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK
failed to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the
narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex
rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not
with him when I'm not feeling well. "
necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.150

KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to
appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when
submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could
MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after
sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told
bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the
her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries
head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their
against the accused-appellant.151
mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.

It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353
abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet
known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition,
fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims
from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This
is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit
to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a
peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma
and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of
police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the
failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in
view of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand.
Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the
rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements
taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they
are inferior to testimony given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it
is riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution
was able to establish that the ₱3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the
proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI
ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is the same
amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-
appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately ₱3 Million was
spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the
accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the
bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how
Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on
October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present
Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for
KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such
love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting
witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that
an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with
10 men - some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the
witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it
reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to
extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's
unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to
destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present
sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the
accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the
accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the
two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi
and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable,
but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to
testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical
impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the
accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but
more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the
crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon
can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by
private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it was
not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the
two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and
credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the
latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently
overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her
consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to
consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the
testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short
pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon
the accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the
RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346,
which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral
damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under
the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she
underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place.1âwphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no
qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is
₱50,000.00159 and not ₱75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic
violence, an award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to
be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's
value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or
social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the
present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed
against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they
seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their
wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she
does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body
and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband
aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to
felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts
that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an
annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological
communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and
self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement,
menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard,
let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and
scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue
and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to
pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of
damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
4.) [G.R. No. 133436. April 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CONRADO AYUMAN, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 97-1040 finding Conrado Ayuman,
appellant, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and imposing upon him the supreme
penalty of death. He was also adjudged to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
The Information charging appellant with parricide reads:
That on or about April 22, 1997, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength and ascendancy
over Sugar Ray Ayuman, his legitimate son, maul, maltreat and kill the latter by slapping
and hitting the latter on his head, stomach and other parts of the latters young and tender
body thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic abdominal injuries, which are fatal injuries
and which caused the latters death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Sugar Ray Ayuman and his legal heirs.
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
The version of the prosecution was established through the testimonies of Dr. Tammy Uy,
Marino Jalalo, SPO1 Salome Catulong, Ederico Mariano, Angelito Roluna, Grace
Songcuya and SPO1 Medel Makalino.
On April 22, 1997 at around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman, appellants wife,
rushed her five-year old son Sugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center (NMMC). When Ederico Mariano, a nurse, took the childs vital signs, it
appeared that he was dead on arrival. Ederico then asked Ermita what happened to the
child. She answered that he was mauled by his father. Ermitas statement was noted in the
emergency room record.[2]
At about 10:45 in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Salome Catulong of Police Precinct
No. 1 of Cagayan de Oro City, received a phone call from the NMMC informing her that
a child died because he was assaulted by his father. Being in charge of cases involving
women and children, she immediately proceeded to the hospital. Angelito Roluna, a
newspaper reporter of the Sun Star, was with her. Ermita refused to answer any query from
SPO1 Catulong regarding the death of her son. But when Roluna asked her what
happened, she told him that Sugar Ray was mauled by his father.[3] This interview could
only be finished the following day when Ermita admitted to him that appellant used to hurt
the child every time the latter left the house or made mistake; that before he died, appellant
kicked him; and that the child informed her he was in pain and vomiting. Roluna reported
this interview in the Sun Star.
Also on that same day, April 22, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening, SPO1 Catulong
went to the Ayuman residence. That was the start of the wake for Sugar Ray. When SPO1
Catulong interviewed Ermita, she stated that appellant maltreated the boy in order to
discipline him and that appellant started to hit him at the age of four. Upon suggestion of
SPO1 Catulong, Ermita agreed that the body of the child be autopsied.[4]
On April 23, 1997, Dr. Tomas L. Uy of the NBI, Region 10, Cagayan de Oro City,
performed the autopsy on the body of Sugar Ray. Prior thereto, he learned from Ermita
that the child was maltreated by appellant in their house on April 22, 1997 at about 10:30
in the morning.[5]
Dr. Uys Autopsy Report contains the following findings:
Pallor, generalized. Rigor mortis, lower extremities. Livor mortis, generalized, back,
buttocks, posterior aspects of the neck and extremities. Areas of post-mortem greenish
discolorations of the abdomen and inferior aspects of the chest are noted.
ABRASIONS: 0.2X0.4 cms. And 0.3X0.6 cm., lower thoracic region of the back, mid-
aspect; 3X2 cms., right iliac region, lateral aspect.
HEMATOMAS, violaceous: 2.2X1 cms. Forehead, right side; 1.5X2 cms., 2.5X2 cms.,
1.2X1.6 cms., and 3X0.8 cms., left side of the face; (page 2-A, record) 1.8X1.2 cms., right
elbow region; 4X2.5 cms., dorsum of right hand; 2.4X1.2 cms., left forearm, dorsal aspect,
dista third; 2.5X2.2 cms., lower sternal region of the chest; 6X3 cms., epigastric region of
the abdomen.
HEMATOMA, 6X2 cms., surface of the pericardium, anterior aspect, beneath the
sternum.
HEMATOMA, stomach, 5X2 cms., lesser curvature region, anterior aspect.
LACERATED WOUND, 1.5 cms. long, with irregular edges, right lobe of the liver,
medial aspect, overlying the gall bladder, surrounded by a HEMATOMA of 4X3 cms.
RUPTURE, small intestine, ileal region/portion; with irregular edges.
PERITONITIS, generalized, aero-purulent; with extensive intestinal and mesenteric
adhesions; serosal surfaces of the small and large intestines are markedly congested and
covered with patches of foul-smelling yellowish purulent exudates. Peritoneal fluid is
heavily contaminated with fecal matter.
Heart chambers, contain smell amount of dark fluid and clotted blood.
Stomach, contains about 1 tbsp. of yellowish-green bilous substance.
Brain, markedly congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Traumatic abdominal injuries.
On April 23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried. Appellant was nowhere to be found. Neither
did he report for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997.[6] During the burial, Ermita cried
and shouted, Dong, forgive your father. Dong, dont leave us. Afterwards, upon invitation
of SPO1 Catulong, Ermita, with her two children, went to the formers office and executed
the following statement quoted as follows:
01. Q - Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth in your statement
now?
A - Yes, I will swear.
02. Q - Please state your name, age, address and other personal circumstances?
A - I am Ermita Ayuman y Mayuela, 36 years of age, married, presently residing at Pilgrim
Compound, Del Pilar/ Magsaysay Street, Cagayan de Oro City and originated from
Manuikan, Zamboanga del Norte, a mother of 3 children, 2 girls and one boy.
03. Q - Why are you here at the police Station at OKK Police Precinct No. 1?
A - I am here to file a criminal complaint against my own husband PO3 Conrado Ayuman
an active member of Cagayan de Oro Central Fire Station, for killing our only son Sugar
Ray Ayuman, 5 yrs. Old, Kinder 2 at Faith Tabernacle situated at Del Pilar/Magsaysay,
Cagayan de Oro City.
04. Q - When and where did this happen?
A - This happened on April 22, 1997 at 10:30 in the morning more or less from our house
at Del Pilar/Magsaysay going to Northern Mindanao Medical Center but died on arrival
at the hospital and the mauling which was done by his father happened in our house and
this the cause of the death of my son.
05. Q - Please narrate shortly the incident.
A - The father of Sugar Ray started mauling him when he was then 4 years old until the
age of 5. His father would kick, box, slap, and beat him even if he just committed slight
mistakes. If Sugar Ray would go out from our room to watch TV at our neighbors place
his father would be furious and would beat him. And on Monday, April 21, 1997, at 10:00
a.m., more or less, my husband came home from office to get something. He called Ray
because that time Ray went out from our room, and immediately slapped him and the head
of Ray bumped on the wall. He let Ray get inside our room, slapped him again and I saw
my husband kick Ray many times hitting his abdomen. I tried to stop him but he would
not listen and instead kicked Ray several times because as what he said I must discipline
my child because he is a boy. He easily gets angry even for slightest mistakes.
06. Q - What else can you say?
A - In that afternoon at past 1:00 oclock of same day, he came home from his work to get
epoxy to repair his radio, and he saw Ray wiping his hands and suddenly hit Rays head
and said You will go out again as your mother is sleeping. But that time I was not yet
asleep and I heard everything that he said to the child then looked for a chain but there was
none; he saw a rope and tied the neck of my son to the bed, so Ray could not go out and
even told me not to untie the knot until the child sleeps, then he left going back to his office.
07. Q - What other things happened?
A - The following day April 22, 1997 at 9:00 oclock in the morning my husband was at
home from a 24 hours duty before that day. He saw me wiping the hands of Ray with wet
face towel and asked me by saying Is Ray having fever? Its because he is disobedient. He
told the child to stand up by saying stand up Ray. Ray then stood up and felt nauseated
and was about to vomit and told Ray Pretentious child hes just pretending to vomit. Ray
lay down again and I continued wiping him and massage him with sanitary balm as he felt
cold and was sweating and at that time seemed to have hard time breathing. I could not
determine his way of breathing, sometimes very fast, and then my husband approached
Ray and put his clenched fist on Rays face and commanded Ray to squat then let Ray stand
up and squat with open hands in front his knees. I told him to stop Ray from squatting,
then Ray lay down again but rose up and vomited and I saw him vomit with blood and I
was so scared so I brought my child to Northern Mindanao Medical Center, and while on
our way on board motorela going to said hospital, Ray was able to say Mang, maybe I will
die now and I told him, You wont die Do because we will go to the hospital. At that time
I noticed Ray having hard time breathing and upon arrival at the emergency room of said
hospital the nurse touched his pulse and declared that my son died on arrival. I could not
believe that my son was already dead and did not know what to do that time. I just
embraced him and kept on crying.
08. Q - Did your husband know at that time that Sugar Ray is already dead?
A - Yes, because he was informed by his sibling who accompanied us to the hospital but
my husband that time did not go with us to said hospital and as what I knew from his
sibling that he told his manong (my husband) that Sugar Ray is already dead and his
response was bury him and until now my husband has not yet appeared.
09. Q - I have no more questions, do you have something more to add?
A - No more as of now.
10. Q - Will you sign your statement voluntarily without being coerced or intimidated by
anybody?
A - Yes, I will sign. (Affidavit as translated, pages 185-186, records).
(Signed) ERMITA MAYUELA AYUMAN
(Affiant)[7]
Thereafter, SPO1 Catulong and Ermita proceeded to the office of Grace Songcuya, Clerk
of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City. Ermita subscribed
and sworn to before Songcuya the truth of her statement given before SPO1 Catulong.
However, on May 15, 1997, Ermita executed an affidavit retracting what she stated in her
sworn statements. Nonetheless, the City Prosecutor filed with the court a quo the
corresponding Information and eventually issued a warrant of arrest against appellant.
SPO1 Catulong arrested appellant at the Central Fire Station, Cagayan de Oro City.[8]
Marino Jalalo, testified that he and appellants family are neighbors. Appellant has three
children, two girls and a boy. But he was particularly violent to his son Sugar Ray. Every
time the boy committed a mistake, appellant would punish him inside a room. About 3 to
4 times a month, appellant would hit the child with a belt or a stick and he could only cry.
Once, Marino heard the child gasping for breath as if he was being drowned by appellant.
At one time, the boy approached Marino and asked for something to eat, saying Tatay, did
you hear me a while ago? At that moment, Marino noticed that the childs head was partly
swollen. When asked what happened to him, the child replied, My face was pushed down.
In the same month and year, appellant locked the child inside a room. Observing that
Marino was around, the child begged him for help.[9]
The defense presented as its witnesses appellant and his wife Ermita.
Appellant denied killing his son Sugar Ray. He testified that on April 22, 1997, when he
came home at around 9:00 oclock in the morning, he saw his son on bed. His wife was
rubbing sanitary balm on him. While he was having breakfast, he noticed that his son was
pale, had fever and was vomiting. So he told his wife to bring the child to the hospital.
Initially, she was reluctant because they had no money, but he insisted. On the same day,
he went to Pagadian to borrow money from his relatives. He returned home on April 27,
1992. Ermita told him that Sugar Ray died because an unidentified person slapped and
kicked him at the Cogon market. At that time, his son was already buried. The couple then
went to the Office of the Prosecutor to tell the truth.[10]
On cross examination, appellant admitted he was strict with his children and disciplined
them in a military way. [11]
After hearing the case, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Conrado Ayuman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide committed by killing his minor son, Sugar Ray Ayuman,
aggravated by treachery, lack of respect due to Sugar Rays tender age, cruelty and abuse of
confidence, and thereby hereby sentences him to death, to indemnify the heirs of Sugar
Ray Ayuman in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of this case.
His custodian is hereby also ordered to ship him to the National Penitentiary immediately,
or without delay.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant now raises the following assignments of error:
I All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, specifically on the basis
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
FILED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND IN DISREGARDING HER TESTIMONY IN
OPEN COURT.[12]
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt that he is guilty of the crime charged. In fact, there is no evidence directly pointing
to him as the culprit. What the prosecution presented are mere hearsay evidence and
assumption. While SPO1 Catulong testified that Ermita executed a sworn statement on
September 22, 1997, however, Ermita denied its veracity. Her affidavit of desistance tells
all.
Appellant likewise maintains that the circumstantial evidence enumerated by the trial court
in its assailed Decision do not support any finding of parricide.
For his part, the Solicitor General, in the appellees brief, maintains that Ermitas affidavit
of recantation is an afterthought and exceedingly unreliable. Moreover, the circumstantial
evidence relied upon by the trial court sustains the conviction of appellant of the crime
charged.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, defines and
penalizes parricide as follows:
Article 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The key
element here is the relationship of the offender with the victim.[13]
of circumstantial evidence.
In People vs. Almoguerra and Aton,[14] we held:
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom
a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. The rules on evidence and case law
sustain the conviction of appellants through circumstantial evidence.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused.
The following circumstances cited by the trial court led us to conclude that the prosecution
proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant killed his son, thus:
1. Appellant has the propensity in maltreating his son. He himself testified that he
disciplined the victim by inflicting on him serious corporal punishment akin to the military
approach;[15]
2. Marino Jalalo, appellants neighbor, testified that whenever the victim committed a
mistake, appellant would bring him in a room and punish him. He often heard the victim
crying as he was being hit by appellant with a belt or a stick. This happened about 3 to 4
times a month;
3. Appellant was at home on April 22, 1997 when Ermita rushed the victim to the NMMC
where he was declared dead on arrival;
4. Appellant immediately left after his son was rushed to the hospital by his wife;
5. Ermita admitted to Ederico Mariano, the nurse then on duty when the victim was rushed
to the hospital, that the latter was mauled by his father. This declaration was later entered
in the NMMC emergency room record by the same nurse;
6. Ermita, when interviewed by SPO1 Catulong and Angelito Roluna, a newspaper
reporter, also admitted to them that appellant has been maltreating his son and mauled
him before he died;
7. Dr. Tomas L. Uy who physically examined the victim found abrasions and hematomas
all over his body, as well as lacerated wound of the liver and ruptured intestine, among
others. According to Dr. Uy, Sugar Ray died of traumatic abdominal injuries. To a layman,
Dr. Uys findings readily show that the child suffered violent blows on his body.
8. During the interment, Ermita shouted, Dong, forgive your father.
9. Although Ermita advised appellant that the victim was slapped and kicked by an
unidentified person at the Cogon market on April 21, 1997, however, contrary to a fathers
natural reaction, appellant failed to take any action to defend a loved one or report the
incident to the police;
10. Appellant did not return home immediately. In fact, he was not present during the
wake and the burial of his own son, conduct so unnatural for a father like him.
The foregoing circumstances, when viewed in their entirety, are as convincing as direct
evidence and as such, negate appellants innocence. Otherwise stated, the prosecution
established beyond a shadow of doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that appellant
committed the crime of parricide.
Here is a father who mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring him to the
hospital, although on the verge of death, for prompt medical treatment. Such a heartless
conduct is condemnable and is extremely contrary to human nature. Every father is
expected to love his children and shower them with acts of affection and tenderness. But
appellant belongs to a different breed. Indeed, he is a tyrant without mercy. His intense
apathy to his dying young son is beyond comprehension.
We have ruled that facts or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of
the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight
and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. [16]
But appellant discredits Ermitas sworn statement because she retracted. It bears emphasis
that mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible, as in this case. We look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious: Affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the
probability that it will later be repudiated. [17] Thus, the trial court correctly disregarded
Ermitas affidavit of desistance. Obviously, she was influenced by appellant to execute it.
Moreover, if it were true that an unidentified person killed their son, why did appellant fail
to report the matter to the proper authorities? There can be no other conclusion, therefore,
than that Ermitas affidavit of retraction is an afterthought, intended to exculpate appellant
from criminal liability.
Appellant, merely denied the commission of the crime and interposed the defense of alibi.
Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses.
Since he was unable to substantiate his alibi with the testimony of a credible witness, it is
reduced to self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law.[18]
In his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, appellant insists
that the prosecution failed to prove that he is the father of the victim. While the prosecution
failed to present to the trial court the victims Certificate of Live Birth, however, both
appellant and his wife Ermita admitted during the hearing that the victim is their son. In
People vs. Malabago,[19] we ruled that oral evidence of the fact of filial relationship maybe
considered.[20]
We now resolve the issue of whether the trial court imposed the correct penalty. Under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7659, the
penalty for parricide is composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death.
In the case at bar, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, abuse of confidence and cruelty. Outright, we cannot consider these aggravating
circumstances in determining the proper penalty because they have not been alleged in the
Information. Also, there are no mitigating circumstances here.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of
the crime, we impose upon the appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Regarding damages, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the
victims mother and sisters. When death occurs as a result of a crime, appellant should be
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,[21] without need of
any evidence or proof of damages.[22] We also award them exemplary damages in the sum
of P25,000.00 considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this
being a case of parricide.[23] In People vs. Catubig,[24] we held that exemplary damages
in the amount of P25,000.00 are recoverable if there is present an aggravating circumstance
(whether qualifying or ordinary) in the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 97-1040, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in the sense that appellant CONRADO AYUMAN is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and is ordered to pay the victims heirs
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
ART 247 – DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
1.) G.R. No. 74515 June 14, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BERTITO TRIGO, accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of his wife, Alicia Dequiña Trigo, the accused-appellant, Bertito Trigo, was
charged with the crime of PARRICIDE in Criminal Case No. C-1790 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, at Roxas City, and under the information which reads:
The undersigned accuses BERTITO TRIGO of the crime of Parricide, committed as
follows:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock in the morning in May 30, 1983 at New Road St.,
Municipality of Pontevedra, Province of Capiz, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his estranged wife ALICIA
DEQUIÑA TRIGO, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, assault and stab his said
wife with a knife (sevillana), thereby inflicting stab wounds on the different parts of her
body which caused her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 11, Rollo)
Upon being arraigned on January 9, 1984, Trigo entered the plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. Trial ensued. On September 16, 1985, the court a quo rendered its decision
convicting Trigo of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Bertito Trigo, 32 years old, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide for killing his estranged wife, Alicia Dequiña
Trigo, on May 30, 1983 in Pontevedra, Capiz, and hereby sentences him appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance
offsetting it, to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA Revised Penal Code, Articles
246; 63(3), as (sic) to indemnify the heirs of his wife, his children in the care of the children's
grandmother, Reynalda dela Fuente, or whoever has custody over them, in the sum of
P12,000.00, with the accessory penalties of the law. Accused is given the benefit of Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, Trigo appealed and assigned the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS MARCOS FUENTES AND IN
ABSOLUTELY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
DEFENSE.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. (p. 1, Appellant's
Brief; p. 44, Rollo)
The records show that the accused and his wife were married by the parish priest of
Panitan, Capiz on January 19, 1972 (Exhibits "D" to "D-3", p. 256, Records).
The prosecutions version of the killing is based mainly on the testimony of Marcos Fuentes.
He testified, inter alia, that he knew the spouses Bertito and Alicia Trigo because he bought
from them their house located at Sitio Umigon, Brgy. Tincupon, Panitan, Capiz, in 1982;
that at about nine o'clock in the morning of May 30, 1983, he was at the market of the
town of Pontevedra; that he met Alicia Trigo at the said market and even greeted her; that
he did not notice at the time whether Alicia was with a companion or not; that after awhile,
a commotion took place; that when he stood up he saw Bertito Trigo stabbing Alicia; that
he saw blood spurting from Alicia's left chest; that Bertito Trigo was at the time in front of
Alicia and holding the latter with one of his arms; that there were no other persons near
Alicia when he saw the latter bleeding; that Alicia later fell on the ground; and that he was
about 50 meters from where the incident took place.
The body of Alicia Trigo was examined by Dr. Ma. Roselle B. Gedang, resident physician
of the Provincial Hospital at Bailan, Pontevedra, Capiz. The medical certificate dated
February 4, 1984 indicated the following pertinent physical findings, to wit:
Multiple Stab wounds:
Right arm anterior aspect middle third about 2 cm. thru and thru;
Left arm anterior aspect-proximal third about 01 cm.;
Left forearm lateral aspect about 3 cm. thru and thru left side of the left nipple chest;
Left chest wall-left side of the nipple and slightly below intering the 4th intercostal space
the penetrating perforating the heart;
Right hypogastric area about 1 cm. superficial;
Right lumbar area above the anterior superior iliac spine about 2.5 cm. mid acillary line
superficial;
Upon admission, patient was restless, chyne strokes respiration noted, B/P not
appreciated, pronounced dead.
Cause of Death:
Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hemorrhage. (p. 255, Records)
Accused, upon the other hand, denied that he killed his wife Alicia. According to him, he
and his wife were at the market to buy some goods for their store; that while they were
walking, he saw Orline Buaco draw from his waist a weapon; that Buaco tried to stab him
but he (accused) was able to evade the blow; that it was his wife who got hit by the blow
delivered by Buaco; and after his wife was hit, Buaco successively stabbed her. He also
claimed that Orline Buaco is also a resident of Barangay Tincupon; that Buaco had
previously fired shots at the house of accused and his family on November 19, 1982 because
the accused had not paid his debt to Buaco in the sum of P1,000.00; that such incident was
recorded at the police department and a complaint was filed by him against Buaco with
the Municipal Court of Panitan (TSN, February 13, 1985, pp. 51-62, Records).
Appellant submits that the trial court should not have relied on the testimony of the
prosecution witness; Marcos Fuentes in view of the inconsistencies and improbabilities
found in his testimony. Appellant also asserts that there is no evidence in the records to
show that he had a motive to kill his wife.
After a careful review of the records, We find the appeal to be without merit.
The issue in this case hinges on the credibility of prosecution witness Marcos Fuentes. It is
a well-established rule that in criminal prosecutions on the matter of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect
by appellate courts because the former is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial (People vs. Kintuan, G.R. 84100, December 3, 1987, 156 SCRA 195). We
find no strong and cogent reason to depart from this established rule. The testimony of
Marcos Fuentes which stated that he saw appellant stab his wife (p. 4, TSN, March 4,
1984) was clear and positive. There was no showing of any ulterior motive on his part to
falsely charge the accused-appellant. The testimony of only one witness, if credible and
positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict (see
People v. Luces, L-60744, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 813).
We affirm the trial court's finding when it declared that even as Marcos Fuentes sort of
wavered at the outset in his testimony, his declaration was straight-forward even during
the cross-examination; and that his court testimony is a reiteration of his declaration in his
sworn statement supporting the complaint (p. 29, Rollo).
Appellant also submits that the prosecution did not prove the motive of appellant for killing
his wife. The law is well-settled that motive is relevant only where the Identity of the person
accused of having committed the crime is in dispute, where there are no eyewitnesses, and
where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons. In the case at bar, the Identity
of the accused was positively proved by the eyewitness. Hence, motive is irrelevant (People
v. Dueño, G.R. No. L-31102, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 23).
Further, We are not persuaded by appellant's claim that it was not him but a certain Orline
Buaco who stabbed his wife. In rejecting this defense, the trial court correctly observed
significant factors/circumstances surrounding the incident which belie appellant's defense
that it was not he who stabbed and killed Alicia Trigo. Firstly, there is great improbability
of Orline Buaco's alleged first attack hitting his wife if the said attack were aimed at
accused. Secondly, there is greater improbability of the deceased Alicia Trigo sustaining
multiple stab wounds if it were the appellant whom Buaco wanted to stab as then the latter
would have aimed all the five other thrusts of the weapon at the accused and not at the
deceased Alicia Trigo. Thirdly, there was failure not only to shield her from the attack but
also failure to retaliate within the duration of the next five attacks upon the deceased.
Fourthly, knowing that his wife was already seriously wounded, the appellant would not
have left her alone in the care of a policeman especially after Buaco had already fled, and
there was no more danger that the latter might attack him. Fifthly, after appellant had
secured police protection at the police station, appellant never returned to personally attend
to his wife and to ascertain if she received timely medical attention at the provincial
hospital at Bailan, Pontevedra. All these facts and circumstances were considered by the
trial court to bolster one thing-that accused was really estranged from his wife and it was
he who killed her.
The direct and circumstantial evidence established at the trial sufficiently prove the guilt of
accused-appellant. As aforestated, the trial court's findings of fact are generally given due
respect. Appellant has the burden, therefore, to convince this Court that a departure from
this rule is justified upon satisfactory showing that the trial court misapplied some facts of
weight and substance as would alter the result of the proceedings. He failed to do so.
The court a quo appreciated in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. We do not agree with this finding. The accused himself testified that
he went to the police station to report that his wife was stabbed by Buaco and to seek
protection as he feared that Buaco would also stab him. Clearly, his action cannot in any
manner be considered as amounting to voluntary surrender. In any event, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the said court.
The indemnity in the amount of P12,000.00 ordered by the court a quo to be paid by the
accused-appellant to the heirs of the deceased Alicia Trigo is increased to P30,000.00.
ACCORDINGLY, with the modification above indicated, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in all other respects, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
2.) [G.R. No. 97961. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY TALISIC y
VILLAMOR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The accused-appellant admits having killed his wife but insists that he did so only after
surprising her in the very act of sexual intercourse with another man. However, he fails to
substantiate the stringent elements required by law to absolve him of criminal
responsibility. His defense appears no more than an amalgam of confusion, contradiction
and concoction.
Statement of the Case
The foregoing sums up our ruling in this appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, Branch 5, in Criminal Case No. 1969, finding
accused-appellant guilty of parricide.
Second Assistant City Fiscal Norma B. Siao charged accused-appellant in an Information
dated May 13, 1988, which reads as follows:
That on or about May 8, 1988, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having conceived a deliberate intent to kill his
wife Janita Sapio Talisic, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
evident premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a result of said attack,
the said Janita Sapio Talisic died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
Arraigned on October 26, 1988, the accused, with the assistance of Counsel de Oficio
Daniel T. Bayron, pleaded not guilty to the charge.[2] Trial ensued in due course.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered its Decision, which disposed as follows:
The foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the inculpatory evidence of the
prosecution quite satisfying and sufficient to establish that the crime of parricide was
committed here and that the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify for civil liability the heirs of the victim in the amount of
(P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[3]
In view of the penalty imposed, the accused appealed directly to this Court.
The Facts
Version of to the Prosecution
The facts as gathered from the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Dr. Regino Gaite,
Danilo Talisic and Victoria Sapyo Tautho are as follows:
Sixteen-year old Danilo Talisic testified that at dawn of May 8, 1988, his mother, Janita
Talisic, was stabbed to death with a chisel by his father Jimmy Talisic, who afterwards
displayed the bloodied weapon before their altar. Realizing that his mother was already
dead, Danilo decided to bring his younger sister to their grandfathers house.[4] They
passed by the house of their aunt, Victoria Sapyo Tautho, a sister of the deceased, and
related to her the bizarre killing. The latter hurried to the house of the deceased, arriving
at six oclock that morning. She was aghast at the bludgeoned body of her sister and the
bloodstained chisel at the altar.[5] In the meantime, Danilo also related the killing to his
paternal grandfather, Simon Talisic, who thereupon proceeded to the house of his son,
Accused-appellant Jimmy Talisic, and brought the latter to the military camp at Tipanoy,
Iligan City.[6]
Substantially corroborating Danilos testimony, Victoria Sagio Tautho stated that she found
her sisters lifeless body sprawled on the floor of their living room, as well as the crimson-
drenched chisel at the altar.
Dr. Regino Gaite examined the body of the deceased and issued the necropsy report
(Exhibit B). On the stand, he described the sixteen stab wounds inflicted on the victim, as
follows:
Q During the examination on the 16 stab wounds you have mentioned, will you please tell
this Honorable Court how deep was the penetration of these injuries on the dead body of
the victim?
A Some were four inches deep; some were two, depending on the site of the body.
Q I would like to call your attention to this document, and tell us how deep was the
penetration of the injuries Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and this No. 6, which is in the neck of the victim?
A Four inches deep.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, these particular injuries numbered you have indicated, will
these be sufficient to cause the death of the victim?
A Numbers 2, three are in the external region; Nos. 4 and 5 are above the heart; then No.
6 is in the carotid region, leftside.
Q What about the injuries on the left arm of the victim, Dr., how deep was the penetration
indicated, Nos. 10, on the left arm of the victim, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16?
A Two inches deep.[7]
According to him, these multiple wounds resulted in hemorrhage and shock which
ultimately caused the death of the victim.[8]
Version of the Defense
The defense presented only the testimony of Jimmy Talisic which is summarized in the
six-page Appellants Brief,[9] dated November 4, 1991, as follows:
Testifying for his defense, accused-appellant declared that between the hours of 3:00 and
4:00 in the early morning of May 8, 1988, she (sic) was requested by his wife to fetch water
from a well as they had earlier (planned) to go to the city together. As requested, he then
fetched water from a well about 200 meters away from their house which took him about
30 minutes to do so. When he came back from the well and while climbing up the stairs,
he was surprised to see a man lying on top of his wife. He tried to draw his bolo and stabbed
the man who, however, was able to run away. He tried to run after him but did not overtake
him. He came back to their house but only to be met by a stabbing thrust from his wife
using a chisel. He was not hit as he was able to parry the blow, thus prompting him to grab
the chisel from his wife. He lost his temper and stabbed her to death.
Issue
In his brief, appellant contends:
The trial court erred in not finding that accused-appellant had killed his wife under
exceptional circumstances and in not applying the provision of Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The crucial question in this appeal is whether the totality of the evidence presented before A Yes.
the trial court justifies the application of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Q Now, will you please tell the Court why you fetch water at this early morning of May 8,
The Courts Ruling 1988?

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. A I fetched water because we were planning to go down early to the city.

Applicability of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code Q You said we, who is your companion?

At the outset, it must be underscored that appellant admits killing his wife. This is clear A My wife is my companion in going down to the City, so she requested me to fetch
from his testimony:
water so she can take a bath.
Q Can your recall where were you between the hours of 3:00 and 4:00 A.M. of May 8,
1988? Q Are you referring to the late Janita Sapio?

A Yes. A Yes, Sir.

Q Where were you? Q Where (sic) you able to go back to your house after fetching water from the well?

A I fetched water from the well. A Yes.

Q Where is this well located? Q When you reached your house, what did you discover if there was any?

A In the lower portion of my house. A When I arrived home and climbed up the stairs, I put the plastic container of water, and
I saw a man lying on top of my wife. I drew my bolo and stabbed the man, but I was not
Q How far is this well from your house? able to hit the man because he ran away.

A 200 meters. Q What did you do after, when you said that the man who was lying on top of your wife
ran away?
Q Can you describe to the court the condition of the road going to that well where you
fetched water? A I ran after him.

A Yes, Sir. Q Were you able to catch up with that man?

Q Please describe to the Honorable Court? A. No, I was not able to catch up.

A It is rolling. Q What did you do next?

Q Were you able to fetch water from the well? A When I went back to my house, I was stabbed by my wife with a chisel because there
was a chisel placed on the wall.
Q What did you do when you were stabbed by your wife with [the] chisel?
A I was able to parry it and grabbed the chisel from her.
Q What did you do next after grabbing the chisel from your wife?
A I lost my temper because I was so mad, so I stabbed her because she was unfaithful to
our marriage because we were legally married.
Q Do you know who was that man you saw on top of your wife?
A. No, I was not able to recognize because it was dark.[10]
However, he argues that he killed his wife under the exceptional circumstance provided in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally
married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
the penalty of destierro. xxx.
An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public
policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.[11] Article 247 is an example of an
absolutory cause. Explaining the rationale for this, the Court held:
x x x. The vindication of a mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife
creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe that it can only be justified
when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only
with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter.[12]
Having admitted the killing, the accused must now bear the burden of showing the
applicability of Article 247. Accordingly, the defense must prove the following:
1. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under
18 years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious
physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that
he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.[13]
We stress that the burden of proof to show the concurrence of all three elements rests on
the defense. Most critically, Appellant Jimmy Talisic must prove that he caught his wife in
flagrante delicto; that he killed her while she was in the very act of voluntary sexual
intercourse with another man or immediately thereafter. Sadly for him, he has miserably
failed to do so.
In deciding this appeal, the Court is guided by this general rule:
x x x, when the question is raised as to whether to believe the version of the prosecution or
that of the defense, the trial courts choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the
highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to
observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the witness stand, and the manner in
which they gave their testimonies, and therefore could better discern if such witnesses were
telling the truth; the trial court is thus in the best position to weigh conflicting testimonies.
Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility must
be respected.[14]
After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find no reason -- as indeed appellant
has failed to provide any -- to overturn the trial courts well-reasoned ruling. Verily, the
claim of the accused-appellant is thoroughly unworthy of belief. He was unable to
controvert the finding of the trial court as follows:
The version of the accused that he caught the victim in flagrante delicto of adultery is quite
difficult to swallow hook, line and sinker. It is very unlikely for a wife in her right senses
to indulge in marital infidelity knowing that her husband is just around the corner and
would soon come back because he was just away for a short while to fetch water. If there
was tryst, the victim could have chosen to perpetrate the adulterous act not in the living
room of their very own house. The plausible place of assignation would have been outside
to avoid impending danger of being caught.
One thing more, it is very unlikely that after the victim was caught in flagrante, she would
just stay put, watch her husband run berserk, chasing her paramour with a lethal weapon
(bolo). The normal reaction of one in this kind of dreadful situation is to swiftly flee from
the scene while there is yet time. A The surrounding is still dark.

This assertion of the accused is simply out of this world to contemplate. All the more it Q By the way, Jimmy Talisic, is your house well-lighted?
became weird when he further said that the victim prepared to meet him with a chisel since
he was carrying a long bolo. A No, very small, kerosene lamp.

If the accused was attacked by the victim with a chisel, would he not use his bolo since he Q Now, you said also upon reaching your house you were confronted with a sight wherein
was admittedly raging mad due to the victims infidelity? Why used [sic] a chisel when the you saw a man lying on top of your wife, is that correct?
bolo in hand was more handy? [15]
A Yes.
We agree with these conclusions of the court a quo for they are manifestly founded on the
oft-repeated dictum that [e]vidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth Q And that immediately you released the plastic container of the water and drew your bolo
of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself - such as the common experience of and stabbed the man who was lying on top of your wife, is that correct?
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of
human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. A He immediately ran.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance.[16] Q Now, Jimmy Talisic, will you please convince the Honorable Court whether the person
that you have seen on that particular time was a man or not?
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that appellant did indeed surprise his wife in flagrante
delicto, his account of subsequent events is implausible. It is difficult to believe his story of A A man.
how, upon catching sight of the infidelity, he immediately drew his bolo and hacked but
missed the other man who, amazingly, had sufficient time to pull up his pants, button up, Q Did you recognize that person?
elude said attack and escape unscathed. Further, his claim that he did not recognize the
man or even see his face is irreconcilable with his insistence that the color of the latters A No, I did not recognize him clearly.
short pants was yellow. His declarations as to the location of the alleged paramours short
pants are also conflicting. Worse, the defense of appellant is belied by his own incredible Q That man on top of your wife was he naked or was he clothed?
and inconsistent testimony.
A He was clothed; he wore short pants.
Appellants testimony[17] quoted earlier, in which he admits killing his wife and describes
the circumstances attending the same, is clearly incompatible with his further account, viz.: Q What was the color of the pants?

Q After you fetched water from the well located 200 meters from your house, what time ATTY. BAYRON:
did you reach your house?
He cannot recognize, Your Honor.
A I estimated it around 30 minutes.
FISCAL TABIMINA:
Q You said and I would like to refresh your memory that you fetched water between the
hours of 3:00 and 4:00 in the morning, please inform this Honorable Court, Jimmy Talisic, Precisely, Your Honor, we are trying to elicit something from this man.
whether upon reaching your house it was still dark or the sun was about to rise?
COURT:
Q You mean to say that the pants were not on his legs?
Answer.
A It was at his knee; inserted up to his knee.
WITNESS:
Q Not at his side as you said earlier?
A Yellow.
A Inserted up to his knees only.
FISCAL TABIMINA:
Q But you said a while ago that the short pants was at the side of the man; which is which,
Could it be white... the pants were on his side or still on his knees?

ATTY. BAYRON: A It was at his knees.[18]

Yellow, Your Honor. As astutely and correctly observed by the trial court:

COURT: Looking at the face value of this testimony, is it possible for one caught in surprise, attacked
by an irate husband to yet put on his pants before fleeing away? Of course, this version that
He said yellow. the paramours pants was just on his side was changed when accused sensed the futilelity
(sic) of his lying. He said that the pants was still actually inserted up to said paramours
FISCAL TABIMINA: knees.

You were not able to catch up with him because he ran away, is that correct?
COURT:
Q What happened with the yellow pants of the man?
A He immediately put it up and jumped through the window and ran away.
Again, let us take a hard look if there is a glimmer of truth to this later version. How can a
man with pants on his knees surprisingly caught in the act of adultery, presto stood up and
jumped out of the window to avoid impending attack from an irate husband? Indeed, if
there was such an intruder on that fateful dawn in the home with the victim caught by
surprise as aforestated, he could surely be killed or at least wounded by the sudden attack
of accused. Yes, if such a thing did not happen it was so because there was none at all. x x
x.[19]

Q But you said you immediately drew your bolo to stab him, how can he put up his pants?
A My house is so wide that he was able to run when I drew my bolo.
Q Just be candid with the Court. This is in the interest of your children. You even recognize
the color of the pants as yellow therefore you saw what was the position of the pants when
you saw the man lying on top of your wife. Where were the pants when you saw the man
lying on top of your wife?
A It was at his side.
The foregoing demonstrate that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is inapplicable to
this case because appellant failed to prove the essential requisite of having caught his wife
and her alleged paramour in flagrante delicto. Indeed, appellant succeeded only in
demonstrating his utter lack of credibility on the witness stand.
On the other hand, the records of this case clearly bolster the trial courts conclusion that
Appellant Jimmy Talisic did not catch his wife with another man that fateful morning.
Jimmys deep-seated suspicion of his wifes infidelity and his resentment of her
maltreatment of their children, coupled with his erratic and turbulent temper, could explain
why he killed her. The following portion of Jimmys testimony sheds light on the matter:
Q After that, you immediately stabbed your wife? FISCAL TABIMINA:

A Yes. Q And because of that you are now changing your statement that you suspect your wife to
have an affair with another man?
Q How many times?
A In my suspicion.
A I do not know because I lost my temper.
Q By the way, when your wife was still alive, how does your wife treat your children?
Q Could it be 10 times?
A She was so irritable with her treatment of our children.
A I do not know how many times.
Q Please explain why she was irritable with her treatment of your children?
Q By the way, let us go back before May 8, 1988, did you have an idea whether your wife
had an affair with another man? A She easily gets angry. Whenever my children do some foolishness and bad actions,
immediately she would whip them.[20]
A I do not know it because I was always at the farm, and what I managed to look at is farm
activities. All in all, we find no ground to reverse or modify the well-reasoned rulings of the trial
court. Appellants uncorroborated, implausible and flimsy testimony has not convinced us
Q Before that incident, am I correct that your wife was all along faithful to you and no one whit that he caught his wife in the very act of voluntary sexual intercourse with another
affair with another man? man in the living room of their house while he was momentarily away fetching water. In
fact, he has not even convinced us that such a man was in their house when he brutally
ATTY. BAYRON: killed his wife. A man betrayed and aggrieved by his wifes brazen unfaithfulness would
have immediately surrendered to the authorities and confessed the truth, instead of simply
Objection, Your Honor, he did not know whether his wife had an affair with another man. awaiting his father to bring him to the military camp. Incredible - that about sums up
appellants case.
COURT:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the trial court
Let him answer. convicting Jimmy Talisic y Villamor of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against appellant.
WITNESS:
SO ORDERED
Yes.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
COURT:
3.) G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
Q In other words, you do not suspect your wife of infidelity?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
A I was suspicious because when I sent her down to Iligan City and gave her money when vs.
she come home the money left is too small. FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing
the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the
approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all
existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform
us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance
therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by
way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the crime
of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent
to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed
firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack
and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which caused
his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to
LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused the death of said
Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their
death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states
accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit
relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila
reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in
Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of
that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter.
However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the
station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and
could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then proceeded to the residence
of his father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision
in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of
sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her
paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in
cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC
soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an
M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his
wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of
Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three
times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who
were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also
hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died
instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984;
see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to
remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado,
was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold
Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-
1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his
wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion
whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the amended
information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not consider
the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to death, to indemnify the
heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000, complainant spouses Arnold and Lina
Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's wife
had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila; that the accused had been deceived,
betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning
faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts. Considering all these
circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive
clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation
of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the Philippines,
thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF
ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double
frustrated murder. Article 247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any
legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to
their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are
living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the
benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant
case. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim
in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the
deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1)
that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in
convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-
appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the
latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that
the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his
spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly
thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity.
But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must
not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of
the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In
People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-quoted
article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit —
amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally
married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or
serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous
indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of
homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished
only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended
more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil.,
672.) And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted
from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances
mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious
physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment
at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would
make the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to
plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be
illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot
be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the
offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which
mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential
element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs.
Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider that
its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the General Provisions
(Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There can, we think, hardly
be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could not have possibly provided
for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and
provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing
of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein
mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is
intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being
a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries
suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the
accused-appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double
frustrated murder against the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense,
proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not
have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense
is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts
to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing
murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired
shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that
before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that
is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We
nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first
part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple
imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated
for one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as
to the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten
to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant
is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within
which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is
furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00
as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's
loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.
4.) [G.R. Nos. 130634-35. March 12, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANOLITO OYANIB y
MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide and parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty[2] of six (6)
months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years one
(1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum,[3] and to pay P50,000.00 civil
indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus Esquierdo, and to reclusion perpetua, to pay
P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T. Oyanib.[4]
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Iligan City two (2) separate informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib
y Mendoza with murder and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit:
a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill and evident premeditation and
by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon him the following
physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating
circumstances (sic) of evident premeditation.[5]
Criminal Case No. 6018
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having conceived and (sic)
deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a
result of said attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.[6]
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities[7] and
was immediately detained at the Iligan City Jail.[8]
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by
reading the informations against him and translating them into the Visayan dialect.[9] He
pleaded not guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter
Tita) were married on February 3, 1979[10] and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius.
They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping
custody of their two (2) children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of
Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family were
watching TV at the sala located at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan,
Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second floor rented by Tita. The
commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went
upstairs to check.[11]
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw
Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latters stomach.
Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito what he was
doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought
Tita to the hospital. She died on the way to the hospital.[12]
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office, Iligan City Police
Command, Precinct I, Poblacion, Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of
September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an information regarding a stabbing
incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City.[13]
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying face up with several
stab wounds in different parts of the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From
the crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy Hospital to check on
Tita; he was informed that she was dead. Manolito was the suspect in the killing of Jesus
and Tita.[14] The incident was recorded in the police blotter as Entry No. 137138.[15]
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal Officer, Iligan City
examined the bodies of Jesus and Tita.[16] Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those
inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were fatal.[17] The cause of death was
cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and
multiple stab wound chest and abdomen.[18]
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds inflicted in the left
chest and right side of the abdomen. The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock and multiple stab wound.[19]
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided
to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after
the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyns house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she
transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and
rented the second floor.[20] The rented space consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining
room. It was arranged in a manner that if one enters the main entrance door, one is
immediately led to the sala and from the sala, directly to the door of the adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards
reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile
with Manolito.[21] In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and
would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour,
Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan
City.[22] Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and
reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill
him.[23]
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito
a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius
failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had
work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to
Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.[24]
Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of romance (kissing) coming from the
inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and
Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his
knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed
Jesus. Though Jesus was 59 in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the
assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this
opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito,
only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the
same time shouting kill him Jake, kill him Jake.[25]
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down
and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the
broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He
stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless
body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was
renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito
told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan
City and stayed at the wake of his friends neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in
stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day,
he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in
Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded
the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan
City.[26]
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wifes place, Manolito said
that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife
and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together.[27]
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and pronouncements and having
carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused
MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim. Case No. II-6018) and
appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender without any aggravating circumstances to consider, this Court sentences accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6)
YEARS as Minimum to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS as
Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and to pay the costs.
2) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to indemnify heirs of
his wife P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay the costs.
It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject to the forty (40) years
limitation prescribed in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge[28]
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an appeal from the
joint decision of the trial court to the Supreme Court.[29]
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to the basic issue of whether
accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.[30] He questioned the trial courts appreciation of the facts and the evidence,
contending that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the
defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends
that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus pants were wide open, unzipped and
unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any underwear, lending credence to his
defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the
other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that accused-appellant failed to discharge the
burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he killed the victims under the
exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence,
the trial court did not err in denying him the exempting privilege under the Article.[31]
We find the appeal meritorious.

At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An absolutory cause
is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment
there is no penalty imposed.[32]
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability.
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for such
a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse.[33] Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise his defense would be untenable. The death caused must be the proximate result
of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of
infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant
adultery.[34]
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that
accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour
in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses,
we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the
act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at
the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse.
Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the
accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in
support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in
People v. Wagas:[35]
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife
creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be
justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted
to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during
the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months of destierro.[36]
He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred (100)
kilometers from Iligan City.[37]
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
5. G.R. No. 102984 June 30, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN TAKBOBO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Domingo A. Uy for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
The nuptial vows which solemnly intone the matrimonial promise of love "(f)or better or
for worse, for richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health, till death do us part," are
sometimes easier said than done, for many a marital union figuratively ends on the reefs
of matrimonial shoals. In the case now before us for appellate review, the marriage literally
ended under circumstances which the criminal law, disdainful of romanticism, bluntly calls
the felony of parricide.
Accused-appellant Ruben Takbobo, a middle-aged fisherman, was charged with the killing
of his wife in Criminal Case No. CBU-21961 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 8, in an information which alleges that on or about 11:00 P.M. on March 25, 1991, A Yes.
in Barangay Guiwanon, Ginatilan, Cebu, said appellant, who was the husband of Lucia
Takbobo, hacked and stabbed the latter with a knife and bolo, thereby inflicting upon her Q If you will commit a sin you will be in hell?
multiple fatal hack and stab wounds which resulted in her instantaneous death.1
A Yes.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty at his arraignment,2 but, considering the gravity of the
offense, the lower court ordered both the prosecution and the defense to submit evidence Q On March 25, 1991, can you still remember who was your companion while you were
in order to determine the motive of appellant and the circumstances surrounding the killing sleeping?
of his wife,3 a course of procedure repeatedly enjoined in our previous decisions and now
enshrined in Sections 3 and 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. A Dodong Gamay, Mama Lucia and Papa Ruben.

On October 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty as charged, Q While you were sleeping were you able to wake up?
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as to pay the costs.4 A Yes.

The evidence of record shows that appellant Ruben Takbobo and Lucia P. Takbobo were Q What was the reason why you woke up at that time?
married in 1969. They had nine children, one of whom is already dead.5 The couple,
together with their youngest daughter, 6-year old Madilyn, and a nephew were residing at A I cannot sleep anymore because it was noisy.
Barangay Guiwanon, Ginatilan, Cebu when the fatal incident happened. The other
Takbobo children were staying with a certain David Manus since, according to the sworn Q What was the reason that (sic) it was noisy (sic) at that time?
statement of their daughter, Marybel, "they were afraid of their father."6
A They were quarreling.
On the night of March 25, 1991, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, young Madilyn
was awakened by noise caused by a quarrel between her parents. She claimed that she Q What were they quarreling about?
thereafter witnessed the entire incident that transpired. This is how she testified at the
preliminary investigation conducted by the 11th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of A Because he was not able to pay at (sic) Danilo.
Malabuyoc-Ginatilan-Algeria:
Q At that time that they were quarreling, what did your father get?
COURT
A A hunting (knife) and a bolo.
Q Madilyn, do you know that if you will not tell the truth you will commit a sin?
Q What did your father do with the hunting (knife) and the bolo?
A Yes.
A He hacked Mama at the feet.
Q And now you are ready to tell the truth?
Q What else?
A Yes.
A On the neck. (Witness pointing to her neck.)
Q If you will not tell the truth you will commit a sin?
Q What else?
A On the hands, on the armpit, on the breast and the other breast was sliced.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In the following morning, what happened to your mother?
A She was already dead.
Q And on the following morning your father was no longer there?
A No more.
Q You said that your father stabbed your mother with a hunting (knife), where did your
father get the said hunting knife?
A From the cabinet.
Q And you saw your father g(e)t the hunting knife from the cabinet?
A Yes. 7
Shortly after the incident, appellant went to the police authorities and told them about the
same. The following day, March 26, 1991, he was investigated by Pfc. Alfredo Cavalina of
the Office of the Station Commander, Philippine National Police (PNP) at Ginatilan, Cebu
for having killed his wife. During that investigation, Reynaldo Singco, also a policeman,
was then present and listening about three (3) meters away from them, Singco, testifying
for the prosecution, declared that he did not hear appellant state the reason why he killed
his wife, and neither did appellant mention that he came from fishing that night.8
Appellant appears to have had a propensity for inexplicable resort to violence against the
members of his family. Irene Takbobo, a 16-year old daughter of appellant, testified before
the trial court that on one occasion before her mother's death, and apparently for no reason,
one of her fingers was cut and the third finger of her older sister was split by a bolo wielded
by her father, thus: "Suddenly, he hacked us and I was hit, and I was able to cover my head
so it was my head he strike (sic) and I parried, that is the reason why my finger was cut."9
Appellant, on the other hand, would like to impress upon the Court that he killed his wife
because he caught her sleeping with another man. This version of the defense is repeated
in appellant's brief as follows:
. . . At about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of March 25, 1991 while he just arrived
home from a sea fishing activity, he was surprised when, upon opening their door, he saw
his wife sleeping with another man, who happened to be their neighbor, Cadiz Catulong.
He tried to kill him by stabbing him but his wife pushed the man who then immediately
jumped out of the window. As a result, his wife was hit by his thrust. He then found out
that his wife had no panty. He tried to look for Cadiz Catulong but failed to find him. He
immediately related the incident to the police though he was not able to execute his
affidavit as he was then very confused. 10
Correspondingly, in his aforesaid brief, the trial court's decision is impugned by appellant
for not having appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation, voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty. 11
We have conducted a thorough and careful study of the records of this case and we find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the court below. Appellant admits
the killing of his wife but contends that his act was justified since he surprised his wife in a
compromising situation with a neighbor, one Cadiz Catulong. He would, therefore, avail
of the specific extenuating circumstance 12 provided for and applicable only under the
situations contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. This contention of the
appellant does not engender credence. His lone testimony, without any other evidence to
prove his claim, will not tilt the scales of justice in his favor.
The exceptional circumstance contemplated in Article 247, just like any circumstance
which may either absolve or exempt an accused from liability or modify his penalty, must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Having admitted the killing of his wife, the
onus probandi has shifted to appellant to establish that he did so while his wife was in
sexual congress with another person, either while his wife was in sexual congress with
another person, either while they were in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter. On
this score, appellant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the supposed
weakness of that for the prosecution.
In the instant case, there was failure of the defense to prove the alleged discovery of the
sexual act between the victim and Cadiz Catulong. Nowhere in the records of this case do
we find any basis for doubting the testimonies of child witnesses have long been matters of
favorable judicial experience. 13 The alleged adulterous interlude was not proven. On the
contrary, the uncorroborated testimony of appellant that his wife committed the ultimate
act of infidelity is contradicted by the facts established in this case, hence his bare
protestations are unavailing.
Furthermore, appellant gave inconsistent answers on the witness stand which cannot but
cast a cloud of serious doubt on his story, to say the least. Initially he declared:
COURT
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was (your) wife doing before the killing?
A My wife was sleeping with another man, I just arrived from fishing.
Q You are sure about that?
A Yes, sir, the man in fact jumped out the window.
Q Before you went up the house, he jumped?
A I observed. 14
Then, in a later part of his testimony, when asked by the lower court what he saw upon his
arrival from the sea, he gave a completely different answer:
COURT
Q What was the man doing?
A The man was already putting on his pants, they have already finished the carnal act. 15
Appellant likewise claimed that "(his) purpose was to kill the man but she pushed the man
and my wife was killed. 16 He accordingly wants it to appear that he had no intention of
killing his wife. However, the physical evidence, as represented by the pictures taken of the
deceased victim, 17 disclose that she was killed with the multiple stab wounds. The manner
of infliction and the number of physical injuries negate the claim of appellant that he did
not intend to kill his wife.
Appellant adamantly insisted in his testimony before the lower court, and also in his brief,
that his wife had no panties on the night he allegedly saw her with another man. 18
However, on a closer examination of the pictures marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" for the
prosecution, we can not entirely believe the claim of the defense, since two of the exhibits
19 contradict such contention. The records do not show nor has appellant essayed any
explanation why in those two exhibits the deceased was apparently wearing her panties.
Finally, from the testimony of Pat. Reynaldo Singco, which the trial court took pains to
quote in its decision, 20 during the custodial investigation appellant never mentioned that
he surprised his wife in the act of infidelity or that, on that occasion, Catulong was present
or was inside their house or, for that matter, anywhere in the vicinity thereof. If it was true
that there was really a man inside the house of appellant, the normal human reaction would
be to tell that fact to the police right after the stabbing incident when appellant went to the
PNP station and/or during the investigation thereafter.
On the issue of whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstances of passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender any voluntary plea of guilty,
we agree with appellant and the Solicitor General that the crime was attended by the last
two mitigating circumstances. The records of the case confirm the compliance by appellant
with the requisites for the appreciation of voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty.
Both appellant and appellee concur on these particular points. Appellant indeed voluntarily
surrendered himself to agents of a person in authority before his arrest could be effected.
He likewise admitted his guilt in open court prior to the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution.
With respect to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, however, it should
be noted that the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful
and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. 21
In the case at bar, the trial court did not agree with the submission of the defense on this
matter. We have earlier discussed that appellant was not able to prove by convincing
evidence that he saw his wife sleeping with another man. Hence, as correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, that allegation of appellant "is a afterthought to lessen his liability,"
22 and that what appears is that appellant killed his wife because "he was not in his right
mind." 23 Appellant cannot, therefore, be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
Notwithstanding the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance, we do not agree with the argument of appellant and, surprisingly, the
recommendation of the Solicitor General to reduce the penalty to reclusion temporal. This
would patently run counter to the rules for the application of invisible penalties under
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the petinent portions of which provide:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—
xxx xxx xxx
In all cases in which the law precribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there
is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial court correctly found the accused guilty of parricide as charged in the information.
Article 246 defines the crime of parricide and imposes thereof the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying Article 63, when the penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties, the penalty cannot be lowered by one degree, no matter how many mitigating
circumstances are present. What obviously misled the parties in this case is that they
overlooked the fact that the so-called special ** mitigating circumstance that they rely on,
that is, when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, is
found in paragraph 5 of Article 6 4, which, as its epigraph shows, provides the "(r)ules for
the application of penalties which contain three periods," meaning, divisible penalties. The
inapplicability thereof to the present case has long been settled.
In a number of cases, 24 we have held that when there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance but the imposable penalties are indivisible
in nature, the court cannot proceed by analogy with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article
64 and impose the penalty lower by one degree. Thus, in a parricide case, 25 the trial court
imposed the penalty next lower, which is reclusion temporal, applying paragraph 5 of
Article 64 since the crime was attended by two mitigating circumstances without any
aggravating circumstance. In reversing the decision of the lower court, we ruled that the
penalty imposed was not correct since the rule applicable in said case is found in Article
63, and not in Article 64, of the Code.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing considerations demostrative of the lack of merit of the
instant appeal, the assailed judgment of the court a quo id hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Nocon, J., concur.
Padilla, J., is on leave.
ART 248 – MURDER
1.) G.R. Nos. 86883-85 January 29, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO,
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO, ROGER BEDAÑO,
RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN DOE and PETER DOE,
accused.
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO and ROGER BENDAÑO,
accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo P. Jorge for accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A hapless
foreign religious minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces
amidst the revelling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around their quarry,
chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing
at his prostrate, miserable, spiritless figure that was gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated
with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader picked up pieces of the splattered
brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators. Some accounts swear that
acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were not sufficiently demonstrated. However,
for their outrageous feat, the gangleader already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-
killer" But, what is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali1 was senselessly killed for no
apparent reason than that he was one of the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in heir
vineyard in the hinterlands of Mindanao.2
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt which
resulted in the capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two
unidentified persons who eluded arrest and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder,3 Attempted Murder4 and Arson5 were accordingly filed against
those responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April 1985. As
these cases arose from the same occasion, they were all consolidated in Branch 17 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato.6
After trial, the court a quo held —
WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander
Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo
Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Murder, and with the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and
treachery, hereby sentences each of them to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua; to pay the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the
congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, a civil indemnity of P12,000.00;
attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 for each of the eight (8) accused or a total sum of
P400,000.00; court appearance fee of P10,000.00 for every day the case was set for trial;
moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00; and to pay proportionately the costs.
Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Arson and with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
indemnify the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation
to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, the sum of P19,000.00 representing the value of
the motorcycle and to pay the costs.
Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr., alias Commander Bucay,
Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia
alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Attempted Murder and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of not less
than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, and minimum,
to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the
complainant Rufino Robles the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as court
appearance fee for every day of trial and to pay proportionately the costs.
The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused successively in the order of their
respective severity in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.7
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago
and Roger Bedaño appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder.
The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto
Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became
final.
Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the
morning, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo
Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the
eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They
were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of
Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a number
of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on
a cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez,
Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias,
an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is
Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted
Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are simply "messengers".
On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should
they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.8
At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified
companions nailed a placard on a street-post beside the eatery of Deocades. The placard
bore the same inscriptions as those found on the cigarette wrapper except for the additional
phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo." Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio also posted a
wooden placard bearing the same message on a street cross-sign close to the eatery.9
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants,
all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim,
which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. They were met by "Bantil" who
confronted them why his name was included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the
query; instead, he asked "Bantil" if he had any qualms about it, and without any
provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of "Bantil". "Bantil" was
able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were hit.
Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray.
But, as he was running away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were
hit. "Bantil" however managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez.
10 Norberto, Jr., ordered his men to surround the house and not to allow any one to get
out so that "Bantil" would die of hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant
of Deocades and pistol-whipped him on the face and accused him of being a communist
coddler, while appellants and their cohorts relished the unfolding drama. 11
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst
of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands
clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the
dreaded desperados.
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered
the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the
motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank,
spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons
raved and rejoiced. 12
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply
stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the
priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon
ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash,
Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands
clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew
to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three
(3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head
of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain
to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight
of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from
possible assistance. 13
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy Lines,
Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño contend that the trial court erred in disregarding their
respective defenses of alibi which, if properly appreciated, would tend to establish that there
was no prior agreement to kill; that the intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr.
Tulio Favali; that there was only one (1) gunman, Edilberto; and, that there was absolutely
no showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting of the victim despite their proximity
at the time to Edilberto.
But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-appellants.
On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were
harvesting palay the whole day of 11 April 1985 some one kilometer away from the crime
scene. Accused Roger Bedaño alleges that he was on an errand for the church to buy
lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato, that morning of 11 April 1985, taking along his wife
and sick child for medical treatment and arrived in La Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.
Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard gunshots
that they rushed to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza,
where they were joined by their fellow CHDF members and co-accused, and that it was
only then that they proceeded together to where the crime took place at Km. 125.
It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some
other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. 14
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of being
present at the crime scene, as can be readily deduced from the proximity between the places
where accused-appellants were allegedly situated at the time of the commission of the
offenses and the locus criminis, 15 the defense of alibi is definitely feeble. 16 After all, it
has been the consistent ruling of this Court that no physical impossibility exists in instances
where it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some
one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the place where he allegedly
was at the time of commission of the offense and the scene of the crime. 17 Recently, we
ruled that there can be no physical impossibility even if the distance between two places is
merely two (2) hours by bus. 18 More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi
cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. 19
In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo,
testified that they were both inside the eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11
April 1985 when the Manero brothers, together with appellants, first discussed their plan
to kill some communist sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the
appellants in the company of the Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when
Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, appellants were very
much at the scene of the crime, along with the Manero brothers, when Fr. Favali was
brutally murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of such positive declarations that appellants were
at the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, the alibi of appellants that they were somewhere else, which is negative in
nature, cannot prevail. 21 The presence of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been
positively established, all doubts that they were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged
communist sympathizers are therefore removed. There was direct proof to link them to the
conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime
and decide to commit it. 22 It is not essential that all the accused commit together each
and every act constitutive of the offense. 23 It is enough that an accused participates in an
act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of
design as evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused. Thus —
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were positively identified
with Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades
in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985
morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the window near the table where
Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified
members of the airborne from Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning, they
all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and drink tuba. They were seen again
with Edilberto Manero and Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that
day near the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot Robles. They
surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left when
Edilberto Manero told them to leave as Robles would die of hemorrhage. They followed
Fr. Favali to Domingo Gomez' house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the
motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when
Edilberto Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and
Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest. 26
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely
innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr.
Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their
militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent
any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of
Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded
Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27 Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of
the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The
appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of
Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots
themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr.
Peter Geremias whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed
a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. On this, the conspirators
expressly agreed. As witness Manuel Bantolo explained 28 —
Q Aside from those persons listed in that paper to be killed, were there other persons who
were to be liquidated?
A There were some others.
Q Who were they?
A They said that if they could not kill those persons listed in that paper then they will (sic)
kill anyone so long as he is (sic) an Italian and if they could not kill the persons they like to
kill they will (sic) make Reynaldo Deocades as their sample.
That appellants and their co-accused reached a common understanding to kill another
Italian priest in the event that Fr. Peter Geremias could not be spotted was elucidated by
Bantolo thus 29 —
Q Who suggested that Fr. Peter be the first to be killed?
A All of them in the group.
Q What was the reaction of Norberto Manero with respect to the plan to kill Fr. Peter?
A He laughed and even said, "amo ina" meaning "yes, we will kill him ahead."
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Severino Lines? What was his reaction?
A He also laughed and so conformed and agreed to it.
Q Rudy Lines.
A He also said "yes".
Q What do you mean "yes"?
A He also agreed and he was happy and said "yes" we will kill him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Efren Pleñago?
A He also agreed and even commented laughing "go ahead".
Q Roger Bedaño, what was his reaction to that suggestion that should they fail to kill Fr.
Peter, they will (sic) kill anybody provided he is an Italian and if not, they will (sic) make
Reynaldo Deocades an example?
A He also agreed laughing.
Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the
act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. 30
The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the
Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, is not proper. There is nothing on
record which indicates that the deceased effectively severed his civil relations with his
family, or that he disinherited any member thereof, when he joined his religious
congregation. As a matter of fact, Fr. Peter Geremias of the same congregation, who was
then a parish priest of Kidapawan, testified that "the religious family belongs to the natural
family of origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a juridical person is not entitled to
moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering
or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
It is only when a juridical person has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
humiliation, that moral damages may be awarded.
Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may otherwise be
lawfully entitled thereto pursuant to par. (3), Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, 33 for the reason
that the heirs never presented any evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish;
much less did they take the witness stand. It has been held 34 that moral damages and their
causal relation to the defendant's acts should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is
elementary that in order that moral damages may be awarded there must be proof of moral
suffering. 35 However, considering that the brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali was attended
with abuse of superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse, exemplary damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not proved
nor expressly pleaded in the complaint, 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered
reasonable.
With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali, the
amount is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence, which should
be paid to the lawful heirs, not the PIME as the trial court ruled.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the civil indemnity which is increased from
P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased plus exemplary
damages of P100,000.00; however, the award of moral damages is deleted.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
2.) G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the
shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he
was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2)
FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course
of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to
MURDER.1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and shoot with the said handgun Roland John
Chapman who war hit in the chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused
the death of said Roland John Chapman.
Contrary to law.2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation, and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman
who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly caused the death
of the said Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Jussi
Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have
caused the death of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of his will, that is, due to the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his death.
Contrary to law.4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail was
set at twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for the murder
of Roland John Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set
on August 9, 1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution manifested that
it would present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and
on the circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness himself and Hultman.
Defense counsel Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending
that day was hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder charge
for the killing of Chapman only. He opined that Leino's testimony on the frustrated murder
charges with respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman would be irrelevant.5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be wasted if the
testimony of Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the crimes
for which accused were charged involved only one continuing incident. He pleaded that
Leino should be allowed to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the
inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two (2) frustrated murder charges.6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted to present
Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused
on August 14, 1991. The defense pointed out that if accused did not file a petition for bail,
the prosecution would still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it
could present Leino.7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail until after
arraignment of accused on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the
same time, hearing on the petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded.8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The prosecution
then started to adduce evidence relative to all three (3) cases. No objection was made by
the defense.9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland
Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park,
Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight. They then
proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where students of International School hang out. 10 After an
hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they stayed until past 3:00
a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of Maureen, then
went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they entered the village,
Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street, about a block away from her house
in Campanilla Street. She wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create
too much noise in going back to her house. She did not want her parents to know that she
was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car
and listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street. When they
reached the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type
Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and
stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and
asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused only wanted to check
their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his plastic wallet, and handed to
accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. 14 Accused did not bother to look at his
I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino and inquired
what was going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are you
bothering us?" Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at
him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you
shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him
but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: "Do you want a
trouble?" Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked
Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for
help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will
somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the
latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and
made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he
could not run far without being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of
accused's car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car,
trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two.
Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down
beside Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and directly in
front of them stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He
faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the
sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall
beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his
car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3) people
looking on and standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The three were:
DOMINGO FLORECE, a private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his
residence at #1357 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE
MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street,
corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private
security guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street,
corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of their employer,
while driver Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to return to his own house. These
three (3) eyewitnesses heard the first gunshot while at their respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was
happening, while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's house
and looked out to Caballero Street. Each saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground,
another man (Leino) sitting on the sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and
a woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot Leino and Hultman and flee aboard his
Lancer car. However, because of Florece's distance from the scene of the crime, 24 he was
not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the control numbers of the gunman's
car as 566. He described the gateway car as a box-type Lancer, its color somewhat white
("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the getaway car and gave
it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and
Mangubat saw the gunman's face. They had a good look at him. Cadenas was then a mere
four (4) meters away from the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20)
meters away from the scene of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the corner of
Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took place was adequately
illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house and went near
the scene of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man
on a bike passed by and Mangubat requested him to report the shooting incident to the
security officers of Dasmariñas Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and
narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the
crime scene while Florece noted the incident in his logbook (Exhibit "B"). He also jotted
down the license plate control number of the gunman's car as 566. 31
The security guards of Dasmariñas Village came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino
and Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for treatment. 32

The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES BALDADO of
the Makati police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the
incident. 33 Their initial investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a box-type
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number 566. They checked the list of vehicles
registered with the village Homeowners' Association and were able to track down two (2)
Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was registered in the name of JOSE
MONTAÑO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmariñas Village, with plate number PKX 566, and
another was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street,
Dasmariñas Village, with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, was also
tasked by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the shooting.
Ranin's team immediately proceeded to the house of Jose Montaño35 where they found
ahead of them the Makati police and operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol.
Ranin tried to verify from Mrs. Montaño whether the white Lancer car registered in the
name of Mr. Montaño and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's car. Mrs. Montaño
denied and declared they had already sold the car to Saldaña Enterprises. She averred the
car was being used by one Ben Conti, a comptroller in said company, who resides in
Cubao, Quezon City. Mrs. Montaño called up her husband and informed him about the
investigation. She also called up Conti and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36
Jose Montaño came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car. Ranin brought
them to the NBI office for investigation, together with Lancer car. At the NBI Ranin
inquired from Montaño the whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13, 1991. Montaño
informed him that the car was at the residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez
Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991,
Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaña Enterprises. Conti confirmed this information.
Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2) NBI agents who made a countercheck
of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request, Montaño left his car at the NBI parking lot pending
identification by possible witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot investigation and
neighborhood inquiry of the shooting incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece and
asked him to report to their office the next day for further investigation.38 They also
interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and even
denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they returned to Cadenas'
post at Dasmariñas Village that night and served him a subpoena, inviting him to appear
at the NBI office for investigation the next day. 39 The NBI agents also talked with
Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas
Village, near the scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car was
not white but light gray. A foreign national, Asliami was afraid and refused to give a
statement about the incident. The agents exerted every effort to convince Asliami to
cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked a representative of the
Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as summoned. Florece
readily executed a sworn statement.41 Cadenas, however, continued to feign ignorance
and bridled his knowledge of the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00
p.m., the NBI agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding
information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas confided to Ranin
his fear to get involved in the case. He was apprehensive that the gunman would harass or
harm him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI protection, Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He described the
gunman's car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to the
NBI parking lot where Montaño's white Lancer car was parked to identify the gunman's
car. Ranin asked Cadenas if Montaño's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its
color was different. Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the parking lot and to
point the color that most resembled the color of the gunman's car. He pointed to a light
gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he pointed to was not white but light gray.
43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied in the
affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to his office and showed him ten (10) pictures of different
men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-10) taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged
to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture
(Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote his name and the date
at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the NBI then took down Cadenas'
statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court to apply for a
search warrant. After a searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador
issued a search warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver
metallic gray, 1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number PDW
566. Ranin and his agents drove to accused's house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas
Village, to implement the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of accused, of their
search warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director Lim
to invite accused to the NBI office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that
accused was not in the house at that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and
called up someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and secured
accused's car. After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car keys
but she told him that the keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee
got in touch with accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to
the NBI for investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he would report to the NBI later
that day. The agents then towed the car of accused to the NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI office and
waited for accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen, after an hour.
He informed them that he just came from the Makati police station where he was also
investigated. He told Lim that he was given a statement to the Makati police and was
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of his Lancer
car at the time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in an accident a
few weeks back and was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's
house at Dasmariñas Village since then. Due to the lateness of the evening, the group
decided to continue the investigation the following day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused on
what really happened at Dasmariñas Village. Accused said he did not see anything. Lim
apprised accused that he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into
silence. 50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested to join the
lineup composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining
room 51 and Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas
pointed to accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2) other agents
brought accused to Forbes Park for further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi
Leino. Leino has just been discharged from the hospital the day before. Since Leino's
parents were worried about his safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification
of the gunman in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house and escorted him
and his father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a couple of
minutes, Leino was brought out of the house and placed in a car with slightly tinted
windows. The car was parked about five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car
with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was
instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of the house and identify the
gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied house,
into the street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of them was wearing sunglasses. Since
Leino could not yet speak at that time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote
down on a piece of paper a request for one of the men in the lineup to remove his
sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father. The men in the lineup were
herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes, they again stepped out and none
was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino identified accused as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred the cases of
murder and double frustrated murder against accused to the Department of Justice for
appropriate action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail
insofar as the murder charge was concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went to see
security guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer in
Dasmariñas Village. Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police
station where his statement (Exhibit "D") was taken. 58
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from his
house and brought him to the Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told him to
wait for a man who would be coming and see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat
was posted at the top of the stairs at the second floor of the station. 59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He ascended the
stairs, passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second floor.
While accused was going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused
was the gunman. Mangubat initially declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to
see the man again to be sure. He also confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and
afraid for accused was accompanied by a police Major. When accused came out from
Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if accused was the gunman.
Mangubat nodded his head in response. 60 Accused, together with Major Lovete and Pat.
Baldado, boarded a Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post at
Dasmariñas Village by other Makati
policemen.61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and asked him
again if accused was really the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the
affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a
statement which he (Baldado) earlier prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI agents.
Director Lim asked Mangubat if he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could.
Mangubat was shown twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different men and was
asked to identify the gun gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that
of accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat's statement was taken. He was
asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a personal identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence of the
media. At that time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of
then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused to
identification. They pointed out that since the cases against accused had already been filed
in court and they have secured a court order for the transfer of accused to the Makati
municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made in the courtroom. Asst.
Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their on-going investigation.
Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested that identification be made
without the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused
is not identified n the lineup, the media coverage would favor accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at Lim's office
and remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men composing
the lineup and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the
office. Mangubat pointed to accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its investigation.
66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter, located at the upper
lip, mouth, along the medial line, directed backwards and downwards, fracturing the
maxillary bone and central and lateral incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then
lacerating the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the right palatine, tongue and
tonsillar region.
SKULL
CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign body (bullet fragments)
along the superior alveolar border on the right. No remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the right palatine, tongue
and tonsillar regions with associated soft tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino. After entering
Leino's head, it fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments
pierced his palette and tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe
and hemorrhage on the covering of the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence
of the gunshot wound because of the fractured upper jaw and the loss of the front teeth.
Sutures were performed on the upper portion of his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries
on the tongue caused him difficulty in speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman. He opined that
the muzzle of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must have been at a higher level than
the victim's head. He concluded that the gun must have been pointed above Leino's head
considering the acuteness and downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center, operated on
MAUREEN HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw Maureen, she was
unconscious and her face was bloodied all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side
of the forehead, above the eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on
the left side of the forehead where the bullet entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She was also given
a CT scan. The examination revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull and brain.
There were several splintered bullets in her brain and the major portion of the bullet, after
it fragmented, was lodged beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a team who
operated on her brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized brain
tissues and retrieve the splintered bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive
swelling of Maureen's brain and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch the
destroyed undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After the surgery, Maureen's vital signs
continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was wheeled to the ICU for
further observation.
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of Maureen's nostrils due
to the unpatched undersurface covering of her brain, leaving the swollen portion of her
brain exposed. A second surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain
covering. He used the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering
of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious. The trickle of brain tissues
through her nose was lessened but Maureen developed infection as a result of the
destruction of her brain covering. Maureen developed brain abscess because of the
infection. She underwent a third operation to remove brain abscess and all possible focus
of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis explained that
Maureen was shot at the left side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above
the eyebrow. Upon entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went from
the left to the right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet
eventually settled behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of the
body, the brain. When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in
her brain. After the bullet hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of
the brain and the second covering of the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling underneath the forehead
brought about by edema in the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's right jaw was
affected by the fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also swollen.
76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the internal bleeding
and remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues. The main bullet
was recovered behind Maureen's right jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory
of the bullet. Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen survived, she
would have led a vegetating life and she would have needed assistance in the execution of
normal and ordinary routines. 78 She would have been completely blind on the left eye
and there was possibility she would have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses
would have been modified and the same would have affected her motor functions. There
was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement in the
hospital, she ceased to be a breathing soul on October 17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed
that on said date and time, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged
that he was then in his house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around
1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning.
Accused avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his presence in his house that fateful day.
80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the Dasmariñas
shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing prosecution
eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas and Vicente Mangubat before they identified him as the
gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with
plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running
condition after its involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the
day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in
Dasmariñas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused, however, conceded that
although the car was not in good running condition, it could still be used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at around 5:00
p.m. upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to
ask him about the ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's house. He readily
gave a statement to the Makati police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted
himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati police to the Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. 83 After the
test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany him to the NBI for he had earlier
committed to his mother that he would present himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim with the
statement he earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI
against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila Hotel for
breakfast. When they returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's office. On his
way, he saw a lineup formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents forced him to join the
lineup and placed him in the number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to
identify him was already in the room. As soon as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas
identified him as the gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI
agents brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified
him as the gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated at the office of
Ranin for he refused to join another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on
the conduct of the identification and ordered a group of men to line up alongside him.
While thus seated, he was identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he
was not assisted by counsel at any stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May 1989 to February 1991, he had been using his
father's Lancer car bearing plate number PDW 566 in going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a bicycle driver
and two (2) trucks parked at the side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the
bicycle driver and damage to his father's car, 90 especially on its body. The timing of the
engine became a little off and the car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at Reliable
Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon city. After a month, he brought the car to the
residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati. He
personally started the car's engine and drove it to Makati from the shop in Quezon City.
He did not bring the car to their house in Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs
and they preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed that
from that time on, he was prohibited by his father from using the car because of his careless
driving. He kept the keys to the car and since he was busy in school, no further repair on
said car had been made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders Hultman, adoptive
father of deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper report that
the gunman may have been an overprotective father. This theory was formed when an
eyewitness allegedly overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy.
Huwag, Daddy." The defense presented Anders Hultman as a hostile witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian Hultman
were married in the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her previous
marriage, one of whom was Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters in
1991. He and Vivian had three (3) children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the initial stage of
the investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman: "Huwag,
Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen could not have uttered those
words for Maureen never spoke Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa,"
not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but instructed her
to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first salary in her first job and she
wanted to celebrate with friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping
in their house. He woke up at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard
came to their house and informed them about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to accused at the
Makati municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on accused in jail and discovered
that accused was not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up accused's whereabouts.
His complaint was investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention,
headed by Congressman Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F. BALDADO and
SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned from Mr. Jose
Montaño that he sold his white Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaña
Lending Investors in February 1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations
Manager of said company and was in the residence of Conti at the time of the shooting.
The other witnesses he interviewed confirmed that Montaño's white Lancer car was not in
the vicinity of Montaño's residence at the time of the incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente Mangubat. Mangubat
saw the gunman and the get-away car but could not give the central letters of the car's
license plate. Fernandez went to one of the houses at the corner of Mahogany and
Caballero Streets and asked the maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call,
the maid told him that he saw the gunman and heard one of the victims say: "Daddy, don't
shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get the maid's name but the latter refused. The
defense did not present this maid in court nor asked the court to subpoena her to testify.
Neither was the alleged statement of the maid included in the Progress Report (Exhibit
"13") prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and Baldado
fetched the latter at Dasmariñas Village for identification of the gunman at the Makati
police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby. After a few
minutes, accused and company arrived. When accused passed by them, they instructed
Mangubat to look around and see if he could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to
identify accused. Mangubat told Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than
accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece (Exhibit
"MM"). It was signed by Florece in his presence. In said statement, Florece described the
gunman's car as "medyo puti" (somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified on the
paraffin test she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As per
Chemistry Report No. C 274-91, 101 the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder
nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report, she noted that accused was subjected to
paraffin test more than seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting incident. She explained
that 72 hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues may not be removed
by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person who has fired a gun. 102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the stand
for the defense. He testified that in the course of handling the cases, he was able to confer
with Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at the Security agency where Cadenas was
employed. Ponferrada informed him that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at
the NBI and was compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to
testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did not compel the attendance of
Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the irregularities
committed in the off-court identification of their client. When asked what he did to remedy
this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the lineup. When
further pressed whether he filed a petition for review raising this issue with the Department
of Justice upon the filing of the cases therewith, he said he did not. He offered the excuse
that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused at that time. He also
declared that although they knew that arraignment would mean waiver of the alleged
irregularities in the conduct of the investigation and preliminary investigation, he and Atty.
Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the progress in the
investigation of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz:
Nestor Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of
the People's Journal and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of defense evidence
consists of newspaper clippings and the testimonies of the news reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two (2) news
reports as having been partly written by him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE
DEP'T ORDERS PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"), appearing on
the July 16, 1991 issue of the Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report
is usually the product of collaborative work among several reporters. They follow the
practice of pooling news reports where several reporters are tasked to cover one subject
matter. The news editor then compiles the different reports they file and summarizes them
into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in evidence as
follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the investigation of the
murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25, and three members of a family —
Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.
Exhibit "1-B"
Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when Hultman, a 10th
grader at the International School in Makati was escorted home by Chapman after going
to a disco.
Exhibit "1-C"
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman.
Exhibit "l-D"
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried to escape.
Exhibit "1-E"
Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive" matter that might
involve influential people. 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of the news items
marked as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them from previous news reports of other
newspapers. He admitted that the only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with
NBI Asst. Director Velasco was Exhibit "I-E."
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the Manila Times,
entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which was
marked as Exhibit "2." Certain portions thereof, which were not written by Barrameda,
107 were lifted by the defense and offered in evidence, viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital region, claims,
however, that another security guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified before the police that
another man, not Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on Teehankee's hands
as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory indicated that he may not have fired the
gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2)
newspaper clippings which were partly written by him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
was entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3", thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called "Daddy" shortly before
Chapman's shooting.
Exhibit "3-b"
But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a dancer before she
was adopted by her foster parent.
Exhibit "3-c"
Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street inside the village after
the shooting and was believed to have proceeded toward Forbes Park using the Palm street
gate.
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a" and "3-c". He
just reiterated previous reports in other newspapers. They were based on speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD
FOR DASMA SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when the witness
showed up and said that the gunman was on board a silver-metallic Lancer.
Exhibit "4-C"
The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car and was talking to
Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several times. 110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination, Marfil admitted
that the news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were written based on information
available at that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled:
"TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18,
1991 issue of Malaya. She testified that she wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-
c", and the sources of her information were several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c"
reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee was arrested at his
house.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control number 566 who
had not been questioned, voluntarily went to police headquarters upon invitation of Makati
police chief Superintendent Remy Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted effort of the
investigators to implicate accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other suspects
aside from accused and that someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual
gunman; (c) that the initial police investigation showed that the gunman's car was a white
Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after the NBI took over the investigation, the white
Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray Lancer of accused and thereafter, he became
the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions she wrote
in the news item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24,
1991 issue of People's Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her information
as Mr. Anders Hultman himself. 114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman said the day
after his 17-year old daughter was cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"
The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman family's request for
permission to visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the curtain,"
Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take the curtain down and jail authorities will
pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item marked as
Exhibit "6". Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was quoted as telling
Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-Hultman, Vizconde and
Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to a secret but very influential multi-sectoral group
monitoring graft and corruption and other crimes in high levels of government and society.
118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given to him by BIR
insiders for the latter refused to be identified. 119

Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind and consuming
personal rage and bias of Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the unwarranted
pressure, prejudice and prejudgment by some congressional leaders in favor of the
Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified the news
account which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA
SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit
"7-c") and the source of his information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number
"566." The witnesses cannot tell the plate's control letters. 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991 issue of the
Inquirer, entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS
TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The portions of said news item which he wrote were marked
in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked not to be
identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has taken over the case from
the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described as "resembling
Teehankee but looks much younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as Mangubat, saw
everything that happened in the early morning of July 13. The witness, however, failed to
identify Teehankee as the gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY
CASE", which appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
(Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire news account, 124 portions of which were marked by
the defense in evidence, thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise witness" picked Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to interview Mangubat
himself. 125
Exhibit "9-b"
Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si Bobby (Teehankee
Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang ituturo, said a red-
faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did not want to be identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article, entitled: "US
DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the
Manila Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof were marked as evidence by
the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's Mercedez Benz with a diplomat's plate
number when a white Lancer with plate number PKX-566 blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a communications
specialist. He said the shooting could be the result of an altercation on the street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news account he
wrote which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER
SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news item were marked by the defense
as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of Mahogany and
Caballero Sts. in Dasmariñas Village at past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who was killed in front
of his friends on his way home from a party. The armed men, on board a white Lancer car,
blocked the path of the victim's Mercedes Benz car inside the village before the shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered Chapman to alight from
the car. They shot Chapman several times in the body, while his companions identified as
Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olanileino, were seriously wounded when the gunmen
sprayed the car with bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later the names of the
detained suspects after their initial investigation. 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "23"),
which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the
defense in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's car on Mahogany
St. in the subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two companions, Maureen
Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn, to get out of their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate No. PDW 566.
They added that they saw the same car in the garage of the Teehankee family. 129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a) stories was the NBI and
they were based on information available to the NBI at that time 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its rebuttal
witness. Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify accused when he saw the latter at
the Makati police station. Her reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati
police went to his place of work in Dasmariñas Village and asked him if he was sure about
the identity of the gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. Baldado then said him he
would no longer require him to sign the statement he prepared for him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, was also
presented as a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive washing of hands
or excessive perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the
hands. Continued washing with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate
residue embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the hand can register the
same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect within 72
hours from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any possible trace of
nitrate may still be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of the paraffin test.
She related that she once attended a training in Baguio City where they tried to test the
accuracy of a paraffin test. In said training, two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of
them washed his hands. They then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using
diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she opined, the result of a
paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative evidence and evaluated together
with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for the presentation
by the defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the scheduled hearing, the
defense filed a Constancia 135 manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal
evidence, the same being unneccesary. The defense, however, declared that this is without
prejudice to the presentation of its evidence in the trial proper should the same be
necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear. The prosecution
moved in open court that the main cases and the petition for bail be submitted for decision
in view of the absence of defense counsels who had manifested that they would no longer
present their sur-rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties were given ten
(10) days from receipt of the Order within which to submit their simultaneous
Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the defense objected to this Order. The records
show that the defense even filed a motion asking for additional time to file its
Memorandum. 137 In due time, both parties submitted their respective Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.
of the crimes charged. 138 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of
Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion
perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,
000.00), Philippine Currency, plus moderate or temperate and exemplary damages in the
sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine Currency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million Three Hundred
Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of earning capacity of the said deceased;
and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for
the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One Hundred Eighteen Thousand
Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine
Currency, and another sum equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as
actual damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of
earning capacity of said offended party; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
(4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all the offended parties the sum of
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a
Motion for New Trial, 139 alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in considering
as submitted for decision not only the petition for bail but also the case on the merits. He
claimed that accused's right to adduce further evidence was violated. His motion for new
trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS
THE ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS
MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY
DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF
CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS
ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF THREE
MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME WITHOUT
GIVING THE ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING
THE ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3) eyewitnesses who
positively identified him as the gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court
identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone surviving victim
of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was
highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified
him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS
agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among
the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the
investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The shooting lasted
for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on
the gunman's face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed
that night.
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution
witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital
evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while
eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the
scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some
authors even describe eyewitness evidence as "inherently suspect." 141 The causes of
misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether
as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the
witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and
communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of
these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information
accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.
(Emphasis Supplied) 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-
ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is
done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect.
It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the
integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out
rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by
appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is
nothing wrong in Leino's identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes
Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security
reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from
his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the house where
he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI
office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. 145 Leino's fear for his
safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the
exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of
the Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast
rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done
in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in
the mind of the victim. 146

Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts
of the shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July
15, 1991, while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different
men by the investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures. He,
however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any
picture of appellant or read any report relative to the shooting incident. 147 The burden is
on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof
of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-
court identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino. The
scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3
meters away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino
had no ill-motive to falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at the trial was
straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels.
He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked how sure he was that
appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: "I'm very sure. It could not
have been somebody else." 148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn
statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was
sufficiently established that Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue,
limited his mobility. The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically
unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. 149 There is also
no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose
statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by appellant on the case of
People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was
acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the finding
that the prosecution evidence was, at best, circumstancial and "suspiciosly short in
important details," there being no investigation whatsoever conducted by the police.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the
CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show
that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption
that the sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is
not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have
remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes.
Five (5) minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant.
Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before
their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree
of reliability the identity of criminals. 151 We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims
of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the
manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the
assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 152 In
the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime
to appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each other before their chance
encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not
witness the crime. He stresses that when the Dasmariñas security force and the Makati
police conducted an on-the-spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither came
across Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed
Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied: "Nakita ko pero patay na."
He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he supposedly witnessed. That
same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to the NBI the next
morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI.
Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities
what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related that he feared for
his and his family's safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the
senseless violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential
family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance of protection from NBI officials
that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities. 153 The Court has taken judicial notice of
the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the
risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not considered
the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an
authorities as an indicium of credibility. 154 It will not depart from this ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by the records.
Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about
his torture. The allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the
witness stand. Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of
torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas' entire family was allowed to stay with him
at the NBI headquarters and likewise extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the
testimony of defense witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado
testified that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as the gunman the first time he was
brought to the Makati police station. Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He
declared he positively identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati police station. He
averred that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to his place of work
in Dasmariñas and asked him again whether appellant was the gunman. Again, he replied
in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he would no longer ask him to sign a
statement (Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously
prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom he saw at the
Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give more weight to the testimony of
Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself.
The Court cannot be as generous to Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has
proved that the Makati police, including some of its jail officials, gave appellant favored
treatment while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a congressional
investigation.
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in not
holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous
shooting incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or omitted
to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the
same or similar thing at another time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination
to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered
from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunman's
car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver mettalic gray. Fourth, appellant could
not have been the gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that
he overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot
me and don't kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in
a house near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard
Maureen say: "Daddy don't shoot. Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from
Dasmariñas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not in good running
condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was
negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the
eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the
gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÑO, another resident of Dasmariñas
Village, who had a white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule
on res inter alios acta when he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents.
This stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant
to which "a trial court's error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused
prejudice and therefore, almost automatically required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer
rule has long been laid to rest for even English appellate courts now disregard an error in
the admission of evidence "unless in its opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of
justice) has been occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this approach especially after
the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate court to "give
judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to
technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." 160 We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In
dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging quality and
its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant,
we disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence
against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character
of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory
evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the
appellant was convicted mainly because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with
high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the
bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant.
The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification
of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not in running
condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from
Dasmariñas Village where it was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated
by the records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its
ignition key which was then in the possession of appellant. Clearly, the car was towed not
because it was not in running condition. Even appellant's evidence show that said car could
run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop
in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmariñas Village, in Makati, where it was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' description of the
color of the gunman's car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was
somewhat white ("medyo puti"); 163 Mangubat declared the car was white; 164 and
Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no
more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors
white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature
of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in the
description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of
Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper item 166
where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy.
Huwag, Daddy." The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman
could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have
uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she
addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not "Daddy." 167 Moreover, Leino outrightly
dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati
police were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT
the gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates.
Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved extremely
unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence
of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the
source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have
handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for
nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also
have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the
products of combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also recognized
several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of
a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at
the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the
time of firing. 170 In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and
confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or
vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the
conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the
shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already
been removed by washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the paraffin test
conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant
was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time
of the alleged shooting.
III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as he contends that
the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there
was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the
developments in the case (as no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then
Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of the hearings and,
President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman while she was still
confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from
prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases.
He claims there were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside
the courtroom clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In
another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger sign" by several young people while he
was leaving the courtroom on his way back to his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now,
we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be
sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed
out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere
fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-
trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our
communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and
right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions
of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out
of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system
are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when
he observed: "When a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears
that testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and
newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will
swear to their own ignorance and stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as
to give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" 174 Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due
to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In
Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et a1., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has
not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not disclose
that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to
or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the
courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the attention of the court to
the visible display of a placard inside the courtroom. Acting on the manifestation, the trial
judge immediately directed that the placard be hidden. Only then did he order the start of
the arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the media after they
had enough opportunity to take pictures. The court granted defense's request, noting that
the courtroom was also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued between the defense
lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience clapped their hands, the defense counsel
invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion of the
public. Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the public was not
unruly. The trial judge noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by the Supreme
Court regarding media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating defense
counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy by spectators inside
the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He also manifested that he
personally saw that when accused was being brought back to his cell from the courtroom,
a group of young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full view of policemen.
Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he could not be dissuaded by public sentiments. He
noted that the clapping of hands by the public was just a reaction at the spur of the moment.
He then admonished the audience not to repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the coverage of the trial by
the press. The defense alleged that the media coverage will constitute mistrial and deny
accused's constitutional right to due process. It invoked the provision in the Rules of Court
which allows the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom, except the organic
personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public can be ordered
only in prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases. He added that
the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of public offenses. He quoted the U.S.
case of Sheppard v. Maxwell 180 where it was held: "A responsible press is always regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in the criminal field. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage
of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in the courtrooms public property." The trial judge
then ruled that the media should be given a chance to cover the proceedings before the trial
proper but, thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures during the trial. They were
allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were ordered to desist from taking live
coverage of the proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial judge gave the media
two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no more. Trial then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the media two (2) minutes
to take pictures before the trial proper. Afterwards, the reporters were duly admonished to
remain silent, to quietly observe the proceedings and just take down notes. 183
6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon session, the judge admonished
the media people present in the courtroom to stop taking pictures. 184

Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for
prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than seven
(7) newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his
defense. The defense's documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings
relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt.
The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge voluntarily
inhibited himself from further hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of
bias and partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of
Inhibition to this Court, we directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice. 186 We found nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir
any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing
of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the
gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the
execution of the crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove
treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the crimes at bar with
treachery and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the
trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance
meeting on the street since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa It,
however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman.
Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He
testified that for no apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and accosted
him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant
questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D.,
Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on. Chapman then
stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and
then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The
gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance
to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of
his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur
of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time
between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of
Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant
rather than a deliberate act of will. We have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the
attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. 187 Hence, absent any
qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting
and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that
treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after
shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen
became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after
her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a
minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the
pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by
appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless
position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing
of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period which appellant used to
prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to
himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant
insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant posits that the
awards of moral and exemplary damages and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen
Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the
trial court's award of attorney's fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of victims Hultman and
Chapman the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced to pay the heirs of
the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death and the
sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moderate or temperate and
exemplary damages.

2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was sentenced to pay the heirs
of the deceased the sum of: Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death;
Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-
Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of
earning capacity of deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to pay: Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three-
Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum
equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount
equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity of Jussi
Leino; and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the offended parties the sum
of One Million Pesos (or a total of three million pesos) for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
5. Costs of litigation. 188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the matter
of damages recoverable in case of death arising from a felony, thus:
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom
are governed by penal laws, ". . . subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this
Book (Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (Art. 100, Revised
Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes indemnification
for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn include
". . . those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107,
id.) Since these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain provisions
of the Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary
that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen by the defendant.
(Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides
thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291,
the recipient who is not an heir called to the descendant's inheritance by law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by this
Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in
the case of People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11, 1968 190, and
it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be
adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages
being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case." (Art.
2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has
been committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being
"separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party." (Art. 2230).
Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the sole fact
of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is cases wherein exemplary damages are awarded
precisely because of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) ". . . damages
to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) "but the party suffering the loss or injury must
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from
the act or omission in question." (Art. 2203) "Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a
proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees
and expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages have
been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or . . . when there is a separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense — P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00),
without the need of any evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased — an amount to be fixed by
the court according to the circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income at the
time of death and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and
awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at
said time on account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the deceased
was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir,
may demand support from the accused for not more than five years, the exact duration to
be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an amount to be fixed by the court. This may
be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances, — an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be
considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, — the actual amount thereof, (but only
when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary
damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
and for moral damages are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of
P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00) corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death,
and that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened according to
the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious
reasons. 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN CHAPMAN
in light of the law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos as
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John Chapman was
baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped together the
awards for moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00), without specifying the particular amount which corresponds to each,
as they are of a different kind. We shall, however, consider their propriety and
reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be given as temperate
or moderate damages for the records do not show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor
can it be given as exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not attended by either
evident premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be considered as one
for moral damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. 192 It states:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall be at least (fifty
thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In addition:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by appellant, we
increase the amount of moral damages to One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death
of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to her
mother, Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He contends that under Article 352 of the
New Civil Code, Anders Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said
award. Only the parents by nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect at the time of
Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by the
trial court. Article 190 of the Family Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate descendants of the
adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate;
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural father.
During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their claim of
damages. Hence, we find that the award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual
and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very least,
exorbitant and should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply justified by the
circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen recovered between life and death for
ninety-seven (97) days. Her family experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable
suffering. During that time, she underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was
never stable and remained critical. It was always touch and go with death. She could not
be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to be perpetually by her side at least six (6) to
seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings had to be sent back to Sweden for
their safety. Left unattended, her family's business took a downspin. Soon, her family's
assets were depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23) doctors attended to her
and their bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely on the goodness of
the gracious. Her family started receiving contributions from other people to defray the
medical expenses and hospital bills. 193 Maureen never regained consciousness until her
demise on October 17, 1991, at the tender age of seventeen. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we thus find the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the circumstances
of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in addition to the award of moral
damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be adjudged in order to deter the
commission of similar acts in the future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to
permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its
imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen Hultman,
a girl in the prime of her youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned down by
appellant in cold-blood, for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the
suffering of his victims and their families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the
imposition of exemplary damages against appellant to deter others from taking the lives of
people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover, since the killing of Hultman was
attended by treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the new Civil Code, 195 we impose
an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages against appellant
for the death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive injuries as a
result of the shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone transplant
operation to restore it. His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for
his taste buds were also affected. When he was discharged from the hospital, he had
difficulty in speaking and had to be fed through a tube running down his nose. He lost eight
of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off and the raw nerves were exposed. But all
these speak only of his physical injuries and suffering. More devastating was the emotional
strain that distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe for a vacation at the time of the
shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2) days for his father
to come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in peace at night. The
traumatic event woke him up in the middle of the night. Black memories of the incident
kept coming back to
mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family. Seppo Leino,
Jussi's father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to relocate his entire family
to Europe where he felt they would be safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we
find that an award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for
moral damages is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with treachery and
pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally adjudged
liable for the payment to Leino of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the
time of injury or death, is gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not
for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas
Bus Company, 199 we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of his
earning capacity although he was still a medical student at the time of injury. However,
the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a fourth year medical student at a
reputable school; his scholastic record, which was presented at the trial, justified an
assumption that he would have been able to finish his course and pass the board in due
time; and a doctor, presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of
income Cariaga would have earned had he finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine pesos, of
Forty capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly
speculative and should be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high school
degree at the International School, Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the
military and has just arrived in Manila in February 1991 to pursue his ambition to become
a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991, he has just enrolled at the Manila
Aero Club to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on his first year, first semester,
in said school and was practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence to justify a reasonable
assumption that Leino would have been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club
and ultimately become a professional pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00)
for loss of earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award
is not supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court incorrectly
used the monthly salary of a secretary working in Sweden, computed at two thousand
dollars ($2,000.00) a month, as per the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the
records does it appear that, at the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills needed
for a secretarial job or that she intended to take a secretarial course in preparation for such
job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's
future career path, thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she continued her studies, what
professional career would she (sic) like to pursue considering her interests and inclinations?
WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our projection is that, certainly
she would have been an artist in the creative side. She would have become an actress or a
movie producer or probably she would have been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in Sweden, how much would
she have much earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month. 200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million (P13,000,000.00) pesos
to the heirs of Maureen far loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high school,
Maureen took up a short personality development course at the John Roberts Powers.
Maureen was employed at the John Roberts Powers at the time of her death. It was her
first job. In fact, she had just received her first salary, for which reason she went out with
her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither the nature of her work nor
her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to compute the award for
Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum wage
prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17, 1991), i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos
(P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of
P19,800.00, her net income per annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using
the formula repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 — age of victim at time of
death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have been received by the
heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning as capacity of deceased Maureen
Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-
settled that the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy
of the deceased, and not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount of Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the ACCRA law firm,
with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos each as attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal
cases were consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some hearings having
both morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost one and a half years. More
than forty (40) witnesses testified during the hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and
filed. A total of sixty-eight (68) documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution.
Incidents related to the trial of the cases came up to this Court for review at least twice
during the pendency of the trial. 206 Given these circumstances and the evident effort
exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial court's award of a total of
Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just
and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the cases, where
no less than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by the parties, 207 were merely
hearings on the petition for bail concerning the murder charge for the killing of Roland
Chapman, and not a trial on the merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the
termination of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce evidence at the trial proper. He
claims he was denied due process when the trial court considered all the cases submitted
for decision after the defense waived its right to present its surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of the
cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was appellant's petition for bail for the
murder of Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only one murder
charge against appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course of
the proceedings on October 17, 1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was appellant's
petition for bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to
testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since all three (3) charges
involved one continuing incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony
of Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges (with respect to the wounding of
Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He argued that since the pending incident was the
petition for bail with respect to the killing of Chapman, any testimony relative to the two
(2) other charges in which bail were recommended was irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would present Leino to
testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after accused's arraingment on August
14, 1991. 208 The prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits
and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as its
first witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the hearings
conducted by the trial court were limited to the petition for bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary evidence relative to the
shooting incident, including evidence in support of the claim for damages. These witnesses
were extensively cross-examined by the defense counsels. The defense never objected that
evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its intention was really to limit presentation
of evidence to appellant's petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial court issued an Order
211 directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after which "the main case as well
as the petition for bail are respectively submitted for Decision and Resolution." After
receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file
the defense Memorandum. In both Motions, the defense did not object to the trial court's
Order submitting for decision the main case and the petition for bail. Neither did it move
for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it still had witnesses to present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, filed a
Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum praying for accused's acquittal. This is
inconsistent with the defense's position that the hearing conducted was only on the petition
for bail. If the defense insist that what was submitted for decision was only his petition for
bail, he would have only prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial court, the defense
did not interpose any objection to the intended promulgation. In fact, the defense attended
the promulgation of the Decision and manifested that they were ready therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail were heard
simultaneously and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present
additional evidence was not abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the records
disclose that the trial court afforded the defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It
took the defense almost one and a half years to submit its evidence. The defense presented
more than twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary evidence. It was only after the
trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he filed a motion for new
trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged that
the joint decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for bail, was irregular
for he was not given a chance to present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note
that in his motion for new trial, 213 appellant did not even identify his alleged additional
witnesses and the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it shown that he could not have
produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable diligence. Appellant's motion was a
patent ploy to delay the decision on his cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial
court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision of
the trial court, dated December 22, 1992, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the
said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for
the victim's death; and, One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting
of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as
actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following
amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity for his
injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-
Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both
as actual damages; One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two
Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3) offended parties the
sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million [P3,000,000.00]
pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
3.) [G.R. No. 128812. February 28, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THADEOS ENGUITO,
defendant-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This case was certified for review pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure by the Court of Appeals[1] which found accused-appellant Thadeos Enguito
guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of murder with less serious physical injuries and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Thadeos Enguito was charged with the crime of Murder with Multiple Less Serious
Physical Injuries under the following Information: Ky-calr
"That on September 22, 1991 at about 3:00 o'clock early dawn at Marcos Bridge, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to kill and with treachery and with evident premeditation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously chased, bumped and hit the motorela
which Wilfredo S. Achumbre was riding with his Ceres Kia automobile bearing Plate No.
722 and as a consequence thereof, the motorela was dragged and fell on the road causing
the driver (Felipe Requerme) and its passenger Rosita Requerme to sustain serious bodily
injuries while the deceased Wilfredo S. Achumbre was able to run towards the railings at
Marcos Bridge but accused with intent to kill him hit instantaneously immediately rammed
and hit him with his driven vehicle cutting his right leg and thereafter ran over him thereby
causing mortal harm on his body which was the direct and immediate cause of his
instantaneous death.
That the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for its commission.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to paragraphs 13 and 21 of
Article 14 thereof."[2]
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.[3]
Trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Felipe Requerme, Rosita
Requerme, PO3 Ricardo Catiil, SPO1 Albert Calingasan, PO3 Virgilio Maquiling, SPO1
Franklin Alamban, Sr., Georgita Achumbre, Dr. Sofronio Sescon and Dr. Apolinar
Vacalares. The defense presented Alberto Chaves, Anita Enguito and the accused himself.
In his brief, accused-appellant states that he is in conformity with the findings of facts of
the court a quo[4] which we quote hereunder:
"Prosecution's Evidence: Ms-esm
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Felipe Requerme, Rosita Requerme, PO3
Ricardo Catiil, SPO1 Albert Calingasan, PO3 Virgilio Maquiling, SPO1 Franklin
Alamban, Sr., complainant Georgita Achumbre, wife of the deceased, Dr. Sofronio Sescon
and Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, it was established that at about 3:00 o'clock dawn of
September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme, a motorela driver who while driving his motorela
with his wife on board, from Lapasan towards Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City, picked up
a passenger near the Nazareno church. The passenger was later identified as the deceased,
Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre. Achumbre asked him to bring him across the Marcos bridge
towards his home. After travelling a distance of 300 meters more or less and near the Sacred
Heart of Jesus Montessori School, Requerme's motorela was bumped by a white motor
vehicle. The vehicle kept pushing the motorela causing it to run very fast for the next 400
meters until it reached the area in front of Wheels Marketing. Because of the violent push
the motorela turned around facing the direction from where it came from and fell on its
right side.
Felipe Requerme screamed for help thinking that his wife was pinned underneath. A
tamaraw pick-up stopped near them and he immediately informed that they were
intentionally hit by the white vehicle. A short time later a police mobile patrol arrived and
with the assistance of the people around, they pushed the motorela to return it to its natural
position. Requerme and his wife were brought to the Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw
(OKK), a 24-hour police station where all victims of crimes report in Cagayan de Oro. At
the OKK the driver of the white service pick-up who bumped his motorela arrived.
Requerme identified the driver as Thadeos Enguito whom he pointed inside the courtroom.
Later, Requerme and his wife were brought to the city hospital for medical check-up. They
were also brought to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital to identify the
deceased. The following day the Requerme spouses went to the police station and executed
their affidavits which are attached to the record.
Felipe Requerme presented a medical certificate issued by the examining physician to
establish the injuries he suffered (Exh. "A"). Likewise, he presented prescription for
medicines and he said that he spent a total amount of P1,000.00 (Exhs. "B", "B-1", "B-2",
"B-3").E-xsm
Rosita Requerme was riding along with her husband and she noticed that when they were
near the Sacred Heart of Jesus Montessori School their motorela was bumped by a white
motor vehicle. She observed that the face of the driver of the vehicle bumping them was
bloody. Mrs. Requerme shouted and waved her hand signalling the driver to stop but the
driver kept pushing the motorela violently. The push was so fast and strong that the
motorela was already uncontrolled and running very fast. Their passenger jumped out
when they were already at the Marcos bridge near the Wheels Marketing. Then the
motorela made a 180 degrees turn facing the direction where they came from and fell on
its right side. Struggling out of the motorela she noticed that the white vehicle went up the
elevated catwalk or pathway pursuing Achumbre who was hit when he was already at the
railing (barandilla). Then she observed that the white vehicle drove across the bridge
towards Iligan City. At the OKK she saw the accused brought by policemen and she asked
him why he bumped them and the accused answered "I have to do it Manang because look
at me now" (TSN, Dec. 16, 1991). She also observed that the face of the accused was
bleeding. She identified the accused in court, as the same person she saw at the OKK. She
was treated at the hospital and was issued a medical certificate (Exh. "C"). Together with
her husband, they spent P1,000.00 for medicines.
PO3 Ricardo Catiil was assigned as driver of the mobile division patrol no. 07 on
September 22, 1991 together with SPO1 Albert Calingasan and Armando Mana. They
parked the mobile car at the other end of the Marcos bridge along C. M. Recto Avenue at
about 2:30 in the morning. Shortly thereafter, he saw a car coming from Cagayan de Oro
poblacion crossing the bridge running fast with a damage on its right portion. He estimated
the speed at 80 kph. Observing something unusual they pursued the vehicle, switched on
their siren and caught up with the vehicle at Km. 3, 2.6 kilometers from the place of
incident. Catiil and the other two policemen alighted from the car and accosted the driver
and brought him to the OKK. He noticed that the face of the driver was bleeding which he
believed may have been caused by the splintered windshield. Examining the vehicle, they
noticed that in addition to the broken windshield, the right portion of the signal light and
the head light were also damaged. The right front tire was flat. When asked, the driver
admitted that he bumped someone at the Marcos bridge.
SPO1 Albert Calingasan, supporting the testimony of Ricardo Catiil who was the driver of
the mobile patrol car 07, declared that they were at the middle of the Marcos bridge when
they saw a Ceres Kia car running fast and they pursued it until it stopped at Km. 3. After
delivering the accused at the OKK, Calingasan together with his two companions drove
back to the place of incident. They saw blood on the street. There were also bits of human
flesh found on the cemented road and the right leg was completely severed. Calingasan
explained that when they followed at the hospital and viewed the body of the victim, they
saw that the right leg was severed from the body. Calr-ky
PO3 Virgilio Maquiling was assigned with mobile patrol 05 of the Cagayan de Oro Police
Station at about 2:00 o'clock dawn of September 22, 1991. They were on patrol near the
Golez residence almost near the foot of the Marcos bridge facing Iligan City. Maquiling
and his companions saw a Ceres Kia coming from Liceo de Cagayan and turned right at
the bridge and went towards the place where the incident occurred. Maquiling observed
that the way the vehicle was driven, the driver may have been drunk. Twenty minutes later,
the same vehicle came back with its right portion damaged. Suspecting that something
untoward may have occurred, he called mobile patrol 101 to intercept the vehicle. Not long
after a PU driver informed Maquiling and his companions that a motorela was involved in
a traffic accident at the other end of the bridge near Licoan Bakery and Restaurant.
Proceeding to the place of incident, he saw a body of a person at Abellanosa Street which
is located immediately below the bridge about 10 feet high. He also saw that the right leg
of the person was hanging at the Marcos bridge railing about seven meters away from the
body. Maquiling, using his radio, called the paramedic. They immediately brought the
body of the victim to the NMRTH. Maquiling inspected the crime scene and he observed
that the latex paint of the railing was scraped and the trailing was dented.
Dr. Sofronio Sescon identified the medical certificate and he described his findings as
follows:
"October 19, 1991
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that MR. FELIPE REQU(I)ERME, 42 years old, of Consolacion,
Cagayan de Oro City was examined by the undersigned in this hospital on September 22,
1991 at about 3:12 A.M. for:
"Abrasions, about 2 x 4 cm. and 0.5 x 2 cm., with hematoma, Right lumbar area." Sd-aad-
sc
=======================================
Healing Period: Two (2) weeks barring complications.
This certificate is issued for whatever purpose it may serve.
(SGD.) SOFRONIO C. SESCON, M.D.
Medical Officer"
Dr. Rogelio Gannaban examined Rosita Requerme at about 3:00 o'clock dawn of Sept. 22,
1991 and he issued a medical certificate (Exh. "C") indicating the following injuries:
"October 19, 1991
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that MRS. ROSITA REQU(I) ERME, 41 years old, of
Consolacion, Cagayan de Oro City was examined by the undersigned in this hospital on
September 22, 1991 at about 3:12 a.m. for:
-.....Contusion 2.0 x 6.0 cm. Right arm, M/3, medial;
-.....Contusion 3.0 x 4.0 cm. Right leg, P/3, anterior
=======================================
HEALING PERIOD: Three to Five (3-5) days barring complications.
This certificate is issued for whatever purpose it may serve.
(SGD.) ROGELIO R. GANNABAN, M. D.
Medical Officer IV"
Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, chief of the Pathology Department of the NMRTH identified the
death certificate of Wilfredo Achumbre (Exh. "D", "D-1"). He conducted an autopsy on
the cadaver of Wilfredo Achumbre and the following are his external findings:
"x x x
Prosecutor Gamotin: Rtc-spped
Q.....Now, you made mention that you were the one who conducted on the cause of death
of the victim on this particular case - will you please tell the honorable court what was your
findings on the victim?
A.....On the autopsy table the external findings are - 1) There was a laceration of the
forehead and contusions on the left forehead, and 2) Multiple injuries on the head and right
extremity, traumatic." (TSN, Dec. 19, 1991, p.9)
x x x"
He also presented an autopsy table showing a diagram of the human body showing therein
the injuries suffered by the victim (Exh. "E", "E-1", "E-2"). In examining the body he saw
that the right leg was cut at the upper third just below the knee. In the diagram of the
human body he identified the injuries on the brain (Exh. "E-5", "E-6, "E-7", "E-8"). The
complete findings of Dr. Vacalares are as follow:
"x x x
Prosecutor Gamotin:
Q.....Now, what was your findings on the brain of the victim in this case?
A.....In opening the brain or the skull, there were blood clots on the external portion of the
covering portion and below the distal portion or surface, again there was a blood clot and
then the thin membrane that covers the brain is also covered with blood.
Q.....You mean to tell this honorable court hemorrhage on the brain?
A.....There was a massive hemorrhage." (TSN, Dec. 19, 1991, p. 12)
When asked by the defense counsel regarding a fall from a certain height which would
result to a damage of the brain, Dr. Vacalares answered:
"x x x
A.....With this drawing with multiple injuries on the leg, it could have fall from a certain
height fifty feet or twenty feet but not from five feet height or even ten feet height." (TSN,
Dec. 19, 1991, p. 21) Scl-aw
Dr. Vacalares declared that the victim suffered massive hemorrhage and, in fact, it was
impossible for the victim to survive even with the most modern medical attendance. There
was massive accumulation of clot and no amount of surgery could have saved the victim.
Death was almost instantaneous.
Georgita Achumbre, wife of the deceased, declared that her husband used to receive
P5,000.00 monthly salary and with other incentives, giving him a total income of
P10,000.00 a month. They have 5 children namely: Charles Ian (9 yrs. old.), Lou Aiza (6
yrs. old), Charmie Aimee (3 yrs. old), Charlene Irene (1 yr. and 10 mos. old), and Christine
Ivy Lou (6 mos. old).
Georgita Achumbre knows the accused because he used to come to their house and he and
her husband were both employed with G & P Builders and they used to play basketball
together. At 5:00 o'clock in the morning of September 22, 1991 she received news of her
husband's death. Together with her brother-in-law she proceeded to the NMRTH and saw
the body of her husband lying on a table and covered with white cloth. She was informed
that her husband was dead on arrival. From the hospital she went to the police station to
retrieve the wallet of her husband which contained P3,000.00. When she confronted the
accused at the police station why he killed her husband, Thadeos Enguito answered that
he was mauled by her husband and it was an act of revenge. The accused explained that
the victim became angry when he was made to pay the bills of Enguito's friend who was
seated on the other table.
Expenses she incurred as a result of her husband's death are the following:
1) P 7,000.00 for the Greenhills Funeral Homes;
2) P 9,000.00 for Divine Shepherd Memorial Park;
3) P 5,000.00 for vigil and prayers for 10 days;
4) P 2,000.00 for the 40th day prayer; and
5) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
She leaves to the discretion of the Court the moral and exemplary damages.
Defendant's Evidence: Sc-lex
Maintaining that the death of the victim was purely an accident, accused Thadeos Enguito,
a co-employee of the victim, declared that he and the deceased Wilfredo Achumbre were
close friends and they used to play basketball together. He is also acquainted with the wife
of the victim because he used to go to their residence. Enguito maintained that on
September 22 at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning he was about to bring Achumbre to his
house located at Kauswagan near Kong Hua School. Enguito was driving a Ceres Kia pick-
up owned by G & P Builders Construction. At the crossroad going to the house of
Achumbre, he (Achumbre) refused to step down, compelling Enguito to go back to where
they came from at Divisoria. Enguito observed that Achumbre was already drunk.
Achumbre invited Enguito to eat bulalo but the latter refused and because Achumbre still
refused to alight from the pick-up, Enguito decided to go home to his residence at
Gaabucayan-Osmea Extension passing by the Coca-Cola plant. Nearing the house of
Enguito, Achumbre suddenly stepped on the brakes and attempted to take over the vehicle.
The Ceres Kia stopped and Enguito quickly jumped out and ran towards his house with
Achumbre pursuing him. After a short while Achumbre was able to catch up with Enguito
and he (Achumbre) said, "You are a braggart" (TSN, May 18, 1992, p. 17) and mauled
him. Enguito failed to put up a fight because Achumbre was very much bigger having a
height of approximately 5'11". Achumbre's blows resulted to Enguito's dizziness and when
his mind was cleared, he noticed that Achumbre already left. The Ceres Kia pick-up which
Achumbre wanted to take away from him was left parked near Enguito. xl-aw
Accused Enguito drove back the Ceres Kia in order to report the incident to the police
authorities. Turning towards Recto Avenue he saw a motorela which had Achumbre as
passenger cruising along Recto Avenue a little beyond the Nazareno Church. Enguito
followed the motorela with intentions of compelling Achumbre to surrender to the police
having observed earlier that a police mobile patrol was parked at the other end of the
Marcos bridge. Still very closely following the motorela, Achumbre suddenly jumped
towards the right of the Ceres Kia and when he attempted to cross the road towards Wheels
Marketing he was hit (TSN, May 18, 1992, p. 23-24). Enguito attempted to apply the brakes
but it was so sudden and Achumbre was too near. Without verifying what happened to
Achumbre, Enguito drove on across the bridge passing by a patrol car and stopping near
the Km. 3 at a distance of 1.7 kilometers beyond the mobile patrol parked at the foot of the
other side of the bridge towards Iligan City.
In trying to avoid hitting Achumbre, the Ceres Kia hit the railings damaging the
windshield, the right front headlight and the right siding of the vehicle. Noticing the police
car pursuing him, Enguito stopped his vehicle and approached the policemen. He was
brought to the OKK where he was informed that Achumbre was killed. On September 23
at the police station during the confrontation, Mrs. Achumbre asked Enguito why he killed
her husband and he explained that it was not intentional (TSN, May 18, 19, p. 26-27).
On Cross examination the accused claimed that the bumper of the Ceres Kia hit the back
portion of the motorela. He also maintained that other than the driver there was a woman
passenger together with Achumbre. He affirmed that Achumbre having mauled him and
bloodied his face he was very angry with the latter.
Enguito saw the woman waiving at him to stop but he still continued to very closely follow
even hitting the motorela. The accused did not apply the brake because he was afraid that
his vehicle might turn turtle. Asked why he did not stop his vehicle after hitting the
deceased he explained that there were people gathered from the distance and he was afraid
that he might be harmed by them. When again asked why he did not stop at the middle of
the bridge, he said that he already saw the mobile patrol and he directly went to them. Scx
As character witness the accused presented Alberto Chaves, 76 years old, former mayor of
Kalilangan, Bukidnon where the accused grew up. Mr. Chaves was former superintendent
of the defunct NARRA and in 1964 he was municipal mayor of Pangantucan, an adjoining
municipality of Kalilangan. He was also elected municipal mayor of Kalilangan in 1968
up to 1986. He knew very well the accused Thadeos Enguito as a young boy. The father of
the accused was a construction foreman in the municipal government where he was mayor
and the wife was employed with the NARRA assigned under the health services. During
all the years when the accused was residing in Kalilangan, Bukidnon he was never involved
in any crime. As far as he knows, he is a good boy and this charge against him (Enguito)
is a complete surprise to him.
Anita Enguito, wife of the accused, testified that they have been married for nine years and
they have four children, the eldest being 9 years old and the youngest 3 years old. As far as
she can remember the deceased Wilfredo Achumbra and her husband were good friends
and she did not know of any quarrel that transpired between them."[5]
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment on October 5, 1992 finding accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The dispositive portion[6] of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court is of the considered opinion and so holds
that the prosecution clearly established beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of
homicide with less serious physical injuries was committed by the accused Thadeos
Enguito with the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle (Art. 14, par. 20,
RPC) without any mitigating circumstance and hereby sentences him to an indeterminate
sentence ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum penalty.
On the civil liability, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the following:
1) P 50,000.00 representing death compensation;
2) P 23,000.00 representing funeral expenses; x-sc
3) P200,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages;
4) P 20,000.00 attorney's fee.
The accused is likewise ordered to pay spouses Felipe and Rosita Requerme the following:
1) P 1,000.00 representing medical expenses;
2) P30,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that since the prosecution's evidence showed that
accused killed the victim by means of motor vehicle, he should be guilty of the crime of
murder and not of homicide. The dispositive portion[7] of the Decision dated October 17,
1996 reads:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modification: appellant Thadeos Enguito is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER WITH LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Pursuant to Section 13 (par. 2) of
Rule 124 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, let this case be certified and the
entire records thereof be elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Costs against the
appellant."
Accused-appellant filed his brief raising the following assignment of errors:
"1. The Honorable Third Division of the Court of Appeals committed error in finding that
accused is guilty of less serious physical injuries suffered by Felipe Requerme.
"2. The Honorable Third Division of the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the conviction of accused for the Crime of Murder with the use of
motor vehicle."
In the first assigned error, accused-appellant avers that no evidence was presented by the
prosecution to show that the motorela driven by Felipe Requerme suffered any damage as
a result of the alleged bumping. Appellant argues that the motorela turned on its left side
in a reverse direction because of the act of Felipe who was not able to balance the motorela
when the deceased Achumbre jumped out from the rear. Appellant contends that he could
not be guilty of any physical injuries suffered by the spouses Requerme because the direct
cause of the motorela turning on its left side was the act of Felipe in guiding the vehicle
while the proximate cause is the thrust which resulted when Achumbre suddenly jumped
out of the motorela. Spped
The argument is devoid of merit. The defense disregards the basic rule in criminal law that
a person is responsible for all the consequences of his unlawful or wrongful act although
such consequences were different from those which he originally intended.[8] Even if it be
assumed that the real intention of accused-appellant was to surrender the victim to the
police for mauling him, his act of pursuing the victim, who was a passenger of the motorela,
resulted in the injuries of the driver and the other passenger of the motorela. Appellant
himself testified[9] that when he followed the motorela, he was "very near"[10] and that he
saw the deceased Achumbre jump out on the right side of the motorela but he went ahead;
he allegedly "tried to evade, but he was so near."[11] Upon seeing that Achumbre was
trying to jump out of the motorela, accused-appellant should have known that by closely
following, pushing and bumping the motorela, he could injure the passengers, which is
what happened in this case. Moreover, accused-appellant ignored the pleas of Rosita
Requerme, the other passenger and wife of the driver of the motorela, for him to stop
bumping and pushing the motorela.[12] Instead, he persisted resulting in the motorela
turning on its side and in the opposite direction. Verily, the act of accused-appellant in
relentlessly pursuing the motorela is a manifestation of his intention to perpetrate the
crime.
Appellant further contends that he did not intentionally choose the motor vehicle he was
driving as a means of committing the offense, and that at most, the vehicle was the only
available means to stop the deceased from escaping. He argues that it was his intention to
apprehend and surrender the deceased to the police for his previous act of mauling him but
in the process, he killed the deceased. Misspped
The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle.
The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by
means thereof.[13] Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van,
to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he
testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing.[14] Accused-appellant
could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own
hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the
motorela[15] but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the
deceased[16] who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge.[17]
Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more
than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle upon
seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.[18]
Appellant contends that he should have been convicted of the crime of homicide with two
(2) mitigating circumstances of acting in passion and voluntary surrender; and had the
charge been homicide he could have pleaded guilty. We find that these mitigating
circumstances cannot be appreciated in his favor. Accused-appellant was allegedly "still
very angry"[19] while he was following, bumping and pushing the motorela which was in
front of him. He was previously mauled by the deceased and he was allegedly rendered
unconscious by the blows inflicted on him. When he regained consciousness, he claims
that he wanted to look for a policeman to report that he was mauled.[20] Clearly, accused-
appellant's state of mind after he was mauled and before he crushed Achumbre to death
was such that he was still able to act reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police
mobile patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in
the death of Achumbre and in the injuries of the spouses Requerme. For passion to be
considered as a mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved to show causes sufficient to
produce loss of self-control and to overcome reason.[21] The turmoil and unreason which
naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or
excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him
of his sanity and self-control.[22]
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence
shows that accused-appellant was further pursued by the police. Appellant himself testified
that he stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but admitted having
"stopped farther than the police mobile".[23] SPO3 Catiil further testified that appellant
did not surrender but only stopped his vehicle when its right tire was already flat.[24] His
testimony was corroborated by PO3 Makiling who was patrolling the portion of Marcos
Bridge. He testified that he saw the vehicle being driven by accused-appellant already
destroyed and the right portion of the vehicle a little bit lower as it was running flat.[25]
Clearly, accused-appellant could have eluded arrest but his situation became futile when
his vehicle suffered a flat tire. Missc
The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance
in the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. The crime committed by accused-appellant is the complex crime of
murder with less serious physical injuries. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for a complex crime shall be the maximum period of the penalty for the most
serious crime. The crime was committed in 1992 where the penalty for the crime of murder,
which is the most serious crime, was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The death penalty being the maximum period
of the penalty for murder should be imposed for the complex crime of murder with less
serious physical injuries considering that under Article 63, an indivisible penalty cannot be
affected by the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.[26] And,
consonant with the ruling in People vs. Muoz[27] that Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution[28] did not change the period of the penalty for murder except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion
perpetua, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
There is a need to modify the award of damages to the heirs of the victim Achumbre. We
affirm the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death to the heirs of the deceased
Achumbre. There is, however, no justification for the award of exemplary damages there
being no aggravating circumstance;[29] hence, the same should be deleted.
Anent the award of moral damages, his widow testified that she was sad and worried for
the children and their future and that there were nights that she cannot sleep.[30] The
award of moral damages in favor of the heirs of the deceased Achumbre is in order,
however, the amount should be reduced to P50,000.00 in light of the purpose for making
such award, which is to compensate the heirs for injuries to their feelings and not to enrich
them.[31] Scmis
As to the award of actual damages, the same cannot be based on the allegation of a witness
without any competent document to support such claim.[32] Proof is required to be less living expenses (50% of GAI)
adequately supported by receipts.[33] The amount of P23,000.00 awarded by the trial court
as funeral expenses should be reduced. Georgita Achumbre, widow of the deceased-victim, X
testified that she spent P7,000.00 for embalming and funeral cortege as evidenced by a
receipt issued by the Green Hills Memorial Homes which is marked as Exhibit "H"[34]
and another P9,300.00 as internment fee as shown in the receipt issued by the Divine =
Shepherd Memorial Gardens, Inc. which is marked as Exhibit "I".[35] She also spent
"about P5,000.00 or more" for a one (1) week vigil, but no receipt was presented;[36] hence,
the same cannot be included in the award for actual damages.[37] A party is entitled to 2 (80 - age at time of death
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.[38] The 3
amount of "not less than P2,000.00" allegedly spent during the 40th day[39] cannot
likewise be considered as the same was incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the
burial of the victim.[40] Hence, only the total amount of P16,300.00 as actual damages x
should be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.

The lower courts failed to consider the fact that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, in (GAI -
addition to civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim, the accused-appellant
is liable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased and such indemnity should be paid
to the heirs of the latter. The widow of deceased Achumbre testified that before her 50% of GAI)
husband died, he was working with G & P Builders as a licensed civil engineer receiving
salary and other incentives in the amount of "more or less, a total of P10,000.00 a month"
or a gross annual income of P120,000.00. They had five (5) children.[41] At the time
Achumbre died, he was 38 years old.[42] The deceased's loss of earning capacity is
computed as follows: Josp-ped =

net earning capacity (x)

2 (80 - 38)
3
=

x
life expectancy

(P 120,000.00
x

- P 60,000.00)
gross annual income (GAI)

= as Exhibits "B" to "B-3"[44] but no receipts were presented. Medical expenses are in the
28
x WHEREFORE, the decision convicting accused-appellant Thadeos Enguito of the
P 60,000.00
=
P 1,680,000.00
Pursuant to Article 2202 of the Civil Code, accused-appellant is liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.
Moral damages are recoverable since the criminal offense resulted in physical injuries[43]
of the spouses Requerme. The total amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages in favor of
the spouses Requerme is believed to be reasonable.
Anent the amount of P1,000.00 representing medical expenses awarded to the spouses
Felipe and Rosita Requerme, the prosecution presented the doctor's prescription marked
nature of actual damages which should be duly proved and the award for actual damages
cannot be made on the basis of the doctor's prescriptions alone. There must be evidence of
the actual amount thereof. Likewise the award of exemplary damages to the spouses
Requerme should be deleted for lack of basis.
complex crime of Murder with Less Serious Physical Injuries and sentencing him to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Wilfredo Achumbre the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P1,680,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; P 16,300.00
as actual damages; P 50,000.00 as moral damages; and to further pay the spouses Felipe
and Rosita Requerme the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. Spp-edjo
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
4.) [G.R. No. 123819. November 14, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. STEPHEN MARK
WHISENHUNT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Stephen Mark Whisenhunt guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided
for by law, to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P100,000.00 representing actual
expenses for the funeral services and wake for 5 days, P3,000,000.00 by way of moral
damages, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P150,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged with the murder of Elsa
Santos-Castillo, under an Information which read:
That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
of one Elsa Elsie Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of her death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then
and there chopping off her head and different parts of her body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was raffled to Branch
152. On January 6, 1994, accused-appellant was arraigned with the assistance of counsel
de parte. He entered a plea of not guilty.[4]
The evidence shows that accused-appellant and the deceased, Elsa Santos-Castillo, also
known as Elsie, were lovers. They met at the Apex Motor Corporation where accused-
appellant was the Manager while Elsa was the Assistant Personnel Manager. Both accused-
appellant and Elsa were married, but they were estranged from their respective spouses. In
April 1993, Elsa resigned from Apex presumably to avoid the nasty rumors about her illicit
affair with accused-appellant.[5] It appears, however, that she continued her affair with
accused-appellant even after she resigned from Apex Motor Corporation.
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee assigned to drive for
accused-appellant, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latters condominium unit at the
Platinum Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.[6]
Accused-appellant ordered him to fetch Elsa at her parents house in Blumentritt, Manila
at 10:30 a.m. He found Elsa standing at a corner near her parents house, wearing a violet-
colored blouse with floral prints, and was carrying three bags --- a paper bag, a violet
Giordano bag and a thick brown leather bag with the trademark of Mitsubishi. He brought
Elsa to accused-appellants condominium unit.[7]
At 2:00 p.m., Elsa told Demetrio to go to the Apex office in Mandaluyong to deliver a
paper bag to Amy Serrano, the Personnel Manager. He proceeded to the Apex office, and
then returned to Platinum. Accused-appellant asked him to stay because he had to drive
Elsa home at 10:00 p.m. He waited until a little past 10:00 p.m. When he had not heard
from accused-appellant, he told Lucy, the housemaid, that he was going home.[8]
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants unit. At around noon,
Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which was missing. He then overheard Lucy ask
accused-appellant who told her that the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw
accused-appellant go inside the room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy.[9]
At 3:40 p.m., Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-appellant. He went out to
buy the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At 5:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Demetrio
to go home.[10]
On September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum Condominium at around 8:00
a.m. He was allowed by accused-appellant to go to Apex to follow up his salary. While he
was there, Amy Serrano asked him if Elsa was still in accused-appellants condominium
unit. Although Demetrio did not see Elsa there, he answered yes. Amy gave him black
plastic garbage bags which he turned over to accused-appellant upon his return to the
condominium. The latter then ordered him to drive Lucy to Cubao and to go home to get
some clothes, since they were leaving for Bagac, Bataan. On the way to Cubao, Lucy told
Demetrio that she was going home. He dropped her off in front of the Farmers Market.
Thereafter, he proceeded to his house in Fairview, Quezon City, to pick up some clothes,
then returned to the condominium at around 10:00 a.m.[11]
Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car. He was told to go to Apex
to get a gas slip and then to gas up. At around noon, he went back to the condominium.
He had lunch outside at Goodah, then returned to accused-appellants unit and stayed in
the servants quarters.[12]
While Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television, accused-appellant came
in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was
willing to work for him forever, and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this,
accused-appellant shed tears and embraced Demetrio. Then accused-appellant said, May
problema ako, Rio. Demetrio asked what it was, and accused-appellant told him that Elsa
was dead. Demetrio asked, Bakit mo siya pinatay?[13] Accused-appellant answered that
he did not kill Elsa, rather she died of bangungot.[14]
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-appellant said that he had
already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he wanted to see the decapitated body, but the
latter refused. The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center
and bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers, colored black and gray.[15] Demetrio
noticed that accused-appellant seemed nervous and his eyes were teary and bloodshot.
When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked Demetrio to help him
wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio entered accused-appellants bathroom
and found the dismembered hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the severed
head by the hair and, when he lifted it, he saw Elsas face. He placed this in a black trash
bag. He helped accused-appellant place the other body parts in three separate garbage bags.
They packed all the garbage bags in the bag with the zipper and rollers, which they had
bought in Shoppesville. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of
accused-appellants car. After that, they boarded the car. Demetrio took the wheel and
accused-appellant sat beside him in front.[16]
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left the condominium.
Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and Tagaytay City. After
leaving Tagaytay, they entered the South Luzon Expressway and headed towards Sta.
Rosa, Laguna. When they were near Puting Kahoy and Silangan, accused-appellant told
Demetrio to turn into a narrow road. Somewhere along that road, accused-appellant
ordered Demetrio to stop the car.[17]
Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the trunk. Accused-
appellant took the plastic bags inside the bag and dumped them by the roadside. Then,
accused-appellant returned the empty bag in the trunk and boarded the car. He called
Demetrio and said, Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa Bataan. It was already 6:30 p.m.[18]
Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South Luzon Expressway, through
EDSA and towards the North Luzon Expressway. They stopped at a gasoline station to
refuel. They then took the San Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en route to the
Whisenhunt family mansion in Bagac, Bataan.[19]
Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car on top of a
bridge. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to get off and to throw a bag into the river. Later,
they passed another bridge and accused-appellant again told Demetrio to pull over.
Accused-appellant alighted and threw Elsas clothes over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio
noticed that accused-appellant took something from a bag, tore it to pieces and threw it out
of the window. When they passed Pilar, Bataan, accused-appellant threw Elsas violet
Giordano bag. As they reached the road boundary of Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a
short-sleeved dress with violet and green stripes, and threw it on a grassy lot.[20]
It was about midnight when accused-appellant and Demetrio arrived at the mansion.
Demetrio was unable to sleep that night, as he was scared that he might be the next
victim.[21]
The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to clean the trunk
of the car, saying, Rio, linisan mo ang sasakyan para ang compartment hindi babaho.[22]
At 1:00 p.m., accused-appellant and Demetrio started off for Manila. As they passed a
place called Kabog-kabog, he saw accused-appellant take out an ATM card. Accused-
appellant burned the middle of the card, twisted it and threw it out of the window. They
arrived at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue at 2:30 p.m. Demetrio asked accused-
appellant if he can get off since he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left,
accused-appellant told him, Rio, you and your family can go on a vacation. I will give you
money. Accused-appellant then gave Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation going to
Fairview.[23]
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what happened. His wife told
him to report the incident to Fiscal Joey Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of
Fiscal Diaz in Fairview to talk to him.[24]
The following morning, September 27, 1993, Fiscal Diaz, Demetrio, his wife and his
brothers went to the Department of Justice. They were referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation, where Demetrio gave his statement before Atty. Artemio Sacaquing, head
of the Anti-Organized Crime Division.[25]
Initially, Atty. Sacaguing could not believe what he heard and thought Demetrio was
exaggerating. He dispatched a team of NBI agents, headed by Marianito Panganiban, to
verify Demetrios report.[26] Accompanied by Demetrio, the team proceeded to Barangay
Polong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. There, they found a crowd of people gathered
around the mutilated parts of a human body along the road.[27] The body parts had been
discovered by tricycle drivers. The Sta. Rosa Police, under Chief Investigator SPO3 Alipio
Quintos, was already conducting an investigation. Agent Panganiban radioed Atty.
Sacaguing in Manila that Demetrios report was positive.[28]
The mutilated body parts were brought to the Lim de Mesa Funeral Parlor in Sta. Rosa.
Two NBI agents, together with Demetrio, went to the house of Elsas family to inform them
of her death. The NBI agents accompanied Elsas two sisters, Amelia Villadiego and Elida
Santos, to the funeral parlor, where they identified the body parts as belonging to Elsa.
In the morning of September 28, 1993, accused-appellant was arrested by operatives of the
NBI as he drove up to his parking space at Apex Motor Corporation.[29] When Atty.
Sacaguing approached and introduced himself, accused-appellant became nervous and
started to tremble.[30]
Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI in his car. When he arrived there, Atty.
Sacaguing informed him that it may be necessary to impound the car since, based on
Demetrios statement, the same was used in the commission of the crime. Accused-
appellant asked permission to retrieve personal belongings from the car. After getting his
things from the car, accused-appellant opened the trunk to place some items inside. When
he opened the compartment, the people around the car moved away because of the foul
stench that emanated from inside. Atty. Sacaguing inspected the interior of the trunk and
found stains on the lawanit board lying flat inside the compartment, which he suspected to
be blood. Thus, he instructed his agents to fetch a technician from the NBI Chemistry
Division to examine the stain.[31]
During Atty. Sacaguings interview of accused-appellant, he noticed contusions on accused-
appellants lower lip and cheek. As standard procedure, and in order to rule out any
accusation of violence on accused-appellant on the part of the NBI agents, Atty. Sacaguing
ordered a medical examination of accused-appellant.[32]
The Medico-Legal Officer found contusions on accused-appellants left periumbilical
region, right elbow, left and right forearms and right leg.[33]
That same afternoon, before the close of office hours, accused-appellant was brought to the
Department of Justice for inquest.[34] However, accused-appellant moved that a
preliminary investigation be conducted, and signed a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, he was detained at the NBI.[35]
On September 29, 1993, armed with a search warrant,[36] the NBI agents conducted a
search of the condominium unit of accused-appellant. They recovered hair strands from
underneath the rubber mat and rugs inside accused-appellants bathroom.[37] In accused-
appellants bedroom, they found bloodstains on the bedspread and covers. They also found
a pair of Topsider shoes with bloodstains, a bottle of Vicks Formula 44 cough syrup, and
some more hair strands on the lampshade.[38]
Later that day, Demetrio Ravelo accompanied some NBI agents to retrace the route he
took with accused-appellant going to Bataan, with the objective of retrieving the items
thrown away by accused-appellant. They were able to recover a violet bag, one brown
sandal and a shirt with violet and green floral prints,[39] which were brought to the NBI
office. Amelia Santos Villadiego, Elsas sister, was summoned to identify the items.[40]
In the meantime, Caroline Y. Custodio, Supervising Forensic Biologist of the NBI, who
conducted comparative examinations between the hair specimens found in accused-
appellants bathroom and hair samples taken from the victim while she lay in state, found
that the questioned hair specimen showed similarities to the hair taken from the victim.[41]
Custodio further reported that the bloodstains on the bed cushion cover, bedspread and
Topsider shoes, all found inside accused-appellants bedroom, gave positive results for
human blood, showing reactions of Group B.[42] The bloodstains on the plywood board
taken from accused-appellants vehicle were also examined and found to give positive
results for human blood showing reactions of Group B.[43] On the other hand, the
examination of blood taken from the victim likewise showed reactions of Group B.[44]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy, concluded
that the cause of death of Elsa Santos Castillo were stab wounds.[45] Dr. Mendez found
one stab wound on the right breast which penetrated the right lung. He also found two stab
wounds under the left breast which penetrated the diaphragm and abdominal cavity, and
also penetrated the right portion of the liver.[46] More particularly, the autopsy yielded the
following postmortem findings:
Body in moderately advanced stage of decomposition.
Head, decapitated, level above 4th cervical vertebra; both hands severed cutting completely
the lower ends of both radius and ulna; both legs, disarticulated at knee joints and cut-off
with both patellar bones, missing; both feet, disarticulated at the ankle joints and cut-off;
all soft tissues of both thighs and perineum, removed, exposing completely the femoral
bones and partially the pelvic bone,
Incised wounds: 19.5 cms., left axillary area; 55.0 cms., thoraco-abdominal area, along
median line, with the abdominal incision involving the whole thickness and the thoracic
incision involving the soft tissues and cutting the sternum from the xiphoid process up to
the level of the third cartilage; from the 3rd cartilage up to the lower border of the neck.
Abdominal organs, removed from the abdominal cavity.
Contusions: 26.0 x 16.5 cms., face, more on the left side involving the forehead, temporal,
nasal, orbital and maxillary areas; 25.0 x 11.0 cms., deltoid area, extending down to the
upper 2/3, arm, left.
Incised Wound, 3.0 cms., neck area, along anterior median line.
Hematoma, scalp, massive, temporo-parietal, left.
STAB WOUNDS:
1. 1.8 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely with sharp infero-lateral extremity
and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the mammary area, right; 3.0 cms., from the
anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards and laterally, involving the soft
tissues, cutting completely the 4th cartilage, right side, into the right thoracic cavity,
penetrating the lower of the right lung with an approximate depth 8.5 cms.
2. 0.8 cm., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented almost vertically, with sharp inferior
extremity and blunt superior extremity, located at the inframammary area, left, 1.1 cms.,
from the anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards and medially, involving
the soft tissues only with an approximate depth of 2.0 cms.
3. 2.0 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely, with sharp infero-lateral
extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the inframammary area, left, 2.2
cms., from the anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards, and from left to
right, involving the soft tissues, into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the diaphragm, into
the abdominal cavity, penetrating the right lobe of the liver with an approximate depth 10.0
cms.
Brain, markedly softened and reduced to grayish white, pultaceous mass.
Other visceral organs, putrified,
Stomach is almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: --- STAB WOUNDS.[47]
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that he stayed home on September 23, 1993
because he was not feeling well. He denied that he asked Demetrio Ravelo to fetch Elsa.
He refuted Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant asked him to buy cigarettes, or that
accused-appellant told him to go home at 5:00 p.m.. Rather, accused-appellant maintained
that he did not see Demetrio at any time in the afternoon of September 24, 1993.[48]
On September 25, 1993, accused-appellant alleged that he was feeling better, hence, told
Demetrio that they were to leave for Bagac, Bataan that afternoon. They left the
condominium at about 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. and proceeded straight to Bagac. When they
arrived at Bagac, accused-appellant went straight to the kitchen and met his mother, father,
aunt and grandmother. Demetrio got the things out of the car and then asked accused-
appellants permission to take the car to go to the town.[49]
Accused-appellants mother, Mrs. Nieves Whisenhunt, testified that accused-appellant
arrived at their beach house in Bagac, Bataan on September 25, 1993 at 5:00 p.m. At 7:00
the next morning, she saw accused-appellant clad in beach attire. Later that day, she and
her husband had lunch at the clubhouse, which was about three to four minutes drive from
their house. When they returned home at 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant and his driver,
Demetrio, had already left.[50] This was corroborated by accused-appellants aunt, Ms.
Frances Sison.[51]
Accused-appellant claimed that he went jet-skiing in the morning of September 25, 1993.
He alleged that the water was choppy and caused his jet-ski to lose control. As a result, he
suffered bruises on his chest and legs. Thereafter, he went home, cleaned up, changed
clothes and rested. Later, as he was going down the stairs, he slipped and extended his arm
to stop his fall. He had lunch with this family. At 1:30 p.m., he and Demetrio left Bagac
for Manila.[52]
According to accused-appellant, he first learned of Elsas death when he was arrested by
the NBI on September 28, 1993.[53] He denied having anything to do with her death,
saying that he had no reason to kill her since he was in love with her.[54] Sometime during
his relationship with Elsa, he claimed having received in the mails two anonymous letters.
The first one reads:
Salamat sa pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang pakialamero,
Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang demonyo. Pinakialaman mo ang di sa yo. Lintik lang
ang walang ganti. Matitiyempuhan din kita. Putang ina mo.[55]
The second letter says:
Steve,
Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang tungo. Mahal mo
ba ang pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan mo? Nakakasagasa ka na.[56]
At first, accused-appellant ignored the letters. But when he told Elsa about them, she got
very upset and worried. She said the letters came from Fred, her estranged husband.[57]
Ms. Frances Sison, accused-appellants aunt, testified that she and her mother visited
accused-appellant at 3:00 p.m. on September 23, 1993. She went inside the bedroom and
talked to accused-appellant for about 30 minutes. While they were there, Ms. Sison testified
that she did not see anyone else in the bedroom. She also said the door of the bathroom
inside the room was open, and there was nobody inside. The next day, at 4:00 p.m., she
went back to visit accused-appellant. Again, they went inside accused-appellants bedroom
and stayed there for one hour. The door of the bathroom was open, and she saw that there
was nobody inside. The following morning, they passed by the condominium before
proceeding to Bagac, Bataan. They went inside accused-appellants bedroom and talked to
him. As in the last two occasions, Ms. Sison saw through the open door of the bathroom
that there was no one inside.[58]
Theresa Whisenhunt, accused-appellants sister-in-law, testified that between December 21,
1991 and January 15, 1992, and again from the middle of April, 1992 to May 15, 1992, she
slept in the bedroom subsequently occupied by accused-appellant in the Platinum
Condominium; that she regularly has her menstruation around the end of every month;
and that her blood type is B.[59]
On January 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed judgment, convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased actual damage, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[60]
Accused-appellant interposed an appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court,
alleging that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS
ABLE TO PRESENT ENOUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REJECTING, DISREGARDING AND/OR
NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.[61]
Much of the evidence on accused-appellants complicity was elicited from Demetrio
Ravelo, the so-called prosecution star witness.[62] On the premise that accused-appellants
guilt or innocence depends largely on the weight of his testimony, this Court has carefully
scrutinized and examined his version of the events, and has found that Demetrio Ravelos
narrative is both convincing and consistent in all material points.
Before accused-appellant confessed to Demetrio Ravelo what had happened to Elsa
Castillo, he first asked the latter how long he was willing to work for him, and how far his
loyalty will go. This was logical if accused-appellant wanted to ensure that Demetrio would
stand by his side after learning what he was about to reveal. More importantly, Demetrios
description of Elsas dismembered body, as he found it in accused-appellants bathroom,
perfectly jibed with the appearance of the mutilated body parts, as shown in the
photographs presented by the prosecution.[63]
Likewise, the mutilated body parts, as well as the other items thrown by accused-appellant
along the road to Bataan, were found by the NBI agents as Demetrio pointed, which
confirms that, indeed, the latter witnessed how accused-appellant disposed of Elsas body
and personal belongings one by one.
All in all, the testimony of Demetrio Ravelo bears the ring of truth and sincerity. The
records show that he did not waver even during lengthy and rigorous cross-examination.
In fact, the trial court gave full faith and credit to his testimony, stating:
The Court had opportunity to observe the demeanor of Demetrio Ravelo when he took the
witness stand on several occasions. He was extensively cross-examined by one of the
defense counsel and he withstood the same creditably. Demetrio Ravelo is a very credible
witness and his testimony is likewise credible.[64]
This Court has consistently ruled that factual findings of the trial court deserve the highest
respect. This is based on the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to assess the
credibility of the witnesses who appeared before his sala as he had personally heard them
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[65] Especially,
where issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses, the trial courts findings thereon will
not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts, or circumstances of weight or substance, which could have affected
the result of the case.[66] Succinctly put, findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to
observe their demeanor while they testified in court.[67]
Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence against him. The
findings of the forensic biologist on the examination of the hair samples and bloodstains
all confirm Elsas death inside accused-appellants bedroom. On the other hand, the autopsy
report revealed that Elsa was stabbed at least three times on the chest. This, taken together
with Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant kept the kitchen knife inside his bedroom
on September 24, 1993, leads to the inescapable fact that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa
inside the bedroom or bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the
hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence.[68] For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.[69]
While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of Elsa, the confluence of
the testimonial and physical evidence against accused-appellant creates an unbroken chain
of circumstantial evidence that naturally leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that
accused-appellant was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others. Circumstantial
evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct evidence is
not available, otherwise felons would go scot-free and the community would be denied
proper protection. The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an
accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there
must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and
(3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt
of the accused.[70]
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the prosecution
without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-
appellants condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993,
accused-appellants housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant
gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993, accused-
appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body parts of Elsa from the
bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that accused-appellant disposed of the body
parts by a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant also disposed
of Elsas personal belongings along the road going to Bagac, Bataan; that the mutilated
body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were found by the police
and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed; that hair specimens found inside
accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas
head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers and in the
trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Mendez,
did not examine the pancreas of the deceased notwithstanding Demetrios statement that,
according to accused-appellant, Elsa died of bangungot, or hemorrhage of the pancreas.
Because of this, accused-appellant insists that the cause of death was not adequately
established. Then, he relied on the controverting testimony of his witness, lawyer-doctor
Ernesto Brion, who was himself a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI for several years, to the
effect that the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Mendez was unreliable and inconclusive.
The trial court noted, however, that Dr. Brion was a biased witness whose testimony
cannot be relied upon because he entered his appearance as one of the counsel for accused-
appellant and, in such capacity, extensively cross-examined Dr. Mendez. Accused-
appellant counters that there is no prohibition against lawyers giving testimony. Moreover,
the trial courts ruling would imply that lawyers who testify on behalf of their clients are
presumed to be lying.
By rejecting the testimony of Dr. Brion, the trial court did not mean that he perjured himself
on the witness stand. Notably, Dr. Brion was presented as expert witness. His testimony
and the questions propounded on him dealt with his opinion on the probable cause of death
of the victim. Indeed, the presentation of expert testimony is one of the well-known
exceptions to the rule against admissibility of opinions in evidence.[71] In like manner, Dr.
Mendez was presented on the stand to give his own opinion on the same subject. His
opinion differed from that of Dr. Brion, which is not at all unusual. What the trial court
simply did was to choose which --- between two conflicting medico-legal opinions --- was
the more plausible. The trial court correctly lent more credence to Dr. Mendezs testimony,
not only because Dr. Brion was a biased witness, but more importantly, because it was Dr.
Mendez who conducted the autopsy and personally examined Elsas corpse up close.
In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established fact that Elsas body was
found mutilated inside accused-appellants bathroom. This clearly indicated that it was
accused-appellant who cut up Elsas body to pieces. Naturally, accused-appellant would be
the only suspect to her killing. Otherwise, why else would he cut up Elsas body as if to
conceal the real cause of her death?
As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was convincing. Accused-appellant attempts
to refute Demetrios statements by saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded the latter for
discourteous and reckless driving, and that he had already asked the latter to tender his
resignation. Thus, accused-appellant claims that Demetrio imputed Elsas death on him in
order to get back at him. This Court finds the cruel treatment by an employer too flimsy a
motive for the employee to implicate him in such a gruesome and hideous crime. Rather
than entertain an accusation of ill-motive and bad faith on Demetrio Ravelo, this Court
views his act of promptly reporting the incident to his family and, later, to the authorities,
as a genuine desire to bring justice to the cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa Santos Castillo,
whom he knew well.
Accused-appellant also argues that his arrest was without a warrant and, therefore, illegal.
In this regard, the rule is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must
be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[72] In other
words, it is too late in the day for accused-appellant to raise an issue about his warrantless
arrest after he pleaded to a valid information and after a judgment of conviction was
rendered against him after a full-blown trial.
Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly threatening letters which,
according to Elsa, were written by the latters husband. There is nothing in these letters
which will exculpate accused-appellant from criminal liability. The threats were directed
at accused-appellant, not Elsa. The fact remains that Elsa was last seen alive in accused-
appellants condominium unit, and subsequently discovered dead in accused-appellants
bathroom. Surely, the place where her dead body was found does not support the theory
that it was Fred Castillo who was probably responsible for her death.
We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there
is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.[73] The fact that the victim was a
woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse
of superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor
and the victim.[74]
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself.[75] In
this case, nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is
not indicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately
took advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court
observed from viewing the photograph of accused-appellant[76] that he has a rather small
frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was
correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head
constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to
murder.[77] In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her
body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted
road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The sight of Elsas severed body
parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both
revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for
the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.
In a case with strikingly similar facts, we ruled:
Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder because of
the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying circumstances of murder under
Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is outraging or scoffing at (the) person or
corpse of the victim. There is no question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged
when it was dismembered with the cutting off of the head and limbs and the opening up of
the body to remove the intestines, lungs and liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the
intestines were removed and hung around Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs
and liver were facetiously described as pulutan.[78]
Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder,
qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse.[79] This circumstance
was both alleged in the information and proved during the trial. At the time of its
commission, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death.[80] No
aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged or proved; hence, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period.[81] Therefore, the trial courts imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua was correct, and need not be modified.
However, the damages awarded by trial court should be modified. Elida Santos, Elsas
sister, testified that the funeral expenses was only P50,000.00.[82] Hence, the trial court
erred when it awarded the amount of P100,000.00. Basic is the jurisprudential principle
that in determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best obtainable
evidence of the actual amount of the loss. Actual damages cannot be presumed but must
be duly proved with reasonable certainty.[83]
The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of the physical suffering
and mental anguish brought about by the felonious acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal
offenses resulting in death.[84] It is true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the
victims heirs or to penalize the convict, but to obviate the spiritual sufferings of the
heirs.[85] Considering, however, the extraordinary circumstances in the case at bar, more
particularly the unusual grief and outrage suffered by her bereaved family as a result of the
brutal and indecent mutilation and disposal of Elsas body, the moral damages to be
awarded to them should be more than the normal amount dictated by jurisprudence.
However, the amount of P3,000,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages is
rather excessive. The reasonable amount is P1,000,000.00 considering the immense sorrow
and shock suffered by Elsas heirs.
The award of attorneys fees of P150,000.00 was duly proved,[86] and thus should be
affirmed.
Finally, the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo should be indemnified for her death. In murder,
the civil indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The grant of civil
indemnity in murder requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime
and proof of accused-appellants responsibility therefor.[87]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, in
Criminal Case No. 102687, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs
of Elsa Santos Castillo actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00; civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; exemplary
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; and attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
5.) [G.R. No. 132547. September 20, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP,
accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In the aftermath of an incident where a certain Buenaventura Wapili[1] went berserk at
Mundog Subdivision, Poblacion Kidapawan, Cotabato, in the early morning of 22
December 1995, Police Officer Ernesto Ulep was found guilty of murder and sentenced to
death by the trial court for killing Wapili. Ulep was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.[2]
The evidence shows that at around two o' clock in the morning of 22 December 1995
Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself
in his room. His brother-in-law, Dario Leydan, convinced him to come out of his room
and talk to him, but Wapili told Leydan that he could not really understand himself. After
a while, Wapili went back to his room and turned off the lights. Moments later, the lights
went on again and Leydan heard a disturbance inside the room, as if Wapili was smashing
the furniture.[3] Unable to pacify Wapili, Leydan called Pastor Bonid of the Alliance
Church of Kidapawan to help him "pray over" Wapili, but they could not enter the latter's
room as he became wild and violent. Suddenly, Wapili bolted out of his room naked and
chased Leydan. Thereafter, Leydan with the aid of two (2) of his neighbors attempted to
tie Wapili with a rope but was unsuccessful as Wapili was much bigger in built and stronger
than anyone of them.[4] Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy, kept on
running without any particular direction.
Thus, Leydan went to the house of policewoman Norma Plando, a neighbor, and asked
for assistance. As Wapili passed by the house of Plando, he banged Plando's vehicle parked
outside. Using a hand-held radio, Plando then contacted SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1
Edilberto Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo, all members of the PNP assigned to secure the
premises of the nearby Roman Catholic Church of Kidapawan.[5]
At around four o'clock in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Ulep together with SPO1
Espadera and SPO2 Pillo arrived at the scene on board an Anfra police service jeep. The
three (3) police officers, all armed with M-16 rifles, alighted from the jeep when they saw
the naked Wapili approaching them. The kind of weapon Wapili was armed with is
disputed. The police claimed that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while
Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool.
SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or they
would shoot him. But Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards
the police officers. When Wapili was only about two (2) to three (3) meters away from
them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his
body. As the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another
bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.[6]
The post mortem examination of the body conducted by Dr. Roberto A. Omandac,
Municipal Health Officer of Kidapawan, showed that Wapili sustained five (5) gunshot
wounds: one (1) on the right portion of the head, one (1) on the right cheek, one (1) on the
abdomen and two (2) on the right thigh: SHEENT - gunshot wound on the right parietal
area with fractures of the right temporoparietal bones with evisceration of brain tissues,
right zygomatic bone and right mandible, lateral aspect; CHEST AND BACK - with
powder burns on the right posterior chest; ABDOMEN - gunshot wound on the right upper
quadrant measuring 0.5 cm. in diameter (point of entry) with multiple powder burns
around the wound and on the right lumbar area (point of exit). Gunshot wound on the
suprapubic area (point of entry); EXTREMETIES - with gunshot wounds on the right
thigh, upper third, anterior aspect measuring 0.5 cm. in diameter with powder burns (point
of entry) and right buttocks measuring 0.5 cm. in diameter (point of exit); gunshot wound
on the right thigh, upper third, posterolateral aspect; CAUSE OF DEATH - multiple
gunshot wounds.[7]
Dr. Omandac concluded that the shots were fired at close range, perhaps within twenty-
four (24) inches, judging from the powder burns found around some of the wounds in the
body of the victim,[8] and that the wound in the head, which caused the victim's
instantaneous death, was inflicted while "the victim was in a lying position."[9]
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Military filed an Information for murder against
SPO1 Ulep. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment, and insisted
during the trial that he acted in self-defense. However, on 28 October 1997, the trial court
rendered judgment convicting the accused of murder and sentencing him to death -
The means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the alleged aggression is not
reasonable because the victim, Buenaventura Wapili, was already on the ground, therefore,
there was no necessity for the accused to pump another shot on the back portion of the
victim's head. Clearly the gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim belies the
pretension of the accused that he acted in self-defense. It indicates his determined effort to
kill the victim. It is established that accused (sic) was already in the ground that would no
longer imperil the accused's life. The most logical option open to the accused was to inflict
on the victim such injury that would prevent the victim from further harming him. The
court is not persuaded by the accused's version because if it is true that the victim attacked
him and his life was endangered - yet his two (2) companions SPO1 Espadera and SPO2
Pillo did not do anything to help him but just witness the incident - which is unbelievable
and unnatural behavior of police officers x x x x
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Ernesto Ulep guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the accused
is hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of Death, to indemnify the heirs of
Buenaventura Wapili the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Death penalty having been imposed by the trial court, the case is now before us on
automatic review. Accused-appellant prays for his acquittal mainly on the basis of his claim
that the killing of the victim was in the course of the performance of his official duty as a
police officer, and in self-defense.
Preliminarily, having admitted the killing of Wapili, accused-appellant assumed the burden
of proving legal justification therefor. He must establish clearly and convincingly how he
acted in fulfillment of his official duty and/or in complete self-defense, as claimed by him;
otherwise, he must suffer all the consequences of his malefaction. He has to rely on the
quantitative and qualitative strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the
prosecution; for even if it were weak it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the
killing.[10]
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of The
Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence of
two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case.
Accused-appellant and the other police officers involved originally set out to perform a
legal duty: to render police assistance, and restore peace and order at Mundog Subdivision
where the victim was then running amuck. There were two (2) stages of the incident at
Mundog Subdivision. During the first stage, the victim threatened the safety of the police
officers by menacingly advancing towards them, notwithstanding accused-appellant's
previous warning shot and verbal admonition to the victim to lay down his weapon or he
would be shot. As a police officer, it is to be expected that accused-appellant would stand
his ground. Up to that point, his decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the
victim's further advance was justified under the circumstances. After all, a police officer is
not required to afford the victim the opportunity to fight back. Neither is he expected -
when hard pressed and in the heat of such an encounter at close quarters - to pause for a
long moment and reflect coolly at his peril, or to wait after each blow to determine the
effects thereof.
However, while accused-appellant is to be commended for promptly responding to the call
of duty when he stopped the victim from his potentially violent conduct and aggressive
behavior, he cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty during the second stage of the
incident - when he fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no
chances, even after the latter slumped to the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds
sustained while charging at the police officers. Sound discretion and restraint dictated that
accused-appellant, a veteran policeman,[11] should have ceased firing at the victim the
moment he saw the latter fall to the ground. The victim at that point no longer posed a
threat and was already incapable of mounting an aggression against the police officers.
Shooting him in the head was obviously unnecessary. As succinctly observed by the trial
court -

Once he saw the victim he fired a warning shot then shot the victim hitting him on the
different parts of the body causing him to fall to the ground and in that position the accused
shot the victim again hitting the back portion of the victim's head causing the brain to
scatter on the ground x x x x the victim, Buenaventura Wapili, was already on the ground.
Therefore, there was no necessity for the accused to pump another shot on the back portion
of the victim's head.
It cannot therefore be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary
consequence of accused-appellant's due performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a
right or office.
Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim of self-defense. The elements in
order for self-defense to be appreciated are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the person
injured or killed by the accused; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[12]
The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-
defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression
against the person defending himself.[13] In the present case, the records show that the
victim was lying in a prone position on the ground - bleeding from the bullet wounds he
sustained, and possibly unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The
aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant
attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to his life.
This Court disagrees with the conclusion of the court a quo that the killing of Wapili by
accused-appellant was attended by treachery, thus qualifying the offense to murder. We
discern nothing from the evidence that the assault was so sudden and unexpected and that
accused-appellant deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of
Wapili, without the victim having the opportunity to defend himself.
On the contrary, the victim could not have been taken by surprise as he was given more
than sufficient warning by accused-appellant before he was shot, i.e., accused-appellant
fired a warning shot in the air, and specifically ordered him to lower his weapons or he
would be shot. The killing of Wapili was not sought on purpose. Accused-appellant went
to the scene in pursuance of his official duty as a police officer after having been summoned
for assistance. The situation that the victim, at the time accused-appellant shot him in the
head, was prostrate on the ground is of no moment when considering the presence of
treachery. The decision to kill was made in an instant and the victim's helpless position
was merely incidental to his having been previously shot by accused-appellant in the
performance of his official duty.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.[14] Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be
proved as fully and convincingly as the crime itself, any doubt as to its existence must be
resolved in favor of accused-appellant. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove
treachery to qualify the killing to murder, accused-appellant may only be convicted of
homicide.
Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence him to death under the
circumstances would certainly have the effect of demoralizing other police officers who
may be called upon to discharge official functions under similar or identical conditions.
We would then have a dispirited police force who may be half-hearted, if not totally
unwilling, to perform their assigned duties for fear that they would suffer the same fate as
that of accused-appellant.
This brings us to the imposition of the proper penalty.
We find in favor of accused-appellant the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment
of a duty or lawful exercise of a right. Under Art. 69 of The Revised Penal Code, "a penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not
wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and
12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the
penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of
the conditions of exemption present or lacking."
Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only
cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law.[15] Undoubtedly, the instant case would have fallen
under Art. 11, par. 5 of The Revised Penal Code had the two (2) conditions therefor
concurred which, to reiterate: first, that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or
the lawful exercise of a right or office; and second, that the injury or offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. But here, only the first condition was fulfilled. Hence, Art. 69 is
applicable, although its "that the majority of such conditions be present," is immaterial
since there are only two (2) conditions that may be taken into account under Art. 11, par.
5. Article 69 is obviously in favor of the accused as it provides for a penalty lower than that
prescribed by law when the crime committed is not wholly justifiable. The intention of the
legislature, obviously, is to mitigate the penalty by reason of the diminution of either
freedom of action, intelligence, or intent, or of the lesser perversity of the offender.[16]
We likewise credit in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The police blotter of Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that
immediately after killing Wapili, accused-appellant reported to the police headquarters and
voluntarily surrendered himself.[17]
Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code prescribes for the crime of homicide the penalty of
reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. There being an incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty, the
penalty should be one (1) degree lower, i.e., from reclusion temporal to prision mayor,
pursuant to Art. 69, in relation to Art. 61, par. 2, and Art. 71, of the Code, to be imposed
in its minimum period since accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
and there was no aggravating circumstance to offset this mitigating circumstance. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the
minimum period of prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to
eight (8) years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree
which is prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years.
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and
under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without
bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the
necessity to kill.[18] It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a
dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action
is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers
in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively,
but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary,
they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit
and purpose of the law.[19] We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement
officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are
apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal
elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings
with human rights.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant SPO1
ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE, instead of Murder, and is sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days
of prision mayor minimum as maximum. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Buenaventura Wapili in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
6.) G.R. No. 128900. July 14, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO S. ANTONIO,
SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR., accused-
appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No. 111232-H, for Murder, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery as charged in the
Information, and there being no mitigating or any aggravating circumstance, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act
No. 7659 entitled An Act to Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes and
Art. 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet shall be
credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C.
CARTALLA, JR., as accessories, having also been established beyond any reasonable
doubt, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet is likewise hereby ordered to pay, unto the
heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, the following sums:
a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
b. P226,298.36, as actual damages;
c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost by reason of Arnulfo B. Tuadles
death;
d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for the three (3) children of Arnulfo
B. Tuadles, and another P500,000.00 for the widow, Ma. Odyssa Suzette Tecarro-Tuadles,
as moral damages;
e. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
f. Costs.
In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet, accused JUANITO
NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR., shall be liable to pay, jointly
and severally, one-third (1/3) of the above-adjudicated sums or the amount of
P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F with Serial Number
BER-041965-Z, including its black magazine and five (5) live bullets, which are presently
under the custody of the Court, be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government
and turned over to the Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO
@ Ambet from the San Juan Municipal Jail to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.[1]
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of
cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal
shooting of one by the hand of the other. The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former
professional basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right
between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta
pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto Ambet S. Antonio, a one-
time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such
that he and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later
became reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International Business Club
(IBC), located along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities
such as a dining room, music bar and gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other
members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their
preferred games were poker or pusoy dos, ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets
always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996. Antonio,
Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at
the club for another poker session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club
first, followed by Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after
waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos, a game for two (2)
players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had
to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 oclock in the morning of
November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument
arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the defense presented two very different
scenarios. The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an argument,
without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles
at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed.
The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy
T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony of accused
Antonio himself, who testified that their argument was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay
Antonios winnings. In the middle of a heated altercation where they traded expletives,
Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio
claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for possession of the gun. As
they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was
left too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that
the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted
the testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have seen
the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who were alerted
by Antonios yells, reached the scene when Tuadles had already been shot and was lying
on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an ambulance or check if
he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute in these succeeding events, Antonio
convinced the two (2) security guards, prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to
accompany him to his home in Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after which
they proceeded to the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member of
the San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios residence for several hours, during
which time Antonio made phone calls and summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock
in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the
custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the two
security guards and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited for the
police investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and executed his
statement at the police station, a statement which he would repudiate three (3) days later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the crime of murder.
Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr. The
Information alleged that:
On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused Antonio, armed with a gun, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, by then and there suddenly,
unexpectedly, deliberately and without provocation, shooting Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles on
his forehead, right between the eyes, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death;
The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder, either as principal
or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent
to its commission, with abuse of his public functions and position as a public officer, by
harboring or assisting the accused Antonio, by then and there failing to arrest and surrender
immediately the said accused Antonio to the authorities and by giving false information
which tended to deceive the investigating authorities; and
The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of murder either as
principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take part
subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his public functions and position as a public
officer, by concealing or destroying the effects or instruments of the body of the crime, in
order to prevent its discovery, by then and there removing the laser sight of the gun used
in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to take steps to preserve the evidence at the scene
of the crime, and purposely failing to call on the crime laboratory service of the proper
agencies for appropriate action.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea of Not Guilty. Accused
Antonio and SPO4 Nieto both refused to enter a plea, and the trial court entered a plea of
not guilty for both of them.
After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as charged, imposing on them
the appropriate penalties and ordering them to pay to the heirs of Tuadles various amounts
as and for indemnity and damages, set forth in the dispositive portion quoted above. All
three accused filed separate appeals assailing the trial courts findings and disposition.
Appellant Antonio assails the trial courts judgment on the following assigned errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF JOSE JIMMY BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS DRASTICALLY NOT
ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL DECLARATIONS BUT ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY
EXECUTED STATEMENT, AND WHICH TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH
SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES, INCREDIBILITIES, AND OMISSIONS ON
SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF
APPELLANT ALBERTO AMBET ANTONIO.

IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM ARNULFO ARNIE TUADLES
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE COMMISION OF THE IMPUTED ACT, AND
IN NOT APPRECIATING THIS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF P7,200,000.00 AS
COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY REASON OF ARNIE TUADLES DEATH,
DESPITE INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH AWARD.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE MORAL
DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF ARNIE TUADLES.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO AMBET
ANTONIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER.[3]
Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial courts decision, arguing that:
I eyewitness, SG Jose Jimmy Bobis. Appellant Antonio challenges SG Bobis worth and
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS AN
ACCESSORY
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED ANTONIO WAS MURDER[4]
Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN
CONVICTING SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS ACCESSORY TO THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD IS SO REPLETE
WITH EVIDENCES THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM
AS SUCH.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT SHOWN
FAIRNESS IN NOT CONSIDERING FULLY THE GOOD FAITH, DILIGENCE
AND HARD WORK EXERTED BY SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE
INVESTIGATED THE CASE ON HAND TILL THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE
SPECIMEN OR PIECES OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME TO THE PNP-
CLS, CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN
DISREGARDING THE SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE POLICE SERVICE OF
SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. SHOWN WITH DEDICATION AND LOYALTY
THERETO SUSTAINING MORE HIS INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED
HEREIN.[5]
Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we shall deal first with the
issues raised in his appeal, foremost of which is the credibility of the prosecutions sole
credibility as an eyewitness on two (2) grounds.
First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan authorities averred that
he did not see the actual shooting since he was still ascending the stairs leading to the
second floor where the crime took place when he heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second
statement taken at the Eastern Police District (EPD) and in his testimony before the trial
court, SG Bobis negated his earlier statement, this time averring that he had indeed seen
appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind, and with neither warning nor provocation,
aim the gun at the head of Tuadles and shoot the latter pointblank. This complete turnabout
in SG Bobis testimony, according to appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said witness
unreliability, incredibility, and unworthiness. He also points out the contradictions and
inconsistencies between SG Bobis first and second statements and court testimony.
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis reasons for giving the San Juan Police
investigators false information in his first statement, saying that nobody threatened SG
Bobis if he testified against appellant Antonio. On the other hand, appellant Antonio
suggests that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who coerced SG Bobis to
change his statement and testimony so that the murder charge against appellant Antonio
would be strengthened.
There is no question that SG Bobis second statement and court testimony, on the one hand,
contradicted what he previously narrated in his first statement, on the other hand. The
question therefore is: Which is more credible and of more value to the courts in ascertaining
the guilt or innocence of the accused?
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally
considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given
in court, and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight.[6] Moreover, inconsistencies
between the declaration of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in open court do
not necessarily discredit said witness.[7] Thus, the trial court followed precedents in giving
more credence to SG Bobis testimony given in open court despite his having executed an
earlier statement which was inconsistent with his testimony.
Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG Bobis explained the
reasons why he was moved to give false information in his first statement. He had testified
that moments after he saw appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles, the appellant warned him:
Ikaw, wag kang tumistigo, ha.[8] Later, he and the other security guard, SG Olac, were
allegedly coerced to go to the appellants house in Quezon City. He also testified that while
they were there, appellant Antonio and his lawyer instructed him (Bobis), should the police
investigator ask him who shot Tuadles, to say that what happened was only an accident.[9]
At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis to say that they were
both outside the club when the trouble started, saying: kailangan ipalabas natin na nasa
labas tayo ng club.[10] Bobis stated that he was confused and afraid, and, therefore, told
the police investigator, appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2, 1996, that he did not see
appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles because he was still ascending the stairs when the gun
went off.
Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions at that time, but also
remorse and confusion. As found by the trial court:
He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of conduct of private
security guards when he did not make a formal report to his superior about the shooting
incident of November 2, 1996 at the Club but countered that this was because accused
Antonio had taken him to the latters house. This being so, neither was he able to put said
accused Antonio under arrest.
Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active service who was
with them at the time and who should have done so, had also failed to arrest accused
Antonio, more so with him and SG Olac who are just ordinary security guards. (Dahil po
maam, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis na po ang kasama namin, hindi niya po nagawa na arestuhin
si Mr. Ambet Antonio mas lalo po kami na ordinary guard lang po.)
True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the time. Nevertheless, because
accused Antonio looked: parang galit pa sila sa amin he can not, as in fact he did not, insist
that instead of going to the house of accused Antonio, he will effect the arrest.[11]
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and seeing Tuadles widow
crying on television, he gathered enough resolve and courage to finally tell the truth to the
police authorities at the EPD. When he testified in open court, SG Bobis did not waver in
his declaration that he witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly pull his gun from behind and
shoot Tuadles three (3) feet away.
Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be
in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning
them. (Underscoring ours).
Thus, this Court has uniformly held that:
Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless
his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity
to explain them. It is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in
reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached.[12]
We find no reason to discredit the trial courts finding that the reasons given by SG Bobis
sufficiently explained the conflicting declarations he made in his two (2) sworn statements
and in his court testimony. Therefore, he cannot be impeached as an eyewitness. This
Court also recognizes that the initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer information about
a criminal case and their aversion to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of
reprisal is not uncommon, and this fact has been judicially declared not to adversely affect
the credibility of witnesses.[13]
Apart from the issue of SG Bobis having given an earlier contradictory statement, his direct
testimony and answers under cross-examination appear clear and convincing. We agree
with the trial court when it held:
But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible.
Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict with each other,
SG Bobis had fully explained to the satisfaction of the Court. His lowly station in life had
been taken advantage of by accused Antonio and Nieto. These two (2) had thought that
they had succeeded in completely prevailing upon SG Bobis. For did not SG Bobis tell
their lies?
Still, the conscience of a good man had won over.
SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and straightforward answers to the
gruelling questions propounded on him and had stuck to his truth.
The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses demeanor on the stand.
While SG Bobis was steadfast with his words, accused Antonio and Nieto were evidently
recalling from a script. The other prosecution witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo M. Solano
were, like SG Bobis, untainted in their testimonies.[14]
Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we respect the findings of
the trial court on the issue of the credibility of SG Bobis as an eyewitness, especially
considering that the trial court was in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witness himself and observed his deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.[15]
In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule that:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to
believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal
unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.[16]
And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that:
It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the culpability or
innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the
veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are entitled to and given the highest
degree of respect.[17]
Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that:
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh the
testimony of a witness in the light of his demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified,
and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and
the false.[18]
There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis was given full faith and
credit. SG Bobis, a mere security guard, realized he was no match to appellants Antonio
and SPO4 Nieto. The former, a wealthy businessman, is known as an intimate friend of
people in power. Appellant Antonio admitted in court that he surrendered himself and his
gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, who was his good friend. Hours later, he went to see then
Vice President Joseph Estrada in Tagaytay City so he (Antonio) could tell his friend, the
Vice President, what happened in his own words.[19]
Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San Juan Police Force who was
close to appellant Antonio. Considering SG Bobis lowly station in life, as compared to that
of the said appellants, it is understandable that his initial reaction to the shocking events
would be one of intimidation, if not fear. SG Bobis believed then, and no one can fault him
for thinking so, that going against the instructions and dictates of appellant Antonio and
SPO4 Nieto would make life very difficult for him, knowing they were well-connected to
the powers that be. This perceived threat, whether real or imagined, compelled him to take
the easy way out and just repeat what appellants told him to say.
There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid his enemies, but he can
never run away from himself. SG Bobis may have momentarily avoided incurring the
wrath of the appellants by acceding to their dictates, but he could not escape the proddings
of his conscience. He realized he had to right a wrong, and this he did with selflessness and
at great risk to himself.
Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part of SG Bobis except
the statement that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who told him how to
testify. Thus, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under solemn
oath without convincing evidence to the contrary deserve full faith and credence.[20]
Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid culpability by claiming that
the shooting of Tuadles was caused by mere accident without his fault or intention of
causing it, or that he acted in self-defense.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an accused admits having killed
the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden of
proof to establish his plea of self-defense by clear, credible and convincing evidence.[21]
To successfully interpose self-defense, appellant Antonio must clearly and convincingly
prove: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the person defending himself must
not have provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression.[22]
Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the events that took place,
we shall discuss the points raised by appellant Antonio only for the purpose of determining
whether the requisites of self-defense were attendant as claimed. In his testimony appellant
Antonio alleged that Tuadles committed an act of aggression when he (Tuadles) grabbed
the gun which was on top of a sidetable. Appellant Antonio then concluded that Tuadles
had the sole intention of using the gun against him (Antonio), so he grappled with Tuadles
to prevent the latter from shooting him. His bare testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does
not convince us that Tuadles would, so to speak, beat him to the draw. The testimony of
Bobis shows that Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant Antonios loud invectives, and
it would be hard to imagine Tuadles as the aggressor under such a situation. And even if
Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could very well have been that Tuadles intended to keep
the gun away from appellant Antonio to prevent the latter from using it against him
considering the state of mind and the foul mood appellant Antonio was in. This would be
a more believable scenario since even appellant Antonio admitted that he was suffused
with anger, his temper short due to three (3) consecutive sleepless nights.
Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun at him. There is no
evidence, apart from appellant Antonios uncorroborated testimony, that Tuadles made an
attempt to shoot him. Hence, there is no convincing proof that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Tuadles. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must
be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.[23] The burden of proving unlawful aggression lay on
appellant Antonio, but he has not presented incontrovertible proof that would stand careful
scrutiny before any court. Lacking this requirement, appellant Antonios claim of self-
defense cannot be appreciated. He cannot even claim it as an extenuating
circumstance.[24]
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke Tuadles, if indeed the
latter had grabbed the gun from the table. Antonio himself admitted that he was shouting
and cursing Tuadles while in a furious rage. Such a threatening stance could be interpreted
as a provocation which could have prompted Tuadles to get the gun so that appellant
Antonio, in his anger, would not be able to use it against Tuadles. If ever there was
provocation, it was certainly coming from appellant Antonio, not from Tuadles.
In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of Tuadles was an accident.
He further argues that Tuadles was killed while he, Antonio, was performing a lawful act
with due care, and without fault or intention of causing it. Having ruled that appellant
Antonio failed to prove his claim of self-defense, (i.e., there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of Tuadles and provocation coming from Antonio himself), there is no basis for us
to argue with appellant Antonio that he was performing a lawful act when he shot
Tuadles.[25]
We note that appellant Antonios version of how the shooting took place leaves much room
for conjecture. It is true that there is no fixed dictum on the reaction of a person under the
circumstances of a sudden death he may have caused. He could react in a variety of ways,
some of them even irrational. However, we respect the trial courts findings. The trial court
upheld the prosecutions version thus sustaining the theory that if Antonio indeed shot
Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected of him would be to immediately see to
it that Tuadles be brought to a hospital or get medical attention at the quickest time
possible. Instead, appellant Antonio left Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend,
lying dead on the floor for several hours. If indeed he and Tuadles both had their hands on
the gun and there was no telling who actually pulled the trigger, we agree that appellant
Antonio should have seen to it that no one else would touch the gun barehanded to
preserve the fingerprints on it. Instead, he gave the gun to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern
for preserving the fingerprints on the gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio also handed
the gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece of evidence that could have
proven his claim of self-defense or accident was unfortunately lost due to his lack of
presence and due care.
Appellant Antonios ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear from the records. First,
he denies that he pulled the trigger because it was Tuadles who was holding the gun. Then
he says that he cannot recall who fired the gun so it could have very well been either him
or Tuadles who did it. Next, he admits firing the gun, but he did it in self-defense. Only,
he could not indubitably prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles.
Failing there, he again admitted shooting Tuadles, but that it was an accident. Again, he
failed to prove that he was in the process of performing a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.
When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an accident to escape criminal
liability, he admits having caused the death of the victim. And when he fails to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the positiveness of that justifying circumstance, having
admitted the killing, conviction of the accused is inescapable.[26] Appellant Antonio had
to rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence
for, even if the latter were weak, his invoking self-defense is already an open admission of
responsibility for the killing.[27] As it was, appellant Antonios testimony is not only
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also doubtful by itself[28] for
being ambivalent and self-serving.[29]
Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant Antonio claims the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this score, we find merit in his claim
considering that all the elements in order that voluntary surrender may be appreciated were
attendant in his case. First, he had not been actually arrested; Second, he surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and Third, his surrender was voluntary. It is of no moment
that appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender to the authorities, but did so only
after the lapse of about six (6) hours. In the case of People v. Bautista,[30] the voluntary
surrender of the accused to a police authority four (4) days after the commission of the
crime was considered attenuating. There is no dispute that appellant Antonio voluntarily
surrendered to the mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested, hence the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in appellant Antonios
favor.[31]
Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the
part of Tuadles. To avail of this mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the
provocation originated from the offended party.[32] However, apart from his own
testimony, appellant Antonio has not proven by convincing evidence that he was provoked
by Tuadles. He claimed that Tuadles provoked him when the latter refused or could not
pay his winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a mitigating provocation for appellant Antonio
to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt cannot, and never will, be a reason to shoot the debtor
dead. Besides, appellant Antonio had no other proof that he won and that the argument
arose from Tuadles refusal to pay. His bare testimony is, at best, self-serving. Accordingly,
appellant Antonio is not entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation.[33]
There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the case which the trial court
overlooked and disregarded.
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the trial court when it relied
on the testimony of SG Bobis. However, we have carefully examined said testimony, the
records of this petition, and the justifications of the trial court upon which it based its
decision.
There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused Antonio consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design
without risk to himself.[34] It ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial
court did not explain the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was
a sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. As
stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page decision, typed single space, the trial
court devoted only a few sentences to the issue of treachery.
There was no treachery in this case.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a
conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment
crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused made no
preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and
specially to insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense
which the victim may take.[35]
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not
consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to
himself.[36]
A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia where it did not appear
that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the
perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself, as where the appellant followed the
victims when the latter refused appellant's invitation to have some more alcoholic
drinks.[37]
The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of alevosia if the mode
adopted by the accused does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly
intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to
themselves arising from the defense that might be offered.[38]
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was
arrived at on the spur of the moment.[39]
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the means, methods, or form
of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or
retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to
be appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously
adopted by the offender.[40] Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-existent
where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment.[41]
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing a murder
because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of this Court.[42] Conscious
deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of attack has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an established principle that the quantum of evidence
to prove a person's being guilty of a crime is also required to prove treachery. The same
degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may also
be reached respecting the attendance of treachery, whether as qualifying or aggravating, in
a criminal case.[43] There is no such proof in this case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and Tuadles spent several
hours having fun playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles
could not pay to appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with
appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other, a
fact attested to by the defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio even called out:
Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka
kasi. The argument precluded the presence of treachery. If Antonio had consciously
adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a Sergeant or
any eyewitness for that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,[44] where we held that there was
no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More recently, in
People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated
argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his
assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen.[45] (Underscoring Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no treachery. In
People v. Chua,[46] we reiterated our consistent view that:
While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded by
acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack
and should have put the deceased on guard.
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could have
anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was
preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as
admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting
was committed with treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in the first
place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which neither of them had
foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because treachery requires that the mode of attack
must have been thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an unforeseen
occurrence.[47]
In People v. Nitcha,[48] we held that:
To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made some preparation
to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it
impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of
the moment is not treacherous. (Underscoring ours)
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull his gun and
shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with treachery. In passion, the
offender loses his reason and control. In treachery, on the other hand, the means employed
is adopted consciously and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason
and self-control, cannot consciously employ a particular means, method or form of attack
in the execution of the crime.[49] Thus, the killing of Tuadles by appellant Antonio was
not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and favorably considered by the
trial court to elevate the killing to murder, was not proven by convincing evidence[50] is
advocated by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief. He agreed with Appellant
Antonio's contention on the matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to agree with this particular
submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles engaged in pusoy dos. In the beginning, they
were heard laughing and kidding each other (nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan). Later,
the banter turned into verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient violence. Hence, Tuadles
could have braced himself with the aggression of Antonio. There is no treachery when the
killing results from a verbal altercation or spat between the victim and the assailant such
that the victim must have been forewarned of the impending danger. In this case, Bobis
testified that he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing each other before Antonio raised his hand
and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The proximate distance of three feet between Tuadles
and Antonio immediately before the fatal shooting allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity
to defend himself.[51]
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal code.
Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that should be imposed on
appellant Antonio should be reduced to reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being one (1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
the penalty to be imposed shall be the minimum period of reclusion temporal, that is, from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed shall be the
penalty next lower which is prision mayor in any of its periods.[52] Therefore, appellant
Alberto Antonio is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and moral damages to the heirs
of Tuadles, arguing that said award was unsupported by adequate evidence. In arriving at
the amount of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages, the trial court relied completely
on the testimony of the victim's widow, Suzette Tuadles, who stated that at the time of his
death, Tuadles was earning P50,000.00 a month from his construction business. Applying
the formula laid down by this Court in the cases of Villa Rey Transit v. CA,[53] and People
v. Quilaton,[54] the trial court arrived at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory
damages for loss of earning capacity. Appellant Antonio argues that the trial court cannot
just rely on the sole testimony of Suzette Tuadles, otherwise, it would be basing its
computation on mere speculation, conjecture, or guess work.
In People v. Silvestre[55] and People v. Verde,[56] we held that the absence of
documentary evidence to support the prosecution's claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages. There, we awarded
damages for loss of earning capacity computed on the basis of the testimonies of the
victim's wives. This was reiterated in People v. Dizon,[57] where we held that:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages
for loss of earning capacity. In People vs. Verde (G. R. No. 119077, February 10, 1999),
the non-presentation of documentary evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity did not prevent this Court from awarding said damages. The testimony
of the victim's wife as to the earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was then 48
years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis
for such an award. x x x As in People vs. Verde, the Court is inclined to grant the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence.
(Underscoring ours)
In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages should be calculated as
follows:
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross annual income - living expenses
(50% of gross annual income)
x = 2(80-40) x [P600,000.00 - 300,000.00]
3 Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two (2) classes of
= 26.67 x P300,000.00
= P8,001,000.00
Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss, the
Court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages
according to its discretion.[58] We agree with appellant Antonio that the trial court's award
of moral damages was excessive. While there is no hard and fast rule in the determination
of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, each case must be governed by its own
peculiar circumstances.[59] And though moral damages are incapable of pecuniary
estimation to compensate the claimants for actual injury, they are not designed to enrich
the complainants at the expense of the accused.[60]
Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole support of his family and they
will also be deprived of his love and companionship. No amount of money could ever
compensate for their loss. While the award of moral damages may help ease the emotional
and psychological trauma that they continue to suffer, this Court has not granted so large
an amount as moral damages. Accordingly, we find that the amount of P3,000,000.00
granted by the trial court in this case is excessive, and the same is therefore reduced to
P500,000.00. Moreover, there being no aggravating circumstances attendant in this case,
the award of exemplary damages should also be deleted.[61]
We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito M. Nieto. He argues that
the trial court erred in convicting him as an accessory. The trial court's grounds for finding
him guilty are: (1) he failed to arrest appellant Antonio; and (2) he gave false information
tending to deceive the investigating authorities.[62]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of
the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or
accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1)
profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing
or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent
its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of
the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the
offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.[63]
accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape
of the principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and
the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony.
Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his public function when
he failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and to conduct a speedy
investigation of the crime committed.
The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's culpability is concerned, shows
that in the middle of the argument between appellant Antonio and the deceased, Antonio
called Nieto by shouting, Sarge! Sarge! Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the
latter went upstairs. Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot Tuadles, and then
ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the table, which Nieto did. Antonio,
Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told guards Bobis and Ernesto Olac to go with
them, and they all boarded Antonio's Mercedes Benz van, including Nieto. They arrived
at Antonio's residence in Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30 o'clock in the
morning. There, they had coffee while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon after, a
certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked to the two security guards, while Nieto was present.
Nieto then told Bobis that in his statement, he should say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis
and Nieto, were seated outside the entrance of the Club when the incident took place. At
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited
outside until members of the San Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and
Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. After the police
investigated the scene, they proceeded to the police station. There, Nieto reiterated his
instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were outside the club. While Bobis gave
his statement to the police, Nieto remained in front of him and dictated to him what he
should answer to the questions of the police investigator.[64]
The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant Nieto's
actuations immediately after the commission of the crime demonstrate his liability as an
accessory. Being a police officer in the active service, he had the duty to arrest appellant
Antonio after the latter committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself witnessed.
Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to do. Instead, he rode with
the offender to the latter's house where they stayed for more than five (5) hours. In the early
case of U. S. v. Yacat, et al., it was held:[65]
It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local president of the town
of Cabiao at the time the crime was committed, has incurred criminal liability. Abusing his
public office, he refused to prosecute the crime of homicide and those guilty thereof, and
thus made it possible for them to escape, as the defendant Pedro Lising did in fact. This
fact is sufficiently demonstrated in the records, and he has been unable to explain his
conduct in refusing to make an investigation of this serious occurrence, of which complaint
was made to him, and consequently he should suffer a penalty two degrees inferior to that
designated by paragraph 2 of article 405 of the Code, by virtue of article 68 thereof.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before the shooting, appellant
Antonio called him and he immediately went upstairs. He saw that appellant shot Tuadles.
Despite this knowledge, he failed to arrest appellant and, instead, left the crime scene
together with the latter. To this extent, he assisted appellant Antonio in his escape.[66]
Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto provided false
information to deceive the investigating authorities. He instructed Bobis to answer falsely
to the questions of the investigating officer, in order to make it appear that there were no
eyewitnesses to the incident and thus make it more difficult for the police to solve the crime.
Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as an accessory to the
crime, and he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed by law. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, we impose on appellant Nieto the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prison correccional, as
maximum.
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s appeal. After carefully
reviewing the facts and issues raised therein, we find that the trial court erred in finding
said appellant guilty as an accessory.
The trial court's sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. was his failure to
produce the laser sight of the gun as evidence during the trial. However, such omission
does not amount to concealing or destroying the body of the crime or effects or instruments
thereof to prevent its discovery. The laser sight had been surrendered to the police
authorities so there was no more need for discovery. Its loss thereafter does not make
appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At most, as custodian thereof, he may be made
answerable administratively.
In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional. He further stated:
Q Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against you as alleged in the
information that you tried to conceal or destroy the effects or body of the crime to prevent
its discovery?
A It's not true, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on the body of the crime
and as far as I know, I did all my job as investigator and I worked for it up to the wee hours
of the morning up to the next morning, I still did it and I gathered evidence and I submitted
it to the Crime Laboratory and even when at the time, I have been hearing that I will not
be the one who will investigate, they got it from me without proper notice, that they will
take over the investigation, I still did my job, and on the fifth, I was asked by Prosecutor
Llorente to retrieve the slug and what I did was even the investigation is not with me, I still
did it, I still went to the IBC and I still worked hard, I even remember
Atty. Flaminiano
We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this moment.
COURT
Continue.
A The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said that this policeman is
very hardworking, even the investigation is not with him anymore, but still, he's working
and I answered him, whatever, whatever they will charge to me, maybe it's just their job
and so, I will also do my job. Because as far as I know, I will not be implicated because I
have not done anything, I have not done the charges that they filed against me, I was
surprised when I was given a confirmation that I was an accessory that is why my youngest
child even told me "kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?" and I told him that it's not true. For me, I
have not done anything like that.
Atty. Fernandez
That's all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT
The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory because according to
one of the witnesses, the gun together with the laser sight was handled to you and when
that gun reached Crame, the laser sight was no longer there, answer me, what happened?
A The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by Inspector Cabrera, the
laser sight was there, I immediately made the transmittal for the laboratory and I described
what is there, together with the laser and after that, I placed it in a brown envelope, I placed
it in my drawer. On the second day, I was really busy on that day because I was the only
one. I was asking for assistance because I would go out, I will investigate and then I just
found out when I was about to submit the laser to the laboratory, I gave the envelope
together with the transmittal and when it was being received, he checked it and he said Sgt.
Where is the laser sight? and I said it's there, attached. And he said please look at it.
COURT
Who told you that?
A The person who received, your Honor.
COURT
But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser?
A Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I was planning to go
back right away but I just said, okay, I will just cross it out and I did not erase because I
want that I will not hide anything. It has happened because maybe somebody is interested
or I might have left in my drawer. Because I will not hide it. That's why I did not sno-pake
it and I just crossed it out so it can be read together with my initial and when I came back,
I asked them who touched my things.
COURT
What answer did you get?
A There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was talking.[67]
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did not intentionally
conceal or destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution failed to prove that he did so with
intent to derail the prosecution of the principal accused. On the other hand, while the laser
sight was an accessory device attached to the gun, it was not essential to the commission,
investigation and prosecution of the crime. The gun itself, which was the instrument of the
crime, was surrendered to the authorities and presented as evidence in court. The failure
of appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. to present the laser sight as part of the evidence did not in
any way affect the outcome of the trial, much less prevent the discovery of the crime.
Furthermore, there is no showing that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. profited by the non-
presentation of the laser sight.
Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised Penal Code and
jurisprudence, appellant Cartalla, Jr.'s omission does not make him liable as an accessory
to the crime committed by appellant Antonio. Even the Solicitor General submits that there
are no grounds to convict appellant Cartalla, to wit:
At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or its corpus delicti had
been discovered. Hence, the loss of the laser sight could not have prevented the discovery
of the crime. The essential instrument of the crime, namely, a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model
92F with serial number BER-041965-7 and black magazine had been preserved and
presented as evidence.
Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation of the laser sight
as this was not proved by the prosecution. Either way, concealing or profiting, there is no
convicting motive for Cartalla to have so committed. More so, as Cartalla was the
investigating officer on the case.
It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not make him an
accessory to the crime committed by Antonio, although he may be administratively liable
for the loss of a part of the evidence for the prosecution in this case.[68]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No.
111232-H is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet" Antonio is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and is correspondingly
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime of HOMICIDE, and is correspondingly
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles
the following sums:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;
(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(5) Costs.
For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime, he is ACQUITTED and absolved of all
liability, both criminal or civil.
In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ Ambet, appellant Juanito Nieto y
Nemer shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the above-adjudicated sums or the amount
of P4,388,649.18 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), joins Justice Puno in his concurring & dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring & dissenting opinion.
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTNG OPINION
PUNO, J.:
I agree with the majority decision except its finding that treachery did not attend the killing
of the victim, Arnulfo Tuadles, and the conclusion that the accused-appellant, Alberto
"Ambet" Antonio, should not be held guilty of murder but only of homicide.
For proper perspective, I wish to relate the relevant facts on the issue of treachery.
On November 2, 1996, at about 9:30 a.m., the victim, Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles, 40 years
old, a former professional basketball player and a family man, was shot to death by
accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet" Antonio, 59 years old and former Chairman of the
Games and Amusement Board. The murder weapon was a 9mm Beretta Model 92F pistol,
with a laser sight.1 Tuadles sustained a single gunshot wound on the forehead, between
the eyes.2 The bullet hit the brain and exited at the right portion of the back of the head.3
He died due to "intracranial hemmorhage."4
Dr. Jaime Leal, Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted the
autopsy examination on the Tuadles. His examination showed that Tuadles was shot at
close range, specifically at a distance of less than 12 inches.5 The bullet's trajectory was
directed backwards, slightly upwards and to the right.6
The autopsy also revealed that Tuadles suffered five (5) abrasions ("gasgas"), located on
his forehead, nose, tip of nose, cheek, and right lower lip. He sustained these abrasions as
he collapsed on the floor after he was shot. There were also contusions on Tuadles'
forehead and lower lip that could have been sustained when his face hit a hard blunt object,
and hematomas on both eyes caused by the "pulling of the blood in the spaces between the
eyes." He had a lacerated wound on the cheek which could have been caused by a forcible
contact of the skin with a hard blunt object, such as chairs or tables, when he was falling
to the floor.7 All the injuries were located on the head of the victim.
Security guard Jose Jimmy Bobis gave the eyewitness account of the shooting. He reported
at the IBC Club in Greenhills, San Juan, on November 2, 1996 at 7:00 a.m. He relieved
co-security guard Ernesto Olac. At that time, there were only five (5) people inside the club:
Antonio, Tuadles, SP04 Juanito Nieto, Olac and Bobis. Antonio and Tuadles were at the
second floor playing "pusoy dos", SP04 Nieto and Olac were sleeping in the dining area at
the ground floor, while Bobis was in the bar, also at the ground floor, keeping watch of the
premises.
In the course of his duty, Bobis heard Antonio and Tuadles laughing and teasing each other
("nagkakantiyawan") while playing "pusoy dos". He recognized the voice of Antonio
because it was loud in contrast to Tuadles' voice which was soft. At past 9:00 a.m., he
heard Antonio say in a loud voice: "Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag pa pass ay mag-
ta-tap ng dalawang beses sa ibabaw ng mesa?" Antonio then said "Sige ". Tuadles' response
was almost inaudible because he spoke in a soft, cool voice (mahina at malamig ang
boses).8 Again, Antonio spoke: "Barya lang itong pinagla-laruan natin" (We are only
playing for loose change). Tuadles kept silent. Antonio then called: "Sarge, Sarge, Sarge!,"
referring to SPO4 Nieto. Bobis walked to the sleeping Nieto and informed him that
Antonio was calling him. They went to the second floor and saw Antonio and Tuadles
standing between the billiard table and the "pusoy" table. They were facing each other but
at a certain angle, and about three feet of space separated them. Antonio appeared, hiding
his right hand behind his back. He (Antonio) cursed "putang ina ka kasi". Tuadles uttered
something which Bobis could not understand because Tuadles' back was turned on him.
Antonio then quickly raised his right hand, pointed a gun at the face of Tuadles and fired
the gun ("Mabilis na inangat niya ang kanang kamay niya at itinapat sa mukha ni Arnie
Tuadles at ipinutok ang baril ").9 Tuadles twisted to the right and fell on the floor face
down. Antonio removed the gun's magazine, cocked it and replaced its magazine. The gun
had a laser light attached to its end.10 Antonio ordered SPO4 Nieto to get the score sheet
and the cards laying on top of a table. SPO4 Nieto placed the cards on a paper, folded it
several times, and placed it inside the clutch bag of Antonio. Bobis was taken aback by the
incident. When he regained his composure, he asked Antonio: "Boss, bakit nangyari ito."
Antonio did not immediately respond but later pointed his finger at Bobis and then warned:
"Ikaw, huwag kang tumistigo, ha!" Bobis kept quiet due to fear. They all went downstairs.
Olac who heard the gunfire inquired from Bobis what happened. He told him that Antonio
shot Tuadles. Antonio then commanded Bobis to get the key of Tuadles' car. He did as he
was told. Only two vehicles were parked in the premises of the club: the Mercedes Benz
van of Antonio and the car of Tuadles. They boarded the van, with Antonio driving.
Following them was the car of Tuadles driven by Antonio's driver. The driver left Tuadles'
car near Shaw Blvd. and rode in the van. They headed to the house of Antonio. They left
the club at 10:00 a.m. and arrived at Antonio's house in Green Meadows at 11:30 a.m. On
instruction of Antonio, his driver burned the score sheet and the cards. They stayed at
Antonio's house for several hours while Antonio conferred with his lawyer. Antonio's
lawyer told Bobis that he should say that the shooting was an accident. SPO4 Nieto
instructed Bobis to claim that he was outside the entrance of the club when the shooting
took place. Bobis, Nieto, Olac and Antonio's driver returned to the club at 5:00 p.m. Thirty
minutes later, a team of policemen from San Juan arrived. They found the lifeless body of
Tuadles sprawled on the second floor.
Police investigator SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. took the statement of Bobis that same day. In his
statement, Bobis denied seeing the shooting incident. On November 4, 1996, Bobis
happened to watch the television and he saw the crying Mrs. Tuadles while being
interviewed. Bothered by his conscience, he requested the operations manager of their
security agency to bring him to the Eastern Police District. On November 5, 1996, he gave
another statement to the EPD and revealed the truth that fateful day of November 2, 1996.
Given these facts, the majority holds that treachery did not attend the killing of Tuadles.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.11
The two elements that must be proved to establish treachery are: (1) the employment of
means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and
retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself, and (2)
the means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by
the offender.12
I respectfully submit that the killing of Tuadles was characterized by treachery.
First. There is little doubt that the first element of treachery was proved by the prosecution.
The victim, Tuadles, had absolutely no opportunity to defend himself from the aggression
of Antonio. The attack was sudden, coming as it did like a thunderbolt from a blue sky. It
was preceded by a not too serious argument about a rule of the "pusoy dos" game which
appeared to have been overlooked by Tuadles. The little argument agitated Antonio but
not Tuadles. Hence, the attack was unexpected especially because Tuadles and Antonio
did not have any prior misunderstanding. Tuadles even endearingly called Antonio
"uncle". Likewise, Tuadles was a basketball player when Antonio served as Chairman of
the Games and Amusement Board.
Second. The prosecution also proved the second element of treachery that "the means,
method and manner of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
offender." This element deals with the subjective aspect of treachery, hence, the more
difficult element to determine. We are not, however, without any established jurisprudence
in determining whether the accused-appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the
means, method and manner of killing the victim. The authoritative La Fave and Scott,
after a survey of court rulings, tell us of the relevant evidence to consider, viz:13
"On the basis of events before and at the time of the killing, the trier of fact will sometimes
be entitled to infer that the defendant actually premeditated and deliberated his intentional
killing. Three categories of evidence are important for this purpose: (1) facts about how
and what the defendant did prior to the actual killing which show he was engaged in
activity directed toward the killing, that is, planning activity; (2) facts about the defendant's
prior relationship and conduct with the victim from which motive may be inferred; and (3)
facts about the nature of the killing from which it may be inferred that the manner of killing
was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according
to a preconceived design. Illustrative of the first category are such acts by the defendant as
prior possession of the murder weapon, surreptitious approach of the victim, or taking the
prospective victim to a place where others are unlikely to intrude. In the second category
are prior threats by the defendants to do violence to the victim, plans or desires of the
defendant which would be facilitated by the death of the victim, and prior conduct of the
victim known to have angered the defendant. As to the third category, the manner of
killing, what is required is evidence (usually based upon examination of the victim's body)
showing that the wounds were deliberately placed at vital areas of the body. The mere fact
that the killing was attended by much violence or that a great many wounds were inflicted
is not relevant in this regard, as such a killing is just as likely (or perhaps more likely) to Q: Let's focus on Mr. Antonio, you said his voice was loud, did you hear him mentioned
have been on impulse. Conduct by the defendant after the killing in an effort to avoid (sic) anything at that time?
detection and punishment is obviously not relevant for purposes of showing premeditation
and deliberation, as it only goes to show the defendant's state of mind at the time and not Atty. Flaminiano:
before or during the killing." (emphasis ours)
Leading, your Honor.
The evidence proves the deliberateness of the attack made by Antonio. The attack was
done with swiftness. It was motivated by the failure of Tuadles to follow an agreement on COURT:
the "pusoy" game. The deliberateness of the attack is also shown by the fact that Tuadles
was shot at close range, with the muzzle of the gun less than 12 inches from Tuadles' Answer.
forehead. Antonio aimed at Tuadles' forehead, between the eyes. The bullet penetrated
Tuadles' brain, destroyed its right hemisphere and caused Tuadles' instantaneous death. A: Yes, sir.
Clearly, Antonio chose to shoot Tuadles at a vital part of his body. As a result, Tuadles
became an instant statistic of the graveyard. Q: What did you hear?

With due respect, I do not agree with the majority that the case at bar involves a spur of xxxxxxxxx
the moment killing, hence, there is no treachery. The majority states that there was a prior
heated altercation between Tuadles and Antonio. The heated altercation allegedly A: Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag-pa-pass ay mag-ta-tap ng dalawang beses sa ibabaw
forewarned Tuadles of the attack. The so-called heated altercation, however, is not well- ng mesa?
established by the evidence. A replay of the facts will reveal that eyewitness Bobis initially
heard the two teasing each other ("nagkakantiyawan"). Later, an argument developed xxxxxxxxx
between them which cannot be characterized as a "heated altercation." Bobis testified as
follows: 14 Q: Before you heard this statement, did you hear other things from Mr. Ambet Antonio
apart from what you have said, before that?
"Q: Now, this matter of 'kantiyawan' and 'nagtatawanan' iyong dalawa, how long did this
continue during the period of time you were there? A: None, sir.

A: A few seconds only. xxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxx Q: Was there any comment that you heard from Mr. Tuadles?

Q: Would you be in a position to recognize the voices of Ambet Antonio and Arnie A: Yes, sir.
Tuadles?
Q: What did you hear from Mr. Tuadles?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I could not understand because his voice was soft and ...
Q: Why?
Prosecutor Llorente:
A: Arnie Tuadles' voice is soft and Ambet Antonio's voice is loud.
May we put on record the answer of the witness in Tagalog?
COURT:
Granted.
A: "Mahina at malamig ang boses."
Despite the soft response from Tuadles, Antonio continued with his outburst, thus:15
"Q: Going back now to Mr. Antonio, did you hear him again mentioned (sic) or say other
things?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you hear from Mr. Ambet Antonio?
A: 'Barya lang and pinagla-laruan natin.' It's only a (sic) loose change that we are playing
with here.
Q: Did you hear any word from Mr. Tuadles?
A: No more, sir."
In sum, it was only Antonio who appeared agitated during the alleged altercation. Tuadles
spoke in a soft and cool voice that Bobis could hardly hear and understand him. The
characterization of the argument that preceded the shooting of is decisive of the issue of
treachery. I submit that the argument between Antonio and Tuadles was trivial for it
merely concerned the inadvertence of Tuadles to tap the table when making a pass.
Nothing in the records shows that Tuadles violated the rule intentionally. Nothing shows
the degree of damage suffered by Antonio as a consequence of Tuadles' omission. It is thus
my submission that the argument appears to be slight and cannot justify the conclusion
that Antonio acted in the heat of passion or on impulse in killing the victim.
The case of People vs. Cruz 16 is apropos. In said case, the accused and the victim were
"compadres" for having stood as sponsors in the baptism of a common friend. The accused
used to drive one of the tricycles of the victim until the latter sold the tricycle the accused
was driving. It was claimed that the accused bore a grudge against the victim because of
the said incident. At any rate, while the victim was talking with a co-tricycle driver along
the street while waiting for passengers, the accused appeared and approached the victim.
Upon nearing the victim, accused angrily uttered, "Pare, walang presidente presidente sa
akin" as he simultaneously drew out a gun from the front portion of his waist and shot the
victim with it point blank, hitting the upper left eyebrow of the latter which caused him to
fall on the ground. Thereafter, accused left. This Court rejected the claim of the accused
that the shooting was accidental and noted with approval the observation of the Solicitor
General that "if the shooting of the victim were accidental, accused would have come to
his aid and taken him to a hospital, instead of abandoning him." The Court further held
that the accused was liable for murder. The victim was unarmed. He did not have the least
suspicion of the accused's design to shoot him. In contrast, accused had a gun. The victim,
therefore, had no chance to defend himself against the latter's frontal attack. Treachery
qualified the killing to murder.
With due respect to the majority, I find the killing of the victim Tuadles qualified by
treachery. I vote to convict accused-appellant Antonio of murder as charged.
7.) G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition
in Criminal Case No. 4007 and of murder in Criminal Case No. 4012 and imposing upon
him the penalty of death in both cases.
On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with violation of Section 1, paragraph (2),
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December 1984, in the City of Tagbilaran Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while acting
under the influence of drugs and without any license or permit from the proper authorities,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have ill his possession, custody and
control an unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with
Serial Number 359323 with Five (5) spent shells and Five (5) live ammunitions and without
any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot
one Francis Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot
wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head & Chest (through and through);
Head Entrance — 1.4 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-Temporal Area; Port — 1.3 x 0.3 cm.; Right
Cheek. 3.5 cm. above the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — Right Infrascapular Area at the level of the 7th Intercostal
Rib (Back); Exist — 0.3 cm. dia; above the right nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at the right angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Presidential
Decree No. 1866. 1
On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for murder was also filed against appellant
reading as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident pre-meditation treachery, while acting
under the influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately augmenting the suffering of the
victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one
Francis Ernest Escano with the use of an unlicensed SMITH & WESSON Airweight
caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 359323 hitting and inflicting upon the latter the
following gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head and Chest (Through & Through);
Head Entrance — 14 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-temporal Area; Port — l.3 x 0.3 cm., Right
Cheek, 3.5 cm., above the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — right Infrascapular Area at the level of the 7th Inter-Costal
Rib (back); exit — 0.3 cm. dia; above the right nipple
Y-shape laceration, cheek at the angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the deceased namely: Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey H. Escano, in the amount
to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, with the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and acting under the influence of
dangerous drugs and cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal cases were
consolidated upon motion of the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July 1986, the trial
court rendered a decision 3 convicting appellant under both informations. The dispositive
portion of the decision read as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 4007 finding the accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with
Murder under Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and hereby
sentences said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Further, decision
is also rendered in Criminal Case No. 4012 finding the same accused Renato Tac-an y
Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866. Appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (treachery used to qualify the crime to
murder) and the special aggravating circumstances of acting while under the influence of
dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult to a person in
authority and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset them, and sentences the said
Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest Escano in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay actual compensatory damages in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P108,310.00); to pay moral damages to Judge Francisco Escano, Jr., the sum of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia Escano the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for the mental anguish and
suffering each experienced because of the death of Francis Ernest. All such amount shall
earn legal interest from the time this decision shall become final and executory until fully
satisfied. The accused shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant signified his intention to appeal
to this Court, although the same was subject to automatic review by this Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I. The lower court erred in believing the prosecution's version of the case instead of
according full faith and credence to the defendant's version.
II. The trial court erred in not holding that Renato Tac-an was justified in shooting the
deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that in (sic) the least the defendant acted in
incomplete self-defense in shooting the deceased.
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the defendant
inasmuch as said decree was enforceable only during the existence of the Martial Law
Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy for
having been prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted for murder
in an information which alleges that the accused used an unlicensed firearm in killing the
deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the
deceased Francis Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year
of high school of the Divine Word College in Tagbilaran City. They were close friends,
being not only classmates but also members of the same gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had
been to the house where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those
occasions, Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a handgun with him. Francis was then
advised by his mother to distance himself from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis
turned sour. Sometime in September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with each other,
on which occasion Francis bodily lifted Arnold Romelde from the ground. Arnold was
friend and companion to Renato. The quarrel resulted in Renato and Francis being brought
to the high school principal's office. The strained relationship between the two (2) erstwhile
friends was aggravated in late November 1984 when Francis teamed that Renato, together
with other members of the Bronx gang, was looking for him, apparently with the intention
of beating him up. Further deterioration of their relationship occurred sometime in the first
week of December 1984, when graffiti appeared on the wall of the third year high school
classroom and on the armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating the Bronx gang and
describing Renato as "bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed the graffiti to Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December 1984, Renato entered Room 15 of
the high school building to attend his English III class. Renato placed his scrapbook
prepared for their Mathematics class on his chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa
Baluma, to raise a question. Upon returning to his chair, he found Francis sitting there, on
the scrapbook. Renato was angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the chair on
which Francis was seated. Francis, however, explained that he had not intentionally sat
down on Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued but some classmates and two
(2) teachers, Mrs. Baluma and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, intervened and prevented them from
assaulting each other. After the two (2) had quieted down and apparently shaken hands at
the instance of Mrs. Baluma, the latter resumed her English III class. Francis sat on the
last row to the extreme right of the teacher while Renato was seated on the same last row
at the extreme left of the teacher. While the English III class was still going on, Renato
slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun. He was back at the classroom
approximately fifteen (15) minutes later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just started
in Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and with both hands
raised, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated
behind and to the light of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at Francis, hitting a notebook,
a geometry book and the armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up and with
several of their classmates rushed forward towards the teacher's platform to seek protection
from their teacher. Renato fired a second time, this time hitting the blackboard in front of
the class. Francis and the other students rushed back towards the rear of the room. Renato
walked towards the center of the classroom and fired a third time at Francis, hitting the
concrete wall of the classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates rushed towards the
door, the only door to and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s platform
nearest the door and for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards
the door. This time, Francis was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both
fell to the floor. Ruel was pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled
on the floor bleeding profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr.
Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis,
approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the
room. Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he
is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the
classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet
entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the
right nipple. 8
Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone inside Room
15. Renato proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There, he found
some teachers and students and ordered them to lock the door and close the windows, in
effect holding them as hostages. He also reloaded his gun with five (5) bullets. After some
time, a team of Philippine Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and
surrounded the faculty room. With a hand-held public address device, Capt. Lazo called
upon Renato to surrender himself Renato did not respond to this call. Renato's brother
approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to persuade his brother to give up. Renato's father
who, by this time had also arrived, pleaded with Renato to surrender himself Renato then
turned over his gun to his brother through an opening in the balustrade of the faculty room.
Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's brother, went to the door of the faculty room,
entered and placed Renato under arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue
Francis but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One of the
students entered the room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and through the
window and opened the door from the inside. The teachers and students brought Francis
down to the ground floor from whence the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares
Memorial Hospital. 10 Francis died before reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City.
The officer deposited the revolver recovered from Renato which was an Airweight Smith
and Wesson .38 caliber revolver, with Serial No. 359323, as well as the five (5) live bullets
removed from the said revolver, and the five (5) empty cartridges which Renato had turned
over to him. Ballistic examination conducted by Supervising Ballistician, Artemio
Panganiban, National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu, showed that the empty cartridge
cases had been fired from the revolver recovered from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having believed the prosecution's version
of the facts instead of the version offered by the appellant. The trial court took into account,
inter alia, the positive and direct testimony of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to, among other things, the events which took place
inside her English III classroom immediately before the shooting;
2. Ruel Ungab — a fifteen (15) year old classmate of Renato and Francis, who had fallen
on the floor with Francis when the latter was finally hit by Renato;
3. Damaso Pasilbas — the Mathematics teacher who was holding his class when Renato
had burst into Room 15 and started firing at Francis; and
4. Napoleon Jumauan — another sixteen (16) year old, classmate of Renato and Francis
who was inside the classroom when Renato had started firing at Francis and who was only
about a foot away from the head of Francis when Renato, having re-entered Room 15, had
fired at Francis as the latter was sprawled on the floor of the classroom.
After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion
of the trial court that Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the circumstances
and in the manner described by these witnesses.
1. The claim of self-defense.
Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete self-defense,
when he shot Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the claimant must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the following requisites existed:
a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the aggression; and
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. 12
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few minutes before the end of Mrs.
Baluma's English III class, Francis had approached him:
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)
Q: How did it happened (sic) that you had a conversation with Francis?
(Renato)
A: While the class was going on, Mrs. Baluma was writing on the blackboard.
Q: Then what happened?
A: While our teacher was writing on the blackboard Francis suddenly got near me.
Q: And what happened when Francis approached you?
A: He said, 'So you are brave now you had a (sic) guts to fight against me.'
Q: And what else did he say?
A: He said, 'Go home, get your firearm because I will go home to get a gun.'
Q: Was that all that he told you?
A: He further said, 'You go home get your firearm, if you won't go home and get a gun, I
will go to your place and kill you including your parents, brothers and sisters.'
Q: And after that where did Francis go?
A: Before the bell rang he went ahead. 13
(Emphasis supplied)
We note at the outset that there was no evidence before the Court, except Renato's own
testimony, that Francis had uttered the above statements attributed to him by Renato.
Although there had been about twenty-five (25) other students, and the teacher, in the
classroom at the time, no corroborating testimony was offered by the defense. In the second
place, assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis had indeed made those statements, such
utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression which is the first and most
fundamental requirement of self-defense. Allegedly uttered in a high school classroom by
an obviously unarmed Francis, such statements could not reasonably inspire the "well
grounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of
death or bodily harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken
out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats
or a merely threatening stance or posture. 15 Further as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, Francis was obviously without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned
and burst into Room 15 demanding to know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him
repeatedly, without the slightest regard for the safety of his other classmates and of the
teacher. There being no unlawful aggression, there simply could not be self-defense
whether complete or incomplete, 16 and there is accordingly no need to refer to the other
requirements of lawful self-defense.
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable.
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm, a Smith and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5) spent
bullets and five (5) live ones and with having used such firearm and ammunition to shoot
to death Francis Ernest Escano III, in violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part, that:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him "considering that the reason for
its [P.D. No. 1866] issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D. No. 1866 was
enforceable only during the existence of martial law, and that when martial law was "lifted
in 1979," the reason for the "existence" of P.D. No. 1866 faded away, with the result that
the "original law on firearms, that is, Section 2692 of the [Revised] Administrative Code,
together with its pre-martial law amendments, came into effect again thereby replacing
P.D. No. 1866." 17
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which
suggests that it was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law
imposed upon the country by former President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain
any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-enforceability upon the termination of
the state or period of martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own terms
purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal
possession and manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives in order "to
harmonize their provisions as well as to update and revise certain provisions and prior
statutes "in order to more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms, ammunitions
and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is thus without basis in fact.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged with illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated by the use
of such unlicensed firearm to commit a homicide or murder, he was unconstitutionally
placed in jeopardy of punishment for the second time when he was charged in Criminal
Case No. 4012 with murder "with the use of an unlicensed [firearm]," in violation of Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a
second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts,
there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that
the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal
Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would
appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from
the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to
be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging appellant with
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that said
firearm and ammunition had been used to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escaño III. We
note also that the amended information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging appellant
with the unlawful killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III, stated that the killing had been done
with the use of an unlicensed firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two
(2) informations did not have the effect of charging appellant with having committed the
same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder, the
trial court did take into account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact that the
killing of Francis had been done "with the use of an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we
believe and so hold, the trial court committed error. There is no law which renders the use
of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an
information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an
unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second offense of
homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The
essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in
destroying human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of
aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. 19
In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition or disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the
increase of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the
unlicensed firearm where such firearm was used to destroy human life. Although the
circumstance that human life was destroyed with the use of the unlicensed firearm is not
an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be
taken into account to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua, under the 1987
Constitution) because of the explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted earlier, the
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is an offense punished under
a special law and not under the Revised Penal Code.
4. The claim that there was no treachery.
Appellant contends that there was no treachery present because before any shot was fired,
Renato had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening statement
was a warning to Francis and that the first three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were
merely warning shots. Moreover, building upon his own testimony about the alleged threat
that Francis had uttered before he (Renato) left his English III class to go home and get a
gun, appellant argues that Francis must have anticipated his return and thus had sufficient
time to prepare for the coming of the appellant. 20 Appellant's contention, while ingenious,
must be rejected. The trial court made a finding of treachery taking explicit account of the
following factors:
1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College High School Department Tagbilaran City, is
situated in the second floor of the building. It is a corner room and it has only one (1) door
which is the only means of entry and exit;
2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was seated on his chair inside his classroom and
was writing on the armrest of his chair and also talking to Ruel Ungab and while their
teacher, Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The deceased was not aware
of any impending assault neither did he have any means to defend himself;
3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver in shooting to death
the defenseless and helpless Francis Ernest Escaño;
4. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected. the accused consciously conceived that
mode of attack;
5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and did not give him a chance to defend
himself. After the deceased was hit on the head and fell to the floor while he was already
sprawled and completely defenseless the accused fired at him again and the deceased was
hit on the chest;
6. The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He was absolutely not aware
of any coming attack. 21
The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room
15 had no means of escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the second
floor of the building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to Francis as he stood on
the teacher's platform closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought to dash
through the door. Renato's question "where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded as
an effort to warn Francis for he shot at Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and
talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato fired three (3) shots before hitting Francis with the
fourth shot, can only be ascribed to the indifferent markmanship of Renato and to the fact
that Francis and the other students were scurrying from one part of the room to the other
in an effort to evade the shots fired by Renato. The cumulative effect of the circumstances
underscored by the trial court was that the attack upon Francis had been carried out in a
manner which disabled Francis from defending himself or retaliating against Renato.
Finally, the circumstance that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive,
re-entered Room 15 and fired again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his
own blood, manifested Renato's conscious choice of means of execution which directly
and especially ensured the death of his victim without risk to himself. 22 We are compelled
to agree with the trial court that treachery was here present and that, therefore, the killing
of Francis Ernest Escaño III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no evident premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the same
as a generic aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the appellant that the
requisites of evident premeditation had not been sufficiently shown. In order that evident
premeditation may be taken into account, there must be proof of (a) the time when the
offender formed his intent to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly indicating that the
offender had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) of the passage of a
sufficient interval of time between the determination of the offender to commit the crime
and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
23 The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed from the time
Renato left his English III class and the time he returned with a gun. While there was
testimony to the fact that before that fatal day of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment
had welled up between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence adequately showing
when Renato had formed the intention and determination to take the life of Francis.
Accordingly, we must discard evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not done under the influence of a dangerous drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as follows:
SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a crime is
committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state shall
be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of a crime and the
application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was under the
influence of a dangerous drug, specifically marijuana, and took that into account as a
"special aggravating circumstance". No medical evidence had been submitted by the
prosecution to show that Renato had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis.
Fourteen (14) days had elapsed after December 14, 1984 before Renato was medically
examined for possible traces of marijuana; the results of the examination were negative.
Defense witness Dr. Rogelio Ascona testified that in order to have a medically valid basis
for determining the presence of marijuana in the human system, the patient must be
examined within twenty-four (24) hours from the time he is supposed to have smoked
marijuana. 24 The prosecution had presented Orlando Balaba, a student at the Divine
Word College, High School Department, who testified that he found Renato and one
Jaime Racho inside the men's room of the High School Department sucking smoke from
a hand-rolled thing that look like a cigarette, that he had asked Renato what that was and
that Renato had replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the testimony of Orlando Balaba was
corroborated by two (2) other prosecution witnesses, we believe that Orlando Balaba's
testimony was incompetent to show that what Renato and Jaime Racho were smoking
inside the men's room was indeed marijuana. It was pointed out by apellant that Orlando
Balaba had never smoked nor smelled marijuana.

In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain detailed factors as
circumstantial evidence supporting the testimony of Orlando Balaba. These circumstances
were:
The circumstance of place where the killing was committed, the circumstance of the
manner of the attack, the circumstance of holding hostage some teachers and students
inside the faculty room, the circumstance of terrifying an entire school, the circumstance
that sitting on a scrapbook is too insignificant as to arouse passion strong enough to
motivate a killing, are circumstantial evidences that gave the court no room for doubt that
prosecution witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin Amper and Allan de la Serna truthfully
told the court that they saw the accused smoking marijuana inside the comfort room at
1:45 in the afternoon of December 14, 1984. ... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of passionate anger
on the part of Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show that Renato had
smoked marijuana before entering his English III class. In the absence of competent
medical or other direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts may be wary and
critical of indirect evidence, considering the severe consequences for the accused of a
finding that he had acted while under the influence of a prohibited drug. The Court
considers that the evidence presented on this point was simply inadequate to support the
ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and killed Francis while under the influence
of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily surrendered.
Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court should have
considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial court did not, and we
consider that it correctly refused to do so. Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not himself,
27 by handing over the weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly, he
surrendered the gun to his brother, who was not in any case a person in authority nor an
agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly, Renato did not surrender himself he was arrested
by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not constitute voluntary surrender.
29 Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had surrendered himself, such surrender cannot be
regarded as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was holed up in the faculty room, in effect
holding some teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room was surrounded by
Philippine Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him. He was not entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
8. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school is considered
a person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in mathematics, was
already checking the attendance did not deter the accused from pursuing his evil act, The
accused ignored his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror
he had done to Francis and the entire school, the accused entered the faculty room and
held hostage the teachers and students who were inside that room. To the court, this act of
the accused was an insult to his teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard of
other's feelings and safety and completely reprehensible. 30
We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. — Who shall be deemed
as such. — In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any
person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security
of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader
and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of
a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and
persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges
and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on
the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by
P.D. No. 299, September 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority,"
such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148
(direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person
in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast,
the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal
Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is
deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach
and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used
by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority"
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the
provision the trial court applied in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby MODIFIED
in the following manner and to the following extent only:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 — (a) the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and of having acted with contempt of or insult to the public authorities shall
be DELETED and not taken into account; and (b) the special aggravating circumstances
of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed
firearm shall similarly be DELETED and not taken into account. There being no generic
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the appellant shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be served successively in accordance with
the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the decision of the
trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
8.) G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA,
accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in
Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province
of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another,
with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and
with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of
Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means
employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of
Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial,
the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but
crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y
Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the
aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term
ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held
liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages
of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned
the following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A
COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY
THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY
SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There
were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel
and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson
with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all
happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun
of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly
took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on
the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the
process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a
human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the
deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped
the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and
other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon
inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the
police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario
municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written
statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two
accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-
appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their
written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F,
that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was
water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the
other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did
not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did
not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written
statements alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police
maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted
effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned
and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as
the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically
stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward,
positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-
serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of
the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the
crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one
Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the
respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-
appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses
in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative,
their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the
prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not
only was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in
exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was
reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and
experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him
to testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise
testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when
the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend
and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous
misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against
them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-
appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to
pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only
when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics
when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How
could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned
later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from
doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a
matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if
that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come
to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that
actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you
to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell
you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline
that is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was
gasoline.

Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold
of a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour
gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process
of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book;
that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased;
that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel;
that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the
deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set
the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or
unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately
before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the
accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is
also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased.
Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different
acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable
only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog,
et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained
gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice
even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to
avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined
in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil.
468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to
be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which
no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all
manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor
General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his
act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is
characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect
himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to
kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing
that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of
treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on
the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have
committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit
of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the
deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility.
Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical
injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into
a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor.
Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances,
the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The
eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they
noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by
Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is
P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the
P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court
a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs
against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
9.) G.R. No. L-14476 (40 PHIL 385) November 6, 1919
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE I. BALUYOT, defendant-appellant.
Filemon Sotto for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This cause has been brought to the Supreme Court upon an appeal prosecuted by Jose I.
Baluyot from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan,
convicting him of the crime of murder, committed August 3, 1918, upon the person of
Conrado Lerma, governor of said province, and sentencing him to undergo the penalty of
death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
At the general election which was held on June 6, 1916, Conrado Lerma was elected
governor of the Province of Bataan. One of his competitors upon this occasion was the
accused, Jose I. Baluyot, who came out third in the race. As a result of this contest a feeling
of personal rancor was developed in the mind of Baluyot against his successful competitor,
and during the two years which followed the accused became fully imbued with the idea
that Governor Lerma was persecuting him.
In the year 1918 Baluyot was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
for the offense of estafa in connection with a loan of money which had been negotiated at
the Philippine National Bank. This proceeding had been tried and in the early days of
August, 1918, was pending decision by the judge who tried the case.
Upon the organization of the National Guard, Baluyot had been commissioned as captain
in that body, and owing possibly to the pendency of the accusation for estafa and its
damaging effects upon his reputation, he had been asked to resign from the position of
captain in the National Guard; and although he had not resigned when the act which gave
occasion to this prosecution occurred, he had apparently been temporarily relieved from
duty with that organization pending investigation.
The misfortunes above mentioned, as well as others of a minor character, were attributed
by Baluyot to the machinations of Governor Lerma, all of which served to foment and
increase his feeling of enmity towards the latter.
On August 2, 1918, the defendant left the city of Manila and went to the town of Orion, in
the Province of Bataan, taking with him a revolver. Early on the following day, August 3,
he shipped to Manila from Orion a piano belonging to his wife, and at 8 a.m., went to
Balanga, the capital of the Province, arriving at the recorder's office in the provincial
building at about 9 o'clock a.m., where he inquired for Governor Lerma.

He was told that the governor had not arrived, but was expected later. The accused
accordingly determined to wait in the recorder's office, which served as a sort of anteroom
to the office of the governor. At about 11 o'clock a. m. the governor arrived. He and the
accused greeted each other in a friendly manner by shaking hands; and the governor, upon
being informed that Baluyot had called to confer with him, invited Baluyot into his office.
Baluyot hesitated, having noted the presence of another caller, and asked if the latter did
not have a prior right to an interview. The governor said that Baluyot should enter first,
which the latter accordingly did. The governor and the accused remained alone in the
former's office for 3 or 4 minutes, whereupon it occurred to Governor Lerma that the
interview might be more extended than he had expected, and he accordingly requested that
Baluyot should withdraw long enough for the governor to confer with one Antonino
Aranjuez, the other caller to whom reference has already been made. Baluyot accordingly
withdrew into the recorder's office and told Aranjuez that the governor wanted to see or
talk to him. Aranjuez then went in and had a conference with the governor for a few
minutes about the appointment of the former as chief of police for the municipality of
Limay. When Aranjuez came out Baluyot said that it was now his turn and again entered
the governor's office.
The evidence shows that at the time Baluyot reentered the governor's office the latter was
sitting behind his desk in an ordinary office chair. Baluyot approached the desk and upon
reaching a position directly in front of the governor spoke certain words which were heard,
though not distinctly, by persons in the recorder's office, Antonino Aranjuez merely heard
the accused call out "governor," while Gregorio de Guzman understood Baluyot to be
asking the governor for his revolver. The accused himself testified that his reference to the
revolver was intended to admonish the governor to prepare for a mortal combat and he
says that the words spoken were these:
BALUYOT. It appears to me that your revolver and mine have the same calibre.
GOVERNOR LERMA. No sir; mine is 32.
BALUYOT. So is mine. Be prepared because one of us must die.
The accused gives a color to this conversation which seems to us somewhat unnatural, and
his statement as to what occurred, especially with reference to the length of time that
elapsed after he entered the governor's office until the first shot was fired, is wholly lacking
in verisimilitude. What really occurred, as the lower court found, and as the testimony of
the witnesses in the recorder's office shows, is that the first shot was fired within a few
seconds after Baluyot reentered the governor's office and that the interval which elapsed
was scarcely more than sufficient to allow Baluyot to reach the governor's desk. The
inference is conclusive that, immediately upon asking the governor about his revolver, and
discovering that he was unarmed, Baluyot drew his own revolver and fired.
In the testimony given by Baluyot himself a circumstance is mentioned which appears to
us important in this connection. He says that while he was sitting in the recorder's office,
awaiting the arrival of Governor Lerma, Paulo Venegas, a guard attached to the provincial
jail, came up and after speaking in a low voice with the recorder, entered the office of the
governor and presently emerged, bringing a revolver and some cartridges. Baluyot noticed
that the revolver was discharged and remarked to the person having it in hand that an
unloaded revolver is less useful even than a cane. The guard replied that he was not the
person charged with loading it, but was going to take it out to be cleaned, whereupon he
disappeared carrying the revolver with him. This act of carrying away of the revolver from
Governor Lerma's office was especially notice by Baluyot and naturally from this he must
have supposed that the revolver seen by him was a weapon commonly kept in the
governor's office. The still further inference was obvious to Baluyot that the governor upon
arrival would be unarmed in his office, unless he should possibly bring a revolver upon his
person.
This circumstance shows that the words which Baluyot directed to Governor Lerma
immediately before the fatal attack were intended to discover whether Governor Lerma
was in fact unarmed. Upon discovering that Governor Lerma did not have his revolver at
hand, the accused at once drew his own weapon and fired. Baluyot therefore knew
Governor Lerma to be unarmed and practically defenseless, and it is plain that the attack
was not begun until the assailant was fully assured upon this point.
The bullet first fired by Baluyot entered in the frontal region of the right shoulder blade of
Governor Lerma and inflicted a wound of minor importance, passing through the aforesaid
part of the body and penetrating the back of the chair in which the governor was sitting.
Passing on from the chair, the ball entered the wall of the office building, but was so far
spent that it did not penetrate deeply. Instead it merely made a circular hole in the wall of
moderate depth and rebounded, falling on the floor. The line of direction followed by the
ball indicates that the accused directed the shot in somewhat downward direction and that
Governor Lerma was in all probability reclining backwards in the chair at the instant the
shot struck him.
The governor immediately arose. His free action was impeded by the table in front, and by
the walls of the office behind and on either side, since his table was in a corner of his office.
His exit was further obstructed by a small book stand on his immediate right. His only
convenient direction of escape was, therefore, in the direction to his left by way of the space
between the left corner of his desk and the wall nearby. This direction the governor
accordingly took, directing himself towards a passageway in the wall a few feet from his
desk leading into a corridor. When the governor had cleared the desk so as to leave a free
space between himself and his assailant, the distance which separated them was only a few
feet. Baluyot meanwhile turned somewhat to his right and advanced slightly in the
direction taken by Governor Lerma.
The latter desiring to make good his escape, started to run in the direction aforesaid, and
Baluyot, raising his revolver, again fired. The ball struck Governor Lerma in the region of
the right shoulder blade and passed through the body an inch or two from the wound made
by the first shot. The firing of the second shot was seen by Antonino Aranjuez, whose
attention had been attracted by the noise of the first shot. Being then seated at a desk in the
recorder's office near the door leading into the governor's office, this witness immediately
arose upon hearing the first shot, and having arrived at a point in the governor's office
where stood a screen, occluding direct vision from the door to the governor's desk, he
placed himself at the side of the screen and was thus able to see the scene then being
transacted. It was at this instant that Baluyot, with his arm extended, fired the second shot
at his fleeing victim. The governor at this moment had his right hand raised to his already
wounded shoulder and was running in a direction away from his assailant rather than
towards him. Immediately upon seeing this shot fired, Aranjuez, instead of intervening to
save the governor, as would have been becoming, turned and fled to obtain succor.
Bonifacio Mencias, the sanitary official, who examined the wounds of Governor Lerma,
says that both of the first two wounds were made by bullets which entered from the front.
This is obviously true as to the first, but as to the second there seems to be room for doubt.
The inspection made by the doctor may have been superficial, and his opinion may have
been partly a matter of mere inference from his information as to the general features of
the tragedy. At any rate he does not state any particulars from which it could clearly be
discovered that the second shot entered from the front. The witness Aranjuez makes it clear
that as the matter presented itself to his eye, the governor was fleeing with his right side,
rather than his front, exposed to Baluyot. This witness says that the governor's face was
turned in the direction of his flight, though he thinks the governor could have seen what
Baluyot was doing. In this view the second shot should apparently have entered from
behind.
The point we consider of little importance, inasmuch as it is obvious that Baluyot was the
aggressor throughout and that the second shot was fired at an unarmed man whose only
purpose was to effect an escape to a place of safety. Whether at the instant this shot was
fired Governor Lerma may have had his body turned so as momentarily to confront his
assailant, moving away sidewise, can have no bearing upon the qualification and character
of the crime. The testimony of Baluyot to the effect that as soon as Governor Lerma
emerged from behind the table the two engaged in a hand to hand struggle is preposterous
in the extreme.
After the second shot was fired, Governor Lerma continued his flight along the corridor
and, instead of attempting to pass out to the right into the recorder's office, which would
have exposed him to the danger of another shot while passing through the open space, he
took refuge in a closet at the end of the corridor. Once within, he shut the door and placed
himself in a position to obstruct the entrance of his pursuer, who vainly attempted to open
the door.
The governor then began to call aloud for help, and Baluyot, judging the position of the
governor's head from the direction of the sound thus emitted, fired his revolver in the
direction indicated. The bullet passed through the panel of the door and struck Governor
Lerma in the forward part of the head near and above the right temple. It passed
downwards and came out through the left eye, loosening the eyeball in its socket. This
wound was necessarily fatal, though not instantly so; and the governor evidently lost
consciousness at once. Baluyot, feeling the movement of the body within the closet, opened
the door without resistance. As he did so the body of Governor Lerma shot forward out of
the closet, as if in an attitude to embrace the slayer, who drew backwards, and the body
fell prone on the floor. In this position it remained and was found prostrate a few minutes
later by person who came upon the scene. Death ensued in about two or three hours,
without recovery of consciousness.
Baluyot, immediately after the tragedy, stepped over to a window of the room overlooking
the public square and calling to a squad of Constabulary, who were directing themselves
to the provincial building, indicated that they should come up. At the same time he threw
his revolver to the ground, with three empty shells and others that had not been discharged.
Upon the arrival of the Constabulary he surrendered without resistance.
The offense committed in this case exhibits features markedly similar to those which
characterized the crime which was the subject of prosecution in United States vs. Gil (13
Phil. Rep., 530); and the offense here committed was properly qualified by the trial judge
as murder, in which was present the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The presence of
this element is easily and in our opinion irrefutably indicated in the conditions and manner
both of the original attack and of the final act by which the offense was consummated.
With reference to the manner in which the attack was begun, the proof shows that access
was gained by Baluyot, to the governor's office upon the pretext that he desired a friendly
interview; and although the strained relations existing between the two, owing to their
political antagonisms, was appreciated by both, there was nothing in the situation to warn
the governor of impending trouble. The fact Baluyot had already been called into the office
upon the governor's first arrival and had withdrawn for a few moments to permit another
person to have an interview was also calculated to put the governor off his guard at the
moment Baluyot reentered the office. Being seated in a reclining chair, and hemmed in by
obstacles which prevented him from reaching his assailant, it is plain that the unarmed
governor could make no effectual defense against a person armed with such a deadly
weapon as a revolver. It is obvious also that the means and methods thus deliberately
selected by the assailant were intended to insure the execution of the crime without any
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party could make.
We need not detain ourselves to analyze the conditions which existed when the second
shot was fired, and we pass on to the third, with the single observation that the entire assault
from the beginning must be considered continuous and that the second shot was fired while
the victim was endeavoring to flee to a place of safety. The presence of alevosia in the firing
of the third shot seems to be too patent to permit of controversy. The victim in his effort to
escape had been driven to take refuge in the closet, and with the door shut, it was
impossible for him to see what his assailant was doing or to make any defense whatever
against the shot directed through the panel of the door. It was as if the victim had been
bound or blindfolded, or had been treacherously attacked from behind in a path obscured
by the darkness of night.
Even supposing that alevosia had not been present in the beginning of the assault, it would
be necessary to find this element present from the manner in which the crime was
consummated. In United States vs. Elicanal (35 Phil. Rep., 209) Justice Moreland said:
This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the
death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present
if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself.
While the writer of this opinion formerly held the view that, where there is no treachery in
the attack which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will
qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow was
struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless, nevertheless, the court having held so
frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established.
There was present in the offense in question the generic aggravating circumstance that said
offense was committed in a place where public authority was engaged in the discharge of
duty. (Subsec. 19, art. 10, Penal Code.) There is no discernible difference at this point
between the present case and that of United States vs. Gil (13 Phil. Rep., 530, 533), in
which this aggravating circumstance was declared to be present.
The trial court also found that the crime in question was characterized by the further
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Certain items of proof which tend
strongly to show the presence of this element may be briefly mentioned. It was testified by
one Pedro Magajes, a friend of the accused, that on July 14, 1918, Baluyot in the course of
a conversation with Magajes exhibited ill-feeling against Lerma and said that Lerma would
pay for the misfortunes that were befalling him (Baluyot). Domingo Lintag, compadre of
the accused, testified that on the Friday in the month of August, prior to the commission
of the crime in question, he saw the defendant in Orion; that when he and the defendant
shook hands the latter squeezed his hand tightly and said, "Parece ser que esta es la ultima
vez que vamos a dar la mano" [may be that this will be the last time we will shake hands].
This remark is especially noteworthy, since it shows that the accused contemplated some
occurrence which would have grave consequences to him. On the morning of August 3,
the day on which the crime was committed, the accused asked more than one person if
they thought he was in Bilibid, intimating that a false rumor to this effect had been
maliciously circulated by his arch-enemy, Governor Lerma. This shows clearly that the
mind of the accused was fixed upon Lerma as the supposed author of his wrongs.
No very satisfactory explanation is given by the accused as to the reason for his trip to
Orion and especially to Balanga; and the conclusion is irresistible that he was carried to
the latter place by a thirst for vengeance . Furthermore, the conduct of the accused in the
next day or two succeeding the commission of the crime was that of a person stimulated
by a feeling of gratification over the successful accomplishment of a fixed purpose, not the
conduct of one effected by grief over the fatal results of a sudden and unexpected
altercation. At no time did he exhibit any sign of regret for the act committed. The
conclusion reasonably to be drawn from the evidence as a whole is that the accused, for
several days prior to the perpetration of this murder, had determined to seek an interview
or encounter with Governor Lerma regardless of consequences. It is impossible to say at
what moment the determination to take life became a fixed resolution. The design to kill
was probably entertained when the accused went in the early morning of August 3 to the
governor's office, and the putting of this resolution into effect was at once determined upon
when the accused found that the governor was unarmed. In order to constitute the element
of known premeditation in the crime of murder it is not necessary that the slayer should
have prefigured in his mind all of the details of the crime or determined upon the exact
moment when he should carry his purpose into effect. It is enough that the determination
to take life should have been formed for a period sufficiently long to allow the actor time
to reflect coolly upon the character and the consequences of the act, the accomplishment
of the crime being left to some suitable opportunity such as chance or design may present.
It is thus manifest that the conclusion of the trial court that the offense was characterized
by known premeditation is by no means without support in the evidence. Nevertheless, as
an express ruling on this point is unnecessary to the disposition of the case, was concede
to the accused the benefit of the possible doubt, and we accordingly refrain from making
any express findings as to the presence of said element.
It is contended in behalf of the accused that the crime in question was qualified by two
extenuating circumstances, namely, first, that it was committed under "an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation" (art. 9, subsec. 7, Penal
Code), and, secondly, that "the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as
that committed." (Art. 9, subsec. 3, Penal Code). This contention rests upon certain
statements found in the testimony of the accused and which, in our opinion, are discredited
by other evidence. Baluyot states that he began his first interview with Governor Lerma on
August 3 by saying that he wished Diputado [delegate] Reyes of Bataan could have been
present as there were certain things which he wanted to say in the presence of them both.
Baluyot then stated that there was no doubt that Governor Lerma had won in the political
contest and that it was also undeniable that in all his own misfortunes the governor had
played an important and direct part. The governor, according to Baluyot, thereupon
replied: "viene usted con la misma queja, Sr. Baluyot, pero no somos enemigos? Si
fueramos amigos, menos mal; y usted en nuestro lugar hubiera hecho lo mismo como usted
ha hecho con mi compadre Velez que acaba de ser separado de la Guardia Nacional." [You
come with the same complaint, Mr. Baluyot, but, are we not enemies? If we were friends,
not quite so bad. If you were in our place you would have done the same as you have done
with my friend (compadre) Velez who has just been discharged from the National Guard.]
Baluyot says that in reply to this he protested that he had nothing to do with the separation
of Captain Velez from the National Guard. At his juncture the governor suggested that the
interview was going to be somewhat lengthy and requested that Baluyot should yield his
turn for a few minutes until the governor could have a short interview with Aranjuez.
Thereupon the interview was interrupted in the manner already stated, Baluyot
withdrawing for a few moments into the recorder's office.
Baluyot says that, when he was readmitted into the presence of the governor, he seated
himself in the same chair in front of the governor's desk where he had been seated before,
and the conversation was resumed. This conversation according to Baluyot was of the
following tenor:
GOVERNOR LERMA. Where do you say you are going to, Mr. Baluyot?
BALUYOT. I am thinking of going to Cebu and residing therefor some time with my
brother-in-law.
THE GOVERNOR. But you will not be able to do so very soon, perhaps until after several
months.
BALUYOT. That is not true. On my return to Manila, I'll prepare for my trip and go to
Cebu.
THE GOVERNOR. I believe you will not be able to carry that out, because Judge
Concepcion will detain you.
BALUYOT. Why?
THE GOVERNOR. Well, Judge Concepcion has sentenced you for estafa to four months,
and I don't know how many days; truly that is a good idea, to change location, a location
so full of people as Cebu where nobody knows you perhaps you may be able to cheat better.
Baluyot says that, upon being informed by Governor Lerma that Judge Concepcion had
rendered judgment against him in the estafa case condemning him to prison, he lost his
head, as he was in high hopes of being acquitted in that prosecution. He accordingly, at
the close of the foregoing words imputed to Governor Lerma, rose from his chair and used
the words which we have quoted in a former part of this opinion with reference to the
calibre of Governor Lerma's revolver, at the same time unbuttoning his coat and producing
his own weapon.
Even supposing that the conversation between the accused and Governor Lerma was
exactly as stated by Baluyot, the language used by Governor Lerma was not such as could
have produced passion and obfuscation in Baluyot sufficient to constitute the mitigating
circumstance defined in subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code. It is to be noted,
however, that no such conversation as that above transcribed could possibly have taken
place in the interval between the reentrance of Baluyot into the governor's office and the
time when the words addressed to the governor about the revolver were heard in the
recorder's office. From the testimony given by the witnesses Pedro Gonzales, Antonino
Aranjuez and Gregorio de Guzman, we consider it to be irrefutably established that the
first shot was fired within nine or ten seconds after Baluyot reentered the governor's office
and that the interval which elapsed was scarcely more than sufficient to allow Baluyot to
reach the governor's desk.
The mind of an unbiased person must also be impressed with the inverisimilitude of
imputing to Governor Lerma knowledge of a judgment rendered by a court in the City of
Manila against Baluyot of which Baluyot was ignorant, for under section 41 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure sentence in such a proceeding as that then pending against this
accused must be pronounced in the presence of the condemned person, and if Baluyot had
in fact been convicted he himself would have been among the first to learn of it. It is highly
improbable that governor Lerma would have been guilty of conduct so unbecoming as to
have engaged in bantering a political enemy over a matter so delicate, when judgment had
not in fact been pronounced. Our conclusion is that Baluyot's account of the words which
passed between him and Governor Lerma immediately prior to the firing of the first shot
must be rejected as false.
The contention that the accused had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that
committed rests upon the statement of Baluyot that the third shot was accidentally
discharged from his revolver while he was attempting to push open the door of the closet
in which the Governor had taken refuge. This pretension is hardly deserving of serious
notice, as it is refuted not only by the circumstantial evidence bearing upon this phase of
the tragedy but also by an admission made by Baluyot on August 5 in conversation with
Eusebio Reyes, reporter of a Manila newspaper. In this conversation Baluyot stated that
he pursued the deceased to the door of the closet and, having observed from the cries
emitted by Governor Lerma that the latter was seated behind the door, he (Baluyot)
discharged his pistol in the direction where he divined the governor to be. We have no
doubt as to the truth of this admission, and it is a complete refutation of the suggestion that
the discharge of the revolver was accidental.
What we have thus far said suffices to demonstrate that in slaying Governor Lerma, the
accused was guilty of murder with at least one aggravating circumstance and that the
penalty for murder was properly imposed in its maximum degree. It is, however, further
insisted in the brief of the Attorney-General that in reality two crimes were committed by
the accused in the same act, namely, murder and assault upon a person in authority. Under
this conception of the case also the penalty for murder should be imposed in its maximum
degree under article 89 of the Penal Code.
We agree with the Attorney-General upon the proposition that the same act in fact resulted
in this case in the perpetration of two crimes. That the homicide is to be characterized as
murder we have already determined; and it is undeniable that, an attack was in the same
act made upon a person in authority while exercising the duties of his office, as charged in
the complaint, since the deceased was, as a provincial governor, an authority within the
meaning of article 249 of the Penal Code. These considerations in our opinion supply an
additional irrefutable basis for the imposition of the death penalty by the trial judge though
his decision did not discuss this aspect of the case.
What has been said is sufficient to dispose of so much of the appeal as is concerned with
the commission of the offense and its legal qualification under the law. Other questions,
however, are raised relative to the conditions under which the case was called to trial and
the manner in which the prosecution was conducted in the Court of First Instance. In this
connection various errors of law are imputed, in a separate assignments, to the action of
the Hon. Carlos Imperial, who acted as judge in the court below.
In the first specification of error the appellant alleges that "he was not given ample
opportunity to defend himself," because the court denied his attorney's last request for a
continuance. Upon this ground the appellant seeks to secure from this court, if not a
reversal of the judgment, at least an order for a new trial. The assignment of error is in our
opinion without merit. It appears in evidence that on August 3, 1918, the provincial fiscal
filed an information in the court of the justice of the peace charging the accused with the
crime of murder. On the 5th, he appeared and waived the right to be defended by an
attorney and requested that the "expediente" be sent to the Court of First Instance as soon
as possible. On the 9th, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance, whereupon
Manuel Banzon, a regularly admitted member of the bar, was appointed by the court as
attorney de officio for the defendant upon the latter's request, and he was duly arraigned,
entering a plea of not guilty. On that date the attorneys for the Government asked that the
trial be set for the 12th, but the counsel for the accused requested that it be set for the 15th,
which petition was granted . After the case was called for hearing on the 15th, the court
received a telegram from Vicente Sotto, then a member of the bar in Manila, stating that
he had been employed by the family of the accused and asking that the hearing be
postponed until the following Monday. The attorneys for the Government objected to this
request but the court, nevertheless, postponed the hearing until the following day, and
Sotto was immediately notified by telegram of that order. Sotto at once departed for
Balanga and was present in court when the case was called for trial the next morning.
Banzon was authorized by the court to retire from the case only with the defendant's
consent and after Sotto had made his appearance and taken charge of the case.
From the foregoing statement it is seen that the accused was at all times represented before
the court by a competent attorney, and no fact is adduced which would enable us to say
that he was in any wise embarrassed in the making of his defense by the action of the court
in setting the case for trial on August the sixteenth and proceeding with it on that day. It
cannot be permitted that a trial court should be put in error for refusing a continuance when
there is nothing whatever to show that the accused was in fact prejudiced by the action
taken. Where a continuance is sought on the ground of want of preparation, an affidavit
should ordinarily be filed showing in what respect the applicant is not ready and that he
has made reasonable exertions to prepare for trial without success, or some good reasons
for not making such exertions. (13 Cor. Jur., 183.) Nothing of the kind was done in this
case; and when Sotto actually appeared in court and assumed the duties of attorney for the
accused, no application for a continuance of any sort was really made. On the contrary the
attorney was content merely to cause a note to be made in the record to the effect that he
respectfully protested against the telegram which the court had sent to him the day before
notifying that the cause was set for trial on the 16th. No statement whatever was made
showing why further delay was necessary. The action taken by the court was in our opinion
in no wise prejudicial and was therefore not erroneous.
In United States vs. Lao Chueco (37 Phil. Rep., 53), it was held that "when an accused is
obliged to come to trial without having the opportunity to cite his witnesses it cannot be
said that he is given the opportunity to be tried completely, fully and impartially as the law
prescribes, and a new trial will be ordered." But in that case the accused was deprived of
the opportunity to subpoena his witnesses, whereas in the case at bar neither the accused
nor his attorney informed the court that there was any witness that they wanted to be cited.
It does not appear even now that there was any essential witness whom he could have
presented had not the case been tried on August 16th. When the accused was arraigned on
August 9 the court told him that, if he had any witness that he wanted the court to
subpoena, he should so inform the court as soon as possible in order that the trial of the
case might not be delayed.
The second assignment of error raises a question which is addressed to the personal
qualification of his Honor, Carlos A. Imperial, to preside at the hearing of this case. The
exception to the trial judge was based on the fact that the latter had attended the funeral
obsequies of Governor Lerma, which had been characterized by marked manifestations of
public grief and sympathy. This fact was relied upon as showing that Judge Imperial was
biased and could not be relied on to try the accused with rectitude, justice, and impartiality.
The judge, however, did not accede to this suggestion and proceeded with the trial as
already stated. There is in our opinion no merit in the assignment. No prejudice on the part
of the judge is in fact shown, and the record by no means bears out the assumption that the
judge was in fact in any wise biased.
Furthermore, the objection raised is not based upon any of the grounds of disqualification
stated in section 8 of Act No. 190. This section expressly enumerates without ambiguity
the cases in which a judge or justice of the peace is disqualified from acting as such, and
the express enumeration of these cases excludes others. Such is the tenor of the decisions
of this court in the cases of Perfecto vs. Contreras (28 Phil. Rep., 538), and Joaquin vs.
Barretto (25 Phil. Rep., 281). In the case last cited it was held that extreme delicacy was no
ground for disqualifying a judge from trying a case. The decisions just cited are civil cases
but in the absence of express provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the analogy is
of value.
In the third assignment it is imputed as error that the court at the hearing denied a motion
of the attorney of the accused to withdraw the plea of not guilty previously entered by him
in order to permit a demurrer to be filed to the information. The attorney did not disclose
to the court the ground on which he proposed to base his demurrer, and as the information
appears to be sufficient, it is evident that this motion was merely dilatory, and the court
committed no error in refusing to accede thereto. The action of the trial court in passing
upon an application of this character is largely discretionary and is not subject to review
except where the judicial discretion appears to have been abused.
The fourth specification is addressed to the supposed error of the court in refusing to
compel the provincial fiscal to produce in court at the request of the attorney for the accused
certain written statements which had been made by the witnesses Pedro Gonzales,
Gregorio de Guzman, and Antonio Aranjuez in a preliminary inquiry conducted by the
fiscal preparatory to this prosecution. It appears that after the witnesses above mentioned
had been examined in court for the prosecution, they were turned over to the attorney for
the accused and were by him fully cross-examined. Later, when the giving of testimony for
the prosecution had been concluded, the defense proceeded to introduce sundry witnesses
who were examined in due course. After four had thus testified, and immediately before
the accused was placed upon the stand in his own behalf, his attorney made the request
that the declarations or statements above referred to should be produced. The attorney for
the prosecution objected on the ground that one party cannot be compelled to produced
evidence in favor of the other. The court was of the opinion that the written declarations
the production of which was sought were of a privileged nature and accordingly overruled
the motion. We are of the opinion that the court was not in error in refusing to compel the
production of the documents in question. They were not original or independent evidence
of such a character as to give the accused an unqualified right to compel their production,
and no proper basis was laid in the cross-examination of the witnesses who had made those
statements to justify their production with a view to the impeachment of the declarants.
The request was of course based upon the supposition or expectation that if the statements
of the witnesses before the fiscal were produced, they might be found to contain something
different from what was contained in their testimony given in court.
We know of no rule of practice which sustains the contention of the appellant. The
statements in question were not the sworn declarations of witnesses taken in conformity
with the requirements of section 13 of General Orders, No 58, and which are commonly
attached to the "expediente" transmitted by the committing magistrate to the Court of First
Instance. In the case at bar the preliminary examination before the committing magistrate
was waived by the accused, and the declarations of the witnesses for the prosecution were
therefore not taken before the magistrate. The declarations referred to were, on the
contrary, taken in an investigation conducted by the fiscal under the authority of section
1687 of the Administrative Code. This section authorizes the fiscal, if he deems it wise, to
conduct an investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor for the purpose of
instituting or carrying on a criminal prosecution. It is expressly declared that this section
shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal to act as a justice of the peace in any
preliminary investigation. The proceeding here contemplated is of an administrative
character, and the information thereby acquired is intended for the use of the fiscal in the
conduct of the prosecution. Such declarations therefore pertain to the official file in the
office of the public prosecutor and are not subject to production at the mere request of the
attorney for the accused where no ground therefor had been laid.
In order that we may not be misunderstood, as well as for the purpose of clarifying the
practice in such matters, a few words may here by properly said in respect to the proper
mode of proceeding in a case where a party wishes to get before the court contradictory
statements made by a witness who is testifying for the adversary party. For instance, if the
attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro Gonzales, had
made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that given in
his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining
said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make
such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different
from that delivered in court. If the witness admits the making of such contradictory
statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the witness has the
opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if the witness denies
making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the
witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce
the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This
process of cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is
called in the practice of the American courts "laying a predicate" for the introduction of
contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid
upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to
impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of
the court.
We wish to add that in a case of this kind, if the accused had, by affidavit or otherwise,
made it appear to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses named had made
statements in their declarations before the fiscal materially at variance with their statements
in court and that the production of said declarations was necessary or even desirable, in
the interests of justice, the court would have had ample power to order their production.
No such showing, or intimation, was made in this case; and the attorney who made the
motion was merely angling at random to discover something that might prove to be
favorable to his client. To put a court in error for refusing to entertain such a motion would
encourage frivolous delays and tend to embarrass the speedy and proper administration of
justice.
The last assignment directed to supposed error of law in the action of the trial court is to
the effect that the judge made his decision without hearing the assessors who acted at the
trial. In this connection it appears that at the request of the accused two assessors were
appointed in accordance with the provisions of sections 153-161 of Act No. 190, which
provisions were extended to criminal causes by Act No. 2369 of the Philippine Legislature.
The record does not show that the assessors in the case before us were in fact consulted by
the judge, and the decision of the court makes no mention of them. We are of the opinion
that the irregularity, if such it be, is immaterial. The functions of the assessor are purely
advisory, and the responsibility for the decision rests exclusively with the judge. The statute
does not require that the opinions of the assessors shall be recorded except where two or
more assessors are of the opinion that the court's findings of fact are wrong. In the silence
of the record it is to be presumed not only that the functions of the assessors were properly
performed but that they agreed with the findings of the court. This presumption is borne
out in the case before us by the circumstance that after the records of the case had been sent
up to this court, the clerk of court of Bataan forwarded as part of said records certifications
signed by the assessors who had sat in the case, stating that they had read the decision
rendered by the court and that they concurred in the findings of fact made therein. It is not
necessary that the record should affirmatively show that the judge consulted the assessors
before making his decision as in the absence of a showing to the contrary it is to be
presumed that he did so.
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that, in the view sustained by the majority of
the members of this court, no material error was committed by the trial judge either in the
mode of conducting the trial or in the qualification of the crime and fixing the penalty
attendant thereupon. However, as one of the Justices of this court is not in accord with the
majority with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
imposed must, in conformity with the requirements of Act No. 2726 of the Philippine
Legislature, be reduced from death to cadena perpetua with the accessory penalties
prescribed in article 54 of the Penal Code. As thus modified the judgment appealed from
is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Malcolm, J., was not present at the argument, and did not take part in the disposition of
the case.
Moir, J., voted with the majority of the court for the affirmance of the judgment, but on
account of his absence at the time of the promulgation of this opinion his name does not
appear signed thereto. (Sgd.) C. S. Arellano.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the foregoing opinion of the Justices in regard to the classification of the
crime committed by the accused Jose I. Baluyot and the penalty which ought to be imposed
upon him.
After a careful study of the case, in my opinion the death of Governor Conrado Lerma of
the Province of Bataan caused by Baluyot in the morning of August 3, 1918, cannot be
qualified by alevosia (treachery), and consequently the crime committed by said accused is
that of homicide. Wherefore, the penalty corresponding to said crime should have been
imposed.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the
offended party might make. (Art. 10, par. 2, of the Penal Code.)
It is a doctrine upheld repeatedly by the courts that the circumstances which qualify the
homicide, converting same into murder, ought to be proven by the prosecution like the
homicide itself, to wit, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the same may be qualified as
murder and the corresponding penalty imposed; that in order that the crime of murder may
be considered established, it is requisite that there appear proved in a manner evident and
undisputable one of the circumstances enumerated in article 403 of the Penal Code; that
mere presumptions and hypothetical deductions do not suffice for their appraisal and
justification. It has also been held repeatedly that before treachery can be considered as a
qualifying circumstance of the crime of homicide, it is requisite that there appear as clearly
proven that regarding it no doubt whatever presents itself, arising from suppositions
founded on facts which may have been the subject matter of the evidence at the trial.
It was proven: First, that the accused Jose I. Baluyot, between 10 and 11 a.m. of August 3,
1918, finding himself in the room or office of the provincial governor of Bataan, Conrado
Lerma, alone with the latter, with a revolver which he was carrying fired, first, two shots
at short intervals at said governor — the first shot while the governor was seated in front
of his writing desk, the second while he, having stood up, was in the act of betaking himself
to a little passage-way leading to a corridor adjoining the office, — and afterwards a third,
the said Lerma then being behind the door of a closet, wherein he took refuge, fleeing from
his pursuer who aimed said third shot through said door; second, that the projectile of the
first shot entered the frontal region of Lerma's right shoulder blade, that is to say (as Dr.
Mencias, who examined him five minutes after the incident has stated), the region below
the upper right clavicle, passing through the said part of the body, the back of the chair in
which Lerma was sitting and lodging itself in the wall of the room behind the chair; third,
that the projectile of the second shot also entered the same part of Lerma's body but about
one or two inches from the first, passed through the body and, like the first, came out of
the shoulder blade on the same side — said wounds not being necessarily mortal except in
case of complications; and fourth, that the projectile of the third shot penetrated the panel
of the door behind which the decease had taken refuge, struck him in the right temporal
region, coming out of the left eye and destroying same, this would being necessarily mortal
and serious for the cerebrum was penetrated, the result being that the wounded Lerma,
without being able to say a word and without recovering consciousness, died at 2:35 p.m.
of the same day, or approximately three hours after having been wounded.
Governor Lerma and the accused Baluyot being alone in the governor's office when
Baluyot, making use of the revolver which he was carrying, began the attack; and nobody
having witnessed what occurred between them before the one began the attack upon the
other or during the same; and the one attacked having died without being able to say a
word, on account of the gravity of the wound caused by the last shot; it is undeniable that
no one, with the exception of the accused himself, has been in a position to relate what
took place then between him and the deceased.
It is said in the majority decision that the accused, in the morning of the third day of August
aforesaid, was awaiting Governor Lerma in the recorder's office, a sort of anteroom to the
governor's office; that on the governor's arrival about 11 o'clock a.m. after an exchange of
friendly greeting and handshaking the accused was invited first by the governor into said
office, in preference to another caller called Aranjuez who was also waiting; that the
accused entered and, the two remained alone in said office for 3 or 4 minutes, but as it
appeared to the governor that the interview would be longer, he requested the accused to
go out a minute in order to confer with said Antonio Aranjuez. The accused did so,
Aranjuez entered the governor's office and had a few minutes conference. As soon as this
was over, the accused reentered the governor's office and that was when the
aforementioned three shots fired successively by the accused, were heard.
Referring to what took place then between him and Governor Lerma, the accused said that
he came that morning from Orion to Balanga where he had been during the first hours of
the same morning occupied in shipping his wife's piano to Manila, his purpose being to
have an interview with the Representative of said province, Reyes, and Governor Lerma,
to talk over certain things with them and to bid them good-bye before leaving for Cebu as
he intended to do, but as Representative Reyes was not in town then, his interview was
only with the governor; that the first time he met the governor in his office telling him the
object of his visit, Lerma said: "I can almost guess what you want to say to me;" that he
answered: "So much the better. That will save me time. There is not the least doubt but
that you have defeated me, just as it is also almost undeniable that in all of my misfortunes
as these documents I have in my hands prove, you have had very important and direct
participation;" that the governor then replied: "You come with the same complaint, Mr.
Baluyot, but, are we not enemies? If we were friends, not quite so bad. If you were in our
place you would have done the same, as you have done with my friend (compadre) Velez
who has just been discharged from the National Guard;" that after having denied that he
had any thing to do with Captain Velez's discharge the governor asked him if his interview
would be long and if he would be willing to grant Aranjuez, who was waiting in the
recorder's office, his turn with whom he (governor) would have a short interview that in
compliance with the governor's suggestion he withdrew to the recorder's office and,
Aranjuez's interview with the governor being over, he reentered said office and resumed
the previous conversation in the following words:
GOVERNOR LERMA. Where do you say you are going, Mr. Baluyot?
BALUYOT. I am thinking of going to Cebu and residing there for some time with my
brother-in-law.
GOVERNOR. But you will not be able to do so very soon, perhaps not until after several
months.
BALUYOT. That's not true. On my return to Manila I'll prepare for my trip and go to
Cebu.
GOVERNOR. I believe you will not be able to carry that out, because Judge Concepcion
will detain you.
BALUYOT. Why?
GOVERNOR. Well, Judge Concepcion has sentenced you for estafa to four months, and
I don't know how many days;" that when he heard this he lost his head, as he was in high
hopes of winning the case or of being acquitted in the prosecution; that the governor
continued saying to him; "Truly that is a good idea, to change residence in a place so full
of people as Cebu, where nobody knows you, perhaps you may be able to cheat (estafar)
better; that then he got up from his seat and addressed the governor in these words: "It
appears to me that your revolver and mine have the same calibre;" that the governor
answered: "No, sir; mine is 32;" that to this he replied: "So is mine. Be prepared because
one of us must die," that upon saying this he opened his coat and drew his revolver; that
then the governor raised his right hand putting it right on the shelf where there was a sword
(cris), but on seeing the revolver out of its case he cried out: "Oh! Mother! guard!;" that he
(the accused) fired the first shot; that the governor having fallen towards the East, he again
pulled the trigger of the revolver, but having missed his shot while he was fixing the trigger,
the governor got up grabbing him in order to reach his right hand with which he was fixing
the trigger, and after this struggle he (governor) fled starting to run towards the corridor;
that he then approached the door of the closet, wherein the governor had taken refuge,
with the trigger raised, and when he tried to push said door the revolver went off, the
accused not knowing whether it was the third or fourth shot; that after this shot the door
was half-opened; that on pushing it, the governor got up in an attitude to embrace him,
and he then believed that the governor was trying to struggle with him, but the governor
took one step backward and fell prostrated completely on the floor; that he was
immediately arrested afterwards by the constabulary to whom he voluntarily surrendered;
and that before this he threw from the window his revolver with the cartridges remaining
in order that the constabulary soldiers in front of said widow should take charge of them.
While the foregoing facts were taking place in the governor's office manner stated by the
accused, in the adjoining recorder's office were the recorder himself (Pedro Gonzalez),
Antonio Aranjuez who had a few moments before left the governor's office, and Gregorio
de Guzman, the provincial assessor, who were produced at the hearing as witnesses for the
prosecution.
Pedro Gonzalez testified that, while seated in his office chair, that is in front of the table
marked No. 9 in the prosecution's plan, Exhibit B, and shortly after the accused entered
the governor's office after Antonino Aranjuez's interview had come to an end, he heard
one pistol shot, that the time from the moment the accused entered the aforesaid office
until he (the witness) heard said first shot was enough for the accused to go from the
witness' office to the governor's desk or about two seconds, calculating the distance
between his desk and the governor's to be only some ten steps; that having left his office,
going towards the engineer's office in order to ask for help and being in front of said office,
he heard a second shot; that the time which elapsed between the first and second shots was
about 20 or 30 seconds, the distance between his office and that of the engineer being about
15 or 20 meters; that having immediately gone to the auditor's office, in the lower story of
the building, he heard the third shot, more than a minute after the second.
The second witness, Antonio Aranjuez, testified that after he had been some two minutes
only in the governor's office, talking with the governor, who said he would be appointed
chief of police of the municipality of Limay, he left the governor in his chair, went to the
adjoining office of the recorder and there, to a question of the accused, replied that his
interview with the governor was now over; that then the accused entered the governor's
office; and he (witness) was not yet seated in a chair in the recorder's office, in the place
marked with the letter Y in the said Exhibit B, and was in the act of picking up a penholder,
when he heard the accused Baluyot say "governor" and immediately afterwards a shot; that
on hearing said shot, he ran towards the door opening into the governor's office, reached
the side of a screen next to said door, and from there saw the accused fire a second shot
with his revolver at the governor; that he then began to run first towards the warden's office,
in the lower part of the building, in order to ask for help and afterwards towards the
Constabulary barracks; that just as he was about to go out of the front door of said
provincial building, he heard the third shot fired from the same place as the two other shots;
that the time from the moment the accused entered the governor's office until he heard the
first shot was 9 or 10 seconds; that from the first to the second shot was 5 or 6 seconds; and
that from the second to the third shot was 3 or 4 minutes, more or less.
The third witness, Gregorio de Guzman, the provincial assessor, testified in turn that when
the accused Baluyot entered the governor's office, he was very near the recorder's desk and
approximately one meter from the door which was between the governor's office and that
of the recorder; that at the moment he was saying good-bye and leaving the recorder's desk
to go to his own office, he heard the accused Baluyot asking the governor for his revolver
saying: "I would like to see your revolver," that as he was taking hold of the door to go out
of the recorder's office, he could not understand the other words of the accused, who was
then talking in a natural tone without any indication of a quarrel; that he heard the
aforementioned words on going out towards the corridor, and for this reason he could not
say whether or not the governor answered; that Baluyot spoke those words as soon as he
(Baluyot) was in front of the governor because Baluyot entered the governor's office while
the witness was in the recorder's office; that the distance between the recorder's desk and
that of the governor was some 9 meters, more or less; that after leaving and while in front
of the engineer's office, he heard a pistol shot coming from the place where he had been;
that the time from the moment he heard Baluyot's words addressed to the governor until
he heard said shot was, according to his opinion 9 or 11 seconds; that the distance between
the recorder's office and that of the engineer was 10 to 11 meters, more or less, and he was
then walking naturally; that upon returning to the recorder's office because he had heard
the shot coming from that place and supposed it was an accidental one, he could not enter
said office for, when he was about to enter he heard a second shot, and he saw coming out,
Antonino Aranjuez, who said that Baluyot had fired at the governor; that the time from
the first to the second shot was about 5 or 6 seconds; that after hearing the second shot and
seeing Aranjuez he went to the provincial guard room, called the guards from the steps of
the building, and then to the warden to tell him what was going on upstairs; that after
loading his revolver and after asking the warden if he would go to help the governor, and
while he was on the stairway, he heard another shot; that finding nobody there, and having
entered the auditor's office, which was open, and in which were the provincial assessor and
an employee of the treasurer's office, he heard another pistol shot fired from the governor's
office; and that the time from the second to the third shot was about 2 or 3 minutes.
And, finally, said three witnesses for the prosecution declared that they had not noted nor
heard any dispute, altercation, quarrel by words or blows between Governor Lerma and
the accused from the time the latter entered the governor's office and before the first shot
was heard.
Now then, if, according to the recorder, Pedro Gonzalez, only some two seconds elapsed
from the moment the accused entered the governor's office until he reached the governor's
desk and fired the first shot, said witness made it clearly understood that the accused had
no time enough to hold with the governor the dialogue related by said accused in his
testimony, but suddenly, unexpectedly and instantaneously fired his first revolver shot at
the governor as soon as he was near him. But it is not explained nor is it comprehensible,
unless said witness has not told the whole truth, why the second witness, Antonino
Aranjuez (who was going to take a seat at a table in the very end of the same recorder's
office which, according to plan Exhibit B, is 5 meters and 96 centimeters long and away
from the recorder's table approximately this same distance, as is shown in said plan) heard
the accused, after having entered the governor's office, say "governor" before hearing the
first shot, and affirmed also that the time that passed from the moment the accused entered
the governor's office until he heard said first shot was 9 to 10 seconds. Neither does one
understand how the recorder, Gonzales, heard the first shot fired by the accused two
seconds after the latter entered the governor's office and as soon as he had reached the
governor's desk, without making mention of having heard the accused say some word to
the governor, when the third witness Gregorio de Guzman, the provincial assessor, (who
was precisely at the side of the recorder and next to the door separating the office of the
latter and that of the governor; i. e., in the same place where the recorder was) heard the
accused say, upon entering the governor's office, "Governor, I would like to see your
revolver." But, it is far more incomprehensible that when the aforementioned witness
Guzman heard the accused utter the aforesaid words he was taking leave of the recorder,
as he testified, and leaving the table of the former bound for his own table (that belonging
to the provincial assessor) but that he heard the first shot only when he was in front of the
door of the engineer's office which was about 10 or 11 meters from the recorder's office and
only after 9 or 11 seconds after having heard Baluyot ask the governor for his revolver; i.
e., the witness being already outside of the recorder's office and having walked a distance
of about 10 or 11 meters from this office to the engineer's a distance much greater than that
intervening between the door of the recorder's office and where the governor's table was,
as may be seen in the plan Exhibit B.
It is evident that the three witnesses having referred to the same act, having been placed
under similar condition so as to have been advised of what the accused may have said to
the governor before firing the first shot, and having heard the first shot, no one of them
ought to have failed to have perceived that which the others heard from the accused when
the latter talked to the governor. If the object of the prosecution in presenting these
witnesses was to prove that Governor Lerma was unsuspectedly and suddenly assaulted
by the accused immediately on having placed himself in front of the former, firing at him
the first shot which caused a wound in his right shoulder blade, and immediately thereafter
the second shot which struck exactly the same part of his body, one or two inches from the
first, and to prove also that between the accused and the governor no words were
exchanged nor did the said dialogue ever take place, it is evident that said object has not
been obtained. The discrepancy and contradiction in the testimony of the two witnesses,
Antonino Aranjuez and Gregorio de Guzman, on the one hand, and that of the other
witness, Pedro Gonzalez, on the other hand, is so evident that one is unable to infer from
their respective testimony what took place between Governor Lerma and the accused while
the two were alone in the office of the former, before the accused assaulted the governor,
and at the time the first shot was fired followed immediately by the second is a positive and
proven fact.
However, in the foregoing decision the majority say that, from the testimony given by the
aforementioned three witnesses, they consider irrefutably established that the first shot was
fired within 9 or 10 seconds after Baluyot reentered the governor's office, and that the
interval which intervened was scarcely more then sufficient to allow Baluyot to reach the
governor's desk.
I do not believe that the evidence warrants such a conclusion. Aside from the fact that for
the reasons already set forth absolute credit cannot be conceded said three witnesses in all
that each has stated regarding the particulars already mentioned, it is indisputable that, if
it be accepted as an established fact that the first shot was fired within 9 or 10 seconds, it
cannot be accepted at the same time as certain that the interval which intervened after the
accused reentered the governor's office or, better said, went to this office from the recorder's
was hardly more than sufficient to allow the accused to reach the governor's desk, for the
simple reason that what is deduced from the testimony of Antonino Aranjuez and Gregorio
de Guzman regarding the first point is an evident contradiction of what the recorder,
Gonzalez, said regarding the second or last point. The recorder said that the distance
between his desk and that of the governor was only some 10 paces and that the time
intervening from the moment the accused entered the governor's office until he (the
witness) heard the first shot was some two seconds or the time sufficient, according to said
witness, to reach the governor's desk from that office. But according to the affirmations of
Aranjuez the first shot was fired within the 9 or 10 seconds after the accused had reentered
the governor's office, and according to De Guzman from 9 to 11 seconds elapsed after
Baluyot was heard saying to the governor that he would like to see his (the governor's)
revolver (words that Baluyot uttered upon arriving in front of the governor) until the first
shot was heard, said witness being then in front of the engineer's office. Wherefore it cannot
be affirmed that what the recorder Gonzalez told about the particulars in question is not
true, because, as anybody, watch in hand, can prove it, the distance of 10 steps between
two points cannot be covered walking at natural pace and not hurriedly, in 2 seconds only;
but from 8 to 9 seconds. Regarding the other two witnesses, one cannot deny that the basis
for their computation of the time intervening from one moment to another was only
reliable in a small degree and easily fallible when before-hand (i.e., from the first moment)
there had been no intention to determine it, and even so, any calculation is not able always
to come out exact. These two witnesses could have just as well said that the time
intervening from the moment stated by each respectively in this affirmation until they heard
the first shot was from 20, 30, 50, seconds or one minute more, without anybody
contradicting them and without their giving any reason justificative of said computation,
as they have said that it was from 9 to 10 or 11 seconds. It is to be noted also that said
Aranjuez and De Guzman have come to agree in their computations regarding the first
shot, the first saying it was from 9 to 10 seconds the second from 9 to 11; and also regarding
the time which transpired from the first shot to the second, the two saying it was some 5 to
6 seconds — coincidence which is rather strange as far as it reveals complete identity in the
computation made by the two, and rather unnatural and unexpected, especially if there is
taking into consideration the circumstances in which are unrolled the events to which said
computation refers. And so much the more strange as the other witness, Gonzalez, has not
coincided with the other witnesses in the computation which concerns the first shot as
much as the second, for according to said witness between the first and the second shot
passed not 5 or 6 seconds, but 20 or 30 seconds.
Therefore, in my judgment, the aforementioned conclusion cannot be reached by means
of the testimony of the witnesses who were in the secretary's office, i.e., of the three
witnesses above named; nor can it be conclusively deduced from same, as is also stated in
the same decision, that, immediately upon asking the governor about his revolver, and
discovering that he was defenseless, Baluyot drew his own revolver and fired.
However, in order to arrive at said conclusion, the majority has had under consideration
various facts and circumstances which are related in the same decision indicative of the
purpose then conceived, according to the majority, by the accused to kill treacherously
Governor Lerma.
In fact it is said in the majority decision that the governor, upon being informed that
Baluyot had gone there to have an interview with him, invited Baluyot to pass into his
office; but Baluyot hesitated, having noted the presence of another caller, and asked if the
latter did not have a prior right to an interview with the governor.
What follows from the evidence regarding this particular is that: First, according to the
recorder, Pedro Gonzalez, who was then in his office, when Governor Lerma arrived and
saw Baluyot he greeted the latter and invited him to pass into his office and that Baluyot
went in; second, according to Antonino Aranjuez, when the governor arrived in the
recorder's office, he greeted everybody, saying "good morning," that they, in turn, greeted
him, that Baluyot shook hands with the governor who then invited Baluyot to enter his
office saying: "Come here, friend, pass in," and then Baluyot asked: "Which of us two, Mr.
Aranjuez or myself, is the one who ought to enter first?" and the governor answered: "You
ought to enter first," and in fact, the governor and Baluyot entered into the former's office;
and third, according to the same accused, Baluyot, in that morning he was in the recorder's
office where he found an employee typewriting; that the recorder Gonzalez and Aranjuez
arrived after he did; that when the governor arrived all greeted each other as usual; that the
governor having invited him, saying: "Come in," he (the accused), before entering the
governor's office, asked the recorder who of those waiting for the governor had the prior
right to enter, that the recorder said: "He who had arrived first ought to enter first," then
he (the accused) entered the governor's office; the accused added furthermore, in his
testimony (rec., 236) that the provincial assessor, Gregorio de Guzman, having entered the
recorder's office while Aranjuez was in the governor's office, he (the accused) said to the
recorder the following: "Mr. Gonzalez, I give you notice that the next turn is mine and not
Mr. Gregorio de Guzman, who has just come," and De Guzman answered: "Yes, I give
my turn to you," and that after Antonino Aranjuez had come out of the same he (the
accused) then entered the governor's office.
As it appears from the foregoing facts, the accused did not hesitate to enter into the
governor's office because he had noted the presence of another caller. The truth is that,
upon having been invited by the governor into his office, the accused went in but before
entering, he showed himself disposed to enter after Aranjuez if his turn was not prior,
having first asked the recorder whose turn it was of those who were waiting for the
governor. Certainly, it cannot be said from this that the accused should have shown
hesitation then because he should want to be alone with the governor in his office, as it
seems to be given to infer in the majority decision. And it is so much the more certain that
the accused did not hesitate to enter the governor's office inasmuch as when Gregorio de
Guzman was also in the office, he reminded the recorder, that he had prior right to enter
the governor's office than De Guzman, who had only recently arrived.
In my judgment, the conclusion in the majority decision that "The fact that Baluyot had
already been called into the office upon the governor's first arrival and had withdrawn for
a few moments to permit another person to have an interview was also calculated to put
the governor off his guard at the moment Baluyot reentered the office" must also be
rectified. From the evidence, it does not appear that the initiative or the idea of
withdrawing from Governor Lerma's office at that moment had come from Baluyot but,
on the contrary, it was the governor himself, as the majority decision says verbatim, who
"requested Baluyot to withdraw long enough for the governor to confer with Antonino
Aranjuez, the other caller to whom reference has been made," in view of its having
occurred to the governor that the interview which he was then having with the accused
might be more extended than he had expected. Moreover, in his testimony (rec. 215)
relative to this incident, the accused said that, in his first interview with the governor after
having protested that he had nothing to do with Captain Velez' separation from the
National Guard, the governor asked him: "Is our interview going to be very long Mr.
Baluyot? Do you wish to give your turn to Mr. Aranjuez who has a short interview?" and
he answered he had no objection to this; that in view of the governor's suggestion, he went
out of the office to say to Aranjuez almost at the same time that the governor was calling
him; and that he passed into the recorder's office.
Baluyot did not then of his own free will withdraw from the governor's office in order that
in the meanwhile Antonino Aranjuez should enter in said office and have a short interview
with the governor. Nor can it be inferred that the governor was off his guard the moment
the accused reentered his office from the fact that said accused had withdrawn from the
same office for a few moment. The inference is exactly the contrary because, the governor
knowing the accused was waiting in the recorder's office so that Aranjuez should finish his
interview, he must have been aware that the accused was going to return in his office as
soon as Aranjuez should go out. In a word, the governor must have been waiting for
Baluyot in his office, immediately after Aranjuez departed therefrom.
In the same decision it is said that in the testimony given by Baluyot, mention is made of
a circumstance seemingly to the majority of importance regarding Governor Lerma'
defenselessness when Baluyot, after asking him for his revolver, drew his own and fired.
According to the decision, Baluyot said, "That while he was sitting in the recorder's office,
awaiting the arrival of Governor Lerma, Paulo Venegas, a guard attached to the provincial
jail, came up and after speaking in a low voice with the recorder, entered the governor's
office and presently emerged bringing a revolver and some cartridges. Baluyot noticed that
the revolver was discharged and remarked to the person having it in hand that an unloaded
revolver is less useful even than a cane. The guard replied that he was not the person
charged with loading it, but was going to take it out be cleaned, whereupon he disappeared
carrying the revolver with him." And the majority infer that, naturally, from the foregoing
fact Baluyot must have supposed that the revolver seen by him was a weapon commonly
kept in the governor's office and that the latter upon arrival would be unarmed in his office,
unless he should possibly bring a revolver upon his person, and they concluded that this
circumstance showed that the word directed to Governor Lerma immediately before the
fatal attack against him were intended to discover whether Governor Lerma was in fact
unarmed, and that, upon discovering that Governor Lerma did not have his weapon at
hand, the accused at one drew his own weapon and fired, and that Baluyot therefore knew
Governor Lerma to be unarmed and practically defenseless, and it is plain that attack was
not begun until the assailant was fully assured upon this point.
In fact, it appears in evidence, from the testimony of the accused, that after narrating the
conversation which took place between him, the recorder, and the other people in the office
of the latter and what he saw and observed at that moment while he was in said office and
before Governor Lerma's arrival, he said that Paulo Venegas, the warden of the provincial
jail, entered the aforesaid office where they were, and after whispering some words to the
recorder, the latter went into the governor's office returning therefrom with a revolver and
some cartridges which he delivered to said warden; that as the latter stayed for a while near
them, pulling the trigger of the revolver which was discharged, he remarked to the warden
that an unloaded revolver is less useful even than a cane, and the warden replied that he
was going to take out said weapon to be cleaned. But in his testimony as witness for the
prosecution, and before the accused had testified in these terms in his own behalf, (for he
testified when the defense offered their evidence) the recorder Gonzalez himself said (rec.,
83) that in that morning the warden of the jail took from him a revolver, before the accused
first met or interviewed the governor; and that the accused was present when he delivered
the revolver to the warden; and (in answer to a question propounded upon him by the
court) that said revolver belonged to the warden because when the latter and the governor
returned from Manila, it was left in his care.
If follows, therefore, that, if the accused saw or believed to have seen the recorder taking
the revolver from the governor's office before delivering it to the warden, the truth was that
the recorder had in his care the revolver which did not belong to the governor but to the
warden, who took it with him upon leaving the recorder's office to have it cleaned, as the
warden himself has testified. From the fact that the warden, upon leaving the recorder's
office, took with him said revolver, which he had received from the former (as said warden
testified that it was given to him) even if the accused must have supposed that said revolver
was a weapon commonly kept in the governor's office, it cannot be said that same accused
might have also supposed that the governor upon arrival would be unarmed in his office;
because, as the same decision says the governor could have possibly brought a revolver
upon his person, and Baluyot could have very well believed this since he was also carrying
his. Moreover, what must be inferred from the very fact that the accused had mentioned in
his testimony this circumstance (that he had seen a revolver given by the recorder to the
warden which, according to the accused himself, the recorder took from the governor's
office) without having been questioned upon this fact but which he spontaneously gave
when he referred, among other things, to the conversation which took place between him
and the people in the recorder's office and to the things he saw therein while waiting for
the governor, appears to be that the accused did not take advantage nor tried to take
advantage of what he had seen; i.e., that the revolver, which the warden took out with him
was not in the governor's office at the time he attacked the latter; because, if it had been so,
he would not have made mention of said revolver in his testimony, nor that the recorder
took it from the governor's office and gave it to the warden, as he was not examined upon
this point when he was testifying. Said statement was spontaneously and voluntarily made
by him, and it is natural and even common sense that if he wanted to take advantage of
what he had seen and he was sure that said revolver was no longer in the governor's office,
he would not have asked the governor any more of his revolver (as the witness Gregorio
de Guzman has said) before firing his own revolver at him. This shows that he had not
been aware of that fact, otherwise he would have hidden and denied it in his testimony
even if he been examined about it, instead of referring to it spontaneously and voluntarily
as he did.
In narrating the facts which took place between the governor and the accused while they
were alone in the office of the former when said accused fired his revolver at said governor,
already mentioned, the majority decision says that the second shot should apparently have
entered from behind the victim. And although same decision goes on to say that this point
is of little importance, inasmuch as it is obvious that Baluyot was the aggressor throughout
and that the second shot was fired at an unarmed man whose only purpose was to effect
an escape to a place of safety, the consideration of such a circumstance has undoubtedly
influenced the mind of the majority (as the other circumstances mentioned in said decision)
in determining that the means and methods employed by the accused in attacking and
killing Governor Lerma were treacherous. It is beyond all doubt that Governor Lerma was
sitting in the chair which was in front of his desk (marked with the number 2 in the plan
Exhibit B) somewhat reclining backwards in said chair, and that when the accused fired
the first shot he was in front of the governor who must have also immediately stood up
from his seat, directing himself towards the corridor which was on the left side of the seat
or chair where he was sitting. The first shot struck the superclavicular region or the frontal
region of the right shoulder blade of the victim, passing through the aforesaid part of the
body (as the majority decision says), and penetrating the back of the chair in which the
governor was sitting.
According to Antonino Aranjuez, who upon hearing the first shot, entered the governor's
office, placing himself at the side of a screen which was before the door of said office,
(marked with the letter "m" in the plan Exhibit B) from said place he saw the accused fire
the second shot with his revolver at the governor who was at this moment fleeing towards
the corridor, and was at the point marked with the letter "n" in said plan, with his right
hand raised to his right shoulder, the accused being then at the point marked with the letter
"ñ" in same plan, and the governor's face was turned in the direction of his flight, towards
the corridor or the southeastern part of the building, just by and towards the right side of
the accused who was in front of the governor, and he (Aranjuez) thought that the governor
could have seen what Baluyot was doing. The majority decision says, regarding this
particular, that the witness Aranjuez makes it clear that as the matter presented itself to his
eye, the governor was fleeing with his right side, rather than his front, exposed to Baluyot.
Dr. Bonifacio Mencias, the sanitary official of Bataan, who examined the governor's
wounds five minutes after they were inflicted and while the victim was yet living, says, in
the medical certificate which he gave on that same day, August 3, that he found in
Governor Lerma's body the following wound: "Two wounds inflicted with a firearm in the
region of the upper-right clavicle coming out of the region of the right shoulder-blade a
wound coming out (?) in the region of the right temple. The first two wounds are not
mortal, but the third was mortal, it having penetrated the cerebrum." At the hearing same
Doctor Mencias, testifying for the prosecution, said that Conrado Lerma had three
perforating wounds and were located: one in the head entering the right temple and coming
out of the left side, and the other in the right shoulder coming out of the shoulder-blade of
the same side. In this same testimony he went on to say that Governor Lerma's two wounds
in the right shoulder had entered from in front and had come out from the region of the
shoulder-blade (rec., 19); that in his judgment the shots which the governor received in his
right shoulder were fired in front of him (rec., 27); that one of said wounds must have been
received by the governor while he was sitting; that one of said wounds was one and one-
half inches from the other (rec., 28). In explaining why there was but one hole at the back
of the chair (c) of the plan Exhibit B, where the governor was sitting in spite of the fact that
near the governor's right shoulder there were two wounds with four holes (two exit wounds
and two entrance wounds), the same Doctor Mencias said that he believed that one of the
wounds in the right shoulder must have been inflicted upon the governor when he arose
from his chair. And when he was asked by the court "You testified that those two wounds
in the right shoulder could have been inflicted from the governor's front, what do you mean
in using the word front?" he answered: "I mean to say that he received the wounds while
he was in front of the assailant" (rec., 29).
From an examination of the plan Exhibit B, it appears that if the accused was at the point
marked with the letter (ñ) and Governor Lerma was going towards the corridor being at
the point marked with the letter (n) when the former fired the second shot at the latter, (as
it has been said Aranjuez had seen it) the projectile of the second shot could not have
entered in the region of the upper-right clavicle or the region in front of the right shoulder-
blade and coming out of the region of the shoulder-blade (scapula) or the victim's back of
the same side, but just the reverse, for according to the position in which the governor was
at that moment (facing the corridor towards which he was going, as it was stated by
Aranjuez), a straight line drawn from the point (ñ), where the accused was, (according to
Aranjuez himself) to the point (n) where the governor was (according to same witness),
must terminate, not in front or in the front part of the victim, but precisely in the right side
of his back or the back part, and therefore the bullet of the first shot must have entered here
and must have come out of the region of the upper-right clavicle or the front part of the
body of said victim. Moreover, each of the holes where the projectiles entered, according
to an express testimony of Doctor Mencias, was in the region of the upper-right clavicle or
the region in front of the right shoulder-blade, near the right shoulder, in front of the victim;
and each one of the holes where said projectiles passed out was in the rear part of same
shoulder or the region of the right shoulder-blade, with the circumstance, furthermore, that
between the two wounds in said region of the upper-right clavicle, or the region in front of
the right shoulder-blade, there was a distance of one or two inches (according to the
majority decision, when it mentioned the wound produced by the second shot). These are
very evident proofs that the first two shots were fired by the accused when Governor Lerma
was in front of him.
However, the majority decision says that the inspection made by this doctor may have been
superficial, and his opinion may have been partly a matter of mere inference from his
information as to the general features of the tragedy, and that at any rate he does not state
any particular from which it could clearly be discovered that the second shot entered the
front. I do not believe that more details are necessary, nor that there are clearer details than
those given by Doctor Mencias in this inspection (rec., 2) and in his statements found can
be seen in the cited pages of his testimony. It is also evident that the inspection of the doctor
aforesaid has not been superficial; nor is there any reason to believe that it has been so; nor
is there any evidence to support such a supposition; and it cannot be supposed that his
opinion may have been partly a matter of mere inference from his information as to the
general features of the tragedy, because, as has already been said, said opinion has been
the result of a material inspection of the victim's body and the wounds themselves
conducted by said doctor; i.e., what his eyes have seen. This inference or supposition could
have better been applied to Aranjuez' testimony because same was in open contradiction
with the reality and referred to an instance when said person was not in possession of a
serene spirit sufficient to understand that which his eyes saw. In fine, the following is the
testimony of Aranjuez in answer to the questions of the Court respecting the particular in
point, as it appears in the stenographic notes (rec., 126):
COURT. But, at the moment the second shot was fired, what part of the body of the
accused was facing towards Governor Lerma and what part of the body of the latter was
facing towards the accused?
WITNESS. I saw Governor Lerma running towards the corridor in this position. (The
witness arises from his seat, looks towards the southeastern part of the building or the court
room and continues saying) When the accused fired the second shot at the governor he
was looking at him, so that the accused was facing the governor.
COURT. What the court wants to say and wants to know is: when the accused fired the
second shot at the governor, in what position was the latter in relation with the former —
was he in front, sideways or at the back?
WITNESS. He was almost sideways and he was on Captain Baluyot's right side which was
facing the governor.
So Antonino Aranjuez first said that when the accused fired the second shot, he was facing
and looking at the governor, but afterwards, when the court asked him the second question
in a very clear and precise term, as it appears, he answered what has already been said,
namely that the governor was almost sideways and over the right side of the accused which
was facing the governor. These contradictory answers give the measure of credit which
such a witness for the prosecution deserves. And it is very clear that from his testimony it
cannot be inferred that the second shot must have manifestly entered from the governor's
back, as it is stated in the majority decision, but that it must have entered in accordance
with the result of the examination conducted by Doctor Mencias and what the latter had
clearly and explicity testified to at the hearing, namely, that the second shot entered from
the front of the victim about one or two inches from the wound inflicted by the first.
Expressing himself why he wanted to have an interview in the morning of the
aforementioned day, August 3, with Representative Reyes and Governor Lerma, the
accused said that he wanted to take leave with them and to tell them that he has given up
the fight between them and to pray them that, if possible, they should leave him in peace
and stop persecuting him when he shall have settled in Cebu. According to the accused
when the first met Governor Lerma that morning, the first question he asked the latter was
whether Representative Reyes was in Bataan, to which the governor answered that he did
not think so; that he wanted to avail himself of the presence of Representative Reyes in
order to take leave from them at the same time; that the governor asked him why he
intended to leave and he answered that he was planning to have a trip but that above all he
wanted to tell them some words, and then the governor said that which has already been
mentioned before, "I can almost guess what you want to say to me," and the dialogue
continued between the two until at the request of the governor, who thought that the
conference between them would continue longer than what he has expected, he (the
accused) retired back to the recorder's office in order that Antonino Aranjuez could confer
with the governor, and to resume the conversation between them after Aranjuez should
have finished.
The wife of the accused as well as the accused himself must have knowledge of the projects
of the latter touching upon what was convenient for the common interest and for the
particular interest of each of them. In No. 152 of the daily newspaper, La Vanguardia, date
August 7th, 1918, which was presented at the hearing as Exhibit 2 for the defense, one of
the reporters of said paper, Eusebio Reyes (the same man, who having been in jail at
Balanga at the first hours of August 5, published in Nos. 150 and 151 of said paper,
corresponding to Monday, the 5th, and Tuesday, the 6th, of the aforementioned month,
which have been presented as evidence for the defense, a report of the different details of
the crime of which Governor Lerma was the victim) amplifying said report, mentioned the
conversation he had with the wife of the accused Baluyot in the house where she was living
in this capital concerning the incident and, among other things, according to said report,
said wife told him, as it appears on the 4th page of said paper, the following:
His trip (Baluyot's) to Bataan would have been the last at present until after a long time,
for we had been planning to reside in Cebu with my brother.
When Baluyot's wife expressed herself in these terms to the reporter Reyes, she has not
seen her husband after the lamentable incident happened and the accused has been arrested
and imprisoned in the provincial jail at Bataan, for according to her own statement to the
reporter aforementioned she had only known what happened between her husband and
Governor Lerma thru the report published before in the same newspaper La Vanguardia
and she wanted (while she was talking with the reporter) to be at the side of her husband
so that she could give him a bed, food, and whatever he needed to the end and that the
lonesome hours of his imprisonment might not be very bitter to him, especially when she
heard that her husband's hands and feet were chained as if he were a common felon and
that he was not allowed to talk to anybody. This is an evident proof of the truth of the
statement of the accused regarding his proposed trip to Cebu, which impelled his desire to
have an interview with Representative Reyes and Governor Lerma in the morning of
August 3, because when the wife of the accused made that statement to the reporter Reyes,
she has not yet been in communication with the accused, nor has she talked with him. And
if the report (given in Nos. 150 and 151 of the newspaper La Vanguardia by the reporter
Eusebio Reyes, as a result of his interview with the accused in the jail at Balanga and with
the recorder Gonzalez and others who were afterwards called as witness for the
prosecution) has been presented by the latter in evidence, it is not reasonable nor just to
disregard what appears in the statement made by the wife of said accused to the same
reporter, Reyes (and which appears in No. 152 of the aforesaid paper, presented as evidence
for the defense), concerning their proposed trip to Cebu — a fact which, on the other hand,
has not been contradicted at the hearing.
It cannot, therefore, be affirmed, as the majority decision does, that no very satisfactory
explanation has been given by the accused as to the reason for his trip to Orion and
especially to Balanga that morning. And even supposing it as true that the accused must
have been entertaining a thirst for vengeance and resentment towards the governor for the
motives mentioned in the majority decision, and for which the accused has given a
sufficient idea when he referred to the dialogue which took place between him and the
governor at the time he first entered the office of the latter, nevertheless from said motives
it cannot be inferred that the conclusion is irresistible that he was carried to Balanga by a
thirst for vengeance or that he was determined to kill the governor, (as is stated in the
majority decision), when he went into said office in that morning.
In order to arrive at such a conclusion the majority have also taken into consideration the
fact that on July 14, 1918, being, says the majority decision, fully imbued with the idea that
Governor Lerma was persecuting him and attributing to the machinations of said governor
his prosecution for the crime of estafa in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
and his having been requested to resign from the position of captain in the National Guard,
the accused in the course of a conversation with one Pedro Magajes, a friend of his, had
said to the latter that Governor Lerma would pay for the misfortunes that were befalling
him (Baluyot); and that also, on a Friday in the month of August, prior to the commission
of the crime, the accused met his compadre called Domingo Lintag, and upon shaking
hands he (the accused) squeezed his hand tightly and said: "May be this is the last time that
we would shake hands."
Upon testifying, Pedro Magajes in fact said that, when he met the accused on the
aforementioned day, July 14, in the railroad car which was bound from Manila to Guagua
with the object of afterwards going to Balanga, he asked the accused what had become of
the charge of the National Bank against him for the crime of estafa, and the accused told
him that it was going on well and that he admired the conduct of Lerma, Sr., (or of the
governor's father), and that he detested the conduct of Lerma, Jr., (or of said governor);
that the governor did not know that he (the accused) was still worth something in Bataan,
and that some day said governor would pay for the things that have be fallen upon him.
Moreover, when the fiscal examined said witness he answered the following:
Q. Who is still worth something in Bataan? — A. Sr. Baluyot.
Q. And who will pay some day? — A. According to my belief, it is Mr. Conrado Lerma.
Q. And why would Mr. Conrado Lerma Pay? — A. I thought it was a political question
and that the accused would work against Governor Lerma, because said accused said,
"Governor Lerma does not know how much I am still worth in Bataan and for the things
that he is doing against me he will pay some day; and afterwards I changed the
conversation because Mr. Baluyot was somewhat grieved.
That's all. (Rec., p. 169.)
In his testimony, Domingo Lintag also said that on a Friday, the 2nd of said month of
August, he met the accused in Orion, and that when they shook hands the accused said,
"May be this is the last time that we would shake hands," squeezing his hand tightly.
Moreover, after the witness had been cross-examined by counsel for the defense in order
to impugne his credibility, said counsel asked that it be made a part of the record that said
witness, upon leaving the witness stand, had approached him on passing by his side, and
had said in a loud voice these words, "In fact I don't know anything." The judge
immediately replied that he had not heard the witness say these words, and denied
counsel's petition, adding, however, that the witness could be recalled and asked new
question if counsel for the defense so desired. When Domingo Lintag was recalled, he
answered in the following terms the cross-questions asked then by same counsel and the
new questions of the Fiscal:
ADDITIONAL CROSS-QUESTIONS BY ATTORNEY SOTTO.
Q. I'll talk to you slowly so that you may understand well. Tell us whether it is true or not
that when you went down from the witness stand upon passing by my side you told me in
a loud voice "Wala po akong talagang nalalaman," which in English is, "In fact I don't
know any thing." — A. Yes, Sir.
That's all.
NEW QUESTIONS BY FISCAL TUASON.

Q. What do you mean by that? — A. That I don't know all the questions propounded to
me.
Q. To what questions do you refer? — A. That I don't know anything more than what I
have said.
That's all. (Rec., p. 182).
From the foregoing, the accused, in his conversation with Pedro Magajes on the occasion
referred to by the latter with his testimony, did not utter any threat of death nor of any
personal injury upon Governor Lerma, but that, when he said that some day Governor
Lerma would have to pay for the things that have been befallen upon him, he meant, as
said witness understood it, that there were political questions between him (the accused)
and said governor and that he (the accused) would work against the latter because he was
still worth something in Bataan. Certainly, what the accused then said in connection with
the governor can not be given other interpretation or different meaning than that given by
the witness aforementioned. Concerning the other witness, Domingo Lintag, he has been
very explicit and definite upon answering the additional cross-question of the counsel for
the accused and the new questions of the fiscal propounded on him at the end of his
testimony and inserted above. First, he answered in the affirmative to the question whether
or not it is true that when he went down from the witness stand he told said counsel upon
passing by his side in tagalog, "In fact I don't know anything." And afterwards when the
fiscal tried to make clear said answer, he said that he did not know all the questions
propounded on him, that it is almost unnecessary to deal with, nor to give any importance
of, what he himself has testified to, to the effect that the accused told him that perhaps
(referring to the date when he met the accused in Orion) it was the last time that they would
shake hands. From the testimony of this witness, nothing in reality can be inferred which
may be useful for the object of the prosecution and for the object he has been presented,
because the fiscal himself did not secure from said witness an answer other than that he
did not know anything more than what he had said, in spite of the effort on his (fiscal's)
part to neutralize the effect of the answer given to the last cross-question of the counsel for
the accused and to the last-mentioned question of the fiscal, wherein said witness showed
ignorance of everything.
But even admitting that in fact the accused, squeezing tightly his hand, said to the aforesaid
Domingo Lintag, on the occasion mentioned by the latter, that perhaps that was the last
time that they would shake hands, and that, according to the majority, it showed that the
accused contemplated some occurrence which would have grave consequences to him,
nevertheless it is clear that it can also be interpreted with greater reason in the sense that
having proposed to go to Cebu and because in the same morning he was going to take leave
from Governor Lerma and Representative Reyes, the accused was also taking leave with
his compadre, Domingo Lintag. In conclusion, from what has been stated by said witness
nothing definite and conclusive can be inferred for the purpose of considering as proven
that in that morning the accused had conceived the idea of killing Governor Lerma when
he went into the latter's office. There is not a single evidence to show that the accused (as
the majority decision says), for several days prior to the petration of this murder, had
determined to seek an interview or encounter with Governor Lerma regardless of
consequences. This conclusion has no other basis than mere inferences from the
testimonies before mentioned and from the fact, also mentioned in the majority decision,
that the accused asked more than one person with whom he had met that morning and
several days before if they thought he was in Bilibid intimating also that such a rumor had
been circulated by Governor Lerma. May be the mind of the accused, as the majority say,
was fixed upon Governor Lerma as the supposed author of his wrongs. But the fact is that
before August 3 the accused had not told anybody that he wanted or had decided to have
an interview with the governor, and only on said day did he communicate such idea to the
people who were in the recorder's office that morning. If several days before he had
intended to meet the governor, the accused did not show any exterior sign of that intention,
much less was he determined to seek that interview regardless of consequences. On the
contrary, according to the recorder, while he (the accused) was waiting for Governor
Lerma in the recorder's office, he was in good humor, and according to same recorder and
Antonino Aranjuez, who were also in said office while the accused was with them, he
continued to be in good humor before his first interview with the governor as well as after
it, when he retired to allow Aranjuez to enter and have a short interview with said governor
and before he reentered said office. Upon the governor's arrival in the recorder's office that
morning he and the accused greeted each other in a friendly manner by shaking hands. No
one noted any change nor alteration in the face or attitude of the accused then; and during
two hours, approximately, that he was in the recorder's office, from his arrival until he
reentered Governor Lerma's office, the accused showed no impatience either because he
wanted to stay with the governor in his office or because he wanted to have with the latter
the interview he desired; for as has been said before, he agreed to yield his turn for a
moment to Antonino Aranjuez at the request of the governor himself.
In fine, is nothing in the record to show or to print out that the accused (even admitting his
mind was fixed upon the governor as the supposed author of his wrongs, as it is stated in
the majority decision) was intending at those moments to executed any aggressive act
against said governor.
After dealing with the assertions and conclusions which has already been mentioned, the
majority decision says that the conclusion of the trial court that the offense was
characterized by known premeditation is by no means without support in the evidence.
However, same decision states that, as an express ruling on this point is unnecessary to the
disposition of the case, the Justices subscribing said decision concede to the accused the
benefit of the possible doubt, and accordingly they refrain from making any express finding
as to the presence of said element. Supported by the evidence in the case, it can be affirmed
in this dissenting opinion, for the reasons already mentioned, that the offense is not
characterized by known premeditation and, to the writer's regret, the absence of an express
finding as to the presence of said element in the crime and the majority's concession to the
accused of the benefit of the possible doubt as to the presence of said element, in spite of
the assertions and conclusions assigned in said decision relative to this particular,
constitutes another reason for not considering that in the commission of the crime there
has been present the qualifying circumstance of alevosia (treachery). And the reason is
obvious. If the accused has been entertaining a rooted rancor and resentment in his mind
against Governor Lerma, and for several days prior to the perpetration of this murder, has
been determined according to the majority to seek an interview or encounter with him
regardless of consequences, upon his interview in the morning of August 3 when he then
killed said governor, the natural and logical thing was or should be that he would have
employed means, methods, or forms that were intended to insure the execution of said
object without any risk to himself arising from the defense which Governor Lerma could
make in that interview. If the preconceived, deliberate, and premeditated design for the
perpetration of this murder at said interview is not considered as proven, or, at least, if the
benefit of a possible doubt as to the presence of said design is conceded to the accused,
necessarily it has to be recognized that it is also doubtful that the accused had intended to
insure by any means the execution of his criminal design without any risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party could make. In the estimation of the existence
of the aggravating circumstances of known premeditation and alevosia (treachery) in the
instant case, there is such a relation in the facts adduced in evidence at the hearing for the
determination whether or not said circumstances were present in the commission of the
crime imputed upon the accused, and it is so clearly gathered from all that has been said
and argued in the majority decision upon dealing with said facts, that it is difficulty, if not
impossible, to conceive that the accused had acted treacherously in killing Governor
Lerma, without having premeditated, deliberated and reflected upon said act before its
execution. If there was then no known premeditation, there could not be alevosia. This
does not mean that in all cases where the first of said circumstances is not present in the
commission of the crime, the second should not or cannot be considered as present; but it
is undeniable that there are cases where, the former not being present, the latter cannot be
considered as present. Such has been recognized by this court in its decision in the case of
United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime (19 Phil. Rep., 164), holding the following:
MURDER; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF "ALEVOSIA". — When the record contains
no evidence showing that the accused had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to
commit the crime, or any proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation,
calculation or reflection, the alleged qualifying circumstance of alevosia can not be
considered.
This holding is exactly applicable to the instant case.
The first meeting between the governor and the accused having been suspended, not by the
latter's will but by the request of the former to whom it occurred that the interview between
them might be more extended than he had expected, it is natural that, upon seeing each
other again in the office they would have resumed the conversation which was interrupted
moments before. Therefore, it is probable that the governor might have begun asking
Baluyot where he said he would go, and that the dialogue mentioned by the accused in his
testimony might have taken place between them, a dialogue which, as it can be tested with
a watch on hand, could not have lasted one minute or more. On the contrary, it is
improbable that when the accused reentered the governor's office and as soon as he reached
the governor's desk (coming from the recorder's office, covering in two seconds the distance
of 10 paces of between said offices, as the recorder Gonzalez has said) and without saying
any word to said governor, he fired the first shot at him, a fact which has been contradicted
by Antonino Aranjuez and Gregorio de Guzman, who were then with said Gonzalez in
his office and heard Baluyot call out to the governor before the first
shot — one of them heard Baluyot call out "governor", and other "governor", may I see
your revolver?". The testimony of these two witnesses, especially that of the last, is another
reason for believing with some foundation that the governor and the accused then talked
of something, or, what is amount to the same thing, that there might have been between
them a short dialogue, and that in view or as a consequence of it, that sad and unfortunate
event took place. That Aranjuez, De Guzman and Gonzalez, who were in the latter's office
had not heard said dialogue, or had not heard what the governor and the accused were
talking about, is no proof that same had not taken place, because as it can be seen on the
plan Exhibit B, from the door of the recorder's office to the place where Governor Lerma
and the accused were, there was a distance of 8 meters and 30 centimeters, or all the length
of the governor's office; from the place where Antonino Aranjuez was, or that marked with
the letter Y in the plan, to the place where Governor Lerma and the accused were, there
was distance equal to the length of the governor's office 8 meters and 30 centimeters plus
the length of the recorder's office, 5 meters and 96 centimeters, according to same plan,
which to be sure, has been traced by the provincial assessor himself, Gregorio de Guzman,
making a total of 14 meters and 26 centimeters. And that, according to this same witness,
when he heard the accused call out to the governor "May I see your revolver?" he was
taking leave with the recorder and was leaving the latter's desk bound for his office, and as
he was going toward the door to leave the office, he did not understand the other words of
the accused, who was then speaking in a natural voice, which showed no sign of alteration,
adding that he heard those words when he was going out towards the corridor and for this
reason he could not tell whether the governor answered the accused or not. With all these
it should be added that (from what has been said by the recorder in his testimony, rec., p.
86) when he heard the first shot, the door between his office and that of the governor "was
almost closed, because one-half of it was closed," a circumstance which should be taken
into consideration in determining whether or not those who were at that moment in the
recorder's office (the recorder, Aranjuez, and De Guzman) were in such a condition as to
have been able to hear what the governor and the accused were talking about. The one
who was in a better condition for said purpose was precisely the recorder Gonzalez,
because he was sitting by the desk in his office near the door of the governor's office, and
from there he did not move until he heard, as he said, the first shot. Nevertheless, unlike
Aranjuez and De Guzman, who said that they have heard the accused utter the words
already mentioned, Gonzalez did not make any mention about this, stating, on the
contrary, that only two seconds elapsed from the moment that the accused reached the
governor's desk coming from his office until he heard the first shot. So that, according to
said witness, there was no sufficient time whereby there could have been an exchange of
words between the governor and the accused. Necessarily, the recorder, Gonzalez, has not
told the truth. His other two friends have contradicted him and there are sufficient reasons
to believe that the former in turn, being able to tell the truth, have not said all that they
knew, or that, because of the distance of the place where they were from that where the
governor and the accused were talking, and because one-half of the door of the governor's
office was closed, they could not hear other words than what, according to them, was
uttered by the accused. In any way it cannot be denied that when the accused, being near
Governor Lerma, called out "governor" as Antonino Aranjuez heard it, and called out
"governor, may I see your revolver," according to De Guzman, the governor and said
accused must have been talking about something related to what they have been talking
about moments before, or at the first interview. The word "governor," spoken by the
accused in a high and dry tone, may mean, or could have been, an exclamation of the
accused, as well as a call of the attention upon the governor to tell him something. It
appears that the words "governor, may I see your revolver," which De Guzman heard,
must not have been spoken by the accused immediately after he has approached the
governor's desk and prior to an exchange of words between them before, because the
conversation which they must have then was a continuation of the former one which have
been interrupted after the accused had protested that he had nothing to do with the
separation of Captain Velez from the National Guard, which was attributed to him by the
governor. Those words could have also been spoken by the accused as a result or by reason
of what he and the governor continued to talk about, namely, the governor's intervention
upon the misfortunes of the accused as alleged by him and something connected thereto.
For it is inconceivable why the accused would have been willing to see the governor's
revolver, unless it is because he (the accused) wanted to challenge the governor, believing
that the latter has offended him. According to the accused, when he rose from his chair as
soon as he was offended by the governor, who said that he could cheat better in Cebu, he
told the governor; "May be your revolver and mine have the same calibre." These words
are, in some respects, similar to those which the witness De Guzman understood or heard
spoken by the accused expressing his desire to see the governor's revolver. But, in any
manner, what is certain and positive is that the accused, before firing the first shot at the
governor, gave the latter a hint that he intended to do something which might have caused
him (governor) some personal harm, and the governor must have also understood it in this
manner, for he knew that they, the two, were enemies, as he himself had said to the accused
moments before and that he had before him one whom he considered his enemy and with
whom he had also behaved as an enemy. Therefore, the situation in which they were found
at that moment was very clear to the governor as well as to the accused. If the accused was
entertaining as ill feeling towards Conrado Lerma because the latter had been one of his
competitors for governorship at the 1916 general elections and because he was then
defeated by said Lerma, as well as because he thought that said Lerma was instigator of
the criminal proceedings for estafa against him, Lerma in turn would not forget that the
accused was one of his competitors in said election and, having been defeated by him, was
a person dissatisfied to him in the province under his control, and as such could have some
day planned to discredit or to cause him some damage. As a matter of fact he (Lerma) was
attributing to the accused the separation of his compadre Velez from the National Guard,
for which reason he believed, as he made it appear to the accused, that everything he could
have done against the latter was justifiable. Two enemies were face to face on that occasion,
although socially they treated each other as friends — one, the vanquished, the humiliated
Baluyot, and the other, the victor, Governor Lerma, the chief of the province, exercising
authority in the place where they were and to whom, like Representative Reyes, the
accused had come to implore that, if possible, they should leave him in peace and should
not persecute him — which is certainly probable — and to bid them farewell for he was
going to Cebu. From those circumstances, it is perfectly conceivable that a gesture, a look,
any action whatever of Governor Lerma which the accused would have considered
depreciatory and humiliating to him, would have been sufficient to provoke the anger of
said accused and to impel him to attack the former, because it should not be overlooked
that the accused in his testimony (rec., 225) has said the following: "When I warned him
to prepared, he was sitting speaking in that manner of his and laughing at me." There is
nothing strange in that the accused, considering himself offended and humiliated by
Governor Lerma upon seeing the attitude of the latter, his manner of speaking and that he
was being laughed at, would endeavor to avenge on that same moment an offense which
was being committed upon him. When the accused, upon entering for the first time
Governor Lerma's office, told the latter that he was going to take leave from him and
Representative Reyes for he was going to Cebu and to implore them that, if possible, they
should leave him in peace and should not persecute him in said province, Governor Lerma
has expressed himself in the sense that, they being enemies, he (Lerma) was justified in his
conduct towards him, thereby showing that the accused could not hope for the peace and
tranquility which he was desiring. This expression shows that the governor was not
accepting the request of the accused with benevolence, but that, on the contrary, he was
refusing to make peace with the accused. And what has been said by the accused on this
particular is verosimil. No one has contradicted it at the hearing, there being, instead,
sufficient grounds for believing that it was true, because it was the cause of the interruption
of the first interview between the governor and the accused at the request of the former, to
be resumed afterwards, as in fact it was resumed, and it was a beginning of what must have
taken place between at the second interview.
The terms used by Governor Lerma in his conversation with the accused, even admitting
that it was not true that he said to the latter that he could cheat better in Cebu, may be
considered not of such a character as to justify that the accused has acted upon an impulse
so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. But it is indisputable
that they might have been such as to provoke the accused to execute an offensive act or an
act of personal aggression against the governor. The two were on that occasion, commonly
speaking, playing with fire (jugando con fuego), and a spark coming from any one of them
was sufficient to cause a conflagration. Of this conflagaration not only the accused must
be blamed. His testimony, given at the hearing under oath when testifying as a witness, has
as much value as that of any witness, and same must be taken into consideration in
connection with the other evidence adduced at said hearing. The only persons who have
testified to what took place between the accused and the governor at the time when the two
were alone in the office of the latter, are the recorder Gonzalez, Antonino Aranjuez, and
the provincial assessor, Gregorio de Guzman. We are already acquainted with their
testimonies limited, as has been seen, to the time, according to them, that elapsed between
the moment the accused entered into the governor's office and that when they heard the
first shot — testimonies in which two of them said that they have heard the accused call
out to the governor and in which Aranjuez said that he has seen them (accused and
governor) when he peeped into the governor's office after the first shot.
In reality, the testimonies of the said three individuals have not been useful in any manner
whatever, as has been already shown, to prove that before the first shot was fired by the
accused the conversation mentioned by the latter did not take place between him and the
governor. All that said witnesses testified to, concerning this particular, has been based
only upon a computation, as has already been said, made by each of them of the time
intervening between one moment and another, a computation which is inconceivable to
serve as a basis for establishing the conclusion that the accused unexpectedly, suddenly,
and instantaneously attacked Governor Lerma as soon as he approached him in his office,
asked for his revolver and saw that he was defenseless, firing at him the first shot, i.e., that
the accused made the attack treacherously.
The majority decision says that the offense committed in this case exhibits features
markedly similar to those which characterized the crime which was the subject of
prosecution in United States vs. Gil (13 Phil. Rep., 530) and, in the following lines, that
the offense here committed was properly qualified by the trial judge as murder, in which
was present the qualifying circumstances of alevosia. With this statement said decision has
made it understood that what has been said and held by this High Court in that case is
applicable to the present case on account of their similarity. The similarity between these
two cases lies in that in one and the other victim had been a provincial governor and the
crime had been committed in a provincial building or in the place where said provincial
authorities were exercising their functions. But in the case, U. S. vs. Gil, the latter, or the
accused, alleged in his defense that, without the least provocation on his part, Governor
Lopez, whom he asked for the favor of a license for the revolver he was carrying with him,
answered him in an insulting manner, upbraiding him for his temerity in seeking a favor
of a man who he had denounced to higher authority and that the governor having reached
for the revolver, a struggle between them ensued during which the shots that wounded the
governor were fired. Not having immediately died as a consequence of said wounds but
after 24 days, Governor Lopez had the opportunity to contradict and did flatly contradict
the accused, denying that he provoked and insulted the latter. This statement was made by
the governor when about to breathe his last. And this dying declaration of the wounded
man was taken into account by this High Court, in connection with the other evidence
adduced in the case, in order not to give credit to whatever the accused had to say for his
exoneration of all that happened between him and the governor when they were alone in
the office of the latter and when said governor was attacked by said accused, Gil. In the
decision of this High Court in the aforementioned case, the following is said:
If the account of what occurred in the office of the deceased governor on the morning of
the 27th of December, 1907, as told by the accused when testifying in his own behalf, be
accepted as true, this testimony, taken together with the other evidence of record not in
conflict therewith, would leave no room for doubt of his guilt of the crime of unlawfully
taking in life of Benito Lopez, deceased the commission of the crime being marked with
certain extenuating circumstances, but unmarked either by "treachery" (alevosia) or
"deliberate premeditation" ( premeditacion conocida) as charged in the information; and
as the slayer was alone with his victim when the fatal shots were fired no eyewitness could
be called to the stand to contradict the testimony of the accused as to what occurred in the
office from the time he entered until the explosion of the pistol shots attracted the attention
of the other occupants of the building. In our opinion, however, the ante-mortem statement
of the deceased, taken together with the other evidence of record, conclusively establishes
not only the falsity in all its essential details of the account of the tragedy given by the
accused, but also the fact that the crime was committed with treachery (alevosia) and
deliberate premeditation ( premeditacion conocida). (Page 533.)
Now then, in the instant case Governor Lerma died approximately three hours after he has
been wounded by the third shot fired by the accused, without having been able to regain
consciousness before his death nor to articulate any word; i.e., he (the governor) did not
contradict the accused Baluyot nor did he contradict the latter's account of what occurred
between them in that morning during the short period of time that they were alone together
in the office of said governor. There being then in this case no ante-mortem statement of
the deceased Governor Lerma, which may be taken together with the other evidence of
record, and if the testimony of the accused in his own behalf, taken together with said
evidence, be accepted (if in the present case we apply, as it should be, the ruling mentioned
by this High Court in the case in U. S. vs. Gil), accepting at the same time, as we should,
the account of what occurred in the office of Governor Lerma in the morning of the 3d of
August, 1918, as told by the accused Baluyot, the guilt of the latter, as author of the crime
of unlawfully taking the life of Conrado Lerma, deceased, leaves no room for doubt, but
unmarked either by treachery (alevosia) or premeditation ( premeditacion) as charged in
the information. Therefore, beside the fact that there is no complete similarity between the
case of U.S. vs. Gil and the present case, and applying in this case the doctrine laid down
by this court concerning the question of evidence in that case, it cannot be accepted as
proved that the accused Baluyot acted treacherously and with deliberate premeditation in
taking away Governor Lerma's life.
However, the accused Baluyot has been charged with some admissions alleged to have
been made to the reporter of La Vanguardia, Eusebio Reyes, when the latter had an
interview with the former in the provincial jail of Bataan in the morning of August 5th (an
information which was published in the corresponding issues of said newspaper, marked
Exhibits D and E of the prosecution) and to the lieutenant of the Constabulary, the
commanding officer of Bataan Province, Angel Labayan, in the afternoon of the same day,
August 3d, in order to prove that said accused attacked Governor Lerma knowing the latter
to be disarmed and defenseless. The reporter, Reyes, affirmed that he has published in said
newspaper, La Vanguardia, the information or news appearing in said two issues, after he
had a conversation with the accused in the morning of the 5th of August; and that, among
other things (as it can be seen in the issue of the 6th of August), the accused told him the
following: "I asked Conrado about his revolver, but it is not true that he was reading when
I fired at him, no. And that cannot be true because I told him: "Governor, defend yourself
as you may. I come to kill you." And I fired the first shot, then the second, one after the
other." Lieutenant Labayan, in turn, testified that in a conversation he had with the accused
in the provincial jail, in the afternoon of August 3d, the latter related to him all that
occurred, and, among other things, that after the accused told the governor "You are taking
advantage of all the opportunities to render me completely useless," to which the governor
answered, "Were you, yourself, in our place, you would take advantage of all the
opportunities to render an enemy useless," the accused, upon hearing this phrase, got mad
and asked the governor: "What calibre has your revolver?" to which the governor answered
that he did not bring his revolver, and then the accused, who was in an attitude of drawing
out his revolver, said to the governor, "I will kill you now;" that the governor cried out
calling the guard and for the scream (so says) the accused fired his revolver at the governor.
Without entering now upon the consideration (inasmuch as the majority does not say
anything about it in their decision) of the question whether the information published in
the press about an event subject of a suit or a prosecution before the courts of justice may
be utilized as an evidence at the hearing, (which is what in reality has been done by the
prosecution in presenting the reporter Reyes and in examining him about the information
aforesaid) and admitting the testimony of said reporter as that made by any other witness,
what in reality is inferred therefrom is that Governor Lerma was not reading when the
accused, fired at him at the first shot and that the accused, before firing said shot, warned
the governor to defend himself as much as he could, because he was going to kill him.
From Lieutenant Labayan's testimony, it appears that the accused asked the governor
about the calibre of his revolver and that the governor having answered that he did not
bring his revolver, the accused, who was in an attitude of drawing out his revolver, told the
governor that he would kill him and, when the governor cried out calling for the guard,
fired his revolver. Above all it is rather strange that to the reporter Reyes, who was his
friend (as they treated such other with familiarity) and who was interested in giving in the
newspaper, La Vanguardia, the most complete information possible about that sad event,
the accused would not tell that when he asked governor Lerma about his revolver he
answered that he was not bringing it (as Reyes did not mention this particular in his
testimony), while to Lieutenant Labayan, who did not know the accused prior to August
3d, (for he happened to know him only on that day and when he had with him a
conversation in the afternoon of same day in the provincial jail of Bataan, conversation
referred to by him in his testimony) the accused would have made a revelation which is so
compromising against him as that he knew before he fired the first shot at the governor that
the latter was not bringing with him his revolver. It should also be taken into consideration
that when the reporter Reyes had an interview with the accused in the morning of August
5th, there were present then. according to him, the Lieutenant of the Constabulary, Pedro
Navarro, the provincial warden and one constabulary soldier; and that when said
Lieutenant Navarro was called to testify for the prosecution, he was not produced, as well
as the other two individuals who witnessed the aforesaid conversation between the accused
and the aforementioned reporter, and who could have testified to what they have then
heard. In referring to that incident the accused said, as it will be remembered, that he told
the governor, "It appears to me that your revolver and mine have the same calibre," and
the Governor answered, "No Sir, mine is 32," and that to this he replied, "It is the same
and prepare yourself because one of us will have to die." The accused did not say that the
governor answered him then that he was not bringing with him his revolver. And it appears
more proper that when the accused asked the governor about the calibre of his revolver, as
Lieutenant Labayan has said referring to the accused himself, the governor should have
answered what the calibre of his revolver was, namely, that it was 32 calibre, for the
question of the accused referred to this. The answer that the governor was not bringing
with him his revolver would have been more appropriate to the question which, according
to the reporter Reyes, referring to the accused, the latter asked to the governor, because it
was referring only to the governor's revolver. In spite of this fact, the reporter Reyes did
not say that the accused had stated to him that the governor had given any answer to said
question nor that the governor had said that he was not bringing his revolver. Lieutenant
Labayan is then the only witness who testified (referring himself to the conversation
between him and the accused in the provincial jail in the afternoon of the 3rd of August),
that the governor told the accused that he was not then bringing his revolver. By this
testimony, said witness made it understood that the accused, before firing the first shot at
the governor, knew that at that moment the latter was without said weapon with which to
defend himself. However, taken together with that of the other witnesses who testified to
said particular, his testimony is not sufficient to prove, beyond any doubt, that Governor
Lerma answered the accused that he was not then bringing with him his revolver. But,
taking due consideration to the testimony of the reporter Reyes as well as that of Lieutenant
Labayan and that of the provincial assessor, Gregorio de Guzman, in connection with
what the accused testified to about the revolver, it is indisputable that what in reality can
be inferred and considered proven therefrom is that having asked the governor about his
revolver and having then told him his desire to know the calibre of his revolver, the accused
warned said governor, before firing the first shot, to prepare and defend himself as much
as he could because one of them will have to die. In a word, before receiving the first shot
fired at him by the accused, Governor Lerma was able to look for his defense, had the
opportunity to make good his defense from the danger that was threatening him because
the accused himself had warned him.
But, moreover, according to the testimony of the accused (rec., 219), while Governor
Lerma was talking with him during the second interview, the former had his left hand on
the table and with it he was playing a brass knuckle (llave inglesa). This brass knuckle was
seen on the governor's table by Lieutenant Navarro of the Constabulary (who was then in
charge of said force in the absence of the provincial commander), when, immediately after
the accused was arrested and imprisoned (whom he found between the door of the office
of the recorder and that of the governor), he returned upstairs in order to learn something
of the incident and to see what happened to the governor. Said brass knuckle was kept by
Lieutenant Navarro and presented at the hearing when he testified to the particular
aforesaid, and marked as Exhibit 1 of the defense. Although the recorder, Pedro Gonzalez,
did not give a satisfactory explanation of the existence of said brass knuckle on the
governor's table, having said, moreover, that he had never seen the governor use it, and it
is said in the Attorney- General's brief that said weapon might have been placed on the
governor's table by the accused himself as part of his plan for defense, the fact is that there
is no proof about this allegation of the Attorney-General and that the brass knuckle was on
the governor's table when Lieutenant Navarro (who arrested the accused bringing him to
the prison and whose veracity there is no reason to doubt) immediately returned to the
governor's office in order to see the latter and to learn what happened then (rec., 193-194).
It also appears from the evidence that when the tragedy occurred there was a long "cris"
(dagger) on the top of the bookcase which was on the right side of the governor's table and
of the chair in which the latter was sitting, a bookcase marked with the No. 3 in the plan
Exhibit B. Lieutenant Navarro of the Constabulary so testified as well as the recorder
Gonzalez, who said, moreover, (rec., 252) that said "cris" (which was presented by the
defense at the hearing as Exhibit 4) belonged to Governor Lerma; that he (the witness)
knew it and recognized it very well because it was placed on the governor's bookcase at the
time he told possession of his office. The accused said in his testimony (rec., 219) that upon
seeing him unbottoning his coat and taking out his revolver after he told the governor (as
has been mentioned already) to prepare because one of them will have to die, said governor
raised up his right hand placing it on the bookcase where the "cris" was, but that when he
saw that the case of his (the accused) revolver was opened, he cried out "ina ko po" (my
mother) "guardia" (guard) and then he (the accused) fired the first shot. Upon being asked
whether in that morning, when he saw the "cris" on top of the governor's bookcase, said
"cris" was within the reach of the latter, Lieutenant Navarro, in turn, answered, "I believe
that the court has been there and can tell by sitting in the chair whether it was within his
reach or not," an answer with which the witness tried to show that he had no interest in
expressing his own opinion about the question propounded upon him. Moreover, upon
being asked again . . . "But as you found the "cris" in that morning, same was within the
governor's, reach, if the governor were sitting in his chair," Navarro answered, "It seems
so." And, finally, upon being asked "If Governor Lerma were in his chair where he used
to sit, could he reach the "cris"? the recorder Gonzalez answered, "Sitting, he could not
reach it, but standing, he could," adding, furthermore, that he did not know Governor
Lerma's object in having said "cris" in his office on top of his bookcase, but that he knew
that he had it there at the time he took possession of his office and that he never saw the
governor use said weapon; and that, lastly, the governor had a revolver which he (the
witness) had seen, but he did not know where this weapon was on that date, or when the
incident took place, and that he (governor) seldom used it, bringing it with him only when
making some inspection in some municipalities.
Now then, it being not proven, beyond all doubt that there is present in the commission of
the crime in question the aggravating circumstance of known premeditation, for
concerning this the majority themselves concede to the accused the benefit of a doubt and
they have refrained from making any holding about it; it being not also proven beyond all
doubt that the accused had made up his mind to kill Governor Lerma when he went into
the office of the latter in the morning in question; on the other hand, it being proven,
without the shadow of a doubt, (for such is the result of the testimony not only of the
accused but also of the reporter Reyes, a witness for the prosecution) that before firing the
first shot with his revolver followed immediately by the second shot, the accused warned
the governor to be prepared to defend himself as much as he could because he (the accused)
was going to kill him; and, finally the governor having means and opportunity to defend
himself in any manner or to resist the attack (for on the bookcase by his side there was a
"cris", which can not be considered as an object for mere ostentation on that bookcase,
because if it was so, it should have been placed in the panoply in said office), and having
been able to take said weapon, even if he were stooping a little or standing by his seat, and
for which he had also enough time inasmuch as the accused unbottoned his coat, took out
his revolver from his belt and from the case where it was before firing the first shot, it is
evident that it cannot be affirmed that the accused employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the crime which had tended directly to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party could have made. On the
contrary, all of the acts executed by the accused (before firing the first two shots with his
revolver at the governor while the latter was in front of him, taken together with the
strained relation between them mentioned in the majority decision, or their enmity, and
with their conversation in the first as well as in the second interview) are incompatible with
the lawful existence of the circumstance of alevosia (treachery).
But even admitting that Governor Lerma was defenseless and that he did not suspect that
he was going to be attacked by the accused in the manner that he was attacked, nevertheless
it cannot be said that the crime was committed with alevosia as a qualifying circumstance,
because, beside the fact that said circumstance is of a subjective character, or that it is
exclusively related to the accused and not to the condition of the offended party, there
having been, in the first as well as in the second interview between the governor and the
accused, an exchange of words which showed that there was an ill feeling between the two
such that would have given rise to a personal attack by anyone of them against the other,
it is not impossible that the one who is attacked would have to defend himself by some
means. The supreme court of Spain has held so in its decision of January 19, 1907 (Vol.
78, Criminal Jurisprudence), in a case which an individual fired a shot gun at two other
individuals who were defenseless and who had no means to suspect that they would have
been attacked by the assailant in the manner they were attacked, thereby killing them
stantaneously. The court based its decision in that (1) alevosia being a circumstance of a
subjective character, in order to consider its existence, it must be shown whether or not the
accused employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tended
directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make; and that (2) admitting that the deceased was
defenseless and that they did not suspect that they would have been attacked by the accused
in the manner they were attacked, this fact is not sufficient to show that the act was
committed with alevosia which qualifies the crime as murder, inasmuch as the personal
acts of the accused constituting the treacherous means employed are not specified, as well
as it appears from the verdict that the shots were preceded by words and gestures indicative
of the initial stage of a quarrel and exclusory, unless there appears facts to the contrary, of
the impossibility that at any stage of the attack the offended party could have defended
themselves, much more in dealing with an attack which, although not foreseen, was
committed by a man who, on appearing at the place of the incident to recriminate upon
the deceased, was carrying a shotgun with which he afterwards fired at them.
Moreover, in its double aspect as aggravating and qualifying circumstance in the crime
against person, alevosia requires for its juridicial integration that, even if same arises at the
moments of the execution of the crime, the election of the means tending to insure the
accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant arising from the possible defense of
the offended party, be the product of the sound mind of the guilty person; for it is only
when, says the Supreme Court of Spain in a decision of July 6, 1910 (Vol. 85, supra), by
an act exclusive of the aggressor, the offended party is deprived of all the natural means of
defense, that the special aggravating circumstance, aforementioned, exists.
The foregoing doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court aforementioned, in the decision
(supra) of a case in which the accused, suddenly, unexpectedly and from behind, struck an
individual with a club in the head from which he died, without risk to his person and
knowledge on the part of the victim, who had challenged the accused before the attack.
The supreme court held that this fact (that the offended party had challenged the accused
before the attack) altered and destroyed the element of alevosia and showed, strictly
interpreting the verdict, that from the provocation and challenge of the one, the attack of
the other followed without interruption, and that the external form of said attack only
meant an accident peculiar to their reciprocal impetuosity at the moment.
In the instant case it is not proven that, when he went to see the governor in that morning,
the accused Baluyot carried with him the revolver expressly and precisely to make use of
said weapon against the former, in the same way that it is not proven that he then had
deliberately and reflexively premeditated and resolved to kill the governor. On the other
hand from the testimony of the accused himself, who was an officer of the National Guard,
it appears that he was accustomed to carrying with him said revolver whenever he used to
leave the house to go from one place to another. Nor did the accused try to avoid all
personal risks arising from the defense which the governor could have made. But, on the
contrary, with the warning he made to the latter to be prepared, to defend himself as much
as he could because he was going to kill him, he (the accused) ran the risk that the governor
might have suddenly made use for his defense of the "cris" which he had by his side
although, as has been already said, he could dispose of a short time. And it is not doubtful
that on that occasion the governor was not deprived by an act exclusive of the accused, of
all the natural means for a defense. It is true that between the governor and the accused
there was no quarrel, altercation, or dispute but there was an exchange of words of such
meaning and sense as could have provoked, as has been already said, the anger of said
accused. And certainly it is not necessary that said words should have been spoken in a
loud voice or in an angry tone in order that same could have produced said effect, for it is
well known that words gently spoken without alteration can produce, according to the
circumstances, same effect as if spoken in a loud voice and in an aggressive tone. It is
undeniable that all of the foregoing circumstances exclude the idea that the accused
treacherously fired at the first two shots at the governor, and (as in the case decided by the
supreme court of Spain in the decision aforementioned), the external form of the attack
was only an accident peculiar to the reciprocal impetuosity of the governor and the accused
at the moment. If Governor Lerma was strongly frightened (as it is natural) when he saw
the revolver in the hands of the accused and heard the warning or the challenge of this and
had no sufficient will power to remain cool before the danger that was threatening him nor
sufficient strength to defend himself from the attack of which he was going to be the object
(to repel, or to resist it, making use of the means of defense which he had in hand or of the
"cris", which was on the top of the bookcase by his side, or of a chair or of any other
furniture which was near him, whereby the accused, by means of the first two shots, caused
him two wounds before the same governor could take refuge in the closet towards which
he suddenly fled, pursued by the accused) it cannot be inferred therefrom that the latter
acted treacherously in making said attack; for, as has already been said, alevosia (treachery)
is a circumstance of a subjective character and in order to determine its existence in a case,
the condition of the person attacked and what this would have done or left to have done
should not be taken into consideration, but the acts of the accused himself.
There having been, then, no alevosia when the accused attacked the governor by firing the
first two shots, we now pass on to the third.
This shot was fired by the accused when Governor Lerma fleeing through the corridor after
the second shot; took refuge in the closet which, as has been said, was at the end of said
corridor. Once in the close, the governor shut the door and placed himself, as the majority
decision says, in a position to obstruct the entrance of his pursuer, who vainly attempted
to open the door. In the same decision it is further said that the accused, judging the
position of the governor's head from the direction of the sound emitted when same began
to call aloud for help, fired his revolver in the direction indicated, the bullet passing through
the panel of the door, struck the governor in the forward part of his head near and above
the right temple. The wound was necessarily fatal and caused the governor's death two or
three hours after.
From the evidence it appears: (1) according to the reporter Reyes (rec., 39), that, referring
to him what happened in connection with the third shot, the accused told him that he (the
accused) pursued the governor because he though that the first two shots missed him, that
the governor was able to reach the door of the closet and to sit behind it and, once within,
called aloud, and from the sound thus emitted, he (the accused) was able to judge where
the governor was and he then fired and observed a movement at the door, that he opened
it and as he did so the body of the governor shot towards him as if in an attitude to embrace
him, and he ran away from the body and it fell; (2) according to Lieutenant Labayan (rec.,
152) that in an interview had between them in the afternoon of the same day of August 3d,
the accused told him that the governor fled through the corridor and was able to enter in it
and close the door of the closet, that then there was a struggle between the two in order to
open the door and as the governor was calling aloud for a guard, he (the accused) knew
from the governor's voice that the latter was sitting and, judging from said voice, he fired
again, and after this shot the door was opened and the governor fell towards the window
of the corridor.
Perhaps, it has been inferred from these two testimonies that before discharging the third
shot, the accused had judged the position of the governor's head, as stated in the majority
decision. But, in reality, what the accused meant by said testimonies was that he knew the
governor's position behind the door. Whatever, it may be, it is evident that when the
accused fired the third shot, his object was to inflict a wound upon and consequently kill
the governor. It is also true, as same decisions says, that the victim in his effort to escape
had been driven to take refuge in the closet, and with the door closed it was impossible for
him to see what his assailant was doing, or to make any defense whatever against the shot
directed through the panel of the door. But, in spite of all these and of the fact that,
according to the majority opinion, the presence of alevosia in firing the third shot seems to
be too patent of controversy that it requires no discussion whatever, in my judgment,
dissenting from such a respectable opinion, the presence of said qualifying circumstance
should not be taken into account in the acts aforesaid.
And the reason is very clear. The accused did not take advantage of the fact that the
governor was behind the door of the closet and he was in front of it, or outside of said door;
nor did he select this situation in order to prevent said governor from defending himself,
so that without risk to his person arising from said defense, he might insure the execution
of his criminal object. On the contrary, said situation was an obstacle against the realization
of the object of the accused; was a means by employed by the governor, under the desperate
and sorrowful condition in which he was found, for his defense against the attack of which
he was the object; was a difficulty encountered by the accused from continuing his attack
upon the governor and making sure his aim at him with his revolver. The accused, after
all, did not avail himself of these means or situation (that the door of the closet being
closed) in order to make his victim a better and more accurate target, as is shown by the
fact that only by judging the governor's position behind the door was he able to hit him
with the third shot. And it is hereby convenient to rectify what appears in the decision of
the lower court, namely, that one of the admissions made by the accused to the reporter
Reyes and Lieutenant Labayan (at the interview they had in the jail with him relative to
the third shot) was that when the accused knew the governor's position from the sound
emitted when the latter called for help, he fired the third shot, placing the muzzle of his
revolver against the door and at the place where he thought the governor's head was. This
is absolutely inaccurate. Neither Lieutenant Labayan nor reporter Reyes has said this. And
it is not strange that (such an admission being found in the judgment of the trial court,
which was reproduced by the Attorney-General in his brief, copying the whole of the
respective paragraph of the judgment appealed from) the Attorney-General has invoked in
his brief, as applicable in the instant case, the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
December 10,1884, cited in I Viada's commentaries 260, in order to maintain that the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia was present when the third shot was fired. As it appears
in the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain aforementioned, the case decided therein
was: that a fight took place between the accused and the inmates of a house; that after the
accused had been ejected from said house and its door closed by those within, said accused
fired his pistol, which he was carrying, through the crevice of the door; and that one of the
persons inside the house was thereby killed. If in the present case (as has been inaccurately
asserted in the judgment appealed from, referring to what has been testified by the reporter
Reyes, an assertion accepted by the Attorney-General in his brief) Baluyot had placed the
muzzle of his revolver against the door behind which was Governor Lerma and at the place
or spot where he thought the governor's head was, or had, upon firing the third shot,
previously placed said revolver against the wall of the door (as is also inaccurately
mentioned in said judgment referring to Lieutenant Labayan), then the holding of the
Supreme Court of Spain in its decision aforementioned would be in some way applicable,
although not closely; for in the case aforementioned the agent or aggressor fired his revolver
through the crevice of the door, i.e., could easily aim at same of the persons behind the
door, one of whom he wounded. But in the present case the accused Baluyot fired the third
shot at the spot where the head of the deceased must have been merely according to his
judgment of the victim's position, or his being seated, and of the sound emitted by him
when he called out for help. As a consequence of said shot, he inflicted the mortal wound
he had intended. Therefore, the difference between this case and the other one is very clear.
Moreover, it must be also taken into consideration that the third shot was fired by the
accused after the first two shots as a mere continuation of his attack upon the governor,
and when he, being already excited and in the heat of anger, could not, naturally be in a
position to stop to aim his revolver with the necessary accuracy at exactly the head of the
deceased — much more less because from the testimony of the accused himself, the
governor was calling out for Venegas, Aranjuez and a guard.
It is true, according to the majority decision, that the victim in his effort to escape had been
driven to take refuge in the closet, and with the door closed it was impossible for him to
see what his aggressor was doing, or to make any defense whatever against the shot
directed through the panel of the door — the case being the same, according to the
majority, as if the victim had been bound or blindfolded, or had been treacherously
attacked from behind in a path obscured by the darkness of the night. It is indisputable that
Governor Lerma was completely defenseless while taking refuge in the closet even if the
door could have very well served to him, in any manner, as a means of defense(and he
must have so understood when he pushed or held it from within to prevent the accused
from entering said closet) But in order to determine whether the means employed by the
accused when he fired the third shot were treacherous or not, the condition and situation
in which the victim was found must be taken alone. Great consideration must also be had
of the acts executed by the accused as constituting his unlawful aggression, because the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia is subjective in character, as has been repeatedly said,
or is specially connected with the aggressor. And it is evident that if Governor Lerma could
be compared to a person bound and in defenseless conditions aforementioned, for the
reason that the door being closed he could not see what his aggressor was doing, or make
any defense whatever against the shot directed through the panel of the door, it was not
due to any act of the accused because the latter was not the one who closed the door, or
prevented it to be opened. On the contrary, it was the accused who tried to open it by
pushing it persistently in order to continue his assault upon the unfortunate governor. And
if Baluyot fired the third shot through the door, it is also indisputable that he did not take
advantage of the door being closed, nor did he choose to fire said shot while it was thus
closed in order to insure himself against any defense of resistance which could be made by
the person attacked, or to insure the consummation of the criminal act he was executing,
for the same reason that from his own actions he preferred to have the door opened before
firing the third shot at his victim
However, supposing, but not admitting as true, that the third shot, which caused Governor
Lerma's death, was fired by the accused under such circumstances as would justify the
holding that the procedure then employed by said accused was treacherous, it cannot also
be considered that the commission of the crime was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia which raises it to the degree of murder. It is a fact recognized in
the majority decision that the entire assault upon Governor Lerma from the beginning must
be considered continuous, i.e., there was no break of continuity in each of the three shots
fired by the accused at the governor. So that said three shots constituted, in reality, one
single attack or one single act. Since it cannot be considered as duly proven, beyond
reasonable doubt or in any manner whatever (as it is not in the judgment of the
undersigned, as has already been said), that the accused acted treacherously when he fired
the first two shots at the governor (which caused the two wounds in the region of the right
supra-clavicle) or when he commenced to execute the criminal act there is no legal
terminology whereby the qualifying circumstance of alevosia can be considered present
after the assault has been commenced; because alevosia must necessarily embrace the
entire assault constituting the crime. Such has been the holding of the Supreme Court of
Spain in its decision of September 9, 1901,(Vol. 67, Jurisprudencia Criminal), in a case in
which the accused fired two gun shots at his victim, who thereby received four wounds,
and when said victim was already lying on the ground the accused again delivered several
blows with the butt of his gun on the victim's head, thereby inflicting upon the latter several
other wounds of which he died shortly afterwards. It appears from the verdict that the first
two shots were not fired by the assailant from behind his victim in order to insure in that
manner the execution of the crime without any risk to himself arising from the defense
which the deceased could have made, but that, in delivering the several blows with the butt
of his gun in the head of the deceased while lying on the ground, the assailant employed
means, methods or forms especially and directly tending to insure the victim's death
without any risk to his person arising from any defense the deceased could have made; i.e.,
the assailant did not employ treacherous means at the beginning of the assault but only
towards its end when he killed the victim. In reversing the decision of the Audiencia
Provincial de Gerona qualifying the crime as murder and condemning the accused to death
penalty, the Supreme Court aforementioned held the following:
That treachery necessarily embraces the entire assault constituting the crime, so that
treachery cannot be considered present when it was not present at the beginning of the
unlawful assault, notwithstanding that said assault was consummated on account of the
victim's inability to repel it; that, therefore, the Jury having found out that there was no
treachery when the accused fired the two shots at the victim, and that, when the latter fell
on the ground as a consequence of said shots, said accused delivered several blows with
the butt of his gun in his head, treachery cannot be considered present, as the victim was
killed with the butt of the gun when he was already lying helpless on the ground.
The case decided in the foregoing decision, as it appears, is identical to the instant case,
and the fundamental reason adduced therein by the Supreme Court aforementioned,
consists in that, the assault being considered as indivisible and only one criminal act
punishable by law, even if it was executed at different and successive stages, it cannot be
considered that in the execution of said act there are present separate and distinct
circumstances in connection with each of the facts embracing said act which constitute but
one crime
However, the majority decision maintains, by citing the decision of this court in the case
of U.S. vs. Elicanal (35 Phil. Rep. 29), that even supposing that treachery (alevosia) had
not been presented at the beginning of the assault, it would be necessary to find this element
present from the manner and surrounding circumstances under which the crime was
consummated. The foregoing decision of the court contains this syllabus:
It is the doctrine of this court that where the person killed was in a helpless and defenseless
condition at the time the fatal blow was given, the homicide was committed with alevosia
notwithstanding that in the attack, which was continuous, and which finally resulted in the
death there was no alevosia.
The facts in the foregoing case were:.
That while the sailboat Cataluña under the command of her captain Juan Nomo, was on
her trip along the coast of Iloilo, the chief mate of said sailboat named Guillermo Guiloresa
told Eduardo Elicanal, the accused, and one of the members of the crew, that he was going
to kill the captain because he was very angry with him and asked him to assist him. But
Elicanal paid no attention to this proposal because he thought that it was a joke; that the
following day while the crew were engaged in their daily occupation, the same chief mate
(Guillermo), finding the captain in his cabin, assaulted him attempting to seize and hold
his hands and at the same time calling the crew to come forward and help him. The crew,
with the exception of the accused, hastened to the spot where Guillermo was engaged in a
hand to hand fight with the captain. At the request of Guillermo the crew seized the captain
and tied him with rope. After he had been rendered helpless, Guillermo struck the deceased
captain in the back of his neck with an iron bar, and then delivering the weapon to the
accused, ordered him to come forward and assist in disposing of his victim. The accused
thereupon seized the bar and, while the captain was still struggling for his life, struck him
the fatal blow in the head, which caused his death.
After a thorough consideration of the qualifying circumstances that should be taken into
account in the commission of the crime among which is that of alevosia, which the court
took into consideration in qualifying the offense as murder and in sentencing the accused
Elicanal to death penalty, in order to hold that in the case then at bar the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia was present, the writer of the majority opinion, Justice Moreland,
said:
This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the
death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present
if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself.
While the writer of this opinion hold the view that, where there is not treachery in the
attack which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will
qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow was
struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless, but, the court having held so frequently
the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established.
In acknowledging in the foregoing decision that the doctrine established in the case, U.S.
vs. Balagtas and Jaime (19 Phil. Rep., 174 invoked by counsel for the defense to maintain
that the qualifying circumstance of alevosia could not be taken into account in the
commission of the crime inasmuch as it was not present at the beginning of the assault
upon the captain of the vessel) was quite different from, if not directly opposed to that
already stated as therefore, the uniform holding of this court in former cases, the writer of
said decision, Justice Moreland, again said that, inasmuch as the majority of the court
being of the opinion that it was not the intention of the court in the case U.S. vs. Balagtas
and Jaime to reverse the previous decision of this court and to set down a new doctrine, he
accepted that view particularly in the face of the almost unbroken line of decisions on the
subject now to be referred to. Then in the following lines Justice Moreland cited various
cases decided by this court holding, as has been already stated, a uniform doctrine quite
different from, if not opposed to, that established in the Balagtas and Jaime case
aforementioned. The first of said cases was that of U.S. vs. De Leon (1 Phil. Rep., 163)
wherein "it appeared," says same decision, "that the accused entered the house of the
deceased, drew their bolos and compelled him to follow him. On arriving at a place called
Bulutong, the deceased was bound and in that condition murdered. It was held that the
fact that the deceased was bound at the time he was killed although there was no treachery
at the beginning of the assault resulting in his death, the qualifying circumstance was
present. The court said:.
From the evidence there appears the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To show this it
is only necessary to mention the fact that the deceased was bound.
"The head note to that case says:
"The fact that the deceased was bound while killed constitute the qualificative circumstance
of alevosia and raises the crime to the degree of
murder, . . ."
The various cases, fifteen in number, mentioned by Justice Moreland in the aforesaid
decision, beside that of U.S. vs. De Leon, aforementioned, are cited in same decision (35
Phil. Rep., 218), followed by, "For these reasons we are of the opinion that the crime was
committed with treachery and that it was properly denominated murder instead of
homicide."
Now then, as it appeared in the De Leon case, the accused began the attack by entering the
house of the deceased, drawing their bolos and compelling him to follow them, and, on
arriving at a certain place, the deceased was bound and in that condition murdered. Upon
an examination of the fifteen cases cited in the same decision, it appears that the facts,
leading to the prosecution of the respective accused and the classification of the crime as
murder because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, were identical
to those in the De Leon case, or, what amounts to the same thing, were, with some
alterations, that after the offended parties had been kidnapped from their respective homes
or sequestered and carried to another place and there bound by their aggressors, they were
put to death while absolutely defenseless. The facts in one of the cases cited in the
aforementioned decision, that of U.S. vs. Nalua and Cadayum (23 Phil. Rep., 1), were:
two persons suddenly and unexpectedly leaped upon a third, and while one of them holds
the victim's hands the other stabs him to death.
What was then mainly taken into account by this court in holding, in the case U.S. vs.
Elicanal, that in the commission of the crime there is present the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia, was that the captain of the sailboat Cataluña was tied with rope when the
accused, by order of the chief mate, took the iron bar and with it struck a blow in the head
of the deceased resulting in his death. The special circumstance that, when the deceased
captain was killed by Elicanal, he was tied with rope and was consequently helpless and
defenseless is what, comparing aid case with that of De Leon and the other cases cited
therein, was taken into consideration by this Court in the aforementioned decision in
holding that treachery was present when Elicanal killed the captain even though there was
no treachery at the beginning of the struggle. Such was duly and thoroughly shown by the
arguments in the same decision holding clearly that where the person killed is bound hand
and foot when the aggressor killed him, the crime was committed with alevosia, even
though the acts of the aggressor prior to the killing were not treacherous, or that in such a
case any other consideration related to the former acts of the offender must be excluded
and the act of said offender in killing the deceased must be considered treacherous. If in
holding what it did in the Elicanal case the purpose of this court had been otherwise, useless
would have been all that has been said by Justice Moreland in the decision of said case,
citing as the ground for his concurrence with the majority (notwithstanding his holding a
different opinion and the doctrine established in the Balagtas and Jaime case) the cases
already mentioned (the De Leon case and the other 15 cases cited in same decision) and
finally accepting the view of the majority in the sense that it was not the intention of the
court in the Balagtas and Jaime case to reverse the previous decisions of this court and to
set down a new doctrine in view of the uniform holding of this court upon the subject in
question; i.e., those holdings in the aforementioned case of De Leon and the other fifteen.
The case at bar, as it clearly appears, has no analogy or similarity whatever with the cases
cited above nor with the Elicanal case. In all these cases the acts complained of were that
the victims had been tied by their respective murderers before they were killed. In the
Elicanal case there was at the beginning of the attack a hand to hand fight in the course of
which the chief mate Guillermo with an iron bar dealt a blow in the back of the neck of the
deceased captain while the latter was tied with the rope, before another blow was delivered
by the accused Elicanal at the request of said Guillermo. Treachery was, therefore, present
when Guillermo dealt the first blow and before Elicanal delivered the fatal one on captain
Nomo, deceased. In the De Leon case and the other fifteen cases cited in the decision
against Elicanal, the purpose, the principal object, of the offenders being to put to death
the victims by them sequestered or kidnapped from their homes, their acts of tying said
victims were simply preliminaries or preparatory to the principal act committed by them
at the time the offended parties were already bound and rendered completely defenseless.
Treachery, therefore, cannot be present in the said preliminary acts, it being present only
when the accused executed their principal object, or their intended purpose at the time they
sequestered the offended parties. On the hand, the case at bar (which is rather unnecessary
to repeat) was that the accused Baluyot began attacking Governor Lerma by firing two
pistol shots while said governor was in front of him thereby causing him two wounds; and
that the deceased having taken refuge into the close next to the corridor adjoining his office,
the accused continued his attempt by firing another pistol shot which caused the death of
the victim.lawphil.net
It is therefore, evident that the case at bar has no application to the doctrine established in
the Elicanal case and in those cases cited in the body of same case by the writer, Justice
Moreland and invoked in the opinion of the majority in order to hold that, even supposing
that at the beginning of the assault upon Governor Lerma treachery was not present, it
would be necessary to consider its presence in view of the form by which the crime was
committed. On the contrary, the present case has an exact application to the doctrine
established by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of September 9, 1901, already
mentioned above, and expressive of the fact that "treachery must necessarily be present
thruout the assault constituting the crime," because the present case is identical to that
decided by said Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision where the foregoing
doctrine was established. The case at bar has also an exact application to the doctrine
established in the Balagtas and Jaime case (supra), to wit:.
In order that alevosia may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the
classification of the crime, or as an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it
must be shown that the treacherous acts were present and preceded the commencement of
the attack which cause the injury complained of. After the commencement of such an
attack, and before its termination, an accused may have employed means or methods
which are of a treacherous character, and yet such means and methods would not
constitute the circumstance of alevosia. One continuous attack cannot be broken up into
two or more parts and made to constitute separate, distinct, and independent attacks so
that treachery may be injected therein and considered as a qualifying or aggravating
circumstance. (19 Phil. Rep., 164.)
The foregoing doctrine must be considered subsisting, and it is, in my own judgment,
subsisting notwithstanding what has been said by this court in the cases already cited; to
wit, U.S. vs. De Leon, U.S. vs. Elicanal, and the fifteen cases mentioned in the last one.
For the foregoing reasons and with the due respect to the opinion of the majority of this
court, I hereby dissent from same and am of the opinion that the crime committed by the
accused, according to the evidence adduced at the hearing and their merits, is not murder
but homicide, defined and punished under article 404 of the Penal Code; and that the fact
that it was committed at the place where the deceased Conrado Lerma, Governor of
Bataan, was exercising the proper functions of his office as such governor, a generic
circumstance modifying the criminal responsibility incurred by the accused in the sense of
aggravating same without the presence of any extenuating circumstance to compensate it,
the accused must be sentenced to suffer the medium of the maximum degree of the
corresponding penalty, i.e., 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal with the
accessories of article 59 of the same Code; but that if it be considered, as it was understood
by the majority in their decision, that same criminal act executed by the accused in fact
resulted in the perpetration of two crimes, one of them being the assault upon persons in
authority defined in article 249 No. 2 of said Code, the accused must therefore be sentenced
to suffer the penalty corresponding to the more serious crime, i.e., that of homicide in its
maximum degree, as provided for in article 89, or 20 years of reclusion temporal and the
same accessories of article 59.

10.) [G.R. No. 139542. June 21, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ,
JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the improvident use of a firearm
did not exacerbate a simple altercation over traffic. This is one of them.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in the
course of her husbands altercation with the accused-appellant and his son along the Garden
of Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found the
accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and
accordingly sentenced him to death. This case is before us on automatic review.
The details of what actually transpired in the few seconds immediately preceding the
shooting are controverted by both parties but the events leading to this tragedy are not
disputed.
In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the families of the private
complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on
their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white Isuzu
Esteem with his grandson and three housemaids, while the private complainant was
driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old son,
Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the intersection near
the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant Gonzalez was turning left
towards the exit and the complainant Noel Andres was headed straight along the road to
the exit their two vehicles almost collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the
brakes. The appellant continued driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind
the appellants vehicle for some time and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do
so.[1] Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellants car
window.[2] This is as far as their versions of the incident coincide.
The prosecutions version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the appellant to
be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his family and
to this Gonzalez allegedly replied, Accidents are accidents, whats your problem. Andres
stated that he saw the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle
when he was blocked by the appellants son who said, Anong problema mo sa erpat ko.
Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at
the drivers seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough to
talk back to appellants son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said Binaril kami. He
turned to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned around
and saw his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also wounded. Andres admitted in court
that he and Dino were shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot. Andres then
got out of his vehicle to warn the appellant not to flee. He then took the wounded members
of his family to the exit where there was an ambulance standing by. The three were then
taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later transferred to the Quezon City Medical
Center.
The defenses version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellants path by positioning
his FX obliquely along the appellants lane from the latters left side. Andres then got out of
his vehicle, stood beside the appellants car window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant,
Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-
bobo mo.[3] The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly replied, Pasensiya ka na hindi
kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang. The appellant Gonzalez and another witness for
the defense, Quidic, testified that Noel Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in such
a way that it is straight in front of the appellants car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle
again and continued shouting and cursing at the appellant.[4] Dino, the appellants son,
who rode in another vehicle decided to go back when he did not see his fathers car behind
him. When Dino arrived at the scene he confronted Andres and the two had an altercation.
Both Dino and the appellant stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during the
altercation with Dino. When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle,
Dino froze on the spot where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get his gun from
the glove compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car ready
to shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding
the gun. This is when the appellants daughter Trisha who was riding in Dinos car arrived
at the scene, walked past Dino and Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged
her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his
hand and with Trishas substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his
balance and the gun accidentally fired. The accused stated that he did not know he shot
somebody until the private complainants sister-in-law, Francar Valdez, got out of the
vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The defense claims that the appellant did not try to
flee and even told the complainants sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double Frustrated
Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against herein accused-appellant:
That on or about the 31st day of October 1998, in the city of Marikina, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ
personal violence by means of treachery and abuse of superior strength upon the person of
Noel Andres y Tomas, by then and there shooting him with a Glock cal. 9mm pistol but
instead hitting one Feliber Andres y Ordoo, on the left back portion of her head, thereby
inflicting upon her serious and mortal wound which directly caused her death, as well as
hitting John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y Ordoo physical injuries which
ordinarily would have caused their death, thus performing all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of some cause or causes, independent of their will, that is, the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez
y Ordoo to their damage and prejudice as well as to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of Feliber Andres y Ordoo.
On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel Andres did not die
instantaneously. She lived to give birth to a baby girl[5] by caesarian section and died the
following morning on November 1, 1998. The Autopsy Report[6] states:
FINDINGS: Fairly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, with post mortem lividity.
Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic. Surgical incisions were noted at left
tempero-parietal region. Surgical incisions is also noted at the abdominal region secondary
to a caesarian section.
HEAD: (1) gunshot wound, point of entry, left fronto-temporal region, measuring 1 by 0.9
cm, 9 cm from the anterior midline, with a uniform abraided collar measuring 0.2 cm.,
directed posteriorwards, slightly downwards, and medialwards, fracturing the frontal, and
left temporal bones, lacerating the left cerebral hemisphere, with a deformed slug fragment
embedded and recovered at the posterior lobe of the left cerebral hemisphere. (2)
hematoma, left orbital region, measuring 4.5 by 2 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline.
There are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrages. Stomach contains 1 glassful of
partially digested food particles mostly rice and meaty material.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head.
Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic fragments on their faces. They
were discharged from the hospital six days later or on November 6, 1998.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting was attended
by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilty of the complex
crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder
for the injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez and sentenced the appellant
to the maximum of the imposable penalty which is death. The trial court held:
Beforehand, the Court takes note of the judicial admissions on the verbal declarations of
the accused that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the case; that he owns the black Gluck
9 mm. automatic pistol; that the said gun will never fire even if he drops it; that only one
bullet was fired from his gun; and that the victim Feliber Andres is already dead. With this
exegesis and the declarations in open court of the eyewitness of both the prosecution and
some of the defense, there is no real dispute on the antecedent facts showing that the
accused fired on Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the victims
John Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death of
the latter. The court takes further judicial admissions of the accused made in their
memorandum demonstrating the existence of five (5) sequences of events leading to the
death of Feliber Andres and the wounding of John Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez
which are as follows: First is when Noel Andres overtook the car driven of the accused and
cut cross his path; Second is when Noel Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted
Inocencio; Third is when Noel had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the
accused; Forth is when, Inocencio seeing his son having confrontation with Noel, got his
gun to protect Dino; and Fifth is when Inocencio had a struggle with his daughter. Trisha
Gonzalez, who tried to reach for the gun and as a result of which Inocencio lost his balance
and as he was falling backward to his side, his right arm holding the gun hit the rear
window of the Tamaraw FX van and the gun accidentally went off hitting the victim, who
were all then inside the van.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol used in this
case which is capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. Practically, the stages before an automatic firearm
would be capable of firing are as follows: 1) the loading of a bullet into the chamber of the
gun; 2) the cocking of the hammer, if uncocked; 3) the releasing of the safety pin; 4) the
pressing of the trigger to unleash the hammer so that the firing pin will hit the cartridge to
propel the bullet out to hit the target. Realistically, it demonstrates that a gun will not fire
even if the bullet is loaded in its chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if cocked if
the safety pin is engaged; or even if the safety pin is disengaged if the trigger will not be
pressed. However, even if the gun is fired if it is not aimed and leveled to the target, the
purpose of firing it shall not be achieved. Contrarily, once a gun is drawn against a person,
the means methods and forms employed for its execution is already conceived. And once
it is tended directly and specifically to insure its execution, it consequently produces the
conscious and deliberate intention. Finally if all the acts of execution had been effectively
done without risk on the part of the offender arising from any defense coming from the
offended party, treachery results. In brief, there is treachery when the offender commits
any crime against persons, employing means, methods and forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from any defense which the offended party might make (People vs. Mesa 276 SCRA 407;
People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr. G. R. No. 112445, March 7, 1996). To appreciate treachery
two (2) conditions must be present, to wit: 1) the employment of means of execution that
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. (People vs. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711;
People vs. Pea, G. R. No. 116022, July 1, 1998, p. 1)
In the case at bar and guided with the above-quoted doctrinal cases, logically, the accused
is positive of the crime charged against him. When he alighted with a drawn gun to protect
his son and released all the safety measures of his gun as he fired and missed at Noel who
was then unarmed, but instead hit Kevin Valdez, John Kenneth Andres and Feliber Andres
which resulted to the death of the latter, demonstrate that the accused has executed the two
(2) conditions to generate treachery enough to qualify the crime committed to murder.
XXXX XXXXX XXXX
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr., y
Esquivel is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder
with Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder penalized under Art. 248, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
and is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death by lethal injection.
The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Feliber Andres;
b) the amount of P3,363,663.60 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased Feliber Andres;
c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;
d) the amount of P271,800.56 for the hospitalization expenses incurred for the injuries
sustained by the deceased Feliber Andres and the amount of P23,622.58 representing the
expenses for the untimely delivery of the child Ma. Clarisse Andres;
e) the amount of P51,566.00 representing the hospitalization expenses for the injuries
sustained by the victim John Kenneth Andres;
f) the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages suffered for the untimely death of his wife
Feliber Andres and for the injuries caused to his son John Kenneth Andres;
g) the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees and a fee of P2,000.00 per
appearance; and
h) the costs of the suit.
2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:
a) the amount of P73,824.75 as actual damages for the injuries sustained by the victim
Kevin Valdez; and
b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court committed reversible error when it found that treachery was present.
2. The trial court committed reversible error when it presumed that there was treachery by
taking judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol involved in this case.

1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:

3. The trial court committed reversible error when it violated the constitutional right of the
accused-appellant to due process when it took judicial notice of the feature of the automatic
pistol involved in this case without notice.
4. The trial court committed reversible error when it found Accused-Appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder.
5. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong,
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act,
incomplete defense of relative, and voluntary surrender.
6. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to find that the shooting incident
was accidental.
7. The trial court committed reversible error when it gave credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Elmer Ramos and Moises Castro.
8. The trial court committed reversible error when it disregarded the basic principle that
the accused is presumed innocent and his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
9. The trial court committed reversible error when it ordered Accused-Appellant to pay for
the civil liabilities.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting him from
criminal and civil liabilities. Appellant declared that he had no intention to shoot Noel
Andres much less his wife nor the children. He lost his balance when his daughter Trisha
approached and pushed him backwards to stop him from joining Dino and Noel Andres
but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it accidentally fired. The
single bullet fired hit the last window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX. The appellant
claims that he did not see the passengers inside the vehicle at the time of the shooting. This
is corroborated by the testimony of two witnesses for the prosecution who testified that the
windows of Andres vehicle are heavily tinted so that a person outside the vehicle would
not be able to see if there are people inside. It is also argued that had the appellant intended
to shoot Noel Andres he could have simply done so by shooting at him directly. The
defense asserts that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of
treachery and without the attendance of the said qualifying circumstance the crime
committed is homicide, not murder.
The appellant also points out that the trial court made the factual finding that the shooting
happened in a matter of seconds and that it was preceded by a heated argument between
the parties. Such being the case, it is argued that the shooting could not have been attended
by treachery. There was no time for the appellant to consciously and deliberately employ
the mode of attack against Noel Andres, nor against any one of the actual victims, to insure
its execution and at the same time to eliminate any form of retaliation from the alleged
intended victim. And yet, the trial court, contrary to the evidence on record, held that the
loading of the bullet into the chamber of the gun, the cocking of the hammer, the release
of the safety pin and the pulling of the trigger by the appellant of his automatic pistol
constitute conscious and deliberate effort to employ the gun as a means of committing the
crime and resultantly, qualified its commission by treachery. Such a finding presupposes
that the appellant loaded the gun to shoot Noel Andres only that very moment when his
son Dino and Noel Andres were arguing. This conclusion has no basis on record. The
appellant testified that his gun was loaded before he left the house and two witnesses for
prosecution stated in court that a few seconds after Noel Andres and Dino started shouting
at each other, the appellant got out of his car and shot at the last window on the left side
of the complainants vehicle. Further, the appellant assigns as error the procedure adopted
by the trial court in taking judicial notice that the gun used by the appellant is an automatic
pistol and as such, it will not fire unless aimed at the intended target. The procedure taken
by the trial court is contrary to Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.[7] The trial court
should have given both parties the opportunity to present evidence, expert evidence, if
necessary, to inform the court on the subject matter. The appellant argues that the factual
finding borne by such erroneous procedure is equally erroneous. The gun used by the
appellant is a semi-automatic and not an automatic pistol which means that the pistol used
has no external safety pin to be released and that the hammer need not be cocked. The
pulling of the trigger, intentional or not, will fire the gun. The use of a semi-automatic
pistol does not necessarily imply treachery.
Appellant also argues that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Castro and Ramos were
improperly given credence by the trial court. The appellant contends that a reading of their
testimonies would show that their narration of the incident is rather absurd and would
show that they did not witness the actual shooting. Defense witnesses, Gonzalez and his
daughter, Trisha, on the other hand, testified that Castro and Ramos arrived at the scene
only after the shooting.
As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it is argued that considering that
there was no intent to kill and that they stayed in the hospital only for six days, the crime
committed is physical injuries. It is argued that the trial court erred in awarding damages.
The bunch of receipts allegedly representing the medical expenses incurred for the injuries
sustained by the victims was erroneously admitted in evidence, without first requiring the
prosecution to establish the authenticity of the receipts. The appellant also points out that
the award for loss of earning capacity has no basis as the deceased was unemployed at the
time of the incident.
Finally, the appellant assigns as error the trial courts rejection of the mitigating
circumstances pleaded by the defense which allegedly attended the commission of the
crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, passion and obfuscation, incomplete
defense of a relative and voluntary surrender. The appellant asserts that these mitigating
circumstances were duly proven during the trial and are supported by the evidence on
record. The private complainant Noel Andres testified that he saw the appellant getting red
in anger after they, Andres and the appellant, had a heated argument immediately prior to
the shooting. These admitted circumstances show that the appellant was not in his proper
state of mind at the time of the shooting. First, he was angered by Andres abusive language
and later he got out of his car with a loaded gun to protect his son from a perceived danger.
The appellant clams that his willingness to help the injured and his voluntary surrender to
the police should likewise be considered as mitigating circumstances in the imposition of
penalties.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the crime was not attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and hence the crime committed by the appellant for
the death of Feliber Andres is homicide, not murder. The appellee takes into consideration
that the shooting was preceded by a heated argument and that the supposed victim was
placed on guard that attack was imminent. It also appears that the shooting was done
impulsively. There is no evidence that the appellant deliberately employed the means of
attack to insure execution of the crime and at the same time eliminate the risk of retaliation
from the private complainant. The appellee also agrees with the appellant that the trial
court erred in equating the use of an automatic pistol with treachery. The trial court made
the factual finding that the appellants automatic pistol would not fire unless aimed and the
trigger is deliberately pulled and hence treachery attended the shooting. The appellee
submits that if we follow the reasoning of the trial court it would appear that the appellant
intended to shoot at the complainants vehicle only as the shot was fired at the last window
on the left side of the FX away from where Andres was allegedly seated. The fact that the
gun was drawn and fired does not mean that the mode of attack was consciously and
deliberately employed.
However, with respect to the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, the appellee
disagrees with the contention that the appellant is liable only for slight physical injuries.
The injuries sustained by both children are head injuries and could have caused their death
if not for the immediate medical attention given them. The number of days spent in the
hospital is not determinative of the severity of the wounds. Their nature and location
should instead be considered. The appellant cannot escape liability for frustrated homicide
for the injuries of the two children on the ground that he fired a single shot at the vehicle
of Noel Andres. He is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act even if the crime
committed is different from that intended.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee asserts that none can be
considered in favor of the appellant. There is evidence on record that the appellant did not
voluntarily surrender to the police and it appears from the testimonies of witnesses that he
entertained the possibility of flight but his car was stuck in traffic along the exit of the
memorial park. His pretense of incomplete defense of a relative is belied by his own
admission that when he saw that Noel Andres did not have a gun he lowered his hand
holding the gun. There was allegedly no threat on the life of his son at the time of the
shooting, no uncontrollable fear nor irresistible force that would mitigate the commission
of the offense.
The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the pecuniary awards granted by the trial court.
The appellee alleges that it is not denied by the appellant that Feliber Andres was a 38 year
old registered nurse at the time of the shooting. Although she was then unemployed on
account of her pregnancy, she still had earning capacity and the trial court properly applied
the salary of a government nurse under the salary standardization scheme in the
computation of damages for the loss of earning capacity. The receipts presented in evidence
by the prosecution to establish hospitalization and other medical expenses incurred by the
private complainants by reason of the injuries suffered by the victims were duly
authenticated by the prosecution witnesses and there is no dispute that they are exact copies
of the original receipts presented in court. The objections raised by the appellant in this
regard were duly met by the evidence presented by the private complainants.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant fired a single shot and in the
process committed four offenses the appellant should be held liable for the complex crime
of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres, double frustrated homicide against Kevin and
Kenneth and attempted homicide against Noel Andres. Under the rules on complex crimes
the penalty for the gravest offense, i.e., reclusion temporal for homicide, should be imposed
in its maximum period.
The appeal has merit.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate
employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two
elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of execution that would insure the
safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter
without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means employed were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender.[8] The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the
wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack
was made or the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the attack
as treacherous.[9] This is of particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack
made by the accused whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim when
the latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless.[10] The means employed for the
commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or
deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime and at the
same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim.[11]
Accordingly, it has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse
killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused
to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack.[12] Thus, the sudden attack made by
the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victims provocation was held to be
without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by
the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior
of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned
of reprisal.[13] For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been
preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the
part of the latter.[14]
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the attack succeeds against
its intended victim or injures another or whether the crime committed is graver than that
intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown that the attack is attended by treachery, the
said qualifying circumstance may still be considered by the court.[15] Thus, the
determining factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is attended by treachery
is not the resulting crime committed but the mode of attack employed in its execution.[16]
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be shown to
have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself. [17]
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended
by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is
homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance encounter. They were
total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial
park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that followed the near collision was
fanned by a short temper, which in the case of the appellant, was augmented by the
improvident use of a firearm.
From a reading of the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses, it would appear that
Noel Andres, who had his pregnant wife and child with him, among others, on board the
Tamaraw FX provoked the altercation. After the near collision of his vehicle with that of
the appellant, he tailed behind the latters car towards the exit until he had the chance to
cut him off to scold him for his failure to observe traffic rules.[18] Andres stated in court
that he calmly told the appellant to be careful with his driving and denied that he was angry
when he alighted from his vehicle to confront the appellant.[19] His statement is belied by
the witnesses, two prosecution witnesses included, who uniformly testified that Andres
quarreled with or shouted and cursed at the appellant for the latters recklessness at the
intersection.[20] The appellant narrated in court that Andres repeatedly shouted at him,
Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na gago ka pa.[21] Andres hostile behavior towards
the appellant is evident from his statement in court that he noticed the appellant turning
red in anger.[22] It is highly improbable for Gonzalez to have turned red in anger had
Andres been polite, as he claims he was, in scolding Gonzalez. Andres could have simply
communicated to the appellant his disgust for the latters bad driving when he overtook the
appellants car near the scene of the shooting but instead he chose to block the appellants
path, insult and virtually provoke the appellant to retaliate.
Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez infuriation he immediately walked
towards his vehicle, because according to him the altercation was over. On his way to his
FX he met another man, whom he later found out to be the appellants son, Dino. It appears
that the altercation was far from over because again Andres had a shouting match this time
with Dino.[23] In a matter of seconds, the appellant alighted from his car and fired a single
shot at the last window on the left side of Andres vehicle at an angle away from Noel
Andres. The single bullet fired hit Feliber Andres on the forehead near the temporal region
above the left eye and the two children with metallic fragments of the bullet on their faces,
one at the cheek and the other below his left eye.
The prosecution did not present evidence as to the exact seating arrangement of the victims
inside the vehicle; suffice it to say, that an examination of the pictures of the vehicle[24]
one of which shows a mass of blood stains on the left side (towards the drivers seat) of the
white seat cover below the head rest[25], would show that the deceased Feliber must have
been seated at the front passengers seat and the children at the middle row behind the
drivers seat.[26] Another picture shows a bullet hole on the last window on the left side of
the vehicle[27] and another shows that the front windshield appears undamaged.[28] A
ballistics expert appeared in court for the prosecution and testified that the bullet fired at
the FX came from the appellants gun, which fact was admitted by the defense. The
prosecution did not inquire from the ballistics expert regarding the trajectory of the bullet
or the approximate distance of the appellant from the FX when he fired his gun to establish
whether or not the appellant aimed for Noel or Feliber or simply fired indiscriminately at
the latters vehicle.[29]
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber Andres was attended by treachery
as she was inside the FX witnessing her husbands altercation, first, with the appellant then
with the appellants son, totally defenseless from the shot that came suddenly from her left
side. Public outrage over the death of Feliber was heightened by the fact that she was then
pregnant with her second child and her death left a new born baby girl and a two year old
boy motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a conclusive finding of treachery
and any doubt must be resolved, like the fact of the commission of an offense, in favor of
the accused. The pictures indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX at an angle away from
Noel Andres and that Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in particular. It is not disputed
that the appellants car was directly behind the complainants FX and that Gonzalez who
was then seated at the drivers seat alighted from his car, took a few steps then fired at the
left side of the FX. Whether Noel Andres was seated at the drivers seat inside his vehicle
when Gonzalez fired at the FX, as the prosecution asserts, or was standing by the door of
the drivers seat outside his vehicle, as the defense submits, it is clear that the shot was fired
away from Noel Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her temple above the left eye indicating
that she was facing left towards her husband when the shot was fired.[30] The direct hit on
Felibers head shows that the angle of the shot was indeed away from Noel Andres. Even
the eyewitness for the prosecution testified that had the appellant intended to kill Noel
Andres he could have shot directly at him, considering that Noel Andres was just a few
steps away from him[31] and that Noel Andres was visible from the outside because his
window was partially open.[32] The pictures show that the bullet hole was on the third
window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX[33] belying any attempt to shoot Noel Andres.
Two prosecution witnesses Ramos and Castro unequivocally declared that nothing or no
one prevented Gonzalez from shooting directly at Noel Andres and that Gonzalez could
have simply done so if he wanted to. But after alighting from his car, Gonzalez took a few
steps and shot at the left side window of the FX.[34]
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself amount
to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately positioned
himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the shot. On the
contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the position of the appellants car was not of
his own doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his path.
We note further, that the appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after
the latter cut off the appellants path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not alight
from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it.[35] For his part
Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor threatened Andres
during their short spat.[36] Gonzalez, although he had his gun in his car, did not react to
Andres cursing until the latter was having an altercation with the appellants son, Dino.
Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son was in imminent danger.[37] Whether he
overreacted or he shot at Andres vehicle out of rage over Andres aggressive behavior, one
thing appears clear to us, that the shooting was not done in cold blood. It is undisputed
that the windows of the FX are heavily or darkly tinted so that a person outside would not
see if anybody was inside.[38] The pictures of the FX[39] on record confirm the testimonies
of both prosecution and defense witnesses that the other passengers of the FX were not
visible from the outside. Gonzalez admitted in court that Noel Andres mentioned that he
has passengers with him while he was shouting and cursing at Gonzalez but there is no
indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers when he fired the shot.
The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a conclusion that Gonzalez
deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue advantage over the intended nor
the actual victim. Without any decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be
considered; thus the crime committed is homicide.[40]
The trial courts finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking of the hammer and finally
the pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate effort on the part of appellant to use the gun
as a means of a treacherous attack is patently erroneous. A single and continuous attack
cannot be divided into stages to make it appear that treachery was involved.[41] The entire
incident happened in a matter of minutes, as testified to by witnesses, and as noted by the
trial court.[42] It was error to our mind for the trial court to divide the assault in stages to
arrive at the conclusion that the mode of attack was consciously employed by the appellant.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court that the appellant prepared the gun before getting
out of his car, the appellant testified that he loaded his gun before he left the house and that
it was ready to fire when he alighted his car. There was no time for him to reflect on the
mode of attack since he just picked up his gun and alighted from his car and shot at the FX
a few seconds after Dino and Noel Andres started shouting at each other.[43] We note
further that the trial court pointed out that from the fact that the appellant prepared his gun
to shoot, this was an indication of the deliberate employment of the gun as a means to kill;
i.e. that the use of an automatic pistol shows that the shooting was attended by treachery.
We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is determinative of treachery, unless it is
shown, and it is not herein shown, that the appellant deliberately used the gun to insure
the commission of the crime and to render the unarmed victim defenseless. As discussed
above, the encounter between the appellant and the Andresses was a chance encounter and
the appellants gun was in the glove compartment of his car even before he left his house.
The shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive decision made by the appellant
preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the private complainant. Jurisprudence
teaches us that under the circumstances, treachery is not obtaining. In the case of People
vs. Valles,[44] the accused, a security guard, fired his Armalite and mortally wounded the
victim when the latter approached the accused four times insisting on entering the
workplace wearing improper uniform, then cursed and insulted and challenged the accused
to a fight. We held that the shooting was not attended by treachery as the shooting was
preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the victim. It is to be noted that the kind
of weapon used against an unarmed victim was not taken into consideration in determining
the attendance of treachery; it is the mode of attack employed by the accused under the
particular circumstances of a case that determines its attendance in the commission of a
crime. We find that the prosecution has not discharged its burden to show that the shooting
was attended by treachery and we are convinced that the crime committed for the death of
Feliber Andres is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime committed are
two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines whether the crime
committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of
the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim.[45] In a case wherein the
accused did not know that a person was hiding behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet
causing superficial injuries requiring treatment for three days, the crime committed is slight
physical injuries.[46] In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should
be convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries.[47] We have earlier pointed out that
the intent to kill is absent in this case. It was also found that one small metallic fragment
was extracted from Kenneth below his left eye while another fragment was extracted from
Kevin immediately below the level of his skin before the cheek bone.[48] An examination
of the testimonies of the attending physicians, showed that the wounds sustained by the
two children from the metallic fragments are not in themselves fatal but may cause death
if left untreated. One of the attending physician testified in court that the fragments
themselves will not cause complication, it is the entry of the fragment or the open wound
that is susceptible to infection.[49] Two small fragments were no longer extracted from the
face of Kevin Valdez, as the doctor deemed it to be without danger of complication.[50]
We note that the various sizes of the metallic fragments were not established, at least to
give an indication of the severity of the wounds sustained. Both children were discharged
after six days of treatment and there is no showing that they required subsequent treatment
or that they were immobilized for a greater number of days by reason of the injuries
sustained. Considering the nature and location of their injuries and the number of days
required for their treatment, we find that the crime committed for the injuries sustained by
the children are two counts of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of the Revised Penal
Code which imposes a penalty of arresto menor or imprisonment for 1 to 30 days for
injuries sustained that has incapacitated the victim for one to nine days or required medical
attendance for the same period. For evident lack of criminal intent to kill the complainant,
Noel Andres, as above stated, the information for attempted homicide must fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete
defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense,
were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties.
The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary
surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant drove away towards the gate of the
memorial park while he was questioning him after the shooting and had not Noel Andres
and onlookers blocked his path the appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.[51]
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For this
mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act
sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2)
that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of
the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accuseds mind; and that (3) the
passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness
or revenge.[52] Noel Andres act of shouting at the appellants son, who was then a nurse
and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed by the
accused. Besides, the appellants son, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a
case wherein the appellants son appeared helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his
reason and shot at the FX of Noel Andres. The same holds true for the appellants claim of
provocation on the part of Noel Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person
to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the
crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of
the case.[53] The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son
may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the
complainants vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a
relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the
appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino
Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance
is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused
to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the
time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim.[54] The appellants use of a gun,
although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably
placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is
sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries
committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced
to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act constitutes two or
more grave and less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of committing
another; in such a case, the penalty for the most serious offense shall be imposed in its
maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 25 defines grave
felonies as those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or afflictive penalties
from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less grave felonies are those to which the law
attaches a penalty which in its maximum period falls under correctional penalties; and light
felonies are those punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred pesos.
Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the appellant of firing a single shot
are one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two counts of slight physical injuries, a light
felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes, which requires two or
more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.
received, considering clear evidence on record that she did have earning capacity at the
time of her death.
The awards for moral damages for the death of Feliber Andres and for the injuries sustained
by the two children, which under the circumstances are reasonable, are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is
hereby found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth
Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby sustained.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., see dissenting opinion.
Puno, Kapunan, and Panganiban, JJ., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Pardo.

The pecuniary award granted by the trial court for actual damages was duly established by
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as supported by the original receipts for
hospitalization and other medical expenses presented in evidence by the prosecution. The
award for loss of earning capacity is likewise sustained for the reason that while Feliber
Andres was pregnant and was unemployed at the time of death, it is not disputed that she
was a registered nurse and had earning capacity. Noel Andres also testified that he and his
wife had plans to go back to Saudi Arabia to work after Feliber had given birth to their
second baby. While there is no evidence as to Felibers actual income at the time of her
death, in view of her temporary separation from work because of her pregnancy, we do not
consider it reversible error for the trial court to peg her earning capacity to that of the salary
of a government nurse under the salary standardization law, as a fair estimate or reasonable
assessment of her earning capacity at the time of her death. It would be grossly inequitous
to deny her spouse and her minor children damages for the support that they would have

ART. 254 – DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS
Any person who shall shoot at another with any firearm shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, unless the facts of the case are such that
the act can be held to constitute frustrated or attempted parricide, murder, homicide or any
other crime for which a higher penalty is prescribed by any of the articles of this Code.
Elements:
1. That the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person.
2. That the offender has no intention to kill that person.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10591
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
ARTICLE
TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act".
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. – It is the policy of the State to maintain peace and
order and protect the people against violence. The State also recognizes the right of its
qualified citizens to self-defense through, when it is the reasonable means to repel the
unlawful aggression under the circumstances, the use of firearms. Towards this end, the
State shall provide for a comprehensive law regulating the ownership, possession, carrying,
manufacture, dealing in and importation of firearms, ammunition, or parts thereof, in
order to provide legal support to law enforcement agencies in their campaign against crime,
stop the proliferation of illegal firearms or weapons and the illegal manufacture of firearms
or weapons, ammunition and parts thereof.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
(a) Accessories refer to parts of a firearm which may enhance or increase the operational
efficiency or accuracy of a firearm but will not constitute any of the major or minor internal
parts thereof such as, hut not limited to, laser scope, telescopic sight and sound suppressor
or silencer.
(b) Ammunition refers to a complete unfixed unit consisting of a bullet, gunpowder,
cartridge case and primer or loaded shell for use in any firearm.
(c) Antique firearm refers to any: (1) firearm which was manufactured at least seventy-five
(75) years prior to the current date but not including replicas; (2) firearm which is certified
by the National Museum of the Philippines to be curio or relic of museum interest; and (3)
any other firearm which derives a substantial part of its monetary value from the fact that
it is novel, rare, bizarre or because of its association with some historical figure, period or
event.
(d) Arms smuggling refers to the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or
transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, from or across the
territory of one country to that of another country which has not been authorized in
accordance with domestic law in either or both country/countries.
(e) Authority to import refers to a document issued by the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) authorizing the importation of firearms, or their parts, ammunition and other
I components.
(f) Authorized dealer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or business
entity duly licensed by the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) of the PNP to engage in
the business of buying and selling ammunition, firearms or parte thereof, at wholesale or
retail basis.
(g) Authorized importer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or
business duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of importing
ammunition and firearms, or parts thereof into the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines for purposes of sale or distribution under the provisions of this Act.
(h) Authorized manufacturer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, or partnership
duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of manufacturing firearms,
and ammunition or parts thereof for purposes of sale or distribution.1âwphi1
(i) Confiscated firearm refers to a firearm that is taken into custody by the PNP, National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and all
other law enforcement agencies by reason of their mandate and must be necessarily
reported or turned over to the PEO of the PNP.
(j) Demilitarized firearm refers to a firearm deliberately made incapable of performing its
main purpose of firing a projectile.
(k) Duty detail order refers to a document issued by the juridical entity or employer wherein
the details of the disposition of firearm is spelled-out, thus indicating the name of the
employee, the firearm information, the specific duration and location of posting or
assignment and the authorized bonded firearm custodian for the juridical entity to whom
such firearm is turned over after the lapse of the order.
(l) Firearm refers to any handheld or portable weapon, whether a small arm or light
weapon, that expels or is designed to expel a bullet, shot, slug, missile or any projectile,
which is discharged by means of expansive force of gases from burning gunpowder or other
form of combustion or any similar instrument or implement. For purposes of this Act, the
barrel, frame or receiver is considered a firearm.
(m) Firearms Information Management System (FIMS) refers to the compilation of all data and
information on firearms ownership and disposition for record purposes.
(n) Forfeited firearm refers to a firearm that is subject to forfeiture by reason of court order
as accessory penalty or for the disposition by the FEO of the PNP of firearms considered
as abandoned, surrendered, confiscated or revoked in compliance with existing rules and
regulations.
(o) Gun club refers to an organization duly registered with and accredited in good standing
by the FEO of the PNP which is established for the purpose of propagating responsible and
safe gun ownership, proper appreciation and use of firearms by its members, for the
purpose of sports and shooting competition, self-defense and collection purposes.
(p) Gunsmith refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or business duly
licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of repairing firearms and other
weapons or constructing or assembling firearms and weapons from finished or
manufactured parts thereof on a per order basis and not in commercial quantities or of
making minor parts for the purpose of repairing or assembling said firearms or weapons.
(q) Imitation firearm refers to a replica of a firearm, or other device that is so substantially
similar in coloration and overall appearance to an existing firearm as to lead a reasonable
person to believe that such imitation firearm is a real firearm.
(r) Licensed citizen refers to any Filipino who complies with the qualifications set forth in
this Act and duly issued with a license to possess or to carry firearms outside of the
residence in accordance with this Act.
(s) Licensed, juridical entity refers to corporations, organizations, businesses including
security agencies and local government units (LGUs) which are licensed to own and
possess firearms in accordance with this Act.
(t) Light weapons are: Class-A Light weapons which refer to self-loading pistols, rifles and
carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns not exceeding caliber
7.62MM which have fully automatic mode; and Class-B Light weapons which refer to
weapons designed for use by two (2) or more persons serving as a crew, or rifles and
machine guns exceeding caliber 7.62MM such as heavy machine guns, handheld
underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank
guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable
launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a caliber of less than 100MM.
(u) Long certificate of registration refers to licenses issued to government agencies or offices or
government-owned or -controlled corporations for firearms to be used by their officials and
employees who are qualified to possess firearms as provider in this Act, excluding security
guards.
(v) Loose firearm refers to an unregistered firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm, firearm
which has been lost or stolen, illegally manufactured firearms, registered firearms in the
possession of an individual other than the licensee and those with revoked licenses in
accordance with the rules and regulations.
(w) Major part or components of a firearm refers to the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder
or the bolt assembly. The term also includes any part or kit designed and intended for use
in converting a semi-automatic burst to a full automatic firearm.
(x) Minor parts of a firearm refers to the parts of the firearm other than the major parts which
are necessary to effect and complete the action of expelling a projectile by way of
combustion, except those classified as accessories.
(y) Permit to carry firearm outside of residence refers to a written authority issued to a licensed
citizen by the Chief of the PNP which entitles such person to carry his/her registered or
lawfully issued firearm outside of the residence for the duration and purpose specified in
the authority.
(z) Permit to transport firearm refers to a written authority issued to a licensed citizen or entity
by the Chief of the PNP or by a PNP Regional Director which entitles such person or entity
to transport a particular firearm from and to a specific location within the duration and
purpose in the authority.
(aa) Residence refers to the place or places of abode of the licensed citizen as indicated in
his/her license.
(bb) Shooting range refers to a facility established for the purpose of firearms training and
skills development, firearm testing, as well as for sports and competition shooting either
for the exclusive use of its members or open to the general public, duly registered with and
accredited in good standing by the FEO of the PNP.
(cc) Short certificate of registration refers to a certificate issued by the FEO of the PNP for a
government official or employee who was issued by his/her employer department, agency
or government-owned or -controlled corporation a firearm covered by the long certificate
of registration.
(dd) Small arms refer to firearms intended to be or primarily designed for individual use or
that which is generally considered to mean a weapon intended to be fired from the hand or
shoulder, which are not capable of fully automatic bursts of discharge, such as:
(1) Handgun which is a firearm intended to be fired from the hand, which includes:
(i) A pistol which is a hand-operated firearm having a chamber integral with or
permanently aligned with the bore which may be self-loading; and
(ii) Revolver which is a hand-operated firearm with a revolving cylinder containing
chambers for individual cartridges.
(2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm or designed to be fired from the shoulder that can
discharge a bullet through a rifled barrel by different actions of loading, which may be
classified as lever, bolt, or self-loading; and
(3) Shotgun which is a weapon designed, made and intended to fire a number of ball shots
or a single projectile through a smooth bore by the action or energy from burning
gunpowder.
(ee) Sports shooting competition refers to a defensive, precision or practical sport shooting
competition duly authorized by the FEO of the PNP.
(ff) Tampered, obliterated or altered firearm refers to any firearm whose serial number or other
identification or ballistics characteristics have been intentionally tampered with,
obliterated or altered without authority or in order to conceal its source, identity or
ownership.
(gg) Thermal weapon sight refers to a battery operated, uncooled thermal imaging device
which amplifies available thermal signatures so that the viewed scene becomes clear to the
operator which is used to locate and engage targets during daylight and from low light to
total darkness and operates in adverse conditions such as light rain, light snow, and dry
smoke or in conjunction with other optical and red dot sights.
ARTICLE II
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
Section 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance of and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess
Firearms. – In order to qualify and acquire a license to own and possess a firearm or firearms
and ammunition, the applicant must be a Filipino citizen, at least twenty-one (21) years
old and has gainful work, occupation or business or has filed an Income Tax Return (ITR)
for the preceding year as proof of income, profession, business or occupation.
In addition, the applicant shall submit the following certification issued by appropriate
authorities attesting the following:
(a) The applicant has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
(b) The applicant has passed the psychiatric test administered by a PNP-accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist;
(c) The applicant has passed the drug test conducted by an accredited and authorized drug
testing laboratory or clinic;
(d) The applicant has passed a gun safety seminar which is administered by the PNP or a
registered and authorized gun club;
(e) The applicant has filed in writing the application to possess a registered firearm which
shall state the personal circumstances of the applicant;
(f) The applicant must present a police clearance from the city or municipality police office;
and
(g) The applicant has not been convicted or is currently an accused in a pending criminal
case before any court of law for a crime that is punishable with a penalty of more than two
(2) years.
For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent dismissal of a criminal case before the
courts of law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and acquire a license.
The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing fees as may be provided in the
implementing rules and regulations of this Act.
An applicant who intends to possess a firearm owned by a juridical entity shall submit
his/her duty detail order to the FEO of the PNP.
Section 5. Ownership of Firearms and Ammunition by a Juridical Entity. – A juridical person
maintaining its own security force may be issued a regular license to own and possess
firearms and ammunition under the following conditions:
(a) It must be Filipino-owned and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC);
(b) It is current, operational and a continuing concern;
(c) It has completed and submitted all its reportorial requirements to the SEC; and
(d) It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly certified by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
The application shall be made in the name of the juridical person represented by its
President or any of its officers mentioned below as duly authorized in a board resolution
to that effect: Provided, That the officer applying for the juridical entity, shall possess all the
qualifications required of a citizen applying for a license to possess firearms.
Other corporate officers eligible to represent the juridical person are: the vice president,
treasurer, and board secretary.
Security agencies and LGUs shall be included in this category of licensed holders but shall
be subject to additional requirements as may be required by the Chief of the PNP.
Section 6. Ownership of Firearms by the National Government. – All firearms owned by the
National Government shall be registered with the FEO of the PNP in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Such registration shall be exempt from all duties and taxes that
may otherwise be levied on other authorized owners of firearms. For reason of national
security, firearms of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Coast Guard and other
law enforcement agencies shall only be reported to the FEO of the PNP.
Section 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence or Place of Business. – A permit to carry
firearms outside of residence shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP or his/her duly
authorized representative to any qualified person whose life is under actual threat or
his/her life is in imminent danger due to the nature of his/her profession, occupation or
business.
It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove that his/her life is under actual threat by
submitting a threat assessment certificate from the PNP.
For purposes of this Act, the following professionals are considered to be in imminent
danger due to the nature of their profession, occupation or business:
(a) Members of the Philippine Bar;
(b) Certified Public Accountants;
(c) Accredited Media Practitioners;
(d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers;
(e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;
(f) Physicians and Nurses;
(g) Engineers; and
(h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their business or undertaking, are exposed to high
risk of being targets of criminal elements.
ARTICLE III
REGISTRATION AND LICENSING
Section 8. Authority to Issue License. – The Chief of the PNP, through the FEO of the PNP,
shall issue licenses to qualified individuals and to cause the registration of firearms.
Section 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. – Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act
and payment of required fees to be determined by the Chief of the PNP, a qualified
individual may be issued the appropriate license under the following categories;
Type 1 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of two (2) registered
firearms;
Type 2 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of five (5) registered
firearms;
Type 3 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of ten (10) registered
firearms;
Type 4 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of fifteen (15) registered
firearms; and
Type 5 license – allows a citizen, who is a certified gun collector, to own and possess more
than fifteen (15) registered firearms.
For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container secured by lock and key or other security
measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall be required.
For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply with the inspection and bond
requirements.
Section 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. – Only small arms may be registered by
licensed citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and concealed
carry. A light weapon shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively by the AFP, the
PNP and other law enforcement agencies authorized by the President in the performance
of their duties: Provided, That private individuals who already have licenses to possess
Class-A light weapons upon the effectivity of this Act shall not be deprived of the privilege
to continue possessing the same and renewing the licenses therefor, for the sole reason that
these firearms are Class "A" light weapons, and shall be required to comply with other
applicable provisions of this Act.
Section 11. Registration of Firearms. – The licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity shall
register his/her/its firearms so purchased with the FEO of the PNP in accordance with the
type of license such licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity possesses. A certificate of
registration of the firearm shall be issued upon payment of reasonable fees.
For purposes of this Act, registration refers to the application, approval, record-keeping
and monitoring of firearms with the FEO of the PNP in accordance with the type of license
issued to any person under Section 9 of this Act.
Section 12. License to Possess Ammunition Necessarily Included. – The licenses granted to
qualified citizens or juridical entities as provided in Section 9 of this Act shall include the
license to possess ammunition with a maximum of fifty (50) rounds for each registered
firearm: Provided; That the FEO of the PNP may allow more ammunition to be possessed
by licensed sports shooters.
Section 13. Issuance of License to Manufacture or Deal In Firearms and Ammunition. – Any
person desiring to manufacture or deal in firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition
thereof, or instruments and implements used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition, shall make an application to:
(a) The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) in the
case of an application for a license to manufacture; and
(b) The Chief of the PNP in the case of a license to deal in firearms and firearms parts,
ammunition and gun repair.
The applicant shall state the amount of capitalization for manufacture or cost of the
purchase and sale of said articles intended to be transacted by such applicant; and the types
of firms, ammunition or implements which the applicant intends to manufacture or
purchase and sell under the license applied for; and such additional information as may be
especially requested by the Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP.
The Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP may approve or disapprove such
application based on the prescribed guidelines. In the case of approval, the Secretary of the
DILG or the Chief of the PNP shall indicate the amount of the bond to be executed by the
applicant before the issuance of the license and the period of time by which said license
shall be effective, unless sooner revoked by their authority.
Upon approval of the license to manufacture or otherwise deal in firearms by the Secretary
of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP as the case may be, the same shall be transmitted to
the FEO of the PNP which shall issue the license in accordance with the approved terms
and conditions, upon the execution and delivery by the applicant of the required bond
conditioned upon the faithful compliance on the part of the licensee to the laws and
regulations relative to the business licensed.
Section 14. Scope of License to Manufacture Firearms and Ammunition. – The scope of the
License to Manufacture firearms and ammunition shall also include the following:
(a) The authority to manufacture and assemble firearms, ammunition, spare parts and
accessories, ammunition components, and reloading of ammunitions, within sites, areas,
and factories stated therein. The Secretary of the DILG shall approve such license;
(b) The license to deal in or sell all the items covered by the License to Manufacture, such
as parts, firearms or ammunition and components;
(c) The authority to subcontract the manufacturing of parts and accessories necessary for
the firearms which the manufacturer is licensed to manufacture: Provided, That the
subcontractor of major parts or major components is also licensed to manufacture firearms
and ammunition; and
(d) The authority to import machinery, equipment, and firearm parts and ammunition
components for the manufacture thereof. Firearm parts and ammunition components to
be imported shall, however, be limited to those authorized to be manufactured as reflected
in the approved License to Manufacture. The Import Permit shall be under the
administration of the PNP.
A licensed manufacturer of ammunition is also entitled to import various reference
firearms needed to test the ammunition manufactured under the License to Manufacture.
A licensed manufacturer of firearms, on the other hand, is entitled to import various
firearms for reference, test and evaluation for manufacture of similar, types of firearms
covered by the License to Manufacture.
An export permit shall, however, be necessary to export manufactured parts or finished
products of firearms and ammunition. The Export Permit of firearms and ammunition
shall be under the administration of the PNP.
Section 15. Registration of Locally Manufactured and Imported Firearms. – Local
manufacturers and importers of firearms and major parts thereof shall register the same as
follows:
(a) For locally manufactured firearms and major parts thereof, the initial registration shall
be done at the manufacturing facility: Provided, That firearms intended for export shall no
longer be subjected to ballistic identification procedures; and
(b) For imported firearms and major parts thereof, the registration shall be done upon
arrival at the FEO of the PNP storage facility.
Section 16. License and Scope of License to Deal. – The License to Deal authorizes the
purchase, sale and general business in handling firearms and ammunition, major and
minor parts of firearms, accessories, spare parts, components, and reloading machines,
which shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP.
Section 17. License and Scope of License for Gunsmiths. – The license for gunsmiths shall allow
the grantee to repair registered firearms. The license shall include customization of firearms
from finished or manufactured parts thereof on per order basis and not in commercial
quantities and making the minor parts thereof, i.e. pins, triggers, trigger bows, sights and
the like only for the purpose of repairing the registered firearm. The license for gunsmiths
shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP.
Section 18. Firearms for Use in Sports and Competitions. – A qualified individual shall apply
for a permit to transport his/her registered firearm/s from his/her residence to the firing
range/s and competition sites as may be warranted.
Section 19. Renewal of Licenses and Registration. – All types of licenses to possess a firearm
shall be renewed every two (2) years. Failure to renew the license on or before the date of
its expiration shall cause the revocation of the license and of the registration of the
firearm/s under said licensee.
The registration of the firearm shall be renewed every four (4) years. Failure to renew the
registration of the firearm on or before the date of expiration shall cause the revocation of
the license of the firearm. The said firearm shall be confiscated or forfeited in favor of the
government after due process.
The failure to renew a license or registration within the periods stated above on two (2)
occasions shall cause the holder of the firearm to be perpetually disqualified from applying
for any firearm license. The application for the renewal of the license or registration may
be submitted to the FEO of the PNP, within six (6) months before the date of the expiration
of such license or registration.
Section 20. Inspection and Inventory. – The Chief of the PNP or his/her authorized
representative shall require the submission of reports, inspect or examine the inventory and
records of a licensed manufacturer, dealer or importer of firearms and ammunition during
reasonable hours.
ARTICLE IV
ACQUISITION, DEPOSIT OF FIREARMS, ABANDONED, DEMILITARIZED
AND ANTIQUE FIREARMS
Section 21. Acquisition or Purchase and Sale of Firearms and Ammunition. – Firearms and
ammunition may only be acquired or purchased from authorized dealers, importers or
local manufacturers and may be transferred or sold only from a licensed citizen or licensed
juridical entity to another licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity: Provided, That, during
election periods, the sale and registration of firearms and ammunition and the issuance of
the corresponding licenses to citizens shall be allowed on the condition that the transport
or delivery thereof shall strictly comply with the issuances, resolutions, rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission on Elections.
Section 22. Deposit of Firearms by Persons Arriving From Abroad. – A person arriving in the
Philippines who is legally in possession of any firearm or ammunition in his/her country
of origin and who has declared the existence of the firearm upon embarkation and
disembarkation but whose firearm is not registered in the Philippines in accordance with
this Act shall deposit the same upon written receipt with the Collector of Customs for
delivery to the FEO of the PNP for safekeeping, or for the issuance of a permit to transport
if the person is a competitor in a sports shooting competition. If the importation of the
same is allowed and the party in question desires to obtain a domestic firearm license, the
same should be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of this Act. If no license is
desired or leave to import is not granted, the firearm or ammunition in question shall
remain in the custody of the FEO of the PNP until otherwise disposed of in-accordance
with law.
Section 23. Return of Firearms to Owner upon Departure from the Philippines. – Upon the
departure from the Philippines of any person whose firearm or ammunition is in the
custody of the FEO of the PNP, the same shall, upon timely request, be delivered to the
person through the Collector of Customs. In the case of a participant in a local sports
shooting competition, the firearm must be presented to the Collector of Customs before the
same is allowed to be loaded on board the carrier on which the person is to board.
Section 24. Safekeeping of Firearms and Ammunition. – Any licensee may deposit a registered
firearm to the FEO of the PNP, or any Police Regional Office for safekeeping. Reasonable
fees for storage shall be imposed.
Section 25. Abandoned Firearms and Ammunition. – Any firearm or ammunition deposited
in the custody of the FEO of the PNP pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be
deemed to have been abandoned by the owner or his/her authorized representative if
he/she failed to reclaim the same within five (5) years or failed to advise the FEO of the
PNP of the disposition to be made thereof. Thereafter, the FEO of the PNP may dispose
of the same after compliance with established procedures.
Section 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. – Upon the death or legal disability of the holder
of a firearm license, it shall be the duty of his/her next of kin, nearest relative, legal
representative, or other person who shall knowingly come into possession of such firearm
or ammunition, to deliver the same to the FEO of the PNP or Police Regional Office, and
such firearm or ammunition shall be retained by the police custodian pending the issuance
of a license and its registration in accordance, with this Act. The failure to deliver the
firearm or ammunition within six (6) months after the death or legal disability of the
licensee shall render the possessor liable for illegal possession of the firearm.
Section 27. Antique Firearm. – Any person who possesses an antique firearm shall register
the same and secure a collector’s license from the FEO of the PNP. Proper storage of
antique firearm shall be strictly imposed. Noncompliance of this provision shall be
considered as illegal possession of the firearm as penalized in this Act.
ARTICLE V
PENAL PROVISIONS
Section 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. – The unlawful
acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as follows:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm;
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if three (3) or more
small arms or Class-A light weapons are unlawfully acquired or possessed by any person;
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-A light weapon;
(d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall,
unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-B light weapon;
(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in this
section shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm under
any or combination of the following conditions:
(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a loaded magazine;
(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget used to guide the shooter to hit the target
such as thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like;
(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes, firearm muffler or firearm silencer;
(4) Accompanied with an extra barrel; and
(5) Converted to be capable of firing full automatic bursts.
(f) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a small arm;
(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a small arm or Class-A light
weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with
the unlawful acquisition or possession of a small arm, the former violation shall be
absorbed by the latter;
(h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-A light weapon;
(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-A light weapon. If the
violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful
acquisition or possession of a Class-A light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed
by the latter;
(j) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-B light weapon; and
(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-B light weapon. If the
violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful
acquisition or possession of a Class-B light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed
by the latter.
Section 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose firearm,
when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the
crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum
penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession
of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the
penalty for the crime charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of
a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that
imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found
guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed
as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of
this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
Section 30. Liability of Juridical Person. – The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
to prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
director or other responsible officer of/any public or private firm, company, corporation
or entity who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding section, or willfully or knowingly allow any of
them to use unregistered firearm or firearms without any legal authority to be carried
outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
Section 31. Absence of Permit to Carry Outside of Residence. – The penalty of prision
correccional and a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person who is licensed to own a firearm but who shall carry the registered firearm outside
his/her residence without any legal authority therefor.
Section 32. Unlawful Manufacture, Importation, Sale or Disposition of Firearms or Ammunition
or Parts Thereof, Machinery, Tool or Instrument Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms, Ammunition or Parts Thereof. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully engage in the
manufacture, importation, sale or disposition of a firearm or ammunition, or a major part
of a firearm or ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used
by the same person in the manufacture of a firearm, ammunition, or a major part thereof.
The possession of any machinery, tool or instrument used directly in the manufacture of
firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by any person whose business, employment
or activity does not lawfully deal with the possession of such article, shall be prima
facie evidence that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful or illegal manufacture
of firearms, ammunition or parts thereof.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period to prision mayor in its medium period
shall be imposed upon any laborer, worker or employee of a licensed firearms dealer who
shall unlawfully take, sell or otherwise dispose of parts of firearms or ammunition which
the company manufactures and sells, and other materials used by the company in the
manufacture or sale of firearms or ammunition. The buyer or possessor of such stolen part
or material, who is aware that such part or material was stolen, shall suffer the same penalty
as the laborer, worker or employee.
If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other
juridical entity, the penalty provided for in this section shall be imposed upon the directors,
officers, employees or other officials or persons therein who knowingly and willingly
participated in the unlawful act.
Section 33. Arms Smuggling. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall engage or participate in arms smuggling as defined in this Act.
Section 34. Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration of Firearms Identification. – The penalty
of prision correccional to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall tamper, obliterate or alter without authority the barrel, slide, frame,
receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including the name of the maker, model, or serial
number of any firearm, or who shall replace without authority the barrel, slide, frame,
receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including its individual or peculiar identifying
characteristics essential in forensic examination of a firearm or light weapon.
The PNP shall place this information, including its individual or peculiar identifying
characteristics into the database of integrated firearms identification system of the PNP
Crime Laboratory for future use and identification of a particular firearm.
Section 35. Use of an Imitation Firearm. – An imitation firearm used in the commission of a
crime shall be considered a real firearm as defined in this Act and the person who
committed the crime shall be punished in accordance with this Act: Provided, That injuries
caused on the occasion of the conduct of competitions, sports, games, or any recreation
activities involving imitation firearms shall not be punishable under this Act.
Section 36. In Custodia Legis. – During the pendency of any case filed in violation of this
Act, seized firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tools or instruments shall
remain in the custody of the court. If the court decides that it has no adequate means to
safely keep the same, the court shall issue an order to turn over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory such firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tools or instruments in
its custody during the pendency of the case and to produce the same to the court when so
ordered. No bond shall be admitted for the release of the firearm, ammunition or parts
thereof, machinery, tool or instrument. Any violation of this paragraph shall be punishable
by prision mayor in its minimum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Section 37. Confiscation and Forfeiture. – The imposition of penalty for any violation of this
Act shall carry with it the accessory penalty of confiscation and forfeiture of the firearm,
ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tool or instrument in favor of the government
which shall be disposed of in accordance with law.
Section 38. Liability for Planting Evidence. – The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period shall be imposed upon any person who shall willfully and maliciously insert; place,
and/or attach, directly or indirectly, through any overt or covert act, any firearm, or
ammunition, or parts thereof in the person, house, effects, or in the immediate vicinity of
an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating or incriminating the person, or
imputing the commission of any violation of the provisions of this Act to said individual.
If the person found guilty under this paragraph is a public officer or employee, such person
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Section 39. Grounds for Revocation, Cancellation or Suspension of License or Permit. – The Chief
of the PNP or his/her authorized representative may revoke, cancel or suspend a license
or permit on the following grounds:
(a) Commission of a crime or offense involving the firearm, ammunition, of major parts
thereof;
(b) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or any offense where the penalty
carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
purposes of commerce or possession, shall be revoked. If government-issued firearms,
ammunition or major parts of firearms or light weapons are unlawfully disposed, sold or
transferred by any law enforcement agent or public officer to private individuals, the
penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed.

(c) Loss of the firearm, ammunition, or any parts thereof through negligence;

(d) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major parts thereof outside of residence or
workplace without, the proper permit to carry the same;

(e) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major parts thereof in prohibited places;

(f) Dismissal for cause from the service in case of government official and employee;

(g) Commission of any of the acts penalized under Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002″;

(h) Submission of falsified documents or misrepresentation in the application to obtain a

license or permit;

(i) Noncompliance of reportorial requirements; and

(j) By virtue of a court order.

Section 40. Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen Firearm or Light Weapon. – A fine of Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any licensed firearm holder who fails to report
to the FEO of the PNP that the subject firearm has been lost or stolen within a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of discovery.

Likewise, a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
holding a valid firearm license who changes residence or office address other than that
indicated in the license card and fails within a period of thirty (30) days from said transfer
to notify the FEO of the PNP of such change of address.

Section 41. Illegal Transfer/Registration of Firearms. – It shall be unlawful to transfer

possession of any firearm to any person who has not yet obtained or secured the necessary
license or permit thereof.

The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall violate the
provision of the preceding paragraph. In addition, he/she shall be disqualified to apply for
a license to possess other firearms and all his/her existing firearms licenses whether for
Any public officer or employee or any person who shall facilitate the registration of a Section 47. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication
firearm through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or submission of falsified documents shall in a newspaper of nationwide circulation.
suffer the penalty of prision correccional.
Approved: May 29, 2013
ARTICLE VI

FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 42. Firearms Repository. – The FEO of the PNP shall be the sole repository of all
firearms records to include imported and locally manufactured firearms and ammunition.
Within one (1) year upon approval of this Act, all military and law enforcement agencies,
government agencies, LGUs and government-owned or -controlled corporations shall
submit an inventory of all their firearms and ammunition to the PNP.

Section 43. Final Amnesty. – Persons in possession of unregistered firearms and holders of
expired license or unregistered firearms shall register and renew the same through the Final
General Amnesty within six (6) months from the promulgation of the implementing rules
and regulations of this Act. During the interim period of six (6) months, no person applying
for license shall be charged of any delinquent payment accruing to the firearm subject for
registration.

The PNP shall conduct an intensive nationwide to ensure t that the general public is
properly informed of the provisions of this Act.

Section 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the PNP, after public hearings and consultation
with concerned sectors of society shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of this Act to be published in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.

Section 45. Repealing Clause. – This Act repeals Sections 1, 2, 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8294 and all other laws,
executive orders, letters of instruction, issuances, circulars, administrative orders, rules or
regulations that are inconsistent herewith.

Section 46. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or any part hereof is held
invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected
shall remain valid and subsisting.
CASES:
G.R. Nos. 136149-51 September 19, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias "WARPAN," appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the
person arrested committed "no other crime." Furthermore, if the person is held liable for
murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not
a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were
about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the
direct assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan," appeals before us the September
17, 1998 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16),
which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,2 all signed by Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information 3 was
for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam
being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo, 4 this City, conspiring
and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in
Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form." 5
The second Information6 charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. We quote it below:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any
justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody
and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with
magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20)
and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver
with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty
shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one
empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with
Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first having
obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in
flagrant violation of the aforementioned law."7
The third Information,8 for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded
thus:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with
M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt
to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO
A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following
manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite
Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of
the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of
the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a
person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of their
duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant
legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus
commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the
accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police
Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the
fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and
were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said
police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam
y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and
subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to
make good his escape and has remained at-large."9
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.10
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad
Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor,
which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The
accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during
which he entered a plea of not guilty.11 After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered,
the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a.
‘WARPAN’ -
"1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and
SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16,
Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
"3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized
under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294,
and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
"4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS
and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs." (emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal.12
The Facts
Prosecution’s Version
In its Brief,13 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
"At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C).
After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was
conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police
Office in connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing was conducted by
SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3
Renato Dela Peña was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos
and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were
assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
"After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent
Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board
several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could
reach appellant’s house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house
shouting, ‘[P]olice, raid, raid’ (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4).
When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were
met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also
gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
"SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Peña who were with the
first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew
appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3
Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the
movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house
(Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
"In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp.
45-46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the
door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The
other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house
through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen
surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young girl and
three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the
young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
"Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant
firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant
noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the
jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol
rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest
appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside
not to fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol and
SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid.,
pp. 21-23).
"At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of
the sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He
removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He
counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14
rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another
with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle
magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-
57).
"After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellant’s house, Rivera, Dela Peña, Gregorio
and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the
PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search
warrant. Dela Peña and Rivera then searched appellant’s room on the ground floor in the
presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table
was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50),
each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or ‘shabu’.
"Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different
denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber
revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch
containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an
M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
"Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the
Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2
Gaganting to go to appellant’s house to buy ‘shabu.’ Locson knew appellant as a seller of
‘shabu’ (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellant’s house about fifteen (15)
times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellant’s house at 3:20 p.m. He
bought P300.00 worth of ‘shabu’ from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu
from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was
a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp
made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke ‘shabu’ and
Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of ‘shabu’ he bought on the table (Ibid., pp.
8-15).
"While they were smoking ‘shabu,’ Locson heard gunfire coming from appellant’s house.
They all stood and entered appellant’s compound but were instructed to pass [through] the
other side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape
‘because the police are already here.’ They scampered and ‘ran away because there were
already shots.’ Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching
a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
"The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an
affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellant’s house [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997.
"After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Peña prepared a
‘Receipt for Property Seized’ (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search.
The receipt was signed by Dela Peña as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji
Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given
to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp.
11-12).
"An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist
of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands
of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility
that appellant had fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11).
Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the
following firearms ‘were fired’ (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial
No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number
(Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79
rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
"With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector
Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service
Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline
granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the
examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative
results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
"The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and
Explosive Section show that appellant ‘had not applied/filed any application for license to
possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside
of his residence’ (Exh. X)"14
Defense’s Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court. 15 Hence,
we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
"Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’, 30 years old, married, gave his
occupation as ‘smuggling’ (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia
and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said
that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan
Ladjaalam [was] only his ‘alias’. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as
Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He
testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police,
he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in
Dandao’s house and not in his house because they ha[d] ‘a sort of a conference’ as
Dandao’s daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in
his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went out
of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested ‘xxx [at]
the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my
house’ (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him ‘considering that the one who arrested
me does not have nameplate.’ He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who
arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio
Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from
[t]he second floor of his house. He said the ‘policemen’ [were] ‘the one[s] who fire[d] at us’ (tsn,
p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die ‘[b]ecause the door is
very near x x x the vicinity of my house’. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. ‘B-3’) which
according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He
does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he
does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. ‘B-4’),
the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. ‘G’; ‘G-1’ to ‘G-2’), the two (2) M14
magazines with live ammunition (Exh. ‘G-3’; ‘G-4’); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers
(Exhs. ‘B-1’; ‘B-2’), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. ‘J-1’ to ‘J-
50’) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. ‘J’, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh.
‘W’) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. ‘K’) all do not belong to him. He said that the
policemen just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him.
They were brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag
containing assorted coins, he said: ‘that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought
that as their evidence’ (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
"Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house.
He affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house.
He could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They
left the place already because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp.
8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome.
Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not
recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him.
He is not selling shabu but he knows ‘for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in
selling shabu in that place’, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji
Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
"After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for
one day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station,
he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at
the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted
the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional
Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-
26, May 4, 1998).
"During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and
Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said
that he saw that ‘it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name." They were
killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible
for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
"Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan
Ladjaalam whom he calls ‘Hadji Id’ at the time the police raided the house. She is the
mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a
helper when ‘soldiers’ entered the house. ‘(W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns)
even inside the house’ (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms.
They searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the
room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa
tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at
her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not
in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted
and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that ‘it was already late
in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx
Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano’ (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano
arrived ‘already late in the afternoon, almost sundown’ (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that
aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything
else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalam’s house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
"Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 o’clock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen
arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles
he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had ‘around P50,000.00’ placed inside a waist bag
tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a
policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch.
He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not
treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained for one day and one
night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was
released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).
"Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997, she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma.
There is only one house between her parents’ house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam.
Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpan’s wife. When
Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The
policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the
policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The
policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down
in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).
"Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a
motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom
she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at
Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was
about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and ‘there was a
shot.’ As a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and
Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
"Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o ‘clock
[o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan
where he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio
Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house.
Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him
but the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and
things were already taken inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw ‘the
things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu‘ (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He
did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during
the search which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. ‘Upon
seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. "P"; "P-1") of
the things x x x taken during the search" (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies
at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The three persons were
killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id)."16
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified
the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense,17 in
violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.18 The court a quo ruled:
"It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally ‘null and void’ because
it was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of
the Rules of Court which provides that ‘A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense xxx’. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184
(1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a ‘scatter
shot warrant’ - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is ‘totally
null and void.’"19 (emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellant’s arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had
shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was
established by the testimonies of several police officers,20 who were participants in the raid,
and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and
appellant.21 Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his
statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that
there had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid.22 The trial court concluded that the
testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellant’s narration that he was not in his
house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning
thus:
"Under the circumstances, the policemen ‘had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan
Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to
effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm.’ Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of
Court, ‘A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.’ An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within
the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search
Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued
and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to
serve the Search Warrant."23
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid:
the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) 24 used by appellant
against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle
magazines.25 The trial court observed that these items were in "plain view" of the pursuing
police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were "evidence [of] the
commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure" 26 since
appellant "had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been given authority
to carry firearm outside his residence."27
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellant’s claim that the items that
were seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It
ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could
have done so during the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it
was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied
by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then
dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak
defense.28
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It
reasoned as follows:
"The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos
and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and
maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and
used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and
sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway
where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may
be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and
circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general
reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan’ that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where
drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over
the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he
is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who
rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are
allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated,
Walpan’s testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or for how long was the
extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that
the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan’ is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials,
if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive
declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the
former deserve more credence."29
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellant’s liability in this manner:
"x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to
enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,]
considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was
proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.
"The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ cannot be held liable [for] the crime of
Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act
6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty
(50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible
as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more
than one offense, and were not found in ‘plain view’ of the police officers who seized them.
Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing
fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and
twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the policemen who
recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue
bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam
a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ because according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not
belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the National
Treasury."30
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:
I event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge.36 Here, there
"The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had]
fired first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him
which led to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
"The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular
inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.
III
"The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of their duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police." 31
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request
for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of
frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed
on appellant.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of
the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the
lower court "a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime." 32 We
do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the
clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.33 We note in particular that the defense had
even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower
court a fairly good idea of appellant’s house.34 Viewing the site of the raid would have only
delayed the proceedings.35 Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant
is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion.37
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.38 Suffice it to A: Yes.
state that the trial court’s assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even
finality.39 After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
support appellant’s claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general rule. 40 Quite the
contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon A: Yes.
the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1
Amado Mirasol Jr.41testified thus:
Q: What did you see inside the house?
"PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of
Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused? of his house[;] I saw two old woman.

A: Yes. xxx xxx xxx

Q: And it’s there where you were met by a volley of fire? PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?

COURT:
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the
ground floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... towards our group so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second
You said you were fired upon? floor of the house.

A: More or less, five (5) meters. Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?

xxx xxx xxx A: Yes.

PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?

Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our
colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question. presence and immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went
immediately and jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness? neighbor’s house.

A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut. xxx xxx xxx

Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence? COURT:
Reform. That is leading Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?

Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbor’s A: Yes.
house?
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the
members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam. A: Yes.

xxx xxx xxx Q: Why can you identify that?

PROSECUTOR NUVAL: A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.

Q: Were you able to go down? Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?

A: Yes. A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.

Q: What happened when you were there? FISCAL NUVAL:

A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team This is already marked as our Exhibit ‘B-3’ with magazine, one magazine and seven round
and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to [ammunition].
arrest Walfan Ladjaalam."42
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo
Lacastesantos,43 as follows:
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine
and I turned it over to the investigator.
"Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the
outside, ‘do not fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.’ A: At the crime scene.

Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this? Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?

A: At the sala set. A: Yes.

Q: This sala set where is this located? Q: Why?

A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.

A: I put x x x markings. Q: RJL?

xxx xxx xxx A: RJL."44

COURT: These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the
weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines? M-14 which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes
Delfin-Diestro explained in open court:
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
"Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence
A: Empty. of gun powder nitrates.

Q: How about the M14? Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?

A: Found with [ammunition]. A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.

Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?

xxx xxx xxx

A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
[would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
A: In the corner.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: Yes.
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you identify them?
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit ‘B-3’, which is the M14 rifle. What did you
do with this?
Q: Where are your initials?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed
A: On the magazines. there [were] black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...? Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements46 of the crime of illegal possession
of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon
A: It indicates that the gun was fired. the approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and
his possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecution’s
Q: Recently? Certification47 stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm,
and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence. 48 Further, it
should be pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private
the incident x x x. individual.49

COURT: Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up

Q: There is also black residue? From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main
defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were
A: Yes. "planted," and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.

Q: What does it indicate? This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is
easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove. 50 Absent any showing of an improper
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired. motive on the part of the police officers,51 coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much credence. 52Indeed, after
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit? examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his
claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his
testimony during the trial.53 He testified thus:
A: This one.

"Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Affidavit?
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit ‘B-3-A’.
A I could not remember.
COURT:
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th
day of December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident? name

A: Yes. FISCAL NUVAL:

Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue? Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?

A: Yes, Your Honor."45 (emphasis supplied) (Showing)

A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I
quote: ‘that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the
shots were directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by
armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house’; [the]
house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this
[what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which
you said you heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: ‘that [o]n that
afternoon of September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo.
Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children,
is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at
Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or
you were in your neighbors[‘] house at that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at
home in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct."54
Crime and Punishment
The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct
assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss
each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an
offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly
established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself
had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including
the time of the raid. The former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police
officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house
and its extension lent credence to the prosecution’s story.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault 55 with multiple
counts of attempted homicide. It found that "[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle
[at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x"
constituted such complex crime.56
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the
penalty of prision correccional.57 Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct
assault, which constitutes the "most serious crime," should be imposed and applied in its
maximum period.58
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the
trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under
PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8
years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court
should not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the
applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial court’s ruling and the OSG’s submission exemplify the legal community’s
difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now
are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(₱30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be
absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup
d’etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the
provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use
unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their
residence in the course of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."
Citing People v. Jayson,59 the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the
specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful
homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there
was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating
circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG
concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the
new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed
at the same time.60
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted
of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been
ignorant of the proviso61 in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed "no other
crime" as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or
homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In
this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide;
hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of
the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms
becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be
held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 62 In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no
other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the accused.63 Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate
offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide.
Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder,
illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSG’s contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA
8294, should be applied in this case.1âwphi1 When the crime was committed on September
24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA
8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997.64 In other words, no longer in existence was the
earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms
separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other
amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that "no other crime was
committed."

Furthermore, the OSG’s reliance on People v. Jayson65 is misplaced. True, this Court
sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had
also committed homicide. We explained, however, that "the criminal case for homicide
[was] not before us for consideration."

Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for
limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the
accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other
crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as
it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of
an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision
correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by
using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense,66 like alarm and scandal67 or
slight physical injuries,68 both of which are punishable by arresto menor.69 This consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to
the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence70 to the proven facts,
and we have done so in this case.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with

the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault
and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2
years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for
which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against
appellant.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible
review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition
in Criminal Case No. 4007 and of murder in Criminal Case No. 4012 and imposing upon
him the penalty of death in both cases.
On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with violation of Section 1, paragraph (2),
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December 1984, in the City of Tagbilaran Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while acting
under the influence of drugs and without any license or permit from the proper authorities,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have ill his possession, custody and
control an unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with
Serial Number 359323 with Five (5) spent shells and Five (5) live ammunitions and without
any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot
one Francis Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot
wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head & Chest (through and through);
Head Entrance — 1.4 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-Temporal Area; Port — 1.3 x 0.3 cm.; Right
Cheek. 3.5 cm. above the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — Right Infrascapular Area at the level of the 7th Intercostal
Rib (Back); Exist — 0.3 cm. dia; above the right nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at the right angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Presidential
Decree No. 1866. 1
On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for murder was also filed against appellant
reading as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident pre-meditation treachery, while acting
under the influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately augmenting the suffering of the
victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one
Francis Ernest Escano with the use of an unlicensed SMITH & WESSON Airweight
caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 359323 hitting and inflicting upon the latter the
following gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head and Chest (Through & Through);
Head Entrance — 14 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-temporal Area; Port — l.3 x 0.3 cm., Right
Cheek, 3.5 cm., above the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — right Infrascapular Area at the level of the 7th Inter-Costal
Rib (back); exit — 0.3 cm. dia; above the right nipple
Y-shape laceration, cheek at the angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the deceased namely: Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey H. Escano, in the amount
to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, with the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and acting under the influence of
dangerous drugs and cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal cases were
consolidated upon motion of the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July 1986, the trial
court rendered a decision 3 convicting appellant under both informations. The dispositive
portion of the decision read as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 4007 finding the accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with
Murder under Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and hereby
sentences said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Further, decision
is also rendered in Criminal Case No. 4012 finding the same accused Renato Tac-an y
Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866. Appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (treachery used to qualify the crime to
murder) and the special aggravating circumstances of acting while under the influence of
dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult to a person in
authority and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset them, and sentences the said
Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest Escano in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay actual compensatory damages in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P108,310.00); to pay moral damages to Judge Francisco Escano, Jr., the sum of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia Escano the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for the mental anguish and
suffering each experienced because of the death of Francis Ernest. All such amount shall
earn legal interest from the time this decision shall become final and executory until fully
satisfied. The accused shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant signified his intention to appeal
to this Court, although the same was subject to automatic review by this Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I. The lower court erred in believing the prosecution's version of the case instead of
according full faith and credence to the defendant's version.
II. The trial court erred in not holding that Renato Tac-an was justified in shooting the
deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that in (sic) the least the defendant acted in
incomplete self-defense in shooting the deceased.
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the defendant
inasmuch as said decree was enforceable only during the existence of the Martial Law
Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy for
having been prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted for murder
in an information which alleges that the accused used an unlicensed firearm in killing the
deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the
deceased Francis Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year
of high school of the Divine Word College in Tagbilaran City. They were close friends,
being not only classmates but also members of the same gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had
been to the house where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those
occasions, Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a handgun with him. Francis was then
advised by his mother to distance himself from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis
turned sour. Sometime in September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with each other,
on which occasion Francis bodily lifted Arnold Romelde from the ground. Arnold was
friend and companion to Renato. The quarrel resulted in Renato and Francis being brought
to the high school principal's office. The strained relationship between the two (2) erstwhile
friends was aggravated in late November 1984 when Francis teamed that Renato, together
with other members of the Bronx gang, was looking for him, apparently with the intention
of beating him up. Further deterioration of their relationship occurred sometime in the first
week of December 1984, when graffiti appeared on the wall of the third year high school
classroom and on the armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating the Bronx gang and
describing Renato as "bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed the graffiti to Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December 1984, Renato entered Room 15 of
the high school building to attend his English III class. Renato placed his scrapbook
prepared for their Mathematics class on his chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa
Baluma, to raise a question. Upon returning to his chair, he found Francis sitting there, on
the scrapbook. Renato was angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the chair on
which Francis was seated. Francis, however, explained that he had not intentionally sat
down on Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued but some classmates and two
(2) teachers, Mrs. Baluma and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, intervened and prevented them from
assaulting each other. After the two (2) had quieted down and apparently shaken hands at
the instance of Mrs. Baluma, the latter resumed her English III class. Francis sat on the
last row to the extreme right of the teacher while Renato was seated on the same last row
at the extreme left of the teacher. While the English III class was still going on, Renato
slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun. He was back at the classroom
approximately fifteen (15) minutes later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just started
in Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and with both hands
raised, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated
behind and to the light of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at Francis, hitting a notebook,
a geometry book and the armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up and with
several of their classmates rushed forward towards the teacher's platform to seek protection
from their teacher. Renato fired a second time, this time hitting the blackboard in front of
the class. Francis and the other students rushed back towards the rear of the room. Renato
walked towards the center of the classroom and fired a third time at Francis, hitting the
concrete wall of the classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates rushed towards the
door, the only door to and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s platform
nearest the door and for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards
the door. This time, Francis was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both
fell to the floor. Ruel was pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled
on the floor bleeding profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr.
Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis,
approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the
room. Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he
is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the
classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet
entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the
right nipple. 8
Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone inside Room
15. Renato proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There, he found
some teachers and students and ordered them to lock the door and close the windows, in
effect holding them as hostages. He also reloaded his gun with five (5) bullets. After some
time, a team of Philippine Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and
surrounded the faculty room. With a hand-held public address device, Capt. Lazo called
upon Renato to surrender himself Renato did not respond to this call. Renato's brother
approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to persuade his brother to give up. Renato's father
who, by this time had also arrived, pleaded with Renato to surrender himself Renato then
turned over his gun to his brother through an opening in the balustrade of the faculty room.
Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's brother, went to the door of the faculty room,
entered and placed Renato under arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue
Francis but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One of the
students entered the room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and through the
window and opened the door from the inside. The teachers and students brought Francis
down to the ground floor from whence the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares
Memorial Hospital. 10 Francis died before reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City.
The officer deposited the revolver recovered from Renato which was an Airweight Smith
and Wesson .38 caliber revolver, with Serial No. 359323, as well as the five (5) live bullets
removed from the said revolver, and the five (5) empty cartridges which Renato had turned
over to him. Ballistic examination conducted by Supervising Ballistician, Artemio
Panganiban, National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu, showed that the empty cartridge
cases had been fired from the revolver recovered from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having believed the prosecution's version
of the facts instead of the version offered by the appellant. The trial court took into
account, inter alia, the positive and direct testimony of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to, among other things, the events which took place
inside her English III classroom immediately before the shooting;
2. Ruel Ungab — a fifteen (15) year old classmate of Renato and Francis, who had fallen
on the floor with Francis when the latter was finally hit by Renato;
3. Damaso Pasilbas — the Mathematics teacher who was holding his class when Renato
had burst into Room 15 and started firing at Francis; and
4. Napoleon Jumauan — another sixteen (16) year old, classmate of Renato and Francis
who was inside the classroom when Renato had started firing at Francis and who was only
about a foot away from the head of Francis when Renato, having re-entered Room 15, had
fired at Francis as the latter was sprawled on the floor of the classroom.
After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion
of the trial court that Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the circumstances
and in the manner described by these witnesses.
1. The claim of self-defense.
Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete self-defense,
when he shot Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the claimant must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the following requisites existed:
a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the aggression; and
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. 12
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few minutes before the end of Mrs.
Baluma's English III class, Francis had approached him:
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)
Q: How did it happened (sic) that you had a conversation with Francis?
(Renato)
A: While the class was going on, Mrs. Baluma was writing on the blackboard.
Q: Then what happened?
A: While our teacher was writing on the blackboard Francis suddenly got near me.
Q: And what happened when Francis approached you?
A: He said, 'So you are brave now you had a (sic) guts to fight against me.'
Q: And what else did he say?
A: He said, 'Go home, get your firearm because I will go home to get a gun.'
Q: Was that all that he told you?
A: He further said, 'You go home get your firearm, if you won't go home and get a gun, I will go to
your place and kill you including your parents, brothers and sisters.'
Q: And after that where did Francis go?
A: Before the bell rang he went ahead. 13
(Emphasis supplied)
We note at the outset that there was no evidence before the Court, except Renato's own
testimony, that Francis had uttered the above statements attributed to him by Renato.
Although there had been about twenty-five (25) other students, and the teacher, in the
classroom at the time, no corroborating testimony was offered by the defense. In the second
place, assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis had indeed made those statements, such
utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression which is the first and most
fundamental requirement of self-defense. Allegedly uttered in a high school classroom by
an obviously unarmed Francis, such statements could not reasonably inspire the "well
grounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of
death or bodily harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken
out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats
or a merely threatening stance or posture. 15Further as pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Francis was obviously without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned and burst
into Room 15 demanding to know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him
repeatedly, without the slightest regard for the safety of his other classmates and of the
teacher. There being no unlawful aggression, there simply could not be self-defense
whether complete or incomplete, 16 and there is accordingly no need to refer to the other
requirements of lawful self-defense.
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable.
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm, a Smith and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5) spent
bullets and five (5) live ones and with having used such firearm and ammunition to shoot
to death Francis Ernest Escano III, in violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part, that:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall
be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him "considering that the reason for
its [P.D. No. 1866] issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D. No. 1866 was
enforceable only during the existence of martial law, and that when martial law was "lifted
in 1979," the reason for the "existence" of P.D. No. 1866 faded away, with the result that
the "original law on firearms, that is, Section 2692 of the [Revised] Administrative Code,
together with its pre-martial law amendments, came into effect again thereby replacing
P.D. No. 1866." 17
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which
suggests that it was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law
imposed upon the country by former President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain
any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-enforceability upon the termination of
the state or period of martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own terms
purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal
possession and manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives in order "to
harmonize their provisions as well as to update and revise certain provisions and prior
statutes "in order to more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms, ammunitions
and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is thus without basis in fact.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged with illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated by the use
of such unlicensed firearm to commit a homicide or murder, he was unconstitutionally
placed in jeopardy of punishment for the second time when he was charged in Criminal
Case No. 4012 with murder "with the use of an unlicensed [firearm]," in violation of Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a
second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts,
there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that
the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal
Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would
appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from
the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to
be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging appellant with
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that said
firearm and ammunition had been used to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escaño III. We
note also that the amended information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging appellant
with the unlawful killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III, stated that the killing had been done
with the use of an unlicensed firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two
(2) informations did not have the effect of charging appellant with having committed
the same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder, the
trial court did take into account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact that the
killing of Francis had been done "with the use of an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we
believe and so hold, the trial court committed error. There is no law which renders the use
of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an
information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed
firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder
to death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the
unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in destroying human life or
committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. 19
In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition or disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the increase
of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed
firearm where such firearm was used to destroy human life. Although the circumstance
that human life was destroyed with the use of the unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating
circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be taken into account
to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua, under the 1987 Constitution) because
of the explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted earlier, the unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm or ammunition is an offense punished under a special law and not under
the Revised Penal Code.
4. The claim that there was no treachery.
Appellant contends that there was no treachery present because before any shot was fired,
Renato had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening statement
was a warning to Francis and that the first three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were
merely warning shots. Moreover, building upon his own testimony about the alleged threat
that Francis had uttered before he (Renato) left his English III class to go home and get a
gun, appellant argues that Francis must have anticipated his return and thus had sufficient
time to prepare for the coming of the appellant. 20 Appellant's contention, while ingenious,
must be rejected. The trial court made a finding of treachery taking explicit account of the
following factors:
1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College High School Department Tagbilaran City, is
situated in the second floor of the building. It is a corner room and it has only one (1) door
which is the only means of entry and exit;
2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was seated on his chair inside his classroom and
was writing on the armrest of his chair and also talking to Ruel Ungab and while their
teacher, Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The deceased was not aware
of any impending assault neither did he have any means to defend himself;
3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver in shooting to death
the defenseless and helpless Francis Ernest Escaño;
4. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected. the accused consciously conceived that
mode of attack;
5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and did not give him a chance to defend
himself. After the deceased was hit on the head and fell to the floor while he was already
sprawled and completely defenseless the accused fired at him again and the deceased was
hit on the chest;
6. The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He was absolutely not aware
of any coming attack. 21
The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room
15 had no means of escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the second
floor of the building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to Francis as he stood on
the teacher's platform closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought to dash
through the door. Renato's question "where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded as
an effort to warn Francis for he shot at Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and
talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato fired three (3) shots before hitting Francis with the
fourth shot, can only be ascribed to the indifferent markmanship of Renato and to the fact
that Francis and the other students were scurrying from one part of the room to the other
in an effort to evade the shots fired by Renato. The cumulative effect of the circumstances
underscored by the trial court was that the attack upon Francis had been carried out in a
manner which disabled Francis from defending himself or retaliating against Renato.
Finally, the circumstance that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive,
re-entered Room 15 and fired again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his
own blood, manifested Renato's conscious choice of means of execution which directly
and especially ensured the death of his victim without risk to himself. 22 We are compelled
to agree with the trial court that treachery was here present and that, therefore, the killing
of Francis Ernest Escaño III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no evident premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the same
as a generic aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the appellant that the
requisites of evident premeditation had not been sufficiently shown. In order that evident
premeditation may be taken into account, there must be proof of (a) the time when the
offender formed his intent to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly indicating that the
offender had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) of the passage of a
sufficient interval of time between the determination of the offender to commit the crime
and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. 23 The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed from the time
Renato left his English III class and the time he returned with a gun. While there was
testimony to the fact that before that fatal day of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment
had welled up between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence adequately showing
when Renato had formed the intention and determination to take the life of Francis.
Accordingly, we must discard evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not done under the influence of a dangerous drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as follows:
SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a crime is
committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state shall
be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of a crime and the
application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was under the
influence of a dangerous drug, specifically marijuana, and took that into account as a
"special aggravating circumstance". No medical evidence had been submitted by the
prosecution to show that Renato had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis.
Fourteen (14) days had elapsed after December 14, 1984 before Renato was medically
examined for possible traces of marijuana; the results of the examination were negative.
Defense witness Dr. Rogelio Ascona testified that in order to have a medically valid basis
for determining the presence of marijuana in the human system, the patient must be
examined within twenty-four (24) hours from the time he is supposed to have smoked
marijuana. 24 The prosecution had presented Orlando Balaba, a student at the Divine Word
College, High School Department, who testified that he found Renato and one Jaime
Racho inside the men's room of the High School Department sucking smoke from a hand-
rolled thing that look like a cigarette, that he had asked Renato what that was and that
Renato had replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the testimony of Orlando Balaba was
corroborated by two (2) other prosecution witnesses, we believe that Orlando Balaba's
testimony was incompetent to show that what Renato and Jaime Racho were smoking
inside the men's room was indeed marijuana. It was pointed out by apellant that Orlando
Balaba had never smoked nor smelled marijuana.
In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain detailed factors as
circumstantial evidence supporting the testimony of Orlando Balaba. These circumstances
were:
The circumstance of place where the killing was committed, the circumstance of the
manner of the attack, the circumstance of holding hostage some teachers and students
inside the faculty room, the circumstance of terrifying an entire school, the circumstance
that sitting on a scrapbook is too insignificant as to arouse passion strong enough to
motivate a killing, are circumstantial evidences that gave the court no room for doubt that
prosecution witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin Amper and Allan de la Serna truthfully
told the court that they saw the accused smoking marijuana inside the comfort room at
1:45 in the afternoon of December 14, 1984. ... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of passionate anger
on the part of Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show that Renato had
smoked marijuana before entering his English III class. In the absence of competent
medical or other direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts may be wary and
critical of indirect evidence, considering the severe consequences for the accused of a
finding that he had acted while under the influence of a prohibited drug. The Court
considers that the evidence presented on this point was simply inadequate to support the
ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and killed Francis while under the influence
of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily surrendered.
Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court should have
considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial court did not, and we
consider that it correctly refused to do so. Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not
himself, 27 by handing over the weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room.
Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his brother, who was not in any case a person in
authority nor an agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly, Renato did not surrender himself
he was arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not constitute
voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had surrendered himself, such
surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was holed up in the
faculty room, in effect holding some teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room
was surrounded by Philippine Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him.
He was not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
8. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school is considered
a person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in mathematics, was
already checking the attendance did not deter the accused from pursuing his evil act, The
accused ignored his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror
he had done to Francis and the entire school, the accused entered the faculty room and
held hostage the teachers and students who were inside that room. To the court, this act of
the accused was an insult to his teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard of
other's feelings and safety and completely reprehensible. 30
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority,"
such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148
(direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person
in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast,
the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal
Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is
deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach
and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used
by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority"
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the provision
the trial court applied in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby MODIFIED
in the following manner and to the following extent only:

We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. — Who shall be deemed as such.
— In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested
with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government
corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain
and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 — (a) the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and of having acted with contempt of or insult to the public authorities shall
be DELETED and not taken into account; and (b) the special aggravating circumstances
of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed
firearm shall similarly be DELETED and not taken into account. There being no generic
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the appellant shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be served successively in accordance with
A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the decision of the
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security
trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader
and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of
a person in authority. SO ORDERED.

In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the
occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No.
299, September 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
G.R. No. 159703 March 3, 2008 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the evidence presented has
sufficiently established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused
CEDRIC SAYCO y VILLANUEVA, petitioner, Zedric V. Sayco is convicted for violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
vs. amended by Republic Act No. 8294. There being no modifying circumstances, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentences the accused to a prison term
ranging from THREE YEARS, SIX MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Prision
Correccional Medium as minimum, to FIVE YEARS, FOUR MONTHS and TWENTY
DECISION
DAYS of Prision Correccional Maximum as maximum, and to pay a fine of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS. The firearm (Exhibit A) and the ammunitions (Exhibit B) are
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: forfeited in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court IT IS SO ORDERED.6
assailing the May 23, 2003 Resolution1 of the Court Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
conviction of Cedric Sayco y Villanueva2 (petitioner) for violation of Section 1, Presidential
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bais City issued a Decision dated March 14,
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294; as well as the
2003, affirming the conviction of petitioner but lowering his penalty as follows:
August 7, 2003 CA Resolution3 which denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated August 2, 2002 rendered by the
The facts are not disputed.
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bais City in Criminal Case No. 99-001 is hereby affirmed
in all respects subject only to the modification with respect to the penalty imposed by the
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bais City with trial court. The herein accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty
illegal possession of firearms under an Information which reads: of four (4) months of arresto mayor as maximum [sic] to two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum [sic].
The undersigned Prosecutor II hereby accuses ZEDRIC SAYCO Y VILLANUEVA of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions penalized and defined under SO ORDERED.7
Section 1 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 as amended by Republic Act Number 8294,
committed as follows:
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review but the same was denied in the May 23,
2003 CA Resolution assailed herein. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration8 was also
That on or about January 3, 1999, at Bais City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of denied by the CA in its August 7, 2003 Resolution.
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously possess and carry away one (1) caliber 9MM marked "SIGSAUER P229" Hence, the present Petition raising the following issues:
with fourteen (14) live ammunitions and with Serial Number AE 25171, without first
having obtained the proper license or authority to possess the same.
I
An act contrary. 4
Whether the lower court erred in convicting the petitioner for violation of P.D. 1866, as
amended by RA 8294, despite the latter's proof of authority to possess the subject firearm.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty".5
II
On August 2, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Whether the prosecution's evidence proved the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.9 Exhibit B - fourteen (14) pieces live ammunition and one (1) magazine placed in a black
plastic bag.
As summarized by the RTC and MTCC, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
following: Exhibit C - Joint Affidavit of the police officers.10 (Emphasis supplied)

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION For his defense, petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject firearm
and ammunitions when he was apprehended on January 3, 1999 in Bais City, but he insists
The first prosecution witness in the person of PO3 Mariano Labe testified on January 17, that he had the requisite permits to carry the same, specifically:
2002. He declared that on or about 3:35 in the afternoon of January 3, 1999, while they
were at the Police Station, they received a telephone call from a concerned citizen from 1) Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (Non-expendable Property), which reads:
Tavera Street, Bais City, informing them that one unidentified person was inside Abueva's
Repair Shop located at Tavera Street, tucking a handgun Hqs Field Station 743, 7ISU, ISG, PA, Camp Montelibano
on his waist. They immediately went to the QTY UNIT NAME OF CLASSI UNIT TOTAL Sr., Bacolod City, Philippines, 01 January 1999. I
aforementioned place, and upon their arrival thereat, they DESCRIPTION FICATION PRICE acknowledge to have received from MAJOR RICARDO B.
saw one unidentified person tucking a handgun on his BAYHON (INF) PA, Commanding Officer, FS743, 7ISU,
right side waistline. They approached the unidentified 1 ea Cal 9mm (SIG Pistol ISG, PA the following property for which I am responsible,
person and asked him if he had a license to possess said SAUER) subject to the provision of the accounting law and which will
firearm, but the answer was in the negative. At this juncture, SN: AE 25171 be used in the office of FS 7431.
they immediately effected the arrest, and confiscated from 2 ea Mags for Cal
his possession and custody a Caliber 9MM marked 9mm pistol
"SIGSAUER P299" with 14 live ammunitions with Serial
No. AE 25171. The arrested person was identified as 24 ea Ctgs for 9mm
Zedric Sayco y Villanueva, a resident of Binalbagan, Ammo x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x- NOTHING FOLLOWS -
Negros Occidental. x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x

NOTED BY: APPROVED BY: Basis: For use of subject EP in connection with his official
SPO2 VALENTINO ZAMORA, member of the PNP
Bais City, testified on February 26, 2002. He was duties/mission in the AOR.
presented to corroborate the testimony of Mariano Labe. Nolasco B. James (SGD) RICARDO B BAYHON (SGD)
He further declared that during the incident, they talked SSg (Inf) PA Major (INF) PA and 2) Mission Order dated January 1, 1999, thus:
to the accused in Cebuano, but they found out then that FS Supply NCO Commanding Officer
the latter is an Ilonggo, so they spoke to him in English. CA Zedric V. Zayco (SGD) Mission Orders
Confidential Agent;11
SPO2 VICENTE DORADO also testified on February Number: FS743-A-241
26, 2002. He corroborated the testimony of SPO2 Valentino Zamora and PO2 Mariano
Labe. TO: CA Cedric V. Zayco

The following exhibits were admitted as part of the evidence of the prosecution: I. DESTINATION Negros Island

Exhibit A - one (1) 9 mm pistol with serial no. 25171.

II. PURPOSE C O N F I D E N T I A L and ammunitions from the AFP. As said firearm and ammunitions are government
property duly licensed to the Intelligence Security Group (ISG) of the AFP, the same could
III. DURATION 01 January 1999 to 31 March 1999 not be licensed under his name;17instead, what he obtained were a Memorandum Receipt
and a Mission Order whereby ISG entrusted to him the subject firearm and ammunitions
IV. AUTHORIZED ATTIRE/UNIFORM and authorized him to carry the same around Bacolod City. Petitioner further argues that
he merely acted in good faith when he relied on the Memorandum Receipt and Mission
Order for authority to carry said firearm and ammunitions; thus, it would be a grave
GOA ( ) BDA ( ) Civilian (x) injustice if he were to be punished for the deficiency of said documents.18

V. AUTHORIZED TO CARRY FIREARMS: (x) Yes ( ) No. The Solicitor General filed his Comment,19pointing out that good faith is not a valid
defense in the crime of illegal possession of firearms.20
Caliber Make Kind Serial Nr MR/License Nr
Nr Ammo The arguments of petitioner are not tenable.
VI. SPECIFIC
9mm Sig Pistol AE25171 ISG Prop 24 rds INSTRUCTIONS: The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license
Sauer
or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. 21 To
a. For personnel in uniform, the firearms shall be placed in holster securely attached to the establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists
belt. Personnel in uniform without holster and personnel in civilian attire will ensure that and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license
their firearms are concealed unless in actual and lawful use. or permit to possess or carry the same.22

xxxx There is no dispute over these key facts: first, that the subject firearm and ammunitions
exist; second, that petitioner had possession thereof at the time of his apprehension; third,
that petitioner is a confidential agent of the ISG-AFP; fourth, that petitioner lacks a license
RICARDO B. BAYHON (SGD)
issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP; and fifth, that petitioner holds a
Major (INF) PA
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order covering the subject firearm and ammunitions.
FS 743 Commander12
Thus, the issue to be resolved is confined to whether petitioner's Memorandum Receipt
and Mission Order constitute sufficient authority for him to possess the subject firearm and
The RTC and MTCC gave no significance to the foregoing documents. The MTCC held ammunitions and carry the same outside of his residence, without violating P.D. No. 1866,
that the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order do not constitute the license required as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
by law because "they were not issued by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms
and Explosives Unit, but by the Commanding Officer of the Philippine Army who is not As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum
authorized by law to issue licenses to civilians to possess firearms and ammunitions." 13 The receipt and mission order cannot take the place of a duly issued firearms license, 23 and an
RTC added that, as held in Pastrano v. Court of Appeals14and Belga v. Buban,15 said documents accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke good faith as a defense against a
cannot take the place of the requisite license.16 prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, as this is a malum prohibitum.24 Petitioner
interposed no new argument that would convince this Court to abandon a deep-rooted
The CA wholly concurred with both courts. jurisprudence.

In the present Petition, petitioner insists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces However, rather than outrightly dismiss the present petition in the light of existing
of the Philippines (AFP), and it was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm jurisprudence, this Court finds it opportune to examine the rules governing the issuance of
memorandum receipts and mission orders covering government-owned firearms to special
and confidential civilian agents, in order to pave the way for a more effective regulation of
the proliferation of such firearms and the abatement of crimes, such as extra-judicial
killings, attendant to such phenomenon.
In 1901, the United States Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 175, providing for the
organization of an Insular Constabulary. Section 6 vested in the Chief of the Insular
Constabulary the following authority over the distribution of firearms:
Section 6. The Insular Chief shall prescribe for the Insular Constabulary suitable arms,
uniform, and equipment and shall report to the Commission, through the Civil Governor,
his action in this regard, together with a statement of the cost, to the end that appropriation
may be made to defray the cost thereof. The guns, revolvers, and ammunitions needed to
equip the insular and municipal police shall be purchased by the Insular Purchasing
Agent on the order of the Chief of Insular Constabulary, by whom they shall be
distributed to the provinces and municipalities as they may be needed. The Chief of the
Insular Constabulary shall keep a record of the guns and revolvers distributed, by their
numbers, to municipalities and provinces x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Firearms owned by the government may therefore be distributed by the Chief of the Insular
Constabulary to the members of the insular and municipal police, with merely a record of
the distribution being required.
Shortly, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1780 25 regulating possession of
firearms:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, for purposes of sale, to
import, buy or otherwise acquire, dispose of, possess, or have the custody of any rifle,
musket, carbine, shotgun, revolver, pistol, or air rifle, except air rifles of small caliber and
limited range used as toys, or any other deadly weapon x x x unless and until such person,
firm, or corporation shall secure a license, pay the license fee, and execute a bond and
otherwise comply with the requirements of this Act and the rules and regulations issued in
executive orders by the Governor-General pursuant to the provisions of this Act x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
but exempted therefrom the following government-owned firearms:
Section 16. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to firearms and
ammunition therefor regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines of the United States Army and Navy, the Constabulary, guards in the employ
of the Bureau of Prisons, the police force of the City of Manila, provincial prisoners
and jails when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use
in the performance of their official duties. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1917 Revised Administrative Code26retained the foregoing exemption:
Section 879. Exemption as to firearms and ammunition used by military and naval forces or by
peace officers. - This article shall not apply to firearms and ammunition regularly and
lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines of the Unites States Army and
Navy, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal presidents, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails, when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use
in the performance of their official duties. (Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Macarandang,27 we interpreted Section 879 of the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code as applicable to a secret agent appointed by a governor as said agent
holds a position equivalent to that of peace officer or member of the municipal police. We
reiterated this ruling in People of the Philippines v. Licera.28
In People v. Asa,29 we acquitted a civilian guard from a charge of illegal possession of
firearms on the ground that he acted in good faith in bearing the firearms issued to him by
his superior.
Two years later, in People v. Mapa,30the Court, speaking through Justice
Fernando, overhauled its interpretation of Section 879, thus:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to x x x possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or
any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and
ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials
and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is
not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply
the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must
stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was
acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret
agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It
is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was
held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.31 (Emphasis
supplied)
We also abandoned the view that good faith is a defense against a prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms.32
On June 29, 1983, P.D. No. 1866 was issued, imposing stiffer penalties on illegal
possession of firearms. It also added the following separate requirement for carrying
firearms:
Section 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms and
ammunition or implements used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition.
- x x x The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
xxxx
Section 7. Unauthorized issuance of authority to carry firearms and/or ammunition outside of
residence. - The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person, civilian
or military, who shall issue authority to carry firearm and/or ammunition outside of
residence without authority therefor.
P.D. No. 1866 was later amended by R.A. No. 8294, 33 which lowered the imposable
penalties for illegal possession of firearm when no other crime is committed. However,
neither law amended or repealed Section 879 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code.
Even Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the 1987 Administrative Code, 34left
Section 879 untouched.
As matters stand, therefore, Section 879, as construed by this Court in Mapa and Neri, and
reinforced by paragraph 6, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, is
still the basic law on the issuance, possession and carrying of government-owned firearms.
In exercise of its rule-making authority under Section 835of P.D. No. 1866, the Chief of the
Philippine Constabulary issued The Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No.
1866, which includes the following provisions salient to the issuance, possession and
carrying of government-owned firearms:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - For purposes of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the following
terms shall mean and be interpreted as hereinafter defined:
xxxx
d. "Mission Order" - is a written directive or order issued by government authority as
enumerated in Section 5 hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a
definite purpose or objective during a specified period and to such place or places as therein
mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly issued or licensed
firearm outside of his residence when so specified therein.
e. "Permit to Carry Firearm Outside of Residence" - is a written authority issued to any
person by the Chief of Constabulary which entitles such person to carry his licensed or
lawfully issued firearms outside of residence for the duration and purpose specified
therein.
f. "Residence" - refers to that place where the firearm and ammunition are being
permanently kept. It includes the office or house where they are kept and the premises of
the house enclosed by walls and gates separating said premises from adjacent
properties. For firearms covered by a regular license or special permit, their residence shall
be that specified in the license or permit; and those covered by a Certificate of Registration
ora Memorandum Receipt, their residence in the office/station to which the grantee
belongs.
xxxx
Section 5. Authority to issue mission order involving the carrying of firearm. - The following are
authorized to issue mission orders with provisions which may entitle the bearer thereof to
carry his issued/licensed firearm and ammunition for the duration of such mission:
a. For officers, men and regular civilian agents of the Ministry of National Defense
(MOND)/Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) including members of the ICHDF:
xxxx
(8) Provincial commanders, METRODISCOM commanders, company commanders and
their equivalent in the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy.
xxxx
Section 6. Specific guidelines in the carrying of firearms outside of residence. - The following
specific guidelines shall be strictly observed in the carrying of firearm outside of residence:
a. Lawful Holders of Firearm – Lawful holders of firearm (regular licenses, special permit,
certificate of registration or M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of
residence except when they have been issued by the Chief of Constabulary a permit to carry
firearm outside of their residence as provided for in Section hereof or in actual
performance of duty or official mission under Section 4 and 5 hereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Section 6 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations was later amended to read as
follows:
a-1. Mission Order. - x x x No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing
the same to carry firearms outside of residence unless he/she is included in the regular
plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular
compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent
must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or
special project which specifically requires the use of firearm(s) to insure its accomplishment
and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent
level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher level of command.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Ministry of Justice also issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16, 1986,
further strengthening the foregoing Implementing Rules and Regulations, to wit:
x x x It is unlawful for any person or office to issue a mission order authorizing the carrying
of firearms by any person unless the following conditions are met:
1. That the AFP officer is authorized by the law to issue the mission order.
2. That the recipient or addressee of the mission order is also authorized by the law to have
a mission order, i.e., he must be an organic member of the command/unit of the AFP
officer issuing the mission order.If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of
the uniformed service), they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of
the government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular
compensation for services they are rendering. (Emphasis supplied)
Earlier, a Letter Directive dated May 19, 198436 was issued to the Chief of Staff of the AFP,
prohibiting the issuance of government-owned firearms to civilians, viz:
4. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1866 which codifies all the laws on
firearms and explosives clarify the following:
xxxx
b. Section 5 identifies the officials/officers of the MOND/AFP who are authorized to issue
Mission Orders to enable AFP officers, men and regular civilian agents carry their firearms
in the performance of their duties. Regular civilian agents are those who are covered by
Permanent or Temporary Civil Service attested appointments in the plantilla of civilian
employees. Special or confidential civilian agents or the like are not regular civilian
agents and are therefore violating the law when they carry firearms (personal-owned or
government-issued) with Mission Orders.
c. There are no other laws or AFP regulations authorizing the loan of AFP-owned firearms
to private firms and individuals. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noted that the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, as amended,
allude to "memorandum receipts" covering government-owned firearms. While said rules
do not define the term, we can derive its meaning from Section 492 of the Government
Auditing and Accounting Manual (Volume I: Government Auditing Rules and
Regulations)37 to wit:
Section 492. Issues of equipment to officers and employees. - Equipment issued by the property
officer for official use of officials and employees shall be covered by Memorandum
Receipt for Equipment (MR) which shall be renewed every January of the third year after
issue. MRs not renewed after three years shall not be considered in making physical count
of the equipment. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, therefore, the rules governing memorandum receipts and
mission orders covering the issuance to and the possession and/or carrying of government-
owned firearms by special or confidential civilian agents may be synthesized as follows:
First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of
any government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving regular compensation
for services rendered are not exempt from the requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a permit to carry
the same outside of residence;
Second, said special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and
possess government-owned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of
a memorandum receipt for equipment covering said government-owned firearms. Neither
will they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a regular firearms license and a
permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-owned firearms
covered by a memorandum receipt; and
Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry
firearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of their residence.
The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in possession of
or bearing private-owned firearms that are duly licensed and covered by permits to carry
the same outside of residence.
Set against the foregoing rules, it is clear that petitioner is not authorized to possess and
carry the subject firearm and ammunition, notwithstanding the memorandum receipt and
mission order which were illegally issued to him. Petitioner is a planter38 who was recruited
to assist in the counter-insurgency campaign of the AFP.39 However, as he offered no
evidence that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or that he is receiving regular
compensation from said agency, he cannot be considered a regular civilian agent but a
mere confidential civilian agent as defined under Section 6(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866. As such, he was not authorized to receive the subject
government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to
account for said government properties did not legitimize his possession thereof.
Neither was petitioner authorized to bear the subject firearm and ammunitions outside of
his residence. The mission order issued to petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a
regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent. Worse, petitioner was not even
acting as such confidential civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject firearm
and ammunitions. Petitioner testified that at that time, he was not on an official mission in
Bais City but had merely visited the place to attend to a family emergency.40
While this Court sustains the conviction of petitioner for illegal possession of firearms, we
re-examine the imprisonment term to which petitioner was sentenced by the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA.
The MTCC imposed on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment for three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional medium as minimum, to five (5) years,
four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as
maximum.41 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC lowered the penalty to
four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as maximum.42 The CA affirmed the RTC.
A further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to crimes penalized by a special law, to wit:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (Emphasis supplied)
P.D. No. 1866 imposed the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua for illegal possession of firearms. R.A. No. 8294 lowered the penalty, as follows:
Section 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, prision correccional in its maximum period
ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, to six (6) years. As prescribed
under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appropriate penalty that can be
imposed on petitioner should keep within said range. Thus, there being no attendant
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and considering that petitioner accepted the
subject firearm and ammunitions from the government under the erroneous notion that the
memorandum receipt and mission order issued to him legitimized his possession thereof,
the appropriate indeterminate penalty is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day as
minimum to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. However, for reasons stated in the text of herein
Decision, the Resolutions dated May 23, 2003 and August 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 27228 together with the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bais City are MODIFIED insofar only as the penalty of imprisonment is
concerned. Petitioner Cedric Sayco y Villanueva is sentenced to serve an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum,
to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163267 May 5, 2010
TEOFILO EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
To be guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, one does not
have to be in actual physical possession thereof. The law does not punish physical
possession alone but possession in general, which includes constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to the owner’s control.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the October 15, 2003 Decision3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 which affirmed the January 23, 1998
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 convicting
petitioner Teofilo Evangelista for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1866,5as amended, as well as the April 16, 2004 Resolution which denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
In an Information dated January 31, 1996, petitioner was charged with violation of
6 trial ensued.
Section 1 of PD 1866 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of January 1996, at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control the following items:
1. One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1)
magazine;
2. One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two
(2) magazines;
3. Nineteen (19) 9mm bullets.
without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After posting his bail, petitioner filed on February 14, 1996 an Urgent Motion for (a)
Suspension of Proceedings and (b) the Holding of A Preliminary Investigation.7 The RTC
granted the motion and, accordingly, the State Prosecutor conducted the preliminary
investigation.
In a Resolution8 dated March 6, 1996, the State Prosecutor found no probable cause to
indict petitioner and thus recommended the reversal of the resolution finding probable
cause and the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, a Motion to Withdraw
Information9 was filed but it was denied by the trial court in an Order10 dated March 26,
1996, viz:
Acting on the "Motion to Withdraw Information" filed by State Prosecutor Aida
Macapagal on the ground that [there exists] no probable cause to indict the accused, the
Information having been already filed in Court, the matter should be left to the discretion
of the Court to assess the evidence, hence, for lack of merit, the same is hereby denied. Let
the arraignment of the accused proceed.
When arraigned on March 26, 1996, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter,
Version of the Prosecution
In the morning of January 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police
assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command, was
informed by his superior that a certain passenger of Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight No.
657 would be arriving from Dubai bringing with him firearms and ammunitions. Shortly
after lunch, Acierto, together with Agents Cuymo and Fuentabella, proceeded to the tube
area where they were met by a crewmember who introduced to them herein petitioner.
Acierto asked petitioner if he brought firearms with him and the latter answered in the
affirmative adding that the same were bought in Angola. Thereupon, Acierto was
summoned to the cockpit by the pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata (Capt. Nadurata), where the
firearms and ammunitions were turned over to him. Petitioner was then escorted to the
arrival area to get his luggage and thereafter proceeded to the examination room where the
luggage was examined and petitioner was investigated. In open court, Acierto identified
the firearms and ammunitions.
During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos
(Bustos) that he bought the subject items in Angola but the same were confiscated by the
Dubai authorities, which turned over the same to a PAL personnel in Dubai. Upon inquiry,
the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) in Camp Crame certified that petitioner is neither
registered with said office11 nor licensed holder of aforesaid firearms and ammunitions.
Bustos likewise verified from the Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no record to
show that the firearms were legally purchased. Among the documents Bustos had gathered
during his investigation were the Arrival Endorsement Form12 and Customs Declaration
Form.13 A referral letter14 was prepared endorsing the matter to the Department of Justice.
Bustos admitted that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when the latter admitted that
he bought the firearms in Angola.
SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and representative of the FEO, upon verification, found that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder. His office issued a certification15 to that effect which he
identified in court as Exhibit "A".
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner, with leave of court, filed his Demurrer to
Evidence,16 the resolution of which was deferred pending submission of petitioner’s
evidence.17
Version of the Defense
The defense presented Capt. Nadurata whose brief but candid and straightforward
narration of the event was synthesized by the CA as follows:
x x x On January 30, 1996, he was approached by the PAL Station Manager in Dubai,
who informed him that a Filipino contract worker from Angola who is listed as a passenger
of PAL flight from Dubai to Manila, was being detained as he was found in possession of
firearms; that if said passenger will not be able to board the airplane, he would be
imprisoned in Dubai; and that the Arabs will only release the passenger if the Captain of
PAL would accept custody of the passenger [herein petitioner] and the firearms. Capt.
Nadurata agreed to take custody of the firearms and the passenger, herein appellant, so
that the latter could leave Dubai. The firearms were deposited by the Arabs in the cockpit
of the airplane and allowed the appellant to board the airplane. Upon arrival in Manila,
Capt. Nadurata surrendered the firearms to the airport authorities.
Meanwhile, in view of the unavailability of the defense’s intended witness, Nilo Umayaw
(Umayaw), the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, the prosecution and the defense agreed
and stipulated on the following points:
1. That PAL Station Manager Mr. Nilo Umayaw was told by a Dubai Police that
firearms and ammunitions were found in the luggage of a Filipino passenger
coming from Angola going to the Philippines;
2. That he was the one who turned over the subject firearms to Captain Edwin
Nadurata, the Pilot in command of PAL Flight 657;
3. That the subject firearms [were] turned over at Dubai;
4. That the said firearms and ammunitions were confiscated from the accused
Teofilo Evangelista and the same [were] given to the PAL Station Manager who
in turn submitted [them] to the PAL Pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata who has already
testified;
5. That [these are] the same firearms involved in this case.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunitions: (One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with
SN-931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets) and hereby sentences
him to imprisonment of Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months to Twenty (20) Years.
The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and
is ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.19
On April 4, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial 20 which the RTC
granted.21 Forthwith, petitioner took the witness stand narrating his own version of the
incident as follows:
On January 28, 1996, he was at Dubai International Airport waiting for his flight to the
Philippines. He came from Luwanda, Angola where he was employed as a seaman at Oil
International Limited. While at the airport in Dubai, Arab policemen suddenly accosted
him and brought him to their headquarters where he saw guns on top of a table. The Arabs
maltreated him and forced him to admit ownership of the guns. At this point, PAL Station
Manager Umayaw came and talked to the policemen in Arabian dialect. Umayaw told
him that he will only be released if he admits ownership of the guns. When he denied
ownership of the same, Umayaw reiterated that he (petitioner) will be released only if he
will bring the guns with him to the Philippines. He declined and insisted that the guns are
not his. Upon the request of Umayaw, petitioner was brought to the Duty Free area for his
flight going to the Philippines. When he was inside the plane, he saw the Arab policemen
handing the guns to the pilot. Upon arrival at the NAIA, he was arrested by the Customs
police and brought to the arrival area where his passport was stamped and he was made to
sign a Customs Declaration Form without reading its contents. Thereafter, he was brought
to a room at the ground floor of the NAIA where he was investigated. During the
investigation, he was not represented by counsel and was forced to accept ownership of the
guns. He denied ownership of the guns and the fact that he admitted having bought the
same in Angola.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After new trial, the RTC still found petitioner liable for the offense charged but modified
the penalty of imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated January 23,
1998 reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunitions: One (1) Unit 9mm Jerico Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283
with one (1) magazine; One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-
931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets and hereby sentences him
to imprisonment of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day to Eight (8) Years and a fine of
₱30,000.00.
The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and
[are] ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.22
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its Decision dated October 15,
2003. It ruled that the stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner. As regards
possession of subject firearms, the appellate court ruled that Capt. Nadurata’s custody
during the flight from Dubai to Manila was for and on behalf of petitioner. Thus, there was
constructive possession.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but it was denied by the appellate court in its April
16, 2004 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
a. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the
charge of Presidential Decree No. 1866, Illegal Possession of Firearms.
b. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Evangelista was never
in possession of any firearm or ammunition within Philippine jurisdiction and he
therefore could not have committed the crime charged against him.
c. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Evangelista committed a
continuing crime.
d. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the results of the preliminary
investigation.24
We find the appeal devoid of merit.
At the outset, we emphasize that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review
on certiorari shall only raise questions of law considering that the findings of fact of the CA
are, as a general rule, conclusive upon and binding on the Supreme Court. 25 In this
recourse, petitioner indulges us to calibrate once again the evidence adduced by the parties
and to re-evaluate the credibility of their witnesses. On this ground alone, the instant
petition deserves to be denied outright. However, as the liberty of petitioner is at stake and
following the principle that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open
for review, we are inclined to delve into the merits of the present petition.
In his bid for acquittal, petitioner argues that he could not have committed the crime
imputed against him for he was never in custody and possession of any firearm or
ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines. Thus, the conclusion of the appellate court
that he was in constructive possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions is
erroneous.
We are not persuaded. As correctly found by the CA:
Appellant’s argument that he was never found in possession of the subject firearms and
ammunitions within Philippine jurisdiction is specious. It is worthy to note that at the
hearing of the case before the court a quo on October 8, 1996, the defense counsel stipulated
that the subject firearms and ammunitions were confiscated from appellant and the same
were given to PAL Station Manager Nilo Umayaw who, in turn, turned over the same to
Capt. Edwin Nadurata. Such stipulation of fact is binding on appellant, for the acts of a
lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. Granting that Nilo Umayaw was
merely told by the Dubai authorities that the firearms and ammunitions were found in the
luggage of appellant and that Umayaw had no personal knowledge thereof, however,
appellant’s signature on the Customs Declaration Form, which contains the entry "2
PISTOL guns SENT SURRENDER TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINE," proves that he was the
one who brought the guns to Manila. While appellant claims that he signed the Customs
Declaration Form without reading it because of his excitement, however, he does not claim
that he was coerced or persuaded in affixing his signature thereon. The preparation of the
Customs Declaration Form is a requirement for all arriving passengers in an international
flight. Moreover, it cannot be said that appellant had already been arrested when he signed
the Customs Declaration Form. He was merely escorted by Special Agent Acierto to the
arrival area of the NAIA. In fact, appellant admitted that it was only after he signed the
Customs Declaration Form that he was brought to the ground floor of NAIA for
investigation. Consequently, appellant was in constructive possession of the subject
firearms. As held in People v. Dela Rosa, the kind of possession punishable under PD 1866
is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intention to possess the same. Animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such,
what goes on into the mind of the accused, as his real intent, could be determined solely
based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances explaining how
the subject firearm came to his possession.
Appellant’s witness, Capt. Nadurata, the PAL pilot of Flight No. PR 657 from Dubai to
Manila on January 30, 1996, testified that he accepted custody of the firearms and of
appellant in order that the latter, who was being detained in Dubai for having been found
in possession of firearms, would be released from custody. In other words, Capt.
Nadurata’s possession of the firearm during the flight from Dubai to Manila was for and
on behalf of appellant.26
We find no cogent reason to deviate from the above findings, especially considering
petitioner’s admission during the clarificatory questioning by the trial court:
Court: So, it is clear now in the mind of the Court, that the firearms and ammunitions will
also be with you on your flight to Manila, is that correct?
A: Yes, your honor.
Court: [You] made mention of that condition, that the Dubai police agreed to
release you provided that you will bring the guns and ammunitions with you? Is
that the condition of the Dubai Police?
A: Yes, your honor.
Court: The condition of his release was that he will have to bring the guns and
ammunitions to the Philippines and this arrangement was made by the PAL
Supervisor at Dubai and it was Mr. Umayaw the PAL Supervisor, who interceded
in his behalf with the Dubai Police for his flight in the Philippines.27
To us, this constitutes judicial admission of his possession of the subject firearms and
ammunitions. This admission, the veracity of which requires no further proof, may be
controverted only upon a clear showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no admission was made.28 No such controversion is extant on record.
Moreover, we cannot ignore the Customs Declaration Form wherein it appeared that
petitioner brought the firearms with him upon his arrival in the Philippines. While there
was no showing that he was forced to sign the form, petitioner can only come up with the
excuse that he was excited. Hardly can we accept such pretension.
We are likewise not swayed by petitioner’s contention that the lower court erroneously
relied on the Customs Declaration Form since it is not admissible in evidence because it
was accomplished without the benefit of counsel while he was under police custody.
The accomplishment of the Customs Declaration Form was not elicited through custodial
investigation. It is a customs requirement which petitioner had a clear obligation to
comply. As correctly observed by the CA, the preparation of the Customs Declaration
Form is a requirement for all arriving passengers in an international flight. Petitioner was
among those passengers. Compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial
investigation is, therefore, not applicable in this case. Moreover, it is improbable that the
customs police were the ones who filled out the declaration form. As will be noted, it
provides details that only petitioner could have possibly known or supplied. Even assuming
that there was prior accomplishment of the form which contains incriminating details,
petitioner could have easily taken precautionary measures by not affixing his signature
thereto. Or he could have registered his objection thereto especially when no life
threatening acts were being employed against him upon his arrival in the country.
Obviously, it was not only the Customs Declaration Form from which the courts below
based their conclusion that petitioner was in constructive possession of subject firearms
and ammunitions. Emphasis was also given on the stipulations and admissions made
during the trial. These pieces of evidence are enough to show that he was the owner and
possessor of these items.
Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case filed against him.
He claims that his alleged possession of the subject firearms transpired while he was at the
Dubai Airport and his possession thereof has ceased when he left for the Philippines. He
insists that since Dubai is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and his
situation is not one of the exceptions provided in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our
criminal laws are not applicable. In short, he had not committed a crime within the
Philippines.1avvphi1
Indeed it is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.29 In order for the
courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. If the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 30
Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed
in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form
upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the
subject firearms in the Philippines.
And more than mere possession, the prosecution was able to ascertain that he has no
license or authority to possess said firearms. It bears to stress that the essence of the crime
penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the accused’s lack of license to possess
the firearm. The fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm. Since it has been shown that petitioner was already
in the Philippines when he was found in possession of the subject firearms and determined
to be without any authority to possess them, an essential ingredient of the offense, it is
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated and completed in no other place
except the Philippines.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information. In this case, the information specifically and categorically
alleged that on or about January 30, 1996 petitioner was in possession, custody and control
of the subject firearms at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City, Philippines,
certainly a territory within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the
present charge happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner,
even in a situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and ownership of the
firearms. Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having been filed against
petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered firearms. Since there is no pending
criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that there was no crime committed in
Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation applies.31
Petitioner finally laments the trial court’s denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information
filed by the investigating prosecutor due to the latter’s finding of lack of probable cause to
indict him. He argues that such denial effectively deprived him of his substantive right to a
preliminary investigation.
Still, petitioner’s argument fails to persuade. There is nothing procedurally improper on
the part of the trial court in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation it itself
ordered. Judicial action on the motion rests in the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In
denying the motion, the trial court just followed the jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo
v. Judge Mogul32 that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound
discretion of the court. The court is not dutifully bound by such finding of the investigating
prosecutor. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc v. Judge How 33we held:
It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be
an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima facie case.
Consequently, petitioner has no valid basis to insist on the trial court to respect the result
of the preliminary investigation it ordered to be conducted.
A final point. Republic Act (RA) No. 829436 took effect on June 6, 1997 or after the
commission of the crime on January 30, 1996. However, since it is advantageous to the
petitioner, it should be given retrospective application insofar as the penalty is concerned.
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 provides:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. x x x
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(₱30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.

In fine, we find no reason not to uphold petitioner’s conviction. The records substantiate Prision mayor in its minimum period ranges from six years and one day to eight years.
the RTC and CA’s finding that petitioner possessed, albeit constructively, the subject Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC as affirmed by the CA is proper.
firearms and ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines on January 30, 1996.
Moreover, no significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
disregarded which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case.
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 affirming the January 23, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated January 23, 1998, convicting petitioner Teofilo
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the Court Evangelista of violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, and
has reiterated the essential elements in People v. Eling34 to wit: (1) the existence of subject sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six years and one day to eight years
firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have and to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 is AFFIRMED.
the corresponding license for it.
SO ORDERED.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the
crime. The existence of the subject firearms and the ammunition were established through
the testimony of Acierto. Their existence was likewise admitted by petitioner when he
entered into stipulation and through his subsequent judicial admission. Concerning
petitioner’s lack of authority to possess the firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. testified that upon
verification, it was ascertained that the name of petitioner does not appear in the list of
registered firearm holders or a registered owner thereof. As proof, he submitted a
certification to that effect and identified the same in court. The testimony of SPO4 Bondoc,
Jr. or the certification from the FEO would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element.35
G.R. No. 121917 July 31, 1996
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA, accused-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:p
On appellant Robin C. Padilla's application for bail.
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, appellant was
charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms punishable
by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.1Pending trial, appellant was released
on bail. Thereafter, appellant was convicted as charged and meted an indeterminate
penalty of 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua.
He appealed to public respondent Court of Appeals, but judgment was rendered affirming
his conviction. Respondent court cancelled his bailbond and ordered his arrest for
confinement at the New Bilibid Prison. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is now before us by way of a petition for review
on certiorari with an application for bail praying, among others, to be allowed to post bail
for his temporary liberty. In his subsequent pleading, 1 appellant moved for the separate
resolution of his bail application.
The threshold issue is whether or not appellant is entitled to bail.
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.2 On the other
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.3Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when
any of the enumerated circumstances4 under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present
then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt strong,
bail shall be denied,5 as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. If the evidence,
however, is not strong bail becomes a matter of
right.6
In People v. Nitcha7, the Court, reiterating established jurisprudence, there said:
. . . if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted
by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on
the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the
court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong — which would
have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise ruled
that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be
granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this
Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People v. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of
right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the
evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.8
In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Applying
the aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled to bail as his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt is strong. And contrary to appellant's asseveration, a summary
hearing for his bail application for the sole purpose of determining whether or not evidence
is strong is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial before the lower court and the appeal
before respondent court are more than sufficient in accomplishing the purpose for which a
summary hearing for bail application is designed.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, moreover, is clear.
Thus:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetuaor life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition, applies in this case. The circular
unequivocably provides that when an accused is charged with a capital offense or an
offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be
placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal. Appellant's application must,
perforce, fail as he is no longer entitled to bail.

Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to accommodate his request for an X-ray and
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital as follow-up examinations for
his 1994 slipped-disc operation. It has been said that while justice is the first virtue of the
court, yet admittedly, humanity is the second. Hence, petitioner's request for the badly
needed X-ray and MRI examinations for which the New Bilibid Prison Hospital is
inadequately equipped, as certified to by its Chief Officer, deserves attention. We recall
that way back in 1946, we allowed in Dela Rama v.People's Court,9 a precedent on which
appellant now anchors his application, a prisoner to be released on bail when his continued
detention would be injurious to his health. This trend, however, has changed with the
development of times. Besides, appellant's situation is not akin to Dela Rama's factual
milieu. While appellant now shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to
his medical needs. And by granting appellant's request, the Court is merely performing its
supervisory powers over detainees to safeguard, among others, their proper
accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.

ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond by public respondent court is

AFFIRMED and the instant application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit. Appellant's
request for an X-ray and MRI examinations at St. Luke's Hospital is GRANTED which
should be conducted at the first opportune time to be arranged by the Director of the New
Bilibid Prison with the responsible officers of the hospital, provided that appellant shall be
at all times subject to the security conditions imposed by the prison's director. The
responsibility for the enforcement of the subject request, as well as the security of the
appellant, devolves upon the Director of the New Bilibid Prison. Upon termination of the
medical examinations, appellant shall be recommitted to prison without delay. As much
as possible, any unnecessary publicity should be avoided.

SO ORDERED.
Section Two. — Infanticide and abortion.
ART. 255. INFANTICIDE.
The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.
1. By using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.
2. By acting, but without using violence, without the consent of the woman. (By
administering drugs or beverages upon such pregnant woman without her
consent.)
3. By acting (by administering drugs or beverages), with the consent of the pregnant
woman.

If the crime penalized in this article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose Elements of intentional abortion:
of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its 1. That there is a pregnant woman;
medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by
2. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the accused
the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be prision mayor.
otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman;
3. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or any other
Infanticide may be defined as the killing of any child less than three days of age, whether
act of the accused, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
the killer is the parent or grandparent, any other relative of the child, or a stranger.
therefrom;
4. That the abortion is intended.
Elements:

ART. 257. UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION.

1. That a child was killed.
2. That the deceased child was less than three days (72 hours) of age.
3. That the accused killed the said child. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed
upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.
ART. 256. INTENTIONAL ABORTION.
Elements:
Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
the pregnant woman.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the
been expelled therefrom.
consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
woman shall have consented.

Carrara has defined abortion as the willful killing of the fetus in the uterus, or the violent
expulsion of the fetus from the maternal womb which results in the death of the fetus.
(Guevara)

Ways of committing intentional abortion:

CASES: Therefore a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the Court of First Instance of
said province on the 5th of June, 1909, charging D. B. Jeffrey with the crime of lesiones
G.R. No. 5597. March 5, 1910. menos graves, whereupon these proceedings were instituted. The trial court sentenced the
accused, on the 19th of August, 1909, to the penalty of forty-five days of arresto mayor, to
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D. B. JEFFREY, Defendant- pay a fine of 325 pesetas, to indemnify the injured woman in the sum of P50, and, in case
Appellant. of insolvency in the payment of the fine and the indemnity, to suffer the corresponding
Allen A. Garner, for Appellant. subsidiary imprisonment, not, however, to exceed one-third of the main penalty, and to
pay the costs. From this judgment defendant’s counsel has appealed.
Attorney-General Villamor, for Appellee.
From the facts above related it is clearly shown that the crime of abortion, defined and
SYLLABUS
punished by article 411 of the Penal Code, has been committed, inasmuch as, in
consequence of the maltreatment received, on the evening of March 1, 1909, by Teodorica
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; ABORTION; CONVICTION FOR Saguinsin, a married woman who for three months had been pregnant, she fell to the
CRIME SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE. — When in a complaint upon which criminal ground, and had a severe hemorrhage and, being unable to return to her home, was taken
proceedings were instituted facts are stated showing maltreatment of a pregnant woman, there in a vehicle, with the assistance of Basilisa Pascual, who witnessed the occurrence.
causing an abundant hemorrhage followed by abortion, for which reason she was ill during On the following day she had a miscarriage, as certified by the president of the municipal
eight days, although the complaint charged the crime of lesiones, once it is proven that the board of health of the town of San Pedro Macati who made an examination of and attended
act perpetrated really constitutes the crime of abortion, and that the accused and his counsel the victim of the maltreatment.
knew the contents of the complaint, and when questioned by the court pleaded not guilty,
denied the charge of having so illtreated the woman as to occasion the hemorrhage and The defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the charge made in the case, although he
consequent abortion, fully defending himself against the charge, it is perfectly lawful and admitted that on the night in question he had a dispute with the injured woman because
just that there should be applied the penalty prescribed for the crime shown to have been he collided with her a little push with the index finger of the right hand in the back of her
committed and not that for the crime erroneously set out in the title of the complaint. body, but without illtreating her, even though he carried a bottle at the time. The foregoing
statements to a certain extent confirm the charge that the woman was maltreated or struck
DECISION three times upon the hips by the accused with the bottle that he was carrying, which fact is
corroborated by the testimony of the witness. The testimony of the military surgeon,
TORRES, J. : Raymond F. Metcalf, who, seven days thereafter, examined the injured woman and stated
that he did not discover upon her body any sings of abortion, has not affected the
On the evening of March 1, 1909, while Teodorica Saguinsin was in a Chinese shop preponderance of the evidence offered by the prosecution, inasmuch as, after the lapse of
situated in Guadalupe, municipality of San Pedro Macati, Rizal Province, a man named seven days, the miscarriage having occurred the day following the night when the woman
D. B. Jeffrey appeared therein, and, without any apparent reason whatever, struck the was brutally struck upon the hips with a bottle, it is not strange that he did not find any
woman three times on the hip with a bottle that he was carrying, in consequence of which traces of the hemorrhage or of the miscarriage, as seen by the physician who examined and
the woman fell to the ground with an abundant hemorrhage from the womb; she was attended the maltreated woman and certified to the fact of the abortion.
immediately taken to her home in a carretela, and being three months pregnant she had a
miscarriage on the following day, according to the examination made by the president of Even though it was not the criminal intent of the defendant to cause the abortion, the fact
the municipal board of health. The woman was ill and unable to attend to her usual duties that, without any apparent reason whatever, he maltreated Teodorica Saguinsin,
for forty-five days. presumably not knowing that she was pregnant, as author of the abuse which caused the
miscarriage, he is liable not only for such maltreatment but also for the consequences
thereof, to wit, for the abortion; and it was also proven that on the said occasion the
defendant was drunk, which circumstance explains how he came to strike the woman with
a bottle without any known motive. It does not appear that he is an habitual drunkard. The months of prision correccional, to indemnify the injured woman in the sum of P50, with
penalty of prision correccional as fixed by the aforesaid article should be imposed upon subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of both instances.
him in the minimum degree, owing to presence of circumstance 6 of article 9 of the Penal
Code, there being no aggravating circumstance to counteract its effect. SO ORDERED.

With respect to the question as to whether or not D. B. Jeffrey, having been accused of the
crime of lesiones menos graves, can be lawfully sentenced for the crime of abortion, one
which is distinct from that of lesiones, it is proper to consider that the complaint filed by
the fiscal reads:
"The undersigned fiscal of the Province of Rizal, P. I., hereby charges D. B. Jeffrey with
the crime of lesiones menos graves committed as follows: In that on the 1st day of March,
1909, in the municipality of San Pedro Macati, Province of Rizal, P. I., the said D. B.
Jeffrey, the accused herein, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assaulted Teordorica
Saguinsin, maltreating and striking her about the hips which resulted in a serious
hemorrhage followed by a miscarriage; the patient required medical attendance for more
than eight days, and was unable to work for an equal period of time. All contrary to law.

The accused, attended by counsel, appeared before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and the foregoing complaint was read to him and translated into English by the clerk of the
court. Upon being asked by the court to plead thereto, he pleaded not guilty.

Hence, when the defendant was informed of the complaint, he at once understood that,
although he was charged with the crime of lesiones menos graves, the charge also included
the fact that he had maltreated Teodorica Saguinsin, striking her about the hips, in
consequence of which she had a hemorrhage which was followed by a miscarriage; the
woman was confined and disabled for work during eight days and was attended by a
physician. Not a single fact constituting the crime of lesiones is alleged in the complaint,
and there can be no question that, because of the translation into English, the accused must
have heard and known that the charge against him was that he had struck and maltreated
the injured woman who, as a result of his unlawful act, suffered an abundant hemorrhage
and a subsequent miscarriage. For this reason, when the defendant denied the charge and
plead not guilty, he defended himself against the charge which consisted in that, in
consequence of having struck her with a bottle, he caused the abortion; and, inasmuch as
the maltreatment and the miscarriage that followed in consequence thereof have been
proved, it is perfectly just and legal that the penalty to be applied shall be that fixed by the
law of the crime shown by the evidence and which the accused actually committed.

For the reason above set forth, and holding that the crime committed is that of abortion
and not that of lesiones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be set
aside, and that the accused should be and he is hereby sentenced to the penalty of eight
G.R. No. L-42819 April 15, 1935 day to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. The indemnity is
fixed at P1,000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The sentence, as thus modified, is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
CRISPIN GENOVES, defendant-appellant.
Leodegario Alba for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
HULL, J.:

Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex
crime of homicide with abortion.

In the morning of the 28th of May, 1934, appellant and deceased Soledad Rivera were
laborers in adjoining cane fields. Soledad claimed that the yoke of the plow which appellant
was repairing belonged to her and tried to take it by force. Appellant struck her with his
fist, causing her to fall to the ground. She got up and returned to the fray, whereupon she
received another blow with the fist on the left cheek which caused her again to fall to the
ground. Immediately after the incident deceased proceeded to the municipal building, a
distance of about four kilometers, and complained to the chief of police about the
maltreatment. At the time Soledad was heavy with child, and as she complained to the
chief of police of pain in the abdomen, she was seen by the president of the sanitary district.
According to testimony deceased was in good health the day before.

From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain which were symptoms of
premature delivery. Deceased remained in this condition until June 10, 1934. On that date
the condition culminated in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin
babies that she way carrying, but the other baby could be delivered. Both babies were dead.
The first assignment of error is the contention of appellant that the death of the offended
party was not the direct result of the assault upon her by the defendant. It is generally
known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and the evidence shows a complete
sequel of events from the assault to her death. The accused must be held responsible for
the natural consequences of his act.

The other defense is that the accused did not strike the deceased, but this fact is clearly
established by the prosecution. We find the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and provocation, as the offended party by force
induced the appellant to use force on his part.

The abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257 of the Revised
Penal Code. On the whole case, the period of confinement is fixed at twelve years and one
G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court the accused Filomeno
Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence on MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the lawfully
wedded wife of the accused, by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing upon her
injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act committed
on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at the time 8 months on the family way,
the accused likewise did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the
death of the child while still in its maternal womb, thereby committing both crimes of
PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246
and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said woman and child in the amount as the Honorable Court shall assess.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the
offenses charged.
After trial the lower court rendered a decision ** dated 9 August 1978, the dispositive part
of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Marciano Abuyo in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For unselfish, valuable
and exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr., a
compensation of P500.00 is hereby recommended for him subject to the availability of
funds
SO ORDERED.
The accused having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, this case is on automatic
review before this Court.
At the trial in the court a quo, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Juan
L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania and Narciso Abuyo.
Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., who was then Rural Health Officer of Talisay, Camarines
Norte, testified that, after passing the Board Examination, he was employed as a Resident
Physician of La Union Provincial Hospital, then as Junior Resident Physician of Bethane
Hospital in San Fernando, La Union and that later, he joined the government service,
starting from 1968 up to the time of the trial; that as a Doctor of Medicine, he had
performed about ten (10) post mortem examinations; that he was called upon by the
Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was
exhumed from its grave in the Municipal Cemetery of Talisay at around 11:00 o'clock in
the morning of 11 December 1974; that his post mortem examination lasted from 12:30
o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. He reduced his findings of injuries
into writing. (Exhibit "A"), which, together with their probable cause, as testified to by
him, are as follows:
Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a
certification thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the
deceased Marciano Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the
basis of the information relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial,
without mentioning the cause of death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was
indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem examination on 11 December
1974.
The other witness for the prosecution was Pedro Salufrania, son of herein appellant and of
the deceased. The lower court's decision states that, by reason of interest and relationship,
before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno
Salufrania, he was carefully examined by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel
under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age of 13 years
old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them
truly and, also, whether he was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify against
his father-accused. 1
The lower court found Pedro Salufrania to be determined and intelligent. He convincingly
declared that he was not threatened by any of his uncles on his mother's side to testify
against his father, because it was true that the latter killed his mother. Then, formally
testifying as the prosecution's lone eyewitness, he stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania
and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3
December 1974, in their small house at a far away sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte; that during said quarrel, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on
the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw
blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where
she fell.
Pedro Salufrania further testified that after killing his mother, the accused- appellant went
out of the house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who
witnessed how the accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were
already asleep when the horrible incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo
and sister Merly woke up after the death of their mother and kept watch at their mothers
body while their father was away; that their father arrived early the next morning with the
hammock and after placing their dead mother on the hammock, the accused carried her
on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house of his sister Conching, located at a
populated section of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon,
Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.
Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania stated that he is now living with his uncle
Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because
the latter has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the
true cause of his mother's death.
The third witness for the prosecution was Narciso Abuyo, a resident of Gabon, Talisay,
Camarines Norte. He testified that the accused Filomeno Salufrania and his sister, the
deceased Marciana Abuyo, were lawfully wedded husband and wife as evidenced by a
marriage contract (Exhibit "C"). He declared that his sister was more or less seven (7)
months pregnant when she died; that he first came to know about his sister's death on 4
December 1974 thru his nephews Pedro and Alex Salufrania who first informed him that
their mother died of stomach ailment and headache; that he went to Tigbinan to request
for the body of his sister so that it may be buried in Talisay, Camarines Norte and, as
intended, Marciana Abuyo was buried in the Talisay Cemetery on 6 December 1974.
Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children
of his deceased sister went to his house and refused to go home with their father Filomeno
Salufrania; that when asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex Salufraña told him that
the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she
was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately after
learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the
police authorities of Talisay, Camarines Norte, who investigated Alex and Pedro
Salufirania and later, to that of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte.
The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and
the accused Filomeno Salufrania.
Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania. He declared that
Marciana Abuyo died at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 in her
house at Sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines Norte; that he happened to pass by
said house because his attention was attracted by the bright light in the fireplace and he
saw Filomeno Salufrania boiling "ikmo" and garlic as medicine for his wife who was about
to deliver a child; that he helped the accused by applying "ikmo" to the different parts of
the body of Marciana Abuyo and by administering the native treatment known as "bantil",
that is, by pinching and pulling the skin with two fingers of his closed fist; that when the
condition of Marciana Abuyo worsened, he told Filomeno Salufrania to go and get Juanita
Bragais who is known as a healer but the latter arrived at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning
of 4 December 1974 and that at that time Marciana Abuyo was already dead.
Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of
Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974. He further
testified that when he reached the house of the Salufranias, Marciana Abuyo was already
dead so he just helped Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house
of the latter's brother-in-law at Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident of Kapagisahan Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte testified that she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about
6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 after being called by one of the latter's
sons; that she saw Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed
her that Marciana was suffering from an old stomach ailment.
The accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted that he was that lawful husband of the deceased
Marciana Abuyo; that at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December 1974,
Marciana arrived home from Talisay where she had earlier stayed for about a week; that
she was hungry upon her arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food and after eating their
lunch, he proceeded to his work while his wife rested in their house; that when he returned
home at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, his wife complained to him of
stomach pain and he was told to prepare the beddings because she was already sleepy; that
at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974, he was awakened by his wife
who was still complaining of stomach pain, and that she asked for a drink of hot water;
that while he was boiling water, Geronimo Villan arrived and assisted him in administering
to his wife the native treatments known as "hilot" or massaging and "banti" that Geronimo
Villan and Francisco Repuya alternately applied "bantil" to his wife but when her condition
worsened, he woke up his children, Pedro and Alex to fetch Rico Villanueva who might
be able to ,save the life of their mother; that his children left and returned without Rico
Villanueva but the latter arrived a little later.
Accused-appellant then went on to say that he sent for Juanito Bragais but the latter was
not able to cure his wife, since the latter was already dead when he arrived; that after the
death of his wife, he ordered his children to get the hammock of Kaloy Belardo whose
house was about two (2) kilometers away from their house, and upon the arrival of the
hammock, he placed the body of his wife thereon and brought it to the house of his sister
Consolacion Salufrania in Tigbinan; that while the corpse of Marciana Abuyo was at
Tigbinan he sent Chiding and his elder son to inform the brothers and sisters of his wife at
Talisay about her death and that Leonila Abuyo and Salvador Abuyo came; that he
informed the Barangay Captain of Tigbinan of the cause of death of his wife; that upon the
suggestion of the brothers and sisters of Marciana Abuyo, especially Salvador Abuyo, the
body of their sister was brought home to Talisay and thereafter buried at the Talisay
Cemetery; that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's
death, and that during the lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her
burial, his son Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since
then, he was not able to talk to his son until during the trial; and that at the time of death
of his wife, aside from the members of his family, Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and
Liling Angeles Balce were also present.
The case was considered submitted for decision by the trial court on 18 July 1978. As
aforestated, the trial court found the appellant guilty of the crimes charged and sentenced
him to the penalty of death.
The appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS
OF THE TESTIMONY OF AN INCOMPETENT WITNESS, AND ON
INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION,
THEREBY VIOLATING THE RULE THAT THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL UNLESS HIS GUILT IS SHOWN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS
CREDIBLE AND SUFFICIENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF PARRICIDE WITH
INTENTIONAL ABORTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCREDITING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
ACCUSED.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania
before he was allowed to testify. Since Pedro was allegedly a child of tender age, being only
thirteen (13) years old when he testified, and only eleven (11) years old when the offense
charged occurred, he is presumed incompetent under Rule 130 Sec. 19 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court, which includes among those who cannot be witnesses:
Children who appear to the court to be of such tender age and inferior capacity as to be
incapable of receiving correct impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined,
or of relating them truly.
Therefore, according to appellant, for failure of the trial court to determine Pedro's
competence, the presumption of incompetency was not rebutted and Pedro's testimony
should not have been admitted. Moreover, appellant stresses that there is no basis for the
trial court's finding that Pedro is intelligent.
Appellant's contention is without merit. The record shows that the trial court determined
Pedro Salufrania's competency before he was allowed to testify under oath. 2 The trial
court's conclusion that Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully supported by Pedro's
responsiveness to the questions propounded to him when he was already under oath:
A. Did you go here in court to testify voluntarily?
Q. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Were you not forced by your uncle to testify in his case?
Q. No, I was not forced by my uncle.
Appellant also alleges that, since Pedro changed his answer from no to yes when he was
asked whether he was threatened by his uncle to testify against his father, shows that Pedro
was lying and proves that he did not appreciate the meaning of an oath at all. 3
Again, this contention is without merit, Pedro became confused when the trial court
ordered that the original question be reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent from the fact
that when asked the third time, he affirmed his first answer,
Q. Isn't it that your uncle threatened you with bodily harm if you will not give statement
before the police?

xxx xxx xxx A. No, sir.

A. The accused is your father? xxx xxx xxx

Q. Yes, sir. Q. But later you actually went with your uncle to the police because you were threatened
by him with bodily harm if you will not follow him?
A. Do you love him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. No, sir.
Q. Is it true that your uncle threatened you with bodily harm if you will not give statement
to the police?
A. Your father is accused now of crime which carries the penalty of death, are you still
willing to testify against him?
A. No, sir. (tsn., pp. 6, 7, Nov. 12, 1976)
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant next lists the following alleged inconsistencies to discredit the testimony of
Pedro. First, Pedro testified on direct examination that his mother died in the evening of
Q. Why did you say that you don't love your father December 3. while on cross-examination he said that she died in the morning of December
4. It must be noted that he affirmed twice during cross-examination that his mother died
A. Because he killed my mother. on December 3, just as he had testified during direct examination. Significantly, he did not
mention December 4 as the date when she died, as appellant would make it appear. Pedro
Q. And that is the reason why you hate your father now? merely answered 'yes' to the question "And isn't it that your mother died in the early
morning on that day (December 4) and not on the evening of December 3?" 4 Thus, Pedro's
A. Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 3, 7,17, Nov. 12, 1976). answer could have resulted only from a misapprehension of the a question, and for no
other reason.
Pedro's strong sense of moral duty to tell the truth, even though it should lead to his father's
conviction, shows that he fully appreciated the meaning of an oath, which likewise proves Second, appellant alleges that Pedro testified on direct examination that he saw appellant
that he was no longer a child of tender years at the time of his testimony. leave the house to get a hammock after strangling the victim and then came back the
following morning. However, upon cross-examination, Pedro testified that appellant left
at noon or in the afternoon of December 4. Moreover, Pedro allegedly testified on re-direct
that he saw appellant sleep beside the dead body of his mother. Again Pedro
misapprehended the question propounded to him. Ajudicious reading of the transcript will
bear this out:
Q. When did your father leave to get the hammock?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. That may be when the body was brought to Talisay. When your father, rather, when
you said that your father left to get a hammock so that your mother may be brought to
Tigbinan what time was that?
A. About 12:00 o'clock noon. (Tsn, p. 16, Nov. 12, 1976)
One may discern that the court itself noticed that there was a missapprehension when it
commented "that maybe when the body was brought to Talisay" after Pedro answered "In
the afternoon". When Pedro answered "about 12:00 noon' he must have been referring to
the time when appellant carried his dead wife to Tigbinan. It must be noted that the
question was so worded that it could have misled Pedro to think that what was being asked
was the time when appellant brought his dead wife to Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing
inconsistent with Pedro's testimony that he saw his father leave in the evening of December
3 and again saw him asleep and thus not noticed appellant's coming back after securing a
hammock and sleeping beside the deceased. Pedro was therefore telling the truth when he
said that, upon waking up, he saw his father sleeping beside his dead mother. By then,
appellant had already returned with the hammock.
Third, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that the corpse was carried to
Tigbinan in the morning of December 4, while on cross-examination, he said it was in the
evening. 5 It must be pointed out that Pedro merely answered "yes" to a question
purportedly mentioning the time when the victim's body was transferred to Tigbinan. The
question is as follows: "The corpse of your mother was brought to the Tigbinan proper
when the vigil was had in the evening of December 4, is that right?" It is to be noted that
the question's thrust is whether or not the victim's body was brought to Tigbinan. The time
it was brought was merely incidental. Thus, Pedro may not have paid attention to the part
of the question involving time. Moreover, the phrase "in the evening" may have referred
either to the time of transport of the body or to the vigil, which could have definitely
confused Pedro.
Fourth, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that he, together with his brothers
and sister, kept vigil beside their mother's dead body that night, while on cross-
examination, he testified that they just kept lying down and pretended to sleep. 6 There is
nothing inconsistent here. The children could have kept vigil while lying down with their
deceased mother.
Appellant further cites other alleged improbabilities to discredit Pedro's testimony.
Appellant contends that it was improbable for Pedro to have seen the attack on his mother
since he testified that the room was dimly lighted, and that, while the attach was going on,
he closed his eyes pretending to sleep. 7 This contention is without merit. Even though the
room was dimly lighted, Pedro was only two (2) meters away from his parents; thus, he
could easily see, as he saw, the attack on his mother. 8 Also, although he pretended to be
asleep, it was unlikely that he kept his eyes closed all the while, as he was aware that a fight
was going on. Rather, it was to be expected that he had his eyes open and, thus, he saw the
heinous crime unfold and ultimately consumated.
Appellant alleges that he does not believe that it was fear of him that caused the delay in
Pedro's divulging the real cause of his mother's death until 10 December 1974. According
to appellant, such fear could no longer have influenced Pedro from December 6, the date
he started to live separately from him. This contention is untenable. Even though Pedro
started to live separately from his father from December 6, it cannot be said that the
influence of appellant's threat suddenly ceased from that time. It must be noted that Pedro
was young and was still very much under appellant's influence and control. The thought
and memory of his father's viciousness were still too fresh even after three days from his
mother's death. The fear that he too could be killed by appellant in like manner must have
deterred him from divulging the truth earlier.
Appellant also alleges that it was improbable for Pedro to have just watched the killing of
his mother. This contention is untenable. At that moment, when his mother was being
assaulted and strangled, Pedro must have been so shocked as to be rendered immobile and
powerless to do anything. This is a normal reaction in such a situation. Besides, it is a fact
of life that different people react differently to the same types of situations. 9 One cannot
overlook that there is no standard form of behaviour when one is confronted by a shocking
occurrence.10
Appellant next alleges that since the prosecution has failed without satisfactory explanation
to present Pedro's brother Alex who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to the killing of the
victim, it is presumed that Alex's testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if
presented. This contention is without merit. First, Alex, who is younger than Pedro by 3
years, may not have been competent to testify due to his tender age. Second, even assuming
that he was competent to testify, his testimony could be merely corroborative.
Corroboration is not necessary in this case because the details of the crime have already
been testified to by Pedro with sufficient clarity. The failure to present all the eyewitnesses
to an act does not necessarily give rise to an unfavorable presumption, especially when the
testimony of the witness sought to be presented is merely corroborative. 11 Witnesses are to
be weighed, not numbered, and it is a well established rule that the testimony of a single
witness, even if uncorroborated, but positive and credible, is sufficient to support a
conviction. 12 In any event, it is not for the appellant to say how many witnesses the
prosecution should have presented. 13
The inconsistencies magnified by appellant in the testimony of Pedro Salufrania have been
satisfactorily explained. In fact, some of them are not material since they neither touch
upon the manner of death of the victim nor question the identity of the killer, both of which
were unwaveringly testified upon by Pedro. Thus, with the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities explained away, Pedro's testimony remains unperturbed. Even if there
were discrepancies, such discrepancies were minor and may be considered as earmarks of
verisimilitude.14
The trial court's assessment of Pedro's testimony, as quoted hereunder, deserves more than
passing consideration:
... The testimony of eye-witness Pedro Salufrania, 13-year old son of the victim Marciana
Abuyo and her killer-spouse Filomeno Salufrania, appears to be very clear, convincing and
truthful. It is vivid as to the details of the horrible occurence that took place at about 6:00
o'clock in the evening of December 3, 1974 in their small house at a far away sitio of
Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, resulting in the untimely and cruel death of her (sic)
mother. He and his brother Alex were the only eyewitnesses to the gory crime committed
by their father. The credibility of this witness (Pedro Salufrania) and his testimony was
invested when, despite rigid cross-examination, the veracity of his testimony in chief was
not impeached. He remained firm and on the verge of crying, when he pointed an accusing
finger at his father during the trial. He was unshaken notwithstanding a long and detailed
cross-examination. And, there is reason to bestow complete credence to his testimony
because he had the opportunity to closely observe how his father had deliberately and
cruelly ended the life of his mother. Despite his tender age and apparent childish
innocence, this Court believes that he can clearly perceive and perceiving, make known his
perception, precluding the possibility of coaching or tutoring by someone. His declaration
as to when, where and how the horrible incident complained of happened is the believable
version.15
Appellant questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, since this is
the first time that the doctor conducted an autopsy on a cadaver which had been buried for
about a week. It must be noted, however, that although this was the doctor's first autopsy
under circumstances present in this case, he had, however, conducted similar post-
mortem examinations on ten (10) other occasions. This would constitute sufficient
experience. Significantly, appellant did not object to the doctor's expression of medical
opinions during the trial. Being an expert in his field, the doctor is presumed to have taken
all pertinent factors into consideration with regard to the autopsy, including embalming
and the state of the cadaver's decomposition. Dr. Juan Dyquiangco Jr., was a disinterested
witness in the case, and a reputable public official in whose favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties must be applied.
Appellant further alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro
Salufrania do not tally. Suffice it to say that the Court finds no inconsistencies between the
findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and Pedro Salufrania's testimony. Both are consistent on
material points. Thus, the Court sees no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the
trial court insofar as their credibility and the appellant's guilt are concerned.
Appellant's third assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in discrediting his
evidence simply because the testimonies of the defense witnesses were consistent on
material points. Moreover, there is no showing, according to the appellant, that said
testimonies were rehearsed so as to dovetail with each other.
This contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even
bother to discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is
tantamount to an admission that he could not adequately support his version of Marciana
Abuyo's death. The trial court's reasons for rejecting the defense version, as hereunder
quoted, are tenable and sound. Thus —
On the contrary, the testimonies of defense witnesses Geronimo Villan, Angeles Liling
Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania suspiciously dove-tailed in every detail as to
when, where and how .Marciana Abuyo died at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December
1974, in their house at sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Carnarines Norte, of stomach
pain. On these points, these witnesses and the accused made statements which seemed to
be very fresh and clear in their minds, despite the lapse of four long years. Their exact and
uniform declarations on these points, their phenomenal recollections, without sufficient
special or uncommon reason to recall, rendered their testimonies unconvincing. If at all,
their testimonies appeared to this Court to be an eleventh hour concoction. And, as defense
witnesses, after observing them and their declarations on the witness stand, they appeared
to the Court to be untruthful and unreliable. For, despite the synchronization of time when,
the place where and how the incidence happened, their testimonies on other material
points revealed their tendency to exaggerate and their propensity to falsehood, thus-Aside
from the accused Filomeno Salufrania, there are three other witnesses for the defense
Geronimo Villan Angeles Liling Balce and Juanita Bragais. There is nothing in the
testimony of Juanito Bragais because he did not witness how and when Marciana Abuyo
died. Francisco Repuya, who was also alleged by Filomeno Salufrania to be present when
Marciana Abuyo died, did not testify. Accused Filomeno Salufrania never claimed that he
summoned for Angeles Liling Balce. According to him Angeles Liling Balce was not
present during the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo, for she was fetched by him only
after the death of his wife. Logically, therefore, there is no basis for the presentation of
Angeles Liling Balce that she was present during the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo.
She was merely play-acting. Geronimo Villan who claimed he passed-by the house of
Filomeno Salufrania and saw the latter boiling water with "ikmo" and garlic, as medicine
for his wife Marciana Abuyo, who was about to give birth was discredited by accused
himself who declared he was merely boiling water for the hot drink of his wife, who was
suferring from her old stomach ailment. In like manner, witness Geronimo Villan
discredited the accused Filomeno Salufrania, about the presence of Francisco Repuya, who
allegedly alternated with Geronimo Villan in applying the native treatments of 'hilot' and
'bantil' to Marciana Abuyo, when throughout his testimony he (Geronimo Villan) never
mentioned the presence of Francisco Repuya.
After closely observing defense witnesses Geronimo Villan and Angeles Liling Balce, this
Court is convinced that their testimonies and accounts of the incident are fabricated,
untruthful and not worth of credence. Certainly, they were not present immediately before
and during the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo. ...
Added to these, there is one scandalous circumstance, which to the mind of this Court,
betrays the guilty conscience of the accused. If there was nothing revealing in the face of
the deceased Marciana Abuyo, why was her face covered by a piece of cloth by the accused.
...
Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the
testimony of witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their
demeanor in giving their testimony.16 Such rule applies in the present case.
Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to
show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct.
He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion
but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of
Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been
expelled therefrom. 17
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion
because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then
strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently
established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of
the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an
abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused
Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same
violence that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted
by the herein accused upon his victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8)
months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her
by her husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died
together with the foetus in her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code states that the accused should be punished with the penalty corresponding to the
more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its maximum period which is death.
However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished the death penalty,
appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of
P12,000. 00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to
P30,000.00 in line with the recent decisions of the Court. With costs against the appellant,

SO ORDERED.