SEC.

1 1 -FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS AND QUASI JUDICIAL BODIES AND ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE
SHALL NOT BE DENIED TO ANY PERSON BY REASON OF POVERTY.

Free access to courts, quasi-judicial bodies, and adequate legal assistance.

-This constitutional provision is the basis for the provision of Section22, Rule 3 of the New Rules of Court
allowing litigation in forma pauperis. Those protected include low paid employees, domestic servants
and laborers. They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported at public expense. "It
suffices that plaintiff is indigent.

-'indigent' persons -are 'persons who have no property or sources of income sufficient for their support
aside from their own labor though self-supporting when able to work and in employment'."

-Rule 4 1 , Section 16, which denied the right to litigate as paupers in appellate courts, has been
amended to make the right applicable even to appellate litigation. The new rule applies even to
litigation pending at the time of its enactment. The retroactive application of the new rule has been
found to be more in keeping with Section 11 of Article III
SEC. 12-(1) ANY PERSON UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE SHALL HAVE
THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO HAVE COMPETENT AND
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE. IF THE PERSON CANNOT AFFORD THE
SERVICES OF COUNSEL, HE MUST BE PROVIDED WITH ONE. THESE RIGHTS CANNOT BE WAIVED EXCEPT
IN WRITING AND IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL.

(2) NO TORTURE, FORCE, VIOLENCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION OR ANY OTHER MEANS WHICH VITIATE THE
FREE WILL SHALL BE USED AGAINST HIM. SECRET DETENTION PLACES, SOLITARY, INCOMMUNICADO, OR
OTHER SIMILAR FORMS OF DETENTION ARE PROHIBITED.

( 3 ) ANY CONFESSION OR ADMISSION OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THIS OR SECTION 17 HEREOF SHALL

BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.

(4) THE LAW SHALL PROVIDE FOR PENAL AND CIVIL SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THIS SECTION AS
WELL AS COMPENSATION TO AND REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS OF TORTURE OR SIMILAR PRACTICES,
AND THEIR FAMILIES.

-provision is of American provenance coming as it does principally from two American Supreme Court
decisions: Escobedo v. Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona.

-Escobedo spoke of the rights of person in "custodial investigations" and specified custodial
investigation as the time when "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements."

-Miranda for its part enumerated the rights that were available:

(1) The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal

terms that he has a right to remain silent.

(2) After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against him in
court.

(3) He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The investigators should tell
him that he has the right to counsel at that point.

( 4 ) He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also that if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

( 5 ) Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel,

the moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present.
(6) If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have been
observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against
him.

-reason for the rule in Section 12(1) is not too difficult to find. It is merely a recognition of the fact that
the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the absence of proper
safeguards, is inherently coercive.'"

-For "coercion can be mental as well as physical, This is the reason upon which the Miranda rule was
founded. And the prophylactic effect of the new provision is better secured if, following the total
Miranda rule, the prosecution is also made to prove compliance with the new safeguards.

-Moreover, there already were decisions which clearly indicated that the presumption of regularity no
longer applied to the behavior of police or prosecution. People v. Duerom said: "Inasmuch as the
prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was
informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he

knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence."

-People v. Inguito- the Court invalidated an extra-judicial confession when the state failed to dispute the
claim of the accused that he had been compelled to sign his confession and that he was not given
counsel nor apprised of his rights.

-People v. Tolentino also said, commenting on Duero, that "the Court not only abrogated the rule on
presumption of regularity of official acts related to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody
interrogation but likewise dispelled [any] doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine. It is now
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to questioning the confessant was
warned of his constitutionally protected rights."

"Any person under investigation . . ."

-Investigation in this section was defined by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as "investigation
conducted by the police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police,
the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government."" This includes conversation with
a barangay captain that is part of an ongoing custodial investigation, Section 12(1) applies.

-"custodial investigations" in the sense of Escobedo. Hence, these rights were seen as beginning to be
available only when "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements."
-the rights enumerated are not available before government investigators become involved. Thus
admissions made in an administrative investigation conducted by officials of the Philippine Airlines do
not come under Section 12.

-It does not apply when the confession or admission is made to a private individual. Neither does it
apply to a person undergoing audit because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.1441
Nor does it apply to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation. Even an admission made to a mayor who is approached not as mayor but as confidante is
not covered. Similarly an interview recorded on video and in the presence of newsmen is not covered.

-However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt,
and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, the Court has warned that it is prudent that
trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.
The Court recognized the possibility of connivance with the police.

-Nor for that matter does Section 12(1) apply to a situation where a person presents himself to the
police and in the process makes his admissions. As the court said in People v. Taylaran:] The applicability
of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the present where no written
confession is sought to be presented in evidence as a result of the formal custodial investigation. What
was testified to was only what appellant told the police why he is (sic) surrendering to them. It is but
natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It
can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the surrenderee is already 'under investigation', within
the meaning of the constitutional provision. As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the
circumstances of this case: 'If however, he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he
surrendered to admit the killing (sic), the constitutional safeguards (sic) to be informed of the rights to
silence and to counselmay not be invoked.

-It is now established that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime.

-There are, moreover, other investigatory situations where Section 12(1) does not apply. Subjection to
paraffin test is one because it is not communicative action or testimonial compulsion. Similarly, one
placed in a police line-up does not enjoy Section 12(1) rights, unless there is a move on the part of
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions. But a person already under custodial investigation who
is placed in a police line-up is entitled to Section 12 rights.

-Finally, however, it is important for the defense to remember that rights under Section 12 can be lost
by neglect. Where the defense fails to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence immediately, as
required by Rule 132, §36, the accused is deemed to have waived his right to object to admissibility.

Rights of a person under investigation.

-Three rights are made available by Section 12(1):

(1) the right to remain silent-Under the right against self-incrimination in Section 17, only an accused has
the absolute right to remain silent. A person who is not an accused may assume the stance of silence
only when asked an incriminating question. Under Section 12, however, a person under investigation

has the right to refuse to answer any question. His silence, moreover, may not be used against him.

(2) the right to counsel-counsel made available to the person under investigation must be "competent
and independent" and "preferably of [the detainee's] own choice."

(3) the right to be informed of such rights-In other words, the right of a person under investigation 'to be
informed' implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed.

When Section 12(1) rights end.

-The criminal process includes the investigation prior to the filing of charges, the preliminary
examination and investigation after charges are filed, and the period of trial. The Miranda rights or the
Section 12(1) rights were conceived for the first of these three phases, that is, when the enquiry is under
the control of police officers. It is in this situation that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of
custodial investigations, in the absence of proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. Outside of this
situation, Section 12(1) no longer applies. But Sections 14 and 17 come into play instead.

Waiver of the rights

-People v. Galit-The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

-People v. Jara said: Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to
that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must
prove with strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted
their confessions and knowingly and deliberately manifested that they were not interested in having a

lawyer to assist them during the taking of the confession.

-The implication of this rule is that, in localities where there are no lawyers, the state must bring the
individual to a place where there is one or bring counsel to the place where the person is held. And,
needless to say, the waiver must be in language which clearly manifests the desire to waive the right.
Where an appellants' contention that he was not apprised of his constitutional rights upon his arrest is
raised only after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and
completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered, the contention comes too late.

Coerced confessions

-The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, also treated separately as Section 17, has
developed and has been interpreted so as to cover a wide range of forms of self-accusation.

Exclusionary r u l e

-Very much a part of the subject of self-incrimination and of the broader Miranda doctrine is the
question of the admissibility of involuntary confessions. In earlier stages of Philippine jurisprudence,
under Section 4 of Act 619, it was a condition to the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions that the
prosecution show that the confession had been freely made. With the repeal of Act 619, by the
Administrative Code, a presumption of voluntariness shifted the burden of proving involuntariness to
the accused. But the repeal of Act 619 did not impair the general rule that a confession improperly
obtained was not competent evidence.

-Then came Moncado v. People's Court which introduced the principle that the illegality of the means
with which evidence was obtained did not affect its admissibility.

-People v. de los Santos applied the Moncado principle to confessions and ruled that the admissibility of
affidavits and confessions obtained through violence or intimidation depended not on the supposed
illegal manner in which it had been obtained but on the truth or falsity of the admissions. Confessions,

the court said, may be rejected only when the affiant had been compelled to state something false.

-the Moncado doctrine was first rejected by Stonehill v. Diokno.

-In People v. Maisug-rejecting the English translation of the confession of an illiterate farmer, the Court
said: "Such a multiple process of reading and translating the questions and translating and typing the
answers and reading and translating again the said answers is naturally pregnant with possibilities of

human, if unintentional, inadequacies and incompleteness which tender the said confession unsafe as
basis of conviction for a capital offense, unless sufficiently corroborated This care also appears in a
number of recent cases where the Supreme Court has insisted that a plea of guilty should be accepted
only after the trial court has taken pains to assure itself that the accused was well aware of the
consequences and full import of his plea. Or, as one decision eloquently put it, "Even if the confession of
an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The same would
necessarily apply to a waiver of the right to counsel not made in the presence of counsel.
-"confession" was used in the last sentence of Section 20 of the 1973 Bill of Rights, the protection
covered not only "confessions" but also "admissions." This is now explicit in the 1987 text. The
difference between confession and admission is found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Admission is
the "act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact" (Rule 130, Section 26) whereas
confession is the "declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein." (Rule 130, Section 33).

-Confessions or admissions covered by the provision, however, need not be explicit; they can be merely
implicit in any evidence that is communicative in nature. Clearly, for instance, it applies to participation
in a re-enactment of the crime. Nor are photos of a re-enactment admissible. Similarly, the signature of
an accused on a receipt for seized property or marijuana cigarettes where the accused wrote his Name
is not admissible. A signature in the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, however, is not an admission of
guilt but only of the fact of booking and arrest. Against whom are illegal confessions and admissions
inadmissible? The text makes them inadmissible "against him," that is, against the source of the
confession or admission. And it is he alone who can ask for exclusion. They are, however, admissible
against the person violating the constitutional prohibition, to the extent that admissibility is allowed by
the ordinary rules on evidence.

-It should also be noted that the exclusionary rule found in Section 12 is not couched in the same
language as the exclusionary rule in Section 3. Section 3 makes evidence illegally obtained "inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding." Section 12 says that confessions made in violation of the section
and of Section 17 "shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." It might be asked whether the text of
Section 12 could be open to the narrowing process which the Miranda rule seems to have undergone in
American jurisprudence. For instance, in Harris v. New York,m* the Burger Court held that Miranda
merely bars prosecution from using illicitly obtained admission as direct proof of guilt but does not bar
the use of such evidence to impeach the credibility of the accused.

-It might be asked whether the text of Section 12 could be open to the narrowing process which the
Miranda rule seems to have undergone in American jurisprudence. For instance, in Harris v. New
York,m* the Burger Court held that Miranda merely bars prosecution from using illicitly obtained
admission as direct proof of guilt but does not bar the use of such evidence to impeach the credibility of
the accused. It is submitted, that the narrowing process allowed in Harris should not be accepted. The
text of Section 12 is general enough to allow a strict construction against government. Moreover,
considering that involuntary testimonial evidence is a more serious affront to human dignity than
illegally obtained real evidence, the absolute inadmissibility provided for in Section 3 should also be read
into Section 12,and with greater reason, since involuntary confessions also affront the , right of privacy
protected by Section 2. In fact, in Aballe v. People,a bloodstained knife which had been found as a
consequence of an uncounselled extrajudicial confession was barred from admission.

Retroactivity or prospectivity?

-After the Escobedo-Miranda rule was promulgated, the United States Supreme Court was faced with
the question whether the rule should be given retroactive affect or prospective effect only. In Johnson v.
New Jersey,after an analysis of cases, some of which gave retroactive effect and others merely
prospective effect to newly formulated rules of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court arrived at the
conclusion that the Escobedo-Miranda rule should be applied only prospectively. Hence, it was made
applicable only to trials begun after the rule was announced. It was not made applicable to cases tried
before theEscobedo-Miranda decision even though these cases might still be on appeal at the time of
the Miranda-Escobedo decisions.

Penal and civil sanctions, compensation and rehabilitation.

-Section 12(4) says: "The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families."