1. People v.

Saylan, L-36941, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 159

Facts: Saylan was accused of rape in the sworn complaint of Eutropia Agno and was found guilty by the
trial court. That one afternoon on their way home with her daughter and another grade one pupil, the
accused pulled out a dagger pointing to the victim threatening her. At this point, the accused grabbed
the victim while still pointing the dagger and dragged her to a creek near a coconut tree. There he forced
Eutropia to have sexual intercourse with him that went further up to the fifth instance, including one
where he forced the victim to stand up and then he bent her body downwards with her hands and knees
resting on the ground. At this point, accused put himself behind the victim and executed the sexual
intercourse the way dogs do. The accused only let go of the victim when the victim promised to accused
not to tell her husband what he did to her.

FACTS NG MASIPAG: January 23 1971 – Eutropia went to the public market to buy food and
thereafter fetch her five-year old daughter Nilsonita from the store of her mother. The two boarded
on a public jeepney on their way home. It was almost six thirty in the evening when they alighted at
Malinas citrus farm, which was the last stop of public vehicles. After walking some distance,
Eutropia’s group (her daughter and a grade 1 pupil) took the opposite road and was followed by
Saylan. The appellant was walking side by side with Eutropia when he suddenly pulled out a dagger
and said “Do not shout Nang, I will kill you!” after which he dragged her towards a creek near a
coconut tree, 5 meters away from where they left the children whom the appellant also threatened
and ordered them to stay behind. Saylan instructed Eutropia to remove her panty and to lie down, he
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After the first sexual act, appellant ordered Eutropia
to stand up which the latter helplessly followed, appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina in
this position. Not satisfied, he ordered Eutropia to lie down again for a third sexual intercourse. After
the third intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up then he bent her body downwards with
her hand and knees resting on the ground. Appellant then placed himself behind her, inserted his
penis into her vagina in the dog’s way of sexual intercourse. After this, appellant still not satisfied,
ordered Eutropia to lie down again and thereafter had a fifth sexual intercourse with her. Saylan was
convinced by Eutropia’s words that she would not tell her husband about what happened. The two
returned to the children and woke them up to continue their walk home. After walking some distance,
Eutropia saw the house of her friend Ben, she asked him to call her husband as she was feeling very
bad. When Eutropia woke up between 9pm-10pm, her husband was already there and she told him
everything. Her husband told her to get a medical examination and thereafter, a rape case was filed
against the accused, and subsequently convicted and sentenced to death penalty by the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not crime of rape was attended by aggravating circumstances of ignominy.

Held: Yes. The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the
missionary position, i.e. male superior female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry
from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the
matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by
couples in the act of copulation. This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners
but not otherwise.
 People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, 27 April 2000, 331 SCRA 216

Facts: On June 2, 1997, around 9:00 in the evening, Juditha Bautista was on her way home from visiting her cousin
when she was accosted by the accused Fernando Sultan. Fernando pointed a sharp instrument at her neck and told
her that this was a hold-up. Fearing for her life, she let him grab and bring her to his house. Through intimidation and
her fear for her life, she was robbed and twice raped. After the second rape, he told her he loved her and in her effort
to release herself, she “agreed” to elope with him. Convinced, Fernando let her go home to get her things. She then
went to her cousin, Antonette and narrated everything that happened. Antonette then called her brother SPO1
Bautista who advised Juditha to continue with the elopement so that he and his companions could stage an arrest.
This went successful and Fernando was apprehended. On June 5, 1997, Fernando was charged with the complex
crime of robbery and rape but he merely brushed this aside as simply sex between consenting adults.

Issue: Whether or not the additional rape committed by the accused is considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Held: No. The record shows that the prosecution has established that he committed both robbery and rape with the
intent to take personal property of another preceding the rape.

Complaining witness Bautista was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. In the recent case of People v. Regala,
the Court held that the additional rapes committed should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite
a resultant "anomalous situation" wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple
rapes in terms of gravity. The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for
that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which
enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy
lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or
homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender. Under this
view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating circumstance.

People v. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, 19 September 2000

FACTS: The trial court found the appellant guilty of maintaining a drug den, an offense for which was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Appellant’s guilt was established by a witness, who himself had used
the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The
former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court.
That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecution’s
story. The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted
homicide. Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the
trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as
amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

HELD: No. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty only of two
offenses which are direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon and
maintaining a drug den. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully
possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”.
Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was
direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance.

The accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only
to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where
the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts.