CHAPTER VII.

LAND REDISTRIBUTION

A. SEC. 22. QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES

B. SEC. 22-A. ORDER OF PRIORITY
C. SEC. 23. DISTRIBUTION LIMIT
D. SEC. 24. AWARD TO BENEFICIARIES
 Mago v. Barbin
 Padua v. CA
 Pasco v. Pison-Arceo Ari. Deve. Corp
E. SEC. 25. AWARD CEILINGS FOR BENEFICIARIES
F. SEC. 26. PAYMENT FOR BENEFICIARIES
 Estribillo v. DAR
 Estate of Vda. De Panillo v. Dizon
G. SEC 27. TRANSFERABILITY OF AWARDED LANDS

CHAPTER III. IMPROVEMENT OF TENURAL AND LABOR RELATIONS

A. SEC. 12. DETERMINATION OF LEASE RENTALS

 Caballes v. DAR
 Gelos v. CA
 Grabriel v. Pangilinan
G.R. No. 173923 - Pedro Mago (deceased), represented by his spouse Soledad Mago, et al. v.
Juana Z. Barbin

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 173923 : October 12, 2009]

PEDRO MAGO (deceased), represented by his spouse SOLEDAD MAGO, AUGUSTO

MAGO (deceased), represented by his spouse NATIVIDAD MAGO, and ERNESTO MAGO,
represented by LEVI MAGO, Petitioners, v. JUANA Z. BARBIN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Decision2 dated 20 October 2005 and the Resolution dated
13 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87370.

The Facts

On 11 November 1994, respondent Juana Z. Barbin filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Norte an action for Cancellation of Emancipation Patents,
Disqualification of Tenant-Beneficiary, Repossession and Damages. Respondent alleged that
she is the owner in fee simple of an irrigated riceland located in Barangay Guinacutan, Vinzons,
Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.7823 hectares, and that Augusto Mago, Crispin Mago,
Ernesto Mago, and Pedro Mago were tenants of the subject landholding. Respondent further
alleged that petitioners violated the terms of their leasehold contracts when they failed to pay
lease rentals for more than two years, which is a ground for their dispossession of the
landholding.

On the other hand, petitioners alleged that the subject landholding was placed under the
Operation Land Transfer program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27
(PD 27).3 Respondent's title, OCT No. P-4672, was then cancelled and the subject landholding
was transferred to Augusto Mago,4Crispin Mago,5 Ernesto Mago,6 and Pedro Mago,7 who were
issued Emancipation Patents on 20 February 1987 by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). The Transfer Certificates of Title issued to petitioners8 emanating from the Emancipation
Patents were registered with the Registry of Deeds on 9 February 1989. Petitioners averred that
prior to the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, they already delivered their lease rentals to
respondent. They further alleged that after the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, the
subject landholding ceased to be covered by any leasehold contract.
In a Decision9 dated 30 January 1997, the PARAD denied the petition for lack of merit. The
PARAD found that in her petition for retention and exemption from the coverage of the
Operation Land Transfer, and cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer, filed before the DAR,
respondent admitted that aside from the 6.7434 hectares of riceland, she also owns other
agricultural lands with an aggregate of 16.8826 hectares consisting of "cocolands." The PARAD
held that the subject landholding is clearly covered by the Operation Land Transfer under Letter
of Instruction No. 474 (LOI 474).10 Under LOI 474, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos directed
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government
pursuant to PD 27 all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to
landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or
lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they
derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.

The PARAD further held that pursuant to DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1978,
payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by the Operation Land Transfer shall terminate
on the date the value of the land is established. Thus, the PARAD held that the proper recourse
of respondent is to file a claim for just compensation.

On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed and set
aside the PARAD Decision. The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision dated 18 June 2004
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 30 January 1997 is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby entered:

1. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte to cancel EP Nos. 745, 747, and 749
issued in the name of Augusto Mago, Ernesto Mago, and Pedro Mago respectively, and

2. DIRECTING the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, to

reallocate the subject lands to qualified beneficiaries.

SO ORDERED.11

The DARAB held that when the subject landholding was placed under the Operation Land
Transfer, the tenancy relationship between the parties ceased and the tenant-beneficiaries were
no longer required to pay lease rentals to the landowner. However, when petitioners entered
into an agreement with respondent for a direct payment scheme embodied in the Deeds of
Transfer, petitioners obligated themselves to pay their amortizations to respondent who is the
landowner. The DARAB found that except for Crispin Mago, who had fully paid his tillage,
petitioners defaulted in their obligation to pay their amortization for more than three consecutive
years from the execution of the Deeds of Transfer in July 1991. Under DAR Administrative
Order No. 2, series of 1994, one of the grounds for cancellation of registered Emancipation
Patents is when there is default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three consecutive
amortizations in case of direct payment schemes. Thus, the DARAB ruled that the cancellation
of the Emancipation Patents issued to petitioners is warranted in this case.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DARAB denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the DARAB Decision and
thereafter denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
 The Court of Appeals' Ruling

The Court of Appeals held that the mere issuance of an Emancipation Patent to a qualified
farmer-beneficiary is not absolute and can be attacked anytime upon showing of any irregularity
in its issuance or non-compliance with the conditions attached to it. The Emancipation Patent is
subject to the condition that amortization payments be remitted promptly to the landowner and
that failure to comply with this condition is a ground for cancellation under DAR Administrative
Order No. 02, series of 1994. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to comply with
this condition since petitioners failed to prove that they have remitted the amortizations due to
the landowner in accordance with their agreed direct payment scheme embodied in the Deeds
of Transfer.

The Issues

Petitioners contend that:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE

FOR VIOLATING DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 02, SERIES OF 1994;

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE

HONORABLE DAR ADJUDICATOR IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
EMANCIPATION TITLES ISSUED TO THE PETITIONERS-FARMER BENEFICIARIES
DESPITE THE LAPSE OF ONE (1) YEAR WHICH RENDERS THE SAID TITLES
INDEFEASIBLE PURSUANT TO THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE;

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE RECEIPTS

EVIDENCING PAYMENTS OF THE DISPUTED AMORTIZATION WHICH WERE FORMALLY
OFFERED AND CONSIDERED BY THE HONORABLE DAR PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF
CAMARINES NORTE (PARAD) IN DECIDING THE CASE AS SHOWN IN THE DECISION
DATED JANUARY 30, 1997.12

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition without merit.

Petitioners argue that the Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title issued to them
which were already registered with the Register of Deeds have already become indefeasible
and can no longer be cancelled.

We do not adhere to petitioners' view. This Court has already ruled that the mere issuance of an
emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond
attack and scrutiny.13 Emancipation patents issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be
corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. In fact, DAR
Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994, which was issued in March 1994, enumerates the
grounds for cancellation of registered Emancipation Patents or Certificates of Landownership
Award:

Grounds for the cancellation of registered EPs [Emancipation Patents] or CLOAs [Certificates of
Landownership Award] may include but not be limited to the following:
1. Misuse or diversion of financial and support services extended to the ARB [Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries]; (Section 37 of R.A. No. 6657)

2. Misuse of the land; (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657)

3. Material misrepresentation of the ARB's basic qualifications as provided under Section 22 of

R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws;

4. Illegal conversion by the ARB; (Cf. Section 73, Paragraphs C and E of R.A. No. 6657)

5. Sale, transfer, lease or other forms of conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any
other usufructuary right over the land acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to
circumvent the provisions of Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws.
However, if the land has been acquired under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, ownership may be
transferred after full payment of amortization by the beneficiary; (Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228)

6. Default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortizations in case of
voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme, except in cases of fortuitous events and force
majeure;

7. Failure of the ARBs to pay for at least three (3) annual amortizations to the LBP, except in
cases of fortuitous events and force majeure; (Section 26 of RA 6657)

8. Neglect or abandonment of the awarded land continuously for a period of two (2) calendar
years as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative; (Section 22 of RA
6657)???ñr?bl?š

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

ROBERTO PADUA, G.R. No. 153456

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CALLEJO, SR.,
ATTY. DELFIN B. SAMSON, CHICO-NAZARIO, and
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN NACHURA, JJ.
REFORM, and MR. TEOFILO
INOCENCIO,* Promulgated:
Respondents. March 2, 2007
x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Herein Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
December 18, 2001 Decision and May 7, 2002 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed the Petition for Annulment of a Final and Executory Order of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, docketed as CA- G.R. SP No. 59366.[2]

The CA summarized the facts as follows:

Private respondents Pepito Dela Cruz, et al. (Dela Cruz, et al.) were tenants of Lot Nos.
68 and 90 of the Dolores Ongsiako Estate in Anao, Tarlac. In 1966, upon the request of Anao
Mayor Catalino Cruz (Mayor Cruz), Dela Cruz, et al. agreed to donate said properties to the
municipality on the condition that these be used as school sites. The project did not materialize
and, in 1977, Dela Cruz, et al. asked that the properties be returned to them. However, they
found out that Mayor Cruz had distributed Lot No. 68 to Flor Labagnoy (Labagnoy) and Lot No.
90 to Edwin Cruz (Cruz) who were each issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). [3]

Upon Petition for Cancellation of CLT filed by Dela Cruz, et al., Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Secretary Condrado Estrella issued an Order dated April 19, 1982 (Estrella
Order), cancelling the CLT issued to Labagnoy and Cruz. The latter filed a Petition for Relief
from Judgment for lack of due process but the same was denied by Secretary Estrella in his
Order dated September 19, 1984. Labagnoy and Cruz appealed to the Office of the President
(OP) which dismissed the same in an Order dated May 9, 1990. Said May 9, 1990 OP Order
became final and the same was partially executed with the restoration of Lot No. 68 in the
possession of Dela Cruz, et al..[4]
However, during the pendency of the appeal before the OP, Cruz executed an Affidavit
of Waiver over his interest in Lot No. 90 on the basis of which DAR Regional Office III issued an
Order dated December 7, 1987 cancelling the CLT of Cruz and declaring Lot No. 90 open for
disposition.[5] On November 7, 1989, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago issued an
Order awarding Lot No. 90 to herein petitioner Roberto Padua (Padua) who had been occupying
said property and paying the amortization thereon to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
Aggrieved, Dela Cruz, et al., acting thru Anao Mayor Clemente Apuan, filed with the
DAR Secretary a Letter-Petition for Cancellation (Letter-Petition) of the December 7, 1987 DAR
[6]
Regional Office III Order and the November 7, 1989 DAR Order.

DAR Secretary Garilao granted the Letter-Petition in an Order dated July 2,

1995 (Garilao Order), to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued granting the

petition, thereby cancelling the Order of Award dated November 7, 1989 issued
in favor of Roberto Padua involving Lot No. 90, Psd-185539, Ongsiako Estate
and directing the Regional Director to cause the restoration of possession of said
lot in favor of the petitioners. All payments made by Roberto Padua on account of
said lot as rentals for the use thereof are forfeited in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Accordingly, DAR Regional Director Nestor Acosta (Director Acosta) issued a

Memorandum[8] dated May 9, 2000, directing herein public respondent Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer Teofilo Inocencio (PARO Inocencio) to implement the Garilao Order. In turn,
PARO Inocencio instructed Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Lino Mabborang (MARO
Mabborang) to issue the necessary documents to award Lot No. 90 to Dela Cruz, et al..[9]

Upon being informed by MARO Mabborang of the implementation of the Garilao

Order, Padua filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of a Final and Executory Order of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction.[10] In justifying his recourse to a Petition for Annulment, Padua claims that the DAR
under Sec. 50 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) cannot take cognizance of the
petition for cancellation because the matter involved is a civil law issue relating to the validity of
a contract of sale executed by LBP and petitioner, not an agrarian reform matter; that
cancellation can only be ordered by a court of justice, not by an administrative agency
exercising only quasi-judicial powers, more so if it is considered that plaintiff was a purchaser for
value and was not a party to the controversy between farmers/tenants and the grantees of the
certificate of land transfer; that Sec. 50 of CARL falls under the heading of Administrative
Adjudication under Chapter XII, hence, this administrative adjudication cannot be the
mechanism for resolutions of a contract; and, that this was in fact the stand of PARO Inocencio
in his 2nd Indorsement dated February 15, 1994.[11]

Padua also claimed lack of due process in that he was allegedly never impleaded as a
party to the Petition for Cancellation of CLT nor furnished a copy of the Letter-Petition but that
he became aware of the Garilao Order only when it was about to be implemented.[12]

On December 18, 2001, the CA issued the herein assailed Decision, dismissing the Petition for
Annulment for being the wrong mode of questioning the Garilao Order. It held that Rule 47
applies only to final judgments and orders of Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) in civil cases and not
to orders issued by the DAR Secretary.[13] The CA also affirmed the Garilao Order, holding that
then DAR Secretary Garilao had authority to resolve the Letter-Petition as it involved an
agrarian dispute.[14] The CA also rejected the contention of Padua that he was not accorded due
process in view of evidence on record that he was notified of the proceedings on the Letter-
Petition but he chose not to participate therein.[15]
Padua filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] which the CA denied in its
May 7, 2002 Resolution.[17]

Hence, the present Petition on the following grounds:

The Court of Appeals committed a grave and reversible error when it held that
Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure may not be availed of for assailing an
Order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.[18]

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not holding that the
Department of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction.[19]

We find that the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Annulment and affirmed the
Garilao Order.
 We reiterate that a petition for annulment of judment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
may be availed of against final judgments and orders rendered by either RTCs in civil
actions[20] or Municipal Trial Courts[21] (MTCs).[22] Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial
tribunals such as the National Labor Relations Commission,[23] the Ombudsman,[24] the Civil
Service Commission,[25] and the OP[26] are beyond the reach of a petition for annulment under
Rule 47. An order of the DAR Secretary issued in the exercise of his quasi-judicial powers is
also outside its scope. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in Macalalag v. Ombudsman,[27] explained the
rationale behind the limited application of Rule 47, to wit:

The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised

only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of
law. There must then be a law expressly granting such right. This legal axiom is
also applicable and even more true in actions for annulment of judgments which
is an exception to the rule on finality of judgments. [28]

In the present case, neither Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657[29] nor R.A. No. 7902[30] allows a
petition for annulment of a final DAR decision or order. Section 61[31] of R.A. No. 6657 provides
that a DAR decision or order be reviewable by the CA in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
turn, the Rules of Court, consistent with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and
R.A. No. 7902, prescribes under Rule 43[32] that the mode of appeal from decisions or orders of
DAR as a quasi-judicial agency is by petition for review to the CA.[33] Paduas recourse to a
Petition for Annulment of the Garilao Order, rather than a petition for review, was therefore
fatally infirm.

Even if Paduas Petition for Annulment had been treated by the CA as a petition for
review, it would still have failed.

Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 vests in DAR the following quasi-judicial power:

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested
with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall
proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes, or controversies in a most
expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of
every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the
case. Towards this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a
 just, expeditious and inexpensive determination for every action or proceeding
before it.

On August 30, 2000, DAR adopted Administrative Order No. 06-00[34] or the Rules of
Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. Section 2 thereof states:
Section 2. Cases Covered. These Rules shall govern cases falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall include the following:

(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), including protests or
opposition thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage;

(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-

beneficiaries;

(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;

(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer

(CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the
purview of Presidential Decreee No. 816, including the issuance, recall or
cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

In the disputed July 2, 1995 Order, then DAR Secretary Garilao cancelled the award to Padua
of Lot No. 90, thereby declaring the latter not qualified to acquire the property as an agrarian
reform beneficiary.[35] Said Order was therefore issued by Sec. Garilao in the exercise of his
power under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 2 (b) of Administrative Order No. 06-00.

Padua insists, however, that his status in relation to Lot No. 90 was no longer that of a
mere potential agrarian reform farmer-beneficiary but a civil law vendor dealing directly with the
LBP in the payment of amortizations on the property.[36] That view is incorrect. The statutory
mechanism for the acquisition of land through agrarian reform requires full payment of
amortization before a farmer-beneficiary may be issued a CLOA or EP, which, in turn, can
become the basis for issuance in his name of an original or a transfer certificate of title. [37] As
Padua himself admitted that he is still paying amortization on Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in
relation to said property remains that of a mere potential farmer-beneficiary whose eligibilities
DAR may either confirm or reject. In fact, under Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 06-00,
DAR has authority to issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential
farmer-beneficiaries but not yet registered with the Register of Deeds.[38]
As to the claim of Padua that he was not accorded due process in the cancellation of the
Santiago Order which awarded Lot No. 90 in his favor, this is belied by his own Annex A in
support of his Urgent Reiteration of Application for Restraining Order or for Observance of
Judicial Courtesy as Mandated by Eternal Gardens versus Court of Appeals.[39]Annex A[40] is the
letter of MARO Mabborang informing Padua of the implementation of the Garilao Order.
Attached to Annex A is the May 9, 2000 Memorandum of Director Acosta, which reads:

We are transmitting herewith the Order dated July 2, 1995 issued by the Office of
the DAR Secretary, in the above entitled case.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it was denied on August 12,
1996. [The] appeal taken to the Office of the President was dismissed May
25, 1998, and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied on January
22, 1999.

Considering per available records, that no further action was taken, hence, it has
already become final and executory and may be [sic] now be implemented.

x x x x[41] (Emphasis added)

Thus, any defect in due process was cured by the fact that Padua had filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and an Appeal to the OP from the Garilao Order.[42]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December 18,
2001 and Resolution dated May 7, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer. The private respondents, as mentioned in the text of the
Petition for Review on Certiorari, are Pepito dela Cruz, Francisco Santiago, Fortunato
Abungan, Leon Suarez, Alejandro Fernandez and Lorenzo Gonzales. Rollo, p. 11.
[1]
Both penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (now retired) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (now retired).
[2]
Entitled Roberto Padua, Petitioner, v. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Pepito dela
Cruz, et al., Respondents, CA rollo, pp. 66-77.
[3]
CA Decision, id. at 67-68, citing Department of Agrarian Reform Order dated July 2, 1995.
[4]
Id.

THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES JESUS and G.R. No. 165501

EVANGELINE PASCO,
Petitioners,

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL
AND DEVELOPMENT CARPIO,
CORPORATION,
Respondent. CARPIO MORALES, and

TINGA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 28, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the Court of Appeals August 27, 2003[1] decision which denied their petition for review of
the decision of the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirming with modification that of
the June 30, 2000 of the Talisay City Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Spouses Jesus
and Evangeline Pasco (petitioners) brought the case to this Court on a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

Respondent, Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, is the registered owner of

a parcel of land containing more than 100 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-88078 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

Constructed on respondents parcel of land are houses which are occupied by its workers.

Petitioners, among other workers, used to work for respondent until 1987. They having ceased
to be employed by respondent, petitioners were asked to vacate the house they were occupying
but they refused, hence, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them before
the MTCC in Talisay City.
In their Answer to the Complaint,[2] petitioners claimed that, inter alia, they built the
house occupied by them at their own expense and their stay on the land was upon the tolerance
of respondent.
 In their Position Paper,[3] petitioners claimed that respondent constructed houses for its
workers but the house they were occupying was destroyed by a typhoon, forcing them to build
their house; respondents demand was merely for them to vacate the house, as they had paid
rentals thru salary/wage deductions; and their refusal to vacate the house is justified, they being
the owners and actual possessors thereof.
By Decision of June 30, 2000,[4] the MTCC of Talisay rendered judgment in favor of respondent
upon the following findings:

As adduced, it is explicitly clear that [respondent] provided housing facilities to

every worker in its hacienda without a requiring payment of rentals, however,
with an implied promise that the same be vacated upon their cessation from
work. . . .

On the issue that [petitioners] were responsible in building their own houses is
devoid of merit. . . . However, [petitioners] made repairs on their houses when
[the] same were destroyed by typhoon sometime in 1975. These are repairs
badly needed at that time there being no however express authority from
[respondent].

xxxx

As to the contention of [petitioners] in Civil Case No. 677, [respondent] is

amenable to remove whatever improvements they have introduced thereto
including the trees they planted. . . .

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)[5]

Accordingly, the MTCC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for [respondent] and herein

[petitioners in Civil Case No. 677], spouses Jesus Pasco and Evangeline Pasco .
. .and those persons claiming under their names are hereby ordered:

1. To vacate the premises of [respondents] Lot 707, Talisay Cadastre

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-88078 and to remove whatever
improvements they introduced thereon;

2. To pay [respondent] the sum of P50.00 a month as rental payment

from the time of the filing of the herein complaint until they have vacated the
premises; and

3. To pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.[6] (Underscoring supplied)

After the promulgation on June 30, 2000 of the MTCC decision or on August 23, 2000, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Talisay City sent a Notice of Coverage and Field
Investigation[7] (Notice of Coverage) advising respondent that its parcel of land is now covered
under Republic Act 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
and inviting the presence of a representative to a field investigation to be conducted on
September 12, 2000 during which it (respondent) may pinpoint its retained area in accordance
with Section 6 of the CARL.

In the meantime, as petitioners appealed the MTCC decision in the Unlawful Detainer Case to
the RTC, they, on August 24, 2000, filed a Memorandum of Appeal[8] contending that the MTCC:

I. . . . . ERRED IN FINDING THE [PETITIONERS] TO BE BUILDERS,

PLANTERS OR SOWERS IN BAD FAITH.

II. . . . . ERRED IN NOT FINDING [RESPONDENT] TO BE OWNERS IN BAD

FAITH.

III. . . . . ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 449 TO 451 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

IV. . . . . HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT UNTIL

[PETITIONERS] RIGHT OF RETENTION UNTIL ARTICLE 546 OF THE
CIVIL CODE HAS EXPIRED.

x x x x[9]

In their Memorandum, petitioners argued that respondents hacienda is covered by the CARL and
they are qualified beneficiaries thereunder; whether they are qualified beneficiaries is material to
the determination of whether they are planters or builders or sowers in bad faith; upon
knowledge that the land subject of the unlawful detainer case is a[n] hacienda, it is within the
sound discretion of the judge to clarify from the parties whether or not the subject land is covered
by [CARL] and whether or not the defendants are qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries; it is
mandatory on the part of the courts to take judicial notice of agrarian laws; and the unlawful
detainer case, at all events, was prematurely filed as respondents right to eject them would arise
only after they are reimbursed of
their expenses in repairing the house and, therefore, the MTCC has no jurisdiction yet to order
their ejectment.

By Decision of December 5, 2000,[10] the RTC of Bacolod City affirmed the June 30,
2000 decision of MTCC Talisay, with modification, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in

Cities, dated June 30, 2000 is hereby modified as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for

[respondent] . . . . against spouses Jesus Pasco and Evangeline
Pasco and the persons claiming under their names are hereby
ordered:

1. To vacate the premises of [respondents] Lot 707,

Talisay Cadastre covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
88078 and to remove the house they constructed thereon;

2. To pay [respondent] the sum of P50.00 a month as

rental payment from the time of the filing of the herein complaint
until they have vacated the premises; and

3. To pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.

With costs against the [petitioners].[11] (Underscoring

supplied)

Petitioners moved to reconsider[12] the RTC decision, they contending that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer in view of the agrarian dispute between them
and respondent; and by Order[13] of June 8, 2001, petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals[14]before which they raised, in the
main, the issues of:

I. . . .

A. Whether or not the Notice of Coverage issued by DAR and which was
ADMITTED by [respondents] sufficient evidence to prove that
[respondents] land is covered by CARP.

B. Whether or not [petitioners] evidence to prove that they are potential

agrarian reform beneficiaries has been existing at the time of the filing of
the complaint for ejectment against them.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN AGRARIAN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE

PARTIES IN CIVIL CASE NO. 677 SO AS TO NULLIFY THE
 PROCEEDINGS IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION.

xxxx
AND

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING

RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT, HAVING BEEN BROUGHT
BY A PARTY WHO IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST.[15] (Underscoring
supplied)

To their petition before the appellate court, petitioners attached a copy of the Notice of Coverage
and Field Investigation sent by the MARO, Talisay City to respondent.

In the meantime, the MARO of Talisay City issued on August 24, 2004 a Certification[16] that
herein petitioner Jesus Pasco is registered as potential Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) beneficiary in the land owned by respondent.

By the assailed Decision of August 27, 2003,[17] the appellate court denied petitioners petition,
ratiocinating as follows:

Well settled is the rule that the only issue in ejectment cases is the physical
possession of the premises, independent of any claim of ownership by the
parties, and this must be so because the issue of ownership cannot be definitely
decided in an ejectment case. Considering that the petitioners were in
possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew
that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who
occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against them. In the instant case, the petitioners admitted in
their Answer almost all the allegations in the complaint. Since the petitioners
occupy the subject land at the owners tolerance, they are bound to vacate the
same, failing which, an ejectment suit is the proper remedy against them.

We agree with the allegations of the respondent corporation that the petitioners
defenses: (1) that the subject land is covered by CARP; (2) that there is an
agrarian dispute; and (3) that the case is not brought by a real party-in-interest
are mere afterthoughts to muddle the case and win at all costs. These issues
were not raised before the trial court. The fact is that the petitioners had
admitted from the very start that the respondent is the owner of the lot in
question. They are therefore in estoppel if they deny the fact the complaint was
brought by the real party-in-interest. In the same manner, the defense that the
court has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case because of an agrarian dispute
or the land is covered by CARP is likewise untenable. Basic is the rule that the
material averments in the complaint, which in this case is for ejectment,
determine the jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence dictates that the
court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple
 expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties. Moreover, it is a settled rule that no
question will be raised on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below.

Anent the allegation that the respondent is not the real party in interest, the same
deserves scant consideration. Even granting that there is indeed a co-ownership
over a portion of the subject land, the law says that anyone of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment. Thus, the respondent (plaintiff) is
unquestionable a real party in interest.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, the petition at bar[19] assailing the appellate courts decision upon the following issues:
1. Whether or not one who has been identified by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) as potential agrarian reform beneficiary may be ejected from
the land where he is identified as such, by the landowner, who has already
been notified by the DAR of the coverage of his land by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program of the government.

2. Whether or not the foregoing issue involves an issue affecting the jurisdiction
of the court over the nature of the action or it involves primary jurisdiction.

3. Whether or not the matters involving jurisdiction of the court over the nature of
the action could be raised for the first time on appeal.[20] (Underscoring
supplied)

As reflected above, the theory of petitioner before the MTCC is different from that
proffered before the RTC. Thus, before the MTCC, they claimed that the house they are
occupying was built at their own expense.

Before the RTC, they raised for the first time that, they being qualified beneficiaries of
the CARP, the same should be considered in determining whether they are builders, planters, or
sowers in good faith. And, for the first time too, they assailed the MTCCs lack of jurisdiction over
the action due to prematurity, they contending that respondents right to eject them would accrue
only after they are reimbursed of their expenses in the repair of the house.

In their motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, petitioners this time argued that
the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case in view of the agrarian dispute between them and
respondent.

As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried
and decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change theory on appeal. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule.[21]

The aforecited rule is not without exception, however. As correctly argued by petitioners,
though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
considered by the reviewing court as it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. [22]

The issuance during the pendency of the case of a Notice of Coverage to respondent
does not, however, automatically make the ejectment case an agrarian dispute over which the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction. [23] The issuance
of a Notice of Coverage is merely a preliminary step for the States acquisition of the land for
agrarian reform purposes and it does not automatically vest title or transfer the ownership of the
land to the government. The purpose of a Notice of Coverage is explained by this Court, thus:

. . . The Notice of Coverage shall also invite the landowner to attend the field
investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from notice. The field
investigation is for the purpose of identifying the landholding and determining its
suitability for agriculture and its productivity. . . . The date of the field investigation
shall also be sent by the DAR Municipal Office to representatives of the L[and]
B[ank] [of the] P[hilippines], BARC, DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries.
The field investigation shall be conducted on the date set with the participation of
the landowner and the various representatives. . . . Should there be a variance
between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the land be placed
under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to agriculture, the degree or
development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a composite
team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly conduct further
investigation. . . .

Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to
the Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law. They also include the
Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 and
subsequently amended in DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A.O. No. 1,
Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner
that his property shall be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise
his retention right; it also notifies him, pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of
1990, that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and representatives of
the concerned sectors of society may attend to discuss the results of the field
 investigation, the land valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A.O.
No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage also informs the landowner that a
field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted where he and the other
representatives may be present.

x x x x[24] (Underscoring supplied)

Since during a field investigation the DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines would make a
determination as to whether, among other things, the land will be placed under agrarian reform,
the lands suitability to agriculture, a Notice of Coverage does not ipso facto render the land
subject thereof a land reform area. The owner retains its right to eject unlawful possessors of his
land, as what respondent did in the present case.

As for the registration of petitioners as potential CARP beneficiaries, the same does not help
their cause. As potential CARP beneficiaries, they are included in the list of those who may
be awarded land under the CARP. Nothing in the records of the case shows that the DAR has
made an award in favor of petitioners, hence, no rights over the land they occupy can be
considered to have vested in their favor in accordance with Section 24 of the CARL which
reads:

Section 24. Award to Beneficiaries. The rights and responsibilities of the

beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the
land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180)
days from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of
the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award,
which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided for in this Act, and
shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the
Certificate of Title. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, to allow petitioners to continue to stay in respondents land on the ground that they are
potential CARP beneficiaries would give them preferential treatment over other potential CARP
reform beneficiaries who are not occupying the premises and still awaiting the award to be made
by the DAR in their favor. Worse, to further tolerate petitioners occupancy of respondents land
might give other potential CARP beneficiaries the wrong signal that they too can occupy the land
which may be awarded to them even before they are chosen or before an award is made in their
favor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
 Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Justices Mercedes Gozo-
Dadole and Rosmari D. Carandang; CA rollo, pp. 207-212.
[2]
Records, pp. 16-17.
[3]
Id. at 40-47.
[4]
Id. at 61-66.
[5]
Id. at 63-64.
[6]
Id. at 66.
[7]
Court of Appeals (CA) rollo, p. 123.
[8]
Records, pp. 84-97.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Id. at 129-136.
[11]
Id. at 135-136.
[12]
Id. at 137-139.
[13]
Id. at 173-175.
[14]
CA rollo, pp. 9-35.
[15]
Id. at 23.
[16]
Rollo, p. 62.
[17]
CA rollo, pp. 207-212.
[18]
CA rollo, pp. 211-212.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 19-30.
[20]
Id. at 24.
[21]
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, G.R. Nos. 137147 &137148, November 18, 2003,
416 SCRA 15, 19.
[22]
Del Rosario v. Bonga, G.R. No. 136308, January 23, 2001, 350 SCRA 101, 110.
[23]
Rule II, Section 1 of the DARAB Rules provides that the DARAB shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes,
cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order
Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.
[24]
Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 727, 770-771 (1999).
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D.

AGUILAR, ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS,
MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL
JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E.
NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIÑO, ROBERTO T. PATIÑO,
ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON,
and JOEMARIE VIBO, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
review and reversal of the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28
August 2003, respectively.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over
parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers presented below:

Areas
Petitioners TCT/EP Nos.
(has.)
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 1.7833
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814 2.0000
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293 0.1565
 3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 3.1441
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 4.2405
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 3.3082
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 3.1437
7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 4.0128
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 2.3087
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 2.0950
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 1.5737
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 2.2670
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674 4.5526
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825 0.4579
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 4.4939
14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 2.2140
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 3.9291
16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 2.7491
17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 1.7954
18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 6.4266
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 2.2143
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 4.5322
21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 4.3223
22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 3.7151
23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 1.31852

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of
deceased recipients of EPs over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa,
Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and EP numbers identified as follows:

Areas
(Deceased) Registered Owners TCT/EP Nos.
(has.)
1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 4.1953
2. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 3.00783
The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a
forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these
areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other
occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.

HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No.
2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three
parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Area
Lot No.
(in hectares)
Lot No. 1620, Pls – 4 28.52
Lot No. 1621, Pls – 4 11.64
Lot No. 1622, Pls – 4 487.47
TOTAL 527.834

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and
corn lands be brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.

HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its
landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving
compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the
landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.

In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the
entire landholdings of 527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976,
the DAR approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the
entire landholdings.

HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the
determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land
Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement
(LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in 1977.

Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other
persons, which was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT
No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the
subject of the Deed of Assignment.

In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988,
the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to
petitioners, among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of
CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under
Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No.
P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area
was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later
consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares
which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other
250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire
landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.

On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered
a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land
covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy
relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21
October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda
Maria Action Team. Petitioners’ TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.

After the DARAB denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the
Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the
following assailed Resolution:

A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding
Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their
behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.6

Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for
the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his
Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed
Resolution:

Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which
dismissed the petition for certiorari.

We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since
petitioners have failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can
be justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the
relaxation of the rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in
the case at bar.

More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Loquias
vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a
matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on]
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.

Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the
proper authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to
exist thereby rendering the petition fatally defective.

Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:

"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice x x x"

It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should
be dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly
filed could cure the petition’s defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners
still has not been met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.7

Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the
EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.

The petition is impressed with merit.1awphil.net

Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure concerning the Certification Against Forum shopping

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No.
28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum
shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the
rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to
resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is
to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."8 Technical rules of procedure should
be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.9 The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting
what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath
the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was
given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog10 and Escorpizo v.
University of Baguio11 that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club
Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,12 we likewise held that:

The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of
petitioner. For a certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the
principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so.
This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this action.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman,13where this Court ruled that:

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr.,
one of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is
defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall
certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any
court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the
certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the
latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the
best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed
or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)

Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution
of the Ombudsman charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above
declaration "at the outset" was made together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on
our part to decide the Petition.14 There being only five petitioners in Loquias, the
unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.’s four co-accused is
immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege
that they are farmer-beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur.
While they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain
to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of transportation. Their
houses are located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is
scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers
(who are members of a non-government organization engaged in development work) are based
in Quezon City who started assisting them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in
1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who signed
the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to Manila
at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers’
organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong
Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners’ counsel went to
Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the
SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to sign
for various reasons – some could not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily
residing in other towns, while some already died because of old age.15 Be that as it may, those
who did not sign the SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.

The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that
justify the relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in
the case at bar,16 without discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their
Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the actuation of
petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would
justify the suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against
forum shopping, such as those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.

In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,17 the appeal to the
Court of Appeals had a certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not
contain a board resolution authorizing the signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein
attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, as in
this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:

[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a
board resolution or a secretary’s certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by
petitioner to represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in
fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least
substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural
requirements.

The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and
while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be
met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help
secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the
rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the
core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,18 the authority of petitioner’s resident manager to
sign the certification against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after
the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already
had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein that:

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by
the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that
should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that
said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.

In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered
the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial
compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264
SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal
of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of
verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated
the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping
certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that
justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.

In the instant case, the merits of petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances
or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-
forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance
with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we
allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum
shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner
subsequently submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an
action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping
is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat
the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.

In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19 we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the
substantive aspect of the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the
reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to suspend our rules to serve the ends of
justice. Thus:

The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not
unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements,
there were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case
should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of
the petition. x x x
There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on
certification against forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In
De Guia v. De Guia,20 petitioners raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of
respondents’ Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against forum shopping. We held
therein that:

With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice

behooves us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the
shortcomings of respondents’ counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim.
Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own
rules in a particular case in order to do justice."

In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 the non-compliance was disregarded

because of the principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:

We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum
shopping. The certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is
not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party
and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the
outright dismissal of their actions.

But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of
social justice involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in
the way of equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties.
Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly
applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.

The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was
violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule
would be justified for two compelling reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent
merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.

Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs

issued in registration proceedings.

Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of its issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the
agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is
governed by the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title."

The DARAB is grossly mistaken.

Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 provides that certificates of title issued in

administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial
proceedings:

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding

pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a
disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.

There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land
Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public
land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of
title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases
clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was
applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved
by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in
accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of
the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree finally awards the
land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director of
Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This,
to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation
of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement
of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would
be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the Government through
the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise
uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government’s system of distributing public
agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands
to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to
contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The
silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is
the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:

Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted
thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who
come into the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements thereof.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by implication to the
patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources,
under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.23

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with
Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the
same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the
issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of
a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."25

As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.26 :

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its
issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act
No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens
system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX27 on the
subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible
as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.

The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first
time on appeal with the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised
before the RARAD.28

The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the
lots covered under the Republic Act No. 6657,29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being
issued with CLOAs, would only delay the application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed
277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and resources of the government.

The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the
alleged wrongful annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more
than ten years after the issuance of the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its
desire to receive a substantially higher valuation and just compensation should the disputed
277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of Presidential Decree No.
27.30 This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:

(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm
they were cultivating;

(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never
protested petitioners’ act of declaring the same for realty taxation;

(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the
entire landholdings or the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be
rice and corn lands;

(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of
Rights in 1977.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to
petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:

Original Grantees TCT/EP Nos.

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675
 2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN,
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.
7. EDGAR DUENAS
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ
14. TERESITA NACION
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR
16. NELSON L. NULLAS
17. CARLITO S. OLIA
18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO
21. PATERNO P. SAIN
22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON
23. JOEMARIE VIBO
24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA
25. RAFAEL PATIÑO
Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658
TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836
TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844
TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873
TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348
TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840
TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829
TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826
TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860
TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830
TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880
TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827
TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832
TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861
WE CONCUR:

On Official Leave
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
Acting Chairman

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 148777 October 18, 2007

ESTATE OF THE LATE ENCARNACION VDA. DE PANLILIO, represented by GEORGE

LIZARES, Petitioner,
vs.
GONZALO DIZON, RICARDO GUINTU, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ELISEO GUINTU, ROBERTO
DIZON, EDILBERTO CATU, HERMINIGILDO FLORES, CIPRIANO DIZON, JUANARIO
MANIAGO, GORGONIO CANLAS, ANTONIO LISING, CARLOS PINEDA, RENATO GOZUN,
ALFREDO MERCADO, BIENVENIDO MACHADA, and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REGION III, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 157598

REYNALDO VILLANUEVA, CENON GUINTO, CELESTINO DIZON, CARMELITA VDA. DE

DAVID, FORTUNATO TIMBANG, OSCAR SANTIAGO, CELESTINO ESGUERRA, ANTONIO
DIZON, and TEODULO DIZON,Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GEORGE LIZARES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Did the owner of two (2) lots by a subsequent affidavit validly and legally revoke the first affidavit
voluntarily surrendering said lots for land acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law? The answer will determine the rights of the parties in the instant petitions––the heirs of the
lot owner vis-à-vis the tenants declared to be beneficiaries of the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.1

The Case

Before us are two petitions. The first is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45
docketed as G.R. No. 148777, which seeks to set aside the November 29, 2000 Amended
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502, which affirmed the August 7,
1997 Decision4 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB
Case Nos. 4558-4561; and the June 26, 2001 Resolution5 disregarding the Motion for
Reconsideration6 of said Amended Decision. The other is a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus7 under Rule 65 docketed as G.R. No. 157598, which seeks to set aside the
November 14, 2002 CA Resolution8 which denied petitioners’ Motion for Entry of
Judgment,9 and the January 24, 2003 CA Resolution10 likewise denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.11

Through our August 27, 2003 Resolution,12 these cases were consolidated as they arose out of
the same factual milieu.

The Facts

Encarnacion Vda. De Panlilio is the owner of the disputed landholdings over a vast tract of land,
with an aggregate area of 115.41 hectares called Hacienda Masamat located in Masamat,
Mexico, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 3510, 3513, 3514,
3515, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3526, 3528, 3530, 3531, 3532, 3533, RT-499 (9191), and RT-
500 (11670),13 all of the Pampanga Registry of Deeds.
On April 19, 1961, Panlilio entered into a contract of lease over the said landholdings with
Paulina Mercado, wife of Panlilio’s nephew. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed
on October 13, 196414 and September 18, 1974,15 covering agricultural years from 1961 to
1979.

Sometime in 1973, pursuant to the OLT under PD 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) issued thirty eight (38) Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to Panlilio’s tenants. The
tenant-awardees were made defendants in the instant consolidated complaints filed by
petitioner Lizares.

On November 26, 1973, lessee Paulina Mercado filed a letter-complaint with the DAR
questioning the issuance of CLTs to Panlilio’s tenants, alleging, among others, that the DAR
should not have issued the CLTs since the land involved was principally being planted with
sugar and was outside the coverage of PD 27. She claimed that respondents surreptitiously
planted palay (rice plant) instead of sugar in order to bring the land within the purview of the law.
After proper investigation, the DAR concluded that the CLTs were "properly and regularly
issued."

Paulina Mercado likewise filed a similar complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) at
San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as CAR Case No. 1649-P’74.

On December 4, 1976, the tenants of the portion of the land planted with sugar cane petitioned
the DAR to cause the reversion of their sugarland to riceland so that it may be covered by the
Agrarian Reform Law. The petition was with the conformity of Panlilio.

Thus, on January 12, 1977, Panlilio executed an Affidavit, partly quoted as follows:

1. That I am the owner of an agricultural landholding situated [in] Mexico, Pampanga,

with an area of 115.4 hectares, more or less, dedicated at present to the production of
palay and sugarcane crops;

2. That I have been informed that 50.22 hectares comprising the portion dedicated to
palay crop have been placed under the provisions and coverage of P.D. No. 27 and that
Certificates of Land Transfer have been issued to the tenant-farmers thereon;

3. That as owner of the abovementioned property, I interpose no objection to the action

taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform in placing the aforesaid portion dedicated
to palay crop within the coverage of P.D. No. 27;

4. That lately, all the tenants of my said property including those in the sugarcane
portions, have filed a petition dated December 4, 1976 with the Honorable Secretary
Conrado F. Estrella, Secretary of Agrarian Reform, requesting for the reversion of the
sugarcane portion of my property adverted to [the] palay land which is the original
classification of my entire subject property;

5. That the aforesaid petition dated December 4, 1976 of the tenants of my property
which was filed with the DAR carries my written conformity;
 6. That it is my desire that my entire subject property which is referred to as Hacienda
Masamat be placed under the coverage of P.D. 27 without exception and that thereafter
the same be sold to tenant-petitioners.16(Emphasis supplied.)

On January 20, 1977, by virtue of the said Affidavit, the DAR Secretary, through Director
Gaudencio Besa, ordered Director Severino Santiago, Regional Director of Region III, San
Fernando, Pampanga, "to distribute all land transfer certificates, in view of the desire of
Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio to place her property under the Land Transfer Program of the
government."

On the basis of the action of the DAR Secretary, the CAR, on March 17, 1978, issued an Order
dismissing the complaint of Paulina Mercado (lessee) in CAR Case No. 1649-P’74, thus:

With this development, the resolution of the principal issue in the instant case has become moot
and academic, it being already settled in the DAR proceedings the placement of the land in
question under the land transfer program of the government. Therefore, the instant case should
be dismissed. Necessarily, all pending incidents should be deemed disposed of. 17

On December 29, 1986, Panlilio died.

Thereafter, sometime in 1993, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to the following
tenants of Panlilio:

EP Nos.
Hermenegildo Flores 690774
143627
Celestino Dizon 690960
683355
45390
Gonzalo Dizon 680524
Roberto Dizon 690758
Cipriano Dizon 45260
45256
Antonio Dizon 681072
Teodulo Dizon 45326
Juanario Maniago 143207
Celestino Esguerra 45265
45219
Florentino Lapuz 690759
45259
Gorgonio Canlas 143508
 Carlos Pineda 197097
45254
Renato Gozun 143208
Romeo Pangilinan 475341
Jose Serrano 475340
Wenceslao Pangilinan 476572
Guillermo del Rosario 475339
Candido Timbang 143931
45262
45257
Arsenio Legaspi 4526618

Subsequently, in June 1994, the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49 appointed
petitioner George Lizares as executor of the estate of Panlilio.19 Records show that petitioner
Lizares is the son of the late Jesus Lizares, Panlilio’s administrator of Hacienda Masamat during
her lifetime.

On February 28, 1994, petitioner Lizares filed his first complaint with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as DARAB Case
No. 638 P’94,20 for annulment of coverage of landholdings under PD 27 and ejectment against
Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. who filed their Answer with Counterclaim21 on April 12, 1994.

On April 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the PARAD three more complaints for cancellation of
EPs, docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 933-P’95,22 934-P’95,23 and 935-P’95,24 against the rest of
respondents who filed their motions to dismiss25 on grounds of lack of cause of action and lack
of jurisdiction. On July 13, 1995, the PARAD denied the motions.26 Respondents then filed their
Answer with Counterclaim.27

Upon petitioner’s motion, all the cases were consolidated. The PARAD then directed the parties
to submit their respective position papers,28 and, thereafter, considered the cases submitted for
decision.

The three (3) complaints filed in 1995 for cancellation of EPs have the following defendants: (1)
in DARAB Case No. 933-P’95, Herminigildo Flores and the Regional Director, DAR, Region III;
(2) in DARAB Case No. 934-P’95, Celestino Dizon, Gonzalo Dizon, Roberto Dizon, and the
Regional Director, DAR, Region III; and (3) in DARAB Case No. 935-P’95, Cipriano Dizon,
Antonio Dizon, Teodulo Dizon, Juanario Maniago, Celestino Esguerra, Florentino Lapuz,
Gorgonio Canlas, Antonio Lising, Carlos Pineda, Renato Gozun, Alfredo Mercado, Romeo
Pangilinan, Jose Serrano, Wenceslao Pangilinan, Guillermo del Rosario, Candido Timbang,
Bienvenido Mechada, and Arsenio Legaspi, and the Regional Director, DAR, Region III.

Thus, aside from public respondent DAR Regional Director, Region III, DARAB Case No. 638-
P’94 had 15 defendants, DARAB Case No. 933-P’95 had a sole defendant, DARAB Case No.
934-P’95 had three defendants, and DARAB Case No. 935-P’95 had 18 defendants. All the four
(4) consolidated cases were against 37 defendants.

The Ruling of the PARAD in DARAB Case

Nos. 638-P’94, 933-P’95, 934-P’95 and 935-P’95

On November 14, 1995, the PARAD rendered a Joint Decision29 dismissing petitioner Lizares’
complaint on the ground that the subject landholdings have been properly placed under the
coverage of PD 27 through the January 12, 1977 Affidavit30 of Panlilio, unequivocally placing
her entire property within the coverage of the OLT. In addition, the PARAD relied on the report
of the DAR and the Bureau of Lands personnel that the subject landholding is devoted to palay.
And, finally, the PARAD applied the equitable remedy of laches, in that Panlilio failed during her
lifetime to bring to the attention of the DAR and CAR her February 3, 1977 Affidavit31 ostensibly
revoking her previous January 12, 1977 Affidavit.

The Ruling of the DARAB in DARAB Case Nos. 4558-4561

(DARAB Case Nos. 638-P’94, 933-P’95, 934-P’95 and 935-P’95)

Aggrieved, petitioner Lizares appealed the PARAD decision before the DARAB, which, on
August 7, 1997, rendered a Decision32 affirming the PARAD decision.

The DARAB likewise disregarded petitioner Lizares’ Motion for Reconsideration33 of the August
7, 1997 Decision.

Prior to the issuance of the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision, petitioner Lizares and defendant-
appellees Wenceslao Pangilinan, Romeo Pangilinan, Jose Serrano, and Guillermo del Rosario
filed their February 10, 1997 Joint Partial Motion to Dismiss34 with the DARAB, seeking
dismissal of their respective claims in DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No. 935-P’95)
based on an Affidavit of Cancellation of Lis Pendens Annotation of TCT Nos. 14321, 14322,
14323, and 14324, all of the Pampanga Register of Deeds,35 which was executed by petitioner
Lizares. Apparently, petitioner Lizares received from a certain Ms. Petronila Catap the amount
of PhP 1,356,619 for the settlement of DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No. 935-P’95)
against the abovementioned defendant-appellees.36

Earlier on, petitioner Lizares filed his April 19, 1996 Motion to Withdraw Appeal in favor of
defendant-appellees Reynaldo Villanueva, Cenon Guinto, Carmelita Vda. de David, Oscar
Santiago, Celestino Dizon, Fortunato Timbang, and Florentino Lapuz in DARAB Case No. 4558
(DARAB Case No. 638-P’94); defendant-appellee Celestino Dizon in DARAB Case No. 4559
(DARAB Case No. 933-P’95); and defendant-appellees Antonio Dizon, Teodulo Dizon,
Celestino Esguerra, Florentino Lapuz, and Candido Timbang in DARAB Case No. 4561
(DARAB Case No. 935-P’95), as said defendant-appellees agreed to settle and compromise
with petitioner Lizares. The motion was however resisted by other defendant-appellees through
a May 27, 1996 Counter-Motion to the Plaintiff-Appellant Motion to Withdraw Appeal,37 on the
ground that a piece-meal withdrawal is not proper as the matter in controversy is common and
the same to all.

Unfortunately, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal was not resolved as petitioner Lizares did not
attend the DARAB scheduled hearings. Thus, the August 7, 1997 Decision was subsequently
promulgated in favor of all defendant-appellees.
Petitioner Lizares elevated the DARAB consolidated cases to the CA for review in CA-G.R. SP
No. 47502 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The April 11, 2000 CA Decision

At the outset, the CA saw it differently.

On April 11, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision sustaining petitioner’s position and granted
relief, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board affirming the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificates of Land
Transfer issued to private respondents insofar as they pertain to sugarlands are hereby
declared NULL and VOID.38

The CA primarily anchored its ruling on Panlilio’s February 3, 1977 Affidavit ostensibly revoking
her January 12, 1977 Affidavit and ascribed error to both the PARAD and DARAB in ignoring
Panlilio’s second affidavit. Moreover, it relied on the November 26, 1973 letter-complaint of
Paulina Mercado to the DAR Secretary and the CAR Resolution in CAR Case No. 1649-P’74,
that the subject landholding in question is principally devoted to the production of sugar cane as
buttressed by the report and findings of Atty. Gregorio D. Sapera, Legal Officer III of the DAR
Central Office.

The November 29, 2000 CA Amended Decision

Unconvinced, Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. interposed a Motion for Reconsideration or in the

alternative, Motion to Remand for New Trial39 of said Decision, where they contended that:

1. Petitioner’s complaints should have been dismissed for his failure to implead therein
indispensable parties, namely the Land Bank of the Philippines which paid Panlilio the
amortizations on the land and the third persons who purchased the landholdings from
the tenants;

2. [The CA] disturbed and reversed the findings of fact by the PARAD and the DARAB
supported by substantial evidence. x x x

3. It is not the job of the appellate court to sieve through the evidence considered by the
administrative agency in adjudicating the case before it, following the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. x x x

4. [The CA] violated the principle of res judicata in reversing the CAR resolution
dismissing the complaint in Case No. 1649-P’74 rendered twenty-two years ago.
Likewise, estoppel and laches bar the instant actions. x x x

5. Lastly, the petition should be dismissed in favor of Romeo Pangilinan, Wenceslao

Pangilinan, Jose Serrano and Guillermo del Rosario in view of the compromise
agreement in DARAB Case No. 4561 between them and petitioner herein. They
 submitted, as proof, their joint motion to dismiss the complaint executed on February 10,
1997 and petitioner Lizares’ receipt from them of P1,356,619.00 as consideration for the
dismissal of his complaints against them.40

After considering the above contentions together with petitioner Lizares’ Comment on the
Motion for Reconsideration dated May 2, 2000 with Motion for Correction of the Dispositive
Portion of the Decision,41respondents’ Reply42 to said comment, and petitioner’s Rejoinder,43 the
appellate court rendered on November 29, 2000 the assailed Amended Decision on a vote of 3-
2, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, respondents’ motion for reconsideration of Our Decision is hereby GRANTED.

The petition is ordered DISMISSED and the challenged DARAB decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.44

In reversing its earlier April 11, 2000 Decision, the CA concluded that the February 3, 1977
Affidavit was not executed by Panlilio, ratiocinating that if she indeed made the second affidavit
which purportedly repudiated her earlier January 12, 1977 Affidavit, the natural course of action
to take was for her to submit the second affidavit to the DAR to exclude the majority of her
landholdings planted with sugar cane from the coverage of the OLT under PD 27. Her failure to
effectuate the removal of her land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage for nine (9) years until her death on December 29, 1986 led the court a quo to believe
that the second affidavit was not genuine. Moreover, Jesus Lizares, Panlilio’s administrator and
father of petitioner Lizares, likewise did not take any action, in accordance with the second
affidavit showing that he was not aware of such affidavit of revocation. The CA even doubted
petitioner Lizares’ contention that the second affidavit was submitted to the DAR and CAR but
was not acted upon for such averment was not substantiated.

The appellate court also found Panlilio and her successors-in-interest guilty of laches, pointing
out that aside from the alleged second affidavit of revocation, there was no indication of
Panlilio’s intention to recover the disputed landholdings.

On the issue of fraud and collusion on the part of the DAR personnel, the CA found that no
preponderance of evidence was evinced to prove the accusation.

In fine, the CA recognized and applied the principle of res judicata to the March 17, 1978 CAR
Order rendered more than 20 years ago, holding that the resolution of said court placing the
entire landholdings in question under the coverage of PD 27 had long become final and
executory.

Petitioner Lizares’ plea for recall of the assailed Amended Decision was rejected through the
assailed June 26, 2001 CA Resolution.45

Petition for review on certiorari under G.R. No. 148777

Thus, we have this Petition for Review on Certiorari against only 15 private respondents from
the original defendants below, namely: Gonzalo Dizon, Ricardo Guintu, Rogelio Munoz, Eliseo
Guintu, Roberto Dizon, Edilberto Catu, Herminigildo Flores, Cipriano Dizon, Juanario Maniago,
Gorgonio Canlas, Antonio Lising, Carlos Pineda, Renato Gozun, Alfredo Mercado, and
Bienvenido Machada.
Petition for certiorari under G.R. No. 157598

Consequent to the filing of the Petition for Review on Certiorari by petitioner Lizares, on January
28, 2002, the other original defendants in the consolidated cases before the PARAD and
DARAB, who were not made respondents in G.R. No. 148777, namely: Reynaldo Villanueva,
Cenon Guinto, Celestino Dizon, Carmelita Vda. de David, Florentino Lapuz, Fortunato Timbang,
Oscar Santiago, Candido Timbang, Celestino Esguerra, Antonio Dizon, and Teodulo Dizon, filed
before the CA a Motion for Entry of Judgment46 of the November 29, 2000 Amended Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 based on the out-of-court settlement during the pendency of the case.
On July 4, 2002, a second Motion for Entry of Judgment47 with the same averments was filed
reiterating their plea for execution.

The November 14, 2002 CA Resolution48 denied their motions for entry of judgment. A Motion
for Reconsideration49 having been turned down through the January 24, 2003 CA
Resolution,50 petitioners now register the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus in G.R.
No. 157598, assailing the aforesaid Resolutions for grave abuse of discretion.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 148777, petitioner Lizares presents the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals
erred gravely in reversing its ruling in the 11 April 2000 Decision on the import and
significance of the second affidavit executed by Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio revoking
or repudiating her first affidavit (by which she purportedly agreed to have her land at
Hacienda Masamat, which was dedicated to sugarcane, placed under the coverage of
P.D. No. 27);

2. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals
erred gravely in setting aside the 11 April 2000 Decision’s ruling that the land in question
being planted with sugarcane is not covered by P.D. No. 27, by instead declaring that
"the fact that land is sugarland has become inconsequential to the coverage under P.D.
No. 27 in the light of the affidavit dated January 12, 1977";

3. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals
erred gravely in finding Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio and petitioner guilty of laches or
estoppel;

4. Whether or not res judicata applies in the instant case;

5. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals
erred gravely in failing to rule that there was fraud and collusion on the part of the
respondents in the coverage of the subject parcels of land;

6. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring
the transfer made by the private respondents to third persons valid;

7. Whether or not forum-shopping or a false certification of non-forum shopping [is

present] here; and
 8. Whether or not the instant petition complies with the nature and requisites of an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.51

In G.R. No. 157598, petitioners raise the sole issue of "whether the petitioners are entitled to an
entry of judgment."52

The Court’s Ruling

G.R. No. 148777

Before we go to the substantial issues, we tackle first the procedural issues raised in the last
two issues in G.R. No. 148777 on whether the instant petition complies with the requirements of
Rule 45 and whether forum shopping is present.

Petition complied with requisites for review on certiorari

Private respondents contend that the grounds relied upon by petitioner are factual in nature and
thus outside the purview of a review on certiorari by this Court. Petitioner disagrees and posits
that the petition raises issues of both fact and law which are so intimately intertwined and that
issues of law permeate the controversy between the parties.

We find for petitioner. The rule is clear––questions of facts are proscribed by Rule 45. A
question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.53

The rule is subject to exceptions. One such exception exists in this case. Mixed questions of law
and facts are raised pertaining to the applicability of PD 27 on a large portion of subject
landholdings that were planted with sugar cane, which would have been otherwise exempt, but
were voluntary waived through an affidavit by the lot owner to be placed under the OLT
pursuant to said law; the import and significance of the purported affidavit of revocation; and,
the interpretation of Executive Order No. (EO) 22854 in relation to subsequent land transfer
made by the farmer-beneficiaries.

At the very least, the instant petition complies with the requisites of Rule 45, particularly Section
6, as we have given the instant petition due course.55

No forum shopping

Private respondents argue that petitioner Lizares is guilty of forum shopping for having pursued
other civil cases allegedly involving the same subject matter and on the same grounds raised in
this petition. Petitioner Lizares counters that there is no forum shopping, first, as the instant
petition is a mere continuation of a pending action, that is, the consolidated cases filed with the
PARAD; second, the causes of action and issues raised in the other civil cases lodged with the
RTC were different.
Respondents’ postulation cannot be entertained.

Private respondents failed to furnish us copies of portions of the relevant records of the other
civil cases instituted by petitioner Lizares needed to determine the existence of forum shopping.
Absent such necessary pleadings, we are constrained to take petitioner’s assertion at face
value that the other cases, particularly Civil Case Nos. 11342, 11344, 11345, 11346 and 11347,
filed before the RTC differ from the instant case as to the issues raised, the reliefs prayed for,
and the parties impleaded.

Time and again, the court has reminded prospective petitioners and lawyers alike that it is
necessary that they attach to the petition under Rule 45 all the material portions of the case
records of the lower courts or quasi-judicial bodies which at one time or another had adjudicated
the case or complaint. These documents are required to support the grounds presented in the
petition under Rule 45.56 Any decision, order, pleading, or document forming parts of the
records that is relevant or important to the petition should be appended to it so that the court, in
reviewing the petition, will have easy access to these papers. More importantly, the submission
will obviate delay as the court can readily decide the petition without need of the elevation of the
records of the court or quasi-judicial body a quo.

Now we move on to the substantive issues.

Main Issue: Genuineness and authenticity

of the February 3, 1977 Affidavit

The pith of the dispute is whether or not the February 3, 1977 affidavit of the lot owner, the late
Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, is genuine or authentic.

We rule in the negative.

In a slew of cases, the principle is firmly entrenched in this jurisdiction that this Court is not a
trier of facts, and is not tasked to calibrate and assess the probative weight of evidence
adduced by the parties during trial all over again.57However, in rare occasions, exceptions are
allowed. One exception is when there are competing factual findings by the different triers of
fact, such as those made by the quasi-agencies on the one hand and the CA on the other, this
Court is compelled to go over the records of the case, as well as the submissions of the parties,
and resolve the factual issues.58 In this case, however, there is coalescence in the findings of
the appellate court with that of the two quasi-judicial agencies below––the PARAD and DARAB–
–on the issue of the authenticity of the second Panlilio Affidavit.

It being a question of fact, we find no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the
court a quo in its questioned November 29, 2000 Amended Decision holding that the challenged
February 3, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit is not an authentic document. We quote with approval the
factual findings of the CA which completely gave full accord and affirmed the findings of the
PARAD and DARAB, viz:

After assessing the grounds raised by respondents in their motion for reconsideration and a
meticulous review of the records, We are now in serious doubts as to the correctness of Our
Decision. Our reasons are:
First, according to petitioner Lizares, Panlilio’s second affidavit (revoking her first affidavit) upon
which this Court anchors its assailed Decision, was executed as early as February 2, 1977. If it
were true, Panlilio’s natural reaction was to submit her second affidavit or affidavit of revocation
to the DAR in order to exclude her landholdings from the coverage of the Operation Land
Transfer under P.D. 27. Significantly, Panlilio died on December 29, 1986. She had therefore,
nine (9) years from the date of execution of her second affidavit, within which to have her land
excluded by the DAR from such coverage considering that it was principally planted [with] sugar
and that she was misled by DAR lawyer, Atty. Pepito Sanchez, into signing her first affidavit. But
she did not. Petitioner’s father, Jesus Lizares, was her administrator. Yet he did not also take
any action for apparently he was not aware of such affidavit of revocation.

Moreover, in her second affidavit, Panlilio specifically stated:

"That another reason for my desire not to place my entire property referred to as Hacienda
Masamat in Mexico, Pampanga, under P.D. 27 is the fact that the said Hacienda Masamat is
leased to my nephew’s wife, Mrs. Paulina Y. Mercado, and the lease contract I executed in her
favor covering my said Hacienda Masamat is still subsisting and in force and will expire only
after the agricultural crop year 1978-1979;"

If Panlilio indeed signed her affidavit of revocation, why did she not inform her niece Paulina
about it in order to protect her right as a lessee? It must be remembered that at that time, the
latter’s complaints (for cancellation of CLTs) against the tenants of Panlilio were still pending in
the DAR and the CAR. Had Panlilio given Paulina a copy of such second affidavit, she could
have brought it to the attention of the CAR and the DAR. Certainly, the subject landholdings
could not have been placed entirely under Operation Land Transfer. We need not emphasize
here that being a lessee, Paulina would not want to part with her Aunt’s landholdings.

Out of the blue, the second affidavit surfaced only in 1994 and 1995 when petitioner Lizares
brought the instant actions against Panlilio’s tenants or after eighteen (18) years from the date
of its alleged execution. At this juncture, We can only conclude without hesitation that Panlilio
did not execute the second affidavit.

Petitioner alleged in his position paper that the same affidavit of revocation was submitted to the
DAR and the CAR, but they were not acted upon because of the dismissal of the cases for
cancellation of CLTs filed by Paulina Mercado. Petitioner’s claim is a mere allegation. It has not
been substantiated. Again, if it were true, why did Panlilio and Paulina fail to pursue any further
action?59

We respect and accord finality to the aforequoted findings of facts of the CA, being the tribunal
tasked to undertake a final review of the facts of the case subject of course to certain tolerated
exceptional situations. Once again we reiterate the prevailing rule that the findings of fact of the
trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court.60

Second Issue: There is valid waiver through

the January 12, 1977 Affidavit

The CA likewise did not err in reversing its April 11, 2000 Decision that the subject land was
properly covered by PD 27 since Panlilio surrendered said lot to the DAR for coverage under
PD 27 pursuant to her January 12, 1977 Affidavit. The non-existence of the February 3, 1977
Affidavit supports the inclusion of the entire lot in the CARP of the Government.
On the other hand, petitioner Lizares argues that there was no valid waiver under PD 27.

We are not convinced.

Considering the non-revocation of the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit,, the CA considered
the land of Panlilio planted with sugar cane as falling under the coverage of PD 27, thus:

[W]hile the proceedings in the CAR tend to establish the land as principally sugarland, hence
outside the coverage of P.D. 27, still, Panlilio’s consent to have the entire land covered by the
said law as alleged in her first affidavit, cannot be construed as a violation of its provisions. In
fact, in executing the said affidavit, she did not defeat, nor contravene the express intent of the
law to emancipate her tenants from the bondage of the soil. In doing so, she even supported its
implementation.

In Our challenged Decision We found that the subject land was principally planted [with] sugar
and therefore outside the pale of P.D. 27. But We overlooked the fact that Panlilio in her first
affidavit, which was not validly revoked, expressed her desire to have her entire
landholdings placed within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. To be sure, the fact that
Panlilio’s land is sugarland has become inconsequential in the light of her first affidavit.61

We agree with the CA.

While PD 27 clearly applies to private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under
a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not, it does not
preclude nor prohibit the disposition of landholdings planted with other crops to the tenants by
express will of the landowner under PD 27.

In the instant case, a large portion of Hacienda Masamat with an aggregate area of 115.41
hectares was planted with sugar cane. It is undisputed, as was duly shown in the January 12,
1977 Panlilio Affidavit, that only 50.22 hectares were planted with palay. Thus, approximately
65.19 hectares of the subject landholdings were planted with sugar cane aside from the portions
used for the residences of the tenants and planted with crops for their daily sustenance.
Needless to say, with the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit, she expressed her intent to include
the 65.19 hectares to be placed under the OLT pursuant to PD 27 in favor of her tenants which
otherwise would have been exempt. Indeed, waiver or an intentional and voluntary surrender of
a right can give rise to a valid title or ownership of a property in favor of another under Article 6
of the Civil Code. Thus, such disposition through the OLT pursuant to PD 27 is indeed legal and
proper and no irregularity can be attributed to the DAR which merely relied on the January 12,
1977 Panlilio Affidavit.

Third Issue: Equitable remedy of laches

The court a quo correctly ruled that Panlilio and her successors-in-interest are bound by the
coverage of the lot under PD 27 by reason of laches.

Even granting arguendo that the February 3, 1977 Affidavit of revocation is genuine and was
furnished both the DAR and the CAR, still, no relief can be accorded petitioner Lizares on
account of laches.

Laches and its elements

Delay for a prolonged period of time can result in loss of rights and actions. The equitable
defense of laches does not even concern itself with the character of the defendant’s title, but
only with plaintiff’s long inaction or inexcusable neglect to bar the latter’s action as it would be
inequitable and unjust to the defendant.

According to settled jurisprudence, "laches" means "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which—by the exercise of due diligence—could or
should have been done earlier."62 Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it of any
judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of
the defendant’s conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in
which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.63

In Santiago v. Court of Appeals, we explained that there is "no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances."64

Laches has set in

The records demonstrate clear signs of laches. The first element is undisputed. Panlilio’s
erstwhile tenants were issued CLTs sometime in 1973 and subsequently EPs in 1993. CAR
Case No. 1649-P’74 filed by Panlilio’s lessee, Paulina Mercado, was dismissed with finality on
March 17, 1978 as no appeal was pursued. Since then, Panlilio and her administrator for the
subject landholdings in Hacienda Masamat, Jesus Lizares, did not take any action to revoke the
CLTs. With the dismissal of the land case in 1978, with finality, the possession of the tenants of
Panlilio was fully recognized by her and her successors-in-interest.

It cannot be disputed that Panlilio’s tenants, the private respondents, occupied portions of the
subject landholdings in an open, continuous, and adverse manner in the concept of owners from
1978 until 1994 and 1995 when the subject cases were instituted by petitioner Lizares or for
more than sixteen (16) years. Private respondents’ possession of said portions for a lengthy
period of time gave cause to petitioner to complain and take legal steps to protect Panlilio’s
rights of ownership and title over the disputed lot. No such action was taken.

Likewise, the second element of laches is amply shown. Panlilio and her successors-in-interest
did not take any administrative or judicial action to protect her rights for more than 16 years.

As it is, if Panlilio indeed executed the affidavit of revocation in February 3, 1977, why did she
not pursue any action to implement her affidavit disregarding her January 12, 1977 Affidavit?
Indeed, Panlilio, during her lifetime, did not lift a finger to regain her land. After she died on
December 29, 1986, Jesus Lizares, her administrator for Hacienda Masamat, likewise did not
initiate any legal action to effectuate her alleged wish. Unfortunately for petitioner Lizares, the
cases initiated by him in 1994 and 1995 were belatedly filed and much delay had transpired
which proved to be prejudicial to his interests.

Anent the third element, private respondents did not know nor anticipate that their possession,
occupancy, and ownership of the subject landholdings after 16 years would still be questioned.
In fact, private respondents did not only continue tilling the land, but later on had conveyed their
lots to innocent third parties for value. Moreover, we take judicial notice that numerous
commercial buildings, residential houses, and a large mall stand on major portions of former
Hacienda Masamat. In fact, the subject landholdings are now much different from what they
were more than two decades ago. Thus, after more than sixteen (16) years of unquestioned,
peaceful, and uninterrupted possession, private respondents did not expect that petitioner
Lizares would still assert any right over the landholdings after the lapse of such a long period of
occupation.

Finally, grave prejudice and serious damage would befall private respondents, in general, who
relied on their CLTs and EPs, and subsequent purchasers for value of the lots forming parts of
the former hacienda who relied on private respondents’ titles if the complaints of petitioner were
not barred. As a matter of fact, some buyers not impleaded in the instant case opted to settle
out-of-court with petitioner Lizares rather than be disturbed in their possession and their right of
ownership.

Considering the foregoing discussion, we uphold the finding of laches. Verily, it would be a
grave injustice if private respondents and the subsequent purchasers for value would now be
made to suffer after petitioner Lizares and his predecessors-in-interest had slept on their rights
for more than 16 years.

Fourth Issue: Principle of res judicata inapplicable

Private respondents contend that the dismissal in CAR Case No. 1649-P’74 constitutes res
judicata over the instant case. CAR Case No. 1649-P’74 involved Panlilio’s lessee against
private respondents with the issue of the crops being planted on subject landholdings, while the
instant case involves Panlilio’s successor-in-interest petitioner Lizares against private
respondents involving the issue of the alleged affidavit of revocation.

The reliance on res judicata is misplaced.

Res judicata, either in the concept of bar by former judgment or conclusiveness of judgment,
cannot be applied to the present case.

In Vda. de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., we discussed the doctrine of res judicata, as follows:

The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: 1)
The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties
and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and 2) Any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim or demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits is the same.
These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical
cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these cases, the first
general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the aforequoted paragraph (b) of Section
49, is referred to as "bar by former judgment" while the second general rule, which is embodied
in paragraph (c) of the same section, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
Stated otherwise, when we speak of res judicata in its concept as a "bar by former judgment,"
the judgment rendered in the first case is an absolute bar to the subsequent action since said
judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain that judgment
but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could
have been adjudged therein. This is the concept in which the term res judicata is more
commonly and generally used and in which it is understood as the bar by prior judgment
constituting a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.

On the other hand, the less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a
rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or which were
necessarily included therein. Consequently, since other admissible and relevant matters which
the parties in the second action could properly offer are not concluded by the said judgment, the
same is not a bar to or a ground for dismissal of the second action.

At bottom, the other elements being virtually the same, the fundamental difference between the
rule of res judicataas a bar by former judgment and as merely a rule on the conclusiveness of
judgment is that, in the first, there is an identity in the cause of action in both cases involved
whereas, in the second, the cause of action in the first case is different from that in the second
case.65

Premised on the foregoing disquisition, the principle of res judicata requires the concurrence of
the following requisites:

a) The former judgment or order must be final;

b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case;

c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and

d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are
substantially between the same parties.66

For want of the fourth requisite that there must be, between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter, and cause of action, the instant case is thus removed from the
operation of the principle of res judicata. Stated differently, there is no identity of parties and
issues in CAR Case No. 1649-P’74 and the instant case.

Nevertheless, while res judicata is not applicable in the instant case, still, it will not accord legal
relief to petitioner with respect to his claim of ownership over the lots in dispute.

Fifth Issue: Fraud and collusion not proven

Petitioner Lizares accuses the DAR personnel and private respondents of fraud and collusion.
Absent any proof, such allegation falls flat.
In the recent case of Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, we elucidated on this same issue
of the required evidential proof, thus:

Basic is the rule of actori incumbit onus probandi, or the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.
Differently stated, upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. In the case at
bar, petitioners must therefore establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, that is,
evidence that has greater weight, or is more convincing than that which is offered in opposition
to it––which petitioners utterly failed to do so. Besides, it is an age-old rule in civil cases that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Fraud
is never presumed, but must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, by
admitting that Victorino, Luis, and Jovito, all surnamed Reyes, indeed executed the Deed of
Quitclaim coupled with the absence of evidence substantiating fraud and mistake in its
execution, we are constrained to uphold the appellate court’s conclusion that the execution of
the Deed of Quitclaim was valid.67

Hence, we uphold the CA’s pronouncement that there was no collusion and fraud especially
considering that no clear and convincing evidence was presented to overwhelm and rebut the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed68 by the DAR personnel.

Sixth Issue: Subsequent transfers valid only

to qualified farmer-beneficiaries

Petitioner Lizares asseverates that ownership of lands granted to tenant-farmers under PD 27

may not be transferred or conveyed to third parties except by hereditary succession or to the
Government. He contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the sale
of the land by private respondents Gonzalo Dizon, et al. to third persons valid. The CA
ratiocinated that EO 228 was enacted after PD 27 and since EO 228 is a later law, it will prevail
over PD 27. Thus, the ownership of the lot may now be transferred to persons other than the
heirs of the beneficiary or the Government.

Petitioner is correct.

EO 228 not inconsistent with PD 27 on prohibition of transfers

The prohibition in PD 27, the Tenants Emancipation Decree, which took effect on October 21,
1972, states that "[t]itle to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of
the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the Government
in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other
existing laws and regulations (emphasis supplied)."

Hereditary succession means succession by intestate succession or by will to the compulsory

heirs under the Civil Code, but does not pertain to testamentary succession to other persons.
"Government" means the DAR through the Land Bank of the Philippines which has superior lien
by virtue of mortgages in its favor.

Thus, PD 27 is clear that after full payment and title to the land is acquired, the land shall not be
transferred except to the heirs of the beneficiary or the Government. If the amortizations for the
land have not yet been paid, then there can be no transfer to anybody since the lot is still owned
by the Government. The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of other
qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to develop generations of
farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production.
With certitude, such objective will not see the light of day if lands covered by agrarian reform
can easily be converted for non-agricultural purposes.

On the other hand, Sec. 6 of EO 228 provides, thus:

Sec. 6 The total cost of the land including interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum with
a two percent (2%) interest rebate for amortizations paid on times, shall be paid by the farmer-
beneficiary or his heirs to the Land Bank over a period of up to twenty (20) years in twenty (20)
equal annual amortizations. Lands already valued and financed by Land Bank are likewise
extended a 20-year period of payment of twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. However, the
farmer-beneficiary if he so elects, may pay in full before the twentieth year or may request the
Land Bank to structure a repayment period of less than twenty (20) years if the amount to
amount to be financed and the corresponding annual obligations are well within the farmer’s
capacity to meet. Ownership of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after
full payment of amortizations. (Emphasis supplied.)

The CA highlighted and made much of the last sentence of Sec. 6 which authorizes the transfer
of the ownership of the lands acquired by the farmer-beneficiary after full payment of
amortizations. It construed said provision to mean that the farmer-beneficiary can sell the land
even to a non-qualified person.

This is incorrect.

First of all, the provision in question is silent as to who can be the transferees of the land
acquired through the CARP. The rule in statutory construction is that statutes in pari
materia should be construed together and harmonized.69 Since there appears to be no
irreconcilable conflict between PD 27 and Sec. 6 of EO 228, then the two (2) provisions can be
made compatible by maintaining the rule in PD 27 that lands acquired under said decree can
only be transferred to the heirs of the original beneficiary or to the Government. Second, PD 27
is the specific law on agrarian reform while EO 228 was issued principally to implement PD 27.
This can easily be inferred from EO 228 which provided for the mode of valuation of lands
subject of PD 27 and the manner of payment by the farmer-beneficiary and mode of
compensation to the land owner. Third, implied repeals are not favored. A perusal of the
aforequoted Sec. 6 of EO 228 readily reveals that it confers upon the beneficiary the privilege of
paying the value of the land on a twenty (20)-year annual amortization plan at six percent (6%)
interest per annum. He may elect to pay in full the installments or have the payment plan
restructured. Said provision concludes by saying that after full payment, ownership of the land
may already be transferred. Thus, it is plain to see that Sec. 6 principally deals with payment of
amortization and not on who qualify as legal transferees of lands acquired under PD 27. Since
there is no incompatibility between PD 27 and EO 228 on the qualified transferees of land
acquired under PD 27, ergo, the lands acquired under said law can only be transferred to the
heirs of the beneficiary or to the Government for eventual transfer to qualified beneficiaries by
the DAR pursuant to the explicit proscription in PD 27.

Thus, the alleged transfers made by private respondents in G.R. No. 148777 of lands acquired
under PD 27 to non-qualified persons are illegal and null and void.70

The ruling in Victorino Torres v. Leon Ventura sheds light on the policy behind the prohibition,
thus:
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree
No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question. As of
that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil. As such, he gained the
rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his
continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any
valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.71

In addition, the prohibition was expanded not only to cover the title issued to the tenant-farmer
but also the rights and interests of the farmer in the land while he is still paying the amortizations
on it. A contrary ruling would make the farmer an "easy prey to those who would like to tempt
[him/her] with cash in exchange for inchoate title over the same," and PD 27 could be easily
circumvented and the title shall eventually be acquired by non-tillers of the soil.72

Anent the contravention of the prohibition under PD 27, we ruled in Siacor v. Gigantana73 and
more recently in Caliwag-Carmona v. Court of Appeals,74 that sales or transfers of lands made
in violation of PD 27 and EO 228 in favor of persons other than the Government by other legal
means or to the farmer’s successor by hereditary succession are null and void. The prohibition
even extends to the surrender of the land to the former landowner. The sales or transfers are
void ab initio, being contrary to law and public policy under Art. 5 of the Civil Code that "acts
executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibiting laws shall be void x x x." In this
regard, the DAR is duty-bound to take appropriate measures to annul the illegal transfers and
recover the land unlawfully conveyed to non-qualified persons for disposition to qualified
beneficiaries. In the case at bar, the alleged transfers made by some if not all of respondents
Gonzalo Dizon, et al. (G.R. No. 148777) of lands covered by PD 27 to non-qualified persons are
illegal and null and void.

G.R. No. 157598

Finally, we resolve the sole issue raised in G.R. No. 157598 on whether petitioners Reynaldo
Villanueva, et al. are entitled to a partial entry of judgment of the Amended Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 47502.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 157598 are not entitled to a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R.
SP No. 47502

Petitioners contend that they are entitled to a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502
as respondent George Lizares in G.R. No. 148777 deliberately excluded them on account of the
amicable settlement concluded between them. Thus, they contend that any judgment rendered
by the Court in G.R. No. 148777 will not affect them. In gist, petitioners strongly assert that the
Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 is already final and executory with respect to
them.

Respondent Lizares, on the other hand, has continually affirmed that he deliberately excluded
petitioners in his petition for review under G.R. No. 148777 as they had amicably settled with
him; and that he has released, discharged, and waived any and all claims against petitioners on
account of the petition. Thus, respondent Lizares interposes no objection for the issuance of a
partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 insofar as petitioners are concerned, as the
issues and reliefs he is seeking in G.R. No. 148777 do not concern nor prejudice petitioners.
We disagree.

It is clear that petitioners, though they settled with respondent Lizares out-of-court, were not
able to get a favorable ruling from the DARAB approving the motion to withdraw appeal filed by
respondent Lizares in DARAB Case Nos. 4558, 4559, and 4561. This motion for the recall of the
appeal remained unacted upon until the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision was rendered in favor
of all the defendants and appellees.

Subsequently, the DARAB cases were elevated for review to the CA and docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 47502.

In its November 29, 2000 Amended Decision, the CA upheld the DARAB Decision.

On January 28, 2002, petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. filed a Motion for Entry of
Judgment based on their out-of-court settlement with petitioner Lizares while the DARAB case
was pending. On July 4, 2002, a second motion for entry of judgment was filed which was
denied together with the first motion by the CA on November 14, 2002.

The reason for the denial by the CA of the aforementioned prayers for entry of judgment is as
follows:

Our Amended Decision in this case had long been elevated to the Supreme Court by a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As held by the Supreme Court in Heirs of the Late Justice
Jose B. L. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, by the mere fact of the filing of the petition, the finality of
the Court of Appeals’ decision was stayed, and there could be no entry of judgment therein, and
hence, no premature execution could be had. In that case, the High Court emphatically declared
that when this Court adopted a resolution granting execution pending appeal after the petition
for review was already filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals encroached on the
hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court. Thus, We find no legal basis or justification to allow
[the] motions for partial entry of judgment even on the ground that private [respondent]-movants
were not impleaded in G.R. No. 148777 and in the absence of opposition from herein petitioner
who had allegedly concluded an out-of-court settlement with private [respondent]-movants.75

We fully agree with the CA that there should be no partial entry of judgment for petitioners
Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. since their motion to withdraw was not acted upon by the DARAB
nor by the CA. Thus, there is nothing to record in the Book of Entry of Judgments.

More importantly, it appears that the transfers made by some or all of petitioners Reynaldo
Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No. 157598) to non-qualified persons are proscribed under PD 27. Such
finding necessarily preludes the entry of judgment in favor of said petitioners. Consequently, the
alleged transfers made by petitioners Villanueva, et al., being in contravention of a prohibitory
provision of PD 27, are null and void, and the titles issued to non-qualified individuals have to be
cancelled and new ones issued to the Government.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 148777 is partly granted. The November 29, 2000
Amended Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 is affirmed with the modification that the
transfers made by private respondents to non-qualified persons, if any, under PD 27 are illegal
and declared NULL and VOID, and the titles issued based on the transfers are likewise NULL
and VOID. The DAR is ORDERED to investigate the transfers covering the subject landholdings
and, based on the findings of illegal transfers for violations of PD 27 and EO 228, to coordinate
with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga for the cancellation of the titles registered in the names
of the transferees or to their subsequent transferees and to issue new titles to the Government
for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. The November 14, 1995 PARAD Joint Decision in
DARAB Cases Nos. 638-P’94, 933-P’95, 934-P’95, and 935-P’95, as affirmed by the August 7,
1997 DARAB Decision in DARAB Case Nos. 4558, 4559, 4560, and 4561, is accordingly
MODIFIED.

The petition in G.R. No. 157598 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The transfers made by
petitioners Reynaldo, et al. to non-qualified persons, if any, under PD 27 are likewise
declared NULL and VOID. Similarly, the DAR is ORDERED to investigate the transfers covering
the subject landholdings and, based on the findings of illegal transfers for violations of PD 27
and EO 228, to coordinate with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga for the cancellation of the
titles concerned registered in the names of the transferees or to their subsequent transferees
and to issue new titles to the Government for disposition to qualified beneficiaries.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988

YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and
BIENVENIDO ABAJON, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public
respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
through its then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the herein petitioner and the private respondent and certifying the criminal
case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent as not proper
for trial.

The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:

The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20
meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being
the petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by
Andrea Alicaba Millenes This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of
about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C
was subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of
the Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in
favor of the petitioner.

In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to
the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the
land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From
1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting
corn but continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00
rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.

Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and
pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding.
Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer
was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they
needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation before the
Barangay Captain of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts
exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply
refused to budge.

On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that
immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the
property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana
plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed
against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all the planting
on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On September
30, 1982, upon motion of the defense in open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered
the referral of the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the parties. As a result, the Regional Director of MAR
Regional VII, issued a certification 1 dated January 24, 1 983, stating that said Criminal Case
No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on the bases of the following findings:

That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining
witness, which is devoted to bananas;

That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his
farmholding, which act is prohibited by law; and

That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.

From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the respondent DAR.
Acting on said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then Minister Conrado Estrella,
reversed the previous certification in its Order 2 of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case
No. 4003 as proper for trial as "the land involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square
meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the
town as evinced from the Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu."

Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR, through its new Minister,
herein respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an Orders dated November 15, 1986, setting aside
the previous Order 3 dated February 3, 1986, and certifying said criminal case as not proper for
trial, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties, and that the case was
designed to harass the accused into vacating his tillage.

In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea Millenes,
testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under
his cultivation. The grandson of Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of
the former, stating that he received said share from Abajon. Roger Millenes further testified that
the present owners received in his presence a bunch of bananas from the accused representing
½ or 50% of the two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes had acquired the property. 4

From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes,
the former owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as truer
thereof. 5 Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of
the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR
ruled that 'the new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim
that the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and
twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square meters."6

Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:

I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an
agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a
commercial lot of the petitioner.

II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003 is not proper for trial
and hearing by the court. 7

We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as
amended. To invest him with the status of a tenant is preposterous.

Section 2 of said law provides:

It is the policy of the State:

(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the
land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the
basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in
agriculture to industrial development;

xxx xxx xxx

RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that
permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an
income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food,
clothing, shelter, and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on
the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." 8

The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square
meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting
camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income
sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs. The
private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land because
it was too small, and that he took on carpentry jobs on the side. 9 Thus, the order sought to be
reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of the law stated above.

The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the former
owner, Andrea Millenes. This led or misled, the public respondents to conclude that a tenancy
relationship existed between the petitioner and the private respondent because, the public
respondents continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner new
owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the supposed agricultural
lessor (the former owner).

We disagree.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

 1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status
as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.10

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from
someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of
sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60,
or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of
this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed
by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of
some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.

Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that
the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently,
Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is
not a tenant of the herein petitioner.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an
agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared
as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.

Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the petitioner, we hold
that the remand of the case to the lower court for the resumption of the criminal proceedings is
not in the interest of justice. Remand to the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve
the ends of justice at all, nor is it necessary, because this High Tribunal is in a position to
resolve with finality the dispute before it. This Court, in the public interest, and towards the
expeditious administration of justice, has decided to act on the merits and dispose of the case
with finality. 11

The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent for
allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take up much of the time and
attention of the municipal court to the prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein.
Furthermore, the private respondent will have to incur unnecessary expenses to finance his
legal battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below were to resume. Court
litigants have decried the long and unnecessary delay in the resolution of their cases and the
consequent costs of such litigations. The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial
dawdle, Impoverished that they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which they
can only interpret as harassment or intimidation brought about by their poverty, deprivation, and
despair. It must be the mission of the Court to remove the misperceptions aggrieved people
have of the nature of the dispensation of justice. If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it
to drop gently from heaven? Thus, considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle the
Court finds it proper and compelling to decide it here and now, instead of further deferring its
final termination.

As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the petitioner's affidavit
stating that after she reprimanded private respondent Abajon for harvesting bananas and
jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees
on the property worth about P50.00.

This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner, who likewise
executed an affidavit to the effect that she saw the private respondent indiscriminately cutting
the banana trees.12

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall deliberately cause
to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter
shall be guilty of malicious mischief."13

The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:

1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;

2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.

After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the aforesaid criminal
case against the private respondent be dismissed.

The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the
banana trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of
the banana trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof The private respondent's
possession of the land is not illegal or in bad faith because he was snowed by the previous
owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the private respondent worked the
land in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners. Consequently, whatever
the private respondent planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not
to the landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is
"damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent because the private
respondent merely cut down his own plantings.

WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case No. 4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the
Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for appropriate action. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 11.

2 Id., 12.

3 Id., 13-17.

4 Id., 15.

5 Id., 16.

6 Rollo, 16.

7 Petition for Certiorari, 3-4; Id., 6-7.

8 Section 166 (20).

9 Petition's Reply Memorandum; Id., 67.

10 Tiongson vs. CA, No. L-62626, July 18, 1984,130 SCRA 482.

11 Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. CA and Muyco, No. L-37783, January 28,
1988; Francisco, et al. vs. The City of Davao, et al., No. 120654, December 24,
1964,12 SCRA 628; Republic vs. Security Credit and Acceptance Cor. et al., No.
1-27802, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 641.

12 MAR Order dated November 15, 1986, 3; Rollo, 15.

13 Article 327, Revised Penal Code, as amended.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992

RAFAEL GELOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA, respondents.

Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner.

Emil Capulong, Jr., for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the real status of the petitioner, who claims to be a tenant of
the private respondent and entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws. The private respondent
objects, contending that the petitioner is only a hired laborer whose right to occupy the subject
land ended with the termination of their contract of employment.

The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao, Laguna, and
belonging originally to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and his parents in equal shares. On
July 5, 1970, they entered into a written contract with petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as
their laborer on the land at the stipulated daily wage of P5.00. 1 On September 4, 1973, after
Alzona had bought his parents' share and acquired full ownership of the land, he wrote Gelos to
inform him of the termination of his services and to demand that he vacate the property. Gelos
refused and continued working on the land.

On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and asked for the fixing of
the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later withdrew the case and went to the Ministry
of Agrarian Reform, which granted his petition. For his part, Alzona filed a complaint for illegal
detainer against Gelos in the Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but this action was declared "not
proper for trial" by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform because of the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. Alzona was rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the
assistance of the Ministry of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and damages against Gelos. On appeal to the Office
of the President, however, the complaint was declared proper for trial and so de-archived and
reinstated.

After hearing, the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City (which had taken over the Court of
Agrarian Relations under PB 129) rendered a decision dated April 21, 1987, dismissing the
complaint. 2 It found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property and entitled to remain thereon
as such. The plaintiff was also held liable in attorney's fees and costs.

The decision was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. In its judgment promulgated
on November 25, 1988, 3 it held that Gelos was not a tenant of the land in question and ordered
him to surrender it to Alzona. He was also held liable for the payment of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

The basic question the petitioner now raises before the Court is essentially factual and therefore
not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Only questions of law
may be raised in this kind of proceeding. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are conclusive on even this Court as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. The petitioner has not shown that his case comes under any of those rare exceptions
on such findings may be validly reversed by this Court.

It is true that in Talavera v. Court of Appeals, 4 we held that a factual conclusion made by the
trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum evidence demanded
by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunals except for
compelling reasons. In the case at bar, however, we find with the respondent court that there
was such a compelling reason. A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, the trial
court misappreciated the facts when it ruled that the petitioner was a tenant of the private
respondent.

The circumstance that the findings of the respondent court do not concur with those of the trial
court does not, of course, call for automatic reversal of the appellate court. Precisely, the
function of the appellate court is to review and, if warranted, reverse the findings of the trial
court. Disagreement between the two courts merely calls on us to make a specially careful
study of their respective decisions to determine which of them should be preferred as more
conformable to the facts at hand.

The Court has made this careful study and will sustain the decision of the respondent court.

The contract of employment dated July 5, 1970, written in Tagalog and entitled "Kasunduan ng
Upahang Araw," reads pertinently as follows:

1. Ang Unang Panig ay siyang may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa,

sinasaka, na tumatayo sa Nayon ng Baclaran, Cabuyao, Laguna, na siyang
gagawa at sasaka sa lupa, samantalang ang Ikalawang Panig ay magiging
upahan at katulong sa paggawa ng lupa.

2. Ang Unang Panig ay gustong ipagpatuloy ang pagbubungkal at paggawa ng

bukid na binabanggit sa itaas at ang Ikalawang Panig ay may ibig na magpaupa
 sa paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawat araw, walong oras na trabaho gaya ng
mga sumusunod: Patubigan ng linang; pagpapahalabas ng mga pilapil;
pagpapaaldabis sa unang araw ng pag-aararo; pagpapalinis ng damo sa ibabaw
ng pilapil; pagpapakamot (unang pagpapasuyod), pagpapahalang at
pagpapabalasaw (ikalawa't ikatlong pagpapasuyod); isang tao sa pagsasabog ng
abono una sa pagpapantay ng linang; bago magtanim; isang tao sa pagaalaga
ng dapog; upa sa isang tao ng magbobomba ng gamot laban sa pagkapit ng
mga kulisap (mayroon at wala); sa nag-we-weeder; upa sa mga tao na
maggagamas at magpapatubig ng palay; magsasapaw ng mga pilapil at iba pa.

3. Ang Unang Panig at ang Ikalawang Panig ay nagkasundo na ang huli ay

gagawa sa bukid ayon sa nabanggit sa itaas bilang katulong at upahan lamang.
Ang Unang Panig bukod sa sila ang gagawa at magsasaka ay maaaring umupa
ng iba pang tao manggagawa sa upahang umiiral sang-ayon sa batas katulad ng
pag-aararo, pagpapahulip, pagpapagamas, pagbobomba, pagweweeder,
pagsasabog ng abono, pagbobomba ng gamot, pagpapatubig at iba pang mga
gawain. Maaaring alisin ang Ikalawang Panig sa pagpapatrabaho sa ano mang
oras ng Unang Panig.

4. Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi

upahan lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid
na nabanggit.

It is noted that the agreement provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (meaning Gelos) ay may ibig
na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawa't araw, walong oras na trabaho" (The
Second Party desires to lease his services at the rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and
that "Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang
na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.'' (The Second
Party makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid for every
day of work on the said farm.)

These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a tenancy agreement but
only a contract of employment. The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute.
This intention is quite consistent with the undisputed fact that three days before that agreement
was concluded, the former tenant of the land, Leocadio Punongbayan, had executed an
instrument in which he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights to the private respondent. 5 It
also clearly demonstrates that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, Alzona intended to
cultivate the land himself instead of placing it again under tenancy.

The petitioner would now disavow the agreement, but his protestations are less than convincing.
His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary in another
proceeding. 6 Her claim that they were tricked into signing the agreement does not stand up
against the testimony of Atty. Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a witness (and
as an attorney and officer of the court) that he explained the meaning of the document to Gelos,
who even read it himself before signing it. 7 Atty. Pampolina said the agreement was not
notarized because his commission as notary public was good only for Manila and did not cover
Laguna, where the document was executed. 8 At any rate, the lack of notarization did not
adversely affect the veracity and effectiveness of the agreement, which, significantly, Gelos and
his wife do not deny having signed.
Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests that they are the
work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so. The work specified is not peculiar to
tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired laborer working under the direction
of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention
of the parties that determines the relationship between them.

As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, 9 "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The
intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their
written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important."

Gelos presented receipts 10 for fertilizer and pesticides he allegedly bought and applied to the
land of the private respondent, but the latter insists that it was his brother who bought them,
being an agriculturist and in charge of the technical aspect of the farm. Moreover, the receipts
do not indicate to which particular landholding the fertilizers would be applied and, as pointed
out by the private respondent, could refer to the other parcels of land which Gelos was
tenanting.

The petitioner's payment of irrigation fees from 1980 to 1985 to the National Irrigation
Administration on the said landholding is explained by the fact that during the pendency of the
CAR case, the Agrarian Reform Office fixed a provisional leasehold rental after a preliminary
finding that Gelos was the tenant of the private respondent. As such, it was he who had to pay
the irrigation fees. Incidentally, Section 12, subpar. (r) of PD 946 provides that the Secretary's
determination of the tenancy relationship is only preliminary and cannot be conclusive on the
lower court.

It is noteworthy that, except for the self-serving testimony of the petitioner's wife, the records of
this case are bereft of evidence regarding the sharing of harvest between Gelos and Alzona. No
less importantly, as the Court of Appeals observed, the petitioner has not shown that he paid
rentals on the subject property from 1970 to 1973, before their dispute arose.

A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to
or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system. (Emphasis supplied)

For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural
production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of
rental. In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. 11

On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4)
the power to control the employee's
conduct –– although the latter is the most important element. 12
According to a well-known authority on the subject, 13 tenancy relationship is distinguished from
farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the
lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm
employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor,
and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm
employer and for his labor be receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer
makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce
or harvest."

The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the produce of the
land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on the subject lot or gave
him vales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer thereon. The petitioner's wife claims that
Alzona made her husband sign the invoices all at one time because he allegedly needed them
to reduce his income taxes. Even assuming this to be true, we do not think that made the said
payments fictitious, especially so since the petitioner never denied having received them.

The other issue raised by the petitioner, which is decidedly legal, is easily resolved. There being
no tenancy relationship, the contention that the private respondent's complaint has prescribed
under Section 38 of R.A. 3844 must also fail. That section is not applicable. It must be noted
that at the very outset, Alzona rejected the petitioner's claim of agricultural tenancy and
immediately instituted his action for unlawful detainer in accordance with Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. As it happened, the said case was held not proper for trial by the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform. He then resorted to other remedies just so he could recover possession of his
land and, finally, in 1979, he yielded to the jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations
by filing there an action for declaration of non-tenancy. The action, which was commenced in
1979, was within the ten-year prescriptive period provided under Article 1144 of the Civil Code
for actions based on a written contract. *

The Court quotes with approval the following acute observations made by Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy:

It might not be amiss to state at this juncture that in deciding this case in favor of
defendant, the lower court might have been greatly influenced by the fact that
defendant is a mere farmer who is almost illiterate while plaintiff is an educated
landlord, such that it had felt that it was its duty to be vigilant for the protection of
defendant's interests. But the duty of the court to protect the weak and the
underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to
the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. Besides,
defendant's economic position vis a visthe plaintiff does not necessarily make
him the underprivileged party in this case, for as testified by plaintiff which
defendant never denied, the small land in question was the only landholding of
plaintiff when he and his father bought the same, at which time he was just a
lowly employee who did not even have a house of his own and his father, a mere
farmer, while defendant was the agricultural tenant of another piece of land and
also owns his own house, a sari sari store, and a caritela. Plaintiff also surmised
that it was only after defendant had been taken into its wings by the Federation of
Free Farmers that he started claiming to be plaintiff's agricultural tenant,
presumably upon the Federation's instigation and advice. And we cannot
discount this possibility indeed, considering that during the early stages of the
proceedings this case, defendant even counter-proposed to plaintiff that he
 would surrender the land in question to the latter if plaintiff would convey to him
another piece of land adjacent to the land in question, almost one ha. in area,
that plaintiff had also acquired after buying the land in question, showing that
defendant was not as ignorant as he would want the Court to believe and had the
advice of people knowledgeable on agrarian matters.

This Court has stressed more than once that social justice –– or any justice for that matter –– is
for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true
that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to
whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to
prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich,
for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the petition is
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974

TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.

Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.

Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant.

Armando M. Laki for movant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for the
reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved.

During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29, 1972, Atty. Virgilio M.
Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, gave notice to this Court that said
appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was survived by his children, who are his legal heirs,
namely: Salvador Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and
Pilar Pangilinan de Avante. For the purposes of this case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan,
therefore, is substituted by his heirs herein named.

Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with this Court advising
that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and was survived by her heirs and
successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel, married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O.
Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel, married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O.
Gabriel and Pablo O. Gabriel, and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by her
heirs herein named. By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for substitution was
granted.

In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the Court of Appeals made
the following findings, which We adopt:

On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of a
fishpond situated in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and measuring about
169,507 square meters; that sometime during the last war she entered into an
oral contract of lease thereof with the defendant on a year to year basis, i.e., from
January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200, plus the amount of real estate
taxes, payable in advance in the month of January; that desiring to develop and
cultivate the fishpond by herself, she notified the defendant in a letter dated June
26, 1957 that she was terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957; that
upon request of the defendant, she extended the lease for another year; that on
November 19, 1958 she again wrote the defendant that he should surrender
possession of the fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demand he however
ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the defendant be ordered to restore the
possession of the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200, plus the amount of real
estate taxes, a year from 1959, attorney's fees and costs.

The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the Court of
Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship
between the parties. Upon opposition by the plaintiff, the motion was denied. The
defendant thereafter filed his answer with counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that
the land in question was originally leased to him, also verbally, by the plaintiff's
father, Potenciano Gabriel in 1923 for as long as the defendant wanted subject to
the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and the part
which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense which would be
reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease for
whatever cause; that when the plaintiff became the owner of the property through
inheritance, she told the defendant that she would honor her father's contract
with the defendant, and likewise assured him that he could continue leasing the
property, whose original rental of P400.00 a year had been progressively
increased to P1,200.00, for as long as he wanted since she was not in a position
to attend to it personally. As a special defense, the defendant reiterated the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance of the case.

On February 12, 1962 the trial court issued an order herein below quoted in full:

The plaintiff sinks to eject the defendant from the fishpond described in the
complaint which is under lease to the said defendant, who, however, refuses to
vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction of this Court contending that
the action should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of leasehold
tenancy.

After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint, the parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of
determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.

It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who
originally leased it from the father of the plaintiff. Upon the death of the said
father, the fishpond was inherited by the plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No.
1634 and is registered in her name. It contains an area of 169,507.00 square
meters. The rental is on a yearly basis.

It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of
helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 he became ill and incapacitated. His
daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers,
Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan
and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the
repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the
watcher. He has lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar
Pangilinan. who is residing near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant
are all professions; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila.
None of these persons has been seen working on the fishpond.

The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which we enter this order.

After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions of the Tenancy Law,
Republic Act No. 1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as amended. it seems clear
that his case does not fall within the purview of said Act. The lease contract is
manifestly a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. Considering the area of
the fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the fact that neither the defendant, who
is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is Personally cultivating the fishpond
or through the employment of mechanical farm implements, and the further fact
 that the persons named above are not members of the immediate farm
household of the defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy relationship exists
between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is vested with
jurisdiction to try and decide this case. After this order has become final, the
plaintiff may request for the setting of the initial trial.

The defendant does not contest the findings of facts therein made by the trial
court.

After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the merits, decision was
rendered wherein the trial court Pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil Code, fixed
the period of the low up to June 30, 1964, the defendant on said date to
surrender possession of the fishpond to the plaintiff and to pay the rentals due
the latter. The plaintiff, on her part, was required upon surrender of on to her, to
pay the defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of the expenses he
incurred in improving the fishpond, and upon failure by either party to pay the
amount due the other, the same would bear interest at the legal rate until full
payment is made.

A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to this

Court and assigned the following errors:

1. The lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant
as that of a civil lease, in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines and
not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep
Act. NO. 1199 as amended.

3. The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of the appellant particularly
the basis for the expenditure for the development of the fishpond in question.

4. The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the appellant in them
easily amount of one thousand pesos for reimbursement and for seven hundred
pesos for the cost of the floodgate.

Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff leased the fishpond to the
defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual rental payable at the end of the year (Exhibit
C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3). It is likewise undisputed that the work in
the fishpond consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae would not
grow, getting some from the river and putting them in the fishpond, changing the dirty water with
fresh water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of fingerlings and attending to them; that
these were done by defendant, with some help; that he personally attended to the fishpond until
1956 when he became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo Cayanan, who was living with
him, helped in the work to be done in the fishpond and his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in
the management, conveying his instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4-8, Magat).
Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between the parties is an
agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to
section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is therefore within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in
effect that since defendant has ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the
members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy
relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil
lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the interpretation of
cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or with the aid of the members of his
immediate farm household.1

Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of Appeals which, as a
general rule, bind this Court.2

1. Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First, was the relationship between the
appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a civil law lease?

There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject
matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either
rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to
personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold
tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other
lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.3

In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the following
requisites must concur.

1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;

3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household;

4. That the land belongs to another; and

5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both.4

Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?

There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and
prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46(c) of said Act provides that
"the consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, salt beds and of lands devoted to the
raising of livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already
ruled that "land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land."5 The mere fact,
however, that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold
tenant within the purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law
lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.

Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has an area of
169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The question of whether such a big
parcel of land is susceptible of being worked by the appellant's family or not has not been
raised, and We see no need of tarrying on this point. So, We pass to the third requisite, to wit,
whether the tenant himself personally or with the aid of his immediate family worked the land.

Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of leasehold tenancy
with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father, such tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when
he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even
did the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land in question. Only the
members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or
not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm
enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household"6 The record shows who helped
work the land in question, and We quote:

It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of
helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he became ill and
incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took over. She testified that she
helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions
to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The
names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who
were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the
defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived separately since he got married.
Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near the fishpond, the other children
of the defendant are all professionals: a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest — all
residing in Manila. None of these persons has been seen working on the
fishpond.7

The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus
Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who,
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who
furnishes the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor
available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires
for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household work
the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy exists when a person, who either personally or with
the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to
cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household, belonging to, or legally possessed by, another in
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his
immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the
land cannot be considered tenants;8and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the
cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as
tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy
the status, rights, and privileges of one.

We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the
appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations.9

2. Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that the Court of First
Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case at bar, this being a case of civil law lease.

3. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned errors as these are issues
involving findings of facts which have been settled by the lower court, and unless there is grave
abuse of discretion, which we do not find in the record of the case, We shall not venture to
discuss the merits of the factual findings of the court a quo.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original parties, as
named in this decision. In consonance with the decision of the lower court, the heirs and
successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should deliver the possession of the
fishpond in question to the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and
said heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the heirs and
successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel the accrued rentals. From January 1, 1960,
at the rate of P1,200.00 a year, until the actual delivery of the possession of the fishpond as
herein ordered, with interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.