VI. Campaign, Election Propaganda, etc.

1. Concept, Campaign - refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate
or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election
of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election
of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties
shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity.
Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on
attributes of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming
political party convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political
activity contemplated under this Article.

2. Campaign Period; Election Period - Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the Commission on
Elections, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the Commission, the election period shall commence ninety
days before the day of the election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
The period of campaign shall be as follows:
1. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election - 90 days;
2. Election of Members of the Batasang Pambansa and Local Election - 45 days; and
3. Barangay Election - 15 days.
The campaign periods shall not include the day before and the day of the election.
However, in case of special elections under Article VIII, Section 5, Subsection (2) of the Constitution, the
campaign period shall be forty-five days.
Prohibited Campaigning Days
It is unlawful for any person to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity on:
(1) Maundy Thursday
(2) Good Friday
(3) eve of Election Day and
(4) Election Day [Sec. 3, COMELEC Resolution 8758]

3. Lawful election propaganda

(1) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, or other written or printed materials not larger than 8.5 x
14 inches
(2) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any political party or candidate
(3) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, framed or posted, not larger than 2x3 feet
(4) Streamers not larger than 3x8 feet are allowed at a public meeting or rally or in announcing the
holding of such. May be displayed 5 days before the meeting or rally and shall be removed within 24
hours after such
(5) Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media
(a) Bear and be identified by the reasonably legible or audible words “political advertisement
paid for” followed by the true and correct name and address of the candidate or party for whose
benefit the election propaganda was printed or aired. [Sec. 4.1, RA 9006]
(b) If the broadcast is given free of charge by the radio or TV station, identified by the words
"airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the true and correct name
and address of the broadcast entity. [Sec. 4.2, RA 9006]
(c) Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party shall not
be printed, published, broadcast or exhibited without the written acceptance by said candidate or
political party. Written acceptance must be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to
the COMELEC within 5 days after its signing. [Sec. 4.3, RA 9006, cf. Sec. 6.3, RA 9006]
(6) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code or the Fair
Election Act of 2001. [Sec. 3, RA 9006, The Fair Election Act]
4. Prohibited election propaganda
 For any foreigner to:
(1) Aid any candidate or political party, directly or indirectly
(2) Take part or influence in any manner any election
(3) Contribute or make any expenditure in connection with any election campaign or partisan political
activity [Sec. 81, BP 881]

 For any person during the campaign period to:

(1) Remove, destroy, obliterate or in any manner deface or tamper with lawful election propaganda
(2) Prevent the distribution of lawful election propaganda [Sec. 83, BP 881]

 For any candidate, political party, organization or any person to:

(1) Give or accept, directly or indirectly, free of charge, transportation, food or drinks or things of value
during the five hours before and after a public meeting, on the day preceding the election, and on the day
of the election;
(2) Give or contribute, directly or indirectly, money or things of value for such purpose (Sec. 89, BP
881)
Note: Sec. 85 “Prohibited election propaganda” of BP 881 was repealed by Sec. 14 RA 9006.

5. Prohibited contributions
(1) From Public or private financial institutions. Unless:
(a) The financial institutions are legally in the business of lending money;
(b) The loan is made in accordance with laws and regulations; and
(c) The loan is made in the ordinary course of business
(2) Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility or in possession of or exploiting any natural
resources of the nation
(3) Natural and juridical persons who hold contracts or sub-contracts to supply the government or any of
its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, with goods or services or to perform construction or other
works
(4) Grantees of franchises, incentives, exemptions, allocations or similar privileges or concessions by the
government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, including GOCCs
(5) Grantees, within 1 year prior to the date of the election, of loans or other accommodations in excess
of P100,000 by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities including
GOCCs
(6) Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds amounting to no less than
P100,000
(7) Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(8) Foreigners and foreign corporations, including foreign governments. [Secs. 95 and 96, BP 881]

6. Lawful expenditures; Limitations on Expenses

A. For Candidates
(1) President and VP: P10 for every voter currently registered
(2) Other candidates: P3 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed
his certificate of candidacy

B. For Candidates without a Political Party

(1) P5 for every voter

C. For Political Parties

(1) P5 for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has
official candidates [Sec. 13, R.A. 7166]

7. Statement of Contributions and Expenses - Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall
file:
(1) In duplicate with the COMELEC
(2) The full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in
connection with the election
(3) Within 30 days after the day of the election
8. Readings:

1. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products and pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up
along the Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. (These last two agreements were entered
into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003, respectively.) On December 30, 2003, petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa. Thereafter, respondent
COMELEC issued a Resolution No. 6520 which contains Sec. 32 prohibiting all propaganda materials
showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement thereof
becomes a candidate for public office. Petitioner was asked by the respondent to comply with the rule
but petitioner asked that he be exempted from said Resolution considering that the billboards mentioned
therein are mere product endorsement and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature
campaigning under the rules. COMELEC it ordered petitioner to remove or cause the removal of the
billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request. Not agreeing with the
decision, petitioner Chavez asks the Supreme Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the
assailed provision. Hence, the petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the billboard mentioned therein are exempted from sec. 32 of resolution no. 6520 due
to the reason that it is purely product endorsement and do not announce or solicit any support for
petitioner's candidacy.
2) Whether or not Sec. 32 of Resolution 6520 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
1) No, the Supreme Court held that the billboard mentioned therein should not be exempted from sec. 32
of resolution no. 6520. The Supreme Court held that Under the Omnibus Election Code, "election
campaign" or "partisan political activity" is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. One of the activities included therein is
"Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate".

2) Yes, the Supreme Court held that Sec. 32 of resolution no. 6520 is a valid exercise of police power.
The Supreme Court said that A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary
objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public
office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or
poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure
and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. This is within the context of police power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the
general welfare of the people.
2. Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181614, 11 September 2009 and 25 November 2009
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate of candidacy
on the day before the prescribed campaign period. When she went to the COMELEC Office for filing
she was accompanied by her partymates. Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two
trucks and ten motorcycles running around the municipality convincing the residents to vote for her and
the other candidates of their political party. Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her
alleging premature campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says:
“Election or partisan political activity outside campaign period.--- It shall be unlawful for any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election
campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period.” She argued that she is not
guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that time and the campaign period has not yet started when
the motorcade was conducted. While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as
mayor and took her office thereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the
complainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning. Likewise, when she appealed in the
COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was affirmed. Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme
Court which decided against her. It held that the conduct of the motorcade is a form of election
campaign or partisan political activity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code
which says: “holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a candidate[.]” Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate the position. Now, she comes for
a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments.

ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of premature campaigning?

RULING: No, she is not. Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that
Congress stated that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the campaign period.” So, it is lawful if done before the start of the campaign period. This
plain language of the law need not be construed further. Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was
not yet a candidate for. As what was decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the campaign
period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet considered as a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature
campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What she did was an exercise of her
freedom of expression.

JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for

Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11
September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30January 2008 of the COMELEC
Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera
shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
3. SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, 05 May 2001
FACTS: Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveysin various fields.
Kamahalan Publishing Corp., on the other hand, publishes theManila Standard which is a newspaper of
general circulation and features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS and
Kamahalan are contesting thevalidity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially
section 5.4which provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not bepublished 7 days before the
election.SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the electionsboth at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results of suchsurvey as well as publish them
directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to publishelection survey results up to the last day of the
elections on May 14, 2001.

ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes aprior restraint
on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and presentdanger to justify such restraint

RULING/RATIO: Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of

freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is
limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable
rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among candidates. Here,
the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the O’brient test
for content related regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types
such as editorials, etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government
interest because the interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment.

4. GMA Network Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205357, 02 September 2014

FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9
(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates
and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect
during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for
political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’
television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based”
airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would
justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence
of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast
time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot
of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national
candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary
that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may
more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly
hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.
5. Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito v. Comelec, G.R. No. 212398, 25 November 2014
FACTS: Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by
Edgar “Egay”San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a
fellow candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna.

• Causes of action: (1) Ejercito, during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the
electorates of the province of Laguna the “Orange Card” which could be used in any public hospital
within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs = a material consideration in convincing the
voters to cast their votes for Ejercito’s favor in violation of Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code;
(2) Under Sec 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the aggregate amount that a candidate may spend
for election campaign shall be “P3.00 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the
candidate filed his certificate of candidacy” The Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered
electorate. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only
authorized to incur an election expense amounting to P4,576,566.00. However, for television campaign
commercials alone, Ejercito already spent P23,730,784. Even assuming that Ejercito was given
30%discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still paid the sum of P16,611,549. Hence,
Ejercito committed an election offense under Sec 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, in relation to
Sec 68 of the OEC.

• On May 17, 2013, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor of Laguna. Ejercito: 549,310 votes. San Luis:
471,209 votes.

• The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed for the
dismissal of the petition which was:
o Improperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for election offenses, thus, the case should
have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, or the election registrar.
o San Luis failed to show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, that he (Ejercito) was
previously convicted or declared by final judgment for being guilty of, or found by the
COMELEC of having committed, the punishable acts under Sec 68 of the OEC.
o Moot and academic by his proclamation as duly-elected Prov. Governor of Laguna for 2013-
2016.
• The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. Ejercito had accepted
donations of PhP 20,197,170.25 and PhP 3,366,195.05 from Scenema Concept International, Inc. (SCI)
in the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBN’s Channel 2. Even assuming that the
actual cost of both advertising contracts only amounted to PhP12,818,470.56, Ejercito exceeded his
authorized expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00 which is a ground for disqualification under Sec 68 (c)
and concurrently an election offense pursuant to Sec 100 in relation to Section 262 of the OEC.
• The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an
action to disqualify Ejercito. One ground for disqualification listed in Sec 68 is spending in an election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law. Hence, COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
petition. As to Ejercito’s assertion that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that the filing of
an election offense and the factual determination on the existence of probable cause are required before
a disqualification case based on Sec 68 of the OEC may proceed, the COMELEC En Banc cited Lanot
vs. Comelec which declared that each of the acts listed as ground for disqualification under Sec 68 of the
OEC has two aspects – electoral and criminal. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the
criminal aspect, and an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of
probable cause in a preliminary investigation.

ISSUE: W/N COMELEC committed GADALEJ in disqualifying Ejercito.

HELD: NO. The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition
filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for disqualification
as well. Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. The title of
San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
which is the specific rule governing the disqualification of candidates. Moreover, the averments of San
Luis’ petition rely on Sec 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of action which enumerates
the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position.

An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. The criminal aspect of a disqualification case
determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor
is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If
there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal information
before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require
proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of
the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a future public office. The conduct
of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral aspect of a disqualification
case.

It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary investigation
because it merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which deals
with disqualification of candidates. In disqualification cases, the COMELEC may designate any of its
officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence only in cases
involving barangay officials.

The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving
criminal infractions of the election laws” stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resol No. 2050 pertains to the
criminal aspect of a disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate may be disqualified even without
prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation.

Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of what is
allowed by the OEC. The Court refused to believe Ejercito's assertion that the advertising contracts
between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without his
(Ejercito) knowledge and consent. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must
because non-compliance is considered as an election offense.

Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall
not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the
advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising
contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized representative
of the political party.

Whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent, and whether
his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65
petition. Contributions made by third parties are included in the election spending limit set under the
law. Ejercito asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between “contribution” and
“expenditure” and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution made by third parties
in favor of the candidates, while the limit set by law, as appearing in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615,
applies only to election expenditures of candidates.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political
parties for election campaign. Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166
as these provisions are merely amended insofar as the allowable amount is concerned. In tracing the
legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said that the intent of our
lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to regulate not just the election expenses of the
candidate but also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate limit
of the former’s election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase “those incurred or caused to be
incurred by the candidate” is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed or
donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution or donation
should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as
“any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer.” Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus. (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should We.)

The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression under
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law’s concern is not to
curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure
equality between and among aspirants with “deep pockets” and those with less financial resources. Any
restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the
substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising.
6. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015
FACTS: On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view.

The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law
of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team
Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.

The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those
who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while
those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis Party List Ang Pamilya

Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise,
COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense against the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.

HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey
any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears to
coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the
expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to
candidates classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” according to their respective votes on the
RH Law.

On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie
of expression protected by our fundamental law. There are several theories and schools of thought that
strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.

First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political
discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against
majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation and
prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate
dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering
the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
7. 1-UTAK v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206020, 14 April 2015
FACTS: On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent
elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner
thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether
motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks,
piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility
franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an
election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of REsolution No. 9615 particularly
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs)
and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials
on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the petitioner’s request to
reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are
constitutional.
HELD: NO!
SUMMARY: Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free
speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of the
COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to
the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection
clause, as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of
private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant
part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most
valuable feature of the democratic way of life
ADDITIONAL READING:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being repugnant to
Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the
fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals,
i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during an
election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility
franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and
effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the
revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant
to the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it
restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely
control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to
the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there
is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and
transport terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to
the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants
COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for
the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated
powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but
only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of
election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of
political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the
PUV or transport terminal.