FLORESTA V.
JUDGE UBADIAS, Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and
A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1774
27 MAY 2004.
Third Division
[CARPIO-MORALES, J.]
FACTS:
By a Sworn Complaint, then Provincial
Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge
Dorentino Z. Floresta (complainant)
administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G.
Ubiadas of the Olongapo City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) with “gross ignorance of [the] law,
grave abuse of authority and violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.” Among other
grounds, complainant faults respondent for
granting, “without giving notice to the
prosecution,” the petition for bail of Jose
Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court of
Subic, Zambales which found probable cause
against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III
of Republic Act No. 7610 (“Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act”). Respondent avers that in
Crim. Case No. 271-99, upon motion filed close
to noon time of January 3, 2000, the prosecutor
was furnished a copy of the petition for bail by
Mangohig, who was then under preliminary
investigation. During the hearing set on the
following day, or on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m,
there was no appearance from the Prosecutor’s
Office. Since the offense for which Mangohig
was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense,
respondent granted him bail.
ISSUE: Is the Judge correct in granting the
petition for bail even without the participation of
the Prosecution during the bail hearing?
HELD: NO, the Judge is not correct.
even if no charge has yet been filed in court
against a respondent-suspect-detainee,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be
given to the prosecutor, or at least his
recommendation must be sought. So Fortuna v.
Penaco-Sitaca instructs:
[A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion
presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance
with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles. The prosecution must first be accorded
an opportunity to present evidence because by the
very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is
on the basis of such evidence that judicial
discretion is weighed against in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other
words, discretion must be exercised regularly,
legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after the evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of
sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice
and outright arbitrariness. (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
True, a hearing of the petition for bail was
conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January
4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. Given the filing of the
petition only the day before, at close to noontime,
it cannot be said that the prosecution was afforded
reasonable notice and opportunity to present
evidence after it received a copy of the petition
minutes before it was filed in court. It bears
stressing that the prosecution should be afforded
reasonable opportunity to comment on the
application for bail by showing that evidence of
guilt is strong.
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications
for bail, no period is provided as it merely
requires the court to give a “reasonable notice” of
the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to
submit his recommendation, and the general rule
on the requirement of a three-day notice for
hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15
allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on
shorter notice, there is, in the case of Mangohig,
no showing of good cause to call for hearing his
petition for bail on shorter notice. Reasonable
notice depends of course upon the circumstances
of each particular case, taking into account, inter
alia, the offense committed and the imposable
penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands
of the prosecution. In Crim. Case No. 271-99,
Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b),
Art. III of R.A. 7610 which is punishable by
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and
subsequently indicted for statutory rape qualified
by relationship which is punishable by death.
Under the circumstances, by respondent’s
assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was
deprived of due process for which he is liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure which is
a serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
ZUÑO V. JUDGE CABEBE,
A.M. OCA NO. 03-1800-RTJ
26 NOVEMBER 2004.
Third Division
[SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.]
FACTS:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the
sworn complaint of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño of the Department of Justice,
against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, then
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Batac,
Ilocos Norte. The charges are knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of
the law and partiality in a case where: The
accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as
ground the right of the accused to a speedy trial;
Respondent judge motu propio issued an Order
granting bail to the accused; Respondent judge
issued the Order without the accused’s
application or motion for bail. The prosecution
then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of
acting thereon, respondent judge issued an order
inhibiting himself from further proceeding with
the case, realizing that what he did was patently
irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent
judge be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the
practice of law. In his comment, respondent
denied the charges. While admitting that he
issued the Order granting bail to the accused
without any hearing, “the same was premised on
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
trial.” There was delay in the proceedings due to
complainant’s frequent absences and failure of
the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in
court, resulting in the cancellation of the hearings.
ISSUE#1: Is the Judge correct in granting bail
sans the application or motion for bail and
without conducting a hearing?
HELD#2: NO, the Judge is not correct.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,
we held that jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity of a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative
to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving
offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter
of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the
grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a
matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of
whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter
of judicial discretion which remains with the
judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise
his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
In fact, even in cases where there is no petition
for bail, a hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge
granted bail to the accused without conducting a
hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
xxx.
[T]he court’s order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution and based thereon, the judge should
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate
the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge did not
follow the above Rules and procedure
enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a
hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus
depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to
interpose objections to the grant of bail.
Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused, he should have conducted a hearing and
thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and
a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed,
these are considered aspects of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense;
its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of
bail
ISSUE#2: Is the contention of the Respondent
Judge, in granting bail on the ground that the
accused were entitled to their right to a speedy
trial, meritorious?
HELD#2: NO. Respondent’s contention is bereft
of merit.
There is no indication in the records of the
criminal case that the prosecution has
intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even
assuming there was delay, this does not justify the
grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter
disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail
hearing has been incessantly stressed by this
Court. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the
law and the Rules and maintain professional
competence; and by the very nature of his office,
should be circumspect in the performance of his
duties. He must render justice without resorting
to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously,
respondent failed to live up to these standards.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION V.
JUDGE OLALIA AND MUÑOZ
G.R. NO. 153675, 29 APRIL 2007.
En Banc
[SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.]
FACTS:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before
the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of “accepting an advantage as agent,” in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong.
Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the extradition of private respondent. After
hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is
no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high “flight
risk.” Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing and the case was raffled off to
another judge. Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by
respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent
motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Is the contention of the Petitioner, that
the potential extraditee has a right to bail under
the Constitution or statutory law, the right being
limited solely to criminal proceedings, tenable?
HELD: NO, the contention is untenable.
The modern trend in public international law is
the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly,
the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now
taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of
individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against
peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently,
under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders
have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that
the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II,
both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights.
Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right
to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights
of every person were proclaimed. While not a
treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of
Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution, the principles set forth in that
Declaration are part of the law of the land. In
1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein
are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and
due process.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see
no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason
why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties,
the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right
to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
G.R. NO. 158754, 10 AUGUST 2007.
En Banc
[GARCIA, J.]
FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the
Resolution of herein respondent Sandiganbayan
(Special Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in
Criminal Case No. 26558, granting bail to private
respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada
(hereafter Jinggoy for brevity). Jinggoy was
among the respondents in the crime of Plunder
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Jinggoy
filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for
early resolution of his Petition for Bail on
Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He
reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Jinggoy filed before the
Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail
against which the prosecution filed its comment
and opposition. Bail hearings were then
conducted, followed by the submission by the
parties of their respective memoranda. Petitioner
suggests that Jinggoy is harboring a plan to
escape, thus a flight risk. But in a Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus
Application for Bail. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Is the grant of bail in favor of Jinggoy
proper on the ground that he is no longer
considered a flight risk?
HELD: YES, the grant of bail is proper.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable
owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt,
the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if
the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since
the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a
little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does
not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be
a flight risk. We quote with approval what the
graft court wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant
[Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently
respectful of the Court and its processes. He has
not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that he
is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his
continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his
conduct, social standing and his other personal
circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this
case seems remote if not nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual
respondent is now almost nil, given his election
on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact
that those who usually jump bail are shadowy
characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes
of the people for as long as they can flee from the
retribution of justice. On the other hand, those
with a reputation and a respectable name to
protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump
bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any
suggestion that someone who has a popular
mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan
to give up his Senate seat in exchange for
becoming a fugitive from justice.
OKABE V. JUDGE GUTIERREZ AND
MARUYAMA,
G.R. NO. 150185, 27 MAY 2004.
Second Division
[CALLEJO, SR., J.]
FACTS:
Maruyama charged Okabe of Estafa. After the
preliminary investigation, an Information was
filed and a warrant of arrest was issued.
Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said
amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B.
Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of
the RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled
the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond
of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of
Pasig City on June 21, 2000. Upon her request,
the petitioner was furnished with a certified copy
of the Information, the resolution and the criminal
complaint which formed part of the records of the
said case. Petitioner twice left the Philippines but
returned. The prosecution moved for the issuance
of a hold departure order to hold and prevent any
attempt on the part of the petitioner to depart from
the Philippines. Petitioner filed a Very Urgent
Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order
and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan.
Petitioner filed a motion for the postponement of
her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial
court ruled adversely thereon, she would refuse to
enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate
court. The court denied the petitioner’s motions
on the ground that when the petitioner posted a
personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, she
thereby waived her right to question the court’s
finding of the existence of probable cause for her
arrest and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
the court, more so when she filed the motion for
the lifting of the hold departure order the court
issued, and the motion to defer the proceedings
and her arraignment.
ISSUE: Is the application for or filing of bail
bond a waiver of one’s right to assail the warrant
issued for his arrest?
HELD: NO, there is no waiver in application for
or filing of a bail.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new
one, intended to modify previous rulings of this
Court that an application for bail or the admission
to bail by the accused shall be considered as a
waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for
his arrest on the legalities or irregularities
thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling
of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is
curative in nature because precisely, it was
designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing
curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes
are by their essence retroactive in application.
Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate
retroactively, even without express provisions to
that effect, to cases pending at the time of their
effectivity, in other words to actions yet
undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Before the appellate court rendered its decision
on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It
behooved the appellate court to have applied the
same in resolving the petitioner’s petition for
certiorari and her motion for partial
reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the
petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it
cannot be argued that she waived her right to
question the finding of probable cause and to
assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by
the respondent judge. There must be clear and
convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish her right to question the
existence of probable cause. When the only proof
of intention rests on what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that
no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In
this case, the records show that a warrant was
issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for
the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of
Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned
of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a
personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure
her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B.
Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City approved
the bond and issued an order recalling the warrant
of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting
of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative
necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not
be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her
arrest.
 LEVISTE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. 189122, 17 MARCH 2010.
Third Division
[CORONA, J.]
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas,
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the
lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He
appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that
the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised “with grave caution
and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now
questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial
of his application for bail, considering that none
of the conditions justifying denial of bail under
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is
that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is more than six years but not more than 20 years
and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal
by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a
penalty of imprisonment for more than six years,
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail
pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail
mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not
mean automatic grant of bail in case of appeal.
After conviction by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion. At the risk of being
repetitious, such discretion must be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Considering that the accused was in fact
convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail
pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-
standards approach. This judicial disposition
finds strong support in the history and evolution
of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise
consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in
prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on
bail despite his conviction may destroy the
deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is
especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in
the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a
certain prison sentence and thus may be more
likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too
freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery
of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
 ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST
AND COMMENTS
G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right
to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No
person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.”
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
on the basis of his purported involvement in the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion
requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan
denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's
arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a
Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a)
Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because
of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the
penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus
allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due
to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan
denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter
of right unless the crime charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is
strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that
if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that
petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he
is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and
presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the
1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction
of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail
may be granted according to the discretion of the
court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a
notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted
the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to the consent
of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by
death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua
subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned
Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail
hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs.
Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described
in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a person under detention such remedies which
hearing of the application for bail regardless of safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present These remedies include the right to be admitted
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is to bail. (emphasis in decision)
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra) Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective
prosecution; of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused
during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
the clear showing of the fragile health and
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
advanced age of Petitioner. As such the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
should be denied.
denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted
whimsically and capriciously and was so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
2. YES.
duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to
-------------------------
bail.
Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's
a very weak legal basis – the grant of bail over
responsibility to the international community
mere humanitarian grounds. He also claims that
arising from its commitment to the Universal
the court has no authority to use humanitarian
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have
grounds. Leonen argues that “[Petitioner's]
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
release for medical or humanitarian reasons was
right of every person to liberty and due process
not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix
and for detainees to avail of such remedies which
Bail before the Sandiganbayan,” nor were these
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
grounds raised in the petition in the Supreme
Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR
Court.
vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
“Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as
presently provided in our Rules of Court nor
well as value the worth and dignity of every
found in any statute or provision of the
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
Constitution.”
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
“The State values the dignity of every human Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only
person and guarantees full respect for human granted bail as a special accomodation for the
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the petitioner and he goes on to criticize the decision
responsibility of protecting and promoting the to wit:
right of every person to liberty and due process,
[This decision] will usher in an era of truly
ensuring that those detained or arrested can
selective justice not based on their legal
participate in the proceedings before a court, to
provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial
enable it to decide without delay on the legality
and solely grounded on the presence or absence
of the detention and order their release if justified.
of human compassion.
In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every
xxx
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the
Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged
with motions to fix bail on the basis of
humanitarian considerations. The lower courts
will have to decide, without guidance, whether
bail should be granted because of advanced age,
hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded diseases.
They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents
charged with plunder and not to those accused of
drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, … and
other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment...
Procedure for granting bail
Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure
outlined for the lower courts in bail cases in order
to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan did not err
in denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. In
Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme Court held:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that
the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges
involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving
bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through
its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been
including lectures on the subject in the regular
seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may,
we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge
in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now
incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are
enjoined to study them as well and be guided
accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to
account for an erroneous decision rendered in
good faith, but this defense is much too frequently
cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on
bail having already been decided, this Court
justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties
assiduously. For judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that
he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith
in the administration of justice can only be
engendered if litigants are convinced that the
members of the Bench cannot justly be charge
with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
Petitioner in this case, insisted that the
Sandiganbayan grant his bail without any hearing
for the purpose of determining whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix
Bail, the prosecution had no opportunity to
present any evidence because of the prematurity
of Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the
dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was
correct in denying the Motion based on
prematurity.
Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate
Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based
on humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan.
Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able
to develop their arguments as to this point to
establish legal and factual basis for this kind of
The majority opinion offers no “guidance”
bail.
The dissent argues that the main opinion is
The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for
unclear whether the privilege (humanitarian
the court to grant bail merely on the basis of the
considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply to
certification of the attending physician, Dr.
those who have similar conditions. Whether or
Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering
not this privilege will only apply to those
from numerous debilitating conditions. The
undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this
dissent states that:
privilege can be granted to those of advanced age
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow only. “The majority has perilously set an unstated
the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of
doctor's certification. In doing so, we effectively bail on the ground of medical conditions.”
suspend our rules on evidence by doing away
There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan
with cross-examination and authentication of Dr.
as to if, when and how bail can then be canceled.
Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a
hearing whose main purpose is to determine Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced
whether no kind of alternative detention is
possible. The reliance of the majority on the case of
Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is
xxx misplaced because this case referred to
extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis on
The better part of prudence is that we follow
international law. As applied to crimes charged
strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and
under Philippine law, the remedies under the
canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be
matter to determine is whether the evidence of
qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding
guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a
bail.
hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after
petition for bail is filed by accused. The medical Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed
condition of the accused, if any, should be of it by remanding the case back to the lower
pleaded and heard. court for factual determination of whether or not
the accused was a flight risk.

Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was

not the version deliberated upon
This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices
voted to grant bail based on a substantially
different version of the opinion, one which did
not use humanitarian considerations as a ground
for the granting of bail. The dissent explains that
the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the issue of
whether or not bail is a matter of right and reveals
that the copy offered for signature was
substantially similar to an earlier draft which used
humanitarian considerations as the basis for the
granting of bail. The dissent makes it clear that
this was an irregularity.