Practice Court

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183577

Appellee,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CORONA,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
HILARIO ESCOTON, Promulgated:

Appellant. February 1, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue.[1] In
passing upon this matter, the highest degree of respect must be accorded to the findings of
the trial court.[2]
The Charge
Impugned in this appeal is the February 5, 2008 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00520 affirming with modification the Decision[4] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4071, convicting
appellant Hilario Escoton of the crime of multiple rape against AAA.[5] The
Information[6] contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2001, in x x x, Province of Leyte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate
intent and with lewd designs, taking advantage of the minority, as well as relationship of
the accused with the victim, and by use of force and intimidation being armed with a sickle
(garab) did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge for
five (5) times in the same evening of May 12, 2001, with one AAA, a 10-year-old, a niece
of the accused, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law with the qualifying circumstance that the victim is under 18 years and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of the victim.
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged during his arraignment. After the
termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
The evidence presented by the prosecution established that AAA was born
on October 29, 1990, as shown by her Certificate of Live Birth[7] and Baptismal
Certificate.[8] The appellant is the uncle of AAA, being the brother of her mother. On May
12, 2001, at around 7 oclock in the evening, AAA and her brother were asleep in the house
of their maternal grandmother with whom they were residing. The appellant woke up AAA
and told her to follow him to his house which was about 500 meters away. AAAs brother
also woke up and accompanied her. Their grandmother did not give them permission to
leave, but they still proceeded towards their destination.
Upon arrival, the appellant undressed himself and removed the lower garments of
AAA. He made her lie down on the bamboo floor then inserted his penis into her vagina
despite her pleas to discontinue his hideous act. AAA felt pain as the appellant had sex with
her. The appellant raped AAA for five times during the night while her brother lay silently
beside her.
When daylight came, the appellant ordered AAA and her brother to fetch drinking
water. However, instead of heeding appellants order, they went home to their grandmother
to whom AAA tearfully narrated her ordeal. Upon advice of a relative, they reported the
incident to the police and AAA submitted herself to a physical examination in a
hospital. Although the doctors who performed the medical examination on AAA the day
after she was raped could no longer be located during the trial, the Records Officer affirmed
the authenticity of the document containing the results of said examination and the
signatures of doctors appearing thereon. The record of the medical examination on AAA
indicated that her genitalia was normal with incomplete healed lacerations of the hymen at
3, 8, and 9 oclock positions. The vaginal smear was negative for spermatozoa.[9]
The Version of the Defense
The appellant presented a totally different version of the incident. He testified that on May
12, 2001, at around 7 oclock in the evening, he was on his way home after
consuming tuba. He passed by the house of his mother and noticed her in the balcony
having a conversation with his aunt Clarita and her husband. He was then requested to
fetch AAA, who was watching television in the house of another relative. The appellant
obeyed and after finding AAA told her to go home. However, AAA got angry, cursed him
and insisted on watching the television.Irked by AAAs behavior, appellant pushed her,
which made her fall from the stairs until she landed on the ground. It was only after this
incident that AAA went home.
When the appellant returned to his mothers house, his mother and his aunt Clarita were
enraged and hurled invectives at him. He cursed them in return. His mother warned that he
would be sent to prison for repeatedly beating up AAA. He replied that the meager amount
paid to him by his aunt Clarita and her husband whenever they hired him to work in their
farm was demeaning to his person. Thereafter, he proceeded to the house of his uncle and
slept on the balcony where he awoke at 6 oclock the next morning.
The appellant asserted that his aunt Clarita initiated this case after he challenged her and
her husband to a fight. He also claimed that AAA concocted false accusation against him
because he used to beat her with a whip and push her head to the ground as punishment for
her stubbornness.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
On June 28, 2004, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
as amended, and further amended by R.A. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997) and the
amendatory provision of R.A. No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law), without any mitigating
circumstance, the Court found accused HILARION ESCOTON, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE RAPE charged under the information and
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH and ordered to pay civil indemnity
to AAA in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos; for moral damages
in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos; and for exemplary damages
in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos; and
Pay the Cost.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The Verdict of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision
Q. You said that when you reached thereat you were undressed, by the way, what were
you wearing that time when undressed?
A. I was wearing then a short and a sando.
Q. Now, what was taken off from you first, was it the sando or shorts?
A. My shorts.
Q. Now, do you have a panty that time?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, after the shorts were taken was it one after the other with your panty or
simultaneous?
A. It was taken off simultaneously, the shorts and the panty.
Q. After your shorts and your panty was [sic] taken off from your body, what did the
accused do relative to your upper apparel?
xxxx
A. He did not take off my sando.
PROS. MERIN:
Q. After your shorts and panty was [sic] successfully taken off from your body, what next
did the accused do upon your person?
A. He inserted his penis [into] my vagina.
Q. Was the accused wearing something when he inserted his penis [into] your vagina?
A. He was not wearing anything.
Q. When did he [undress] himself after you were undressed or before you were undressed?
xxxx
A. He took off first his apparel before taking off my shorts and panty.
PROS. MERIN:
Q. You mean, he undressed himself after your arrival at the house?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was your relative position when your uncle Hilario Escoton inserted his penis
[into] your vagina?
A. I was then lying.
Q. Lying where?
A. I was then lying on the center of the room.
Q. Now is there any floor to that?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what is it made of?

A. Made of bamboo sheets.
Q. Now, after you [were] made to lie on that bamboo splits and his penis was inserted [into]
your vagina, what did you feel?
A. I felt the warmth.
Q. What did [sic] Hilario doing with his penis [into] your vagina?
A. He kept on inserting.
Q. You mean he made a push and pull movement?
xxxx
A. Yes, sir.
PROS. MERIN
Q. Was he successful in inserting his penis [into] your vagina?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. For how long was the accused doing the push and pull movement of his penis [into]
your vagina?
A. I cannot exactly remember because he kept on repeating it.
Q. Now, how [sic] did you feel while the accused was doing the push and pull movement
of his penis [into] your vagina?
A. Pain, sir.
Q. Pain coming from where?

A. In my vagina, sir.
Q. Now, was the accused able to reach his ejaculation?
A. The warm.
Q. Warm what?
A. Warm liquid.
Q. And where was that liquid coming out?

A. From his penis.
Q. Now, after he was able to ejaculate, what did the accused do?
A. He lie [sic] for a while.
Q. How about you what did you do after he was able to ejaculate while lying?
A. I wore my panty.
Q. What did you tell your uncle while he was raping you.
A. I said, dont do that kuya.
Q. What do you mean kuya, to whom are you addressing the word kuya?
A. To Hilario.
Q. Is that what you address him, your uncle?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times by the way after he rested for a while and you already put your panty,
what next happened tell this Court?
xxxx
A. He repeated again.
PROS. MERIN:
Q. What do you mean he repeated again?

A. He raped me again.
Q. You mean he inserted again his penis [into] your vagina?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you said a while ago that you wore already a panty did I hear you correctly?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what did he do with your panty?

A. He slept for a while.
Q. And when did he wake up?

A. I do not know because he kept on repeating.
Q. You mean, he had repeatedly raped you on that evening?
xxxx
A. Yes, sir.
PROS. MERIN
Q. How many times were you raped that evening?
xxxx
A. Five times, sir.[14]
We stress that in rape cases the accused may be convicted based solely on the
testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.[15] In this regard, the trial
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the victim, having personally heard
her and observed her deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. In the absence
of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some factor
or circumstances of weight that would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted
arbitrarily, the trial courts assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest
respect.[16] Here, the appellant fails to persuade us to depart from this principle and to apply
the exception.
The testimony of rape victims are given full weight and credence, considering that
no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a
public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to seek justice for the wrong done
to her.[17] It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years who is not yet exposed to the
ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims
is false.[18] Considering that the victim in this case underwent a harrowing experience and
exposed herself to the rigors of public trial, it is unlikely that she would concoct false
accusations against the appellant, who is her uncle.
It should be noted that AAA immediately informed her grandmother of the

incident. Upon the advise of a relative they proceeded to the police station to file a
complaint against the appellant. Thereafter, they proceeded to the hospital for a medical
examination. AAAs act of immediately reporting the commission of the rape strengthens
her credibility.[19] Her spontaneous revelation of the assault on her and her unrelenting
determination to have the appellant arrested and prosecuted of rape lend credence to her
claim that she was indeed raped.[20]
Appellant likewise contends that the court a quo grievously erred in relying on the
medico-legal report considering that the examining physician who issued the same was not
presented for its identification. However, medical examination or medical report is not
indispensable to prove the commission of rape, for it is merely corroborative
evidence.[21] An accused can still be convicted of rape on the sole basis of the testimony of
the victim.[22] Here, even if we disregard the medico-legal report, the result would still be
the same the prosecution, through the testimony of AAA, has successfully proved the case
of rape against the appellant.
Appellant vehemently denies raping AAA and claims that he was already drunk and
had fallen asleep in the house of his uncle during the alleged commission of the
crime. However, he failed to present any witness to corroborate his testimony. Denial and
alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible
witness. Between the positive assertions of the victim and the negative averments of the
appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater
evidentiary weight.[23]
Much less convincing is the proposition of the appellant that AAA filed the
complaint against him because she and her other relatives were harboring ill feelings and
evil motives against him. Ill motives become inconsequential where there are affirmative
or categorical declarations establishing the accountability of the appellant for the felony, as
in this case.[24]Moreover, we have observed that persons convicted of rape sometimes
attribute the charges against them to family feuds, resentment or revenge.[25] However, as
borne out by numerous cases, family resentment, revenge or feuds have never swayed us
from giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape, especially a minor
who remained steadfast and unyielding throughout the trial that she was sexually
violated.[26]
Appellant also argues that the testimony of AAA is unworthy of credence since it is
replete with inconsistencies. He contends that if AAAs grandmother was with her at the
time he fetched her, then AAA could have easily refused since her grandmother did not
allow her to go with him. He further contends that if he really intended to rape AAA, he
would not have allowed her younger brother to tag along as an eyewitness.
The factual question raised by the appellant fails to impress. It is an inconsequential
matter that does not bear upon the elements of the crime of rape. The decisive factor in the
prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently
proven. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis
for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts indispensable to the guilt or innocence of
the appellant for the crime charged.[27] As the inconsistencies alleged by the appellant had
nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape, they cannot be used as ground for his
acquittal.[28]
Further, victims do not cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of the
manner in which they were sexually violated. Thus, an errorless recollection of a harrowing
experience cannot be expected of a witness, especially when she is recounting details from
an experience as humiliating and painful as rape. Furthermore, rape victims, especially
child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed
in such a situation.[29]
In this case, minor inconsistencies are expected because (1) AAA was a child
witness, (2) she was made to testify on a painful and humiliating incident, (3) she was
sexually assaulted several times, and (4) she was made to recount details and events that
happened two years before she testified.[30]
The Penalty
Thus, given the foregoing circumstances, we find no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The prosecution sufficiently
proved the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant. The trial court correctly meted
the penalty of death since the rape committed against a child under 12 years of age by an
offender who is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree merits no less than
the imposition of capital punishment under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.[31] It
is clear from the birth certificate of AAA that she was only ten years old when she was
ravished by the appellant, her uncle, being the brother of her mother.
However, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled An Act Prohibiting
The Imposition Of The Death Penalty In The Philippines, the penalty, as correctly imposed
by the Court of Appeals, should be reclusion perpetua.[32] Pursuant to the same law, the
accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[33]
While the appellant was meted the proper penalty for committing one count of rape,
we must not overlook the fact that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt
that the appellant is guilty of five counts of rape. AAA related in detail to the trial court in
a simple and straightforward manner how she was repeatedly ravished by the appellant,
thereby leaving no doubt about its credibility and truthfulness. She testified that the
appellant inserted his penis inside her vagina and after consummating this act, she was
raped again for four times under the same circumstances throughout the night. Thus,
appellant must be held guilty of five counts of rape and suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility of parole for each count.
The Damages
The five counts of rape committed by the appellant also require a modification of the award
of damages by the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals. For each of the five
counts of rape, AAA is entitled to an award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
another P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.[34]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.

00520, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, finding appellant Hilario Escoton guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing multiple rape is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
(1) For each of the five counts of rape committed, he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole; and
(2) For each of the five counts of rape committed, he is ordered to pay
complainant civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the sum
of P75,000.00, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 183563

THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA,
Accused-Appellant. December 14, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February

8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed with modification the
Decision[2]dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban
City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the
accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1)
count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of rape against the private complainant
AAA.[3]
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged[4] with eight (8)
counts of rape in separate informations, the accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of

Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the
third civil degree.[5]
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party,
actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
[AAA], without her consent and against her will.

That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],



That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

third civil degree.[12](Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he

entered a plea of not guilty.[13] On March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of the
cases was conducted and the parties stipulated on the identity of the accused-
appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused
appellant is the uncle of the victim.[14]
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the
accused and his counsel. The cases were then heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges
against the accused-appellant. AAA testified that she was born on November 1,
1987.[15] In one afternoon when she was only eight years old, she stated that the
accused-appellant raped her inside their house. She could not remember, though, the
exact month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts,
panties and shirt and went on top of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled down
his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina and did the pumping
motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her
vagina. When he pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so only
when she urinated.[16]
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for
five times on different nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with
BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAAs
house, took off her panty and went on top of her. She could not see what he was
wearing as it was nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked
again how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said year,
AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped. She
felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she
felt pain. AAA said that she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since
it was a moonlit night and their window was only covered by cloth. He entered
through the kitchen as the door therein was detached.[17]
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in
August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top
of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was
heavy. She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the
accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that
she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to
kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape
her younger sister, DDD.[18]
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary
evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A - the Medico-Legal Report,[19] which
contained the results of the medical examination conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel
Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B -
the Social Case Study Report[20] pertaining to AAAs case, which was issued by the
Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office of the Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:

- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so
many times. last act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 oclock
position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE[21]
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness
stand to deny the informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of
AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995,
he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked
in Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed
there up to 1996. He stated that he was working in Tacloban City when the alleged
rapes happened in the municipality of XXX. When he would go home from
Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the
house of AAA as the latters parents were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel
with AAAs parents because he did not work with them in the ricefields. He further
recounted that in July 1999, he was also living in Tacloban City and worked there
as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to September
1999. The accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still
working at the same restaurant in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go
home to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he would have drinking
sprees with AAAs stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.[22]
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of

AAA was his sister and they were close to each other. He said that his parents were
still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter then resided at Calaasan,
Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents house was about two kilometers
away from the house of AAA.While he was working at the restaurant
in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once every month, mainly on
Sundays.[23]
The Judgment of the RTC

On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a
Decision convicting the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of

the Revised Penal Code as amended, and further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law
of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the Court found accused HENRY
ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF
STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged under the
informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to
indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for
each count of Rape and pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.[24] (Emphases in the original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that
AAA was in tears when she testified convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of
her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If there were inconsistencies in
AAAs testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable considering that
AAA was pitted against a learned opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of
the rape incidents was not also an indication that the charges were
fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal
officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-appellants defense of alibi
was likewise disregarded by the trial court, declaring that it was not physically
impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of the day after working hours
while he was working in Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-
appellant was positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her
and she held no grudge against him. The trial court imposed the penalty of death as
it found that AAA was less than 18 years old at the time of the commission of the
rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against the accused-
appellant the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the RTC

Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his minority as a privileged
mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct examination, the accused-appellant
claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17
years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999,
respectively. In a Resolution[26] dated November 6, 2002, the trial court denied the
accused-appellants motion, holding that the latter failed to substantiate with clear
and convincing evidence his allegation of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed
as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.[27] The parties then filed their respective briefs.[28] On
February 7, 2006, we resolved[29] to transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[30] The cases were docketed in the
appellate court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision,

decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-
01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary damages to [AAA]
in the amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for each count of
rape and clarification that the separate award of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
as moral damages likewise pertains to each count of rape. The death penalty
imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.[31]
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the
accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA were not sufficient to discredit her. The
appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when the incidents of rape occurred
no longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More significant was her
straightforward, categorical and candid testimony that she was raped eight times by
the accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC
that AAAs charges of rape conformed with the physical evidence and the accused-
appellants uncorroborated defense of alibi could not stand against the positive
identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations
and admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate court, however, differed in
appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAAs
minority. The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an
insufficient proof therefor. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also
ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was purposely sought by
the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In
view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of
Appeals awarded exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[32] of the above decision and
the same was given due course by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[33] dated May
27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required
the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30
days from notice.[34] Thereafter, in a Manifestation and Motion[35] filed on December
24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed
that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the
accused-appellant submitted a Supplemental Brief.[36]
The Issues
In the accused-appellants brief, the following issues were invoked:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME

PENALTY OF DEATH.[37]
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give
weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with
consistency the exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well as her age
at that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the
dates of the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in
a uniform manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-
appellant posits that the above inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted as
insignificant. He further insists that the qualifying circumstances of AAAs minority
and her relationship to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the
prosecution. The accused-appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to
deny the appeal, but with a modification of the penalties and the amount of
indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant
guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of
rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years
old. However, the accused-appellant points out that the prosecution failed to
substantiate the said fact as AAAs testimony thereon was too inconsistent and
incredible to be worthy of any belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that
she was raped for the first time when she was eight years old. Nonetheless, during
her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999, she said
that the accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only seven years
old. On her redirect examination, AAA then stated that she was first raped in 1998
when she was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape
by sexual intercourse as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of
statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented.[38]
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No.
[39]
8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22,
1997.[40] Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code,[41] which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
In People v. Macafe,[42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs

from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence, force and
intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the
victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years;
the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil
from good.[43] (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions

of law are essentially the same. Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in
this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the
prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of
AAA at the time of the commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission

of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the
offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.[44] Inconsistencies and discrepancies in
details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for
acquittal.[45]
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the
substance of AAAs testimony. On this matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v.
Condes[46] that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the
credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's
observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality.
The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner
of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" are all
useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The
trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being
in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result
of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were
lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the [Court of Appeals].[47]
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and
we found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-
appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape charged. AAA positively
identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears
in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as
follows:
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you were still 8 years
old?
[AAA]
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and date.
Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old?
A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.
Q: How did he rape you?

A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts.
Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you?

A: Yes, sir in our house.
Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?
A: My younger brother and I.
Q: About your mother and step father where were they?

A: In the ricefield.
PROS. SABARRE:
May we make it of record that the witness is crying.
COURT:
Have it on record.
PROS. SABARRE:
Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?

A: In the afternoon.
xxxx
Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did he do to you
next if any?
A: He went on top of me.
Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?

A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled down the
zipper.
Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what did he do next
if any?
A: He was pumping on me.
Q: Did he pull out his organ?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where did he place his organ?

A: In my vagina.
Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

A: Pain.[48]
The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal

Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete
hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA. [W]hen the testimony of a rape
victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude
that there has been carnal knowledge.[49]
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in
July 1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts
were proven with moral certainty. The testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as
follows:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July 1999?
A: Five times.
Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?

A: Night time.
Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?

A: Different nights.
Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five times?
A: My Kuya and other siblings.
Q: You have companions why were you raped?

A: Because they were sleeping.
Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you please narrate to
the court?
A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled out my panty
and went on top of me.
Q: With whom was he drinking?

A: With my step father.
Q: Where did they drink?

A: In our neighbor.
Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused wearing at that
time?
A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.
Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

A: No, sir.
Q: What did he do with his penis?

A: He made me hold it.
Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?
A: He left.
xxxx
ATTY. SABARRE:
Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how did he rape
you?
A: (witness did not answer)
PROS. SABARRE:
Make it of record that the witness is crying again.
Q: Why are you crying?

A: I am angry and hurt.
PROS. SABARRE:
Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding considering that the
witness is psychologically incapable of further proceeding.
xxxx
Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please narrate the whole
incident to this honorable court?
A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of me.
Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?

A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he pump what did you feel?

A: Pain.
COURT:
Why did you feel pain?
A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.
ATTY. SABARRE;
How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night time?
A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by cloth as cover.[50]
From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of

rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that were
likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in
August 1999. AAA narrated only one incident of rape in this manner:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the month of August
1999?
A: Two times.
Q: Was it during day time or night time?

A: Nighttime.
Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?

A: He kissed me.
Q: After kissing you what did he do next?

A: He took off his shirts.
Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?

A: He went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?

A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?

A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his name answered
Henry Arpon).[51]
It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime
that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's
evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands to
satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence.[52] Thus,
including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish
three instances when the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described

the incidents of rape in a uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our mind,
AAAs narration of the sexual abuses committed by the accused-appellant contained
an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that
he placed his organ in her private part.[53] Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine
that a victim of a savage crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then
give an accurate account of every lurid detail of a frightening experience a verity
born[e] out of human nature and experience.[54]
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellants defense of alibi
deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy
to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce
clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at
the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.[55] [S]ince alibi is a weak
defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face
of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the
crime.[56]
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court
that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be
negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible
for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of the day after working hours
while working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday,
which according to him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who
sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and subsequently
thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999. She can not be mistaken on the
identity of the accused, because the first sexual molestation happened during the
daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her
mother.[57]
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA
may have been prompted to falsely testify against him (accused-appellant) in view
of the latters quarrel with AAAs parents when he refused to work with them in the
rice fields.[58] Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and
implausible. Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a
minor disagreement, even if true, does not amount to a sufficient justification for
dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial brings
in its wake.[59]
As to the accused-appellants objection that there was no proof of the age of the
victim, we affirm the trial courts finding that the prosecution sufficiently established
the age of AAA when the incidents of rape were committed. The testimony of AAA
that she was born on November 1, 1987,[60] the voluntary stipulation of the accused,
with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and
his testimony regarding his recollection of the age of the victim, [61] his own niece,
all militate against accused-appellants theory. In People v. Pruna,[62] the Court
established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents

such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have

been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or

the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's
age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the
witness stand (when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial
features, was indeed a minor.[63]
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or
intimidation need no longer be belabored upon. [I]n rape committed by close kin,
such as the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.[64]
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime of rape with reclusion
perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law-spouse of the parent of the
victim. (Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding

article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
(Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three
(3) counts of rape committed by the accused-appellant. As a special qualifying
circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victims minority and her
relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[65] In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was less than
eighteen (18) years of age when the incidents of rape occurred and the accused-
appellant is her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. The
said circumstances were also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial
conference of the case and again admitted by him during his testimony.[66]
In People v. Pepito,[67] the Court explained that [t]he purpose of entering into
a stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and
the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial
and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions
during the pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the
admissions made by appellant therein must be given weight. Consequently, for the
first incident of rape, regardless of whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998,
the imposition of the death penalty is warranted. For the second and third counts of
rape, the imposable penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-
appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Although this matter
was not among the issues raised before the Court, we still take cognizance of the
same in accordance with the settled rule that [i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws
open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors,
though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.[68]
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for the rule on how
to determine the age of a child in conflict with the law,[69] viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy
the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict
with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of age or older. The
age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case
of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,[70] we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed
sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused
provided the following conditions concur, namely: (1) the absence of any other
satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of
testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at
the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the
prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or
his relatives' testimonies are untrue.[71]
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23,
1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly
happened in 1995.[72] Other than his testimony, no other evidence was presented to
prove the date of his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any
objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary
evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have
appreciated the accused-appellants minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344
took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68
thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences.
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the
time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this
Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and
their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released
if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
People v. Sarcia[73] further stressed that [w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to
[a] case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act

No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such
child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit
of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended,[74]i.e., from under nine years of age and above nine years of age and under
fifteen (who acted without discernment) - to fifteen years old or under and above
fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption
from criminal liability.[75]
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case
No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-
appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that time. In view
of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident
of rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed,
any doubt therein should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial
to the latter.[76] The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal
liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable
therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the
accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said
instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In Madali v. People,[77] the
Court had the occasion to reiterate that [d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a
minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may
be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this case, the fact that the
accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the
testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified
that she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands
of the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her mother if
she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal
his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and
that he was aware of the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor
under eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, for the
second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the
circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been entitled to a suspension of
sentence for the second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act
No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the
Law.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant
case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of
Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a suspended sentence,
namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the
court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.(Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No.
9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and

Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement
in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities
that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of
Corrections], in coordination with the [Department of Social Welfare and
Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and
third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above disposition and the same
shall be enforced in accordance with law and the pronouncements in the prevailing
jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.[78] that [c]ivil indemnity is
mandatory when rape is found to have been committed. Based on prevailing
jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil
indemnity for each count. We also explained in Sarcia that [t]he litmus test x x x in
the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.[79] The trial courts award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count
of rape is therefore increased to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape
committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified without need of proof other
than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries
[from the experience she underwent].[80] We also increase the trial courts award
of P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein
established in keeping with the recent case law.[81]
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages. As held

in People v. Llanas, Jr.,[82] [t]he award of exemplary damages is also proper not only
to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of the aggravating circumstances of
minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the offense, both of which
were alleged in the information and proved during the trial. The appellate courts
award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is raised to P30,000.00 for each of the
three (3) counts of rape in keeping with the current jurisprudence on the matter.[83]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated February 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry
Arpon y Juntilla is hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for
each of the three (3) counts of rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest
on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this
Decision.
(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate
action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202122 January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEOANRDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19, 2012
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the
conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556-CFM and 04-1557-CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. The
Informations for the three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04-15 5 6-CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bernabe
Pareja y Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor victim’s mother, through force, threats
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual
assault upon the person of [AAA3], a minor 13 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast
and inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bernabe
Pareja y Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age, through force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said
minor against her will.5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04-1558-CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ,
being the common law spouse of minor victim’s mother by means of force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of
Rape against the person of minor, [AAA], a13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards
her direction where she was sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor victim’s mother who confronted the
accused, and which acts of child abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of said minor complainant as a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against
him.7 After the completion of the pre-trial conference on September 16, 2004,8 trial on the merits
ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took
place on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and March 27,
2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old9]. At the time of the commission of the
aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accused-appellant Bernabe
Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged
twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s mother was
not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja],
while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun
to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise
inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately
stood up and rushed outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for
fear that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the
incident to anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to
AAA, in February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by [Pareja].
Under the same circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not around while
she and her half-siblings were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her
breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother
who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep.
Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said
incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja]
x x x many times x x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan
issued Provisional Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-03-0091. Her medico-legal report stated the
following conclusion:
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 o’clock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic
xxxx
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s mother
then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as
his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live-
in partner and that they all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAA’s allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that the alleged
incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house and argued that
there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10)
meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the
vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side.
Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go
about with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him by
AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge because
AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason behind her parents’ separation.10
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted
him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004
incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of
attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04-1558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he is
meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4
years and 2 months of prision [correccional] as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is meted
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of ₱50,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to
the prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation of ill motive.
However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to testify about what she had
witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March
2004 incident for lack of evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAA’s
testimony for being hearsay evidence as she had no personal knowledge of what happened on
March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on January
19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556 and 04-1557, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and,
consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 04-1556 to 04-1557 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the following errors as he
did before the Court of Appeals:
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES

CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS’ TESTIMONY.16
In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:
The private complainant’s actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was raped.18
Pareja’s main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of AAA in
convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the credibility of
AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing happened after the
alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled with
inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines
that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we enumerated them
as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments
and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly
when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations
omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when
his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive
upon this Court."21 While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no
substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter
of AAA’s credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally expected.22 As
this Court stated in People v. Saludo23:
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is
not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving;
rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim,
scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget.
Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of
the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial
account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness.24 The
inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that merely caused
AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the
December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAA’s ordeal.25 The date and time of the
commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the
commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other
words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and
truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the
crime."26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying that our
rulings therein are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances in Ladrillo are
prominently missing in Pareja’s case. In particular, the main factor for Ladrillo’s acquittal in that case
was because his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated when the Information against him only stated that the crime was committed "on or
about the year 1992." We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules
Court which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the
actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the
constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform
accused-appellant of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months of 1992 but
includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused-appellant
has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with
particularity the date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial
the date of the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accused-appellant
of his right to intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At
most, accused-appellant could only establish his place of residence in the year indicated in the
Information and not for the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.
xxxx
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accused-appellant
raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the offense as
alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture, and a conviction anchored mainly thereon
cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the
Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not
specified, the period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike "on or about the year
1992." Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only moved in the house where the rape
supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that
house in 1992.30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in Ladrillo contributed to
his eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not enough to reverse Ladrillo’s
conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness’ testimony that militates heavily
against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently,
the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court’s judgment of conviction, but assessed and
weighed in its totality, and in relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness
dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.31 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime charged
against him to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which, together with the other
evidence, produced reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja
merely denied the accusations against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.
As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court
has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a
conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone
would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony
of a single witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that their
house was so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the alleged incidents
happened, AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything
unusual was happening.33
This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on
his beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed
to us were not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place,34 and rape defies
constraints of time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this
wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big
families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of
other persons around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples
perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the
attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to
copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family
members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being committed.
One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily
awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellant’s contention
that there can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can
be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that "lust is no respecter of time and
place," and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped. He said
that "the ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her strength and courage to thwart
any attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish her purity." Pareja pointed out that they lived in a
thickly populated area such that any commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by
the neighbors, thus, giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja said,
AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the possibility that he
indeed committed the crimes. AAA’s belated confession, he claimed, "cannot be dismissed as trivial
as it puts into serious doubt her credibility."37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the blame
on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized
the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is
a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of
resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person
was intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative
such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the
place of violence.38 In this case, AAA’s lack of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja
would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the incident.
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also not
enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within
reason or in accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard
rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected
to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind
placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or
behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with different
circumstances.39
Likewise, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is
insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that Pareja
threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte,40 we explained why a
rape victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or
to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not
sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated.
Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape
never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and
pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats to
kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, "cannot be given any significance, as it failed
to indicate how and when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted." Furthermore, Pareja said,
the findings that AAA’s hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the
alleged sexual abuse that occurred in December, was not by penetration of the vagina.41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of the
sole testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely
corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time she
was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters
AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration.
However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong
committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable
that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a
crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and
convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence on
"sex-related" orifices other than a woman’s organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crime’s
expansion to cover gender-free rape. "The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of
rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated
from the traditional ‘rape through carnal knowledge’ or ‘rape through sexual intercourse.’"44Republic
Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and
incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as
"organ rape" or "penile rape."45 The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is
carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.46
2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or
object rape," or "gender-free rape."47 It must be attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be
a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended
party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the
second is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is
"by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into her
anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident, she was
positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the
occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the
Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven
during trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between the two
modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa.
Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape
through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the
variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall
be punished by prisión correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation omitted.)
Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and were
sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape
through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without
violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.54
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People of the
Philippines, as represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting the
Information, which contains the charge against an accused. The primary duty of a lawyer in public
prosecution is to see that justice is done55 – to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order
maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly
punished for his crime. A faulty and defective Information, such as that in Criminal Case No. 04-
1556-CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the offended party, and even the offender. Thus,
the public prosecutor should always see to it that the Information is accurate and appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution against
Pareja, especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAA’s declaration on the rape in
the December 2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify
it as explained above. However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable
doubt, was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of
rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC
considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or not she was actually penetrated by Pareja, and
eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from
sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to give
a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite being repeatedly
asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in
open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that
Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the material omissions
and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless,
Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her breasts
in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a quo of the crime
of acts of lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the attribution of
ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him because she was angry
that he caused her parents’ separation. Pareja added that these cases were initiated by AAA’s
father, as revenge against him.57
Such contention is untenable. "AAA’s credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation
of ill motives. It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill
1âw phi 1
motives or grudge."58Furthermore, motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never

swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim.59 In People v.
Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of
her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of
rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisión
correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree,62 i.e.,
arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case, absent any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, is the medium period of prisión correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months.66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows:
₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity;67 ₱30,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱10,000.00 as exemplary
damages,68 for each count of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y
Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisi6n correccional, as
maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness,
all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190178 February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA, Accused-Apellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of
the private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy,
and it is usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing
rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants are usually the only
witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accused's conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the
private complainant's testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is then incumbent upon
the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony. Judges
must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have
been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant
of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should
equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice according to law.1
Before Us is an appeal from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by
private complainant ("AAA") against appellant, Felimon Patentes.
The Prosecution’s Case
On 5 December 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit
and bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant
suddenly sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant; the first time was on 4
December 1998, when appellant persistently courted her. She only knew appellant as he was a
friend of her brother.
After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard
tucked in his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to
threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Appellant then accompanied AAA to her
grandmother’s place and returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around, appellant
placed his right hand on AAA’s shoulder. Appellant also held AAA’s right hand, which covers her
mouth with a handkerchief.
Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store.
Upon arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his pocket.
Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister,
brother-in-law, nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing
machine. Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing
AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed
AAA’s clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis into her
vagina.
The following day, 6 December 1998, appellant again forced AAA to inhale the smoke from his
cigarette, causing her to feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.
On 7 December 1998, appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA using threats, force and
intimidation, causing bruises on AAA’s arms.
On 8 December 1998, while appellant was sleeping beside AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape.
However, AAA’s attempt, while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her in the
stomach, causing AAA to lose consciousness. When AAA gained a little strength, appellant again
mauled her and raped her again.
On 9 December 1998, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped AAA while pointing a bolo to her neck.
On 10, 11 and 12 December 1998, appellant raped AAA while threatening her with bodily harm. He
also threatened to kill her family, in case she tells anyone of her ordeal.
On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will
marry him. Appellant agreed. Appellant’s mother accompanied AAA to the latter’s house to discuss
the marital plans with AAA’s family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAA’s mother asked for a private
moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA confessed how appellant forcibly took her to his house
on 5 December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAA’s mother then accompanied AAA to
report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City
Health Officer of Davao City.
Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about
AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit
a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for
spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse
as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.
The Accused-Appellant’s Defense
On 5 December 1998, pursuant to their previous agreement, appellant accompanied AAA to

Bansalan to visit and bring medicines to AAA’s grandmother. After going around Davao City, they
went to his house at about 7:00 p.m. Appellant then offered to bring AAA to her house but the latter
refused, insisting that she wanted to live with appellant because she was fed up with her mother,
who often called her "buntog" or prostitute.
AAA stayed in appellant’s house together with the latter’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews
and nieces. AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse.
Throughout AAA’s stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the household
chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAA’s grandfather went to appellant’s house on 7 December
1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999. Appellant’s mother also
went to AAA’s house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998. However, AAA’s mother
rejected the marriage proposal because of appellant’s social standing.
Leonora Gerondio (Gerondio), appellant’s neighbor, testified that she first met AAA in appellant’s
house on 5 December 1998. The following day, Gerondio again saw AAA when she went to
appellant’s house. Appellant told her that he will marry AAA. Since then, Gerondio saw AAA
everyday from 7 to 11 December 1998, cleaning the surroundings, doing the laundry, and walking
around the vicinity. AAA even visited her house and talked about AAA and appellant’s marital plans.
In her observation, AAA and appellant acted like a couple. Gerondio also accompanied appellant’s
mother to AAA’s house to discuss AAA and appellant’s marital plans. However, AAA’s mother
rejected the marriage proposal.
Wilma Enriquez (Enriquez), a common friend of AAA and appellant, testified that between 5 to 12
December 1998, she went twice to appellant’s house upon AAA’s invitation to talk about the couple’s
marital plans.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant herself;
(2) Dr. Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private complainant’s mother; and (5) Julie
Dayaday.
On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon Patentes, accused-appellant himself; (2)
Leonora Gerondio; (3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.
After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
Felimon Patentes a.k.a. Arnold Patentes is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 42,786-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
The accused shall indemnify AAA Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) in each of the eight cases
for a total of Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (₱240,000.00).
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED as to the conviction of appellant FELIMON

PATENTES for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of eight (8)
counts of Rape and as to the imposition upon him of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the
eight (8) offenses. His civil liability, however, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant FELIMON PATENTES is hereby directed to pay the following amounts:
1. ₱50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱400,000.00;
2. ₱75,000.00 each as moral damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱600,000.00; and
3. ₱25,000.00 each as temperate damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with
Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.5
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution. According to the appellate court, "AAA’s account of her ordeal in the hands of
appellant was straightforward, firm, candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the rigid, lengthy and
rigorous cross-examination by the defense, AAA remained steadfast in her narration of the details of
her harrowing experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that AAA’s testimony bears
the earmarks of truth and credibility."6
Hence, this appeal.
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12
years of age or is demented.7 In the case at bar, appellant never denied having carnal knowledge of
AAA. The only matter, thus, to be resolved by this Court is whether appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation, or that AAA was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or was under 12 years of age or is demented.
Appellant argues that if AAA really was raped for more than an entire week, it is perplexing why she
did not escape, or even seek the help of the neighbors despite several opportunities to do
so.8 Appellant further alleges that AAA’s failure to escape and her helping in the household chores in
appellant’s house prove that she was not raped and that they had consensual sexual intercourse.9
About this position, the appellate court noted and reasoned that, "appellant threatened AAA with
harm in the event that she told anyone of what happened between them. The lingering fear instilled
upon AAA is understandable considering that appellant was always armed with a bolo and was
constantly showing it to AAA. The possibility of him making good his threat was not at all remote and
the fear for her life remained palpable."10
Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.11 Nevertheless, the Court must
be guided by established principles.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape
is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.12 So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.13
Following these legal precepts, AAA’s testimony, placed side by side with the prosecution’s
evidence, must stand the test of credibility.
1. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape since proof
of injuries is not an essential element of the crime.14 And, it is also a precept that physical evidence is
of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.15 In the case at bar,
the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In fact, contrary to the
prosecution’s claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the medical certificate
revealed no telltale sign of the prosecution’s allegations. It has to be noted that the medical
examination was conducted the day after AAA’s supposed escape from appellant. As shown by the
medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save for a kiss mark, to wit:16
EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:
Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lower-inner quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm. xxx
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the subject, age of which is consistent
with the alleged date of infliction.
2. That under normal conditions without subsequent complications and unless a deeper
involvement might be present but which is not clinically apparent at the time of examination,
said injury will require medical attendance of not more than seven (7) days from date of
infliction.
3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized
male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.17
2. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility
with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man.18 Thus, whatever is repugnant
to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie
outside judicial cognizance.19
As culled from the records, AAA lived with appellant’s family for eight (8) days – in the same house
where appellant’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called
appellant’s mother, "mama." As argued by the defense, "the members of the appellant’s family could
have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if the accusations were really
true."20 Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8) days in a
house where the abuser’s entire family, including the abuser’s minor nephews and nieces live.
When appellant and AAA arrived in the former’s house, they were greeted by appellant’s father. If
AAA’s account were true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then tied her to a sewing
machine, appellant’s father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the least,
he would have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly, appellant’s mother
went to AAA’s house to propose marriage – contrary to the common experience.
Contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA only saw appellant on 4 December 1998, a day before
the alleged commission of the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as appellant was a
neighbor and friend of AAA’s brother.21 Furthermore, appellant’s mother was the midwife who
assisted AAA’s housemaid in giving birth.22 Lastly, AAA and appellant have a common friend,
Enriquez, who testified that she saw the two in appellant’s house, through AAA’s invitation.23 The
TSN reflects the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony:24
Q: Do you know that his mother is a midwife?
A: No, Sir. Because she helped in the delivery of our housemaid.
Q: When did your housemaid give birth?
A: When I went to Bansalan on December 5 I passed by the house she was about to deliver and I
saw the mother of the accused that’s the time I came to know his mother.
Q: Is it not that your stepfather even went to the house where you stayed?
A: No, sir.
Q: You will deny that?
A: I did not see him.
xxxx
Q: Is it not you said you were being locked?
A: I was locked at the door when my father arrived. I do not know because he locked me at the
room. [Emphasis supplied]
For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety among
AAA’s family members, AAA’s father, instead of reporting the matter to police authorities, went to
appellant’s house to discuss AAA and appellant’s marital plans on 7 December 1998.25 Clearly, this
is contrary to human logic and experience, and inconsistent with the prosecution’s claim.
3. The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance
in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.26 In the case at bar, the actuations of AAA
after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal
human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abuser’s mother, and worse, to live with her abuser’s
entire family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape.
It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of her honor and
chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor.27 Instead of
escaping from her abuser, AAA visited appellant’s neighbor.28 Even if AAA had several opportunities
to share her ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and instead
described the details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional, however, is the testimony of
AAA that she visited her grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction. Despite
inconsistencies in her testimony as shown in the TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her grandmother:29
Q: So you did not proceed to your grandmother’s house, where is the house of your grandmother?
A: Km. 81.
Q: Near the Dulo?
A: A bit farther of Dulo.
Q: You rode in a jeep and the driver is your cousin?
A: No sir we rode (sic) pedicab going to my grandmother’s place.
Q: There were no people?
A: We are used to ride (sic) pedicab.
Q: So you rode a pedicab at that time?
A: No, Sir. [Emphasis supplied]
We are mindful that appellant’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must
be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.30 There is such
corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and
AAA’s common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellant’s claim:31
Q: When you arrived at their house did you see the complainant AAA?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell the court what was the subject of your conversation?
A: She told me that she and Felimon Patentes are getting married, saying where they will live and
that they will go into the buy and sell business.
Q: Did you notice AAA to be happy with Felimon Patentes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the second time you went to their place do you remember what was the subject of your
conversation?
A: Regarding their plan of getting married. [Emphasis supplied]
Appellant’s neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony:32
Q: Do you remember seeing the accused sometime on December 5, 1998?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see him?
A: In their house, he just arrived.
Q: Was he alone?
A: He is with AAA.
xxxx
Q: On the following day did you see again AAA?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see her?
A: Inside their house, she was walking.
xxxx
Q: When was that when you saw her?
A: The next day, December 6, 1998.
xxxx
Q: On the succeeding days, from December 7 to 11 were you able to see AAA in the house of
Felimon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see her?
A: In the house of the accused, Felimon.
Q: What was she doing?
A: She was cleaning the surroundings of the house and did the laundry, and she was also going
around.
Q: When you said going around or "suroy-suroy" where did she go around?
A: She also went to our house.
Q: Were you able to talk to her personally?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: What did you observe from them?
A: As if they are married.
Q: What were the actions that you saw in them?
A: They were loving with each other.
Q: What do you mean by loving?
A: They are close to each other, they joke, and Felimon would place his arm on the shoulder of AAA.
[Emphasis supplied]
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means
a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution.33 In the
case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the
truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats,
force or intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity for the charge can easily be concocted.34 Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility
to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is
not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting
interpretations.35 While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law.36
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable
doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of
1âwphi 1
appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the
quantum of proof to support a conviction.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, finding appellant
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible Abduction with Rape,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being
detained for some other charge.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

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Practice Court

Diunggah oleh

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Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183577

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

HILARIO ESCOTON, Promulgated:

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Version of the Prosecution

The Version of the Defense

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court

Pay the Cost.

Q. Now, do you have a panty that time?

Q. Now is there any floor to that?

Q. And what is it made of?

Q. You mean he made a push and pull movement?

Q. Was he successful in inserting his penis [into] your vagina?

Q. Pain coming from where?

Q. And where was that liquid coming out?

Q. Is that what you address him, your uncle?

Q. What do you mean he repeated again?

Q. You mean he inserted again his penis [into] your vagina?

Q. And what did he do with your panty?

Q. And when did he wake up?

Q. You mean, he had repeatedly raped you on that evening?

Q. How many times were you raped that evening?

A. Five times, sir.[14]

It should be noted that AAA immediately informed her grandmother of the

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

RENATO C. CORONA ARTURO D. BRION

PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 183563

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52

That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],

During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he

The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:

P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:

Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE[21]

On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of

The Judgment of the RTC

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of

The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the RTC

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision,

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional

In the accused-appellants brief, the following issues were invoked:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME

The Ruling of the Court

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

1. By using force or intimidation;

In People v. Macafe,[42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under