Rule 3 - Parties to a Civil Action
In the instant
Sections 1-3
1. Iron and Steel Authority - Actions; Parties; Pleadings and Practice - Rule
3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties to a civil
action: “Section 1. Who May Be Parties.—Only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.” Under the
above quoted provision, it will be seen that those who can be parties to a
civil action may be broadly categorized into two (2) groups: (a) those who
are recognized as persons under the law whether natural, i.e., biological
persons, on the one hand, or juridical persons such as corporations, on the
other hand; and (b) entities authorized by law to institute actions.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that
agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the
Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some
other disposition thereof such as e.g., devolution or transmission of such
powers, duties, functions, etc to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring
agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be
looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way
of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in
the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of
the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are
properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special
statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession
thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines
is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-
plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little
differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require
or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
It is also relevant to note that the non-joinder of the Republic which
occurred upon the expiration of ISA’s statutory term, was not a ground for
dismissal of such proceedings since a party may be dropped or added by
order of the court, on motion of any party or on the court’s own initiative
at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.
case, the Republic has precisely moved to take over the proceedings as
party-plaintiff.
In E.B. Marcha Transport Company, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
the Court recognized that the Republic may initiate or participate in actions
involving its agents. There the Republic of the Philippines was held to be a
proper party to sue for recovery of possession of property although the
“real” or registered owner of the property was the Philippine Ports
Authority, a government agency vested with a separate juridical
personality. The Court said: “It can be said that in suing for the recovery
of the rentals, the Republic of the Philippines acted as principal of the
Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising the commission it had earlier
conferred on the latter as its agent. x x x”
2. Figuracion - In a case for annulment of title, the plaintiff must allege
two essential facts: (1) that plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2)
that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property.
Absent either of these allegations, the plaintiff is considered not the proper
party to cause the cancellation of the title of the defendant.
In essence and effect, Civil Case No. CEB-21193 is actually for reversion of
the subject lot, as a portion of Lot No. 899-D-2, to the public domain.
Reversion is a proceeding by which the State seeks the return of lands of
the public domain or the improvements thereon through the cancellation
of private title erroneously or fraudulently issued over it. The one crucial
element which sets it apart from all other actions involving possession or
title to property is the positive averment in the complaint of state
ownership of the property in dispute.
Applied to the present case, herein respondents are not even lessees of
the subject lot; they do not claim to have been occupying the property in
any capacity. Their sole interest is in the use of the property as access to
Escario Street. Such interest is merely tangential to any issue regarding
the ownership and possession of the property; hence, it is not sufficient to
vest in respondents legal standing to sue for reversion of the property. If
at all, their cause of action is only for an easement of right of way over it.
This was what they initially sought when they filed their original complaint.
Unfortunately, they abandoned such cause of action when they failed to
allege the same in their Second Amended Complaint. Under Section 8,
Rule 10, Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an original
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one. The original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered
part of the record.
Respondents having no real interest in the subject lot under their Second
Amended Complaint, they have no legal personality to file the action for
reversion of public land. It is not merely a rule of procedure but a
requirement of law that reversion be instituted in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines. Section 101 of the Public Land Act is categorical:
Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name
of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines.
The RTC acted without jurisdiction when it entertained the Second
Amended Complaint of respondents even when the latter was not a real
party-in-interest. The February 23, 2000 Decision rendered by the RTC
was an utter nullity, without legal effect or binding force whatsoever, even
upon defendant Cebu City which does not appear on record to have
appealed from it.
3. Lee - Real party in interest, defined.—Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates that: “Parties in interest.—Every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. x x x.”
By “real party in interest” is meant such party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit (Subido v. City
of Manila, et al. 108 Phil. 462 and Subido v. Sarmiento, et al., 88 Phil.
150, citing Salonga v. Warner. Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 125). A real
party in interest plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in
interest defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act
or omission violates the legal right of the former.
Indispensable Party; Petitioner Chiongbian argument that he was not
included in the original complaint and no relief was sought against him is
untenable since his own counsel had impleaded him filing a motion as an
indispensable party.—On the second issue, it is argued that since
petitioner Henry Chiongbian was not included in the original complaint and
no relief was sought against him therein, consequently, there can be no
valid judgment making him jointly and severally liable with his co-parties.
The argument standing by itself appears sound but the records clearly
show that the petitioners’ own counsel had Chiongbian impleaded as an
indispensable party and he formally filed a motion to that effect. We are in
accord with the following manifestation which the private respondent made
regarding this issue, to wit: “By his own act petitioner Henry Chiongbian
impleaded himself a party ostensibly to assure him a day in court. He was
properly summoned and he seasonably filed his answer to the complaint
and in his answer he interposed some counterclaims against herein
respondent. In all stages of the proceedings before the lower court—
except on two occasions when he and his lawyer did not appear in spite of
due notice—he was always represented by his counsel. His counsel
presented both testimonial and documentary evidence which were all
admitted and considered by the lower court. However, he did not testify in
his own behalf, although there was nothing that prevented him to do so
had he desired or chosen to testify. His not having testified in his own
behalf before the lower court, in spite of all the opportunities given to him,
amounted to a waiver of that right. But, certainly, the protective mantle of
due process of law has been fully accorded to, and fully enjoyed by him.
Hence, he could not validly and rightfully claim that he was denied due
process of law. Whatever the imperfection in form—although here there is
no such imperfection—he was validly, legally and rightfully held as a party.
4. Aguila - Parties; Pleadings and Practice; A complaint filed against a
party who is not a real party in interest should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.—Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of Court of 1964, under
which the complaint in this case was filed, provided that “every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
interest.” A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, or who is entitled to the avails of the suit. This ruling is
now embodied in Rule 3, §2 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Any decision rendered against a person who is not a real party in interest
in the case cannot be executed. Hence, a complaint filed against such a
person should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Partnerships; A partnership “has a juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of each of the partners”—it is the partnership, not its
officers or agents, which should be impleaded in any litigation involving
property registered in its name.—Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a
partnership “has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of
each of the partners.” The partners cannot be held liable for the
obligations of the partnership unless it is shown that the legal fiction of a
different juridical personality is being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal
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purposes. In this case, private respondent has not shown that A.C. Aguila
& Sons, Co., as a separate juridical entity, is being used for fraudulent,
unfair, or illegal purposes. Moreover, the title to the subject property is in
the name of A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. and the Memorandum of Agreement
was executed between private respondent, with the consent of her late
husband, and A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co., represented by petitioner. Hence, it
is the partnership, not its officers or agents, which should be impleaded in
any litigation involving property registered in its name. A violation of this
rule will result in the dismissal of the complaint. We cannot understand
why both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals sidestepped
this issue when it was squarely raised before them by petitioner.
5. Pascual - Katarungang Pambarangay; Where the parties are not actual
residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is
no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon.—In the 1982
case of Tavora v. Veloso, this Court held that where the parties are not
actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays,
there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as
provided for in Section 6 vis-à-vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508
(Katarungang Pambarangay Law). [B]y express statutory inclusion and
exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the
parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except
where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as
applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by
respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a “real party in interest” as
defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-à-vis Section
3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and
misunderstood by respondent. In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner,
the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where
the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no
jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is
not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
6. Golango - Certiorari; At the very least, he should have furnished a copy
of the petition for certiorari to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
prior to the filing thereof, but even that he did not do.—The petitioner did
not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
his petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should have furnished a
copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof, but
even that he did not do. Thereby, he violated Section 35(1), Chapter 12,
Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of
1987), which mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party.” Although the petition for certiorari bore the conformity
of the public prosecutor (i.e., Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo Formoso of
Manila), that conformity alone did not suffice. The authority of the City
Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and represent the People of the
Philippines was confined only to the proceedings in the trial court.
It does not escape our notice that the trial court’s assailed order
terminating the Prosecution’s presentation of evidence was merely
interlocutory. This fact surely adds justification to the Court of Appeals’
rejection of the petition for certiorari, because it is the settled rule that
certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order, but only a final
judgment or order that terminates the proceedings. Certiorari will be
refused where there has been no final judgment or order and the
proceeding for which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined
in the lower court. Indeed, a writ of certiorari is not intended to correct
every controversial interlocutory ruling unless the ruling is attended by
grave abuse of discretion or tainted by whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, for the function of certiorari is limited to
keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieving persons
from its arbitrary acts—acts that courts or judges have no power or
authority in law to perform.
Judgments; As long as the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, its
alleged error committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounted to
nothing more than an error of judgment that was reviewable by a timely
appeal, not by a special civil action of certiorari.—The proper remedy for
the petitioner was to proceed in the action until judgment, which, once
rendered, might then be reviewed on appeal, along with the assailed
interlocutory order. As long as the trial court acted within its jurisdiction,
its alleged error committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounted to
nothing more than an error of judgment that was reviewable by a timely
appeal, not by a special civil action of certiorari.
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7. Equitable - Parties; Where the Amendment to the Real Estate Mortgage
(AREM) was executed by the husband, with the marital consent of the
wife, the wife is obliged principally under the AREM and she is a real party
in interest, hence, any action must be prosecuted in her name as she
stands to be benefited or injured in the action.—The AREM was executed
by Antonio, with the marital consent of Matilde. Since the mortgaged
property is presumed conjugal, she is obliged principally under the AREM.
It is thus she, following Art. 1397 of the Civil Code vis-à-vis Sec. 2 of Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, who is the real party in interest, hence, the action
must be prosecuted in her name as she stands to be benefited or injured
in the action. Assuming that Matilde is indeed incapacitated, it is her legal
guardian who should file the action on her behalf. Not only is there no
allegation in the complaint, however, that respondents have been legally
designated as guardians to file the action on her behalf. The name of
Matilde, who is deemed the real party in interest, has not been included in
the title of the case, in violation of Sec. 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
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Sections 4 - 6
1. Lucman - Mandamus; Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular
deposits—they are really loans because they earn interest; All kinds of
bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as
loans and are to be covered by the law on loans; Mandamus does not lie to
enforce the performance of contractual obligations.—This Court elucidated
on the matter in Guingona, Jr., et al. v. The City Fiscal of Manila, et al.,
128 SCRA 577 (1984), citing Serrano v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 96
SCRA 96 (1980), thus: Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular
deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest. All kinds of
bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as
loans and are to be covered by the law on loans (Art. 1980, Civil Code;
Gullas v. Phil. National Bank, 62 Phil. 519). Current and savings deposits
are loans to a bank because it can use the same. The petitioner here in
making time deposits that earn interest with respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila was in reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a
depositor. The respondent Bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure
of the respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay its
obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from a depository’s
failure to return the subject matter of the deposit. (Emphasis supplied.)
The relationship being contractual in nature, mandamus is therefore not an
available remedy since mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance
of contractual obligations.
Local Government Units; Barangays; Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs);
Actions; Parties; Where the lawful recipients of the Internal Revenue
Allotments (IRAs) are the barangays, the determination of whether or not
the IRA funds were unlawfully withheld or improperly released to third
persons can only be determined if the barangays participated as parties to
the action.—The IRA funds for which the bank accounts were created
belong to the barangays headed by respondents. The barangays are the
only lawful recipients of these funds. Consequently, any transaction or
claim involving these funds can be done only through the proper
authorization from the barangays as juridical entities. The determination,
therefore, of whether or not the IRA funds were unlawfully withheld or
improperly released to third persons can only be determined if the
barangays participated as parties to this action. These questions cannot be
resolved with finality without the involvement of the barangays. After all,
these controversies involve funds rightfully belonging to the barangays.
Hence, the barangays are indispensable parties in this case.
An indispensable party is defined as parties-in-interest without whom
there can be no final determination of an action. The nature of an
indispensable party was thoroughly discussed in Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals, 280 SCRA 20 (1997), to quote: An indispensable party is a party
who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an
indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a
determination between the parties already before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one
who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.—In Arcelona, the Court also
dwelt on the consequences of failure to include indispensable parties in a
case, categorically stating that the presence of indispensable parties is a
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condition for the exercise of juridical power and when an indispensable
party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. The absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present. The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the
judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are
not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. Clearly, this case was
not initiated by the barangays themselves. Neither did the barangay
chairmen file the suit in representation of their respective barangays.
Nothing from the records shows otherwise. On this score alone, the case in
the lower court should have been dismissed.
The right to demand for the Internal Revenue Al-lotments (IRA) funds
belongs to the local government itself through the authorization of the
Sanggunian.—This prescribed legal framework governing the release and
disbursement of IRA funds to the respective barangays disabuses from the
notion that a barangay chairman, relying solely on his authority as a local
executive, has the right to demand physical possession of the IRA funds
allocated by the national government to the barangay. The right to
demand for the funds belongs to the local government itself through the
authorization of their Sanggunian.
2. MWSS - Contracts; A contract where consent is given through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud, is voidable.—As noted by
both lower courts, petitioner MWSS admits that it consented to the sale of
the property, with the qualification that such consent was allegedly unduly
influenced by then President Marcos. Taking such allegation to be
hypothetically true, such would have resulted in only voidable contracts
because all three elements of a contract, still obtained nonetheless. The
alleged vitiation of MWSS’ consent did not make the sale null and void ab
initio. Thus, “a contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud, is voidable.” Contracts “where
consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud” are voidable or annullable. These are not void as—“Concepts of
Voidable Contracts.—Voidable or annullable contracts are existent, valid,
and binding, although they can be annulled because of want of capacity or
vitiated consent of the one of the parties, but before annullment, they are
effective and obligatory between parties. Hence, it is valid until it is set
aside and its validity may be assailed only in an action for that purpose.
They can be confirmed or ratified.”
Same; Prescription; Where a contract is voidable at most, the four-year
prescriptive period under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code applies.—As
the contracts were voidable at the most, the four-year prescriptive period
under Art. 1391 of the New Civil Code will apply. This article provides that
the prescriptive period shall begin in the cases of intimidation, violence or
undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases,” and “in
case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same time.”
Parties; Indispensable Parties; Pleadings and Practice; Owners of property
over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties without
whom no relief is available and without whom the court can render no
valid judgment, and their absence in the suit renders all subsequent
actions of the trial court null and void for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present; When indispensable
parties are not before the court,the action should be dismissed.—There is
no denying that petitioner MWSS’ action against herein respondents for
the recovery of the subject property now converted into a prime
residential subdivision would ultimately affect the proprietary rights of the
many lot owners to whom the land has already been parceled out. They
should have been included in the suit as parties-defendants, for “it is well
established that owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted
are indispensable parties without whom no relief is available and without
whom the court can render no valid judgment.” Being indispensable
parties, the absence of these lot-owners in the suit renders all subsequent
actions of the trial court null and void for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Thus, when
indispensable parties are not before the court, the action should be
dismissed.
3. Pamplona - Remedial Law; Appeals; Certiorari; Section 1 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court states that only questions of law are entertained in
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, exceptions.—Section 1 of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court states that only questions of law are entertained
in appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. However, jurisprudence has
recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by
this Court: (1) the legal conclusions made by the lower tribunal are
speculative; (2) its inferences are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact of the lower tribunals are conflicting; (6) the CA went beyond the
issues; (7) the CA’s findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties;
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(8) the CA manifestly overlooked facts not disputed which, if considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (9) the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10)
when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Actions; Parties; The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action; The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable.—The non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to
comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable. In this case, the NLRC did not require respondents to
implead the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation as respondent;
instead, the Commission summarily dismissed the Complaints.
Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which is
inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by
substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest.—In any event,
there is no need to implead the leisure corporation because, insofar as
respondents are concerned, the leisure corporation and petitioner-
company are one and the same entity. Salvador v. Court of Appeals has
held that this Court has “full powers, apart from that power and authority
which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and
decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest.”
Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; Where badges of
fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated, where a wrong is sought
to be justified thereby, or where a separate corporate identity is used to
evade financial obligations to employees or to third parties, the notion of
separate legal entity should be set aside and the factual truth upheld.—
The principle requiring the piercing of the corporate veil mandates courts
to see through the protective shroud that distinguishes one corporation
from a seemingly separate one. The corporate mask may be removed and
the corporate veil pierced when a corporation is the mere alter ego of
another. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
defeated, where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, or where a
separate corporate identity is used to evade financial obligations to
employees or to third parties, the notion of separate legal entity should be
set aside and the factual truth upheld. When that happens, the corporate
character is not necessarily abrogated. It continues for other legitimate
objectives. However, it may be pierced in any of the instances cited in
order to promote substantial justice.
4. Pantranco - Parties; Permissive Joinder of Parties; Requisites; Where
there is a single transaction common to both plaintiffs, they have the same
cause of action against the defendants.—Permissive joinder of parties
requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or
series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all
the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise
proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue. In this
case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus
hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of
fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single
transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the
same cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether
the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of
action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first.—To
determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the
same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action
would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had
respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence
would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the
filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in
order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the
convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Jurisdictions; “Totality Rule”; Under the “totality rule” “where there are
several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.”—Section
5(d), Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “Sec. 5. Joinder of
causes of action.—A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing
party, subject to the following conditions: x x x (d) Where the claims in all
the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate
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amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.” The above provision
presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in
favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no
misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of whether respondents’ claims
shall be lumped together is determined by paragraph (d) of the above
provision. This paragraph embodies the “totality rule” as exemplified by
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others, that “where
there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions.”
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Sections 7 - 12
1. Chua - Parties; It is elementary that it is only in the name of a real
party in interest that a civil suit may be prosecuted. Under Section 2, Rule
3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.—It is elementary that it is only in the
name of a real party in interest that a civil suit may be prosecuted. Under
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. “Interest” within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. One having no right or interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an
action. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an
action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner
of the right sought to enforced.
Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the
whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.—Section 8,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as “one
who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete
relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.” Necessary
parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree
can be made in their absence without affecting them.
Said defendants no longer have any interest in the subject property.
However, being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their
presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible issues of the
controversy.—An example of a necessary party may be found in Seno v.
Mangubat. Petitioner therein sold her property through a deed of sale to
three vendees. Two of the vendees then sold their shares to the third
buyer, who then sold the property to another set of persons. Thereafter,
petitioner, who claimed that the true intent of the first sale was an
equitable mortgage, filed a complaint seeking the reformation of the deed
of sale and the annulment of the second sale. The question arose whether
the two vendees who had since disposed of their shares should be
considered as indispensable parties or necessary parties. In concluding
that they were only necessary parties, the Court reasoned: In the present
case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact an
absolute sale nor if the sale is held to be an equitable mortgage.
Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject
property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the aforementioned
defendants in the property. Said defendants no longer have any interest in
the subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to
be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible
issues of the controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an
absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will
have been amply protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event
may enforce their rights against defendant Marcos Mangubat.
Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the
dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties.—
Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: Neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action.—
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately. Clearly, misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the
complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-
joinder or misjoinder of parties. Moreover, the dropping of misjoined
parties from the complaint may be done motu proprio by the court, at any
7
stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse party.
Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while
erroneous, may be corrected with ease through amendment, without
further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit.
Courts; Jurisdictions; It should then follow that any act or omission
committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for
impediment to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of
the suit.—It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a
misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the
prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all,
such party should not have been included in the first place, and no efficacy
should be accorded to whatever act or omission of the party. Since the
misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an
indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever
action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or
certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential. Hence, it should
not have mattered to the RTC that Jonathan Chua had failed to sign the
certification against forum-shopping, since he was misjoined as a plaintiff
in the first place. The fact that Jonathan was misjoined is clear on the face
of the complaint itself, and the error of the RTC in dismissing the
complaint is not obviated by the fact that the adverse party failed to raise
this point. After all, the RTC could have motu proprio dropped Jonathan as
a plaintiff, for the reasons above-stated which should have been evident to
it upon examination of the complaint.
2. Seno - Remedial Law; Parties; Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 3 of Rules of Court;
Indispensable and Necessary Parties, defined—Under Section 7,
indispensable parties must always be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them. Necessary parties
must be joined, under Section 8, in order 'to adjudicate the whole
controversy and avoid multiplicity of suits. Indispensable parties are those
with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without
their presence. Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary
to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far
separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without
affecting them.
Defendants, being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their
presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible issues of
controversy. —In the present case, there are no rights of defendants
Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale
should be held to be in fact an absolute sale nor if the sale is held to be an
equitable mortgage.
Defendants, being proper parties, their joinder as parties-defendants was
correctly ordered under Sec. 8 of Rule 8.—In fact the plaintiffs were not
after defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as shown
by their noninclusion in the complaint and their opposition to the motion to
include said defendants in the complaint as indispensable parties. It was
only because they were ordered by the court a quo that they included the
said defendants in the complaint. The lower court erroneously held that
the said defendants are indispensable parties. Notwithstanding, defendants
Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat not being indispensable
parties but only proper parties, their joinder as parties defendants was
correctly ordered being in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.
Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot
disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate for
that would impair public confidence in the certificate of title; otherwise
everyone dealing with property registered under the torrens system would
have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly
or irregularly issued by the court. Indeed, this is contrary to the evident
purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and the
law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. Stated differently, an innocent purchaser for
value relying on a torrens title issued is protected.
3. Lotte - Remedial Law; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; An indispensable
party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants; The
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory; The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present.—An indispensable party is a party in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable
parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to
vest the court with jurisdiction, which is “the authority to hear and
8
determine a cause, the right to act in a case.” Thus, without the presence
of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court
cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.—In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties
may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of
the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.
4. Domingo - Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Parties; Indispensable
Parties; The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void.—Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court
cannot attain real finality.Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment rendered by the court.The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority
to act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The
responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the
petitioner/plaintiff.
Non-Joinder; The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action.—However, the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added
by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court,
the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s
failure to comply therefor.The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
to be indispensable. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent
(petitioner therein) to implead the BOC as respondent, but merely relied
on the rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca and Vivo v. Cloribel. The CA’s
reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the
petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and
not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an
indispensable party in the aforecited cases.
5. Republic - Courts; Sandiganbayan; Administrative Law; Executive Order
No. 14; PCGG; The PCGG does not try and decide, or hear and determine,
or adjudicate with finality cases involving the issue of whether or not
property should be forfeited and transferred to the State because the
same is ill-gotten; this function is reserved to the Sandiganbayan. ___
Executive Order No. 14 defines “the jurisdiction over cases involving the
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates,
close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees.”
Section 2 thereof provides that the PCGG shall file all such cases, whether
civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction thereof.” In the case of Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]), the court interpreted
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction under this statute to extend to “all cases
of the commission x x x, and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or
related to (them), such cases necessarily fall likewise under the
Sandiganbayan’s exclusive and original jurisdiction subject to review on
certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.” (pp. 561-562; Italics
supplied). Likewise, in the case of Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc.
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, (150 SCRA 181 [1987])
we said: “It should also by now be reasonably evident from what has thus
far been said that the PCGG is not, and was never intended to act as, a
judge. Its general function is to conduct investigations in order to collect
evidence establishing instances of ‘ill-gotten wealth;’ issue sequestration,
and such orders as may be warranted by the evidence thus collected and
as may be necessary to preserve and conserve the assets of which it takes
custody and control and prevent their disappearance, loss or dissipation;
and eventually file and prosecute in the proper court of competent
jurisdiction all cases investigated by it as may be warranted by its findings.
It does not try and decide, or hear and determine, or adjudicate with any
character of finality or compulsion, cases involving the essential issue of
whether or not property should be forfeited and transferred to the State
because ‘ill-gotten’ within the meaning of the Constitution and the
executive orders. This function is reserved to the designated court, in this
case, the Sandiganbayan. (Ex. Ord. No. 14)”
9
Powers of the PCGG; The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited; the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to determine whether or not the PCGG
exceeded its power. ___ The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited. Its
jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth must be within the
parameters stated in Executive Order No. 14. Necessarily, the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten wealth cases
must include the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the PCGG
exceeded its power to grant immunity pursuant to the provisions of
Executive Order No. 14.
The PCGG is authorized to file both criminal and civil cases against persons
suspected of having acquired ill-gotten wealth. ___ A cursory reading of
Executive Order No. 14 shows that the PCGG is authorized to file both
criminal and c ivil cases against persons suspected of having acquired ill-
gotten wealth. Section 3 thereof provides: “Section 3. Civil suits for
restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential
damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379,
or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in
connection with Executive Order No. 1 dated February 28, 1986 and
Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately from
and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.”
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of
Parties; PCGG’s motion to drop Campos, Jr. in the civil case has legal basis
under Sec. 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. ___ Even from the viewpoint
of procedure, the PCGG was right when it filed a motion to drop Jose
Campos, Jr. as defendant in the civil case. Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court states: “SECTION 11, RULE 3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties. ___ Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are just. x x x (Italics supplied)” We interpreted this rule in the case of
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975): “x x x the latter rule does
not comprehend whimsical and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a
complaint. What it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-
joinder and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in a
complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously later at the pleasure
of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had been
made in the honest conviction that it was proper and the subsequent
dropping is requested because it turned out that such inclusion was a
mistake. And this is the reason why the rule ordains that the dropping be
‘on such terms as are just’ ___ just to all the other parties.” There is
nothing whimsical or capricious in dropping the petitioner-intervenor from
the complaint. Quite the contrary, it is based on sound and salutary
reasons.
Indispensable Parties; Effect of Solidarity; Solidarity does not make a
solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by a creditor. ___ As
discussed earlier, the PCGG’s motion to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in
Civil Case 0010 has legal basis under Executive Order No. 14. The fact that
Campos, Jr. and all the other defendants were charged solidarily in the
complaint does not make him an indispensable party. We have ruled in the
case of Operators Incorporated v. American Biscuit Co., Inc., [154 SCRA
738 (1987)] that “Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an
indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil
Code says that the creditor ‘may proceed against anyone of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.”
6. Algura - Actions; Parties; Pauper Litigants; The rule on pauper litigants
was inserted in Rule 141 without revoking or amending Section 21 of Rule
3—on 1 March 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants.—It
can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule
141 without revoking or amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for
the exemption of pauper litigants from payment of filing fees. Thus, on
March 1, 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely,
Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 18.
Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141,
Section 18 on 1 March 2000 and subsequently amended as Rule 141,
Section 19 on 16 August 2003, which is now the present rule) are still
valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants.—The position of
petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to
litigate as indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial
court has to apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on
such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and
discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141,
Section 16 on Legal Fees. The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule
141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000
and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003,
which is now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on
indigent litigants.
10
The fact that Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent
litigant was retained in the rules of procedure, even elaborating on the
meaning of an indigent party, and was also strengthened by the addition
of the third paragraph on the right to contest the grant of authority to
litigate only goes to show that there was no intent at all to consider said
rule as expunged from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.—The history of
the two seemingly conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the
intent of the Court to consider the old Section 22 of Rule 3, which took
effect on January 1, 1994 to have been amended and superseded by Rule
141, Section 16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M. No. 83-
6-389-0. If that is the case, then the Supreme Court, upon the
recommendation of the Committee on the Revision on Rules, could have
already deleted Section 22 from Rule 3 when it amended Rules 1 to 71 and
approved the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1,
1997. The fact that Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on
indigent litigant was retained in the rules of procedure, even elaborating
on the meaning of an indigent party, and was also strengthened by the
addition of a third paragraph on the right to contest the grant of authority
to litigate only goes to show that there was no intent at all to consider said
rule as expunged from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore,
Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000
and the second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite these two
amendments, there was no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3.
This clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules
on indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as an indigent litigant.
Statutory Construction; Implied repeals are frowned upon unless the
intent of the framers of the rules is unequivocal—instead of declaring Rule
3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly amended by Section 18
and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can
and should be harmonized.—It may be argued that Rule 3, Section 21 has
been impliedly repealed by the recent 2000 and 2004 amendments to Rule
141 on legal fees. This position is bereft of merit. Implied repeals are
frowned upon unless the intent of the framers of the rules is unequivocal.
It has been consistently ruled that: (r)epeals by implication are not
favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature
so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with
full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute[,] it was not intended to interfere with
or abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the
later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the
reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every
effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable
construction they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a
repeal of the earlier. (Emphasis supplied). Instead of declaring that Rule 3,
Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly amended by Section 18 and
later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and
should be harmonized. The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and
Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when conflicts
are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize
them. Hence, “every statute [or rule] must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.”
If the trial court finds that the application meets the income and property
requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically
granted and the grant is a matter of right, but if the trial court finds that
one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing
to enable the applicant to prove that he has “no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself
and his family.”— The two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible
with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is
filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents
submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the
income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of
Rule 141—that is, the applicant’s gross income and that of the applicant’s
immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum
wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a
fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP
300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income
and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is
automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right. However, if the
trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it
would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has
“no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family.” In that hearing, the adverse party
may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by
the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application
depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also
provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such
11
authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court,
possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the
application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time
fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees
shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may
impose.
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards
while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement
to the exemption.—The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides
specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits
of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse
the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and
scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that the
applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial
court must also guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate
as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which
would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement.
Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and
secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the
underprivileged, and the marginalized.—Access to justice by the
impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) itself,
initiated by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed prime
importance on ‘easy access to justice by the poor’ as one of its six major
components. Likewise, the judicial philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban makes it imperative that the courts
shall not only safeguard but also enhance the rights of individuals—which
are considered sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, one of
the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the
unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged,
and the marginalized.
-------
Sections 13 to 19
1. Chiang - Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Only natural or
juridical persons may be parties in a civil action.–––We hold against the
petitioner on the first question. It is true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the
Rules of Court clearly provides that “only natural or juridical persons may
be parties in a civil action.” It is also not denied that the school has not
been incorporated. However, this omission should not prejudice the private
respondent in the assertion of her claims against the school.
Labor; Money Claims; Petitioner school failed to comply with its obligation
to incorporate under the Corporation Law; Petitioner cannot now invoke its
own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from respondent’s
complaint.–––Having been recognized by the government, it was under
obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from
such recognition. It appears that it had not done so at the time the
complaint was filed notwithstanding that it had been in existence even
earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-
compliance with the law to immunize it from the private respondent’s
complaint.
Estoppel; Having contracted with respondent every year for 32 years and
respondent itself is possessed of juridical personality, it is now estopped
from denying such personality to defeat respondent’s claim.–––There
should also be no question that having contracted with the private
respondent every year for thirty two years and thus represented itself as
possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped
from denying such personality to defeat her claim against it. According to
Article 1431 of the Civil Code, “through estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it.”
As the school may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Sec.
15 of Rule 3 under which persons joined in an association without any
juridical personality may be sued with such association.–––As the school
itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3,
Section 15, under which the persons joined in an association without any
juridical personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has
been shown that the individual members of the board of trustees are not
liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent’s dismissal.
A charitable institution is covered by the labor laws; In 1968 there was no
law exempting charitable institutions from the operation of the labor laws;
12
Private respondent is entitled to the protection of the Termination Pay Law
then in force assuming that petitioner was a charitable institution.–––It is
clear now that a charitable institution is covered by the labor laws
although the question was still unsettled when this case arose in 1968. At
any rate, there was no law even then exempting such institutions from the
operation of the labor laws (although they were exempted by the
Constitution from ad valorem taxes). Hence, even assuming that the
petitioner was a charitable institution as it claims, the private respondent
was nonetheless still entitled to the protection of the Termination Pay Law,
which was then in force.
2. Lawas - Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Attorneys for a party
ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death of the
principal.—Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred
in considering the former counsels of the deceased defendant as counsels
for the heirs of the deceased. The statement in the decision of the Court of
Appeals that "the appearance of the lawyers of their deceased father in
court on January 13, 1976 (Annex K) carries the presumption that they
were authorized by the heirs of the deceased defendant" is erroneous. As
this Court held in People vs. Florendo (77 Phil. 16), "the attorneys for the
offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death
of the latter, the principal." Moreover, such a presumption was not
warranted in view of the manifestation of said lawyers in open court on
November 27, 1975 that they were not representing the heirs of the
deceased defendant.
Substitution of deceased; After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased,
the executor or administrator of his estate, as the substitute.—Under the
said Rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased, that
is, the executor or administrator of his estate. It is only in cases of
unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or
in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate,
that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the
deceased to be substituted for the deceased.
3. Bonifacio - Agrarian Law; Ejectment of an agricultural lessee; General
rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party.—Private
respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B ’68 as more
than an ordinary ejectment case. It is, indeed, an agrarian case for the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee, which in the light of the public policy
involved, is more closely and strictly regulated by the State. This factor,
however, does not operate to bar the application to the instant case of the
general rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party.
Ground for ejectment; Right of cultivation as a ground was not exclusive
and personal to the landowner-lessor.—Under this provision, ejectment of
an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor
desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his
immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law clearly did not intend
to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but
to extend the exercise of such right to the members of his immediate
family. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was
not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say
otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise
conferred upon the landowner’s immediate family members.
“Personal Cultivation”, defined.—The right of cultivation was extended to
the landowner’s immediate family members evidently to place the
landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still
is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In this
regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the
landholding with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the
contemplation of the law engaged in “personal cultivation.” Thus, whether
used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term “personal
cultivation” cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a right
personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right
extends to the members of the lessor’s or lessee’s immediate family
members.
Actions; Death of a party; Duty of the attorney to inform the court.—Rules
of procedure make it the duty of the attorney to inform the court promptly
of his client’s death, incapacity or incompetency during the pendency of
the action and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative. In case of a party’s
death, the court, if the action survives, shall then order upon proper notice
the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased within a period of 30 days or within such time as may be
granted.
Statutes; General rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless
otherwise provided therein.—Neither can private respondent derive
13
comfort from the amendment of Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 by Section 7
of R.A. No. 6389 and the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. In Nilo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-34586, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 519, we categorically
ruled that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied
retroactively under the general rule that statutes have no retroactice effect
unless otherwise provided therein.
4. Heirs of Haberer - Practice and Pleadings; Appeal; The Court of Appeals
committed a grave abuse of discretion in applying the rule “that litigants
have no right to assume that extensions of time to file appellants’ brief
shall be granted” to the instant case inasmuch as appellant died during the
pendency of the appeal. Under the Rules, the courts are required to order
the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative to
represent the estate of a deceased party.—Respondent court, however,
denied reconsideration, per its Resolution of January 15, 1976 citing the
general principle that “litigants have no right to assume that such
extensions will be granted as a matter of course.” But respondent court
erred in applying this general principle and summarily denying
reconsideration and denying admission of the appellant’s brief conditioned
upon the administrator of the deceased’s estate making his appearance
upon his appointment and being granted leave to file his supplemental
brief/memorandum, in view of the intervening event of appellant’s death
and the interposition of the equally established principle that the relation
of attorney and client is terminated by the death of the client, as
acknowledged by respondent court itself as well as respondents. In the
absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives of his
deceased client, the attorney would thereafter have no further power or
authority to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform
the court of the client’s death and take the necessary steps to safeguard
the deceased’s rights in the case.
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court sets the rule on substitution of
parties in case of death of any of the parties. Under the Rule, it is the
court that is called upon, after notice of a party’s death and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal
representative of the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or
such time as it may grant. Since no administrator of the estate of the
deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same was still pending
determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion of
the deceased’s counsel for the suspension of the running of the period
within which to file appellant’s brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule,
it should have set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with
her legal representative or heirs, failing which, the court is called upon to
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased at the cost of the deceased’s estate, and
such representative shall then “immediately appear for and on behalf of
the interest of the deceased.”
Actions; Where there was no proper substitution of the deceased party’s
legal representative, the judgment rendered by the Court is null and
void.—Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in an action that
survives, and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the
legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the
deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been
effected, the trial held by the court without such legal representatives or
heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because
the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment
would be binding.
The death of appellant does not of itself render the continuace of the
appeal unnecessary.—Respondent court likewise gravely erred in
dismissing the appeal on “(its) belief that the supervening death of the
appellant Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer rendered the continuance of
the appeal unnecessary” on the basis of a totally inapplicable citation of a
ruling in Velasco vs. Rosenberg, 29 Phil. 212, 214 that “If pending appeal,
an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant
any relief, the appeal will be dismissed.” Manifestly, the appellant’s death
in no way impedes that the deceased’s appeal to recover the parcel of land
registered in her name be continued and determined for the benefit of her
estate and heirs.
Judges; Due Process; Litigants should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of their case.—What should guide judicial action is the
principle that a party litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose
life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. A liberal, rather than a
strict and inflexible adherence to the Rules, is justified not only because
appellant (in this case, her estate and/or heirs) should be given every
opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial injury or prejudice
can well be caused to the adverse parties principally, since they are in
actual possession of the disputed land.
14
5. Gochan - Constitutional Law; Due Process; A critical component of due
process is a hearing before a tribunal that is impartial and disinterested.—
A critical component of due process is a hearing before a tribunal that is
impartial and disinterested. Every litigant is indeed entitled to nothing less
than “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.” All the other elements of
due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate
decision were to come from a biased judge.
Remedial Law; Judges; Inhibition; The Rules contemplate two kinds of
inhibition: compulsory and voluntary.—The Rules contemplate two kinds of
inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. The instances mentioned in the first
paragraph of the cited Rule conclusively presume that judges cannot
actively and impartially sit in a case. The second paragraph, which
embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the discretion of the judges
concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with
only their conscience as guide.
Judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation; When
circumstances reasonably arouse suspicions, and out of such suspicions a
suggestion is made of record that they might be induced to act with
prejudice for or against a litigant, they should conduct a careful self-
examination; Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on
their own “sound discretion”.—To be sure, judges may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when circumstances reasonably
arouse suspicions, and out of such suspicions a suggestion is made of
record that they might be induced to act with prejudice for or against a
litigant, they should conduct a careful self-examination. Under the second
paragraph of the cited Section of the Rules of Court, parties have the right
to seek the inhibition or the disqualification of judges who do not appear to
be wholly free, disinterested, impartial or independent in handling a case.
Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on their own
“sound discretion.” That discretion is a matter of conscience and is
addressed primarily to their sense of fairness and justice.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis.—Verily, the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered
discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition
must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality
is not enough ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is
without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of
bias or partiality.
Bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary
inhibition of judges must be proved with clear and convincing evidence.—
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice,
to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must
be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their
partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed
against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to
administer justice fairly and equitably—both to the poor and the rich, the
weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected.
A preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses is discretionary on the part
of a judge; Judge Dicdican cannot be charged with bias and partiality,
merely on the basis of his decision not to grant a motion for a preliminary
hearing.—The fact that respondents’ Motion for Hearing was denied does
not by itself show bias and partiality. Clearly, Judge Dicdican based his
denial on the Rules of Court, according to which a preliminary hearing on
affirmative defenses is indeed discretionary on the part of a judge. Thus,
Judge Dicdican cannot be charged with bias and partiality, merely on the
basis of his decision not to grant a motion for a preliminary hearing.
-------
Sections 18 - 22
1. Board of Liquidators - Courts; Judgment; Appeals.—An appellate court
may base its decision of affirmance of the judgment below on a point or
points ignored by the trial court on which said court was in error.
Corporations; Three methods of winding up corporate affairs.—Accepted in
this jurisdiction are three methods by which a corporation may wind up its
affairs: (1) under Section 3, Rule 104, of the Rules of Court (which
superseded Section 66 of the Corporation Law), whereby, upon voluntary
dissolution of a corporation, the court may direct "such disposition of its
assets as justice requires, and may appoint a receiver to collect such
assets and pay the debts of the corporation"; (2) under Section 77 of the
Corporation Law, whereby a corporation whose corporate existence is
terminated, "shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three
years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose
of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and of enabling it
15
gradually to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its
property and to divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was established"; and (3) under
Section 78 of the Corporation Law, by virtue of which the corporation,
within the three-year period just mentioned, "is authorized and
empowered to convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of
members, stockholders, creditors, and others interested,"
Board of Liquidators; Trustee for government.—By Executive Order No.
372, the government, the sole stockholder, abolished the National Coconut
Corporation (NACOCO) and placed its assets in the hands of the Board of
Liquidators. The Board thus became the trustee on behalf of the
government. It was an express trust. The legal interest became vested in
the trustee, the Board of Liquidators. The beneficial interest remained with
the sole stockholder, the government. The Board took the place of the
dissolved government corporations after the expiration of the statutory
three-year period for the liquidation of their affairs.
No term for life of Board.—No time limit has been tacked to the existence
of the Board of Liquidators and its function of closing the affairs of various
government corporations. Its term of life is not fixed.
Right of Board of Liquidators to proceed as partyplaintiff; Case at bar.—At
no time had the government withdrawn the property. or the authority to
continue the present suit, from the Board of Liquidators. Hence, the Board
can prosecute this case to its final conclusion. The provisions of Section 78
of the Corporation Law, the third method of winding up corporate affairs,
find application. The Board has personality to proceed as party-plaintiff in
this case.
Settlement of decedent's estate; Actions; Actions that survive; Executors
and administrators.—The actions that survive against a decedent's
executors or administrators are: (1) actions to recover real and personal
property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3)
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. A suit to
recover damages, based on the alleged tortious acts of the manager of a
government corporation, survives. It is not a mere money claim that is
extinguished upon the death of a party.
Corporations; Implied authority of corporate officer to enter into
contracts.—A corporate officer, entrusted with the general management
and control of its business, has implied authority to make any contract or
do any other act which is necessary or appropriate to the conduct of the
ordinary business of the corporation. As such officer, he may, without any
special authority from the Board of Directors, perform all acts of an
ordinary nature, which by usage or necessity are incident to his office, and
may bind the corporation by contracts in matters arising in the usual
course of business.
Where similar acts of manager were approved by directors.—Where similar
acts have been approved by the directors as a matter of general practice,
custom, and policy, the general manager may bind the company without
formal authorization of the board of directors. In varying language,
existence of such authority is established by proof of the course of
business, the usages and practices of the company and by the knowledge
which the board of directors has, or must be presumed to have, of acts
and doings of its subordinates in and about the affairs of the corporation.
Where the practice of the corporation has been to allow its general
manager to negotiate and execute contracts in its copra trading activities
for and in Nacoco's behalf without prior board approval, and the board
itself, by its acts and through acquiescence, practically laid aside the by-
law requirement of prior approval, the contracts of the general manager,
under the given circumstances, are valid corporate acts.
Ratification by corporation of unauthorized contract of its officers.—
Ratification by a corporation of an unauthorized act or contract by its
officers or others relates back to the time of the act or contract ratified
and is equivalent to original authority. The corporation and the other party
to the transaction are in precisely the same position as if the act or
contract had been authorized at the time. The adoption or ratif ication of a
contract by a corporation is nothing more nor less than the making of an
original contract. The theory of corporate ratification is predicated on the
right of a corporation to contract, and any ratification or adoption is
equivalent to a grant of prior authority.
Contracts; Bad faith.—Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
16
Damages; Damnum absque injuria.—The present case is one of damnum
absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here absent. There
cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting.
2. Aguas - Executor and Administrator; Claims against the estate of the
deceased; Actions that are abated by death.—Under Rule 87, section 5, of
the Rules of Court, actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for
funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2)
judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract express or implied". The phrase "contract express or
implied" includes all purely personal obligations other than those which
have their source in delict ortort.(Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil. 182,
189-194).
Actions that Survive; Meaning of "injury" to property.—Actions that survive
against a decedent's executor or administrator are: (1) actions to recover
real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien
thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property (Rule 88). Injury to property is not limited to injuries to specific
property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured
or diminished (Baker vs. Crandall, 47 Am. Rep. 126; also 171 A.L.R.,
1395). To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses is
injurious to that party's property (Javier vs.Araneta, L-4369, August 31,
1953). Hence, a suit for damages therefor survives the death of the
defendant.
-----
Rule 4 Venue
1. Hoechst - Remedial Law; Venue; Improper venue; Change of venue
from that fixed in the rules may be effected upon written agreement of the
parties not only before actual filing of action but even after the same has
been filed; Written agreement of the parties as to venue binding and
enforceable by the courts; After action has been filed, transfer of venue by
agreement of the parties is at court’s discretion.—The pose taken by
respondents does evoke sympathy, but it can hardly carry the day for
them. Change or transfer of venue from that fixed in the rules may be
effected upon written agreement of the parties not only before the actual
filing of the action but even after the same has been filed. The settled rule
of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written agreement of the
parties as to venue, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 4, is not only binding
between the parties but also enforceable by the courts. It is only after the
action has been filed already that change or transfer of venue by
agreement of the parties is understandably controllable in the discretion of
the court. The agreement in this case was entered into long before the
petitioner’s action was filed. It is clear and unequivocal. The parties therein
stipulated that “(I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement,
the venue of any action shall he in the competent courts of the Province of
Rizal.” No further stipulations are necessary to elicit the thought that both
parties agreed that any action by either of them would be filed only in the
competent courts of Rizal province exclusively.
Exceptions from application of transfer of venue by agreement of the
parties; Agreement as to venue is oppressive when venue stipulation
works injustice or deny the party concerned access to the courts by reason
of poverty.—We have given due attention to this posture of respondents.
Indeed, there may be instances when an agreement as to venue may be
so oppressive as to effectively deny to the party concerned access to the
courts by reason of poverty. The difficulties pictured by respondents that a
poor plaintiff from a distant province may have to encounter in filing suit in
a particular place can indeed happen. In such an eventuality and
depending on the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Court may
declare the agreement as to venue to be in effect contrary to public
policy,—despite that in general, changes and transfers of venue by written
agreement of the parties is allowable—whenever it is shown that a
stipulation as to venue works injustice by practically denying to the party
concerned a fair opportunity to file suit in the place designated by the
rules.
Economic conditions of contending parties as well as practical reasons do
not warrant change of venue; Case at bar.—But a cursory inquiry into the
respective economic conditions of the parties herein as reflected in the
record before Us does not show that private respondent Francisco Torres is
really in no position to carry on a litigation in the Province of Rizal,
because of this residence or place of business being in Isabela province.
The volume of business covered by the Distributorship Agreement in
question, Annex C of the Petition, and to be handled by private respondent
Torres is P700,000. The amount sought to be covered by said respondent
in his complaint, Annex A of the Petition, totals more than P300,000.
These circumstances preclude, in Our view, the need to apply equitable
considerations to the case of respondent Torres. It is quite obvious that his
17
economic condition does not warrant non-enforcement of the stipulation as
to venue that he has agreed to. We are persuaded that his pretension that
he had no alternative but to agree, even if true, does not merit relief.
Considering the nature and volume of the business he has with petitioner,
there is nothing oppressive in his being required to litigate out of his
province. After all, for practical reasons, there seems to be justification
also for petitioner to see to it that all suits against it be concentrated in the
Province of Rizal, as otherwise, considering the nationwide extent of its
business, it would be greatly inconvenienced if it has to appear in so many
provinces everytime an action is filed against it. We are convinced both
parties agreed to the venue in controversy with eyes wide open.
2. Surigao - Remedial Law; Action; Venue; The cause of action is the
recovery of the damage ex-contractu on account and on the basis of the
bill of lading.—The matter was correctly resolved by the Court of Appeals,
to which We concur, to wit: "x x x the cause of action is the recovery of
the damage ex-contractu on account and on the basis of the bill of lading.
The present action does not concern or refer to any disagreement or
dispute arising out of the lease of the barge.—The present action does not
concern or refer to any disagreement or dispute arising out of the lease of
the barge which under the lease contract needs to be settled by the
parties in the proper court of the Province of Surigao del Norte; withall,
this is an action of respondent Phoenix, as subrogor to recover sum of
money and damages from petitioner as debtor arising out of marine
subrogation recovery and on the basis of the bill of lading.
A statement in a contract where venue should be laid does not preclude
the filing of suits at the election of the plaintiff.—Even assuming arguendo
that the contract of lease should prevail over the bill of lading, We have
previously held that a statement in a contract where venue should be laid
does not preclude the filing of suits at the election of the plaintiff. Sec. 3,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides an alternative to Sec. 2(b) of the
same rule such that parties may, by written agreement, change or transfer
venue of an action from one province to another. But such written
agreement should clearly and explicitly state the intention of the parties
restricting the filing of action to a particular court or to the exclusion of
other courts.
3. Phil. Banking Corp. - Actions; Venue; Venue relates to the place of trial
and not to the jurisdiction of the court.—Under Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss an action may be made within
the time for pleading on the ground that venue is improperly laid. Venue
relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. The
matter of venue is regulated by the Rules of Court, so that the choice of
venue is not left to the caprices of plaintiff.
Venue is waivable.—As a general rule, all personal actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. However, by written agreement of the
parties, the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another. Besides, when improper venue is not objected to in a
motion to dismiss it is deemed waived. In other words, venue is waivable.
It is procedural, not a jurisdictional matter. It is intended to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts.
The rules on venue simply arrange for the convenient and effective
transaction of business in the courts and do not relate to their power,
authority or jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, venue stipulations in a
contract should be considered merely as agreement on additional forum,
not as limiting venue to the specified place.—The later cases of Lamis
Ents. v. Lagamon, Capati v. Ocampo, Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals,
Moles v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation v. Sherman, Nasser v. Court of Appeals and just recently,
Surigao Century Sawmill Co. v. Court of Appeals, all treaded the path
blazed by Polytrade. The conclusion to be drawn from all these is that the
more recent jurisprudence shall properly be deemed modificatory of the
old ones. Restating the rule, venue stipulations in a contract, while
considered valid and enforceable, do not as rule supersede the general
rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an
agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. For, to restrict venue
only to that place stipulated in the agreement is a construction purely
based on technicality which, on the contrary, should be liberally construed.
Thus, we hold that the petitioner in this case is not barred nor proscribed
from filing its case against private respondents in Makati where petitioner
holds its residence, pursuant to Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
18
4. Saludo v. AMEX - Actions; Venue; The choice of venue for personal
actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is given to the plaintiff
but not to the plaintiff’s caprice because the matter is regulated by the
Rules of Court.—Petitioner Saludo’s complaint for damages against
respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is
governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads: SEC. 2.
Venue of personal actions.—All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff. The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is
given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff’s caprice because the matter is
regulated by the Rules of Court. The rule on venue, like other procedural
rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or
the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and
proceeding. The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the
RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the
place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to
that place.
Residence; Domicile; Words and Phrases; The term “residence” as
employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of
first instance means the place of abode whether permanent or temporary,
of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from “domicile” which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.—The appellate court committed reversible error in
finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the
time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue
was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc.
v. Sarmiento, 75 SCRA 124 (1977), the Court had the occasion to explain
at length the meaning of the term “residence” for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 298 (1976), we explained that the
term “resides” as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed
with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished
from “domicile” which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. “It is fundamental in the
law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs
for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain
the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into
consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It
is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous
in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established
principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay
of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well
emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily
supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
The definition of “residence” for purposes of election law is more stringent
in that it is equated with the term “domicile”; When parsed, the term
“residence” requires two elements—(1) intention to reside in the particular
place, and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.—As a member of the House of
Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a
quo as possessing the requirements for the said position, including that he
was then a resident of the district which he was representing, i.e.,
Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term
“residence” is synonymous with “domicile,” thus: x x x [T]he Court held
that “domicile” and “residence” are synonymous. The term “residence,” as
used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. x x x It can be readily gleaned that the
definition of “residence” for purposes of election law is more stringent in
that it is equated with the term “domicile.” Hence, for the said purpose,
the term “residence” imports “not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.” When parsed, therefore, the term “residence”
requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and
(2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, “the place where a
party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.”
For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of “residence” is
adopted; Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile; Since a congressman, or the lone
19
representative of a particular district, has his residence (or domicile)
therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he
is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for
filing personal actions.—For purposes of venue, the less technical definition
of “residence” is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as “the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile.” Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone
representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or
domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws,
necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for
purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner,
Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his
residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because
“residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time.”
Following the definition of the term “residence” for purposes of election
law, a congressman for a particular locality not only has the intention to
reside therein but also the personal presence therein, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.—Petitioner Saludo was the
congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of
his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary,
he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including
that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term
“residence” for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the
intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence
therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter
element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was
sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for
purposes of venue.
Community Tax Certificates; The fact that a party’s community tax
certificate was issued in a place other than where he claims to be a
resident of is of no moment because the same does not preclude his
having a residence in another locality for purposes of venue.—The fact
then that petitioner Saludo’s community tax certificate was issued at Pasay
City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be
considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a
residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but
one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence.
Evidence; Judicial Notice; Words and Phrases; Courts are allowed “to take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions”; The concept of “facts of common knowledge” in
the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are “so
commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require
proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among
reasonable men”; The fact of a congressman being duly elected could be
properly taken judicial notice of by a trial court, the same being a matter
of common knowledge in the community where it sits.—That petitioner
Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a
fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as
such, petitioner Saludo’s residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be
faulted for doing so because courts are allowed “to take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.” Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, including its
Constitution. The concept of “facts of common knowledge” in the context
of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are “so commonly
known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and
so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men.”
Moreover, “though usually facts of ‘common knowledge’ will be generally
known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice
that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits.”
Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected
representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken
judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common
knowledge in the community where it sits.
A congressman’s residence in his province where he was elected could be
properly taken judicial notice of by the trial court.—Petitioner Saludo’s
residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice
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of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution,
one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House
of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be
elected.
Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Certification of Non-Forum Shopping;
A verification and a certification of non-forum shopping that states that the
petitioner read the contents of the petition and that the same are true and
correct of his own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the
records at hand, clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.—Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court reads: Sec. 4. Verification.—Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the
affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A
pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
“information and belief,” or upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or
lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo’s verification and certification of non-forum shopping
states that he has “read the contents thereof [referring to the petition]
and the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and
belief and on the basis of the records at hand.” The same clearly
constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the
Rules of Court.
5. Araneta - Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Verification is,
under the Rules, not a jurisdictional but merely a formal requirement
which the court may motu proprio direct a party to comply with or correct,
as the case may be.—Verification is, under the Rules, not a jurisdictional
but merely a formal requirement which the court may motu proprio direct
a party to comply with or correct, as the case may be. As the Court
articulated in Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism
and Nationalism (KILUSAN)-Organized Labor Associations in Line
Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA) v. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 45
(2007): [V]erification is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is
mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made
are done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation.
The Court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act
on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a
strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served. Given this consideration, the CA acted
within its sound discretion in ordering the submission of proof of
Francisca’s authority to sign on Julita’s behalf and represent her in the
proceedings before the appellate court.
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; The signature of any of the principal
petitioners or principal parties would constitute a substantial compliance
with the rule on verification and certification of non-forum shopping, and,
should there exist a commonality of interest among the parties, or where
the parties filed the case as a “collective,” raising only one common cause
of action or presenting a common defense, then the signature of one of
the petitioners or complainants, acting as representative, is sufficient
compliance.—Regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping, the general
rule is that all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case should sign it. However,
the Court has time and again stressed that the rules on forum shopping,
which were designed to promote the orderly administration of justice, do
not interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances. As has been ruled by the Court, the signature of any of the
principal petitioners or principal parties, as Francisca is in this case, would
constitute a substantial compliance with the rule on verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. It cannot be overemphasized that
Francisca herself was a principal party in Civil Case No. 3341-17 before the
RTC and in the certiorari proceedings before the CA. Besides being an heir
of Benedicto, Francisca, with her mother, Julita, was substituted for
Benedicto in the instant case after his demise. And should there exist a
commonality of interest among the parties, or where the parties filed the
case as a “collective,” raising only one common cause of action or
presenting a common defense, then the signature of one of the petitioners
or complainants, acting as representative, is sufficient compliance. We said
so in Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, 400 SCRA 255 (2003). Like Thomas
Cavile, Sr. and the other petitioners in Cavile, Francisca and Julita, as
petitioners before the CA, had filed their petition as a collective, sharing a
common interest and having a common single defense to protect their
rights over the shares of stocks in question.
Words and Phrases; “Questions of Law” and “Questions of Fact,”
Distinguished.—Whether a determinative question is one of law or of fact
depends on the nature of the dispute. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain given set of facts; or when the issue does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
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the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact obtains
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites the calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
Certiorari; The Court of Appeals oversteps its boundaries when, in
disposing of a petition for certiorari, it does not confine itself to
determining whether or not lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
tainted the issuance of the assailed lower court orders, but proceeds to
pass on the merits of the case pending before the trial court; The onus of
factually determining whether a trust allegedly established in favor of a
party, if one was indeed established, was implied or express properly
pertains, at the first instance, to the trial court and not to the appellate
court in a special civil action for certiorari.—The CA overstepped its
boundaries when, in disposing of private respondents’ petition for
certiorari, it did not confine itself to determining whether or not lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tainted the issuance of the
assailed RTC orders, but proceeded to pass on the factual issue of the
existence and enforceability of the asserted trust. In the process, the CA
virtually resolved petitioner Irene’s case for reconveyance on its
substantive merits even before evidence on the matter could be adduced.
Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17 in fact have not even reached the
pre-trial stage. To stress, the nature of the trust allegedly constituted in
Irene’s favor and its enforceability, being evidentiary in nature, are best
determined by the trial court. The original complaints and the amended
complaint certainly do not even clearly indicate whether the asserted trust
is implied or express. To be sure, an express trust differs from the implied
variety in terms of the manner of proving its existence. Surely, the onus of
factually determining whether the trust allegedly established in favor of
Irene, if one was indeed established, was implied or express properly
pertains, at the first instance, to the trial court and not to the appellate
court in a special civil action for certiorari, as here. In the absence of
evidence to prove or disprove the constitution and necessarily the
existence of the trust agreement between Irene, on one hand, and the
Benedicto Group, on the other, the appellate court cannot intelligently
pass upon the issue of trust. A pronouncement on said issue of trust
rooted on speculation and conjecture, if properly challenged, must be
struck down. So it must be here.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Pleadings; Motion to
Dismiss; Words and Phrases; Responsive pleadings are those which seek
affirmative relief and/or set up defenses, like an answer; A motion to
dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Sec. 2 of Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court.—We agree with petitioners and turn to the governing
Sec. 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 2.
Amendments as a matter of right.—A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or
in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
As the aforequoted provision makes it abundantly clear that the plaintiff
may amend his complaint once as a matter of right, i.e., without leave of
court, before any responsive pleading is filed or served. Responsive
pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses,
like an answer. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for
purposes of Sec. 2 of Rule 10. Assayed against the foregoing perspective,
the RTC did not err in admitting petitioners’ amended complaint, Julita and
Francisca not having yet answered the original complaints when the
amended complaint was filed. At that precise moment, Irene, by force of
said Sec. 2 of Rule 10, had, as a matter of right, the option of amending
her underlying reconveyance complaints. As aptly observed by the RTC,
Irene’s motion to admit amended complaint was not even necessary. The
Court notes though that the RTC has not offered an explanation why it saw
fit to grant the motion to admit in the first place.
Venue; Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal
actions, is fixed for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiff and
his witnesses, and where the ground of improperly laid venue is not raised
seasonably it is deemed waived.—Venue essentially concerns a rule of
procedure which, in personal actions, is fixed for the greatest convenience
possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The ground of improperly laid
venue must be raised seasonably, else it is deemed waived. Where the
defendant failed to either file a motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue or include the same as an affirmative defense, he is
deemed to have waived his right to object to improper venue. In the case
at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the earliest time possible,
meaning “within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint,” the matter of improper venue. They would thereafter reiterate
and pursue their objection on venue, first, in their answer to the amended
complaints and then in their petition for certiorari before the CA. Any
suggestion, therefore, that Francisca and Benedicto or his substitutes
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abandoned along the way improper venue as ground to defeat Irene’s
claim before the RTC has to be rejected.
Words and Phrases; The venue of personal actions is the court where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff; In a
personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages, while real actions
are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein.—In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real
actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein. In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of
Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be the proper court which has
territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or
a portion thereof, is situated. The venue of personal actions is the court
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
An action seeking to compel recognition of an alleged trust arrangement is
an action in personam.—In the instant case, petitioners are basically
asking Benedicto and his Group, as defendants a quo, to acknowledge
holding in trust Irene’s purported 65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII,
inclusive of the fruits of the trust, and to execute in Irene’s favor the
necessary conveying deed over the said 65% shareholdings. In other
words, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust arrangement she has
with the Benedicto Group. The fact that FEMII’s assets include real
properties does not materially change the nature of the action, for the
ownership interest of a stockholder over corporate assets is only inchoate
as the corporation, as a juridical person, solely owns such assets. It is only
upon the liquidation of the corporation that the stockholders, depending on
the type and nature of their stockownership, may have a real inchoate
right over the corporate assets, but then only to the extent of their
stockownership. The amended complaint is an action in personam, it being
a suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now represented by Julita
and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability to Irene upon
an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They are not actions in
rem where the actions are against the real properties instead of against
persons. We particularly note that possession or title to the real properties
of FEMII and UEC is not being disputed, albeit part of the assets of the
corporation happens to be real properties.
Residence; Community Tax Certificates (CTCs); A plaintiff who is not a
resident of a particular place cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt
for said place as venue of her reconveyance complaint; One can easily
secure a basic residence certificate practically anytime in any Bureau of
Internal Revenue or treasurer’s office and dictate whatever relevant data
one desires entered.—We point out at the outset that Irene, as
categorically and peremptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is not a
resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. The Court perceives no
compelling reason to disturb, in the confines of this case, the factual
determination of the trial court and the premises holding it together.
Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt for Batac
as venue of her reconveyance complaint. As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is
not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as the place
“where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides” at the time
she filed her amended complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451
issued sometime in June 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she
indicated her address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment.
Let alone the fact that one can easily secure a basic residence certificate
practically anytime in any Bureau of Internal Revenue or treasurer’s office
and dictate whatever relevant data one desires entered, Irene procured
CTC No. 17019451 and appended the same to her motion for
reconsideration following the RTC’s pronouncement against her being a
resident of Batac.
Parties; Trusts; When there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action
case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for
determining proper venue; Trustees can only serve as mere
representatives of the beneficiary.—There can be no serious dispute that
the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the
disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of the
present suit. It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G.
Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as co-
plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene’s new designated trustees. As
trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of Irene. Upon the
foregoing consideration, the resolution of the crucial issue of whether or
not venue had properly been laid should not be difficult. Sec. 2 of Rule 4
indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a
23
personal action case, the residences of the principal parties should be the
basis for determining proper venue. According to the late Justice Jose Y.
Feria, “the word ‘principal’ has been added [in the uniform procedure rule]
in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor
plaintiff or defendant as the venue.” Eliminate the qualifying term
“principal” and the purpose of the Rule would, to borrow from Justice
Regalado, “be defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in
the action since the latter would not have the degree of interest in the
subject of the action which would warrant and entail the desirably active
participation expected of litigants in a case.”
The trustees may be accorded the right to prosecute a suit, but only on
behalf of the beneficiary who must be included in the title of the case and
shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest—their residences cannot
be made the basis in determining the venue of the suit.—The Court can
concede that Irene’s three co-plaintiffs are all residents of Batac, Ilocos
Norte. But it ought to be stressed in this regard that not one of the three
can be considered as principal party-plaintiffs in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17
and 3342-17, included as they were in the amended complaint as trustees
of the principal plaintiff. As trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue of
Sec. 3 of Rule 3, the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of the
beneficiary who must be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party-in-interest. In the final analysis, the
residences of Irene’s co-plaintiffs cannot be made the basis in determining
the venue of the subject suit. This conclusion becomes all the more
forceful considering that Irene herself initiated and was actively
prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his heirs, assigns, or associates,
virtually rendering the impleading of the trustees unnecessary.
the complaint doubtless to insure, but in vain as it turned out, that the
case stays with the RTC in Batac. Litigants ought to bank on the
righteousness of their causes, the superiority of their cases, and the
persuasiveness of arguments to secure a favorable verdict. It is high time
that courts, judges, and those who come to court for redress keep this
ideal in mind.
6. Lantin - Actions; Venue; In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, the stipulation on venue should be deemed as merely an
agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.—At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule
4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of
actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action,
have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation
on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from
bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that
such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

Courts; It is high time that courts, judges, and those who come to court
for redress keep this ideal in mind, that litigants ought to bank on the
righteousness of their causes, the superiority of their cases, and the
persuasiveness of arguments to secure a favorable verdict.—Irene was a
resident during the period material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was
not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence
has it that one can have several residences, if such were the established
fact. The Court will not speculate on the reason why petitioner Irene, for
all the inconvenience and expenses she and her adversaries would have to
endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her case be heard and decided by
the RTC in Batac. On the heels of the dismissal of the original complaints
on the ground of improper venue, three new personalities were added to
24