RULE 77

VDA. DE PEREZ VS TOLETE

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens
and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died
first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family
perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will,
filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael
opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that
since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued
that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled
to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills
were in accordance with New York law. Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the
reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix,
requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as
special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la
Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and
allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in
accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is
that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines.
However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each
and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.

ISSUE:

Did the respondent judge err in disallowing the reprobrate in the present case?

RULING:

Yes. P roof that both wills conform to the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of
the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country
on procedure and allowance of will Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them.

Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit
the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge
just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should
relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is
susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of
the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are
given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS

FACTS:

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a
foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized

United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent
Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC a petition for
the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
Petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is
invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified
to act as administrator of the estate. Since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz
and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent
Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. RTC
directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s
U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.- based executor
designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. CA
AFFIRMED: The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not
require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which
refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different
rules or procedures.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.

RULING:

YES, CA decision affirmed. But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place
where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.

- Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
 - Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or
legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after
the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed

- Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable
value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters
are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
having custody of it.

- Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province

- The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

- In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed
by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here.

- But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in

a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time
before a competent court.

- Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.

- Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to

reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local
court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
RULE 78

VENTURA vs. VENTURA

FACTS:

 Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio

Ventura. Juana Cardona is the surviving spouse and mother of Maria Ventura.
 Appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children
with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano.
 On December 14, 1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will
which did not include the appellees. (HENCE THERE WAS PRETERITION!) In the
said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and
appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his
estate. Said will was admitted to probate on January 14,195.
 Gregorio Ventura died. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the
corresponding letters testamentary was issued in her favor.
 Oppositions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to remove as
executrix and administrator Maria Ventura on the grounds that (1) that she is grossly
incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties
of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can
have no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected
to render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the Court.
 The court a quo then removed Maria as executrix and administratrix of the estate and
in her place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are hereby appointed.
 While the case was pending, the SC ruled in a case that the will of Gregorio resulted
to intestacy due to the preterition of compulsory heirs. Hence the institution of heirs
including that of Maria were annulled. Hence, a new administrator needs to be
appointed.

ISSUE:

Who should be the new administrator?

RULING:

First, Juana Cardona – the surviving spouse and mother of Maria Ventura.

Second, Legitimate children being nearest of kin

Third, illegitimate children

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;"
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona
while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura.
The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the
statute of distribution to the decedent's property

It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant,
is preferred in the choice of administrator.” Among members of a class the strongest ground
for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the
nearest of kin is to be preferred." As decided by the lower court and sustained by the
Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of
Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are
Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of
kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in
order to represent both interests.
RULE 79

DE GUZMAN VS ANGELES
GR No. L-78590

FACTS:

On May 5, 1987 Private Respondent Elaine de Guzman filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman before RTC of Makati City. The petition alleges
among others that petitioner as the surviving spouse of the decedent is most qualified and
entitled to the grant of letters of administration. On May 22, 1987, private respondent filed a
motion for writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under the name of the said
deceased person, alleges to be conjugal properties of the de Guzmans and in order to
preserve the assets of her late husband, but which are at present in the possession of
private respondent’s father-in-law, herein Petitioner Pedro de Guzman.

On May 28, 1987, PR filed her “ex-parte motion to appoint petitioner as Special Administratix
of the estate of Manolito de Guzman”. Hearing was set on June 5, 1987, however, no notice
was given to petitioner. In the order dated June 5, 1987, the RTC granted the PR’s motion to
be appointed as special administratix. The RTC issued another order dated June 8, 1987,
granting the Urgent ex-parte Motion for assistance filed by private respondent for
appointment of two deputy sheriffs with some military/policemen to assist her in preserving
the estate of her late husband. Petitioner resisted on taking the subject vehicles on the
ground that they were his personal properties. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to annul
the RTC’s orders dated June 5 and June 8, 1987. He alleges that the appointment of a
special administrator constitutes an abuse of discretion for having been made without giving
petitioner an opportunity to oppose said appointment.

ISSUE:

Whether the probate court may appoint a special administratix and issue a writ of possession
of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate of the said deceased
person even before the probate court causes notice be served upon all interested parties.

RULING:

No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over
the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the
private respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of
the deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of
the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

There is a difference, however, between the jurisdiction of the probate court over the
proceedings for the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the persons
who are interested in the settlement of the estate of the deceased person. The court
may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased person but the determination of
the properties comprising that estate must follow established rules.

Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a petition for letters of
administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and
creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the
estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through
publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring
all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein
becomes binding on all the world. Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of
the Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the estate of
the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and should be
annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no
person may be deprived of his right to property without due process of law.

Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons,
subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment.

In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the
private respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for
assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
RULE 80

DE GUZMAN VS GUADIZ
G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition Special Proceeding No. 865 for the probate of a will alleged to have
been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and universal
heir and naming him as executor. The private respondents, thereafter, filed a motion to
dismiss and/or opposition contending, among others, that all the real properties of Catalina
Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter vivos execute.

Respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties
shall have presented their evidence. However, a motion for the appointment of a special
administrator was filed by the petitioner alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss would
necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor. The
appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the necessity of enabling somebody
to take care of the properties where there is a considerable delay in the appointment of a
regular administrator. In the present case, since the properties covered by the will are
undoubtedly in the possession of the oppositors who claim to be the owners thereof, the
Court sees no necessity of appointing a special administrator.

ISSUE:

Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special
administrator?

RULING:

Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will.
Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of
the Court which must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity
or legal principle.

The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that estates
of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to
great waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the
assets in the interim. No temporary administration can be granted where there is an executor
in being capable of acting, however.

Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve estate until it can

pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.
It appears that the estate of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consists of eighty (80) hectares
of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80 hectares produce P 50,000.00 worth
of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an immediate need for a special
administrator to protect the interests of the estate as regards the products.

All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in accordance with
Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.
The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the appointment of a special
administrator in this case because the respondents are already in possession of the
properties covered by the will. The respondent judge has failed to distinguish between the
partisan possession of litigants and the neutral possession of the special administrator under
the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not as a
representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the
administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. The accountability
which the court, which attaches to the office of a special administrator to be appointed by the
court is absent from the personal possession of private respondents.
DE GUZMAN VS ANGELES
(supra)

RULING:

The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for his apparent haste in
issuing the questioned orders, states: “In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned acted in
the honest conviction that it would be to the best interest of the estate without unduly
prejudicing any interested party or third person. Any delay in issuing the said Orders might
have prejudiced the estate for the properties may be lost, wasted or dissipated in the
meantime.”

This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the disregard of the
Rule. If indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both the estate and the person who
have interest in the estate, then it could have caused notice to be given immediately as
mandated by the Revised Rules of Court. A special administrator has been defined as the
"representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed." The petitioner as creditor of
the estate has a similar interest in the preservation of the estate as the private respondent
who happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of
notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what
emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least
until the most interested parties were given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable
delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.

In order to fully and correctly ascertain the suitability of the applicant to the trust, a hearing is
obviously necessary wherein the applicant can prove his qualifications and at the same time
affording oppositors, given notice of such hearing and application, the opportunity to oppose
or contest such application.

If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate justify a court's
immediately taking some kind of temporary action even without the required notice, no such
emergency is shown in this case. The need for the proper notice even for the appointment of
a special administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case.

A special administrator has been defined as the "representative of decedent appointed by

the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator is appointed." The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in
the preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be the widow of
deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of
Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued if the
appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were
given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular
administrator is apparent from the records.
MANUNGAS VS LORETO

DOCTRINE:

As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of
the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity. There is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a
debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased.

FACTS:

1. This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

2. Engracia Manugas was the wife of Florentino Manugas. They had no children.
Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila(Avila).
3. Florentino died intestate while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was
survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. De Manugas.
4. Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino. There she stated that there were no other legal and compulsory heirs of
Florentino except herself, Avila and Ramon Manugas whom she acknowledged as
the natural son of Florentino. Avila’s widow executed a waiver of rights and
participation renouncing her rights over the property of her husband in favor of
Engracia.
5. Consequently, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate of
Florentino distributing the properties to Engracia and Ramon. (TAKE NOTE: At this
point, the intestate estate proceedings as regards Florentino’s properties were
already terminated)
6. Thereafter, the RTC of Panabo City appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia as the
Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
7. Through Parreño, Engracia instituted a civil case against the Spouses Diosdado
Salinas Manugas(Diosdado) and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages.
MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia due to the failure of Diosdado
to file an answer.
8. After sometime, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Engracia’s Estate in his favor before the RTC of Tagum. He
alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino, is an heir of Engracia.
9. The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that
Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator:
a. He was not a Manugas

b. He was a debtor of the estate

10. RTC-Appointed Parreño as administrator
11. Upon MR, the RTC reversed it’s ruling while appointing Diosdado as Special
Administrator.
12. CA- RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion and reinstated Parreño as the
administrator of the estate. Thus this petition.
ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred when it ruled to annul the appointment of Diosdado herein petitioner as
judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of Parreño. NO. (Relevant to our topic)

RULING:

The RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion(CA did not err in reversing RTC’s order)

● The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not
mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the
Estate of Engracia.
● Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within
the discretion of the court.

● Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel

“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right
of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as
well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply
to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who
shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed,
discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity.”

● Reiterated in Ocampo

“While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a
mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding
the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of
fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of
Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As
long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.”

● While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of
the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of
equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that
 the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular
administrator is appointed as stated in Section 2 Rule 80 of the Rules of court.
○ There is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate
and otherwise a stranger to the deceased.

● Diosdado is a stranger to Engracia while Parreño is the latter’s relative.

○ evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia
and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate
○ Parreño is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive
and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and
preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would
reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s estate

● It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the
subject of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds
distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the
termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as
an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas
and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas.
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO
G.R. No. 187879
July 5, 2010

FACTS:

Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate. Petitioners Dalisay, Vince, Melinda and
Leonardo, Jr. are the surviving wife and children of Leonardo Ocampo, respectively.
Respondents Renato and Erlinda are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses
Vicente and Maxima. 5 months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for
intestate proceedings of the estate of Sps. Vicente and Maxima, and Leonardo in the RTC of
Laguna. They alleged that Leonardo, respondents’ brother, managed the estate of their
parents, but after his death, respondents took possession of the properties, thus they ask for
the settlement of estate and the award of the estate to the rightful heirs. Respondents
contended that the petition was defective because of settling two estates in a single
proceeding. They also prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the
estate of Vicente and Maxima. The RTC denied the opposition but admitted their counter-
petition for appointment of special joint administrator. The RTC appointed Dalisay and
Renato as special joint administrators, but was opposed by respondents in their motion for
reconsideration, stating that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed as
administrator. The RTC then revoked the appointment of Dalisay, as respondents are the
nearest kin of Vicente and Maxima. After a few months, petitioners filed a motion to terminate
or revoke the special administration, contending that the special administration was not
necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties are properly identified
and not involved in any litigation necessitating special administrators. The RTC granted the
motion. Respondents the filed a petition for certiorari before CA to which CA ruled in favor of
repondents

ISSUE:

Was there a need to appoint a special administrator?

HELD:

Yes. Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator

of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to
appoint joint special administrators pending the determination of the person or persons to
whom letters of administration may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering
that such disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of letters of administration,
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC, on June 15, 2006,
appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon each of them
the obligation to post an administrators bond of P200,000.00. However, taking into account
the arguments of respondents that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of
a special administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners
nominated Bian Rural Bank as special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007,
revoked Dalisays appointment and substituted her with Erlinda.

A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control,
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth
administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an
agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the
hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs,
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased
parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory
requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrators.

The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other
than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon
and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference
under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not
obtain.
ROWENA F. CORONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO G. VITUG et al

FACTS:

On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two
Wills: one, a holographic Will and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or
about three weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for
reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a ground
for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her
sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces
Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner,
as her Executrix.

On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as
Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New
York City.

On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and
Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be
disallowed on the ground that they were procured through undue and improper pressure and
influence, having been executed at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and under the
medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona,, petitioner's husband, and that the holographic Will
impaired his legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator
because the Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no interest to
be protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to administer.

On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointing
Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband, Romarico as
Special Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons that under
Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of
preference for appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the
disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of disqualification for
appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is appointed only where the surviving
spouse is not competent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix
appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing
more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion for the appointment of co-
Special Administrators.

The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Probate Court
stating that the Probate Court strictly observed the order of preference established by the
Rules; that petitioner though named Executrix in the alleged Will, declined the trust and
instead nominated a stranger as Special Administrator; that the surviving husband has
legitimate interests to protect which are not adverse to the decedent's estate which is merely
part of the conjugal property; and that disinheritance is not a disqualification to appointment
as Special Administrator besides the fact that the legality of the disinheritance would involve
a determination of the intrinsic validity of the Will which is decidedly premature at this stage.

ISSUE:

WON Nenita Alonte be appointed as co-Special Administrator

RULING:

Yes. Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's

choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to the highest
consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of
kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the
deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management
of the decedent's estate.

It is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective
interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the
Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth
administration, and its earliest settlement.

DISPOSITIVE: The Court of First Instance of Rizal, hereby ordered Nenita F. Alonte as co-
Special Administrator, properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the other Special
Administrator on all matters affecting the estate.
LIWANAG vs. REYES
G.R. No. L-19159 September 29, 1964

FACTS:

Pio D. Liwanag executed a real estate mortgage with acceleration clause in case of non
payment within at a rate of 12% per annum over a parcel of residential land with building and
improvements in favor of Rotegan Financing, Inc., to secure the payment of a loan. Liwanag
died intestate leaving the loan unpaid. Thereafter, a complaint for foreclosure against the
Estate of Pio D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the estate and an action
for the appointment of a receiver. The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for foreclosure, on the theory that she may not be sued as special
administratrix. Also expressed opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
receivership, on the ground that the property subject of the foreclosure proceeding's is
in custodia legis, since administration proceedings had already been instituted for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action for foreclosure be brought against the special administratrix or the
appointment of a received is proper in a foreclosure proceedings.

RULING:

The case raises the following fundamental issues: first, the correctness of the Section 7 of
Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the
deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these
remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim in the testate or intestate
proceeding and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his
mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged
property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely
exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of
limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not be admitted as
creditor of the estate, and shall not share in the distribution of the assets.

Here respondent has chosen the second remedy by filing his action for foreclosure against
the administratrix of the property. Under the Rules of Court it does not expressly prohibit
making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate otherwise to deny
the present action on technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator
will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.

It is also emphasized that the will of the deceased himself in case of foreclosure, the
property be put into the hands of a receiver, and this provision should be respected by the
administratrix of the estate. The allegation of the petitioner on the theory that property
in custodia legis can not be given to a receiver is not tenable because this is an action to
enforce a superior lien on certain property of the estate and the appointment of a receiver is
the very convenient and feasible means of preserving and administering the property.
ZAYCO VS HINLO JR.

FACTS:

After Enrique Hinlo died intestate on January 31, 1986, his heirs filed a petition for letters of
administration of his estate in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Silay
City, Branch 40. Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was initially appointed as special
administratrix of Enriques estate. On December 23, 1991, petitioners Nancy H. Zayco and
Remo Hinlo were appointed as co-administrators in lieu of their mother Ceferina who was
already sickly and could no longer effectively perform her duties as special administratrix.

On March 4, 2003, respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of Enrique and heir to his
estate by virtue of representation, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
in his favor and an urgent motion for the removal of petitioners as co-administrators of
Enriques estate. Petitioners opposed both the petition and the motion.

RTC revoked the appointment of petitioners as co-administrators of the estate of Enrique

and directed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of respondent on a P50,000
bond. Respondent posted the required bond, took his oath as administrator and was issued
letters of administration.

Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2002 order on August 2, 2002 and moved for its
reconsideration on August 9, 2002. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.

RTC denied the notice of appeal and record on appeal. It ruled that petitioners resorted to a
wrong remedy as the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 orders were interlocutory and not
subject to appeal. Even assuming that appeal was the proper remedy, it was filed late.

Petitioners challenged the RTC order in CA by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
CA dismissed the petition. MR was denied by CA as well.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC errend when it ruled that the July 23, 2002 and 2003 orders were
not appealable.

RULING:

An order appointing an administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination of

the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of
the decedents estate.[10] It is a final order and, hence, appealable.[11]

In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and
the record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of
judgment or final order. [12] Pursuant to Neypes v. CA,[13] the 30-day period to file the notice of
appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.

From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their motion for
reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003, they had 30 days or until
August 30, 2003 to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal. They did so on August
29, 2003. Thus, the appeal was made on time.
TAN VS GEDERIO, JR.

G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008

FACTS:

Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo Lim Suga and
Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for the
appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special administrator. This was
opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the
respondents can be appointed since they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does
not have the same competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto
administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of kin, being the legitmate children, is
preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that the respondent were illegitmate
children).

However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the
estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection of a
special administrator.

RULING:

The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference, they should pursue
the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated
the appointment of a special administrator.