PROPERTY CASES
As Correctly Asserted By Rev. Cortez, A Possessor In The Concept Of
1. Republic, Petitioner, Vs. Rev. Claudio R. Cortez
G.R. No. 197472 September 7, 2015
Facts:
Rev. Cortez, A Missionary, Established An Orphanage And School In
Cagayan. He Claimed That Since 1962, He Has Been In Peaceful
Possession Of About 50 Hectares Of Land Located In The Western
Portion Of Palaui Island In Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan Which
He, With The Help Of Aetas And Other People Under His Care, Cleared
And Developed For Agricultural Purposes. Proclamation No. 201
Reserved A Parcel Of The Public Domain Situated In Palaui Island For
Military. More Than Two Decades Later, Proclamation No. 447 Was
Enacted Declaring Palaui Island And The Surrounding Waters Situated
In The Municipality Of Sta. Ana, Cagayan As Marine Reserve. In 2000,
Rev. Cortez Filed A Petition For Injunction With Prayer For The
Issuance Of A Writ Of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction Biñas In His
Capacity As Commanding Officer Of The Philippine Naval Command
In Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According To Him, Some Members Of The
Philippine Navy, Upon Orders Of Biñas, Disturbed His Peaceful And
Lawful Possession Of The Said 50-Hectare Portion Of Palaui Island
When They Commanded Him And His Men, Through The Use Of Force
And Intimidation, To Vacate The Area. Thus, Rev. Cortez And His Men
Were Constrained To Leave The Area. In View Of These, Rev. Cortez
Filed The Said Petition With The RTC Seeking Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction Ordering Biñas To Restore To Him Possession And To Not
Disturb The Same, And Further, For The Said Preliminary Writ, If
Issued, To Be Made Permanent.
Issue:
Whether Or Not Rev. Cortez Is Entitled To A Final Writ Of Mandatory
Injunction.
Held:
No, Rev. Cortez Is Not Entitled To A Final Writ Of Mandatory Injunction.
Jus Possessionis Or Possession In The Concept Of An Owner Is One
Of The Two Concepts Of Possession Provided Under Article 525 Of
The Civil Code. Also Referred To As Adverse Possession, This Kind Of
Possession Is One Which Can Ripen Into Ownership By Prescription.
An Owner Has In His Favor The Legal Presumption That He Possesses
With A Just Title And He Cannot Be Obliged To Show Or Prove It.
However, The Following Cannot Be Appropriated And Hence, Cannot
Be Possessed: Property Of The Public Dominion, Common Things
(Res Communes) Such As Sunlight And Air, And Things Specifically
Prohibited By Law. Here, The Court Notes That While Rev. Cortez
Relies Heavily On His Asserted Right Of Possession, He, Nevertheless,
Failed To Show That The Subject Area Over Which He Has A Claim Is
Not Part Of The Public Domain And Therefore Can Be The Proper
Object Of Possession. Pursuant To The Regalian Doctrine, All Lands
Of The Public Domain Belong To The State. To Prove That A Land Is
Alienable, The Existence Of A Positive Act Of The Government, Such
As Presidential Proclamation Or An Executive Order; An Administrative
Action; Investigation Reports Of Bureau Of Lands Investigators; And A
Legislative Act Or A Statute Declaring The Land As Alienable And
Disposable Must Be Established. In This Case, There Is No Such Proof
Showing That The Subject Portion Of Palaui Island Has Been Declared
Alienable And Disposable When Rev. Cortez Started To Occupy The
Same. Hence, It Must Be Considered As Still Inalienable Public
Domain. Being Such, It Cannot Be Appropriated And Therefore Not A
Proper Subject Of Possession Under Article 530 Of The Civil Code.
Viewed In This Light, Rev. Cortez' Claimed Right Of Possession Has
No Leg To Stand On. His Possession Of The Subject Area, Even If The
Same Be In The Concept Of An Owner Or No Matter How Long, Cannot
Produce Any Legal Effect In His Favor Since The Property Cannot Be
Lawfully Possessed In The First Place.
2. Republic of the Philippines vs Emmanuel Cortez
G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2014
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the decision of CA.
February 2003, Cortez filed with RTC an application for judicial
confirmation over a parcel of land in Manila. He submitted tax
declarations from 1966 to 2005, survey plan of the property with the
annotation that it is alienable and disposable and other documents.
Cortez alleged that the tax declarations were under the name of his
mother from which he inherited the land. A testimony was also
submitted saying that the family of Cortez have in fact occupied the land
for over 60 years. RTC granted Cortez the application for registration
of the title.
After its finality, RP, represented by Solicitor General appealed to the
CA alleging that RTC erred in granting the application for registration.
Pointing out that there was no evidence the Cortez were in possession
of the subject land in open, adverse and continuous possession of the
property for more than 30 years. CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether CA erred in affirming the RTC?
Held:
Petition is meritorious.
Applicants for original registration of title to land must establish
compliance with the provisions of Section 14 of
P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently provides that: Sec. 14. Who may
apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that
Cortez failed to comply with the legal requirements for the registration
of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
The 1st requirement was not satisfied, the survey plan does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that
the subject property remains part of the alienable public domain. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for
are alienable and disposable.
The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be an official
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public use, public service, or for the development of
national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere
declaration by government officials that a land of the public domain is
already alienable and disposable would not suffice for purposes of
registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The Court further
stressed that the period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to
run from the time that the State officially declares that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service,
or for the development of national wealth.
Note: properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such property now falls
within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2) of PD
1529, over which title by prescription can be acquired. Thus, under the
second paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529, those who are in
possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession
has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years
or more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite
the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June
1945.
3. Bliss Development Corp./Home Guaranty Corporation V. Diaz
G.R. No. 213233 August 5, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Bliss Development Corporation (BDC), Is The Registered
Owner Of A Lot In Quezon City Which Executed A Deed Of Sale Over
The Property In Favour Of Sps. Melgazo, Both Are Now Deceased.
Nacua Sent A Letter To BDC Stating That Sps. Melgazo Transferred
To Him Their Rights Over The Property. Before The Property Was Fully
Paid, Nacua Sold His Rights To Garcia Who Later Transferred His
Rights To Reyes Who Further Sold His Rights To Respondent Diaz.
BDC Then Issued A Permit To Occupy The Property In Favor Of Diaz
Who Later On Introduced Improvements On The Said Property. A
Contract To Sell In Favor Of Diaz Was Executed But He Was Informed
That A Certain Arreza Was Claiming That The Heirs Of Sps. Melgazo
Sold To Him The Rights Over The Said Property. The RTC Ruled That
Diaz Failed To Prove That He Is An Assignee In Good Faith. The CA
Reversed The Decision Of RTC Stating That As A Buyer And Builder
In Good Faith, Diaz Is Entitled To Be Paid Reimbursement And
Damages. BDC Is The One That Acted In Bad Faith For Issuing An
Occupancy Permit Despite Its Knowledge Of Arreza’s Claims Over The
Property.
Issues: (1) Whether Or Not Respondent Diaz Is A Buyer And Builder In
Good Faith. (2) Whether Or Not BDC Is Liable To Diaz For The Value
Of Improvements The Latter Has Introduced To The Property.
Held:
(1) No, The Court Failed To Find Sufficient Basis For The CA’s Ruling
That Diaz Is A Purchaser For Value And In Good Faith. A Purchaser In
Good Faith And For Value Is One Who Buys Property Of Another
Without Notice That Some Other Person Has A Right To, Or Interest
In, Such Property And Pays Full And Fair Price For The Same At The
Time Of Such Purchase Or Before He Or She Has Notice Of The Claim
Or Interest Of Some Other Person In The Property. In The Case At Bar,
Diaz Failed To Diligently Inquire Into The Title Of His Predecessor
Before Entering Into The Contract Of Sale. As Such, He Cannot Be
Considered A Buyer In Good Faith.
(2) Yes, BDC Is Liable To Diaz. Article 453 Of The Civil Code States
That “If There Was Bad Faith, Not Only On The Part Of The Person
Who Built, Planted Or Sowed On Land Of Another, But Also On The
Part Of The Owner Of Such Land, The Rights Of One And The Other
Shall Be The Same As Though Both Had Acted In Good Faith. It Is
Understood That There Is Bad Faith On The Part Of The Landowner
Whenever The Act Was Done With His Knowledge And Without
Opposition On His Part.” In This Case, Since Both Of The Parties Had
Acted In Bad Faith, The Petitioner For Giving A Permit Of Occupation
To The Respondent Despite The Claims Of Arreza And The
Respondent For Not Inquiring Into The Validity Of The Title Of The
Seller, The Civil Code Commands That The Rights Of One And The
Other Shall Be The Same As Though Both Of Them Had Acted In Good
Faith. The BDC Shall Pay Only The Amortizations Paid And The
Amount Spent By Diaz For The Improvements Thereof.
4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTOS
G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012
FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years,
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March
7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot
4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in
the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an
abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by
Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application
for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because
of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property
had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30
years. Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already
classified as alienable and disposable by the Government. They cite as
proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following
notation found on the survey plan, to wit: Surveyed in accordance with
Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director
issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996. This survey is
inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968. On
May 10, 2000 the RTC granted the application for land registration. On
May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land property survey inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj.
No. 25 by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968 is classified as
alienable and disposable by the Government.
HELD:
NO. The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals; DISMISSES the application for registration. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of
the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. These rulings of the Court
indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-
000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that
Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive
prescription of Lot 4988-B. The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and
may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil
Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public
dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like
Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public
dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-
up river beds should belong to some other person.
5. SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA
vs. HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO
ABALON
G.R. No. 183448 June 30, 2014
Facts:
The instant case before the RTC Legazpi City involved a parcel of land
described as Lot 1679 consisting of 8,571 square meters covered by
OCT No. (O) 16 and registered under the name of Bernardina
Abalon. It was fraudulently transferred to Restituto Rellama by
executing a Deed of Sale and who, in turn, subdivided the subject
property and sold it separately to the other parties - Spouses
Dominador and Ofelia Peralta (TCT No. 42252);and Marissa, Leonil
and Arnel, all surnamed Andal (TCT No. 42482 and TCT
No. 42821). Thereafter, Spouses Peralta and the Andals individually
registered the respective portions of the land they had bought under
their names. The heirs of Bernardina were claiming back the land,
alleging that since it was sold under fraudulent circumstances, no valid
title passed to the buyers. On the other hand, the buyers, who were
now title holders of the subject parcel of land, averred that they were
buyers in good faith and sought the protection accorded to them under
the law.
Issue:
Whether a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof
has been in possession of the genuine title, which is valid and has not
been cancelled.
Held:
Yes. The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and
cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the
Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger
to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is
that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This means
that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the
innocent holder for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger
–
 must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the
transferee. Contrary to what the Abalons would like to impress on us,
Fule and Torres do not present clashing views. In Fule, the original
owner relinquished physical possession of her title and thus enabled
the perpetrator to commit the fraud, which resulted in the cancellation
of her title and the issuance of a new one. The forged instrument
eventually became the root of a valid title in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. The new title under the name of the
forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for
value. Hence, it was clear that there was a complete chain of registered
titles. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of
registered titles was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither
were they proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them
suspicious of the nature ofRellama’s ownership over the subject parcel
of land. Hence, we sustain theCA’s ruling that the Andals were buye
rs in good faith. Consequently, thevalidity of their title to the parcel of
the land bought from Rellama must beupheld.
6. GONZALO VILLANUEVA vs. SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA
BRANOCO
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his
heirs,[3] sued respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco
(respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court)
to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba,
Leyte (Property) and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership
over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere
(Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo
(Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name
for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.
Respondents claimed ownership over the Property through purchase
in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) towhom Rodrigo
donated the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation
(Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and the two (2)
witnesses, stated therein “ I , ALVEGIA RODRIGO xxxx by reason of
poverty which I suffered while our children were still young; and
because my husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was with our destitution
separated us [sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what
happened to his family; and because of that one EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our
poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and
because of the love andaffection which I feel [for] her, I have one
parcel of land located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax
Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise)
said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors,
and assigns together with all the improvements existing thereon, which
parcel of land stated above. I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the
herein Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to
the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ;
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above
described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and
praying further for a longer life; however, I will give one half (1/2) of the
produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime’’
. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21,
1962 in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that
ownership be vested on her upon my demise.’’
ISSSUE :
1. Whether or not the sale of Vere from Rodrigo void.
2. Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis
causa.
3. Whether or not the Deed is a donation or a will or a
devise.
Supreme Court Ruled:
Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos.
First.
Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the
heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling theirrevocability of the passage of
title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This
transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of
Rodriguez's acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the
Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965.Rodrigo's
acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti,
not in futuro, as only donations inter vivosneed acceptance by the
recipient.[. Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could
have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the
donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the
properties here donated x x x"] or used words to that effect. Instead,
Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez
predeceases her.
Petitoners contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause (for
the non-reversion stipulation). The question of the Deed's juridical
nature, whether it is a will or a donation, controversy ; by treating the
clause in question as mandating fideicommissary substitution, a mode
of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted
with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of the inheritance. The petitioner assumes that the Deed
is a will. Neither the Deed's text nor the import of the contested clause.
.Second.
What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the
Property, evident from Rodriguez's undertaking to "give one [half] x x x
of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime ;, the Deed's
stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my
demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer
to Rodrigo's beneficial title. ; the donor, while "b[inding] herself to
answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall question or
disturb [the donee's] right," also stipulated that the donation "does not
pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee]
shall be the true owner" of the donated parcels of land. ; the disposition
as a gift inter vivos,
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same
deed [the donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and
successors, the right to said property thus conferred. From the moment
[the donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to [the donee] to the two
parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right;
otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right. Therefore,
when [the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base their
contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa [that the
gift "does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be
the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant
nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and
usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the
donee would be able to dispose of them freely.
Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was
unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
Third.
The existence of consideration other than the donor's death, such as
the donor's love and affection to the donee and the services the latter
rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the
express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers.".
. Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations (e.g. "the ownership
shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and
"devise"). are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the donor's
intent.; "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision
in the deed to the effect that the donation is `to take effect at the death
of the donor' are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor."the nature of dispositions are resolved to
favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of
the property subject of the deed."
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation transfer of the
Property to Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were
the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal
uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to
rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles,
which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing
ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels
against licensing such practice.
Having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to
Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor
dispose of the said property in favor of another." Thus, Rodrigo's post-
donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere's
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On
the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus
acquiring the latter's title which they may invoke against all adverse
claimants, Petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property
through his and Vere's combined possession of the Property for more
than ten years, counted from Vere's purchase of the Property from
Rodrigo in 1970 until February 1986 for prescription. The ten year
ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real
property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession
coupled with just title and good faith. There is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom the possessor received the thing was the owner
thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.Petioner acquired no title over the property.; just
title having successively acquired the Property through sale, neither
was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed,
Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the
concept of an owner" ("como tag-iya") since 21 May 1962, nearly three
years before Rodrigo's donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years before
Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest
binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property through her,
including Vere and petitioner. The payment of taxe in 1982 finds no
basis, infact, when Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in 1970,
Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere
from being a buyer in good faith. The sale between Rodrigo and
petitioner” predecessor-in-interest (Vere) is void . owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief. Nolasco
Lacking good faith possession, petitioner's only other recourse to
maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is to show open,
continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30 years.
Rodrigo never passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez,
namely, that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the
Property only in 1982; the text of the Deed and based on the
contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the latter, already in
possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted, obtained
naked title over it upon the Deed's execution in 1965. Neither
registration nor tax payment is required to perfect
donations.; Rodriguez obtained the title obtained from Rodrigo under
the Deed.
The "language of the [Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit
of possible different interpretations,"; foolowing[ factors be considered
pivotal to the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in
possession of the Property as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the
delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed's
consideration was not Rodrigo's death but her "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo
waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her,
implying its inclusion in Rodriguez's estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted
the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate
donations inter vivos, not devises.
7. Raul Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz vs Genaro Nolasco and
Jeremy Nolasco
G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014
Facts:
Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a
233sq.m. Land in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was
succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children. On
January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-
owners, except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective
shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more
co-owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing
responded that they did not know about the intention to sell, because
they were not called to participate in the negotiations regarding the sale
of the property.
RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their
consent to sale. Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA. CA: reversed
the RTc decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel Nolasco to
give their consent.
Issue: Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and
whether this withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners.
Held: CA was right. From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a
co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners
is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property. To
be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of
every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right
within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it
necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that
the previous consent of all the interested arties be obtained.meera
8. Unisource Commercial And Development Corporation Vs.
Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung And Kleto Chung
G.R. No. 173252 July 17, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 176253 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement
which has been carried over from the Original Certificate of Title of
Encarnacion S. Sandico. As Sandico's property was transferred to
several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary
easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated
at the back of every title covering Sandico's property until TCT No.
176253 was issued in petitioner's favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo's
property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat
Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No. 121488. On May 26, 2000,
petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary
Easement of Right of Wayon the ground that the dominant estate has
an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial
court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land registration
case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the property. On August 19, 2002,
the trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary
easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by
respondents. It found that the dominant estate has no more use for the
easement since it has another adequate outlet to a public road which is
Matienza Street.
Issue: Whether or not to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary
easement of right of way.
Held:
No, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way
exists in favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance
of voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner alleged that the
easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain
Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of described as Lot No. 2,
Block 2650. It further stated that the voluntary easement of the right of
way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply
by will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and
definitely not an easement created by such court order because `[the]
Court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the
parties." In its Memorandum dated September 27, 2001, before the trial
court, petitioner reiterated that "[t]he annotation found at the back of the
TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement." As defined, an easement
is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby
the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody
else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement.
9. TEOFILO ALOLINO vs FORTUNATO FLORES AND ANASTACIA
MARIE FLORES
G.R. No. 198774, April 04, 2016
Facts:
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie)
Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on the vacant
municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of
Alolino’s house. Since they were constructing on a municipal road, the
respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only
about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino’s house,
covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents’ construction
deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed
and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the
rear door of his house. The respondents contend that the said barrio
road which they built on was already converted to patrimonial property
of the state and hence they had validly built their store.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s contention is correct.
Held: No. To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law
requires the LGU to enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds
(2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing the road. In this
case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a
resolution. Properties of the local government that are devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these
properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case
with Section 21 of the LGC. In exercising this authority, the LGU must
comply with the conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by
Congress. As a barrio road, the subject lot’s purpose is to serve the
benefit of the collective citizenry. It is outside the commerce of man and
as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable; (2) it is not
subject to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot
be the subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription;
(4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract;
(5) it is not subject to attachment and execution; and (6) it cannot be
burdened by any voluntary easements. As it remained a road, it is within
the purview of Sec. 28 of Urban Development and Housing Act and
hence can be demolished. Petition granted
10. Planters Development Bank vs. Julie Chandumal
G.R. No. 195619 September 5, 2012
http://www.academia.edu/9786433/PLANTERS_DEVELOPMENT_BA
NK_vs._JULIE_CHANDUMAL
11. Ambrosio Rotairo substituted by his Spouse Maria Ronsaryo
Rotairo, et al. vs. Rovira Alcantara and Victor Alcantara
G.R. No. 173632 September 29, 2014
12. United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, Inc. vs. The Board of
Commissioners-HLURB, J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. and Eduplan
Phils, Inc.
G.R. No. 182133 June 23, 2015
Facts:
Respondent J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. (JOS Managing Builders)
is the registered owner and developer of the condominium project
Aurora Milestone Tower. On December 16, 1997, JOS Managing
Builders and respondent EDUPLAN Philippines, Inc. (EDUPLAN)
entered into a Contract to Sell covering Condominium Unit E, 10th Floor
of the Aurora Milestone Tower with an area of 149.72 square meters,
more or less. EDUPLAN effected full payment, and in December 1998,
JOS Managing Builders and EDUPLAN executed a Deed... of Absolute
Sale over the condominium unit. EDUPLAN learned that the... lots on
which the condominium building project Aurora Milestone Tower was
erected had been mortgaged by JOS Managing Builders to petitioner
United Overseas Bank of the Philippines (United Overseas Bank)
without the prior written approval of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). JOS Managing Builders and United
Overseas Bank before the HLURB praying that: (a) the mortgage
between JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank be
declared null and void; (b) JOS Managing Builders and United
Overseas Bank be compelled to cause the issuance and release of the
Condominium Certificate of Title; and (c) JOS Managing Builders be
ordered to provide emergency power facilities, to refund the monthly
telephone carrier charges, and to permanently cease and desist from
further collecting such charges.
Issues: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY
THE EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Ruling: The petition is meritorious. The issue on whether non-
compliance with the clearance requirement with the HLURB would
result to the nullification of the entire mortgage contract or only a part
of it is purely legal which will have to be decided ultimately by a regular
court of law. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Petitioner United Overseas Bank
alleges that the HLURB erred in declaring null and void the entire
mortgage constituted by JOS Managing Builders in its favor, as
EDUPLAN does not claim ownership over all the properties mortgaged
by JOS Managing Builders in favor of United Overseas Bank, but only
over a single condominium unit We agree with petitioner. The HLURB
erred in declaring null and void the entire mortgage executed between
JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank. Since EDUPLAN
has an actionable interest only over Unit E, 10th Floor, Aurora
Milestone Tower, it is but logical to conclude that it has no standing to
seek for the complete nullification of the subject mortgage and the
HLURB was incorrect when it voided... the whole mortgage between
JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank. Considering that
EDUPLAN had already paid the full purchase price of the subject unit,
the latter is entitled to the transfer of ownership of the subject property
in its favor. despite the fact that the mortgage constituted between JOS
Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank cannot bind EDUPLAN,
because of the non-observance of the provision of P.D. No. 957 by JOS
managing Builders, the mortgage between the former and United
Overseas Bank is still valid. In the present case, it is undisputed that
JOS Managing Builders mortgaged several parcels of land, including
all the buildings and improvements therein covered by TCT Nos. N-
146444, N-146445 and N-143601 to United Overseas Bank without
prior clearance from the HLURB... the failure of JOS Managing Builders
to secure prior approval of the mortgage from the HLURB and United
Overseas Bank's failure to inquire on the status of the property offered
for mortgage placed the condominium developer and the creditor
Bank... in pari delicto Hence, they cannot ask the courts for relief for
such parties should be left where they are found for being equally at
fault. failure to secure the HLURB'S prior written approval as required
by P.D. No. 957 will not annul the entire mortgage between the
condominium developer and the creditor bank, otherwise the protection
intended for condominium buyers will inadvertently be extended to
the... condominium developer even though, by failing to secure the
government's prior approval, it is the party at fault. the HLURB erred
when it declared the entire mortgage constituted by JOS Managing
Builders, Inc. in favor of United Overseas Bank null and void based
solely on the complaint of EDUPLAN which was only claiming
ownership over a single condominium unit of Aurora Milestone Tower.
Accordingly, the mortgage executed between JOS Managing Builders
and United Overseas Bank is valid. Principles:
13. Philippine National Bank vs. Sps. Bernard and Cresencia Marañon
G.R. No. 189316 July 1, 2013
Facts:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The antecedent events being the Spouses Maranon, owner of
a piece of real property, erected with a building occupied by various
tenants. Said subject property was among the properties mortgaged by
spouses Montealegre to PNB as a security for a loan. Spouses
Montealegre, through a falsified Deed of Sale, acquired title to the
property and used the property’s title which was purportedly registered
in the name of Emelie Montealegre. However, due to failure to pay the
loan, said property was foreclosed by PNB, and upon auction, was
thereafter acquired by the same bank, PNB. Spouses Maranon filed
before the RTC a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages against spouses Montealegre. Judgment of RTC was
rendered in favour of spouses Maranon, and also stipulated that the
Real Estate Mortgage lien of PNB shall stay and be respected. Such
decision prompted PNB to also seek for entitlement to the fruits of the
property such as rentals paid by the tenants.
Issue: Whether or not is PNB entitled to fruits of the disputed property.
Ruling:
No. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property
producing it by right of accession. The rightful recipient of the disputed
rent in this case should be thus the owner of the lot at the time the rent
accrued. It is beyond question that spouses Maranon never lost
ownership over the subject lot, and that technically, there is no juridical
tie created by a valid mortgage contract that binds PNB to the subject
lot because the mortgagors Montealegre were not the true owners.
PNB’s lien as a mortgagee in good faith pertains to the subject lot alone
and not on the erected building which was not foreclosed and still
remained to be a property of Maranon. Thus, PNB’s claim for the rents
paid by the tenants has no basis.
14. Heirs of Mario Malabanan (represented by Sally A.
Malabanan) vs. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of
land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of
the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property
owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–
Benedicto, Gregorio,Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his foursons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,Magdalena,
had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by EduardoVelazco
to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during
trial was a Certification dated 11 June2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject
property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No.3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March15, 1982.” On 3
December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration. The
Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.
ISSUE: 1. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
HELD: While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.
15. Cerila J. Calanasan, represented by Teodora J. Calanasan as
Attorney-in-fact vs. Spouses Virgilio Dolorito and Evelyn C. Dolorito
G.R. No. 171937
November 25, 2013
16. PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs LEGASPI
TOWERS 300, INC.
G.R. No. 147957 July 22, 2009
Facts:
Caruff Development Corporation(now Legaspi Towers 300 Inc) owned
several parcels of land along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard, Manila.
In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on the
mortgaged parcels of land. Along with the other appurtenances of the
building constructed by Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating set)
and two sump pumps in the adjacent lot covered by TCT No. 127649
(now TCT No. 200760)
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the construction of a generator set and 2
sump pumps constitutes as easement of the property.
RULING:
The SC ruled in the negative. Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner. In the case at bar Legaspi
Towers 300 Inc. the owner of the property where the generator set and
sump pumps was built is also the same owner of the property where
the condominium was constructed. In fine, the properties are owned by
the same person.
17. Enriqueta M. Locsin vs. Bernardo Hizon, Carlos Hizon, Sps. Jose
Manuel & Lourdes Guevarra
G.R. No. 204369 September 17, 2014
Facts:
In 1992, Petitioner Locsin filed an ejectment case against one Aceron
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) to recover possession over
the land in issue. Eventually, the two entered into a compromise
agreement, which the MTC approved. In 1994, Locsin and her counsel
discovered that one Marylou Bolos had the TCT cancelled and then
secured a new one in her favor by registering a Deed of Absolute Sale
allegedly executed by Locsin; Bolos later sold the subject lot to
Bernardo Hizon but it was titled under Carlos Hizon’s name.
Locsin learned that Carlos had already sold the property to his sister
and her husband, herein respondents spouses Guevara. The spouses
Guevara then immediately mortgaged the said property to secure a
loan/credit facility with Damar Credit Corporation (DCC).
Petitioner Locsin insists that Bernardo was well aware, at the time he
purchased the subject property, of a possible defect in Bolos’ title since
he knew that another person, Aceron, was then occupying the lot in
issue. As regards Carlos and the Sps. Guevara’s admissions and
testimonies, petitioner points out that when these are placed side-by-
side with the concurrent circumstances in the case, it is readily revealed
that the transfer from the former to the latter was only simulated and
intended to keep the property out of petitioner’s reach.
For their part, respondents maintain that they had the right to rely solely
upon the face of Bolos’ clean title, considering that it was free from any
lien or encumbrance. They are not even required, so they claim, to
check on the validity of the sale from which they derived their title. Too,
respondents claim that their knowledge of Aceron’s possession cannot
be the basis for an allegation of bad faith, for the property was
purchased on an “asis where-is” basis.
ISSUE:
Are respondents innocent purchasers for value and in good faith of the
subject property?
RULING:
No. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest
in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or
before receiving any notice of another person’s claim. As such, a
defective title–– or one the procurement of which is tainted with fraud
and misrepresentation––may be the source of a completely legal and
valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in
good faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an
innocent purchaser for value. (Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of
Militar, et al., G.R. No. 164801, June 30, 2006)
Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal
rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way
obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. (Rufloe v. Burgos, G.R. No. 143573, January 30, 2009)The
recognized exceptions to this rule are stated as follows:
A person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further
except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or
when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then
prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the
title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who
falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not
merit the protection of the law. (Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
106657, August 1, 1996)
18. Maria Torbela, et al. vs. sps. Andres T. Rosario and Lena Duque-
Rosario, et al./Lena Duque-Rosario vs. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank
G.R. Nos. 140528/140553 December 7, 2011
19. Alicia B. Reyes vs. Spouses Valentin Ramos, Francisco S. and
Anatalia
G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015
Facts:
On March 28, 2006, petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, through Dolores B.
Cinco, filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, for easement of right of way against respondents, Spouses
Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos. In her Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court, petitioner alleged that she was the registered
owner of a 450-square-meter parcel of land in Barangay Malibong Bata,
Pandi, Bulacan, designated as Lot No. 3-B-12 and covered by TCT No.
T-343642-(M). The property used to be a portion of Lot No. 3-B and
was surrounded by estates belonging to other persons. Petitioner also
alleged that respondents' 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her
property, and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to
the highway. A 113-square-meter portion of respondents' property was
also the "point least prejudicial to the respondents. The easement
sought was the vacant portion near the boundary of respondents' other
lot. According to petitioner, her and respondents' lots were previously
owned by her mother. Respondents' lot was given to Dominador
Ramos who allegedly was respondents' predecessor-in-interest.
Dominador was also her mother's brother and caretaker of properties.
Petitioner's mother only learned about what Dominador did when a
meeting was called in 1989 regarding the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. She did not cause the
recovery of her title because at that time, the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan was razed by fire, causing the destruction of the documents
covering the subject properties.
Issue: Whether or not to grant of compulsory easement of right of way
on a 113 square meter portion of defendants' property to be devoid of
merit.
Held:
The petition has no merit. I. The issue of ownership is irrelevant to the
case; filing of a complaint for easement is a recognition of the servient
property owner's rights Petitioner points out that respondents' property
was previously owned by her mother. She alleged that her uncle who
was her mother's caretaker of property fraudulently caused the titling of
the whole 1,500-square-meter property instead of just the 500-square-
meter portion under his name. These allegations are relevant only if we
are determining the issue of the property's ownership. However, this is
not an issue in this case. Petitioner does not question the ownership or
the registration of respondents' title over the property. We are limited to
the issue of petitioner's easement rights. On that matter, petitioner's act
of filing a Complaint for easement of right of way is an
acknowledgement that the property is owned by respondents. It is
tantamount to a waiver of whatever right or claim of ownership
petitioner had over the property
20. HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN CALIMOSO, and LIBY CALIMOSO
v. AXEL ROULLO
GR No. 198594 / January 25, 2016
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for easement of right of way in which
damage would be done to the estate of the petitioners claiming that the
route was the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest
public road. Petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement
stating that it would cause substantial damage and there are
alternatives. The RTC granted respondent’s complaint. The CA
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the requirements of a valid right of way demand is
present.
RULING:
NO. “To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following
requisites should be met: 1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; 2. There
is payment of proper indemnity; 3. The isolation is not due to the acts
of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and 4. The right-of-way claimed
is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.” “The immovable in whose
favor the easement is established is called the dominant estate, and
the property subject to the easement is called the servient estate. Here,
the respondent’s lot is the dominant estate and the petitioners’ lot is the
servient estate.” “Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the
easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be
established on the tenement where the distance to the public road or
highway is shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If
these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur
in a single tenement, we have held in the past that the least prejudice
criterion must prevail over the shortest distance criterion.” “In this case,
the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners’ lot would
cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners’
property. Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public
road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed
out, and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any
damage, albeit longer, is available.” “We have held that ‘mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis of setting up a compulsory easement’; that ‘a longer way may
be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there
are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way.’
21. Republic of the Philippines vs. Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III, et al.
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
Facts:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years,
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March
7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot
4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C.Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in
the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an
abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by
Arcadio Ivan.On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application
for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because
of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property
had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30
years.
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land
registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters
from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be
registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was
an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.
On May 10, 2000, the RTC granted the application for land registration,
disposing: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants,
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both
Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of
the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San
Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five
(1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan
Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case
4,Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot
4998-BWith this, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appealed. The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457
of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit. Article 457 of the Civil Code
provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the currents of the waters. "In ruling for respondents, the RTC
pronounced that on the basis of the evidence presented by the
applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio
C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application
which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an
orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins
the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after
it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion
Cruz, now deceased. The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, and
stated that it could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New
Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos,
Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the
applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother The
Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts
of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that
respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the
drying up of the Parañaque River.
Issue: Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of
acquisitive prescription (section 14(1) of PD 1529)
Held:
NO. (By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made
through the effects of the current of the water-belongs to the owner of
the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up
of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to
the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner,
unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.)
22. HEIRS OF DELFIN v. HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD,
GR No. 187633 2016-04-04
Facts:
On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin)[5] and Maria
Tappa (Spouses Tappa) filed a complaint[6] for Quieting of Title,
Recovery of Possession and Damages (Complaint) against
respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud),[7] Henry Calabazaron
(Calabazaron), and Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng).[8] The property
subject of the complaint is a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3341,
Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square meters, located in Kongcong,
Cabbo, Peñablanca, Cagayan (Lot No. 3341).[9] In their complaint,
Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No.
3341, having been issued OCT No. P-69103... r 18, 199 September 18,
1992,... Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo
Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo
were in open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot
since time immemorial In their Answer,[12] respondents Bacud,
Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the original owner of Lot No.
3341 was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and
Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and
Irene by operation of law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the
property. Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit...
stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated that
one-half (1/2) of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole
property was declared as his, only for taxation purposes. Respondents
started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each
of them. They continued to occupy them despite several demands to
vacate from Spouses Tappa. Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963
Affidavit was executed through force and intimidation.[23] Bacud and
Malupeng denied this allegation.[24] The R TC... that there was no
document in the hands of respondents as strong and persuasive as the
title in the name of the Spouses Tappa that will support respondents'
claim of ownersh... ip Respondents appealed to the CA They alleged
that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they were not in
possession of the lot since 1963, which possession was required for an
applicant for a free patent under the law. respondents argued that the
complaint should be dismissed because both extinctive and acquisitive
prescription have already set in. They also argued that the action for
quieting of title had already prescribed since the possession of Bacud
and Malupeng started in 1963, which fact was allegedly admitted by
Spouses Tappa in their complaint.[40] Thus, Spouses Tappa had only
until 1993 to file a complaint, which they failed to do. Ail respondents
claimed that from the start of their possession, they (1) have paid real
taxes on the lot, (2) have planted crops, and (3) have continued to
possess the lot in the concept of owners.[41]... respondents alleged that
Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right over the subject lot because
they cannot rely on the certificate of title issued to them on September
18, 1992 by virtue of a free patent The CA set aside the decision of the
RTC. uled in favor of respondents and explained that their possession
over Lot No. 3341 already ripened into ownership through acquisitive
prescription. A noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their
complaint that they have not been in possession of the lot, and that
respondents have been continuously occupying portions of it since
1963. first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a
legal or an equitable title to or an interest in the property. The CA
explained that the free patent granted to Spouses Tappa produced no
legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land,... while Spouses
Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over the property, and were
able to register it under the Torrens system, they have not become its
owners. "[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership
over immovable property—it does not create title nor vest one but it
simply confirms a title already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible."
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa's complaint for
quieting of title against respondents;[56]Whether the CA erred in not
finding that Spouses Tappa's certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked in this case;[57] and
Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents have acquired the
property through acquisitive prescription.[58]
Ruling:
We affirm the decision of the CA. for an action to quiet title to prosper,
two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.[61]Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two
requisites We agree with the CA that at the time of the application for
free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land by virtue of
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by
respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the
coverage of the Public Land Act,[62] which governs public patent
applications. Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that
sometime in 1963, Bacud and Malupeng started occupying portions of
Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property, while Calabazaron did
the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.[71] The complaint
stated further that since 1963, the respondents "continuously occupied
portion of the subject land."[7 Records also show that Spouses Tappa
were aware of respondents' possession of the disputed portions of Lot
No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by
respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. A cloud... ment (deed, or
contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
apparendy valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated)
or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to
the title 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) 24. ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact
or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly found that EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA vs.DIONISIO UGAY
Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation m the execution of the G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014
1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiate

23. Province of Camarines Sur, represented by Governor Luis

Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr. vs. Bodega Glassware, represented by its
owner Joseph D. Cabral
G.R. No. 194199 March 22, 2017
25 Republic of the Philippines vs. Diosdada L. Gielczyk
G.R. No. 179990 October 23, 2013

26 The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Florentina

Prudencio, et al.
G.R. No. 187942 September 7, 2016