ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS AND THE INTEGRITY QUESTION IN NIGERIA: THE FIRST, SECOND,

THIRD AND FOURTH REPUBLICS IN PERSPECTIVE.

. OBI, EMEKA ANTHONY****

Introduction:

The place of an electoral commission in the conduct of elections is such that one can
argue that the outcome of elections is largely a function of the performance of the electoral
body. This is because in any regulated contest or competition, the conduct of the contestants
depends on the rules of the game and the enforcement of such rules. Thus, in elections, the
behaviour of political parties and their candidates definitely has a lot to do with the behaviour
of the electoral commissions. As a regulator of elections, electoral commissions are supposed to
set the rules for elections relying on the country's constitution or electoral laws and organize
the elections within the ambit of these rules and laws. The level of compliance of the electoral
commission with these rules and laws serves as a barometer for measuring the authenticity of
the outcome of elections in a state.

In Nigeria, different electoral bodies have been set up at different periods to oversee the
conduct of elections, since the attainment of political independence in 1960. Thus, we have had
the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN), that conducted the independence elections, the
Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) which conducted the 1964 general elections. In the Second
Republic, we had the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), the National Electoral
Commission (NEC), came up in 1987 to conduct elections that would usher in the Third
Republic that was aborted by Ibrahim Babangida's evil antics. His friend Abacha disbanded NEC
and replaced it with the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON). Abacha's death also
marked the death of NECON, and in its place we now have the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC). One fundamental fact about these electoral commissions is that despite the
changes in nomenclature they have all faced one common problem which is that of the issue of
integrity. The integrity question which hung on the necks of these bodies, and sadly still hangs
on the neck of the present INEC has rubbed off on most of the elections conducted in Nigeria.
The changes have been that of form and not a change in the content, thereby driving home the
point that the hood does not make the monk, it was more or less mere differences in semantics.
The remaining part of this chapter would therefore be devoted to buttressing the above
assertion on electoral commissions and the integrity question in Nigerian elections which
incidentally is the title of this chapter.

ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS AND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA

At the dawn of political independence in Nigeria, the Electoral Commission of Nigeria

(ECN) was established. The Commission was headed by a Chief Commissioner in the person of
Mr. R.E. Wraith, while Mr. J.J. Warren served as the Executive Secretary. Four Nigerians also

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served in the Commission. They were Alhaji Muhammed Bello (North), Mr. Anthony Aniagolu
(East), Prof. Orisejolum Thomas (West) and Mr. M.A. Shosilver (Lagos), (Avosetinyen, 2004). The
1959 general elections were fairly well organized. According to Ojiako (1981) the elections
which held on December 12 went so well that the then Governor-General of Nigeria, Sir James
Robertson, in his new year broadcast observed that the quiet and orderly way in which the
elections were organised was certainly a major achievement for all those who had planned it.

With Nigerians fully at the helm of affairs after the attainment of political independence
and republican status, it soon became time for another elections. This time around, a new
electoral body was established. This time it was named the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC),
and had as its first Chairman, Sir Kofo Abayomi, who later resigned and was replaced by Mr.
Eyo Esua. The Chairman of the Commission was appointed by the President on the advice of the
Prime Minister.

As the 1964 general elections were drawing closer, the events surrounding the elections
as it related to the conduct of the politicians, the political parties and the electoral commission,
became apparent that while the politicians and parties were bent on winning at all cost, the
Federal Electoral Commission itself was biased in favour of the ruling party. There was this
curious scenario where at the close of nominations, the Federal Electoral Commission declared
many candidates unopposed despite the clear and established fact that candidates from the
opposition parties had filed their papers. This was done to clearly disenfranchise the opposition
and pave the way for candidates of the party in power to coast home to easy victories. In some
instances, the electoral officers would disappear the moment they collected the nomination
papers of the ruling party's candidates, thereby making it impossible for the opposition
candidates to file their papers. This made many electoral constituencies to be declared
unopposed, whereas there were candidates who either duly filled their papers, or those who
had their papers but could not locate the electoral officers who were in hiding. For instance, in
the Eastern Region, there were fifteen unopposed candidates, while in the North there were
over sixty, in the West it was the same story as NNDP candidates were returned unopposed
despite the presence of Action Group (AG) candidates. According to Ojiako (1981), the most
sensational of the unopposed saga had been the NNDP candidates for Ife South and Ife Central
in Western Nigeria, which the Action Group considered as likely winners and for which their
candidates had gone through all the necessary formalities. It was clearly absurd. It was also sad
and one might say ominous that the first attempt by Nigerians to conduct elections would
witness such evil contraptions.

The NCNC through its National Secretary, Mr. F.S. McEwen, reacting to the “drama of the
unopposed” stated that 'we do not regard these seats as won by the NPC' and that the party
had decided on 'a course of action'. While the leader of the party and Eastern Region Premier,
Dr. M.I. Okpara described the election arrangement as a 'farce' (Ojiako, 1981,p.203).
Incidentally, the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. E.E. Esua himself admitted the unopposed
drama in a broadcast where he said among others that there had been cases where more than
one candidate had been validly nominated “and yet names of candidates have been announced
as returned unopposed” (Ojiako, 1981,p.203). Based on all these anomalies and the apparent
collusion of the FEC to the grand design of the Nigeria National Alliance (NNA) to knock off any

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form of opposition, the United Peoples Grand Alliance (U.P.G.A) boycotted the elections. The
boycott was completely successful in the Eastern Region (which had 76 seats), and partially
successful in the Western Region (where the NNDP won 36 out of 57); it failed completely in the
Northern Region where the NPC won 102 of the 167 seats allocated to the Region (Nnadozie,
2007).

The country so soon after gaining political independence found itself engulfed in a
political crisis as the President ,Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe refused to invite the Prime Minister and the
Leader of the 'victorious' Northern Peoples Congress (NPC),the senior partner in the NNA
alliance, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to form a new government in line with the tenets of a
parliamentary democracy. However, after series of interventions and negotiations, it was finally
agreed that elections be conducted in areas where they were not held while the outgoing Prime
Minister, Sir Abukakar Tafawa Balewa, was invited by the President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, to form
a new government that would be of a broadly based national character.

Despite the problems that arose from the 1964 general elections, which almost led to
the collapse of the young Republic, the Western Regional election of October 11 1965 clearly
showed any discerning observer that both Nigerians and the electoral commission were not
prepared for free and fair polls. The atmosphere before the elections showed that it was going
to be very violent. Some electoral officers were kidnaped, while some UPGA candidates could
not file their papers because they couldn't locate the electoral officers at the close of
nominations as the drama of the unopposed continued. At the close of nominations, 16 NNDP
candidates had been declared unopposed, whereas the UPGA had candidates for those
constituencies. The results which the electoral commission started releasing at the end of
voting expectedly showed that the NNDP was in clear lead. At that point, the UPGA started
releasing its own results which it said was based on information from the constituencies. The
Deputy Leader of the Action Group and the leader of UPGA in the Western Region declared that
they had lost hope in the electoral commission. He went on and formed a ten-man interim
government saying he was convinced that UPGA had won the election. The Governor of the
Region, Chief Fadahunsi, called on the outgoing Premier, Chief S.L. Akintola, to form a
government based on the fact that the electoral commission had declared NNDP a clear winner
in the election. The disturbances and violence that followed the dubious victory of the NNDP
lasted till the fall of the First Republic on the 15th of January 1966. Though the exact number of
people killed was not known, but the figure was in hundreds while property worth millions of
pounds were destroyed that military intervention lasted till 1979.

In preparation for a return to civil rule, and in keeping faith with the promise of the slain
former Head of State Gen Murtala Mohammed, to hand over to an elected government in 1979,
the Obasanjo government through Decree No. 25 of 1978 promulgated the new 1979
Constitution which came into effect on 1s' October 1979. The government through Decree 41 of
1977 (with retroactive effect) established the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO). In order
to avoid the pitfalls of the electoral commissions of the First Republic, section 4 of Decree 41
made FEDECO an autonomous body subject to the manipution of nobody in the discharge of its
statutory duties. A controversial provision which made the decision of the body immutable even

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in the law courts was the subject of several litigations, until it was interpreted that not FEDECO
decisions but the act establishing it in its entirety was immune (Aderemi, 2004).

The first Chairman of the body was Michael Ani, The ban on political activities was lifted
on September 21, 1978 and barely 24 hours later, Chief Obafemi Awolowo announced the birth
of his party, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). The Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) was also born on
the same day. In less than three months, about 53 political associations have declared their
existence and intention to seek registration with the FEDECO. However, only 17 actually applied
to FEDECO for registration before the expiration of the dead line for registration of political
parties which was 18th of December, 1978. At the end, only five parties were found worthy and
subsequently registered by FEDECO. They were the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), the National
Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), the Peoples Redemption Party
(PRP), and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). According to Yaqub (2002), from a variety of
analytical stand points, it was generally accepted that with the exception of the NPP, all the
other political parties were to a certain extent re-incarnations of the political parties of the
defunct First Republic. It must be pointed out that the provision of section 76 of Decree 73 of
1979 which vested the regulatory power on FEDECO stipulated that among others that to be a
registered political party, the association must have offices in two-thirds of the then exiting
nineteen states of the federation. Therefore, though the five political parties as already pointed
out were to some extent reincarnations of the First Republic parties, they were now more
national in character. Yaqub (2002) also argues that apart from this statutory provision, the
presidential system must have contributed to this national character,

If not for the problem that arose from the screening of candidates by FEDECO, which
had to do with payment of taxes as at when due and other sundry issues, the elections which
held between July 7 and August 11, 1979 were fairly well conducted, though there were pockets
of complaints in some parts of the country. At the end, the Shehu Shagari led NPN was declared
the winner of the presidential election. The UPN candidate in the elections, Chief Obafemi
Awolowo, who rejected the results filed a petition at the Special Presidential Election Tribunal
challenging the declaration of Shehu Shagari as the duly elected President. His main argument
was that Alhaji Shehu Shagari was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes because he had
not satisfied section 34 sub-section(l)(c)(i) of the Electoral Decree 1979 (Ojiako, 1981).

The Tribunal ruled on September 11, 1979 that it was satisfied with the election of Alhaji
Shehu Shagari as the President-elect. Not satisfied with the verdict, Chief Awolowo proceeded
to the Supreme Court. On September 26, 1979, the Supreme Court in a judgment read by the
Chief Judge, Justice Atanda Fatai Williams ruled that Aihaji Shehu Shagari was duly elected,
having scored at least 25 percent of the votes cast in each of twelve and two-thirds states of the
19 states of the federation. Shagari was subsequently sworn in on 1st October, 1979 as Nigeria's
first Executive President.

The events preceding the 1983 elections made it obvious that the elections would not
likely be free and fair as the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was hell bent on retaining
power at all cost and even expanding its reach. Thus, despite its dismal performance in the first
four years, the ruling NPN capitalized on its incumbency and subsequently manipulated the

4
electoral process in order to ensure that it retained power (Nnadozie, 2007). In his
own analysis of that election, Aderemi (2004), argues that the susceptibility of FEDECO was
openly displayed when it was accused to have connived with the NPN to rig the election. The
NPN was able to penetrate states which were hitherto exclusive preserves of its opponents with
solid assistance from FEDECO. Concrete examples were the UPN-controlled states of Oyo and
Ondo and the NPP controlled state of Anambra.

Unfortunately, FEDECO was unable to convince the nation against its complicity in the 1983
elections before the army struck. In the same vein, Tijani (1986) in an indictment of FEDECO, the
NPN and the police in that election posits that:

It is very clear that the Nigerian election of 1983 is a sham election. it was massively
rigged and nobody can honestly, truthfully and scientifically state that Shagari and his
lieutenants- in the state capitals were democratically voted into office. A massive
collusion involving the NPN, the FEDECO, the police and some sections of the judiciary
had produced governments that could not claim legitimacy by dint of even the most
rudimentary requirement of bourgeois democracy (p.15).

Despite the flawed and massively rigged elections, the NPN was still rejoicing over its
fraudulent victory when the military struck on December 31, 1983 thereby truncating the
Second Republic and ending the era which Madunagu (1984) said witnessed the most rapid
politics of aggrandizement and robbery of the treasury. Though most Nigerians were happy that
Shagari and his looting co-travelers have been booted out of office, nobody knew nor was
prepared for the type of misrule, corruption, tyranny, manipulations, deceit and repression that
the military would visit on Nigeria and Nigerians for the next sixteen years. Probably with the
benefit of hindsight Nigerians would not have rejoiced then and would have preferred that the
Second Republic was allowed to continue and sought itself out in due time.

The Buhari/Idiagbon regime that took over from the ousted Shagari civilian
administration had no room for a transition programme before it was overthrown in a seeming
palace coup. The Babangida administration that succeeded the Buhari/Idiagbon regime (which
had no transition programme) introduced the longest transition programme in Nigeria, which
almost at every junction was “designed to secure for the military extended legitimization and
thus kept them in power” (Onuoha, 2002,p.261). The government set up the National Electoral
Commission (NEC) under Prof. Eme Awa in 1987, The government from the inception of NEC
claimed that the body was given full autonomy to operate but in actual practice, this was not
true. According to Taiwo (2002), in practice, NEC operated as an agency of the Babangida
regime, which determined what funds it got, its powers and limits and the appointment of its
personnel. It should be noted that the assertion of autonomy by two chief executives of NEC at
various times during the Babangida transition programme cost them their jobs.

The first election organized by NEC was the local government elections on non-party basis
held on 12th December, 1987. The elections were fairly conducted and there were few reported
incidents of mal-practices. Prof. Eme Awa was removed in 1989, for having opinions that were
considered divergent from that of the regime and was replaced by his former student, Prof.

5
Humphrey Nwosu. When the government rejected the thirteen political associations that NEC
presented to it for registration, the government decided to form parties that were 'a little to the
left and a little to the right' and all their members were equal joiners. The two parties were the
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). The Commission
also introduced the Option A4 voting formula, that required voters to queue behind the
candidates of their choice. NEC conducted the second local government elections in December
1990, but this time around on party basis and in 1991 it also conducted gubernatorial elections.

Then came the presidential elections of June 12, 1993. Most unfortunately, this election
which was considered the most free and fair election ever conducted in Nigeria, and which
would have laundered the image of electoral commissions in Nigeria was annulled, by General
Babangida as part of his self-succession plot. Prof. Nwosu was beaten up by security agencies,
sacked and disappeared from public glare until recently. He was replaced by Prof. Okon Uya.
One sour point that trailed the operation of NEC was its omnipotent powers under Decree 48 of
1991. This Decree empowered NEC to accept, cancel, or annul the result of any primary election
presented to it by the political parties. It had powers to disqualify any candidate “whose loyalty,
patriotism and attitude towards a peaceful and orderly democratic election are questionable;
whose participation in the democratic process may seriously put in doubt and jeopardize the
legitimacy or credibility of such an election”. These powers were seriously abused as politicians
colluded with NEC officials to disqualify their strong opponents. NEC actually disqualified 28
candidates duly elected at the party primaries of the National Assembly election. Aside from
this, NEC updated some results of the primaries submitted to it (Taiwo, 2002).

Abacha's ascendancy to power in 1993 signaled the death of NEC and from its ashes came the
National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) with Chief Summer Dagogo Jack as
Chairman. NECON was set up by the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (Establishment
etc) Decree 1996.

NECON registered five political parties, namely, the United Nigeria Congress Party
(UNCP), Congress for National Consensus (CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), National
Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), and Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM). The Abacha
transition programme which was expected to terminate in October 1998 was crafted to
transform Abacha into a civilian President. Thus, the political parties were manipulated to adopt
him as their presidential candidate. The game was simple, if they all adopted him as their
candidate, there would be no need for elections and NECON will simply declare him the
country's president. However, before this would happen, the man suddenly and mysteriously
died on 8lh June, 1998, in what Meier (2000) referred to "as the coup from heaven". Then came
General Abdulsalami Abubakar who succeeded the late Abacha, he scrapped NECON and in its
place, established the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) via Decree No. 17 of
1998. The first Chairman of INEC was Justice Ephraim Akpata, a retired Supreme Court Judge.
The Commission went ahead to perform its assigned duties. It reviewed the voters register,
registered three political parties and conducted elections in a staggered form, The three parties
registered were the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the All Peoples Party (APP) and the
Alliance for Democracy (AD). The elections were held as follows;

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December 5,1998 Local Government Elections

January 9,1999 Governorship and House of Assembly Elections

'February 20,1999 National Assembly Elections

'February 27,1999 Presidential Elections (Obikeze and Obi, 2003,p.219).

Aderemi (2004), believes the perceptible doggedness of the Abubakar government to

restore democratic rule in Nigeria on the appointed date coupled with the choice of the well
respected and elderly Ephraim Akpata, Judge of the Appellate division of the Nigerian judiciary
as Chairman gave invaluable credence to INEC and the transition process at a time the citizenry
was completely befuddled by the shenanigans of the Babangida and Abacha years which
spanned an odd decade.

Part of INECs functions which elicited some controversy was the issue of party
registration. According to Ihonvbere (2003), this goes against the autonomy of the nationalities
of the federating units and erodes the ability of states to organize their political interests and
processes independently. He further argues that the entire idea of parties being registered by
the federal government means that the same federal government could deny registration on
the grounds that its requirements have not been met.

On the same issue, a frontline politician, Balarabe Musa argued that the idea of party
registration is undemocratic. ''For instance, during the last election, we saw a situation whereby
only people who had money and who could afford to buy votes, were able to contest in and win
elections" (quoted in Akhaine, 1999). Thus, Ihonvbere posits that the cumbersome, expensive
and intrusive federal government's requirement for party formation and registration is a direct
way of encouraging corruption, elite-dominated politics and the continuing marginalization of
persons without connections of wealth in the political process. However, it must be noted in line
with Onuoha (2002) that being aware of the credibility problem of Babangida and Abacha years,
General Abubakar allowed some greater measure of autonomy to INEC. Thus, it was INEC and
the political associations and not INEC and government which discussed and agreed on the
modalities for the formation and registration of political parities. This was a marked difference
from the previous transition programmes where the military governments issued guidelines
often in terms of Decrees on party registration with little or no input at all from the political
associations.

The guidelines issued by INEC for the registration of political parties stipulated that
parties were to have provisional registration, while full registration depended on the
performance of the parties at the local government elections scheduled for December 5, 1998.
Acording to this rule:

To be qualified to contest subsequent elections under the transition, provisionally

registered associations must poll at least 10% of the total number of votes cast in each
of at least 24 states of the federation at the said local government council election.
After the local government election, any political association which satisfied the

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 requirement (scored 10% of the votes cast in 24 states) shall be granted certificate of
registration as a political party (Yaqub, 2002,p.338).

Political activities kicked off immediately and at the end of the deadline on September 9,
1998, 25 political associations had applied to INEC for registration. On October 9, 1998, INEC
released the names of political associations which it said met its guidelines. These associations
were:

Peoples Democratic Partly = PDP

All Peoples Party = APP

Alliance for Democracy = AD

Democratic Advance Movement = DAM

National Solidarity Movement = NSM

Movement for Democracy and Justice = MDJ

Peoples Redemption Party = PRP

United Democratic Party = UDP

United Peoples Party = UPP

These 9 political associations contested the local government elections and only 2 met
the requirements for full registration as political parties. These were the PDP and the APP.
However, because of the fact that the AD which was mainly based in the South-West and an off-
shoot of the NADECO could not meet the guideline, INEC amended its provision for the
registration of parties. According to the amendment, where only two parties poll at least 10% of
votes cast in at least 24 states of the federation, the next political association which scored 10%
of the total votes cast in the highest number of states of the federation shall be registered, or
the party placed third in the overall election or which made 5% in 24 states of the federation
(Onuoha, 2002). This amendment made it possible for the AD to be registered. Yaqub (2002)
argued that perhaps what made INEC bend its initial rules was because excluding the AD would
have been very disastrous for the country. According to him:

For instance, if we consider the fact that AD was largely made up of Nigerians from the
South-western zone, one implication would have been that non-registration of AD
would have meant that close to one quarter of Nigerians would have been excluded
from full participation in the Abubakar transition exercise. It was feared that most of
those in AD would not have bothered joining other registered political parties if AD were
not registered. Such exclusion would have been suffered by a section of the country
(including Lagos) which had the most favourable geopolitical location in the
country(p.339).

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Going further in his argument, he posits that:

At the same level of analysis, which is not misleading, if we consider the degree of
political mobilization and consciousness in this zone, and its favourable geopolitical
location, it would not be an over statement to suggest that political logistical legitimacy
might have been questionable and problematic for any government emerging from an
arrangement that excluded that zone from full political and electoral
participation(p.339).

In the same vein, Omoruyi (2001),has posited that the AD was registered on national
security grounds, since the military had to face the prospect of denying a voice to the Yoruba
people after what they went through after the annulment.

Apparently the 1999 elections cannot be said to be completely free and fair, however,
Bonu (2004) believes that though there were flaws in that elections, they were not substantial
to warrant a cancellation of the entire results. Also both local and foreign election observers in
their various reports detailed forms of electoral malpractices witnessed in the elections but
most concluded that they were really not substantial to call for an annulment of the elections.
However, Soyinka (2003) has a different view of the elections. He believed that the elections
were designed to impose General Obasanjo on Nigerians, while erstwhile Abacha cronies
initialized their accumulated gains under the regime to bulldoze their ways into Governorship,
Senate and House of Representatives. Most regrettable, Dauda (2007) sees the group as
enjoying the benefits of the struggle to which they posed the greatest stumbling block.

By 1999, the fact that Nigerians and even the international community were already
tired of the military and its concomitant destruction conspired to give the elections some
measure of credibility (Oddih and Obi, 2006). Thus, the emergence of Obasanjo as a candidate
and his eventual victory at the polls was purely a contrivance that was accepted so that the
military would no longer find any reason to hang on to power. For the Western powers, they
had to accept it because, as Omelle (2005) has argued:

A casual reading of the maneuvers leading to his choice as candidate of the largest party
in Africa (as vaunted by its leadership without evidence beyond them), the Peoples
Democratic Party and the external orchestration of support for the electoral process
including the validation of the 1999 elections by election monitors from European Union
and the U.S.A. makes sense only in the context of the West's (in particular America's)
anxiety and resolve to install a General known for his proclivity to pursue policies in
tandem with imperialist designs for Nigeria in particular because of its strategic
resources and Africa in general(p.5)

It should be noted that the acceptance of the annulment of the June 12 1993
Presidential election by Gen. Babangida by the political class was the main reason why the
military remained in power. There is no doubt that if both the SDP and NRC had rejected the
annulment and insisted that the winner of that election, Chief M.K.O Abiola be allowed to

9
actualize his mandate, the military would have beaten a retreat from the annulment and
handed over. However their failure to realize then that they were competing for power with the
military as a distinct class made them play into the hands of their competitors. The cost of that
error was the human disaster called Abacha and more six years of prolonged military
dictatorship. As the saying goes ‘once beaten twice shy’. In the spirit of allowing the military go,
there seemed to have been a conspiracy of silence among Nigerians in terms of the shortfalls of
the 1999 elections, and the military were eased off the stage peacefully.

The 2003 elections was a complete sham. The Transition Monitoring Group's (TMG)
report of the election, pointed out serious flaws in both the nomination process and
organization of the party primaries thus:

First, the process demonstrated vividly the supremacy of political party executives,
power brokers and factions within the parties in determining the flag bearers of the
party in particular elections. The party membership has virtually no direct say in the
choice of flag bearers. Second, the guidelines for the party primaries were originally
designed to provide discriminating support for the incumbents particularly that of the
PDP. This was because of the deliberate choice of the delegate system as against the
congress system which the parties had adopted. By this preferred system, there was no
respect for the democratic principle of equal opportunities and a level playing field for
all the aspirants. It adopted the use of special automatic delegates, including Ministers,
Ambassadors, Presidential Aides and other appointees of the President. On the eve of
the primaries, those incumbents manufactured appointment letters for loyalists who
were to serve as delegates. There were also reports of substitutions made on the
authentic delegate lists from local government areas to include trusted and devoted
loyalists of the incumbents.

On the elections itself, the report insisted that it was characterized by disruption of polls
or absence of elections in some polling centres, vote-buying, stealing and stuffing of ballot
boxes, improper set-up and voting procedures, multiple, ghost and under-aged voting, violence
and harassment, general insecurity, collaboration of INEC officials to commit electoral fraud,
absence of polling officials at polling units and intimidation of election observers. In his review
of the same elections, Omelle (2005) argues that:

To call the 2003/2004 electoral motions 'elections' is to brutalize the English language.
This brutalization of the white man's language is brought about by the brazen assaults
on the basic principle of democratic process-the elections. Virtual democracy, the
substitution of content for form could not have been better calibrated (p.4).

Most unfortunately, those who criticized the conduct and outcome of the 2003 elections
never knew that what they were criticizing was really a 'wonderful' exercise until they
witnessed the 2007 elections. The elections were simply nothing but brazen day-light robbery
and wanton assault on the sensibilities of Nigerians. Little wonder that elections have been
variously described as the worst elections ever conducted in Nigeria. In their preliminary report

10
of the 2007 Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial and State House of Assembly
Elections released on the 23rd April, 2007, the European Union Election Observer Mission (Eu
EOM) observed among others that:

More specifically complaints relating to missing voters registers, ballot box stuffing,
hijacking of ballot boxes and other sensitive materials, thumb printing of ballot papers,
forgery of results, use of violence to force people to vote for a particular political party,
intimidation and harassment of party agents and voters by thugs, police and the armed
forces, (Guardian, 25th April, 07)

The Prof. Maurice Iwu-led INEC has been the most vilified electoral commission in
Nigeria's history, yet the commission remained unperturbed.

The appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega, a Professor of Political Science, a former

Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) President, as INEC Chairman in 2010 by President
Goodluck Jonathan, brought some semblance of decency and breathe of fresh air in INEC.
Preparation for the 2011 general elections under Jega's INEC was most elaborate, methodical
and painstaking. This started with a biometric voters register that captured over 73 million
voters. As at the time of the elections, Nigeria had a total of sixty-three registered political
parties. This indeed was quite unwieldy, however only 20 of them took part in the presidential
election.

The major event that almost cast aspersion on the capability of Professor Jega and his
team to conduct a free and fair pool, was the cancellation of the National Assembly election on
April 2 2011, midway into voting. The postponement was occasioned by the late arrival of
some of the voting materials to the extent that some even arrived on the morning of the
election day. However, the skepticism which this postponement caused easily evaporated with
the orderly manner in which the rescheduled elections where conducted.

Though the elections were hailed by both foreign and domestic observers as free and
fair, and also the best ever conducted by INEC, the result of the Presidential elections sparked
violence in some states in the North. The violence could be partly traced to the statement
allegedly made by the candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Gen.
Mohammadu Buhari that he would make Nigeria ungovernable if he lost the elections.
Incidentally, despite the heavy losses recorded as a result of the violence in both human and
material resources, the Jonathan government pretended that nothing happened, while the
sponsors of the violence and their perpetrators were not tried.

A measure of the transparency of the 2011 elections is the number of post-election

petitions. When judged against the 2007 elections, the difference becomes very glaring.

However, the elections generally faced some challenges before the conduct proper. The
first has to do with the issue of whether President Jonathan should contest or not. Though it
was his constitutional right to contest, some strong Northern elements within the PDP felt that
he shouldn't. Their argument was that based on the PDP zoning formula, another Northerner
ought to complete the second tenure of President Yar'dua whose first tenure his Vice President

11
Goodluck Jonathan completed. They reasoned that since Chief Olusegun Obasenjo a Southerner
had ruled for eight years, and another Southerner, Dr Goodluck Jonathan had ruled for another
two years, while Yar'dua a Northerner ruled for only two years, natural justice demands that
this time around, a Northerner should take the shot. It was on this bitter note that the PDP
primaries took place as a strong contest between President Jonathan and former Vice President
Atiku Abubakar, a well known political titan. President Jonathan won the primaries clearly, while
Atiku and his Northern elements were left to lick their wounds which was re-opened in 2015,
four years later.

One may ask why the internal problem of the PDP should be seen as a major challenge
for the elections, when they are just one of the parties in the country. Well, PDP then was not
just one of the parties in Nigeria, it was the ruling and dominant party in Nigeria and whatever
happened in or with the PDP reverberated throughout the country. Moreso, the PDP then set
the tone and mood of party politics in the country. They served as the political barometer.

Another controversy that trailed the elections was the issue of postponement. The
elections were initially scheduled to hold in January 2011, but with the appointment of a new
INEC Chairman, in the person of Prof. Attahiru Jega in June 2010, the Commission felt it needed
more time under a new Chairman to prepare well for the elections. Prof. Jega, being mindful of
the pitfalls of the much maligned 2007 elections which were considered the worst in Nigerias’
electoral history wanted to do a thorough job. Such a thorough job would definitely need more
time. The postponement which the Commission requested for in September 2010, moved the
elections from January 10,to April 2011, following the amendment of the Electoral Act.

The next challenge was that of pre-election violence. On the 1st of October 2010 during
Nigeria's 50th independence anniversary celebrations, there were bomb explosions close to the
venue of the national celebrations, which left many people dead and scores injured. The
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant group claimed
responsibility for the dastardly act. Meanwhile the Islamic sect known as Boko Haram was
already gradually wrecking havoc in the Northern part of Nigeria through bombings and
shootings. There was also a bomb explosion in Yenegoa, Bayelsa state during a gubernatorial
campaign rally, in December 2010, bomb explosions in Jos capital of Plateau state in the same
December, while another bomb exploded in Abuja on the 31 December 2010, killing some
people. It was against the backdrop of this level of insecurity that the INEC was preparing for
the 2011 polls.

In order to make the elections credible, the INEC took the following steps. First, the new
Commission which was inaugurated on the 30th of June 2010 by President Jonathan; went on a
retreat at the Le Meridian Hotel, Uyo, Akwa-Ibom state. At this retreat, the Commission
examined the electoral management body it inherited. It focused mainly on the voters register,
which was found to be replete with irregularities, which included under-aged registrants, blank
or blurred photographs, multiple registrations of the same persons and missing names of
previously registered voters. The register of voters also excluded a sizeable number of eligible
voters (INEC 2011).

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It was based on these glaring shortcomings that the Commission argued that if it:

Had gone ahead to use that register for the 2011 general elections initially fixed for
January, it would not only have disenfranchised a large chunk of voters, but also the
credibility of the elections would also have been severally undermined. Indeed, the
Commission's decision to do a fresh voters registration is unanimously acclaimed by all
critical state holders in the electoral process who had totally lost confidence in the then
existing register of voters. Consequently the new Commission took the view that an
entirely new register of voters was the irreducible minimum for free, fair and credible
elections ( INEC 2011).

The new voter's registration exercise lasted for three weeks, between January 15th and
February 4th 2011. For this exercise, the Commission procured and deployed over 132,000
Direct Data Capture Machines, (DDCMs), one per each of the 119, 973 Polling Units (PUs) and
each of the 8,809 Registration Areas (RAs) with a provision for some contingency to facilitate
the capture of the biometrics and other data of registrants. At the end of the exercise, 73, 528,
eligible Nigerian voters were registered.

The second step taken by the Commission was a verification exercise of all the polling
units and registration areas nation-wide. This entailed the physical confirmation of the
existence, location, name and code number of the units and the registration area. This was the
first time such an exercise has been conducted. The report of the exercise showed that there
were 119,973 verified pooling units and 8,809 registration areas nationwide, which was a slight
reduction in the earlier recorded number.

What the Commission considered as by far the most outstanding area of the review
process was the setting up of the Action Plan Implementation Committee (APIC) and later the
Expanded Action Plan Implementation Committee (EAPIC) to drive the process. At the state
level, they were directed to set up State Action Plan Implementation Committees (SAPICs),
whose main duty was coordinating the implementation of the projects and programmes
indentified and funded in the planning for the registration of voters for the 2011 general
elections. It believes that it is to the credit of this committee that the funding gaps were
identified and covered.

The other new innovations which INEC introduced prior to the 2011 general elections
was the Remodified Open Ballot System (REMOB), the Reestablishment of Area Centres (RACs),
the use of senior academic staff of tertiary institutions and federal agencies as Collation and
Returning Officers.

The third step was a review of the ad-hoc staff recruitment policy which was reviewed
through the formalization of INEC/NYSC partnership. A memorandum of understanding (MOU)
was signed between the Commission and NYSC directorate, which made the NYSC and its corps
members the main source of the Commissions ad-hoc personnel requirement. If there was a
short-fall, this would be filled by students of federal tertiary institutions.

13
 In conclusion, the Commission embarked on the training of 368,812 polling unit officers
(NYSC members). Also all other ad-hoc personnel were trained by the training department
through The Electoral Institute (TEI) as part of its statutory functions, the Commission engaged
in elaborate public enlightenment and voter education programme. It collaborated with the
National Orientation Agency (NOA), civil society organizations (CSOs) and other relevant
stakeholders.

On the elections proper, the National assembly elections was billed for the 2nd of April
2011. On that day, voting started at various polling stations across the country, though party
agents were complaining about incomplete election materials. Surprising at mid-day the INEC
Chairman Prof. Jega stopped the elections nationwide according to (INEC):

Late delivery of materials led to the postponement of the first set of elections i.e.
National Assembly elections. The materials arrived the country in the morning of the
day of the election. This created massive logistical nightmare in terms of distribution
and transportation of the materials. This situation affected the election time table and
led to the postponement of the National Assembly election initially scheduled for 2nd
April, 2011.

The postponement led to initial apprehensions and doubt about the capacity of the Prof.
Jega led INEC to conduct credible elections. This palpable fear was based on the experiences of
the 2007 elections, which both international and local observers said was the worst elections
ever conducted in Nigeria. However, when the elections started on the 9th of April, these
doubts cleared as the conduct and outcome was far better than the 2007 elections. At the end
of the general elections, INEC identified three main challenges which it encountered. These
were:-

A). Late procurement of election material. This was attributed to section 31 of the 2010
Electoral Act (as amended) which requires political parties to submit to the Commission not
later than 60 days before the date for election the list of their candidates standing for elections.
Section 35 of the same Act stipulated a period of not less than 45 days to the elections for a
party to substitute candidates for an election. Clearly this duration was too short for early
printing of the election materials. This becomes obvious when it is noted that these materials
are usually printed outside the country.

B). Late release of funds to vendors for sensitive materials. Funds for the elections were not
released early, and when they were released, the contractors faced a lot of administrative bottle
necks associated with the due process mechanism.

C). Inadequate transport facilities: Movement of personnel to coastal areas, mountainous

regions and arid/desert zones of the country as always proved a difficult challenge.

At the end of it all, both international and domestic observers declared the elections as
the best ever in Nigeria's history despite some observed pit falls.

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 Elections, have not really been well conducted in Nigeria with the result that every
election we conduct seem to be worse than the proceeding one. When elections are not well
conducted and the 'winner' is not the real person the people actually voted for, no one can
rightly say that the system is democratic. Based on the findings of the study, it is therefore
pertinent to discuss the problems with the Nigerian electoral system.

The first major problem of the country's electoral system is the electoral body. The present
situation where the President appoints the top-shots of the National electoral body, while the
Governors appoint those of the states is simply not right considering the present state of our
social development.

In the first place, the integrity of the people being appointed is not adequately
addressed by the constitution. Also the issue of he who pays the piper, dictating the tune helps
to make sure that those who are appointed are more likely to be loyal to those who appointed
them. This has to be addressed if we desire to have free, fair and credible elections. The
electoral law should be amended to check the present situation where one of the contestants is
allowed to appoint an umpire. Commenting on this and other defects of the electoral system,
the European Union, Election observation Mission (EUEOM) in a report stated that:

A number of problems were not addressed in the Electoral Act 2006, in particular
relating to the independence of INEC. The President continues to have involvement in the
appointment of INEC Commissioners. At the federal level, consultations with the Council of
State and confirmation by the Senate, and at the state level, all 37 Resident Electoral
Commissioners (RECS) are appointed directly by the President. Other significant concerns
include a lack of requirement for result to be displayed at the polling station level and for a
breakdown of polling station results to be displayed at all superior levels of the handling of
complaints and appeal before election day, and a lack to time limits for the publication of results
and for the determination of election petitions. The Electoral Act 2006 is silent on a number of
important issues. Significantly, there is no prohibition on use of state resources during the
campaign or provisions to promote transparency in the appointment of polling station staff or
access to INEC decisions. In addition election petitions can only be filled by candidates and
political parties.

One of the best means of handling this is to constitutionally empower interest groups to
nominate certain number of people into the leadership of the electoral commission. Thus,
groups like the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), Nigeria Medical Association (NMA), the Trade
Union Congress (TUC) and the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), among others
should statutorily have their members in INEC. The members of the body should be made to
elect their chairman from among themselves. This we believe will help in making the electoral
body, largely independent. They should also have a fixed tenure.

Secondly, in the event that the court rules against the incumbent and orders him to
vacate office, he is allowed to go with all he has earned from the office, irrespective of the fact
that he got into office by stealth. The person is even addressed there after as an ex-Governor,
Senator etc. There is also no serious attempt to compensate the person whose mandate he

15
stole, and enjoyed. This is simply unfair. In such cases, the persons involved should be made to
refund every penny they were paid while in office, from which the rightful person would now be
paid.

Thirdly, In Nigeria, those who aid and abet electoral mal-practices do not suffer any
repercussions, The only person that suffers a little is the candidate whose victory may be voided
by the courts. Little or no thought is given to the fact that somebody or some persons actually
helped him to perpetrate the fraud. The consequence of this for our electoral system is that we
have some staff of the electoral commission, who have gained over thirty years experience in
electoral malpractice and who can manipulate the system no matter how tight it appears to be.
They are so to say, veterans in election rigging. Some fraudulent politicians lobby the electoral
commission to post such people to their constituencies, to help them out. Thus, it is not
surprising to see such people brag that they 'delivered' messrs A.B.C., and will still 'deliver' them
again if the price is right. With these characters in our electoral commissions the issue of
electoral malpractice will only get worse and more sophisticated. Those who aid and abet
electoral malpractices should be seriously punished.

Fourth, the length of electoral litigations in Nigeria is indeed very worrisome. There are
instances where some cases in the 2003 elections lasted for three years. The case of Mr. Peter
Obi and Dr. Chris Ngige of Anambra State easily comes to mind. In this particular instance, by
the time Peter Obi was declared as duly elected by the court, Dr. Chris Ngige had governed
Anambra State for almost three years out of a four year term, so even though the court sent
Ngige packing, he didn't lose much since he had occupied the position of Governor for almost
three years with all the privileges attached to the high office. Though in the case of Mr. Peter
Obi, he was lucky that the Supreme Court judgment of June 14 2007 declared that his mandate
actually started from 2006 when he was sworn in and would therefore end in 2010, (The Nation
15/6/07), the others especially in the legislature were not as lucky. Some had to serve for less
than two years, depending on when they won their cases. There should be definite time limits
for electoral litigations, while those declared winners for positions which are subjects of
litigations should not be sworn in until such cases are finally decided. This would help to stop
the present situation where people whose positions are still been contested in court from using
government resources and paraphernalia to prosecute their cases to the disadvantage of their
opponents.

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