Rights of Illegitimate Children:

Tonog vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar V.
Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after,
Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care
of her father and paternal grandparents.

Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin. The court granted the petition and
appointed Edgaras the legal guardian.

Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its original judgment and
allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Meanwhile, the court issued a resolution
granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of
the resolution.

Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA let Gardin remain in the
custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged.

Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of Gardin, as
a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her
as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she
had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.

Isuse:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?

Held:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of
the child.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that
the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody
over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently
formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition
for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to
assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the
choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain
with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.

Mossesgeld vs. Vourt of Appeals

Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar
Calasan (married), signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the
child’s name as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the
dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true
and correct. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.

The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the child’s surname in the
certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local
civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on
the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that
under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after
August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother.

Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate
son using his surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration.
Later, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting
the child’s mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied. The CA
affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity?

Held:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.”
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local
Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate
child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the
putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case
of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his
surname.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of
an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus
does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.
Silva vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales cohabited without the benefit of marriage and they had two
children. A rift surfaced and the two eventually separated. They agreed that Carlitos would have
the children in his company on weekends.

Claiming that Suzanne broke the agreement, Carlitos filed a petition for custodial rights over the
children before the RTC. Suzanne opposed, alleging that Carlitos often engaged in "gambling
and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.

The RTC ruled in favor of Carlitos giving him visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays
and/or Sundays. The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Carlitos take the
children out without the written consent of Suzanne.

Suzanne appealed. In the meantime, she got married to a Dutch national and eventually
immigrated to Holland with her children. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and denied the
Carlitos any visitorial rights. Carlitos appealed.

Issue:
Should Carlitos be denied visitorial rights?

Held:
No. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her
child or children.

There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the inherent and
natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that
"(f)amily relations include those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and children; x x x." Article 209, in
relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those
exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give
them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The
Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of
the youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely
address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on
support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members
of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or
inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriatevisitation rights to
parents who are not given custody of their children.

David vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar,
who is married, and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a
son, Christopher, who was eventually followed by 2 more girls, Christine
and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar’s wife when Daisie
took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After
this, Daisie’s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even
accepted by his legal family.
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to
go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar
refused to give Christopher back and had enrolled him at the
HolyFamilyAcademy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving
custody to Daisie and ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a
month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie
Ruling:
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered
to givetemporary support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the
amount of support in an appropriate action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate
child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was married to
another woman other than his mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority
of his mother, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. And because she has been deprived of her rightful custody
of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother
who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her
child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with
sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of
the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise."

In the matter of the petiton for cancellation of certificate of live birth of tinitigan v.
Republic

FACTS:

On 24 June 2008, she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky 0. Tinitigan
in her relative’s residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the
birth of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a
hospital.
To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while
Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On 24 August
2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote.
Again, she did not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges.
Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City.

When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally
decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur
to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late registration of
the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, with Registry Nos. 2012-1344
and 2012-1335, respectively, after submitting proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has
no record of both births on file.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO,
Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates)
with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.

The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City state the
names “Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan” and “Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan”. Ricky
Tinitigan was the listed Informant in both birth certificates.

Thus, petitioner Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subjectbirth
certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for containing
erroneous entries.

RTC granted the cancellation of birth certificates. CA, however, reversed and set aside the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the certificates of live birth of the two illegitimate children registered by their
father Tinitigan, which were not duly signed by their mother Barcelote, were void.

Mother must sign the birth certificate of her illegitimate child; otherwise, the same is void

Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificateof her
child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not. The
only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the
child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that
individuals are not falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to the
information entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and
custody of the illegitimate child.

Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the
documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth certificates.
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law
respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in
the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should have
been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the
signature of the mother.

Accordingly, the Court declared the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation for
being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of the
mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the
mother in her children’s birth certificates.

Legitimated Children

De Santos vs. Angeles

Facts:

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita
Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by
obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.

Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been
cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On
March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio
and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws.
On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of
P15,000,000.00.

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court 1 asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband’s estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was
granted.

On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent’s account of her administration, the
court a quo passed upon petitioner’s motion. The court, citing the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent’s ten children
legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court’s order dated
January 9, 1992.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only
natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.

Issue:

Whether or not the natural children by legal fiction be legalized.

Whether or not the petitioner have the rights to the properties of the deceased.

Held:

YES, since there are only two classes of children in the Family Code, it is deemed that natural
children by legal fiction are nothing but fiction and should be declared as legitimate child based
on the provision of the Civil Code.

Thus, natural children by fiction can be legalized as legitimate children as there are no such class
of children on the Family Code and since they have the same rights under the law.

YES, based on the Article 895 of the Civil Code, natural children by legal fiction cannot be
deprived of their legitime equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate
children or descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of
the latter’s estate.

Thus, the petitioner has the right to be the sole heir of the deceased as she was declared as the
sole legitimate child and entitled to all rights by a legitimate child under the law by the Court.

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran

FACTS:

Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the
charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited
with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and
Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful
conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be
registered as “legitimate” by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration
was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed
since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was
neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had
begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and 1975).

ISSUE: WON the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

HELD:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time they
were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural
children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

Adopted Children
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of America,
married Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen,who herself was later
naturalized as a citizen of that country.The spouses jointly filed a petition
with the RTC to adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been
living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors,
aswell as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. The RTCrendered a
decision granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Can the spouses adopt the minors.
Ruling:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under
any of the exceptional cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not
thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband
and the wife, a condition that must be read alongtogether with Article 184.
Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603 had
thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of
them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article
185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses
except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the
subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case
husband and wife jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in
accordance with this Code.

REPUBLIC vs. TOLEDANO

Facts:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a
petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically,
mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12)
year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 upto the
present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and
custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption.
His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses
Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184,
paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly enumerates the
persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One
who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the
foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify
pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former
Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It
reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

REPUBLIC vs. ALARCON VERGARA

Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due
Dye filed a petition before the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt
Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively,
younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United
States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in
Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized
American. They have two children. Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their
natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law,
contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt
Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino
citizens.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is
disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he
does not fall under any of the three afore quoted exceptions in the law. He is
not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity.
Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to
adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a
Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time
the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the
exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a
former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens
may not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the
law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions.
Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code)
retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may jointly adopt.
The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of
joint adoption and making it now mandatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption is valid.
Ruling:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must
adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for
they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will
sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate
children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended,
we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with
Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by
Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD.
The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven
months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave
their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3
instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly
adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word
“shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This
is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child
to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario
will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as
an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes
caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a
petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the
former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when
her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for
their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2
children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time
she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother
passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her
children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social
Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption
and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the
adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said
social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written
consent of the adoptee’s biological mother
Ruling:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the
biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of
the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of
consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed,
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and reestablish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover, abandonment means
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the
care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements
of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.

CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married
on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on
January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s
relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie
learned of her husband’s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a
family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed
a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebuwhich rendered a decision
approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they
agreed to “live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then
left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie
before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court
issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor
children to Anna Marie, reserving “rights of visitation at all reasonable
times and places” to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and
never remarried.Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner
immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano
were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were
“too meager” compared to theirs, he could not “in conscience, allow
anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.”
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to
reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had
transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to
private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody
should
be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver
custody over the minors to petitioner.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of
a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Ruling:
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals
failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a
different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his
children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its
ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of
“putting under a ban.” The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with
which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s
rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the
act of abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.”
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to
their whims. t abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately
executory.

Castro vs. Gregorio

Castro vs. Gregorio
Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate
court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs’ decree of adoption.

Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated
later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage
bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home
Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly
raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver
and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and
Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that
he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was
often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children that’s why he
adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of
the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO
certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually
Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

Issues:
Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is
required?

Decision
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the
adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the
law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the
decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs.

JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN
Facts:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of
whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for
adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge
Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly
qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the
"findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on
the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed
love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated
to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD
findings and recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study
Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD
through respondent Elma P. Veda.a. However, when the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisites travel clearance from the
DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD
found that it did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and
that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there
was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the
lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required
reports for said minor's adoption.
Issue:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study
reports made by a social welfare officer of the court?
Ruling:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no
uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social
Welfare, or the Social Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be
adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents,
and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the
court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall
intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the
petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure,
was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption
cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to
be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603
by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural
parents, and the adopting parents.
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court,
respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of
Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and
respondent Elma P. Veda.a, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is
REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.
REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ
Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the
first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname
Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption. Petitioner
opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition
for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the
petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change
of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that
what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a
matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of
the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and
adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule
2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the
Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as
two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the
change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Ruling:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal
effect of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which
is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first
or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding,
such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in
this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired,
this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive
and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons
or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private
respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living
with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor
Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. Private
respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all
intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child;
and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the
petitioners and that the first name this was mistakenly registered as
“MIDAEL” be corrected to “MICHAEL."
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
contention that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same
proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because in
the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate
of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz
v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because
that case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to
require the petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of name
would entail "additional time and expenses for them as well as for the
Government and the Courts."
Issue:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition
for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in
affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did so. With regard to the
second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for
the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what
the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case
and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void
and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding
Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the
civil status of persons

IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mother’s middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her
mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig”
his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant
to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie
Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.

TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26,
1965
Facts:
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera.
The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila
which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all
parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged
natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed
an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed
the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the
oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the
will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court
rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the
disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that
the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's
heirs by way of intestate succession.
Issue:
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene
in this proceeding.
Ruling:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim
to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the
estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or
executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate
because she is not a co-owner thereof.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As
a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives
of the adopter.

Bartolome vs. SSS

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.

He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program
(ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the
time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary,
filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer
considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by
Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary
beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results
to the restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of t latter.

Held:
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights
of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption.
While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not
form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their
minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

Geronimo vs. Santos

Facts:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of
document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that
with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one-half of the
parcel of land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax
Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed
on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants
executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and
Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that
consequently they took possession and were able to transfer the tax
declaration of the subject property to their names. She prayed that the
document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the land
transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her
damages.

In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff

was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their
ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They
claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document.
It was allegedly impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the
plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or sojourned
in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never
filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963
until October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-
brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of Rufino's father
Marciano Geronimo with another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-
owned Lot 1716 with the defendants' mother Carmen, and upon his death in
1980, when the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property
devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and she
executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino's estate
entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod Sa
Karapatan, whereby the plaintiffs mother Caridad waived all her rights to
Rufino's share and in the land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be
that as it may, in 1985, guardianship proceedings appeared to have been
instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it
was established that the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with her
late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person
and estate of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the
real estate taxes on the property, but in 2000, the defendants took
possession of the land and had the tax declaration transferred to them. This
compelled her to file the present case.

Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff
is the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that
when Rufino's wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the
plaintiff who was Caridad's niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in
1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents'
household. Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother
Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed
in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called Pagmamana sa Labas ng
hukman. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel
pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the word and
figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma Dañowas superimposed
on the entry in the box intended for the informant's signature.

Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of
the DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiffs service record as an elementary
school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to show that she did not have any
maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to
October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division
Superintendent that the plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her
service. He declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it reflects
the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she availed of.
Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that the leaveswere reflected but
the absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiffs birth certificate, Exhibit
14, Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was
an alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In view of
the alterations, he considered the document questionable
Issue:
Is karen entitled to support?
Ruling:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166,
it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived
through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation
or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak
of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his
heirsshould file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case
at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.

LAHOM vs. SIBULO

Facts:
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December
of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In
her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and pleadings of said
spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom,
to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever
properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent
continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of
herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in
1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection
with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with
only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and
show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would
only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or four years,
the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view
of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most
the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained
callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a
son.
That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent
alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some material
benefits from petitioner.
That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained
and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has
suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive
to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of
herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of
Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally
eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal
purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation,"
Issue:
Can the adoption be rescinded?
Ruling:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless,
the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be
the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is
still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the
legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance,
upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

Support
Lim-Lua vs. Lua
FACTS:

Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage
with a prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to
P500,000.00 per month. Citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends
in several companies and businesses here and abroad.

After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is
demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the
date of judicial demand, and thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00.

The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled
to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate
dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their
sustenance and well- being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing.

The husband also assert that the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00
retroactive support is unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not
having considered the needs of the respondent

MR denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the monthly support to

P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.

The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the
final CA decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears
(P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for
the children, their cost of maintenance and advances are given to the petitioner and his
children.

CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be
considered advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due
to the petitioner and the two children.

Thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total
support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children.

ISSUE:

Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from
the total support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.
RULING.

The SC partly granted CA’s decision. First, is to resume payment of his monthly support
of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by
him. Second, that only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions
from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children and not
PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered by the CA).

LAM vs. CHUA

Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua
against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109).
Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on January
13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam;
Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such
psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration
of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in
womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal
properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future
properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had
long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of
their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana
prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void
but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
Issue:
Should Jose give the corresponding support
Ruling:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the
amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient,
pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is incumbent
upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented
before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents
who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under
Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.

BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 156343 October
18, 2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca
Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include
Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002
ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the
minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent
Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her
minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the
Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Issue:
Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and
parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right
over their minor child. He insists, however, that custody should be awarded
to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays
there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the
mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is
abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she
is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds,
is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special
Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary
custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan,
where he is studying,9 thus rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the
Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on
July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," alleging
therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so
the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied
the Motion for lack of merit.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This
is the rule regardless of whether the father admits Paternity.
QUIMIGING vs. ICAO
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant,
were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations.
Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and
without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s
fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del
Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl
but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original
complaint averred no cause of action”.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen’s complaint.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were
already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married
man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a
clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim
compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.
Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.

FRANCISCO vs. ZANDUETA

Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad
litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner
Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is the latter’s
acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the
allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was
not present at his baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenio’s
birth.
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco
Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite.
Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the writ for
certiorari. Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner,
in compromise, agreed that his client would pay the monthly pension during
the pendency of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first
establishing his status as petitioner’s son
Ruling:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner’s counsel really
agreed to have him pay the pension during the case’s pendency is not
necessary to the solution of the case. As in the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the
fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of support can be
derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through
his guardian ad litem, his civil status as the petitioner’s son. As such, no
right of support can be given because the very civil status of sonship, from
which the right is derived, is in question.
It held that “(t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the granting
of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a
person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case
the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is
no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a
simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right
recognized by a final judgment.” Additionally, the respondent judge was
without jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of herein
private respondent’s absence of aforementioned status

SANTERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero,
had three children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and
Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four children with Anselma Diaz
namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their
mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFICavite
involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of
CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the amount of
Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing
materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the
administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that
private respondents were no longer studying, that they have attained the
age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed,
and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said
expenses.
Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private
respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which
included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of
the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php
6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the
estate of their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma
Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation
as to the additional three children included in the said motion. She said in
her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four minor
children were included for support and the three children were then of age
should have been included since all her children have the right to receive
allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo
Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get
back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition
of the petitioners.
Issue:
a) Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
b) Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance
without hearing?
Ruling:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married
should not be regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance
under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code.
Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court
did was just to follow the precedent of the court which granted previous
allowance and that the petitioners and private respondents only received
Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.

GOTARDO vs. BULING

G.R. No. 165166 August
15, 2012
Facts:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25,
for compulsory recognition and support aendent lite, claiming that the
petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the petitioner
denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties’ failure to amicably
settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on
the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as
witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on
December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual
employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner
for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the
respondent amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth to their
son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and
failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July
24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the
petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint
for compulsory recognition and support aendent lite.
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He
denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with
the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have
been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of
the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, granted a P2, 000.00
monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should provide support.
Ruling:
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that
such other proof of one’s filiation may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common
reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies]
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a
matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.

Maabugay-Otamias vs. Republic

Facts:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias was married to Colonel Francisco Otamias on 1978. The couple had five
children. On September 2000, they separated because of Colonel Otamias’ alleged infidelity. After the
separation, their children remained with Edna. She then demanded support equivalent to 75 percent of
the colonel’s retirement benefits. However, Colonel Otamias executed an affidavit stating that he can
commit only 50 percent of his retirement benefits to his children and wife. Because of this, they
entered into a compromise agreement. On February 26, 2003, the colonel executed a Deed of
Assignment where he waived 50 percent of his salary and pension in favor of Edna and his children.
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003, and the agreement had been honored until January 6, 2006.
According to Edna, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) decided not to honor the agreement.

Issue:
Did Colonel Otamias’ execution of the Deed of Assignment make him effectively waive his rights to 50
percent of his retirement benefits in favor of his family?

Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 6 of the Civil Code, rights may be waived unless it is contrary to law or public
policy. In this case, the waiver was made in order to ensure the support of the retired colonel of his
family, a right granted to them by the Family Code. The waiver is in no way contrary to public policy or
any law for that matter. Thus, it is deemed to be valid.

LACSON vs. LACSON

Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are
legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea
Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a
little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner
left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else.
For a month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with
her (Lea’s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time,
they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea’s mother.
As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to
1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling
place to another not their own.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.
Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both
respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however,
that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to
1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been
made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family
Code to complete his point:Article 203 – The obligation to give support shall
be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date
of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision
starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that
moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon
him.

LIM vs. LIM

Facts:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim
(Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes
Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak
and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business, which
provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family
expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence,
bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of
Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising
situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward,
Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to
provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide
support to respondents.
Ruling:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants
to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners
themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the narrow question
of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental
Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only
upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s
offspring ends with them.

MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her
then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and
Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said
petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent
Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in
Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent
Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11
August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of
their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny
Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally
abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina
were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where
petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to
and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts
(Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and
Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities,
Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education because of the following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about
US$22,000/year, broken down as follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
Or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina Issue:
Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support
Ruling:
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not
avail himself of the second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior
to the commencement of this action, the relationship between respondent
Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other,
was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them
expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one
another’s well-being. The photographs presented by petitioner as part of
her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of
these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and
the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships
among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica
and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed
as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these,
we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the
company of those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our
bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to
be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent
Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica
and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent
Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various
business endeavors.

DE GUZMAN vs. PEREZ

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became
sweethearts while studying law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their
studies were interrupted when private respondent became pregnant. She
gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2,
1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner
married another woman with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in
1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill,
petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the cost of the
child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances,
petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs,
private respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she
worked for two years. It was only because of her short stint overseas that
she was able to support Robby and send him to school. However, she
reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide
for her and Robby’s needs. The child’s continued education thus became
uncertain.
Issue:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child
the education his station in life and financial condition permit, be charged
for neglect
Ruling:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the
crime does not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The
law intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the
failure to give the child the education which the family’s station in life and financial
condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance with
his or her own parental duties.
Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the
neglectful parent to shield himself from criminal liability defeats the
prescription that in all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. However, while
petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD
603, the charge against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of
RA 7610 which provides:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in its minimum
period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of
neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by
Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code." The
"neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime
(known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph
of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the
coverage of RA 7610.

Mabugay-Otamias vs. Republic

Facts:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias was married to Colonel Francisco Otamias on 1978. The couple had five
children. On September 2000, they separated because of Colonel Otamias’ alleged infidelity. After the
separation, their children remained with Edna. She then demanded support equivalent to 75 percent of
the colonel’s retirement benefits. However, Colonel Otamias executed an affidavit stating that he can
commit only 50 percent of his retirement benefits to his children and wife. Because of this, they
entered into a compromise agreement. On February 26, 2003, the colonel executed a Deed of
Assignment where he waived 50 percent of his salary and pension in favor of Edna and his children.
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003, and the agreement had been honored until January 6, 2006.
According to Edna, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) decided not to honor the agreement.

Issue:
Did Colonel Otamias’ execution of the Deed of Assignment make him effectively waive his rights to 50
percent of his retirement benefits in favor of his family?

Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 6 of the Civil Code, rights may be waived unless it is contrary to law or public
policy. In this case, the waiver was made in order to ensure the support of the retired colonel of his
family, a right granted to them by the Family Code. The waiver is in no way contrary to public policy or
any law for that matter. Thus, it is deemed to be valid.

Del Socorro vs. Wilsem

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and
her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and
resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a
complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision
of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent
upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing,
even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here
in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

Lacson vs. Lacson

Facts:
On Feb 14, 1953, when they got married, Jan 9, 1963 is when Carmen (respondent) left
home in Bacolod to go to Manila, on March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for
custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two
eldest kids would go to
petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen, This was affirmed by the
CFI. and on May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be
given to her in JDRC since, she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of
her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who
are all below 7 years old. CA ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of
children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is
void too.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife
HELD:
Yes, should have but was filed out of time, Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so
agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were
stated otherwise, However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old
may choose which parent they want to live with and Court may also award custody to
who they deem more fit through evidence

ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the
following as his heirs: (a.) Edmond Ruiz – only son; (b.) Maria Pilar Ruiz
– adopted daughter; (c.) Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz. Testator bequeathed to
his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond
Ruiz executor of his estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his
estate was immediately distributed among Ruiz and respondents. Edmond,
the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will. Four years after, Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for
the probate and approval of the deceased’s will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under undue influence. The house and lot
in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters
was leased out by Edmond to third persons. Probate court ordered Edmond
to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments
totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate
taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the
release of P7,722.00. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
will. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as
executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. Prayed for release
of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Montes
opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3
granddaughters. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the
motion of Montes due to Edmond’s lack of opposition. Probate Court
ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may
be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. CA sustained probate court’s
order.
Issues: Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate
but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority:
a) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of
the testator's grandchildren
b) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs
c) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of
the will.
Ruling:
No. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the
funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to
"widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall
receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are
provided by law.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made:
a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any
of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned
upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles
to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication
of the notice to creditors
c. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes
on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained.
d. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid
before distribution of the estate.
i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post
a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.
ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the
estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law
e. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated
i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was
controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his
Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of
funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26,
1993 order of the said court.
ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the
devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will
included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired
his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who
are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to
hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.
The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not
absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration

REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO

Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A
complaint was filed on June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was
prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein she was already
living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her
driver’s intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and
prayed for support pendente lite for herself and her three children. The
husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the wife
committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano
of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a
motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive
such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she is
entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the
amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the
petition which made the husband appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of
an action.
Ruling:
Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence.
Mere allegations will not bar her right to receive support pendente lite.
Support can be administered during the pendency of such cases. In
determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the
case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978
ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to February
1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted
findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his
affluence and because it wasn’t excessive.
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and
they had two children, namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and
Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and Suzanne had an understanding
that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. The legal
conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding
on visitation rights. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the
children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of Quezon City. The
petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in
"gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and
social values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva
giving him visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays.
The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take
the children out without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an
appeal from the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime,
Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated
to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC.
The CA, stated that as alleged by Suzanne, Silva’s womanizing would have a
negative influence on the children.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.
b) Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.
Ruling:
The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and
reinstated the Quezon City RTC’s decision favoring Silva’s visitation rights
on weekends with Suzanne’s written permission. The Supreme Court ruled
that the biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in
view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children. The Court clarified: “Parents have the natural right, as
well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their
proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This
authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither
may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for
their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this
affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being
of the child.”
The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child
(Art. 176 of the Family Code). The biological father has visitorial right over
his illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent
and natural right of parents over their children. This right is personal to the
father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his
visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the
mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from immigrating to
Holland with her two children. The right to visitation and the duty to pay
child support are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father of the
illegitimate child can agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation,
then there will be no problem. In case of disagreement however, the father
must file a petition asking the court to settle the terms and conditions.

Imbong vs. Ochoa

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of
the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court
now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two
(2) petitions-in-intervention.

Issue:

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the
Court has synthesized and refined them to what are the characteristics of
Parental authority?

Ruling:

The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants

that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for

TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of
Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as
a registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents.
Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC of
Quezon City. In March 1992, the court granted the petition and appointed
Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for
relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the judgment only on
April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed
Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion
for reconsideration.
In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In
1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for
reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah
moved for the immediate execution of the resolution.
Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for
reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin remain in the
custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme
Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as
a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers
parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate
minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as
of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it
appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the
guardianship proceeding?
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the
welfare and well-being of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the
court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are
concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise,
Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a
strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in
Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is
the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission: The general rule
is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed
by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child.

VANCIL vs. BELMES

Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy
serviceman who died on 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children
named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject
guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27,
1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of
Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural
mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the
subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed,
Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American
citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and
Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing
the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case
reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of
Vincent.
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should
be his guardian?
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian.
Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being
the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural
and legal right to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound
public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state
or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by
way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family
Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute
parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen.
Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her
right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to
be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped
Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a
subject of this guardianship proceeding.

BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY

Facts:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of
age) were married on February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila
under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before her
marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the
conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely,
Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, and Amouaje, born on September 29,
1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their
marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi
Arabian woman whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in
Makati City. In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's
mother in 145 Tanguile Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could
not see his children until he got an order from the court. Even with a court
order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang,
Muntinlupa City .
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as
Christians and their names changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz
Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with
different men at odd hours in Manila,and that she would wear short skirts,
sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under
Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep
their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home
from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be
happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would
ride the jeepney in going home from school.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa
City an action for nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the
parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court. On
March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is
applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both
parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion.
The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and
Guardianship does not apply to this case because the spouses were not yet
divorced. The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for
her children. The Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable
both personally and financially to look after the best interest of his minor
children.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her
marriage to a Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their
separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of
her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is
the controlling consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the
factors that determine the fitness of any parent are: [1] the ability to see to
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and [2]
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is
not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into
consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is incompetent.
What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code
now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see
to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code
provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children.
Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not
divorced or legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise
just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility over
their legitimate children.

SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their
marriage, the couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The
couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to
the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with
her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria
intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and
entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house
and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year
after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with
her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and
accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a
decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of
custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child
to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.

SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on
April 23, 1987 in Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987,
Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic,
owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have
enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella
could not be discharged as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was
only 300. The spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give
Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the
spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and
imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and
summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to
someone who claimed to be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor
of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s complaint, filed an information
against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor
before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the
child may be found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a
small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the
child to be hers even if she wasn’t entirely sure that it was Arabella.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in
Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the child. The
Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by
respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the
problem respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If
indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the effect
would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and
(3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the paramount consideration
in this case which involves child custody.
The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabelle?
Ruling:
Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is
legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section
1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty.”