IMPLIED ADMISSION

G.R. No. 180281 July 01, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEMARIE JALBONIAN alias "Budo"
DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: Barangay Chairman Oscar Valenciano (Valenciano) testified that at 9:00 a.m. of January 26, 1991, a
barangay assembly meeting was held in Balicotoc Elementary School, a public educational institution located
in Brgy. Balicotoc, Ilog, Negros Occidental.8 After the meeting was adjourned at noon, the participants
including Valenciano left the school premises.9

From a distance of about three-arms length, Valenciano saw appellant position himself behind Fortunato
Quintanilla, Jr.10 (Quintanilla), stab the latter on the back with a knife, and immediately run away.11 Valenciano
ordered Julio Gaston, a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), to chase appellant
but the latter eluded arrest.12

Appellant went into hiding for more than five years and was apprehended only on July 10, 1996. 6 During his
arraignment, he entered a plea of "not guilty".7 Thereafter, trial ensued.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS [GUILT] BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.25

RULING: NO

The testimony of Valenciano as the lone witness for the prosecution suffices to establish appellant’s culpability
for the crime charged.

It has been held that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward manner, there is no room for
doubt that the witness is telling the truth.32 Moreover, Valenciano’s testimony on the stabbing of the victim
was corroborated by the Certificate of Death33 attesting that the cause of death was a stab wound.

As to appellant’s argument that it was impossible for Valenciano to personally identify him as the assailant
since the victim and his attacker had their backs turned to Valenciano, we find the same unworthy of
credence.

Likewise untenable is appellant’s contention that Valenciano’s testimony cannot be relied upon since it was
not corroborated by other witnesses to the crime. Finding of guilt based on the testimony of a lone witness is
not uncommon.36 "For although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of
evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the
basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary
‘only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation had been inaccurate.’"37 This is not obtaining in this case.

Under these circumstances, the rule that "where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim
and the accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive can be
attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then [his] version of the story deserves much
weight,"40 thus applies. We are therefore convinced that appellant’s culpability for the killing of the victim was
duly established by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Valenciano.
G.R. No. 191068 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHRIS CORPUZ Y BASBAS
PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: That on or about October 22, 2000 at around 8:45 o’ clock in the evening at barangay Salay,
Municipality of Mangaldan, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused CHRIS CORPUZ y BASBAS, being then armed with an unlicensed firearm a cal
.38 revolver, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and shoot at the left upper portion of the stomach of one GILBERT CEREZO y ESQUEBEL, causing his
death shortly thereafter due to: "MASSIVE BLOOD LOSS SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND" as per Certificate
of Death issued by Dr. Danilo A. Claridad, Municipal Health Officer, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, to the damage
and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased GILBERT CEREZO y ESQUEBEL and other consequential
damages relative thereto.4

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant Corpuz pleaded not guilty5 to the charge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to the alleged eyewitness testimony of Aquino,
despite the latter’s failure to positively identify the appellant as the victim’s assailant.

RULING: NO

Time and again, we have ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. 11 In numerous instances, this
Court observes restraint in interfering with the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, absent
any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion,
more so, when the CA sustained such assessment. In the case at bench, we have scoured the records for any
indication of arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence that would
warrant a reversal of the factual findings of the courts a quo. However, we found none.

Well aware that the identity of the offender is crucial in the success of the prosecution of an offense, we note
important details that clearly ascertain the appellant as the person responsible for the death of Gilbert Cerezo.
For one, it must be pointed out that at the outset, appellant’s identity as Chris Corpuz was already admitted
and he was positively identified by Romeo Aquino during the trial as the person who shot his friend Gilbert
Cerezo in the abdomen, while the latter was having a conversation with appellant’s daughter "Naning." In a
straightforward manner, Aquino narrated and demonstrated how appellant shot the victim and where they
were positioned vis-a-vis his location at the time of the shooting. He also pointed to the appellant as the
person who shot Cerezo with a handgun, causing the latter’s death. This was appreciated by the court a quo
which observed the demeanor of Aquino while on the witness stand. At this point, we see no reason to
disbelieve his testimony, especially so, that there was no motive on his part to attribute the killing to appellant
Corpuz, a neighbour known to him for so long.

In the same vein, we are not persuaded by the appellant’s defense of denial.1âwphi1 Well entrenched is the
rule that the defense of denial can easily be overcome by a positive identification that is categorical,
consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter. Nothing is
more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony of the witness.
G.R. No. 187731 September 18, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 ALFREDO ALAWIG
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: In the early morning of November 30, 1996, the victim and Reyes went to a nearby market. Upon their
return, Reyes left the victim at the latter’s residence and came back at noon. He did not immediately enter the
house as he noticed several policemen strategically positioned on the premises. He saw appellant and PO3
Ventinilla standing by the door shortly before entering the victim’s house. He also saw SPO2 Dabu standing at
the front gate while PO2 De Vera was on top of the septic tank. Standing at the main door was PO2 Corpuz. To
avoid being noticed, Reyes used the alternative road and went inside the house through the back gate. From
his position, he could hear the conversation among appellant,PO3 Ventinilla and the victim. The latter who
just woke up was told to dress up and bring his firearm as he was summoned by SPO4 Miraples to join a police
team in an operation regarding illegal drugs. After the group left the victim’s residence, Reyes entered the
house. While inside, he received a telephone call from the victim telling him, "Pare wala pala kaming
tatrabahuhin, ako pala ang tatrabahuhin, tulungan mo ako, sumundo ka ng tao na tutulong sa akin." But
before Reyes could say anything, the telephone conversation was cut. Not longafter, Reyes learned that the
victim died from gunshot wounds in different parts of his body while inside the premises of Police Kababayan
Center I in Doña Ata Subdivision, Marulas, Valenzuela City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was guilty of the crime charged against him.

RULING: YES

Appellant claims that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to convict
him. He argues that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of events that showed his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he is entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of innocence.

We find the contention unconvincing.

Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime. But jurisprudence tells us that
direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding
of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of
guilt.27Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference
which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established."28

The prosecution likewise presented corroborating evidence which constitute an unbroken chain leading to the
inevitable conclusion that appellant is guilty of killing the victim. For instance, the presence of gunpowder
nitrates on appellant after a paraffin test;30 the firearm used in the killing which could either be a .38 caliber or
9 mm pistol31dovetails with the testimony of Reyes that he saw appellant carrying a .38 caliber short firearm
which was later found to have been recently fired; and the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the
victim after a paraffin test32 which belies appellant’s claim that he was shot by the victim or that the latter
exchanged fire with PO3 Ventinilla.

"Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the
facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt."33 All the foregoing elements were sufficiently established in
this case.
OPINION RULE
G.R. No. 198240 July 3, 2013
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS vs. THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively.
They left behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in Cayabon,
Milagros, Masbate.3

The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro
Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents
herein.4

Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot.
Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres,
Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.5

Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a
handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that
Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written
by one and the same person.6

Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215.7 After the pre-trial, respondents
moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.

RULING: YES.

Petitioners’ stress that PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render an opinion on whether
the disputed handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or whether it is a forgery. 13

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to
others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness
since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify
her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be
received in evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document examiner
was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even
before her testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should
have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.

True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies that the use of
opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. 23 Jurisprudence is also
replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove
forgeries.24 However, we have also recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents. 25 More important, analysis
of the questioned signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.

G.R. No. 181444 July 17, 2013

BOBBY "ABEL" AVELINO y BULAWAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was riding on a tricycle
going to Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila. Since Manalangsang was the last passenger to board the tricycle,
he sat behind the driver. Upon reaching a certain point between Muelle Del Rio and 2nd Street, Port Area,
Manila, the tricycle which Manalangsang was riding on passed at the left lane instead of the right lane of the
road to give way to the owner-type (sic) jeep owned by the barangay and driven by its Chairman, Generoso
Hispano, herein victim (TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 11-17, Exhs. "R-1" and "4").

While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man suddenly emerged and
blocked Chairman Hispano’s vehicle. Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard bursts of gunshot which prompted
him to jump from the tricycle. Manalangsang instinctively hid behind the center island of the road (TSN,
September 26, 2001, pp. 17-21).

At this juncture, Manalangsang peeped at the direction of Chairman Hispano’s jeep and saw three (3) men
wearing bonnets, two of whom were strategically blocking the jeep of Chairman Hispano. The third man, who
was wearing a green jacket and positioned himself near the gutter, fired successive shots at Chairman Hispano
and thereafter approached the jeep of Chairman Hispano. He pulled down from the jeep the almost lifeless
body of Chairman Hispano. Since Manalangsang was situated near the third assailant, he failed to identify the
other two assailants. However, Manalangsang positively identified the third assailant as appellant Bobby
"Abel" Avelino, whom he saw stooping down at the Chairman’s body and pulling the opening of his bonnet
down to his chin to ascertain if the Chairman was still alive. Sensing that it was safe for him to leave the scene,
Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again and went home (TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 22-26).

Thereafter, appellant and the other assailants drove away using the owner-type jeep of Chairman Hispano.
However, on their way towards Divisoria, the jeep was incidentally blocked by a tricycle and a white car which
prompted the companion of appellant to shout "tabi-tabi." At that moment, Mary Ann Ca[ñ]ada saw
appellant, who was wearing a green jacket and a bonnet rolled up to his forehead, driving the owner-type (sic)
jeep of Chairman Hispano. Ca[ñ]ada readily recognized appellant as she was familiar with the face of appellant
having seen him driving the jeep of the Chairman on several occasions before (TSN, November 19, 2001, pp.
17-28).
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of
Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the
gunman.

RULING: NO

The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as regards the position
of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on board the
owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony. However, case
records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the
location of the gunman in relation to the place where the empty shells were found is immaterial.

Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b) the
witness has been qualified as an expert.27 In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the necessary
qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.

Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the probative
value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. The case of Madali v.
People28 elucidates thus:

Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given
incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative
value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very
material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the
witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their
credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.

Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman by Manalangsang, as corroborated by Cañada,
must stand.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN
ABAD, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner wife filed against respondent husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her,
claiming that respondent husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed
him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.

Respondent husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially agreed to
marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof
that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same form carried a
physician's handwritten note that the husband suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Based on the physician's handwritten statement, petitioner wife requested for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husband's medical records. The husband
opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The request of the
wife was denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering the husband's hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged
character of the physician-patient communication?

RULING: NO.

The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is premature. Petitioner wife made the request before trial started.
She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering her husband's hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial,
that the husband may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the
hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to
trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x x
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed
are “not privileged.”

Petitioner wife, of course, claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
“testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states
that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined” regarding their
professional conversation. The privilege, according to her, does not cover the hospital records, but only the
examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that
the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would
be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all
these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior
consent.