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PROBLEM AREAS 1

Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014

DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants,


vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.

x-----------------------x

Adm. Case No. 10299

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty.
Felisberto Verano liable for improper and inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of influence upon
a public official. The Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that
respondent beissued a warning not to repeat the same nor any similar action, otherwise the Commission will impose a more severe
penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April 2013. 2

The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm.
Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his
clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the "Alabang Boys") werethe accused in cases filed by
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. 3In a Joint Inquest Resolution issued
on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause. 4

Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case, several media
outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade.This prompted the
House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that
respondenthad prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead ofthe Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5

Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a
highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized
for acts unbecoming a member of the bar. 6

For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall upholdthe Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal
processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and
sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a government prosecutor. 8 Atty. Lozano’s verified
ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356. 9

Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of respondent and showing unqualified
support for the VACC’s filing of disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground
PROBLEM AREAS 2

that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as
well as for investigation, report and recommendation. RESPONDENT’S VERSION

In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against his clients for lack of probable
cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the
accused, together with their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release his clients. 12 Sheer faith in the
innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that
perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited." 13 In any case,
respondent continues, the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper
with no effect at all."14

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER

The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had
not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the charges.

However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted the release order specifically for the
signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to
influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action. 15

RULING OF THE COURT

We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against members of the bar, irrespective of
the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a
witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. 17

As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. 18 (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold respondent administratively liable.
Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court." We believe that other
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but
even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.

During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his
clients unless it received a direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more serious action,
viz.:

ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is
the type of a person who opens his [sic] kasihe is very political also so he opens his office. If I’m not mistaken that day because of the
timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was
very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer now…I
prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and
send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.
PROBLEM AREAS 3

xxxx

So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka
tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho ang
Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do
if I move on this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi
naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will
study the matter, those particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami
ron eh. They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the case. 19

Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;" and that "because of my practice and
well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows
my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in Congress. In other words, I am not a complete stranger to
him."20 Upon questioning by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally acquainted with the
Secretary; however, they were not that close.21

These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ
Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft
release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of "expediting the case."

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a government
agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondentis duty-
bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the
people’s faith inthe judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice.1âwphi1 To that end, their clients’ success is
wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to bythe lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause,
is condemnable and unethical.22

Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the law. 23 A self-respecting independence in
the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that
respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not
serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.

In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-month suspension against a judge who likewise
committed acts of influence peddling whenshe solicited ₱100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her help in
the case of her friend Emerita Muñoz, who had a pendingcase with the Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a former
court attorney of the high court.24 We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.

WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately. This also serves as an emphaticWARNING that repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent’s bar records. The Court Administrator is hereby directed to inform the
different courts of this suspension.

SO ORDERED.
PROBLEM AREAS 4

A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013

HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas
plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided
by herein complainant Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge
Manahan issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said
Order reads in part, viz:

More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own
brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a
serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the Supreme
Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction.2

Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the pronouncements of Judge Manahan
as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation. 3

In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the
antecedents of the case as follows:

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. 1863,
entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the
complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant.

x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial
Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was
expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x
Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.

The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and
submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and
October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so
shall be considered a waiver on his part.

Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010 stating among others, the following
allegations:

xxxx

4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are
being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?

5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1But even
worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
PROBLEM AREAS 5

6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his
due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely superimposed without indicating the
date and place of compliance. During the preliminary conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he
will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to
appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date
stating as follows:

If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached Motion which you
may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.

With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer
interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in your sala. 5

The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to
submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate
language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.6

The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge. 7

Our Ruling

There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the
several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but
because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to
the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the
Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system." 8

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect
in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.

At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the
bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense. 9

However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent. It
appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty
of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law
for half a century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine respondent in the
amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
PROBLEM AREAS 6

SO ORDERED.

IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED 28 A. C. No. 6332


APRIL 2003 IN G.R. NOS. 145817 AND 145822
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,*
VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 17, 2012

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Factual Background

This administrative case originated when respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003 [1] (the subject Motion to Inhibit) in two consolidated petitions
involving respondent that were pending before the Court. [2] This motion is directed against the then ponente of the consolidated
petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and reads in part:

PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEA, pro se, respectfully states:

1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has had to hurdle in his quest for justice against Urban
Bank and its officials, he has remained steadfast in his belief that ultimately, he will be vindicated and the
wrongdoers will get their just deserts [sic]. What respondent is about to relate however has, with all due respect,
shaken his faith in the highest Court of the land. If an anomaly as atrocious as this can happen even in the august
halls of the Supreme Court, one can only wonder if there is still any hope for our justice system.
PROBLEM AREAS 7

2. Private respondent wishes to make clear that he is not making a sweeping accusation against
all the members of this Honorable Court. He cannot however remain tight-lipped in the face of the overwhelming
evidence that has come to his knowledge regarding the actuation of the ponente of this Honorable Division.

3. In the evening of 19 November 2002, private respondent received a call from the counsel for
petitioners, Atty. Manuel R. Singson (through his cell phone number 09189137383) who very excitedly bragged that
they had been able to secure an order from this Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the
consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale. Private respondent was
aghast because by them, more than two weeks had lapsed since the redemption period on the various properties
had expired. At that juncture in fact, Certificates of Final Sale had already been issued to the purchasers of the
properties. The only step that had to be accomplished was the ministerial act of issuance of new titles in favor of
the purchasers.

4. Private respondent composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending incident
with this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period but he could not remember any. In
an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an
order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had
to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all
the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as it might again cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to
close down.

5. Since private respondent himself had not received a copy of the order that Atty. Singson was
talking about, he asked Atty. Singson to fax him the advance copy that they had received. The faxed advance copy
that Atty. Singson provided him bore the fax number and name of Atty. Singsons law office. A copy thereof is hereto
attached as Annex A.

6. Private respondent could not believe what he read. It appeared that a supposed Motion for
Clarification was filed by petitioners through Atty. Singson dated 6 August 2002, but he was never furnished a copy
thereof. He asked a messenger to immediately secure a copy of the motion and thereafter confirmed that he was
not furnished a copy. His supposed copy as indicated in the last page of the motion was sent to the Abello
Concepcion Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA, however, was never respondents counsel and was in fact
the counsel of some of the petitioners. Respondents copy, in other words, was sent to his opponents.

7. The Motion for Clarification was thus resolved without even giving respondent an opportunity
to comment on the same. In contrast, respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 19
November 2001 had been pending for almost a year and yet petitioners motions for extension to file comment
thereon [were] being granted left and right.

8. In view of these circumstances, private respondent filed on 10 December 2002, an Urgent


Omnibus Motion (to Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13 November 2002 Resolution). He filed a
Supplement to the said motion on 20 December 2002.

9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he received
sometime last week two documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two documents indicate that this
Honorable Court has not actually granted petitioners Motion for Clarification. They indicate that the supposed 13
November 2002 Resolution of this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT!

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official Agenda of the
First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was
supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members of the Division,
one of which is the copy of the ponente himself),it is clearly indicated that the members of the Division had
agreed that petitioners Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT
GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes the 13 November 2002
Resolution (at least the version that was released to the parties) a falsified documentbecause it makes it appear
that a Resolution was issued by the First Division granting petitioners Motion for Clarification when in fact no
PROBLEM AREAS 8

such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes B and C.

11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was
confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was bragging to him about. The clear and undeniable fact is the Honorable
members of this Division agreed that petitioners Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but
the ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution misrepresented that the same was GRANTED.

12. Respondent is not just speculating here. He is CERTAIN that the ponente has a special interest
in this case. Recently, he also found out that the ponente made a special request to bring this case along with him
when he transferred from the Third Division to the First Division. Respondent has a copy of the Resolution of this
Honorable Court granting such request (hereto attached as Annex D). Indeed, this circumstance, considered with all
the foregoing circumstance, ineluctably demonstrates that a major anomaly has occurred here.

13. In view of these, private respondent is compelled to move for the inhibition of the ponente
from this case. This matter should be thoroughly investigated and respondent is now carefully considering his legal
options for redress. It has taken him seven years to seek vindication of his rights against petitioners, he is not about
to relent at this point. In the meantime, he can longer expect a fair and impartial resolution of this case if the
ponente does not inhibit himself.

14. This Honorable Court has time and again emphasized the importance of impartiality and the
appearance of impartiality on the part of judges and justices. The ponente will do well to heed such
pronouncements.

15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent upon this Honorable Court to clarify its real position on
the 19 November 2001 Resolution. It is most respectfully submitted that in order to obviate any further confusion
on the matter, respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 09 December 2002 (as well as the Supplement dated 19
November 2002) should be resolved and this Honorable Court should confirm that the stay order contained in the
19 November 2001 Resolution does not cover properties already sold on execution. xxx (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)

In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty. Pea attached to the subject Motion to Inhibit two copies of the official
Agenda for 13 November 2002 of the First Division of this Court, which he claimed to have anonymously received through the mail.
[3]
He also attached a copy of the Courts internal Resolution regarding the transfer of the case from the Third Division to the First
Division, upon the request of Justice Carpio, to establish the latters alleged special interest in the case. [4]

In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17 February 2003 to require Atty. Pea and Atty. Manuel R. Singson, counsel of
Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, to appear before the Court on 03 March 2003 for an Executive Session. [5]

The reason for the required appearance of the two lawyers in the Executive Session is explained in the Courts Resolution
dated 03 March 2003.[6] It states:

The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. formally opened the
executive session and then requested Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug to act as chair. Justice Vitug stated that the
executive session was called because the Court is perturbed by some statements made by respondent Atty.
Magdaleno Pea involving strictly confidential matters which are purely internal to the Court and which the latter
cites as grounds in his Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion.
PROBLEM AREAS 9

Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Pea and counsel for petitioner Atty. Manuel R. Singson attended the
session.

The matters under inquiry were how respondent was able to obtain copies of the documents he used as
annexes in his motion to inhibit, and whether the annexes are authentic.

The court also clarified that these matters were to be taken as entirely different and apart from the merits
of the main case.

Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to the three (3) annexes attached to the motion to inhibit,
Annexes B, C and D, questioned how the latter was able to secure copies of such documents which are
confidential to the Court and for the sole use of the Office of the Clerk of Court, First Division and the Justices
concerned.

Annex B is alleged to be a photocopy of the supplemental agenda of the First Division for November 13,
2002 (pages 61-62), with an entry in handwriting reading 10 AC on the left side and what appear to be marginal
notes on the right side of both pages. Annex C is alleged to be a photocopy of the same supplemental agenda of
the First Division for November 13, 2002, with marginal notes on the right side of pages 61-62. Annex D appears to
be a photocopy of the resolution dated September 4, 2002 of the Third Division transferring the instant case to the
First Division (an internal resolution).

Atty. Pea was made to understand that all his statements taken during this executive session were deemed
under oath. Atty. Pea acceded thereto.

Atty. Pea was asked whether he knows any personnel of the Court who could possibly be the source. Atty.
Pea replied in the negative and added that he obtained those documents contained in the annexes through
ordinary mail addressed at his residence in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, sometime in the second or third week
of January 2003; but failed to give the exact date of his receipt. He said Annexes B and C were contained in one
envelope while Annex D was mailed in a separate envelope. He did not bring the envelopes but promised the Court
he would do his best to locate them. On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Pea admitted that the envelopes may
no longer be found. He was unable to respond to the observation of the Chief Justice that the Court would be in no
position to know whether the envelopes he would later produce would be the same envelopes he allegedly
received. Atty. Pea further admitted that his office did not stamp Received on the envelopes and the contents
thereof; neither did he have them recorded in a log book.

When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on those annexes as grounds for his motion to inhibit when
the same were coursed only through ordinary mail under unusual circumstances and that respondent did not even
bother to take note of the postal marks nor record the same in a log book, Atty. Pea answered that he was 100%
certain that those documents are authentic and he assumed that they came from Manila because the Supreme
Court is in Manila.

At this juncture, Atty. Pea was reminded that since he assured the authenticity of Annexes B, C and D, he
should be willing to accept all the consequences if it turns out that there are no such copies in the Supreme Court
or if said annexes turn out to be forged. Atty. Pea manifested that he was willing to accept the consequences.

When further asked by the Court whether he had seen the original that made him conclude that those
photocopies are authentic, he replied in the negative, but he believed that they are official documents of the
Court inasmuch as he also received a copy of another resolution issued by the Court when the same was faxed to
him by Atty. Singson, counsel for petitioner.

Atty. Pea expressed his disappointment upon receiving the resolution because he was not even furnished
with a copy of petitioners motion for clarification, which was resolved. He found out that his copy was addressed to
Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices, which was never respondents counsel and was in fact the counsel
of some of the petitioners.
PROBLEM AREAS 10

He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the motion for clarification was acted upon even without
comment from him, and he admitted that under said circumstances, he made imputation of bribery as a joke.

As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of record that Justice Carpio and Justice Azcuna denied
that Annex B is their copy of pp. 61 and 62 of the agenda, Justice Carpio also said that per verification, Annex B is
not Justice Santiagos copy. Thus, Justice Carpio added that Annex B does not belong to any of the Justices of the
First Division. It was also pointed out that each of the Justices have their respective copies of the agenda and
make their own notations thereon. The official actions of the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes
and resolutions of the Court.

Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of both Atty. Pea and Atty. Singson to paragraphs 3 and 4 of
respondents Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion, which contain the
following allegations: (Atty. Singson) very excitedly bragged that they had been able to secure an order from this
Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank
properties sold during the execution sale. Private respondent was aghast because by then, more than two weeks
had lapsed since the redemption period on the various properties had expired. In an effort to hide his discomfort,
respondent (Atty. Pea) teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise,
Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort
because they could not afford to lose the properties involved.
For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a copy of the resolution dated November 13, 2002 to
Atty. Pea and expressed his belief that there was nothing wrong with it, as the resolution was officially released and
received by his office. He explained that his staff merely copied the parties in the resolution of February 13, 2002
when the motion for clarification was prepared. Hence, the respondent was inadvertently not sent a copy.
Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to inhibit, reasoning
that all he said was about the suspension of the redemption period which was the subject of the motion for
clarification. Atty. Singson branded as false the allegation of Atty. Pea that he, Atty. Singson, resorted to bribery in
order that the suspension of the redemption period would be granted.
On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Pea admitted that he was only joking to Atty. Singson when on
the cellular phone he intimated that Justice Carpio could have been bribed because he has a new Mercedes
Benz. When pressed many times to answer categorically whether Atty. Singson told him that Justice Carpio was
bribed, Atty. Pea could not make any candid or forthright answer. He was evasive.

After further deliberation whereby Atty. Pea consistently replied that his only source of the documents in the
annexes is the regular mail, the Court Resolved to require Atty. Magdaleno Pea within fifteen (15) days from today
to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if he
will not be able to satisfactorily explain to Court why he made gratuitous allegations and imputations against the
Court and some of its members that tend to cast doubt or aspersion on their integrity.

Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit within fifteen (15) days from today his response to the allegations of Atty.
Pea, particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of respondents motion to inhibit.

The Court excused Attys. Pea and Singson from the executive session at 11:35 a.m. and resumed its regular session on the
agenda.

In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases, the Court Resolves to GRANT the motion by counsel for petitioner
praying that intervenor-movant Unimega Properties Holdings Corp. be directed to furnish aforesaid counsel with a
copy of the motion for reconsideration and intervention and that they be granted an additional period of ten (10)
days within which to file comment thereon and require said intervenor-movant to SUBMIT proof of such service
within five (5) days from notice.

The manifestation and comment of petitioners in G.R. No. 145882, Benjamin de Leon, et al., on the motion for
reconsideration with intervention by Unimega Property Holdings Corp. is NOTED. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Pea duly submitted his Compliance with the Courts Order, where he stated that: [7]
PROBLEM AREAS 11

PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEA, pro se, respectfully submits the following explanation in compliance
with the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated 3 March 2003:

1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003 Resolution required respondent to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a result of the allegations he made in
his Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003. As this
Honorable Court stated during the 3 March 2003 hearing, the members of the Court were perturbed by some
statements respondent made in the motion.

2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the distress his statements may have caused
the members of this Honorable Court. While such distress may have been the unavoidable consequence of his
motion to inhibit the ponente, it was certainly not his intended result.

3. In the course of the discussion during the 3 March 2003 hearing, it appeared that this
Honorable Court was most concerned with how respondent was able to secure Annexes B and C of his motion
(referring to the two copies of the Supplemental Agenda of the First Division for 13 November 2002) and why
respondent used those documents as basis for his Urgent Motion to Inhibit.

4. Respondent had explained that he received the two annexes by ordinary mail at his residence
in Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental sometime during the second week of January. The sender of the
document was unknown to respondent because there was no return address. Despite efforts to locate the
envelope in which these documents came, he was unable to do so.

5. Respondent has no record keeper or secretary at his residence. Since he is often in Manila on
business, it is usually the househelp who gets to receive the mail. While he had given instructions to be very careful
in the handling of documents which arrive by registered mail, the envelopes for Annexes A and B may have been
misplaced or disposed by the househelp because it did not bear the stamp registered mail.

6. When respondent read the documents, he had absolutely no reason to doubt their
authenticity. For why would anyone bother or go to the extent of manufacturing documents for the benefit of
someone who does not even know him? The documents contained a detailed list of the incidents deliberated by
this Honorable Court on 13 November 2002. Definitely, not just anyone could have access to such
information. Moreover, respondent subsequently received another mail from apparently the same sender, this
time containing a pink copy of this HonorableCourts 4 September 2002 Resolution (Annex D, Urgent Motion to
Inhibit) transferring this case from the Third Division to the First Division. The receipt of this last document
somehow confirmed to respondent that whoever sent him the copies of the Supplemental Agenda really had
access to the records of this Honorable Court.

7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the main basis of his motion to inhibit was the
information relayed to him by Atty. Singson during their telephone conversation on 19 November 2002. As stated in
respondents Urgent Motion to Inhibit, while Atty. Singson did not categorically claim that they had bribed the
ponente to secure the 13 November 2002 resolution, however, he made no denial when respondent, in order to
obtain information, half-seriously remarked that this was the reason why the ponente had a brand new car . Atty.
Singson retorted that obviously, they had to take extra-ordinary measures to prevent the consolidation of
ownership of the properties sold as the bank may again close down. Indeed, one would normally be indignant upon
being accused of bribery but Atty. Singson even chuckled and instead justified their extra-ordinary efforts.

8. Respondent very well knew that mere suspicion was not enough. An implied admission of
bribery on the part of Atty. Singson, sans evidence, may not have been sufficient basis for a motion to
inhibit. However, respondent did not have to look far for evidence. Atty. Singson in not denying the allegation of
bribery is considered an admission by silence, under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Further, Atty.
Singson faxed to him the advance copy of the 13 November 2002 Resolution. To respondent, that was solid
evidence and in fact to this day, Atty. Singson fails to explain exactly when, from whom, and how he was able to
secure said advance copy. The records of this Honorable Court disclosed that Atty. Singsons official copy of the 13
November 2002 Resolution was sent to him by registered mail only on 20 November 2002 (a copy of the daily
PROBLEM AREAS 12

mailing report is hereto attached as Annex A). Why then was he able to fax a copy to respondent on 19 November
2002 or a day before the resolution was released for mailing?

9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to file a motion to inhibit. He only finally decided to
proceed when he received the copies of the Supplemental Agenda. To emphasize, the Supplemental Agenda
merely confirmed what Atty. Singson had earlier told him. Contrary to the apparent impression of this Honorable
Court, respondents motion is not primarily anchored on anonymously received documents but on the word of
petitioners counsel himself. The copies of the Supplemental Agenda are merely corroborative (albeit extremely
convincing) evidence.

10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who comes into possession of the information relayed by
Atty. Singson and the copies of the Supplemental Agenda would bring them to the attention of this Honorable
Court. In doing so, respondent was compelled by a sense of duty to inform this Honorable Court of any apparent
irregularity that has come to his knowledge. It was not done out of spite but a deep sense of respect.

11. In all honesty, respondent had been advised by well-meaning friends to publicize the incident
and take legal action against the parties involved. Instead, respondent decided that a motion to inhibit before this
Honorable Court was the most appropriate channel to ventilate his concerns. Respondent is not out to cast
aspersions on anybody, most especially members of this Honorable Court. He had to file the Urgent Motion to
Inhibit because he sincerely believed, and still firmly believes, that he could not get impartial justice if
the ponente did not recuse himself.

12. Respondent sincerely regrets that documents considered confidential by this Honorable
Court leaked out and assures this Honorable Court that he had absolutely no hand in securing them . Respondent
just found himself in a position where he had to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude
enough to brag that their extra-ordinary efforts to secure a stay order from a certain ponente had bore fruit.
Respondent has devoted at least seven years of his life to this cause. He almost lost his life and was nearly driven to
penury fighting this battle. Certainly, he cannot be expected to simply raise his hands in surrender.

13. At this point, respondent is just relieved that it was confirmed during the 3 March 2003 hearing
that Annex C of his Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a faithful reproduction/replica of the relevant portions of the
Supplemental Agenda (TSN dated 3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81) on record with the first Division. With this,
respondent rests his case. [8] (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his Compliance and Affidavit dated 28 July 2003, [9] categorically denied having
bragged to Atty. Pea and that he did not employ extra efforts to obtain a favorable suspension order from the Court. [10]

After considering and evaluating the submissions made by the two lawyers, the Court ordered that a formal investigation be
undertaken by the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on the actions of Atty. Pea. [11] The Courts Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in the
consolidated petitions, which is the subject matter of this separate administrative case, reads:

On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M. Pea filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit the ponente of the instant
case. Respondent Pea attached to his Urgent Motion Annex B, a copy of pp. 61-62 of the First Divisions Agenda of
13 November 2002. Respondent Pea claimed that Annex B bears the recommended actions, in handwritten
notations, of a member of the Court (First Division) on Item No. 175 of the Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to the
Urgent Motion for Clarification filed by petitioner on 7 August 2002. The purported handwritten notation on Annex
B for Item No. 175 (f) is N, or to simply note the motion. However, the Court issued a Resolution on 13 November
2002 granting the Urgent Motion for Clarification. In his Urgent Motion to Inhibit, respondent Pea claimed that the
Resolution of 13 November 2002 was forged because the recommended and approved action of the Court was to
simply note, and not to approve, the Urgent Motion for Clarification.
PROBLEM AREAS 13

Thus, respondent Pea stated in his Urgent motion to Inhibit:

9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he received sometime last week
two documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two documents indicate that this Honorable
Court had not actually granted petitioners Motion for Clarification. They indicate that the
supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged
about WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official Agenda of the First Division of
this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was
supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members
of the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the
members of the Division had agreed that petitioners Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion
to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13
November 2002 Resolution. This makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version
that was released to the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a
Resolution was issued by the First Division granting petitioners Motion for Clarification when in
fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be
gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto
attached as Annexes B and C.

11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of what Atty.
Singson was bragging about. The clear and undeniable fact is the Honorable members of this
Division agreed that petitioners Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente
responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution misrepresented that the same was GRANTED.

On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent Pea and Atty. Manuel Singson, counsel for petitioner Urban Bank, to
a hearing to determine, among others, the authenticity of the annexes to respondent Peas Urgent Motion to
Inhibit, including Annex B. In the hearing, respondent Pea affirmed the authenticity of the annexes and even
manifested that he was willing to accept the consequences if the annexes, including Annex B, turned out to be
forgeries.

In the same hearing, the members of the Court (First Division) informed respondent Pea that the handwritten
notations on Annex B did not belong to any of them. In particular, Justice Carpio, to whom the case was assigned
and the apparent object of respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit as the ponente responsible for the 13
November 2002 Resolution, stated that his recommended action on Item No. 175(f) was a & f, see RES, meaning on
Items 175(a) and (f), see proposed resolution. In short, the handwritten notations on Annex B, purportedly
belonging to a member of the Court, were forgeries. For ready reference, attached as Annexes 1 and 2 to this
Resolution are a copy of pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpios 13 November 2002 Agenda, and a copy of Justice Carpios
recommended actions for the entire 13 November 2002 Agenda, respectively.

In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent Pea to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and
subjected to disciplinary action for submitting the annexes to his Motion to Inhibit. In his Compliance dated 3 April
2003, respondent Pea did not give any explanation as to why he attached B to his Urgent Motion to Inhibit . In
fact, in his Compliance, respondent Pea did not mention at all Annex B. Respondent Pea, however, stated that he
just found himself in a position where he had to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude
enough to brag that their extra-ordinary efforts to secure a stay order from a certain ponente had bore fruit. In
petitioners Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Singson stated that he categorically denied that he had
bragged to PEA about the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated November 13, 2002 and that extra efforts have
been exerted to obtain the same.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DIRECTS the Office of the Bar Confidant to conduct a formal
investigation of respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea for submitting to the Court a falsified document, Annex B,
allegedly forming part of the confidential records of a member of the Court, in support of his Motion to Inhibit
that same member of the Court. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to submit its findings, report and
recommendation within 90 days from receipt of this Resolution. [12] (Emphasis supplied.)
PROBLEM AREAS 14

During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys. Pea[13] and Singson[14] duly submitted their respective Affidavits.

While the administrative case was still pending, some of the other parties in the consolidated petitions specifically, Benjamin
L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee, (the De Leon Group), the petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 manifested before the Court
other malicious imputations allegedly made by Atty. Pea during the course of the proceedings in the said petitions. They moved that
these be considered as sufficient and additional basis to cite him for contempt of court. [15] The Court likewise referred this matter to
the OBC.[16]

In reply to the accusations leveled against him by the De Leon Group, respondent Pea denied having used abrasive, insulting
and intemperate language in his pleadings; and argued that his statements therein were privileged and could not be used as a basis
for liability.[17] He also accused Urban Bank and its directors and officers of violating the rule against forum shopping by dividing
themselves into separate groups and filing three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822) against the same Decision of the
Court of Appeals with the same causes of actions and prayers for relief. [18]

The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein respondent Pea and Atty. Singson appeared and testified on matters that
were the subject of the administrative cases. [19]Several hearings were also held with respect to the additional contempt charges
raised by the De Leon Group. Thereafter, respondent Pea filed his Memorandum. [20]

The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the instant administrative case and made recommendations on the matter
(the OBC Report). As a matter of policy, this Court does not quote at length, nor even disclose the dispositive recommendation of the
OBC in administrative investigations of members of the bar. However, Atty. Pea, despite the fact that the OBC Report is confidential
and internal, has obtained, without authority, a copy thereof and has formally claimed that this Court should apply to him the non-
penalty of an admonition against him, as recommended by the OBC. [21]

Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that the present ponente of the consolidated petitions[22] from which this
separate administrative case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, would exclude or suppress material evidence found in the
OBC report from her ponencia in the parent case in alleged gratitude to the alleged help that Justice Carpio had given her by
allegedly recommending her to the Supreme Court. [23] The specific allegation on the supposed loyalty by one Member of the Court to
another, without any extrinsic factual basis to support it, is too undignified to warrant a response in this Decision. To allay his fears
that Justice Sereno would participate in any undue attempt to suppress material evidence, the Court shall summarize and quote from
the OBC Report the four charges of professional misconduct in connection with the instant administrative case.

On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against members of the Court, the OBC found that respondent Pea gave the
impression that some anomaly or irregularity was committed by the Courts First Division in issuing the questioned 13 November
PROBLEM AREAS 15

2002 Resolution. According to respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the consolidated petitions, purportedly changed the
action of the First Division from simply NOTING the motion for clarification filed by Urban Bank to GRANTING it altogether. The OBC
opines that although respondent Pea may appear to have been passionate in the subject Motion to Inhibit, the language he used is
not to be considered as malicious imputations but mere expressions of concern based on what he discovered from the internal
documents of the Court that he had secured. [24] Moreover, the OBC ruled that respondent did not make a direct accusation of bribery
against Justice Carpio, and the formers remark about the latter having received a new Mercedes Benz was not made in the presence
of the court, but was uttered in a private mobile phone conversation between him and Atty. Singson. [25] Respondents profound
apologies to the Court were also taken cognizance by the OBC, which suggests the imposition of a simple warning against any such
future conduct.[26]

Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of the second charge that respondent supposedly submitted falsified
documents to this Court as annexes in the subject Motion to Inhibit, specifically Annex B which appears to be a photocopy of the
agenda of the First Division on 13 November 2002 with some handwritten notes. [27] It reasoned that the submission of falsified
documents partakes of the nature of a criminal act, where the required proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but respondent Pea
is not being charged with a criminal offense in the instant case. The OBC noted the statement of the Clerk of Court during the 03
March 2003 Executive Session that Annex B does not exist in the records. [28]

On the third charge for contempt against respondent filed by the De Leon Group and Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, their counsel,
the OBC likewise suggests the dismissal of the same. To recall, respondent submitted pleadings in the consolidated petitions where
he allegedly charged Atty. Vinluan of having used his influence over Justice Arturo B. Buena to gain a favorable resolution to the
benefit of his clients.[29] The OBC suggests that respondent be acquitted of the charge of using abrasive and disrespectful language
against Members of the Court and his fellow lawyers, but nevertheless recommends that respondent be advised to refrain from using
unnecessary words or statements in the future.[30]

Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the fourth charge of forum-shopping leveled by respondent Pea against
Urban Bank and the individual bank directors. In his counter-suit, respondent accused the bank and its directors and officers of
having violated the rule against forum-shopping by splitting into three distinct groups and filing three separate petitions to question
the unfavorable decision of the Court of Appeals. [31] However, since not all the parties to the consolidated petitions participated in
the hearings in the instant case, the OBC recommends that separate proceedings be conducted with respect to this counter-suit in
order to afford Urban Bank and all of the concerned directors and officers, including their respective counsel, to defend themselves
and present witnesses and/or evidence in support of their cause. [32]

Taking the foregoing in consideration, the OBC submitted the following recommendations for approval of this Court:

RECOMMENDATIONS:
PROBLEM AREAS 16

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended the following:

A. On the charge of gratuitous allegations:

1. To DISMISS the charge on the ground that the statements in his Motion to Inhibit, etc., do not
constitute malicious imputations as he was merely expressing his concern of what he has discovered based on the
documents he has obtained. However, let this case serve as his FIRST WARNING, being an officer of the court, to be more
cautious, restraint and circumspect with his dealings in the future with the Court and its Member.

2. To ADMONISH respondent for making such non-sense and unfounded joke against Honorable Justice
Antonio T. Carpio the latter deserves due respect and courtesy from no less than the member of the bar. Likewise, Atty.
Singson should also be ADVISED to be more cautious in his dealing with his opposing counsel to avoid misconception of
facts.

B. On the charge of falsification:

1. To DISMISS the charge of submitting falsified documents on ground of lack of legal basis. A charge of
submitting falsified documents partakes of the nature of criminal act under Art. 172 of the Revised penal Code, and the
quantum of proof required to hold respondent guilty thereof is proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is to avoid conflicting
findings in the criminal case. The administrative proceedings of the same act must await of the outcome in the criminal case
of falsification of document.

C. On the contempt of court filed by private complainant:

1. To DISMISS the charge considering that the statements cited by Atty. Pea in his pleadings previously
filed in related cases, while it may appear to be offending on the part of the complainant, but the same do not categorically
contain disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language or intemperate words that may tend to discredit the name of the
complainant. Respondent merely narrated the facts based of his own knowledge and discoveries which, to him, warranted
to be brought to the attention of the court for its information and consideration. He must be ADVISED however, to refrain
from using unnecessary words and statements which may not be material in the resolution of the issued raised therein.

D. On the counter-charge of forum-shopping


PROBLEM AREAS 17

1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-charge of forum shopping, as embodied in the Comment dated 22 August
2003 of Atty. Pea, as a separate administrative case against the petitioners and counsels in G.R. 145817, G.R. No. 145818
and G.R. No. 145822;

2. To FURNISH the petitioners and their counsel a copy of the said comment dated 22 August 2003 for
their information.

3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and their counsel, SINGSON VALDEZ & ASSOCIATES, represented by ATTY.
MANUEL R. SINGSON, ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA & CRUZ represented by ATTY. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ATTY.
STEPHEN GEORGE S. D. AQUINO and ATTY. HAZEL ROSE B. SEE to comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUES

In these administrative matters, the salient issues for the Courts consideration are limited to the following:

(a) whether respondent Pea made gratuitous allegations and imputations against members of the Court;

(b) whether he can be held administratively liable for submitting allegedly falsified documents consisting of internal
documents of the court;

(c) whether he can likewise be held administratively liable for the contempt charges leveled against him in the Manifestation
and Motion filed by the De Leon Group; and

(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual bank directors and officers are guilty of forum shopping.

OUR RULING

A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless Imputation of Bribery and Wrongdoing


against a Member of the Court.

We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC on this charge.

Respondent Pea is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of bribery and wrongdoing against a member of
the Court, as seen in the text of the subject Motion to Inhibit, his statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, and his
PROBLEM AREAS 18

unrelenting obstinacy in hurling effectively the same imputations in his subsequent pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a
Member of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent Pea, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers.
[34]
They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court [35] and must refrain from attributing to a
judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. [36]

While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of foul and
abusive language.[37] Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. [38] A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting
an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [39]

In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Pea insinuated that the then ponente of the case had been bribed by Atty.
Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, in light of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, suspending
the period of redemption of the levied properties pending appeal. The subject Motion to Inhibit reads in part:

4. Private respondent [Pea] composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending incident with
this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period but he could not remember any. In an
effort to hide his discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an
order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had
to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all
the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as it might cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close
down.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)

During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the First Division of this Court, respondent Pea explained that his reference
to the bribe was merely a joke in the course of a telephone conversation between lawyers:

CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:

Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Pea on [sic] when you made mention earlier of him saying about Justice
Carpio?

ATTY. SINGSON:

Yes, Your Honor, he said kaya pala may bagong Mercedez [sic] si Carpio, eh.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

He said to you that?

ATTY. SINGSON:
PROBLEM AREAS 19

Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said about bribery.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. PEA:

First of all I would like to everything that he said, he told me that he got, they got a stay order, it is a stay order
from the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio and then I gave that joke. That was just a joke really. He got a
new Me[r]cedez [sic] Benz, you see, he was the one who told me they got a stay order from the Supreme Court
through Justice Carpio, that was what happened

CHIEF JUSTICE:

You mean you made a joke?

ATTY. PEA:

You Honor?

CHIEF JUSTICE;

You made a joke after he told you supposedly that he got (interrupted)

ATTY. PEA:

He got a stay order from Justice Carpio.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

And you say that is the reason why he got a new Mercedez [sic] Benz, you made it as a joke?

ATTY. PEA:

Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers.

CHIEF JUSTICE;

That is correct, you are making it as a joke?

ATTY. PEA:

Your Honor, I think, because how they got (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:

If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion that it was Atty. Singson who said that Justice Carpio was
bribed or the ponente was bribed, is that also another joke?[41](Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent Pea insinuated ill motives to the then ponente of the consolidated petitions with respect to the issuance of the
13 November 2003 Resolution. To respondents mind and based on his interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda which he
anonymously received, the First Division agreed only to simply note Urban Banks Motion for Clarification. Nevertheless, the
questioned Resolution, which Atty. Singson sent to him by facsimile, had instead granted the Motion. Hence, respondent Pea
PROBLEM AREAS 20

attributed the modification of the action of the First Division to simply note the Motion, one apparently unfavorable to respondent
Pea, to Justice Carpio, who had supposedly received a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly altered resolution.

However, as pointed out by the Court in the Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each Justice has his own respective copy of
the Agenda, where he can make his own handwritten notations on the action for each item and case, but [t]he official actions of the
Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions of the Court. [42]Hence, contrary to the insinuations made by
respondent Pea, Justice Carpio had not altered the action of the First Division in granting Urban Banks Motion for Clarification in the
consolidated petitions, as in fact, this was the approved resolution agreed upon by the Justices then present. The ponente of the case
had not recommended that the Motion for Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had referred to a separate resolution, i.e., a) & f)
See RES., disposing of the said item (F) including item (A), which is the Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban. In
addition to the official minutes of the 13 November 2002 Session, [43] Justice Carpio submitted for the record his written
recommendation on the agenda item involving the consolidated petitions, to prove that this was his recommendation, and the
minutes confirm the approval of this recommendation. [44]

The Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the First Division, had indeed adopted the recommended
and proposed resolution of Justice Carpio, as the then ponente, and granted the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is
completely wrong for respondent Pea to claim that the action had been issued without any sufficient basis or evidence on record,
and hence was done so with partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to immediately justify the imputation of
such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court, absent any verifiable proof of specific misconduct.
Suspicions or insinuations of bribery involving a member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave accusations.
They cannot be treated lightly or be jokingly alleged by parties, much less by counsel in pleadings or motions. These suspicions or
insinuations strike not only at the stature or reputation of the individual members of the Court, but at the integrity of its decisions as
well.[45]

Respondent Pea attempts to draw a connection and direct correlation between Urban Banks failure to furnish him a copy of
its Motion for Clarification, purportedly denying him an opportunity to refute the allegations therein, and the supposedly corrupt
means by which the unfavorable Resolution was thereby obtained. This is completely untenable and irresponsible. Had he simply
confined the issue to an alleged deprivation of due process, then there would hardly be any controversy regarding his conduct as a
lawyer and an officer of the Court. The purported lack of notice of the Motion for Clarification filed the bank in the consolidated
petitions could have been raised as a valid concern for judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Pea insinuates ill motives on the part
of Members of the Court imputing the failure of a private party to give him due notice to be, in effect, a failure of the Court. This
merits the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers over him as a member of the Bar. To allege that bribery has been committed by
members of the judiciary, a complainant especially, a lawyer must go beyond mere suspicions, speculations, insinuations or even the
plain silence of an opposing counsel.
PROBLEM AREAS 21

Based on the two lawyers disclosures during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Pea appears to have been
caught by surprise by his telephone conversation with Atty. Singson, who informed him of the suspension of the redemption period
by the Court and its issuance of a Stay Order over the execution pending appeal. The astonishment of respondent would seem
natural, since he was caught unawares of Urban Banks Motion for Clarification, which was the subject matter of the 13 November
2002 Resolution. His supposed joke, which he himself initiated and made without provocation, was disdainful all the same, as it
suggested that the bank had obtained the Order from this Court in exchange for an expensive luxury automobile.

Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the reputation and integrity of
members of this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of
investigating the veracity of Atty. Singsons revelations, respondent read too much into the declarations and the purported silence of
opposing counsel towards his joke. Respondent made unfounded imputations of impropriety to a specific Member of the Court. Such
conduct does not befit a member of the legal profession and falls utterly short of giving respect to the Court and upholding its
dignity.

Respondent Peas defense that the allegation of bribery and collusion between Justice Carpio, Atty. Singson and the
petitioners was a joke fails to convince, as in fact, he was deadly serious about the charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his
alleged insinuation of ill motives was just a joke between two lawyers engaged in a private telephone conversation regarding the
case. Although the courts and judicial officers are entitled to due respect, they are not immune to criticisms nor are they beyond the
subject matter of free speech, especially in the context of a private conversation between two individuals. In this case, though,
respondent himself was responsible for moving the private matter into the realm of public knowledge by citing that same joke in his
own Motion for Inhibition filed before this Court. In general, courts will not act as overly sensitive censors of all private conversations
of lawyers at all times, just to ensure obedience to the duty to afford proper respect and deference to the former. Nevertheless, this
Court will not shy away from exercising its disciplinary powers whenever persons who impute bribery to judicial officers and bring
such imputations themselves to the courts attention through their own pleadings or motions.

Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of bribery was only made in jest, respondent has never backed down since
he first made the accusation in January 2003 and continually raises as an issue in the consolidated petitions how Justice Carpio
purportedly changed the agreed action of the First Division when he issued the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, even
after the Court in the 03 March 2003 Executive Session had precisely explained to him that no impropriety had attended the
issuance of the said Resolution. In the Motions to Inhibit dated 21 January 2010 [46] and 22 August 2011,[47] he repeatedly insists on
the anomalous/unusual circumstances surrounding the issuance by Justice Carpio of the same questioned Resolution, which was
allegedly contrary to the handwritten notes made in the copies of the Agenda that he received. Respondent Pea most recently
capitalized on the purported alteration or falsification supposedly committed by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics complaint against
the latter, where he alleged that:
PROBLEM AREAS 22

Sometime thereafter, respondent Pea received a copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda 1 st Division of this
Honorable Court with a notation in handwriting 10AC on the left side and marginal notes on the right side. A
perusal thereof, reveals that when this Honorable Court took up the matter of the Motion for Clarification of
petitioner Urban Bank, this Honorable Court merely N or Noted the Motion for Clarification of petitioner Urban
Bank and did not grant the same.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a copy of the Motion for Clarification, or required to comment by
the Honorable Justice Carpio and opposing counsel, Atty. Singson, being able to secure an advance copy of the
assailed 13 November 2002 Resolution), the matter brought out in the Executive Session and the admission made
by Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the Honorable Hilario Davide and the Honorable Justice Vitug with regard to his copy of
the Suppl [sic] Agenda 1st Division of this Honorable Court which was sent to respondent Pea was correct and that
the Motion for Clarification was merely N or NOTED. However, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued a Resolution
Granting the Motion for Clarification.

Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the 13 November 2002 Resolution in an anomalous/falsified
manner and in clear contravention of this Honorable Courts Decision to merely Note the same. A clear judicial
administrative violation.[48] (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the bribery joke which respondent himself initiated has gotten the better of him. Respondent has convinced himself
of the veracity of his own malicious insinuations by his own repetitious allegations in his subsequent pleadings.

The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual penalties in administrative cases in the presence of mitigating factors,
such as the acknowledgment of the infraction and the feeling of remorse. [49] In this case, the profound apologies [50] offered by
respondent Pea for his insinuations against Justice Carpio are insincere and hypocritical, as seen by his later actions. Although he
expressed remorse for having caused the Court distress because of his statements, [51] he refuses to acknowledge any unethical
conduct on his part for his unfounded accusations against the actions of Justice Carpio with respect to the questioned 13 November
2002 Resolution. Worse, he has persisted in attributing ill-motives against Justice Carpio, even after the latter had recused himself
from the case since 2003.

This is not the first time that respondent resorted to initiating unfounded and vicious attacks against the integrity and
impartiality of Members of this Court. Earlier in the proceedings of the consolidated petitions, respondent assailed how retired
Justice Arturo B. Buena showed bias in favor of the De Leon Group, when the latters petition in G.R. No. 145822 was reinstated on a
second motion for reconsideration:[52]

It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein respondent that petitioners counsel has been
making statement to the effect that they could get a favorable resolution from the Supreme Court, on their
second motion for reconsideration. In short, petitioners counsel is practically saying that they are sure to get the
Supreme Court to entertain the second motion for reconsideration even if it violates the rules. [53]

1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at Justice Buena because it was he who penned the
challenged Resolution, which granted the second motion for reconsideration in violation of the Rules. It was he
who crafted, drafted and finalized the said Resolution. It was he who tried to justify the violation of the Rules. It
was from Justice Buenas office that contents of the challenged Resolution was apparently leaked to the
petitioners counsel long before its promulgation.[54]
PROBLEM AREAS 23

What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what phenomenon transpired? Why are herein petitioners
very special in the eyes of Justice Buena?[55]

It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena has been affected by his relationship with Atty.
Vinluan, as evidenced by the above-described facts and circumstances. [56]

Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned ponente, reinstated the petition without any
explanation whatsoever, and in gross violation of Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This was
highly irregular by itself. But what made reinstatement more suspicious was the fact that even before the release
of the Resolution reinstating the petition in G. R. No. 145822, the counsel for petitioners, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, was
already boasting that he would be able to reinstate their petition. Obviously, even before the release of the
Resolution in question, Atty. Vinluan already knew what Justice Buenas resolution would be. [57] (Emphasis supplied.)

In no less than six motions, [58] he similarly accused former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban of prejudice based on his
affiliation with the Rotary Club, wherein some of the directors and officers of Urban Bank were also members. He even claimed that
Justice Panganiban went to Urban Bank to meet with some of the directors and officers, who consulted him on the legal issues
arising from criminal suits in relation to the facts of the main petitions, citing only an unnamed reliable source:

The friendship and close relationship of the three (Justice Panganiban and Urban Banks Arsenio Archit
Bartolome and Teodoro Ted Borlongan) went beyond their being Rotarians. As a matter of fact, Justice Panganiban
was seen a couple of times going to Urban Bank to see Archit and/or Ted, before the banks closure. Respondent
has also discovered, through a reliable source, that Justice Panganiban was known to have been consulted, and
his legal advice sought, by Borlongan and Bartolome, in connection with the above-entitled cases, while the
same was still pending with the Court of Appeals and in connection with the four (4) criminal cases filed the with
the MTC [Municipal Trial Court] at Bago City by herein respondent against Borlongan, et al., for introducing falsified
documents in a judicial proceeding. In the latter cases, it was even Justice Panganiban who furnished a copy of the
SC Decision in Doris Ho vs. People (his own ponencia) to Bartolome and Borlongan, for the purpose of giving his
friends a legal basis in questioning the issuance of the warrants of arrest against Borlongan and the rest of his co-
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, MTC Bago City (now appealed to Supreme Court; see Footnote No. 1
below).[59] (Emphasis supplied.)

Lastly, respondent Pea raised the issue of unmitigated partiality against retired Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura on the
ground that the latter resolved a separate case involving related issues to the main petitions in favor of the opposing parties:

3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled Teodoro C. Borlongan, et al., v. Magdaleno M. Pea, et
al, are also the same petitioners in the above-entitled consolidated cases G. R. Nos. 145817 and 145822; and the
respondents in the above-entitled consolidated case G. R. No. 162562. Under the circumstances, herein private
respondent is ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the extreme bias and prejudice of Justice Nachura against him in G. R.
No. 143591 would certainly be carried over to the above-entitled consolidated cases.[60] (Emphasis supplied.)

Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of bribery and wrongdoing
against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the
Court.[61] Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain
PROBLEM AREAS 24

mitigating circumstances. Respondent Pea has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in utter
disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[62] the Court chose to indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan Paguia, when the latter imputed devious
motives and questioned the impartiality of members of the Court, despite its earlier warnings:

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the
Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance
any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.
In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation
of justice.

Respondent Peas actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot be countenanced especially
for those privileged enough to practice law in the country. To be sure, Atty. Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the practice of
law after showing sincere remorse and having renewed his belief and respect for the Court, almost eight years from the time the
penalty was imposed. Thus, the Court orders respondent Pea be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for his apparently
irredeemable habit of repeatedly imputing unfounded motives and partiality against members of the Court.

B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal Court Documents.

We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC with respect to the second charge.

It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions dated 03 March 2003 and 28 April 2003, expressed administrative concern
over Atty. Peas behavior on three points: (1) his submission of a falsified court document, (2) his access to Supreme Court documents
that are highly restricted and confidential, and (3) his use of court documents (genuine or false) in his pleadings.

Respondent Pea submitted a falsified internal court document, Annex B, had illegal access to confidential court documents,
and made improper use of them in the proceedings before this Court. The Court directed the initial investigation by the OBC based
on the charge that respondent Pea had submitted a falsified document to this Court. [63] The charge of falsification stems from his
submission of an alleged copy of the Courts Agenda [64] (Annex B) purportedly belonging to a member of the Division handling the
case. The pertinent portion of the subject Motion to Inhibit reads:

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the Official Agenda of the First
Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was supposedly
issued. In both copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members of the Division, one of which
is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the Division had allegedly agreed
that petitioners Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED
PROBLEM AREAS 25

contrary to what was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was released to the
parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First Division granting
petitioners Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the
First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are
hereto attached as Annexes B and C.[65] (Emphasis supplied.)

During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Pea expressed his absolute conviction that the document attached
as Annex B was an exact copy of the Agenda of the then ponente of the case.[66] It was later discovered, however, that no such copy
existed, either in the latters records or in those of any other member of the Division concerned:

CHIEF JUSTICE:

We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is concerned it was confirmed by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of this Division that the original of that does not appear in the record, is not in the record and that
nobody, none of the members of the division has a copy of, that copy of Annex B of your pleading does not come
from anyone of the members of the division. That is the position of the Court now as explained earlier. Specifically
Mr. Justice Carpio said that Annex B, specifically with that capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not come from his
office, was not based on the document in his office and that is also true to each of the members of this Division.
[67]
(Emphasis supplied.)

The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Pea submitted to the Court a
document he was absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In supporting
the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent misled the Court by presenting a document that was not what he claimed it to be. Contrary
to the assurances made in the same motion [68] he made allegations that were false and submitted documents that were not borne
out by the records of this case. Instead of verifying the contents of Annex B, which came to him through dubious means, he
unquestioningly accepted their genuineness and veracity. Despite the Courts own explanation that Annex B does not exist, he
continues to insist on its existence.

Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members of the legal profession. [69] Thus,
lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. [70] As disciples of truth, their
lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusions.[71] Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. [72] In the
instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of dishonesty
that puts into doubt the ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.

Respondent Pea would argue, however, that falsification as a criminal act under the Revised Penal Code was not judicially
established during the proceedings of the OBC investigation and, thus, he cannot be held liable for falsification. The comparison of
the present administrative and disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of falsification is misplaced.
PROBLEM AREAS 26

The subject matter of administrative proceedings is confined to whether there is administrative liability for the submission
of a falsified document namely Annex B, which respondent Pea claims (albeit mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the Agenda of
the ponente. The issue, then, is whether he transgressed the ethical standards demanded of lawyers, by which they should be
truthful in their dealings with and submissions to the Court. The investigation clearly does not include the determination of criminal
liability, which demands a different modicum of proof with respect to the use of falsified documents. At this time, the Court makes
no definitive pronouncement as to the guilt of respondent over his violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code regarding
the use of falsified documents.

In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of the ponentes Agenda,
just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was later found to have been inexistent in the courts
records. Regardless of whether or not Annex B was criminally falsified or forged is immaterial to the present disposition. What is now
crucial is whether respondent was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty with respect to the genuineness and
authenticity of his submissions.

The assertion of respondent Pea that the typewritten contents of Annexes B and C appear to be genuine and accurate is
unconvincing and cannot exonerate him from liability. Although Annex C was determined to be in the Courts records, [73] the bare
similarity of its typewritten contents with those of Annex B will not shield him from disciplinary action. Although the typewritten
contents of the two Agendas appear identical, the handwritten notes located at the right-hand side are different. Respondent, in
fact, claims that the handwritten notes come from two different members of the Division, one of them the then ponente of the case.

The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the veracity of the handwritten remarks not on the printed contents which are
allegedly contrary to the substance of the Courts 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. Respondent Pea
cannot claim the genuineness of Annex B (which is not in the records), based on the apparent identity of its printed contents with
those of Annex C (which is in the records). The handwritten notes are markedly different and, according to him, made by two
different members of the Court. In his Motion to Inhibit, respondent failed to substantiate his assertion that Annex B and the notes
made therein belonged to any member of this Court.

More importantly, the Court notes that respondent Pea has not explained, to the Courts satisfaction, how he managed to
obtain internal and confidential documents.

Respondent Pea would have the Court believe that he happened to obtain the two copies of the Agenda (Annexes B and C)
and the internal Resolution (Annex D) in two separate envelopes anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly received them
sometime during the second or the third week of January 2002 in his home-cum-office in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. [74] He,
however, failed to present the envelopes containing the documents, but explained that these may have already been thrown away,
PROBLEM AREAS 27

since he had no system of recording incoming communications in his home/office in the province. The Court is not persuaded by his
account of the receipt of these restricted court documents.

The Agenda, the Courts action thereon, as well as the Resolution (Annex D), are internal documents that are accessible only

to court officers,[75] who are bound by strict confidentiality. For respondent Pea to have been able to secure originals or photocopies

of the Courts Agenda is disturbing because that ability implies a breach of the rules of strict confidentiality in the Court. Notably, the

Agenda purportedly sent to him did not contain all the items for deliberation by the Courts First Division for that day; the copies sent

were limited to the incidents pertaining to his pending case. This circumstance can hardly be considered as random, since the exact

item (Item No. 175) of concern for him specifically, the Courts action on Urban Banks Motion for Clarification was what had been

sent directly to his provincial home/office, and what he conveniently acquired thereby.

The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential court records just coincidentally and anonymously appeared in the

provincial home/office of respondent Pea through ordinary mail. Also incredible is his explanation that the envelopes that contained

the documents, and that could have led to the identification of their source were opportunely misplaced or thrown away, despite the

grave importance he had ascribed to them. It is highly improbable that a personnel of the Court would breach the rules of strict

confidentiality[76] to send to litigants or their counsel the Courts Agenda, together with handwritten notes and the internal

resolutions of the Court, without any prodding or consideration, and even at the risk of incurring grave criminal and administrative

penalties.[77] Respondent Peas account of having lost the envelopes appears too convenient an excuse to assuage the Courts

skepticism towards this breach of confidentiality within its own halls.

Worse, respondent Pea flaunted his continued access as recent as 2010 to other internal and confidential records in the
proceedings of this case. Despite the administrative proceedings leveled against him for having illicitly obtained the confidential
Agenda of the Courts First Division, he brazenly resorted again to such unethical behavior by surreptiously acquiring no less than the
confidential and still unreleased OBC Report on the very administrative case of which he himself is the subject.

In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010, [78] respondent Pea prayed that the questioned 13 November 2002
Resolution be recalled on the ground that there was a mistake in its issuance based on the copies of the Agenda he had mysteriously
received. In support of this motion, he casually cited and attached a photocopy of the confidential OBC Report.[79] This OBC Report
has not been released to any party, and was then in fact still under deliberation by this Court. Curiously, the attached photocopy
bears marks corresponding to the unreleased copy of the signed OBC Report, as it actually appears in the rollo of the administrative
case.[80] Unfortunately, respondent did not explain in the said motion how he was able to obtain a copy thereof.

Regardless of the means employed by respondent, his acquisition of the OBC Report from the Courts own records already
speaks of an appalling pattern of unethical behavior that the Court will no longer ignore. Even as he was the subject of an
PROBLEM AREAS 28

administrative case for obtaining confidential court records, he continued to have access to other internal documents of the Court.
His actions have established that he is incorrigible and not likely to change. His continued obstinacy in disregarding ethical standards
and ignoring the rule of confidentiality of court records deserves nothing less than the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the
profession.

Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent Pea even tried to bolster his claim that the then ponente of the case
had a special interest in the case by attaching an internal resolution of the Court.[81] In the said Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, the two consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822) were transferred from the Third Division to the First
Division, where Justice Carpio was subsequently assigned. [82] How respondent Pea was again able to secure this internal document is
another disturbing mystery in this case, especially since the resolution was sent by the Third Division Clerk of Court to the First
Division Clerk of Court, the Raffle Committee and the Judicial Records Office only, and not to any of the parties. Similar to the copies
of the Agenda of the First Division, respondent Pea again purportedly received this Internal Resolution by mail. [83] What is more
alarming in this instance is that he received not just any photocopy of the Courts Resolution, but a pink copy itself, the very same
material used for such internal resolutions in the Courts records. As he himself admitted, respondent Pea could not have gotten hold
of the said internal Resolution, which was on its face declared an internal matter, without the assistance of a person who had access
to the records of his case in the Court.

This claimed major anomaly of the transfer of the case, which is being decried by respondent in the subject Motion to
Inhibit, stems from his gross misunderstanding of the internal rules of the Court.

Upon the reorganization of the members of various Divisions due to the retirement of other Justices, the cases already
assigned to a Member-in-Charge are required to be transferred to the Division to which the Member-in-Charge moves. [84] Hence, in
this case, Justice Carpio, similar to other members of the Court at that time, did not lose his case assignments but brought them with
him when he transferred to the First Division. In fact, the transfers of the assigned cases to the new Division are made by request
from the Member-in-Charge, because otherwise the rollo of the cases of which he is Member-in-Charge will be retained by a Division
in which he is no longer a member. Thus, the transfer of the two consolidated petitions to the First Division that is being heavily
criticized by respondent Pea was simple compliance with the established internal procedures of the Court, and not attributable to
any undue interest or malicious intention on the part of the then ponente to retain the case for himself. Respondent had raised
irresponsible suspicions[85] against the integrity of the ponente without any understanding of the Supreme Courts processes in the
transfer of cases.

Respondent Pea had, in fact, previously used this deplorable tactic of obtaining internal court records to call for the
inhibition of Justices of the Court. In previously moving for the inhibition of Justice Buena, he assailed how supposedly the retired
Justice violated the rules with respect to a second motion for reconsideration when the latter reinstated the Petition of the De Leon
Group in G.R. No. 145822. Respondent attributed the special treatment extended by Justice Buena to his supposed association with
PROBLEM AREAS 29

the De Leon Groups counsel, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan of the ACCRA Law Office. To establish this special treatment, he attached a
complete copy of the Minutes of the Division [86] composed of 58 pages and showing 77 cases dismissed by the Court due to failure to
pay the required fees, which Justice Buena allegedly did not reinstate:

10. A review of the records of the Supreme Court will show that for the past several months alone,
seventy-seven petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, mainly for failure to pay the required fees. Out of
that number, NONE WERE REINSTATED upon the filing of a SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. If Justice
Buena willingly disregarded the Rules by reinstating petitioners petition (De Leon Group Petition in G. R. No.
145822) upon the filing of a second motion for reconsideration, then he should have reinstated also the aforesaid
77 cases in order to be fair. At the very least, he should now reinstate all of said 77 cases if only to show that he is
not biased in favor of herein petitioners. He could not and will not do so, however, because those cases are not
favored ones. Photocopies of the case titles and numbers, as well as the resolutions dismissing the aforesaid
seventy-seven cases, consisting of 58 pages, are attached hereto collectively as Annex A. [87]

Respondent Pea was able to attach to this motion for inhibition the portions of the Courts Minutes on 12 April 2000, 07
February 2001, 12 February 2001, 14 February 2001, 26 February 2001, 28 March 2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26 April 2001,
16 May 2001, 11 July 2001, 08 August 2001, 13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29 August 2001, 05 September 2001, 24 September
2001, 08 October 2001 and others which were undated. The attached Minutes pointed to specific cases which were dismissed for
failure to pay the necessary fees, among others. It was unclear if the cases were specifically assigned to Justice Buena or if
respondent Pea represented any of the parties therein.

Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained confidential Minutes of the Court pertaining to other cases, which
specifically dismissed or denied petitions on the failure of the parties to pay necessary fees. This could not have just been mere
coincidence again since it required some legal understanding and familiarity with the cases in order to be able to sift through and
identify the kinds of cases, which were dismissed or denied on such grounds. Although the parties to these cases were notified and
given copies of the Courts resolutions, what respondent Pea obtained were the actual copies of the Minutes that included other
items in the Courts Agenda and that were not released to the public. Under the Courts own Internal Rules, only the Minutes
pertinent to the parties are those that are distributed to the parties concerned. [88] Yet, respondent was able to attach wholesale
Minutes of dozens of cases to his pleading.

Although the above confidential documents that were accessed by respondent totaling 58 pages in all are not the subject of
the investigation of the administrative case, his previous receipt or acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as 2000 confirm in
no uncertain terms his access to internal records of the Court, not just of his case, but of other pending cases and that this access has
continued as late as 2010. It seems rather ironic that respondent Pea would accuse his fellow lawyers of allegedly having an inside
track to members of the Court, when he in turn, on record, had mysteriously easy access to confidential court documents. That
internal documents of the Court (whether voluminous or in relation to his case or otherwise) would suddenly find themselves in the
hands of respondent Pea through registered mail is too incredible for this Court to attribute any good faith on his part.
PROBLEM AREAS 30

Even if the Court were to give some modicum of credence to the unlikely story of how respondent Pea came upon these
internal documents, it looks with disapproval upon his actions with respect to those documents, which were supposedly sent to him
anonymously. If indeed lawyers were sent official judicial records that are confidential in nature and not easily accessible, the ethical
recourse for them would be to make a candid and immediate disclosure of the matter to the court concerned for proper
investigation, and not as proof to further the merits of their case. In fact, respondent himself acknowledged that reporting the
leaked out documents was a duty he owed to the Court [89] more so in this case, since the documents were sent anonymously and
through dubious circumstances.

No issue would have arisen with respect to his continuing fitness to be a member of the legal profession, if he had simply
reported his receipt of the leaked court documents, and nothing more. Yet, he not only failed to immediately disclose the suspicious
circumstances of his having obtained confidential court records; he even had the tenacity to use the documents sent through
suspicious means to support his request for inhibition. As a lawyer, he should have known better than to hinge his motions and
pleadings on documents of questionable origins, without even verifying the authenticity of the contents by comparing them with
sources of greater reliability and credibility.

If respondent Pea entertained doubts as to the veracity of the Divisions actions with respect to the pending incidents in his
case, as allegedly embodied in the anonymous Agendas sent to him, then he should have simply checked the records to verify the
genuineness of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. It is through officially released
resolutions and decisions that parties and their counsel are informed of and guided by the Courts actions on pending incidents, and
not by the confidential and handwritten notes of the individual members of the Court. Respondents wholesale reliance on copies of
the Agenda purported to be those of individual members of the Court and anonymously sent to him is grossly misplaced.

The Court has already explained that there was in fact no discrepancy between the agreed upon action of the Division and
the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, contrary to the assertions of respondent Pea. He grounded the subject Motion to
Inhibit on the fact that the anonymously sent copies of the Agenda indicate that the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank
should simply be noted,[90] but it was instead granted by the Court. The Court, however, made clear during the 03 March 2003
Executive Session, that there was nothing irregular about annotating the first item with SEE RES (See Resolution) and marking the
rest of the incidents with N (Noted). In fact, these annotations conform with the recommended actions submitted by the ponente for
that particular item.[91] The Resolution identified in the first item governs and contains the actual disposition of two of the incidents in
the pending case.[92] To be sure, what governs as the final action of the Court en banc or in Division is the minutes of the
proceedings,[93] which lists the dispositions of the items taken up during the session, reviewed by the members, and finally approved
by the Chief Justice or the Division chairperson. Contrary to respondents suspicions, the action taken by the Division in its 13
November 2002 Session was accurately reflected in the questioned Resolution released by the Court.
PROBLEM AREAS 31

Respondent Pea has no one else to blame but himself, since he allegedly, blindly and mistakenly relied on anonymously sent

unverified photocopies of the Courts Agenda, in order to support his call for the inhibition of a member of the Court. Neither can he

rely on the alleged bragging of Atty. Singson which the latter denies to impute ill motive to judicial officers. Whether Atty. Singson

actually exerted extraordinary efforts to secure the suspension Order or freely divulged it in their telephone conversation,

respondent should have been more circumspect in making grave accusations of bribery (jokingly or not) without any extrinsic

evidence or proof to back up his claim.

Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and documents, which he

suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal court documents has not been properly explained. The

cavalier explanation of respondent Pea that this Courts confidential documents would simply find themselves conveniently falling

into respondents lap through registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer be traced is unworthy of belief.

This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal rules have been violated over and over again by some court

personnel, whom respondent Pea now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have reached him.

It is not unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code [94] and the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Pea benefitting from the same. [95] Respondents actions clearly merit no other penalty

than disbarment.

This second penalty of disbarment is all the more justified by the earlier imposition of an indefinite suspension. If taken

together, these two violations already speak of respondent Peas inherent unworthiness to become a member of the Bar. Although an

indefinite suspension opens up the possibility of future reinstatement after a clear showing of remorse and a change of ways (as in

the case of Atty. Paguia), respondent has shown to be incorrigible and no longer deserves the compassion of the Court. Not only has

respondent thumbed his nose on the integrity of the persons occupying the Bench by casting grave aspersions of bribery and

wrongdoing, he has also showed disdain for the sanctity of court procedures and records by his haughty display of illegal access to

internal Supreme Court documents.

C. Third Charge: Respondent Peas insinuations of wrongdoing and collusion between


members of the Court and another counsel.

Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente, respondent Penas allegations of collusion between previous members of the

Court and the counsel for the De Leon Group are unfounded and contravene the ethical duties of respondent to the Court and his

fellow lawyers. His actions reveal a pattern of behavior that is disconcerting and administratively punishable.
PROBLEM AREAS 32

However, considering the ultimate penalty of disbarment earlier imposed on respondent Pea, the Court no longer finds the

need to squarely rule on the third charge, as any possible administrative liability on this matter would be a mere superfluity.

D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is not the proper subject of the
present allegations of administrative misconduct.

The counter-charge of forum shopping has been made by respondent Pea against petitioners and their respective counsel in
his defense.[96] However, this is already beyond the scope of the subject matter of this administrative case. It will be recalled that he
assailed the fact that Urban Bank, the De Leon Group, and the other group of bank officers filed three separate Petitions (G.R. Nos.
145817, 145818 and 145822, respectively) before the Court. They all questioned therein the rulings of the appellate court affirming
the grant of execution pending appeal.

Considering that this claim is the subject of administrative penalties, and that other interested parties did not participate in
the investigation conducted by the OBC herein, prudence and equity dictate that the Court reserve judgment for the meantime until
the subject is fully ventilated and all parties are given an opportunity to argue their cases.

The charges of forum shopping are hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing and/or hearing of separate
administrative complaints[97] against petitioners Urban Bank, Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C.
Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L. de Leon and Eric L. Lee, and their respective counsel of record. Considering their deaths, petitioners
Teodoro C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr., can no longer be included in any future administrative action in relation to these matters.
On the other hand, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by respondent Pea and therefore, is not a real and direct party to the
case.

EPILOGUE

As parting words, the Court herein highlights the disorder caused by respondent Peas actions in the administration of
justice. In order to foreclose resort to such abhorrent practice or strategy in the future, the Court finds the need to educate the
public and the Bar.

Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional colleagues. [98] They shall not,
in their professional dealings, use language that is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. [99] Lawyers shall use dignified language in
PROBLEM AREAS 33

their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. [100] The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of a judicial forum.[101]

The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for
inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the legal
profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are charged. [102]

It has not escaped the Courts attention that respondent Pea has manifested a troubling history of praying for the inhibition
of several members of this Court or for the re-raffle of the case to another Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded
accusations of partiality. A sampling of his predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an
apparent bid to shop for a sympathetic ear, includes the following:

1. Peas Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12 January 2001;

2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated 20 August 2001;

3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October 2001;

4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18 February 2002;

5. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;

6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January 2003;

7. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing) dated 08 July 2004;

8. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;

9. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura) dated 17 December 2007;

10. Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;

11. Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re: Justice Panganiban);

12. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January 2008;

13. Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for Inhibition (Re: Justice Antonio T. Carpio) dated 02
June 2008;

14. Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J. Velasco) dated 10 July 2008;

15. Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Dante O.
Tinga) dated 04 August 2008;

16. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Carpio Morales, Tinga and Velasco) dated 14
August 2008;
PROBLEM AREAS 34

17. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Arturo D. Brion, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated 28 August 2008;

18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21 January 2010;

19. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices Carpio Morales and Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno) dated 30 March
2011;

20. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011 (Re: Justice Sereno); and

21. Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01 September 2011 (Re: Justices Carpio, Jose Perez and Sereno).

The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these motions of respondent ranged from flimsy and sparse relations between
the parties and the members of the Court to wild accusations of partiality on mere conjectures and surmises. For example,
respondent accused former Chief Justice Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, in which the late Teodoro
Borlongan, then President of Urban Bank, was likewise an officer. [103] He moved for the inhibition of Justice Sereno on the ground that
she was a close judicial ally of Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter, according to respondent, was antagonistic toward him during the
Courts 03 March 2003 Executive Session in this administrative case. [104]

Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the case re-raffled from the Courts Third Division because Justice Jose
Portugal Perez, a member thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court through the endorsement of former Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, who was a close ally of the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former President Fidel V. Ramos. [105] He similarly
sought the inhibition of Justice Dante O. Tinga for his close professional and political ties with former President Ramos. [106] He
likewise assailed the partiality of Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering he is a law school classmate and fraternity brother of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then Presidential Legal Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, according to respondent Pea,
President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will most likely exercise his influence over the Honorable Justice Brion. [107]

Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice Nachura for his alleged partiality in favor of Urban Bank because of his
decision in a related case[108] and his prior appointment as Undersecretary of Education during the Ramos presidency, respondent Pea
impliedly prayed that his case be specifically retained in the Courts Third Division. [109] Respondents peculiar request, which was not
included in his other motions, gives the impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura inhibit himself, respondent nonetheless
did not want his case to be raffled out of the Third Division. If his only intention was to raise the possibility of bias against Justice
Nachura alone, then it would not matter whether his case remained with the Third Division, with another member being designated
to replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another Division altogether. Respondent Peas odd prayer in his motion for inhibition bore
signs of an intent to shop for a forum that he perceived to be friendly to him, except for one member.

In Chin v. Court of Appeals,[110] the Court warned against litigants contumacious practice in successively asking for the
inhibition of judges, in order to shop for one who is more friendly and sympathetic to their cause:
PROBLEM AREAS 35

We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy of
public trust and confidence. But under the circumstances here, we also agree that unnecessary inhibition of judges
in a case would open the floodgates to forum-shopping. More so, considering that Judge Magpale was not the first
judge that TAN had asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of prejudgment. To allow successive inhibitions
would justify petitioners apprehension about the practice of certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly
and sympathetic to their cause than previous ones.

As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges to disqualify themselves need not always be
heeded. It is not always desirable that they should do so. It might amount in certain cases to their being recreant
about their duties. It could also be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting
another more amenable to his persuasion. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Courts warning in Chin applies squarely to the multiple and successive requests for inhibition and re-raffle filed by
respondent Pea. Lest other litigants follow his lead, the Court condemns in no uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a justice,
most especially in the highest tribunal of the land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one of the reasons why this administrative case
has dragged on for years. Not only does it impute ill motive and disrepute to the members of the Court, but it likewise delays the
administration of justice.

Oddly enough, respondent Pea has been less concerned about the inordinate delay in resolving the case than about making
sure that the wrong or unfriendly Justices in his perception do not sit and rule on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted
interruptions caused by his numerous motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the case languishing in this Court for years and
clogging its dockets. Respondent stands out for this disorderly behavior and must be made an example so that litigants be reminded
that they cannot bend or toy with the rules of procedure to favor their causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less than the rules
of basic courtesy in imputing sinister motives against members of the Court.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Pea has violated several canons of professional and ethical conduct
expected from him as a lawyer and an officer of the court. His conduct, demeanor and language with respect to his cause of action in
this Court, no less tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as well as inflict unfounded accusations against
fellow lawyers. Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to obtain confidential and internal court records and to use
them shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his cause.

In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his inclination towards casually moving for the inhibition of Justices of
the Court based on unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse or contrition for his ways. Atty. Pea has shown and displayed
in these proceedings that he has fallen short of the ethical standards of the noble profession and must be sanctioned accordingly.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for failing to give
due respect to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
PROBLEM AREAS 36

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Peas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and other
copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to secure copies of the following: (a) copies
of the Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of the Courts First Division, attached as Annexes B and C of respondent Peas Urgent Motion
to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003; (b) the Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, attached as Annex D of the same motion; (c) the Report and Recommendation dated 11 December 2007, issued by
the Office of the Bar Confidant, attached as Annex 5 of respondent Peas Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the
Minutes of the Court, consisting of 58-pages, attached as Annex A of the Reply (to Petitioners Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion
to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001 filed by respondent Pea. She is further required to SUBMIT such an investigation report with
recommendations on the administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any, of all court personnel possibly involved therein, as well as
suggestions for protecting confidential and internal court documents of pending cases within NINETY (90) DAYS from receipt of this
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent
Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of
marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. 2 Bansig is the
sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a
certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. 3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his
second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly
immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint.
PROBLEM AREAS 37

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by
Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution 5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against him. 6

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion 7 praying that respondent's failure to file his comment on the
complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was filed against him, he did not
know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this
Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing
the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was
able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at
59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when
the same was sent to his law office address.

Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office
address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order
to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which
triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred
to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.

In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the administrative
complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint was furnished to
respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry
Receipt No. 2167.9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved
to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure. 10

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint. He claimed that
Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew
that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the complaint, and required Bansig
to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent. 12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation, 13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was
supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and
willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating
that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No.
3582.

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered
mail.14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to
respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise
required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent. 15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence with the Court No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said
PROBLEM AREAS 38

address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at
"Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." 16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new
address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. 17

On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for failure to file his
comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon
Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b)
REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required thereon. 18

In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's Resolutions dated June 30,
2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER
the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty.
Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The
Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20

However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft
Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao,
Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City
was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot be found or located and there were
no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as per their records, the
address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.

Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any
action on the matter.

On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a
period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

RULING

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite
numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his
first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by
the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8,
1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced
PROBLEM AREAS 39

by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila,
states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the
Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while
the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first
marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the
second marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence
of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.

Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that
respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified
xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. 24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against the Court as
demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged
on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but
respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several
resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer
thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him.
Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that
indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him
that is pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.

The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case; accommodating respondent's
endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by
numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's
Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest
efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint.
When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his
PROBLEM AREAS 40

actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.

Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring
the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree
of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving
of reproof."26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of
respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its
Chapters.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7474, September 09, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUAN S.
DEALCA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in
the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a
motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the
disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled “People of the Philippines
v. Philip William Arsenault” then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant
Judge Jose L. Madrid. 1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the
accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-
6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC “[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
PROBLEM AREAS 41

undersigned,” where “he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by
the undersigned.”2cralawred

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14, 2007, 3viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxxx
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This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was not even the
original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province as he would like
it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge which were all
dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack of merit. This is why he should not have accepted this particular case so as not to
derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a
client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED.

Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is
hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint 4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of
entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents
between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to submit his
comment.5cralawred

In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and
unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited
bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge
Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation, report and recommendation. 7 Several
months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled “Joseph
Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer Merlyn D. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51,
Sorsogon City” (Yap v. Judge Madrid). 8cralawred

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madrid dismissed for its lack of merit the administrative complaint against Judge Madrid
for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him and his clients. 9cralawred

In compliance with the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following findings and
recommendation:10cralawred
PROBLEM AREAS 42

xxxx

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No.
1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E; (4) Adm. Matter
OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that
respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of
the IBP Election and incidents in cases that respondent had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and
lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out of the unfavorable
consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out
of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled
“Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.,” for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent for the complainant
Alita Gomez.

OMB-L-C-0478-E was an offshoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled “Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III”
for: Support pending before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against
defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this ombudsman case
arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled “Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty.
Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was
heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled “Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph
D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III” for Support pending before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the respondent that instead
of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and
criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case
entitled “EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINAS-CARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm.
Case No. 6334 entitled “SOFIA JAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA” passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: “RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the Supreme
Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of resolution
dated October 22, 2005 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT
in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled “Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida” for: Malpractice (Forum
Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454
entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records” which provides for the dismissal of
the cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the
verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to persons other than judges
and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an
undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and
Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida,
respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the “PROPENSITY”
of the respondent as a member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by
the Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of SUSPENSION in the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months from finality of the decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.
PROBLEM AREAS 43

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation 11 finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating
the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal complaints; and
recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was
devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed the administrative
complaint for its lack of merit, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the
DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.

Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through
its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14cralawred

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

I
Atty. Dealca must guard against
his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court personnel, including
Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt
judges and court personnel.15cralawred

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the
Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied
by any taint of insincerity or self-interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for
that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of
idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant
for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, 16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel
and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He
well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a
substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to
render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 17cralawred

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a
ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. 18 The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to “wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit.” These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust
that must be upheld and keep inviolable.19cralawred

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits.
The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
PROBLEM AREAS 44

thuswise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly
impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate, 20 so must he
equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover
the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to
vex and harass them, among other things. 21cralawred

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He disregarded his
mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the
Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in
good faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his
fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not
substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even the Court with
the following arrogant tirade, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges and court personnel ‘for
lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the case. 23

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in frequently dismissing his
unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of
the rules of procedure applicable to the Court. The minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by
the Court.24 Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is
understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld, 25 and
the minute resolution then constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or its denial of
due course indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26cralawred

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issues in disposing of a
case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: 27cralawred

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a
case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the
petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying
due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

xxxx

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals.28 The
petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14, 29 Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court, through Justice
Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions within the constitutional contemplation, for the former “merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully
explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision.” It
pointed out that the constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after
the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due course, with the
resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition and the
subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions raised were factual, or there was no
reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 30cralawred
PROBLEM AREAS 45

II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have “in good grace inhibited himself” upon his motion to inhibit in order to
preserve “confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.” 31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca
be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of
factual and legal bases.32cralawred

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their clients. As a
consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar
imposes certain obligations upon them.33cralawred

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
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xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence
in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 34cralawred

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not appear before the
incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned x x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges could choose the
cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel.
Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid
but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any
document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases
without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias
and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a
counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice, 37because the presumption that Judge
Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only
be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as
expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought against Atty.
Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely.
Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03, 40 and Canon 11, Rule
11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year.
PROBLEM AREAS 46

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon
11, Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from
notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca’s personal record as an
attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8644 January 22, 2014


[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2908]

AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a complain for disbarment 1 on grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty filed against Atty. Eliseo
M. Campos (Eliseo), former presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The complainants herein are his
wife, Aida R. Campos (Aida), and their children, Alistair R. Campos (Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine).

Antecedents

Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was born in 1982, and Charmaine, in 1986.

In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a 936-square meter lot (the property) in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur from a certain Renato
Alimpoos. Eliseo thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in Alistair’s name. Alistair was then a student without an income and a
capacity to buy the property. In 2006, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28258 covering the property was issued in Alistair’s
name. Meanwhile, Alistair got married and his wife and child likewise resided in Eliseo’s house until 2008. 2

On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Branch 7, a Petition 3for the Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage. He alleged that both he and Aida are psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital
obligations. He claimed that during the first few days of their marriage, he realized that he finds no gratification in engaging in sexual
intercourse with his wife. He alleged that he is a homosexual. He also averred that Aida experienced severe pain when she delivered
Alistair. Consequently, Aida no longer wanted to bear children. He likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to Aida.

On September 10, 2008, Eliseo executed an Affidavit of Loss 4 wherein he represented himself as the owner of the property covered
by OCT No. P-28258. He declared that he unknowingly lost the owner’s certificate of title which used to be in his files. On September
15, 2008, he caused the annotation5 of the said affidavit in the copy of OCT No. P-28258 kept in the Register of Deeds of Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur. In the Affidavit of No Loss6 executed on October 21, 2008 and likewise inscribed 7 in the certificate of title, Alistair
refuted Eliseo’s representations.

On November 26, 2008, Alistair filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur a complaint for
perjury8 against Eliseo. Alistair stated that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 was in his possession. Eliseo was aware of such fact,
but he still deliberately and maliciously asserted a falsehood.

In Eliseo’s Counter-Affidavit,9 he insisted that he is the sole owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. Eliseo continued:

That when I applied for titling of said lot, I caused it to be registered in the name of [Alistair], who was still single, as I have some
other properties (land) under my name;
PROBLEM AREAS 47

That I never intended to give it to [Alistair] as he still has a sister;

That when the title was released, it was kept in our files;

That when I filed an annulment case against my wife which is now pending before the [RTC] of Bayugan, I offered to my wife as a
settlement to have our properties settled. One of [these properties] is this lot, which I asked to be sold and its proceeds be divided
between us. I have learned that my wife refused to have that property sold claiming that I could not sell the house and lot as it is in
the name of our son, herein complainant Alistair R. Campos;

xxxx

That my son’s statement in his complaint affidavit that the Owner’s Duplicate of the Title of the Lot has long been in his actual,
physical and personal possession, is utterly false, as the title was previously in our possession in our files as the property is
undersigned's own exclusive property. x x x

That when I learned that together with my wife, he is going to apply for a loan making the title of the lot as collateral, I decided to file
a petition for cancellation of the title under my son's name Alistair R. Campos, and asked Mrs. Azucena A. Ortiz, to get a certified
copy of the title from the Register of Deeds to be used in the filing of a petition for cancellation of the title in my son’s name;

That I was told by Mrs. Ortiz, that she was told by the Register of Deeds, that I have to execute an affidavit of loss so that I can be
given a certified copy. Since the title is not in my possession after I left my residence and I cannot find it from my files, I let Mrs. Ortiz
prepare an affidavit of loss and I signed it. I have also instructed her to [cause the annotation of the affidavit on the certificate of
title] to protect my interest as the real owner of the lot, to counter or stop my wife and son from using the titles as collateral of a
loan;

x x x x.10

Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Sur dismissed for lack of probable cause Alistair’s complaint for
perjury against Eliseo.11 The resolution, which dismissed the complaint, in part, reads:

"[W]hen [Eliseo] found out that the title of the lot he bought was missing and could not be found in his files, he did the proper
actions to protect his rights thereto by executing an Affidavit of Loss.

x x x [W]hen [Eliseo] sensed that his wife is about to obtain a loan using the title as collateral without his consent and to protect his
right as owner of the property, he went to the Register of Deeds to cancel his son’s ownership over the lot in question with the intent
to revert back its ownership in his name. However, when asked to produce a copy of its duplicate original, [Eliseo] could not present
the same as it was already lost and could not be retrieved from his files. To prove its loss, an Affidavit of Loss was executed by [Eliseo]
attesting to the fact of its unavailability.

x x x It can be deduced that the act of [Eliseo] was done in good faith. x x x The intent of [Eliseo] in executing the Affidavit is not
tainted with a corrupt assertion of falsehood since there was a firm belief that indeed, the title is not anymore found in his files. It
could not be located and the title is kept by [Alistair] who took sides with [Aida] who has plans to enjoy the benefits from the title
using it as a collateral in obtaining a loan from the lot covered by the said title. [Had Alistair been truthful to Eliseo, the former could
have informed the latter of the] whereabouts of the title and could have sought permission from his father when he took the copy of
the title from [Eliseo’s] files. By not informing [Eliseo], he could not be faulted for executing such Affidavit and neither can he be
found guilty of perjury as there was no malice on his part to do the same. x x x." 12 (Citation omitted)

On February 11, 2009, Aida filed a Complaint 13 for Legal Separation, Support and Separation of Conjugal Properties against Eliseo.
Aida alleged that Eliseo confessed under oath that he is a homosexual. However, Eliseo, in effect, contradicted the said confession
when he admitted to Alistair and Charmaine that he was then intimately involved with another woman. Aida likewise claimed that
Eliseo is temperamental and had stopped giving support to their family.

On April 6, 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an administrative
complaint14 for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo. Formal investigation was thereafter conducted.
PROBLEM AREAS 48

Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned administrative complaint against Eliseo, he resigned from his judicial post on July 1,
2009.15

On September 14, 2009, after the conclusion of a hearing on Eliseo’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Judge Eduardo Casals (Judge Casals) called the parties for a conference in his chamber. A scuffle ensued
inside the chamber. The police blotter filed promptly after the incident indicated that Eliseo choked Charmaine and attempted to box
but failed to hit Alistair.16

On June 4, 2010, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed the instant complaint for disbarment 17 against Eliseo. They alleged that Eliseo
committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in (a) causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name;
(b) subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258; (c) falsely declaring under oath in
the Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge
that the said title is with Alistair; (d) stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit
admitting to his children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and (e) choking and boxing his children on September
14, 2009.

After Eliseo’s submission of his comment,18 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.19

In Eliseo’s Position Paper20 filed with the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), he interposed the following defenses: (a) the
complainants are engaged in forum shopping in view of pending administrative and civil cases in all of which the issues of immorality
and homosexuality have already been raised;21 (b) the complaint is instituted merely to harass him as a consequence of his refusal
to provide a monthly support of Php60,000.00 to his wife and children; 22 (c) he has no extra-marital relation but he once told Alistair
and Charmaine in jest that due to Aida’s infidelity, he intends to live separately with another woman who may be more caring and
loving than his wife;23 and (d) to protect his rights and prevent the complainants from using as a collateral for a loan the house and
lot covered by OCT No. P-28258, he executed the Affidavit of Loss on September 10, 2008 as a pre-requisite to his filing of an action
in court for the registration of the property in his name. 24 Further, Eliseo refuted Alistair and Charmaine’s claims relative to the scuffle
which occurred on September 14, 2009 inside the chamber of the judge hearing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Eliseo insists that if Alistair and Charmaine’s claims were true, they could have presented independent witnesses to corroborate their
version of the incident, and medical certificates to prove that they indeed sustained injuries. What follows is Eliseo’s account of what
had transpired:

[A]fter adjournment of the hearing of the annulment case, the judge called the parties to his chamber for a conference. [Aida]
however was reluctant to go unless her children would join her. The judge then called all of them to the chamber. Once there, the
Judge inquired about [Eliseo’s] proposal for settlement. While [Eliseo] was explaining to the judge, [Charmaine] reacted by raising her
voice uttering unprintable words to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo] requested her to calm down reminding her that they were still in court. But she
continued her tirade at [Eliseo] with greater intensity even calling him a bad father, and that she despised him. x x x Charmaine had
already been ejected by the judge out of the court for lack of decorum and respect. The order for her removal arose after she
interrupted the court several times by shouting at [Eliseo]. When she was already outside the court premises, she was even heard by
a certain Samuel Pasagdan saying that [Eliseo] should watch out after the hearing as she was going to attack him. The prior incident
(where she was thrown out of court) made her angrier in the chamber. So when she continued with her unpleasant and scandalous
utterances by again interrupting [Eliseo] who was asked by the judge to talk about his proposal for settlement, [Eliseo] walked to her
and held her by her shoulder to put some sense to her that she really had to calm down out of respect [for] the judge. There was no
choking of Charmaine. But, this sight of holding Charmaine by the shoulder was viewed differently by [Alistair] who flung with force
and recklessness a bag containing an unknown hard object to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo] was hit and in pain. At this point, Charmaine suddenly
held [Eliseo] from behind so he could not defend himself from the onslaught of Alistaire (sic) who was poised to attack him. [Eliseo]
was forced to elbow Charmaine to break free from her hold. There was a brief exchange of punches between Alistair and [Eliseo]
before the Presiding Judge broke the fray. This incident could not have happened if not for Charmaine’s own misdemeanor and initial
provocation.25

Aida, Alistair and Charmaine did not attend the hearing held on March 18, 2011, but Atty. Gener Sansaet came to represent them.
Eliseo appeared on his own behalf, with Atty. Alex Bacarro as collaborating counsel.

During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations against him of (a) immorality and psychological incapacity in having extra-
marital affairs; and (b) serious misconduct in the execution of the Affidavit of Loss need not be resolved anymore in the instant
PROBLEM AREAS 49

disbarment complaint since they are already the subjects of other pending cases. 26 He also expressed his doubt that Alistair is his
biological son.27 He also alleged that Aida, who had served for three terms as a Provincial Board Member, had a lover, who was
likewise a political figure.28 Aida harbored the impression that Eliseo’s filing of his Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
caused the downfall of the former’s political career. 29

The Report and Recommendation of the CBD

On June 11, 2012, CBD Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (Commissioner Din, Jr.) submitted his Report and Recommendation 30 to
the IBP Board of Governors. Commissioner Din, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the instant disbarment complaint against Eliseo for
lack of evidence. Commissioner Din, Jr. ratiocinated that:

The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not [Eliseo] committed serious misconduct sufficient to cause his disbarment. The
determination of [Eliseo’s] culpability is dependent on the following: 1. whether or not [Eliseo] was dishonest with regards to the
statements he made in his Petition for Annulment. [Corollarily] whether or not [Eliseo] is guilty of immoral conduct; 2. Whether or
not the statements raised in the Affidavit of Loss concerning the certificate of title of the Campos’ property were untrue; and 3.
Whether or not [Eliseo] choked his daughter, Charmaine, during the amicable settlement of the annulment case in the (sic) Judge
Casal’s (sic) chambers.

The Commission finds in the negative. Gross or serious misconduct has been defined as "any inexcusable, shameful and flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties
or to the right determination of a cause, a conduct that is generally motivated by a predetermined, obstinate or intentional purpose
(Yumol, Jr. vs. Ferrer, Sr., 456 SCRA 457).

As a consequence of finding of gross misconduct has been held to be "a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of
such privilege." (Cham v. Atty. Paita-Moya[,] A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008).

In the same vein, the Supreme Court has likewise held that: "A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law but also a good qualification for all
members of the bar (Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564, August 20, 2008).

In the case at bar, the complainants’ averments of [Eliseo’s] alleged transgressions, i.e. the incongruence of his homosexuality and
the extramarital relation of [Eliseo] as grounds for annulment compared with the complainants’ allegation that [Eliseo] admitted that
he has a mistress; the alleged choking of [Charmaine]; and the execution of the Affidavit of Loss despite knowledge of the fact that
the certificate of title was with [Alistair] who is the registered owner of the subject property taken on their own is a valid ground to
find [Eliseo] guilty of gross misconduct.

However, [Eliseo] has succinctly rebutted each and every single allegation of the complainants making the case at fore a battle of
opposing narration of facts.

More importantly, the pieces of evidence presented by the complainants are insufficient to prove their claim beyond the degree of
evidence required of them by law to satisfy and overcome.

Basic and fundamental is the rule that "the burden of proof is upon the complainant and the Court will exercise the disciplinary
power only if the former establishes the case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence."

xxxx

In the case at bar, [apart] from the allegations in the complaint, no other evidence was presented by the complainants to bolster
their claims. Aside from the statements made in the complaint, no other corroborative or collaborating evidence documentary or
testimonial from independent, third person was presented to convince this Commission by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof
that [Eliseo] is guilty of the allegations contained therein. 31(Citation omitted)
PROBLEM AREAS 50

The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings of Commissioner Din, Jr. In the Extended Resolution issued on March 20,
2013, the Board suspended Eliseo from the practice of law for two years. Thus:

[T]he Board, upon a thorough perusal of the records, finds sufficient evidence to sustain misconduct on the part of [Eliseo] as a
lawyer, specifically his filing an Affidavit of Loss of Title to Real Property which Title was in the name of Alistair, his son, and which
was in the latter’s possession, substantiated with annexes and affidavits. The same holds true for the alleged choking incident in the
Judge’s chamber which was caused to be blottered, Annex "G". [Eliseo] also admitted his infidelity albeit he postulated the defense of
homosexuality. All these, taken together, fall short of the ethical standards set forth for lawyers in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.32

Issues

Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in:

I.

Causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name;

II.

Subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258;

III.

Falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that the owner's copy of OCT No. P-
28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with Alistair;

IV.

Stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he
has an intimate relation with another woman; and

V.

Choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.

This Court’s Ruling

Of the five issues raised herein, only the allegation of Eliseo’s engagement in the scuffle inside the chamber of Judge Casals on
September 14, 2009 shall be resolved. Anent the foregoing, this Court is compelled to once again impose a fine upon Eliseo for
violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he conducted himself in a manner not befitting a
member of the bar.

This Court affirms the findings of the IBP Board of Governors that Eliseo deserves to be sanctioned for his unbecoming behavior.

In recommending the imposition upon Eliseo of a penalty of two years of suspension from the practice of law, the IBP Board of
Governors considered all the three charges of immorality, dishonesty and misconduct against the former.

However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, had already imposed upon Eliseo a fine of Php20,000.00 for
simple misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name when the subject property actually belongs to the
former. The charges of (a) immorality in engaging in extra-marital affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss on
PROBLEM AREAS 51

September 10, 2008, were, on the other hand, dismissed by the Court after finding either the evidence of the complainants as
insufficient or the issues raised being already the subjects of Eliseo’s pending Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are anchored upon almost the same set of
facts, except that in the former, the issue of occurence of the scuffle on September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This Court does not
intend to punish Eliseo twice for the same acts especially since they pertain to his private life and were not actually committed in
connection with the performance of his functions as a magistrate before.

In Samson v. Caballero,33 the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of administrative cases against justices and judges to
disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers" means, viz:

This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar,
in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:

"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and
the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar
for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice,
judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. x x x. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution."

xxxx

Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not
also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." xxx In other words, an order to comment
on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the
bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases
against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-
SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of
the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a
member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of
Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court. 34 (Citations and emphasis omitted)

The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint against a lawyer when an administrative case had
been previously filed against him or her as a magistrate. Ideally therefore, the instant disbarment complaint should have been
consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761. However, it is well to note that Samson v. Caballero 35 was promulgated by the Court on
August 5, 2009 subsequent to the filing of the instant disbarment complaint on April 6, 2009. Further, while all the allegations in A.M.
No. MTJ-10-1761 are replicated in the instant disbarment complaint, the last issue of engagement in the scuffle is an addition to the
latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve the said issue to write finis to the parties’ bickerings.

In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare accusations were exchanged.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that not one of the
parties had presented even one independent witness to prove what transpired inside the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14,
2009. That a scuffle took place is a fact, but the question of who started what cannot be determined with much certainty.

While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as self-defense on his part. 36

While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s narration of the incident, and understands that the successive acts of the parties
during the tussle were committed at a time when passions ran high, he shall not be excused for comporting himself in such an
undignified manner.
PROBLEM AREAS 52

Rule 7.03, Canon 737 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from engaging in conduct that "adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession."

The case of Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong,38 on the other hand, is instructive anent what constitutes unbecoming conduct, viz:

Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or
logical procedure or prescribed method."39

Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his own children inside the chamber of a
judge. This Court shall not countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by people with high respect
and is regarded as a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed. 40 Misbehavior
within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity. 41 Although Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a
higher level of decorum and restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due respect for the court and
lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the legal profession.

Further, albeit not raised as an issue, this Court views with disfavor Eliseo’s statement during the hearing conducted by the CBD on
March 18, 2011 that he doubts Alistair to be his biologiocal son. 42 As a lawyer, Eliseo is presumably aware that ascribing illegitimacy
to Alistair in a proceeding not instituted for that specific purpose is nothing short of defamation.

All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he conducted himself in a manner not
befitting a member of the bar by engaging in the scuffle with his own children in the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009
and recklessly expressing his doubt anent the legitimacy of his son Alistair during the hearing before the CBD.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds that respondent Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is hereby imposed upon him, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for disbarment filed by complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws2 and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic surgery. 3 On the other hand, respondent is the
lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical
procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009. 4

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social networking site, insulting and verbally
abusing complainant. His posts include the following excerpts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client's Ass, Belo. Senator Adel Tamano,
don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a national
PROBLEM AREAS 53

campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You will go down in Medical History as a QUACK
DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the
U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22 at 11:18pm) 5

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-
bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for
P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm)6

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon. Kaya lang, histado ko na kung sino-sino ang
tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)7

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA
MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me, ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions....
(September 15 at 3:57pm)8

Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed the news of a picket demonstration in front of the Belo
clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the story when the next rallies will have the following numbers
100, 200, 500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas
Morato on July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm)9

Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my reputation is worth that much. Aba ako kaya
magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince editors to pin me down with something eh alam ko
na wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si Aling Becky at may tama na sa utak - eh kung gagastos ka lang
ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect your burak na reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na
lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas [ni]Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October
23 at 5:31pm)10

Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on national television to expose the Reyna ng
Kaplastikan, Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact that the much needed partial restoration of her
behind would cost a staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford Medical Hospital and she will still remain permanently disabled for the
rest of her life... (July 11 at 2:08am)11

Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT VICKI BELO'S QUACK
DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)12

Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which side you'll be taking- just pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit
at St. Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10 at 12:08am)13
chanrobleslaw
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin
BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause, 14 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the operations of all her clinic and seek
out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good response – 70% decrease in her July sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm) 15

Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all. With only 2 surgeons of
BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries like liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been
performed by [BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk of something going wrong with the procedures they have undergone
under [BMGI's] hands:(" (July 12 at 12:21am)16

Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and trained doctors, they nearly killed a client of mine,
medical malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. just recently, in flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple facial
landed in the hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm) 17

Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and friends in Cebu to greet Vicki Belo with a boycott
PROBLEM AREAS 54

once she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set already knows that she is not a certified plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless
Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)18

Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-making machines, dapat convert them into public
health clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of those who want to look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at 2:16am) 19

Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga kapalpakan
niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)20

Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a week to a place where there will be no
facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you want to find out more about our anti-quack doctor campaign! (September 24 at
3:00pm)21

Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT
ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)22

Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard - BOYCOTT BELO!!! FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!! BELAT
ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU???
(September 23 at 1:50am)23

Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group. To all my friends and comrades, please stay away
from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have canceled their lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the
Belo Medical Group until they perform their moral and legal obligation to Ms. Josie Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)24
chanrobleslaw
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly threatened complainant with criminal
conviction, without factual basis and without proof, 25 as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she will be jailed for plunder; Vicky Belo will no longer be
a doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal prosecution. The General Surgeon of France will have a Philippine version. By
October and November, some congressmen I have spoken with will be issuing summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional inquiry; the
subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic surgery! (September 22 at 11:31pm) 26

Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison - from Vicky Belo after she gets convicted too for
criminal negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)27

Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical Group for its criminal negligence which nearly killed
Ms. Josie Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He found out that the Dr. Belo herself marketed the product to Ms.
Norcio, the operation was carried out by her doctors who were not licensed by the Philippine Association of Plastic Reconstructive
and Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm) 28
chanrobleslaw
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women, 29 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest cebuana chic chick there nowadays? haven't been there
for quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-and-below naprends diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)30

Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will soon picket the belo clinic there, can u tell me where
that is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)31

Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts of attacks na against me. to thwart them, being the
gayest gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like your type? at yung preferred ko lang
aythin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)32
chanrobleslaw
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort money from her, as apparent from the
following reply made by respondent on a comment on his Facebook post: 33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)
PROBLEM AREAS 55

Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman, maibagsak ko lang ang kaplastikan ni belo, quits na
tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)34
chanrobleslaw
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation,
and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his demand
letter35 dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.

In defense,36 respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to
privacy,37 asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be
shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part. 38 He also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of
his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed
against complainant.39 He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred
against complainant.40 He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a
requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her. 41 Finally, respondent
pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment. 42

After the mandatory conference had been terminated, 43 the parties were directed to file their respective position
papers.44 Thereafter, the IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for clarificatory hearing. 45 Upon
termination thereof, the case was deemed submitted for report/recommendation. 46

IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation47 dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended for a period
of one (1) year from the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.48 It held respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03, 49 Rule 8.01,50 and Rule 19.0151 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for having posted the above-quoted remarks on his Facebook account, pointing out that respondent cannot invoke the
"private" nature of his posts, considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the IBP-CBD
maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence;
therefore, he can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not been established. 52

In a Resolution53 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the August 13, 2013 Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,54 arguing that there was no specific act attributed to him that would warrant his suspension
from the practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases filed against him by an employee of BMGI had already been dismissed,
without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.55

In a Resolution56 dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted respondent's motion, reducing the penalty
from one (1) year to six (6) months suspension.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations
of the verified complaint.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's findings, except as to the penalty imposed on
respondent.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about
complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private
PROBLEM AREAS 56

remarks" on his "private account"57 that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she
violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.

The defense is untenable.

Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion
monthly active users.58 Social media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users to generate and
share content. There are various classifications59 of social media platforms and one can be classified under the "social networking
sites" such as Facebook.60

Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling
friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another." 61 Users register at this site, create a
personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic
notifications when they update their profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible
to anyone, depending on the user's privacy settings.62

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to
regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,63 the South Gauteng High Court of
Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but with the
cautionary advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies, "makes every effort to protect a user's information, these privacy
settings are however not foolproof."64

Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it
is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his
or her right to informational privacy. 65

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were
set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook
available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to
corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends,
respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. 66

Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only,
there is no assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile - will be
safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any
conceivable way";

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite
its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.67
PROBLEM AREAS 57

chanrobleslaw
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of
another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her
own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also,
when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was
tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." 68 Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim
of violation of right to privacy is negated.

Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and
expression.

Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute.69 While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights
in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.70 As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or
half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. 71

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult
and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith
and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal
negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a
"Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio
had already filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which is
contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the
reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
X
by DNSUnlocker

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
chanrobleslaw
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he
is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a
manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used
words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning
complainant's and BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism 72 does not justify
respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety.73 In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason
the former must be administratively sanctioned.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want
of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct,
the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office
PROBLEM AREAS 58

and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them." 74 Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt
of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

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