G.R. No.
176278 June 25, 2010 The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue
ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON.
HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the
Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate
ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting
Congress’ role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on
Appointments’ confirmation of nominees. However, for lack of a case or controversy
grounded on petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness, we dismiss the
petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the
question raised, novel and fundamental it may be.
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original
action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s
nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent
Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of
1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination
in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his
argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner
theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or
non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates
against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the
petition. First, they question petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his
indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Second, the Office of the President
and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither
petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question
respondent Davide’s appointment because petitioner remains without personal and
substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power
of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents
question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition
for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question.
On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s
mandated retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit
non-career appointees such as respondent Davide.
and mootness.
First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to
bring this suit. We have granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of
ground: when they raise issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent
resolution. Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits
so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised – the character
of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or
statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest to bring the suit. None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of
these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a
statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its
seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a "clear disregard of
constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of
personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career
ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age
unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioner’s
generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.1avvphi1
The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status.
Taxpayers’ contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question
appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or
illegal. However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received
commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive
issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s
total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since
respondent Davide’s nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority
(appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw
salary, negating petitioner’s claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds."
Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains.
Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience." Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully
crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules
of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed
conduct.
Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed
for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
1
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an
alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has
reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the
present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente
D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen,
and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11
April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St.
Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was
allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit
to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998,
the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing
that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered
voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth
B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching
was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar
examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable
status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further
proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar
and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was
a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority
he elected Philippine citizenship" in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is
a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must
concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely:
(a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the
Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the
age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to
be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino
(ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97,
s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after
over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule
on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath
as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of
Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July
1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself
as one in my school records and other official documents;
2
 3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant)
reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was
eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to
by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question
raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In
the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took
the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution.
Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship
of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens
of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority" are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person
was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge
under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced
before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter
only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on
the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to
the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after
attaining the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age
of
majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3)
year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the
Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the
reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16,
1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-
eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not
been made "upon reaching the age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-
five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15
June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection,
that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
3
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching
erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in
the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally
married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare
was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as
1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship.
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining
therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its
applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and
procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling
in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not
necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already
a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court
stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary
to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-
4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that
he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which
he is rightfully entitled.
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal
and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the
Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of
the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when
he came of age constitutes a positive act of
Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot
be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr.
Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of
the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but
it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if
we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching
the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of
the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect
Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
4
should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this
case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result.
this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then
entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining,
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each
of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for
probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an
Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago.
The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's
initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission
to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his
criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993
Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. He
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's
oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take
the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that
Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order
dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than
ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions
for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and
which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer:
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition
precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice
law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to
make up such a character. It is something more than an absence
of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his
fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man
of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the
line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer.
He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In Re Application of Kaufman, citing Re Law Examination of 1926
(1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in
5
the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant
for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard
therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate
for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of
scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings
are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment
of his license.
In Re Keenan:
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every
citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It
is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but
not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the
unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and
a fair private and professional character is one of them; to refuse
admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so
that they may not only protect the rights and interests of their
clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet
what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such
agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so
that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not
bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of
the highest possible consequence that both those who have not
such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts
to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of
justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to
admit no person to the practice of the law unless
he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the
proper administration of justice than legal
learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after
years, but if the applicant passes the threshold
of the bar with a bad moral character the
chances are that his character will remain
bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead
of an ornament to his great calling — a curse
instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk,
a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a
Smith or a Ruffin.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be
properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay:
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a
proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in scope than
in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells:
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for
want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in
its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that
might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent
6
a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our
legal system as we know it.
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far
short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than
merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated
serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved,
reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the
Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C.
Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to
above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the
bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since
the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to
the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate
written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in
default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day
from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A.
DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A.
Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite
academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor
General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report
recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he
(Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the
following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A.
diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in
support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of
successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the
first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given
therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon
his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as
the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's
failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper
school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge
is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and
yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-
1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
7
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A.
from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six
months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have
been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant
for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis
on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations;
but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and
was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under
false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of
Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within
thirty days. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.
MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner
Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor
of Laws in 1979and passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general
weighted average of 82.7.cralaw virtualaw library
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International
Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do so on
his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll
of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.cralaw virtualaw library
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found
the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was
probably just an attendance record.cralaw virtualaw library
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he
was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively
involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that]
since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not
as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”; and “the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten.”cralaw virtualaw library
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.cralaw virtualaw library
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the
matter on 21 September 2012 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this
Court on 4 February 2013.The OBC recommended that the instant petition be
denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. It
explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner
could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.cralaw virtualaw library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant
petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent
to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty
that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the
Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he
finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was
not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it
was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of
more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to
file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka
kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same
time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And,
finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the
oath as necessary.
8
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from
the practice of law,which is more than what we can say of other individuals who
were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this
fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the
ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner,
having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation,
the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.cralaw virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, this Court will
not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental
fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for
his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning
more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this
behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”cralaw virtualaw library
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know
the law and its consequences. Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated
under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However,
the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record,
he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act
of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge,
he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete
all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be
an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may
constitute indirect contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both. Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt and must be
reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. In this case, while it
appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by
knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has
been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:chanrobles virtua1aw
1ibrary
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself
is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s
duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring
members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have
warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. As Medado is not yet
a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we
see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise
see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period,
petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has
signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is
hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law.
During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and
is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he
has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose
de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus
9
Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the
intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of
indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate
existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27
November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2
January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and,
in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation
provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos
sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra
muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro
sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no
estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su
lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la
muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el
varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor
Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el
varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la
administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI
pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la
Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de
esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to
Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second
on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became
the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court
litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as
they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons
of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna
Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui,
resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between
them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the
"convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a
letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13
September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the
complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same
office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by
the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and
therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the
deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives
preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein
named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o
a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus
Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas
(Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to
qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and
although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141),
was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks
before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase
"titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has
used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the
administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and
therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed
as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws
but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the
practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento
dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua
Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as
follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito
o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen
sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's
degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed
and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by
license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.
10
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the
authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate
from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession.
The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to
the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant
to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion
of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are
instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who
had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the
Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required
possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it
would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado"
because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or
university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer,
the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that
order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among
those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the
managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of
said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids
and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3,
d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in
conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of
considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct
asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the
defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is
a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the
deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the
ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident
sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was
disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960,
before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of
his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to
the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in
the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally
speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the
orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the
bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit
and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration
the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p.
443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon
following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been
held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the
court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission.
(7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether
applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is
used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be
entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his
mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his
duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a
separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney &
Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking
reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in
paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in
this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions
and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time
amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16,
Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within
one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago
as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against
Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931.
Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The
case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant
there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings
(Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as
indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby
Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and
plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
11
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial
maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1
February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention
of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with
another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the
administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office
before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of
acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who
thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of
4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to
the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S.
1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff,
not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4
March 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had
frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint
against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken
oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by
the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the
administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October
1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as
administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion
to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning
that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary
that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken.
The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case
filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-
parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted
the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted
a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was
decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the
appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion
of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of
the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated
against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he
has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July
1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action
in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the
aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as
member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as
administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on
the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided
the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for
further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant
administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure
to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the
appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the
parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in
such an action — all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present
claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one
year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the
plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of
the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact
that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in
September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of
the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that
the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to
discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo,
62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a
lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of
the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of
succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another
one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad
de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola
persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de
cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui,
Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera
preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la
administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma.
Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are
otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to
confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the
nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since
the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line,
the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the
deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention
are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
12
 [A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,
Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the
4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase
on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed
a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio.
Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on
the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed
with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract,
even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous
and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by
your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of
his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions
at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,
rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against
my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the
attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the
minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from
me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be
the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February
21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons
already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account thereof. He also wrote on January 18, 1996
to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in
relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage,
and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26." In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.
13
 She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger,
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with
the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions,
lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or
be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably
with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding
Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" in which he questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link"
between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk
of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a
Royal Family **."
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive,
even obsequious tones, Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might comment thereon. He stated that his acts as clerk
of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia
Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from
his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. He declared that
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26,"
were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); and as far as he knew,
his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage,
and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had
occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is
often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured." He claims he was manipulated into reposing
his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. He was induced to sign a blank contract on
Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups"
he still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with
Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not
do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract
with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those
regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house,
salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious,
malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court
with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written
inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him
by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa &
Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority
and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely
acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that
14
"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and **
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest." More than once has this Court
emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an
agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most
junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs
or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has
a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right
with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a
manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra;
or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify
resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the
Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person
and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his
strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-
law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is
of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his
use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,
the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the
use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
IN RE CUNANAN CASE DIGEST
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates
of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and
concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a
candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o
falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing
grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and
passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against,
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than
those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no.
12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21,
1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies
1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law
profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and
the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the
law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power
and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not
the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the
court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to
Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C.
may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
15
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules
on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the
profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire
law is void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and
w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of
the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the
candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates
who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade
of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have
filed petitions for admissions or not.)
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar
flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing,
thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that
for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken
down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this
was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in
excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum
norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can
practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying
admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice
of law.
16
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board
of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the
IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted
the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following
June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes
of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23,
1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint
reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments.
The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show
that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in
essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule
of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) — in accordance with
which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court
the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in
par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of
the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule,
which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in
these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official
national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or
may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the
Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force
and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name
from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body."
17
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case
before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition
for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners."
The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in
the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that
the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar
is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics
or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than
constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon
the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not
a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of
the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an
officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the
holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to
the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York,
291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme
Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act,
the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated
on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181
dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare
and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of
the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus
populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental
principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70
Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from
all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of
Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power
to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively.
18
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act
(Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the
Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of
law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were
(and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good,
even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to
compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence,
Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional
right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State.
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution
that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent
acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are,
to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration.
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes
on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in
the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a
profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that
the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are
legion.
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board
of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment
ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power
to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a
court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the
argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or
accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts
are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to
uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public
from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that
the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...
(Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain
a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
19
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is
hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[SBC-585. February 29, 1984.]
EMILIA E. ANDRES, Complainant, v. STANLEY R. CABRERA, Respondent.
[SBC-571. February 29, 1984.]
LOURDES C. PEREA, Complainant, v. STANLEY R. CABRERA, Respondent.
not on the vindictive principle and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea
of punishment. (Weigal v. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340; Villavicencio v. Lucban, 39 Phil.
778; People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 480; Victorino v. Espiritu, 5 SCRA 653;
Reliance Procoma, Inc. v. Phil-Asia Tobacco Corp., 57 SCRA 370, Fontelera v.
Amores, 70 SCRA 37). Furthermore, contempt power should not be utilized for mere
satisfaction of natural inclination to strike back at a party who has shown lesser
respect to the dignity of the court. (Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1).
4. ID.; PURPOSE THEREFOR; ACCOMPLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The dignity
and authority of the Court has been maintained and preserved when the Court
punished respondent for his contumacious conduct and he willingly and promptly
paid the penalty therefor. The preservative and corrective purpose of the contempt
power of this Court has already been accomplished and achieved that to continue
denying his plea for forgiveness and mercy in his behalf and his family is not only to
prolong the agony of his misconduct which he has suffered for seven long years
since 1977 when he passed the Bar examinations but also would appear to be
despotic and arbitrary. We hold that respondent has expiated enough for his
misdeed and may now be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath and thus become a
more useful member of society and of the law profession.
RESOLUTION

GUERRERO, J.:
SYLLABUS

In Our Resolution promulgated December 14, 1979 in the first above-entitled case,
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO ADMIT, SUSPEND, DISBAR
respondent Stanley R. Cabrera, a successful Bar examinee in 1977 against whom
AND REINSTATE LAWYERS; NATURE. — The authority and responsibility over the
petition had been filed for denial of his admission as member of the Bar for lack of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law is vested
good moral character and for his proclivity to filing baseless, malicious, and
in the Supreme Court by the Constitution. (Art. X, Sec. 5(5). This power is
unfounded cases, was found guilty of contempt of this Court for" (b)y his improper
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. It is judicial in the sense that
conduct in the use of highly disrespectful, insolent language, respondent has tended
discretion is used in its exercise. The function requires (1) previously established
to degrade the administration of justice; he has disparaged the dignity and brought
rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court" and was sentenced to pay
determinate individuals, and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by
within ten days from notice a fine of P600.00 or imprisonment of 50 days. (See 94
the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. (In re:
SCRA 512.)chanrobles law library
Cunanan, Et Al., 94 Phil. 534).
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 9, 1980 which We
2. ID.; ID.; POWER TO ADMIT ATTORNEYS TO THE BAR; REQUIRES EXERCISE OF
denied on March 6, 1980 and further required respondent to pay within five (5) days
SOUND JUDICIAL DISCRETION. — This power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not,
from notice the aforesaid fine of P500.00.
however, an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the
Court, or from passion, prejudice or personal hostility, but it is the duty of the court
The fine was thereafter paid on March 14, 1980 under SC Official Receipt No.
to exercise and regulate it by a sound and judicial discretion.
5369050X. On July 16, 1980, respondent submitted an Urgent Motion for Admission
to the Bar "in view of the foregoing (payment) and for mercy" which We denied on
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT, INHERENT IN
August 12, 1980 since the investigation against the said respondent was still
ALL COURTS. — The power to punish persons for contempt is inherent in all courts
pending before the Legal Investigator of the Court, Atty. Victor J. Sevilla.
and essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of their lawful orders and decisions (Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA
Another Urgent Motion for Early Resolution dated August 29, 1980 was again filed
1). A lawyer who uses intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening language
with the Court by respondent, calling attention to the fact that the case has been
betrays disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and invites the exercise by the
pending since April, 1977. We noted said motion on September 16, 1980.
court of its disciplinary power. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, L-
27072, Jan. 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo v. Gica,
Meanwhile, respondent manifested to the Court in still another Urgent Motion for
6Q SCRA 234). Such power, however, should be exercised on the preservative and
Admission to the Bar dated September 25, 1981 that "respondent has amended his
20
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language as can
be gleaned from (his) urgent motion for admission to the Bar dated July 16, 1980
and (his) urgent motion for early resolution dated August 29, 1980 filed with this
Honorable Court; and that undersigned respondent reiterates his sincere apologies
to this Honorable Court and its Legal Investigator for all his actuations since this
case was filed in 1977; . . . that undersigned respondent was acquitted by Judge
Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila for estafa wherein Lourdes C. Perea was
the complaining witness as hereto authenticated by Annexes A, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4,
A-5, A-6 and made an integral part of this motion. Respondent prayed that "for
humanitarian considerations, considering that undersigned respondent has seven
children, a wife and a widowed mother to support," he be allowed to take his oath of
office as a lawyer and be admitted to the Bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent then wrote a letter dated August 25, 1982 to the Chief Justice,
reiterating his sincere apologies to the Court for all his actions which culminated in
his conviction for contempt and prayed for help to enable him "to uplift the living
conditions of (his) seven children considering that up to this date (he is) a squatter
beside the railroad tracks living in abject poverty." The aforementioned letter was
noted by this Court on September 16, 1982.
In the meantime, the second case, "SBC-571 (Lourdes C. Perea v. Stanley R.
Cabrera)" was ordered archived in view of the resolutions in the first case "SBC-586
(Emilia E. Andres v. Stanley R. Cabrera)" denying, among others, respondent’s
admission to the Bar, as per Our Resolution dated September 13, 1979 in SBC-571.
On February 21, 1983, respondent wrote a second letter to the Chief Justice, once
more reiterating his sincere apologies to the Court and begged for mercy "to the
end that he be allowed to take his oath of office as a lawyer and enable him to give
his children a bright future." In Our Resolution of June 14, 1983, We resolved to
deny the aforesaid letter/petition.
On July 5, 1983, there was received in this Court a letter from one Nerida V.
Cabrera with address at 732 Int. 4, Bagumbayan, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, M.M., wife of
the respondent herein, addressed to the Chief Justice, appealing for kindness and
humanitarian consideration to allow her husband to take his oath as a lawyer so
that he can provide food and shelter for their eight children because he is
unemployed. She also apologized for her husband for his disrespectful language to
the Court and prayed that she be allowed to apologize personally to the Chief
Justice and to the Supreme Court for her husband.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We noted the said letter of Nerida V. Cabrera and required said respondent to
appear personally before this Court on Tuesday, August 23, 1983 at 11:00 o’clock
a.m. The records further disclose that a handwritten letter by Nerida Cabrera dated
August 1, 1983 attaching a picture of the family of respondent and their eight
children and a similar handwritten letter by Presentacion Vda. de Cabrera, mother of
the respondent, were sent to the Chief Justice. Notices of the hearing set for August
23, 1983 were given to the parties.
At the said hearing, Atty. Rhodora Javier appeared and argued for the complainant
Emilia E. Andres in SBC-585 (Emilia E. Andres v. Stanley R. Cabrera). Stanley
Cabrera appeared in his own behalf and answered the questions asked by the Court.
Atty. Victor Sevilla, Legal Investigator of this Court, who investigated SBC-585, also
answered the questions asked by the Court. The Court then resolved to require
respondent Cabrera to submit within five (5) days from date (1) letters of apology
to the Court, to Atty. Victor Sevilla, to complainant Emilia E. Andres, and to Fiscal
Leonardo Arguelles for the contumacious and vile language contained in his
pleadings, and (2) certifications of good behavior and exemplary conduct from the
Parish Priest and from the Barangay Captain of the place where he resides.
Thereafter, the petition to take the lawyer’s oath shall be considered submitted for
resolution.
On August 25, 1983, respondent forwarded to the Chief Justice his letter of apology
and through him to all the Associate Justices of the Court "for all (his) disrespectful
acts and utterances thru (his) pleadings against the Honorable Supreme Court" and
promised never to commit the same. He enclosed therewith the Letter of Apology to
Atty. Victor Sevilla, Legal Investigator of the Court, Letter of Apology to Atty. Emilia
E. Andres, Legal Division, MOLE, complainant in SBC-585, Letter of Apology to Fiscal
Leonardo Arguelles, Manila City Hall, Certification of Good Moral Character from
Rev. Fr. Eduardo A. Cruz, Parish Priest, Our Lady of Fatima Parish, Fatima Village,
Bacood, Lubiran St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, and Certification of Good Moral Character
from Barangay Captain Emiliano C. Masilungan of Barangay 604, Zone 60, Sta.
Mesa, Manila.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law is vested in the Supreme Court by the
Constitution. (Art. X, Sec. 5(5). This power is indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. It is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its exercise. The
function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals, and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree. (In re: Cunanan, Et Al., 94 Phil. 534).
This power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not, however, an arbitrary and despotic
one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from passion, prejudice or
personal hostility, but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a
sound and judicial discretion. (In re: Crum, 204 Pac. 948, 103 Ore. 297; 1 Thornton
on Attorneys-at-Law, Sec. 2, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
6, pp. 204, 205).
On the other hand, the power to punish persons for contempt is inherent in all
courts and essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of their lawful orders and decisions (Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA
1). A lawyer who uses intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening language
betrays disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and invites the exercise by the
court of its disciplinary power. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, L-
27072, Jan. 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo v. Gica,
6Q SCRA 234). Such power, however, should be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea
of punishment. (Weigal v. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340; Villavicencio v. Lucban, 39 Phil.
778; People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 480; Victorino v. Espiritu, 5 SCRA 653;
Reliance Procoma, Inc. v. Phil-Asia Tobacco Corp., 57 SCRA 370, Fontelera v.
Amores, 70 SCRA 37). Furthermore, contempt power should not be utilized for mere
satisfaction of natural inclination to strike back at a party who has shown lesser
respect to the dignity of the court. (Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA
1).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In the case at bar, respondent having paid the fine imposed upon him for direct
contempt against the integrity and dignity of this Court, having apologized in
21
repeated motions filed before this Court for his disrespectful language and
personally reiterated at the hearing conducted herein, and has furthermore
complied with the Court’s directives contained in Our Resolution dated August 23,
1983 by submitting his letters of apology to the Chief Justice and to the members of
this Court, to Atty. Victor Sevilla, Legal Investigator of the Court, to complainant
Atty. Emilia E. Andres, to Fiscal Leonardo Arguelles, and Certifications of Good Moral
Character from his parish priest, Rev. Fr. Eduardo A. Cruz, and his Barangay
Captain, Emiliano C. Masilungan of Barangay 604, Zone 60, Sta. Mesa, Manila where
respondent resides, We are convinced by these actions that he has become
respectful, sincere and honest, thereby evincing that good moral character required
of a person who may be admitted to the practice of law.
The pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of respondent’s family
with eight young children, altho self-serving, are strong human factors in
considering, judiciously and wisely the motion of respondent which in effect would
allow him to start on a professional career as a lawyer that would certainly mean a
bright future for himself and his family, for otherwise the discretion with which the
Court may admit qualified persons to the practice of law may be clouded with
vindictiveness and retaliation which is not the basic purpose of the Court’s inherent
power to punish for contempt.
The dignity and authority of the Court has been maintained and preserved when the
Court punished respondent for his contumacious conduct and he willingly and
promptly paid the penalty therefor. The preservative and corrective purpose of the
contempt power of this Court has already been accomplished and achieved that to
continue denying his plea for forgiveness and mercy in his behalf and his family is
not only to prolong the agony of his misconduct which he has suffered for seven
long years since 1977 when he passed the Bar examinations but also would appear
to be despotic and arbitrary. We hold that respondent has expiated enough for his
misdeed and may now be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath and thus become a
more useful member of society and of the law profession.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
In SBC-571, since the charge against respondent for estafa which is the basis of the
petition for disqualification filed by complainant Lourdes C. Perea, has been
dismissed and respondent acquitted in Criminal Case No. 015429-CV by the City
Court of Manila, Branch VII, the same is hereby dismissed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING respondent Stanley R. Cabrera is
hereby allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979
SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent
Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978
and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the
basis of respondent's motions for postponement. These motions were predicated on
respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing before
Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip
(Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused
in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas
Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before
said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right
to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio
Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in
"Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name
and maternal surname.
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of
Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record
containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A
lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no
falsehood". As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable
obligations of "truthfulness, candor and frankness". Indeed, candor and frankness
should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so
because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D.
Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot
be overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire
devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when
he resorts to deception or permits his client to do so."
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by
which he was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect
resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts.
The circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from
imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator
of this Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon
22
as possible. The request of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing,
assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R.
CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF
THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES."
RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE
MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who
had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions
were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under
a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of
the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph
that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of
the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part
thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the
deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership.
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the
legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to
the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession
requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that
implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name,
strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of
a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics
of a "trade name."
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of
the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use. ...
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their
respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international
law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a
professional firm's name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least
in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
Identifies the individual members of the firm.
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted
practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court
in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including
in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved
with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation
the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-
11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law
firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting
thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be
informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is
already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and
Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by
petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile"
be held proper.
23
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso
Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of
the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart
from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys
Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston,
deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and
confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client,
and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS"
from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by
the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership
names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the
Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name,
which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their
names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a
partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership
must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be
living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil
Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain
of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm
cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased
lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such
division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or
responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the
heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law
firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an
old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old
firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX
of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with
the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual
property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership
which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the
deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over
situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members.
Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial
partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers. têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to
carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a
stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial
partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will
of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or;
the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a
firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such
skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision
in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ...
(ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by
other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy
specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy. têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a
mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is
not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property." Thus, it has been stated that
"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law
practice is improper.
24
 The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business
is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey
of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern
Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, —
no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from
business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods
of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients.
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature
of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust."
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when
such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of
petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names
have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more
of the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by
local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify
the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the
Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner
and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who
was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name
of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search
of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name
appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of
a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so
because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733)
which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York
Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none
of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was
sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy
and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of
custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative policy.
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the
American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association
provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is
not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to
local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased
members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations
and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such
practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
25
 Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names
Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot
SO ORDERED.
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. We find such proof of the existence of a
local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein.
Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with
the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system. When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its
Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom
or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our
civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any
partner. Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of

justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making
trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit

of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a
profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as
in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive
self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer
may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling
in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may
within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession
does not regard himself as in competition with his professional
brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer
sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or
physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is
often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it
is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession
even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public
service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised
is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to
law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization
and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they
secure and maintain that spirit.
26