Rule 2 COMMENTS oN THE RULES oF couRT Sec.

3
on misconduct allegedly committed by the Mayor during his
prior term. Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed by ~e
respondent Provincial Board, the Court of First Instance dis-
missed the action upon the ground that it is premature, th e
l\layor having the administrative remedy of appeal to the
Executive Secretary. The Supreme Court reversed the order
upon the ground that while the general rule above stated
is true it is not without exceptions as in a case where the
only question to be settled in the action for prohibition is a
purely legal one - whether or not a municipal Mayor may
be subjected to an administrative investigation of a charge
based on misconduct allegedly committed by him during his
prior term.

SEC. 3. One siiit for a single cause of action. -

A party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action.
Taken substantially from section 3 of former Rule 2.

SEC. 4. Effect of splitting a single cause of

action.-If two or more con1plaints are brought for
different parts of a single cause of action, the filing
of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other
or others, in accordance with Section 1 ( e) of Rule
16, and a judgment upon the merits in any one 1s
available as a bar in the others.
Taken substantially from section 4 of former Rule 2.

1. Rule explained. Its object.

Section 3 provie-es that a party may not institute more than
one suit for a single cause of action, meaning thereby that a
single cause of action cannot be the subject of two or more
suits, at the same time, or successively. In other words a
single cause of action can not be split up into two or m~re

94
 Rule 2 ACTIONS IN GENERAL Sec. 4
parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints,3:i
as was the wording of Rule 2 section 3 of the former Rules.
An~ when this prohibition isviolated, and separate com-
pla~nts are ?~ought for different parts of a single cause of
action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of
the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is avail-
able as a bar in the other, according to section 4.
As elsewhere stated, 40 cause of action is the delict or wrong
by which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the de-
f endant. Where there is only one delict or wrong, ,t here is
but a single cause of action regardless of the number of
rights that may have been violated belonging to one person.
And the rule is that all such rights should be alleged in a
single complaint, otherwise those that are not therein includ-
ed cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints, for
they are barred forever. For instance, when one's property
is taken through violence by another, a single delict or wrong
is committed consisting of the illegal taking of the property,
and accordingly there is but a single cause of action. This
cause of action, however, entitles the plaintiff to two claims :
one for recovery of property, and another for damages for
its detention by the defendant. Under the above stated rule,
plaintiff may file only one complaint embracing the two
claims. He may not file two complaints, one for the posses-
sion and another for damages, for if he does so, he would
be splitting up a single cause of action into two parts, and
the filing of the first complaint would bar the second.41
A$1ain where a common property is held by some of the co-
o '
owners who refuse to make a partition as demanded by the
others there exists a single cause of action consisting of such
refusai and a single co·mplaint may be filed for partition of
the property and its improvements. If, in the complaint,

seems t:
39 Th· the language of section 3 of former R~le 2 which
bea~Iearer than the language of present section 3 of Re-
vised Rule 2.
,o Supra, p. 9M2. . 36 Ph1·1 350 359· Camara v. Aguilar, 50 0 .G.
41 Santos v. 01r, · • '
154S.
95
Rule 2 COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT Sec. 4
artition of the property alone is sought, no subsequent com-
pplaint may be filed for partit~on
·· ~
f th e improve·
. m ents.•2
In an action by plaintiff for his reinstatement as general
superintendent, he claimed nQ damages; he cannot file a
subsequent action to claim such damages. 43 The purpose
of the rule against splitting up a single cause of action is to
prevent repeated litigations between the same parties in re-
gard to the same subject of the controversy and to protect the
defendant from unnecessary vexation."

2. Cause of action, when single.

For a proper understanding and application of the rule, it
is important to determine when a cause of action may be
said to be single. The singleness of a cause of action lies
in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights
of one person. A single delict or wrong may consist of a
single act or of a series of acts or of a single transaction or
series of transactions. It may be either a breach of contract
or a tort.
(a) Action ex-contractu; single or several breaches of a
single contract.

Only one cause of action, as a general rule, arises from a

single breach or several breaches of a single and indivisible
contract, and all the damages claimed by reason thereof
must be secured in a single action. 4 6 Accordingly it was held
that non-payment of a loan secured by mortgage constitutes
~ single cause of action, and the creditor cannot split it up
into itwo separate complaints, one for payment of the de-bt
a_n~ another for foreclosure of mortgage. If he does so, the
fi!mg of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint.

~! Lavarr?, et al. v . Labitoria, et al., 54 Phil. 788, 791, 792.

Valencia v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., G.R. No. L-13715.
44
45
Bachrach Motor C?. v . Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287, 293.
T U_rquhart v. American Dyehood Co., 78 F. (2d) 866; Felt City
T~wnSite Co .. v. )felt I~v: Co., 167 P. 835 50 Utah 36· Brummett,
ire Co. v . Smcla1r Refmmg Co. (Tenn. App.) 75 s.w.(2d) 1022.

96
Rule 2 ACTIONS IN GENERAL Se~. 4
In other words, the complaint filed for payment of the debt
only shall be considered as a waiver of the right to foreclose
the mortgage.46 As an example of several breaches of a
single contract, it was held that under a contract to purchase
town lots, the failure to survey, plat, and record lots, and the
failure to furnish abstracts deeds and bonds, are merely
different breaches of a single' contract
' constituting but one
cause of action. Another example : In a contract of lease
47

it is stipulated that the tenant will repair the house and pay
a monthly rent of Pl ,000.00. In five months after the con-
tract, the tenant failed to pay five monthly rentals and to
repair the roof of the house which allowed the waters to flood
the whole interior of the house. The lessor cannot bring two
separate suits against the tenant, one for collection or rents
and another for damages on account of the tenant's failure
to repair. There is a single contract and the two breaches
thereof constitute a single cause of action which cannot be
split up into two parts to be the subject of two complaints.
( b) Contract creating obligations to be performed at dif-
ferent times. Several breaches thereof.
Upon the other hand, a contract providing for several
obligations to be performed at different times, gives rise to a
single and independent cause of action for each obligation
that is not performed at the proper time; but if upon the
filing of the complaint several obligations have already ma-
tured , all of them shall be considered as integrating a single
cause of action and must all be included in the complaint,
otherwise those ,t hat are not thus included are barred for-
ever. For example, as held by our Supreme Court, "When
a lease provides for the payment of rent in separate install-
ments, each installment is an independent cause of action,
though it has been held, and is good law, that in an action
upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the installments.
due at the time the action is brought must be included in the

46 Bachrach Motor Co. v. Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287, 293.

47 Felt City Townsite Co. v. Felt Inv. Co., supra.

97
Rule 2 CoMMENTS oN THE RULES oF CounT Sec. 4
laint and that failure to do so will constitute a bar to a
~~~~quent action for the payment of that rent. 48
The theory of the rule is that although an action may be
brought on each breach as it _occ~rs or installment as it
comes due, yet if in fact no action 1s commenced until sev-
eral breaches have occurred or installments come due, then
at each successive breach of the contract the cause of action
on such contract is enlarged and no new cause of action is
created, the existing breaches or past due installments con-
stituting, in the aggregate, only one comprehensive breach
of the general contract and all the various causes of action
founded on the several breaches or installments meeting or
consolidating into one cause of action. 49
( c) Contract containing obligations to be performed at
different times. Total breach thereof.
A -total breach of a contract may occur even where it con-
tains several obligations some of which have already matured
and the others have not yet matured. In such event, a single
cause of action arises to recover damages for the total breach
of such contract. To illustrate: Plaintiff and defendant
entered into a contract in September, 1918, by which the
latter engaged to deliver to the former from month to month
during -the period of ten years a specified amount of water
gas tar and coal gas tar. Up to July, 1920, defendant failed
to deliver to the plaintiff the stipulated amount of water gas
tar and coal gas tar and "flatly refused to make any deliver-
ies under said contract." In November 1923 plaintiff filed
'
an action for damages arising from defendant's ' failure to
make delivery up to that date, and judgment was r endered
in his favor. Later, another action was filed by plaintiff for
damages arising from defendant's failure to make deliveries
after November, 1923. Our Supreme Court held that this
subsequent action is barred by the former. Defendant's flat

48
Rubio d e Larena v . Villanueva, 53 Phil. 923, 925-926.
4
~ Burritt v. Belfy, 47 Conn. 323, 36 Am. R . 79 ; Whitake r v. Haw-
ley, 1 P . 508, 30 Kan. 317; Eastland County v. Davisson, (Tex. corn.
App.) 13 ~ .W . (2d) 673, affirmin g j udg m e n t D avisson v . E a stla nd
County (C1v. App.) 6 S.W. (2d) 782.

98
Rule 2 ACTIONS IN GENERAL Sec. 4
refusal in 1920 to make any deliveries under the contract,
was a breach of the whole contract constituting a single
cause of action entitling the plaintiff to recover all his dam-
ages arising from such total breach. Accordingly, he cannot
split up that single cause of action by filing one complaint
for damages sustained up to 1923 and another for damages
caused in a subsequent period. The filing of the first bars
to second.60
( d) Action ex-delicto. Damages to one or several persons.
A single tort gives rise but to one cause of action no mat-
ter how many items of damages may have been caused to one
person.61 Thus, a person driving his car sustained damages
on his body and on his car when he was hit by another car
driven negligently by its owner. There being in this case a
single tort causing damages to one person there is according-
ly a single cause of action, and the two claims one for per-
sonal injury and another for damages to property, must be
made in a single complaint. If a complaint is filed for per-
sonal injury and later another complaint is brought for dam-
ages to the car, the second complaint is barred by the filing
of the first. 52
But when by a single delict or wrong several rights are
violated belonging to different persons, several causes of
action will arise on behalf of such different persons. For
instance, if as a result of a collision a car sustained damages
and at the same time a passenger therein not the owner of
the car, sustained injury, although there is here a single de-
lict, since there are two rights violated pertaining to different
persons, two causes of action arise, one for each person
whose right is thus violated.63 Accordingly, the passenger
may bring an action separately from the owner of the car,
although the rule of permissive joinder of parties applies
here under section 6, Rule 3.

60 Blossom & Co. v . Manila Gas Corp., 55 Phil. 226, 237, 244._
s1 Sutherland Code Pleading, Practice and Forms, p. 143; Silent
Automatic Sales Corp. v . Stayton, 45 F . (2d) 476.
s2 Silent Automatic Sales Corp. v . Stayton, supra.
63 1 C.J .S., p . 1332.

99
 Rule 2 COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT Sec. 4
( e) Action ex-delicto. Single or separate tortious acts.
\Vhen there are separate tortious acts. resulting in d~fer-
ent injuries, separate causes of action ans~, and accor~1~gly
several actions may be maintained;°" but if only one InJury
resulted from the several wrongful acts, only one cause of
action arises. 65
(f) Series of acts or transactions.
There is no difficulty in determining the singleness of a
cause of action when the delict or wrong rests on a single
act or on an isolated transaction. But when the delict or
wrong consists of several acts or of a series of events or
transactions, there may be a mistake in multiplying the
causes of action. In such cases, the rule is that when the
several acts or series of events constitute in legal contempla-
tion only one wrong there is a single cause of action. The
following ruling is helpful: "A cause of action does not
consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which
the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged
do not establish more than one cause of action so long as
their result, whether they be considered severally or in com-
bination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal
wrong. The mere multiplication of grounds of negligence
alleged as causing the same injury does not result in mul-
tiplying the causes of action. The facts are merely the means,
and not the end. They do not constitute the cause of action,
but the_Y show its existence by making the wrong appear.
The thing, the refore, which in contemplation of law as its
cause, b~comes a ground for action, is not the group of facts
alleged in_the declaration, bill, or indictment, but the result
of these 1n a legal wrong the existence of which if true
they conclusively evince."66 ' '

437.
M Reid u . Ferries 71 M
'
w·
·
484 11
•
. . .
2 Mich, c1tmg 693, 67 Am. S.R.
1>!'> Baltimore S S Co Ph·1 ·
1 hps,
L. ed. 1069. . . . v. 47 S. Ct., 600, 274 U .S. 316, 71
:.i. Baltimore S S Co Ph"l ·
1 hps, 4 7 S. Ct., 600, 276 U .S. 316, 71
L. ed. 1069. . . . v.

100

-
Rule 2 ACTIONS IN GENERAL Sec. 4
3. Civil action arising from crime or from culpa aquiliana.
A single· criminal negligence causing damages may create
on the part of the wrongdoer a civil liability either under
Art. 100 of the Penal Code or under Arts. 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code dealing on culpa aquiliana. For instance a driver
of a bus belonging to a Transportation Company ;as found
guilty of homicide thru reckless imprudence for having killed
a person while driving the car, and being insolvent to pay
the civil indemnity, a civil action may be brought for dam-
ages against the Company, either under Art. 100 of the Penal
Code creating civil liability arising from crime, or under
Arts. 1902-1910 of the Civil Code providing for civil indem-
nity arising from culpa extra-contractual. And the question
is whether .the aggrieved party has one or two causes of action
and whether he may bring an action under the Penal
Code and later another action under the Civil Code. Our
Supreme Court held in one case5i that the offended party has
"different causes of action" and in the course of its decision
it was made to understand that two civil actions may be
brought successively, one under the Penal Code and another
under the Civil Code. And as a matter of fact the Supreme
Court decided one of these actions in favor of the offended
party after the latter had failed finally in the other action
in the Court of Appeals. This ruling which is doubtful calls
for some clarification.
The better view would seem to be that there is only one
cause of action, and not two causes of action, there being
only one wrong ( reckless driving), one injury ( killing of
the victim) , and one person injured ( the dead victim ) . The
single wrong, as a source of civil liability, may be considered
either as a crime under the Penal Code or as a civil wrong
under the Civil Code, but this does not imply that there are
two wrongs, two injuries and two civil liabilities and that the
offended person may recover twice by filing two separate
complaints. In truth, there is only one civil liability because

67 Diana, et al. v. Batangas Transportation Co., 49 O.G. 2238.

101
Rule 2 COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT Sec. 4
there is only one wrong and one injury and the offended
person may recover only once because there is only one cause
of action. It must be recalled that a cause of action is the
delict or wrong by which the defendant has violated the
rights of the plaintiff. It has, therefore, two elements: (a )
delict or wrong ; and ( b) injury or damages caused thereby.
Thus, delict or wrong alone is not sufficient to constitute a
cause of action if no injury or damages are caused to anyone.
The reckless driving alone does not constitute a cause of ac-
tion if no one has suffered any injury or damages, To de-
termine, therefore, whether there is a single or plural causes
of actions, not only the existence and number of tortious acts,
but the existence and number of injuries caused and of per-
sons injured, must be considered. Here, independently of
the number of tortious acts performed, it is beyond dispute
that there is only one injury caused, and only one person
injured. Hence, there is clearly only one cause of action. 58
Although the plaintiff has only one cause of action, but he
is accorded with two alternative remedies, one under the
Penal Code and another under the Civil Code, he is free to
choose which remedy to enforce. He may enforce these two
remedies alternatively in a single complaint, under Rule 8,
sec. 2, but cannot enforce one remedy in one complaint and
the other remedy in a separate complaint, for he is not en-
titled to recover twice for the same injury; neither can he,
after failing in one remedy, resort to the other remedy, for
this would be splitting up a single cause of action into sever-
al complaints, which is offensive to sections 3 and 4 under
consideration. This is similar to the violation of a mortgage
contract. The creditor has only one cause of action, but he
is accorded two remedies, one to compel payment of a simple
debt, and another to foreclose the mortgage. If he files a
complaint for payment of the debt, he cannot later file ano-
ther complaint for foreclosure of mortgage .ss

ss See the prece ding paragraph No. 2 ( e) .

ss B achrach Motor Co. v . lcarangal, 68 P hil. 287.
102
 Rule 2 ACTIONS IN GENERAL Sec. 4
This case is analogous to a certain extent to a case decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In that c~se,Go a
minor thru his guardian ad litem sued Baltimore Steamship
Company for damages in that while employed on board a
vessel operated by defendant he was injured by the fall of
a strongback used to support a portion of the hatch, and. as
a result he suffered an amputation of the leg. The negligence
alleged was the use of defective appliances. Defend ant was
acquitted, but made to pay plaintiff only $500.00 for main-
tenance and cure.
Subsequently, another action is filed by the same plaintiff
against the same defendant for the same injury charging
this time negligence in the operation of the appliances by
the officers and co-employees of the defendant. Defendant
pleaded res judicata based on the judgment rendered in the
first case. The District Court held the plea wrong which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the latter holding that the
second action was based on a different cause of action.
The two acts of negligence, i.e., use of defective appliances
and negligent operation of the appliances by officers and
employees, are both provided by law as grounds for recovery.
The Supreme Court of the United States in reversing the
decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the District Court
said :
"Here the court below concluded that the cause of action
set up in the second case was not the same as that alJeged
in the first, because the grounds of negligence pleaded were
distinct and different in character, the ground alleged in the
first case being the use of defective appliances and, in the
second, the negligent operation of the appliances by the of-
ficers and co-employees. Upon principle, it is perfectly plain
that the respondent suffered but one actionable wrong and
was entitled to but one recovery, whether his injury was due
to one or the other of several distinct acts of alleged negli-
gence or to a combination of some or all of them. In either

Go Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Vernon Phillips, 71 L. ed., 1069, supra.

103
Rule 2 COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT Sec. 4
view there would be but a single wrongful invasion of a single
p~ary right of the plaintiff, namely, the right of bodily
safety, whether the acts constituting such invasion were one
or many, simple or complex.
"A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the
unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The num-
ber and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more
than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they
be considered severally or in combination, is the violation
of but one right by a single legal wrong. The mere multi-
plication of grounds of negligence alleged as causing the same
injury does not result in multiplying the causes of action.
The facts are merely the means, and not the end. They
do not constitute the cause of action, but they show its exist-
ence by making the wrong appear. The thing, the ref ore,
which in contemplation of law is its cause, becomes a ground
for action, is not the group of facts alleged in the declara-
tion, bill, or indictment, but the result of these in a legal
w r ong, the existence of which, if true, they conclusively
e vince."
The injured respondent was bound to set forth in his first
action for damages every ground of negligence which he
claim~d to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be
permitted, as was attempted here, to rely upon them by
piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same
wrong and injury.61

'1 . Civil action for damages unclainted in a previous one.

In an action for recovery of property, damages sustained

up to the date of the complaint were claimed but not proved
at the trial. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff with
r~erence to the property but his cla~m for damages was dis-
missed.. The question is whether or not he may file another
complaint for damages accruing after the institution of the
first suit. He may, according to our Supreme Court in one

1
0 Baltimore Steamship Co. v . Vernon Phillips, 71 L . ed., 1069. supra .

104
 'I

Rule 2 ACTIONS IN GENERAL

Sec. 4
case.62 But . thisd .ruling does not seem to be correct . The
damages c1a~e ~n the first complaint may not be the same
damages claimed 1n the second, but they certainly spring out
of the same cause of action, namely, the detention of the prop-
erty_ by the defend~nt, and that detention cannot be split
up into seve_ral periods of time to be the subject of sepa-
rate complamts for damages. If this is done, the result
would be a mul_ti?licity of suits which is abhorred by the
above two prov1s1ons of the new Rules. In a complaint,
d~ages accruing after its filing, may be claimed, upon the
basis of the damages already sustained, and where this can-
not be done because the subsequent damages belong to an
unforeseeable type, they may be alleged in supplemental
pleadings, except, of course, damages sustained after final
judgment is entered, which cannot be the subject of supple-
mental pleadings, but of a new and separate action. 63
Furthermore, this ruling does not seem to square with the
ruling laid down in another case wherein the facts are as fol-
lows : Mrs. Strong brought an action against Repide to re-
cover shares of stock which, through fraudulent representa-
tions made by him, appeared to have been sold by her. Judg-
ment was rendered in favor of plaintiff which was satisfied
by defendant. It turned out later that during the pendency of
this suit and while the shares were in the hands of the de-
fendant, dividends were declared and paid to him. May plain-
tiff bring a new action to recover those dividends? Our Su-
preme Court ruled that if a plea of multiplicity of actions is
properly made by the defendant, the new action must be dis-
missed as regards the dividends payable during the period
of time lying between the date of the first complaint and the
date when final judgment was entered, the reason being that
such dividends are a part of the cause of action alleged in the
first complaint and should have been included therein, where-
as the dividends accruing after final judgment was entered
are not barred, there being no possibility of including them
in the first action.64
s2 Solano v . Salvillo, 29 Phil. 66. . .
63 Santos v. Moir, 36 Phil. 350; Pascua v. S1deco, 24 Phil. 26.
6-i. Strong v . Repide, 22 Phil. 19.

105
Rule 2 CoMMENTS oN THE RULES OF CoURT Sec. 5

SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - Subject

to rules regarding jurisdiction, ven:1e and join~er of
parties, a party may in one pleading state, 1n !he
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action
as he may have against an oppnsing party (a) if the
said causes of action arise out of the same contract,
transaction or relation between the parties, or (b)
if the causes of action are for den1ands for money, or
are of the same nature and character.
In the cases falling under clause (a) of the pre-
ceding paragraph, the action shall be filed in the in-
ferior court unless any of the causes joined falls
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance,
in which case it shall be filed in the latter court.
In the cases falling under clause (b) the jurisdic-
tion shall be determined by the aggregate an1ount of
the demands, if for n1oney, or by their nature and
character, if otherwise.
The first paragraph was substantially taken from Section
5, of former Rule 2, but with important amendments.
The second and third paragraphs are restatement of rul-
ings of the Supreme Court."6
The two preced~ng sections 3 and 4 deal with a single
cause of action which cannot be split up. The above section
has :ef ere nee to seve~al causes of action which may be joined.
s_ubJect to the exceptions enumerated therein, where a plain-
tiff has several causes of action against the same defend ant
he ma~ join them all in ~ single complaint, although he i~
not obhged to do so. For instance, in an action for acknowl-
edgment of a natural child, plaintiff may join another action
6~ Campos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timb c
Argonza, et al. v . International Colleges L-388~ No., 52 0 .G. ~387;
et al. v . Go, et al., 50 o .G 307l · R '. , _ov. 29, 1951, Go,
et al., 57 O.G. 9397; P . G. Pangili'nanos:rico V . Justice of the reace,
et al., 57 O.G. 9397. o., Inc. v . Hon. Pas1colan,

106
Rule 2 ACTIONS IN GENERAL
Sec. 5
to compel defendants to a partition of all the properties left
by the deceased natural father.66 An application to pro-
nounce the husband an absentee may be joined to an action
to place the management of the conjugal assets in the hands
of the wife.67 However, the joinder of causes of action is not
compulsory but merely permissive. In an action against two
defendants to recover from them Pl,033.34, plaintiff did not
include another separate credit of P187.50 which he had
against the same defendants. It was held that plaintiff is
not barred from filing another complaint for the other cre-
dit, since the provision regarding joinder of causes of action
is permissive, not compulsory.Gs
This rule, however, is subject to several restrictions. One
of them is the limitation regarding venue, whereby several
causes of action with no common venue cannot be joined. For
example, if A, a resident of Manila, has against B, a resident
of Baguio, two causes of action, one for money and another
for title to real property located in Zamboanga, he cannot
join them in a single complaint, for the venue of the first
action, which is either Manila or Baguio, is different from
the venue of the second, which is Zamboanga.
The rule is likewise subject to the limitation regarding
joinder of parties. For instance, if plaintiff A has a cause
of action against B, another cause of action against C, and
another cause of action against D, the three causes of action
cannot be joined, because there would be a misjoinder of
parties defendant, each of them being interested in the cause
of action alleged against him but not the other causes of
action pleaded against the others.Gll A claim on a promissory
note against three defendants may not be joined with a claim
on another promissory note against !wo of th~ def end ants,
for again there is a misjoinder of parties, the third defend ant

66 Briz v . Briz, 43 Phil. 763 ; Suar~z v . Suare~, 43 Phi~ 90~: Es-

coval v. Escoval, 48 o .G. (?d) 615 ; Tiamson v . Tiamson, 3_ Phil. 62;
Siguiong v . Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5. _
67 Peyer v . Martinez, et al., L-350~, Jan. 12, l~ol. . .
ss Palomar Badovi v . Sarte, 36 Phil. 550; Manila Tradmg v . Dicke,
G.R. 44792, promulgated Nov. 26, 1938.
6:) Gacula v . Martinez, et al., L-3038, Jan. 31, 1951.

107

- - - --,"--=-"~=--- -
Rule 2 COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT Sec. 5

in the first cause of action not having an interest in the

second cause of action. 70
In another case 7 1 two causes of action were stated in the
complaint. The first related to the co-ownership between
the plaintiff and the defendant, except M, of a parcel of land
described in the complaint. As to this cause of action, the
court was asked to order the partition of the property. The
second cause of action related to the absolute and exclusive
ownership by the plaintiff of two parcels of land, also de-
scribed in the complaint and alleged to be illegally detained
by all the defendants including M. As to this second cause
of action the court was asked to order all the defendants
to deliver' the property to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
held that these two causes of action cannot be joined on the
ground that there would be a misjoinder of parties defendant,
M not being interested in the first cause of action.72
There are three new further restrictions to the joinder of
causes of action, namely, (a) that they are subject to the
rules regarding jurisdiction; ( b) that the said causes of
action arise out of the same contract, transaction, or relation
between the parties, or ( c) the causes of action are for de-
mands for money or are of the same nature and character.
It must be observed in this connection, that under the for-
mer provision contained in Rule 2, section 5 of the former
Rules of Court, a party could join all the causes of action he
could have against an opposing party, subject only to the
rules regarding venue and joinder of parties. Under the
present provision, a party may join all his causes of action
against an opposing party subject not only to the rules re-
garding venue and joinder of parties, but subject also to
three additional restrictions, namely, ( 1) Jurisdiction, ( 2)
the causes of action that are joined should arise out of the
same contract, transaction or relation between the parties;

70 Federal Housing Administrator v . Christianson, 1 Fed. Rules

Service, p . 304, 26 F . Suop. 419.
'71 Sapalicio v . Calpe, 41 Phil. 850.
12 Sapalicio v . Calpe, supra.

108
Rule 2 ACTIONS IN GENERAL Sec. 5
or ( 3) that the causes of action are all for money or are of
the same nature and character. Hence, if plaintiff has two
claims against the defendant, one to collect a promissory
note and another to recover a jewel, and these two causes
of action arose from completely unrelated transactions they
may not be joined under the present provision, which 'could
have been done under the former procedure.
The above provision allows the joinder of causes of action
in the alternative. The alternative joinder is proper where
plaintiff is not certain as to the true facts, and due to that
uncertainty, he cannot, with safety, determine which of the
possible causes of action may be found true at the trials. 73
When two independent actions are improperly joined in
one proc~ding, it is the duty of the Court to order their
separation; the dismissal of one on jurisdictional or other
legal ground, should not affect the other action if their is no
iegal ground to dismiss it. Each action should be dealt with
according to its own merits. 74
The second and third paragraphs deal with the test of
jurisdiction when several causes of action are joined. Thus,
when in a complaint, several causes of action are properly
joined, what shall be the basis for determining the jurisdic-
tion of the Court? The old ruling laid down by the Supreme
Court was to the effect that when two separate debts are al-
leged, the amount of each of them, and not the aggregate
amount of both shall furnish the test of jurisdiction.75 This
ruling was ho~ever abandoned by several decisions of the
Supreme Court 76 which have been reiterated in the above
section. The p;evailing rule, therefore, is that if ~he causes
of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or re-
lation between the parties, the action shall be filed in_ ~e
Interior Court unless any of the causes JOINED falls within
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, in which case

7:i Carbary v. Detroit United R . Co., 157 Mich. 683, 122 N.W. 367.
74 Pacal v . Ramos 81 Phil. 30.
76 Villasenor v. E~langer & Galinger, 19 Phil. 574.
76 See citations in foot note 65.

109
Rule 2 COM~IENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT Sec. 6
it shall be filed in the latter court; if the causes of action
are for demands for money, or are of the same nature and
character, the jurisdiction shall be determined by the aggre-
gate amount of the demands if for money, or by their nature
and character. if otherwise.

SEC. 6. Co1n1nence11ient of action. - A civil

action is con1111enced by filing a complaint with the
court.
Same as section 2 of former Rule 2, which in turn was
taken from Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and from sections 46 and 389 of Act No. 190 with substantial
amendments.
The words "filing a complaint" as used in this provision
means "nothing more than the delivery of the complaint to
an officer of the court authorized to receive it either the
Clerk of Court or a Judge thereof." 77
Under this section, a civil action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint. And, when an additional defendant is in-
cluded, the action is commenced, as to him, on the date a
complaint is filed joining him. Usually that complaint is
filed in the form of an amended complaint joining a new
defendant.
The following rulings under a similar provision in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States dis-
trict courts are pertinent:
( 1) f'iling of complaint as commencement of action
where defend ant not served until after statute of limita-
tions has run. - For the purpose of th e s tatute of limita-
tions, an action mm,t be deemed t o be commenced whf:'n
the complaint is filed. In an action in which the com-
p_lai_nt ~•as filed short_ly before expiration of the period of
hrmtat1ons and service was not obtained until fiftee n
months later, the statute wa~ held to have been tolled by

TT Robinson v . Waterman, S.S. Co., D .C.N.J. 1947, 7 F.R.D . 51.

110