CASE ON ISSUE 1

Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Others vs The State Of Bihar(And Connected ... on 23 April,
1958
The Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act ,955, put a total ban on the
slaughter of all categories of animal,, of the species of bovine cattle. The U. P.
Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, put a total ban on the slaughter of cows and her
progeny which included bulls, bullocks, heifers and calves. The C. P. and Berar
Animal Preservation Act, 1949, placed a total ban on the slaughter of cows, male or female
calves of cow, bulls, bullocks, and heifers and the slaughter of buffaloes (male or
female, adults or calves) was permitted only under a certificate granted by the proper
authorities. No exception was made in any of these Acts permitting slaughter of cattle even
for bona fide religious purposes. These three Acts were enacted in pursuance of the directive
principles of State policy contained in Art. 48 Of the Constitution. The petitioners,who
were engaged in the butcher's trade and its subsidiary undertakings, challenged the
constitutional validity of the three Acts on the grounds that they infringed their funda-
mental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) and 25 of the Constitution. The responded
pleaded that the distinction is not violative of their fundamental right to equality as it is made
on the basis of intelligible diffrentia.

Ameerunnissa Begum And Others vs Mahboob Begum And Others on 9 December, 1952

A nobleman of Hyderabad died in 1936 when it was under the rule of the Nizam, and
disputes as to succession arose between his legally married wife and two ladies,
Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum, who claimed to be his wives. After protracted
proceedings before several non-judicial bodies a report adverse to the latter was made in
January, 1950, but before the Nizam could issue a firman in accordance with it, Hyderabad
became a part of the Indian Union and the Constitution of India came into force. An
enactment called the Waliuddowla Succession Act, 1950, was therefore passed by the
Hyderabad Legislature which provided that " the claims of Mahboob Begum and
Kadiran Begum and of their respective children to participate in the distribution of the
matrooka of the late Nawab are hereby dismissed" and that the above decision "cannot be
called in question in any court of law. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Air India v Nergesh Meerza & Ors 1981 AIR 1829

The case imposed a challenge on Regulations 46 and 47 of the Air India Employees Service
Regulations. With the challenge being posited on the grounds that the aforesaid regulation
created a substantial degree of disparity between male (referred to as Air Flight Pursers) and
female (Air Hostesses) (and within the Air Hostesses different operational standards dependent
on whether one is working for Air India International on the International circuit or Indian
Airlines on the domestic circuit) on multitude of grounds such as promotional avenues,
differential retirement ages, conditions pertaining to termination of the Air hostesses services
in cases of pregnancy or marriage (retirement age for them was 35 years as opposed to 58 for
their “male counterparts” – according to Regulation 46). Furthermore, a more prosaic question
was regarding the discretionary powers of the Managing Director who under Regulation 47
could increase the age of retirement as per his own behest. An aspect which is contested by the
petitioners as being arbitrary.

Sri Venkataramana Devaruand ... vs The State Of Mysore And ... on 8 November, 1957
This was an appeal by the trustees of the ancient and renowned temple of Sri
Venkataramana of Moolky Petta, who were managing the temple on behalf of the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins in accordance with a Scheme framed in a suit under s. 92 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. After the passing of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act (Madras
V of 1947) which had for its object the removal of the disability of Harijans from entering
into Hindu public temples, the trustees made a representation to the Government that
the temple was a private one, and, therefore, outside the operation of the Act. But the
Government did not accept that position and held that the Act applied to the temple. Thereupon
the trustees brought the suit, out of which the appeal arises' for a declaration that the temple
was not one as defined by S. 2(2) of the Act but was a denominational one having been
founded exclusively for the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins.
In the result, both the appeal and the application for special leave to appeal must be
dismissed.The parties will bear their own costs throughout. The appellants will take their costs
out of the temple funds. Appeals Dismissed.

Gulam Abbas & Ors vs State Of U.P. & Ors on 3 November, 1981
In Mohalla Doshipura of Varanasi city, there are two sects of Mohamedans-the Shias and
the Sunnis. Both the sects revere the martyrdom of Hazrat Imam Hasan and Hazrat Imam
Hussain, grand-sons of Prophet Mohammed, during the Moharram but in a different manner.
Shias of that Mohalla numbering about 4000 constitute a religious denomination
having a common faith and they observe Moharram for two months and eight days in a
year in memory of Hazrat Imam Hussain who along with his 72 followers attained
martyrdom at Karbala in Iraq. Matam (wailing) and taking out processions with Tabut Tazia,
Alams, Zukinha, etc. For performing these religious rites, practices and observances the Shia
community has been customarily using from time immemorial the nine plots in Mohalla
Doshipura and the structures thereon. The entire period of Moharram is a period of mourning
for the Shias whose staunch belief is that the whole purpose of their life is to carry out these
religious practices and functions during the Moharram and that in case they do not perform
all these rites, practices, observances and functions, including those relating to the
Tazia, they will never be delivered and till these are performed the whole community will be
in mourning and in none of their families any marriage or other happy function can take place.
CASES ON ISSUE 2
Abdulwahab Abdulmajid Baloch vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC 044
Abdulwahab Abdulmajid Baloch vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC 0440: in this case,
deceased body was found near his own residence and vasudev gave ride to him to his home to
his home. Abdulwahab was one of the suspect, who was convicted in but later on was acquitted
on the ground that the circumstances don’t prove the guilt of abdulwahab beyond reasonable
doubt.
K.V. Chacko vs. State of Kerala (07.12.2000 - SC) : MANU/SC/0776/2000:
The prosecution case as presented before the trial court is that on 6.8.1988 at about 3.20 a.m.
the appellant entered the house of Johnny, a resident of Thadiyampadu in Idukki District by
making an opening near the kitchen door of the house where deceased Johnny was sleeping
with his family members, namely, his wife Mariakutty, daughter Rani aged 15 years, daughter
Honey aged 9 years, and son Sony aged 7 years.
aunt of the accused stated that a few days before and after the incident, the appellant, who was
her nephew, was visiting her and stayed with her.
it was held that if any of the circumstances brought out makes it probable that somebody else
might have committed the crime, then there will be an element of the doubt the benefit of
which, no doubt, must go to the accused.
Rambilas v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1997 Cr. L.J. 4649.
The blood stain on the bamboo lathis were not identified because of mud stick on it. It was
found in the accused backyard and hence it is held that , in a case of murder, the mere fact that
a weapon, which could have been used for the commission of a crime, was discovered from
the accused would not, by itself, be sufficient to show that he was the murderer.
Badshah and Ors . vs . State of U . P . AIR 2008 SC 978.
Criminal conspiracy- one of the accused was continuously calling the deceased but there was
doubt because someone else had also called her that time and hence the benefit of doubt went
to the accused.
Gedu vs. State of Orissa (13.07.2016 - ORIHC) : MANU/OR/0275/
the informant and the deceased took their supper and the deceased went to sleep inside the
thatched house -cum- tea stall. The informant and co-villager Suguna Munda (P.W. 3) were
warming themselves in front of the tea stall by sitting by the side of the fire. At about 10 p.m.
the appellant arrived there and sat with them. Sometimes thereafter, the informant and P.W. 3
left the spot to join their duties as watchmen. At that time the appellant was sitting near the
house of the informant. On the next day morning at about 6 a.m. when the informant returned
from his duty, he found that the deceased was not present in the house and the bed was lying
as such. At that point of time, Bhagirathi Nayak (P.W. 4) who was a neighbour of the informant
came there and informed him that the dead body of a woman was lying in the front courtyard
of his house. The informant went there and found the deceased lying dead with bleeding injuries
on different parts of her body. He also found dragging mark from his house to the place of
occurrence and the saree of the deceased was lying at a separate place. The informant suspected
that after his departure in the night, the appellant might have committed murder of the deceased
and dragged her from the house and threw the dead body in the front courtyard of the house
Held, prosecution had failed to establish any motive on part of Appellant to commit crime - No
positive evidence to conclude that Appellant and deceased were last seen together in night of
occurrence - Therefore, last seen theory as advanced by prosecution miserably fails -
Absconding of Appellant could not be said to be sufficient to establish guilt of Appellant - Case
against Appellant had not been established by prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt.
Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2009 SC 0059.
Deceased used to reside in the property where he was found murdered - Appellant had gone to
work and was working when this information was received - Appellant's working hours were
from 9 PM to 9 AM every day - Witness No. 6 and 7 had gone to the said room and as per their
testimony deceased was found lying in a pool of blood - FIR was lodged on the statement of
the appellant - Appellant has cordial relations with his brother and they were staying together
- There was no any argument or quarrel - Murder of his brother was come to know through his
roommates Witness No. 6 and 7 and they might have killed him.
Gedu Alias Parameswar Patra v. State of Orissa, SC on 13th July 2016:
in which the Supreme Court has held that confessional statement of co-accused could not be
treated as evidence for deciding to proceed against another, more so when the statement was
exculpatory in nature, exculpatory statement cannot be treated as evidence.
M.C. Verghese vs. T.J. Poonan and Ors. (13.11.1968 - SC) :
respondent wrote three letters to his wife containing defamatory notes against appellant-father-
in-law - appellant filed complaint in Court of District Magistrate - District Magistrate
discharging respondent on grounds that communication by husband to wife do not amount to
'publication' in law.
communication between the spouses during the marriage cannot be disclosed or disposed to by
the spouse without the consent of the other who made the communication.
Vithal Eknath Adlinge v. State of Maharashtra, SC on 27th Feb, 2009: "There was a vacant
plot of Mool Chand Rohilla wherein two heap of dung cake were there and near the said heap
of dung cake the cow dung was lying where one naked dead body of a male was found lying
having its face towards earth and some bricks and rope were found lying on the dead body and
it was in highly putrefied condition."

State of Karnataka v M.N. Ramdas, AIR J.T. 2002 (6) S.C. 621.
We fully agree with the submissions raised on behalf of the Appellants that it cannot be said
that the deceased Sudhir was last seen in the company of the Appellants. In Bodh Raj @ Bodha
and Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, MANU/SC/0723/2002 : (2002) 8 SCC 45, the
Supreme Court held that the last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the
point of time when the accused and deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is
found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being author of the
crime becomes impossible.
 The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference
that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing
connectivity between the accused and the crime. It is well settled that where the inference of
guilt of an accused person is to be drawn from circumstantial evidence only, those
circumstances must, in the first place, be cogently established. Further, those circumstances
should be of a definite tendency pointing towards the guilt of the accused, and in their totality,
must unerringly lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the offence was
committed by the accused and none else.There may be cases where on account of close
proximity of place and time between the event of the accused having been last seen with the
deceased and the factum of death a rational mind may be persuaded to reach an irresistible
conclusion that either the accused should explain how and in what circumstances the victim
suffered the death or should own the liability for the homicide....
Mula Devi v. State of Uttrakhand,AIR 2009 (1) J.C.R. 55.

Puola Devi (hereinafter referred to as `deceased') daughter of PW 3 Amar Singh was married
to Kamal Singh, son of accused Dayal Singh in Village Jaikot, District Tehri Garhwal. Accused
/ appellant Mula Devi is mother-in-law and accused / appellant Rajmati is sister-in-law of the
deceased. Puola Devi, always complained about the harassment being made to her by the
accused/appellants whenever she visited her parental house. She often told that her in-laws
used to ask her to give her jewellery to them else they would kill her. On 30.05.1990, Amar
Singh (P.W.3) (father of the deceased), who used to work in Delhi, received a message there
that his daughter Puola Devi has died. On the next day, at about 5.00 P.M, he proceeded for his
home Village Kulpi, District Tehri Garhwal, and reached there on 01.06.1990. He went to the
Patwari and came to know that dead body of his daughter has already been taken to Narendra
Nagar. It needs to be noted that in the interior hills of Uttarkhand, certain Revenue Officials
are given the police powers. Meanwhile, Lal Singh (P.W.1), uncle of the deceased, had already
lodged the first information report on 30th of May 1990, after he received information that
Puola Devi had died in her in-laws house. In the first information report (Ext. A-1), , Lal Singh
(P.W.1) had mentioned that Puola Devi was married to son of Dayal Singh in Village Jaikot,
where she used to get harassment at the hands of her in-laws. He had also stated in his report
that whenever Puola Devi used to come to her parental village she complained of the
harassment meted out to her by the accused / appellants. She had apprehended that she would
be killed in her in-laws house. Lal Singh (P.W.1) at the end of the first information report
expressed suspicion that after committing murder of his niece Puola Devi, kerosene oil was
poured over her body and it was set on fire to conceal the fact of murder. On the basis of the
first information report, Crime No.02 of 1990 was registered against all the three accused
persons under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC by Patti Patwari, Baman Gaon. The dead body of
the deceased was taken into possession by Kapur Singh Payal (P.W.5), Patwari, who initially
investigated the crime. He prepared the check report (Ext. A-3) on the basis of the first
information report received from Lal Singh and made necessary entry in the general diary, copy
of extract of which is Ext. A-4. He inspected the spot, took the dead body in his possession,
prepared the inquest report (Ext. A -2) and other necessary papers including sketch of the dead
body (Ext. A -6), police form No. 13 (Ext. A-7), sample of seal (Ext. A-8). He also prepared
the site plan (Ext. A-5). The dead body was sent for postmortem examination. Dr. P.P. Raturi
(P.W.7) Medical Officer, Narendra Nagar conducted the autopsy on the dead body of Puola
Devi on 01.06.1990, at 10:00 A.M., and prepared the postmortem examination report (Ext. A-
11). The cause of death in the opinion of the Medical Officer was asphyxia as a result of ante
mortem strangulation. He also found postmortem burn injuries. Subsequently, the investigation
was taken up by, Bachchan Singh (P.W.6), Patwari, who further interrogated the witnesses and
arrested the accused persons. After completion of the investigation, he submitted charge sheet
(Ext.A -10) against all the three accused for their trial in respect of the offences punishable
under Section 302 and 201 IPC.

Yadav v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2009 (1) A.C.R. 202.

Geetabai Tukaram Ambre v, State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 (1) Mah.L.R. 103.

2.Bollavaram Pedda Narsi Reddy And ... vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 7 May, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991 AIR 1468, 1991 SCR (2) 723
Chandrasekhara Reddy, the deceased, and the accused were residents of village Jeereddy
Kotharpallai. In 1970, Accused No. 3 was elected as a Sarpanch of the village with active
support of the deceased. However, differences arose between them as they supported rival
groups in the election in the neighbouring village. 10 days before the incident, the deceased is
stated to have openly declared that he would get Accused-3 removed by moving a no
confidence motion. This according to the prosecution is the motive for the crime.
On the date of occurrence, Chandrasekhara Reddy met PW- 1 (Guddeti Balaveera Reddy) and
PW-2 (Donthireddi Subba Reddy) in the hotel of Subbamma (PW-8) in the neighbouring
village Proddatur. The deceased along with the two witnesses attended a cinema show at Anwar
Talkies. They came out of the theatre 10 minutes earlier around 9.30 P.M. and were walking
along the road towards the bus stand. When they reached near the old telephone exchange about
50 metres away from Anwar Talkies, there was an explosion of crackers. The accused persons
suddenly surrounded the deceased. They were armed with daggers. They attacked him after
one of them pushing aside PW-1. PW-1 fell on the barbed wire fence of the transformer and
received scratches on his thigh. The deceased was stabbed indiscriminately and simultaneously
by all the assailants who retreated in two different directions and the deceased died on the spot
instantaneously. Besides PWs 1 and 2, who witnessed the occurrence, PW-3 Donthireddi
Narayana Reddy, and PW-4 Poreddi Subba Reddy. had also seen the attack. These witnesses
were passing along the road.PW- 5, Mekkamalla Balireddi, reached the scene attracted by the
crowd and had seen the accused persons running away. The street light besides the electric light
at a petrol bunk and the light in the bunk on the side of the road were burning at the time of the
occurrence. The assailants had been identified by the witnesses in that light. The assailants
were strangers to the PWs 1 and 2 but A-2, 3 and 5 were known to PWs 3 and 4 and 5 who had
also acquaintance with the deceased PW-5 informed PW-7 (Polagiri Siva Reddy), the brother
of the deceased, about the occurrence, while PWs 3 and 4 left the place after seeing the
deceased lying at the scene. This in short is the prosecution case.
The learned sessions judge analysed the prosecution evidence meticulously and discarded the
testimony of PWs 1 to 5. He considered PWs 3, 4 and 5 as chance witnesses, found their
conduct in not disclosing the involvement of the accused persons known to them until their
statements were recorded on 18.8.1974 as suspicious and strange when they had acquaintance
with the deceased. PWs 3 and 4 when examined by PWs 9 and 10 for the purpose of test
identification parade had given statement which vary with their earlier statement and their
evidence before court was contradictory to their prior statements. It was, doubtful whether they
could have seen the occurrence or identified any of the assailants. Their evidence was,
therefore, rejected as untrustworthy. The testimony of the two eye witnesses PWs 1 and 2
who claimed that they were in the company of the deceased at the time of the occurrence
was also not accepted by the trial court for various reasons. They were strangers to the
accused persons. Their evidence regarding the identification of the assailants as the
accused did not impress the trial court which pointed out that the prosecution had no
consistent case regarding the source of light at the scene that these witnesses even if
present at the scene when the assailants mounted the attack on the deceased could not have
remained there to observe and memorize the features of the assailants and identify them after
a long lapse of time. PW-1 rushed to the police station in utter confusion even without his dhoti.
The witnesses were frightened and ran away. In this situation in the meagre light available,
they could not have identified the assailants as the accused. The learned judge on a
consideration of the medical evidence was also of the view that the occurrence could not have
happened at the time mentioned by these witnesses and, said there were several suspicious
features which render their version doubtful. The learned judge also pointed out that the
identification parade was perfunctory and was of no assistance to the prosecution. The learned
sessions judge analysed the entire evidence and considered it unsafe to accept the testimony of
the two witnesses to record a conviction. In that view of the matter, he acquitted all the accused
persons.
The credibility of the evidence relating to the identification depends largely on the
opportunity the witness had to observe the assailants when the crime was
committed and memorize the impression.
In the instant case at the scene of the crime when no natural light was available and
the street light was at a distance it is unlikely that the eye witnesses by momentary
glance of the assailants who surrounded the victim had a lasting impression and the
chance of identifying the assailants without mistake. Therefore the testimony of PWs
1 and 2 is unsafe to be acted upon. The overall view of the evidence taken by the Trial
Court is reasonable and plausible. The High Court was not justified in
interfering with the order of acquittal when the identity and involvement of the
appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

CASES ON ISSUE 3

 Boraiah Alias Shekar vs State on 20 December, 2002

In the case of Boraiah Alias Shekhar, the plaintiff a medical examiner had issued a
post-mortem report however there were certain things in the post mortem report
that could only be clearly explained by a certified medical examiner the defence
 pleaded to cross-examine the medical examiner which was granted by the HC.
The Karnataka HC held where the Post Mortem report is marked by consent and
where its genuineness is not disputed, it is clearly admissible in evidence
notwithstanding the fact that the author of the Postmortem report is not called into the
Court to give evidence, and more so or especially where the defence has not chosen to
cross-examine the doctor who conducted the postmortem examination on the dead
body of the deceased.

 Shaikh Farid Hussinsab vs The State Of Maharashtra

The Appellant is convicted for an offence of murder under section 302 I.P.C. The
trial Court relied, amongst others, on the post-mortem notes. The doctor, who
held the post-mortem and prepared the notes, was not examined at the trial. The
defence layer had earlier indicated that he was not disputing the genuineness
thereof in response to a query under sub-section (1) of Section 294 of the Code.
The Bombay high court in this case described the word "genuineness" contemplates
not only genuineness of the signature but also genuineness of the contents of the
document.

 Jagdeo Singh vs The State.

There is no dispute that in 1356 Fasli (1.7.1948 to 30.6.1949) first respondent
Mini Lal's name was recorded as the person in the possession of the disputed
plots. It appears that earlier, in 1945, the revenue Court had passed an order for
his eviction from the land in a proceeding under Section 175 of the U.P. Tenancy
Act, 1939 initiated by the appellants. Mihi Lal's name, however, continued to be
recorded against these plots as occupant for several years; either Mihi Lal
continued to be in possession of the plots or somehow get back into possession as
would appear from the fact that on June 27, 1952, another proceeding was
instituted under Section 180 of the said Act for his eviction. A reading of § 294
would reveal that it contemplates reading in evidence, upon admission about
genuineness by the opposite party, only such documents which, when formally proved
speak for themselves. It does not refer to a document which even if exhibited, cannot
be read in evidence as a substantive piece. Post-mortem report by itself proves
nothing as it is not a substantive piece of evidence. It is only a previous statement of
the doctor based on his examination of the dead body. It is the statement of the doctor
made in Court which alone is the substantive evidence. The post-mortem report can
be used to corroborate the statement of the doctor concerned under § 157 of the
Evidence Act.
Anil A. Lokhande vs State of Maharashtra, The Applicant accused and Original
accused No. 2 Shankar are being prosecuted for offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code for committing murder of
one Shoukat on 23rd September 1978.
The Bombay HC held that Section 53 Cr PC lays down the condition that the medical
examination of the accused can only be done at the instance of a police officer not
below the rank of a sub inspector but that does not debar the other superior officers or
the court concerned from exercising the said power when necessary in criminal cases.
  Thogorani Vs State of Orissa
The petitioner lodged an F.I.R. before Parlakhemundi Police Station on 16-7-2001
alleging therein that when she was 14 years of age, the opposite party No. 3 developed
relationship with her giving assurance of marriage and cohabitated with her. As a
consequence of the same, a female child was born but was not catered to by the defendant.
The Orissa HC held that taking the blood of the accused for the purpose of DNA test will not
amount to compelling an accused to become a witness against himself thus violating article
20(3) of the constitution.

Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta

Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 25 - Right to religion - Performance of Tandava dance
in public as an essential religious practice of Ananda Margi Order - Constitutional validity of -
Performance of Tandava dance in public prescribed by Ananda Margi Ji, founder of Ananda Margi
Order as an essential religious practice subsequent to decision of First Ananda Margi Case wherein
held that Tandava dance in public was not an essential rite of Ananda Margi faith - Ananda Margis
seeking permission of Commissioner of Police to perform Tandava dance in public - Permission
accorded by Commissioner to take out dance without knife, live snake, trident or skull - Challenged by
respondent by filing writ petition - Single Judge and Division bench holding that taking out Tandava
dance in public carrying out skull, trident being an essential part of Ananda Margi faith, Commissioner
of Police could not impose conditions on it - Appeal to Supreme Court - Dismissing appeal held that it
is settled law that protection under Article 25 and 25 extend guarantee for rituals and observances,
ceremonies and modes of worship which form part and parcel of religion - What constitutes an
essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to doctrine of that religion
itself and court cannot say that a belief or practice is not part of religion - Ananda Margi are a religious
denomination and as such are entitled to protection under Articles 25 and 26(b) of constitution for
their beliefs and practices including their practice of Tandava dance in a procession or public place -
Held that right to carry Trishul, Conch or skull is an integral and essential part of religious practice and
same is protected under Article 25 - However same is subject to right of State to interfere with said
practice of carrying Trishul, Conch or skull if such procession creates law and order problem - Anand
Margis held entitled to take a procession in public places after obtaining necessary permission from
the concerned authorities

The Math, known as Shirur Math, of which the petitioner is the superior or Mathadhipati, is one of the
eight Maths situated at Udipi in the district of South Kanara and they are reputed to have been
founded by Shri Madhwacharya, the well-known exponent of dualistic theism in the Hindu Religion.
Besides these eight maths, each one of which is presided over by a Sanyasi or Swami, there exists
another ancient religious institution at Udipi, known as Shri Krishna Devara Math, also established by
Madhwacharya which is supposed to contain an image of God Krishna originally made by Arjun and
miraculously obtained from a vessel wrecked at the coast of Tulava. There is no Mathadhipati in the
Shri Krishna Math and its affairs are managed by the superiors of the other eight Maths by turns and
the custom is that the Swami of each of these eight Math presides over the Shri Krishna Math in turn
for a period of two years in every sixteen years. The appointed time of change in the headship of the
Shri Krishna Math is the occasion of a great festival, known as Pariyayam, when a vast concourse of
devotees gather at Udipi from all parts of Southern India, and an ancient usage imposes a duty upon
the Mathadhipati to feed every Brahmin that comes to the place at that time.
4. The petitioner was installed as Mathadhipati in the year 1919, when he was still a minor, and he
assumed management after coming of age some time in 1926. At that time the Math was heavily in
debt. Between 1926 and 1930 the Swami succeeded in clearing off a large portion of the debt. In 1931,
however, came the turn of his taking over management of the Shri Krishna Math and he had to incur
debts to meet the heavy expenditure attendant on the Pariyayam ceremonies. The financial position
improved to some extent during the years that followed, but troubles again arose in 1946, which was
the year of the second Pariyayam of the Swami. Owing to scarcity and the high price of commodities
at that time, the Swami had to borrow money to meet the expenditure and the debts mounted up to
nearly a lakh of rupees. The Hindu Religious Endowment Board, functioning under the Earlier Act of
1927, intervened at this stage and in exercise of its powers under section 61-A of the Act called upon
the Swami to appoint a competent manager to manage the affairs of the institution. The petitioner's
case is that the action of the Board was instigated by one Lakshminarayana Rao, a lawyer of Udipi,
who wanted to have control over the affairs of the Math. It appears that in pursuance of the direction
of the Board, one Sripath Achar was appointed an agent and a Power of Attorney was executed in
favour on the 24th of December, 1948. The agent, it is alleged by the petitioner, wanted to have his
own way in all the affairs of the Math and paid no regard whatsoever to the wishes of the Mahant. He
did not even submit accounts to the Mahant and deliberately flouted his authority. In this state of
affairs the Swami, on the 26th of September, 1950, served a notice upon the agent terminating his
agency and calling upon him to hand over to the Mathadhipati all account papers and vouchers
relating to the institution together with the cash in hand. Far from complying with this demand, the
agent, who was supported by the aforesaid Lakshminarayana Rao, questioned the authority of the
Swami to cancel his agency and threatened that he would refer the matter for action to the Board. On
the 4th of October, 1950, the petitioner filed a suit against the agent in the Sub-Court of South Kanara
for recovery of the account books and other articles belonging to the Math, for rendering an account
of the management and also for an injunction restraining the said agent from interfering with the
affairs of the Math under colour of the authority conferred by the Power of Attorney which the
plaintiff had canceled. The said Sripath Achar anticipating this suit filed an application to the Board on
the 3rd of October, 1950, complaining against the cancellation of the Power of Attorney and his
management of the Math. The Board on the 4th October, 1950, issued a notice to the Swami
proposing to inquire into the matter on the 24th of October following at 2 p.m. at Madras and
requesting the Swami either to appear in person or by a pleader. To this the Swami sent a reply on
21st October, 1950, stating that the subject-matter of the very enquiry was before the court in the
original suit filed by him and as the matter was sub judice, the enquiry should be put off. A copy of the
plaint filed in that suit was also sent along with the reply. The Board, it appears, dropped that enquiry,
but without waiting for the result of the suit, initiated proceedings suo motu under section 62 of the
Earlier Act and issued a notice upon the Swami on the 6th of November, 1950, stating that it had
reason to believe that the endowments of the said Math were being mismanaged and that a scheme
should be framed for the administration of its affairs. The notice was served by officer on the Swami
and the 8th of December, 1950, was fixed as the date of enquiry. On that date at the request of the
counsel for the Swami, it was adjourned to the 21st of December, following. On the 8th of December,
1950, an application was filed on behalf of the Swami praying to the Board to issue a direction to the
agent to hand over the account papers and other documents, without which it was not possible for
him to file his objections. As the lawyer appearing for the Swami was unwell, the matter was again
adjourned till the 10th of January, 1951. The Swami was not ready with his objections even on that
date as his lawyer had not recovered from his illness and a telegram was sent to the Board on the
previous day requesting the latter to grant a further adjournment. The Board did not accede to this
request and as no explanation was filed by the Swami, the enquiry was closed and orders reserved
upon it. On the 13th of January, 1951, the Swami, it appears, sent a written explanation to the Board,
which the latter admittedly received on the 15th. On the 24th of January, 1951, the Swami received a
notice from the Board stating inter alia that the Board was satisfied that in the interests of proper
administration of the Math and its endowments, the settlement of a scheme was necessary. A draft
scheme was sent along with the notice and if the petitioner had any objections to the same, he was
required to send in his objections on or before the 11th of February, 1951, as the final order regarding
the scheme would be made on the 15th of February 1951. On the 12th of February, 1951, the
petitioner filed the petition, out of which this appeal arises, in the High Court of Madras, praying for a
writ of prohibition to prohibit the Board from taking further steps in the matter of settling a scheme
for the administration of the Math. It was alleged inter alia that the Board was actuated by bias against
the petitioner and the action taken by it with regard to the settling of a scheme was not a bona fide
act at all. The main contention, however, was that having regard to the fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution in matters of religion and religious institutions belonging to particular religious
denominations, the law regulating the framing of a scheme interfering with the management of the
Math and its affairs by the Mathadhipati conflicted with the provisions of articles 19(1)(f) and 26 of
the Constitution and was hence void under article 13. It was alleged further that the provisions of the
Act were discriminatory in their character and offended against article 15 of the Constitution. As has
been stated already, after the New Act came into force, the petitioner was allowed to amend his
petition and the attack was now directed against the constitutional validity of the New Act which
replaced the earlier legislation.

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri
Shirur Mutt.

The petitioner was a member of the Indian Administrative Service in the cadre of
the State of Tamil Nadu. The petitioner was accordingly promoted as Chief Secretary.
The posts of Chief Secretary and First Member of the Board of Revenue should be deemed
to be in the same category and should be inter-changeable selection posts the Central
Government by notification dated January 14, 1970 provided that the pay of First Member,
Board of Revenue was to be the same as that of the Chief Secretary. On April 17. 1971 the
State Government accorded sanction to the creation of a temporary post of Deputy Chairman
in the State Planning Commission in the grade of Chief Secretary for a period of one year
and appointed the petitioner to that post providing that he shall be entitled to the same rank
and emoluments as admissible to the post of Chief Secretary. The petitioner did not join
this post and went on leave. On the petitioner's return from leave the post of Deputy Chairman
was again created for a period of one year in the grade of the Chief Secretary and the petitioner
was appointed to that post. Against this the petitioner made a representation that the
continuance of the post of Deputy Chairman in the rank of Chief Secretary for a period of
more than one year would be invalid under r. 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre)
Rules, 1954. Next the State Government created a temporary post of officer on Special Duty
for streamlining and rationalising the Sales Tax Act, "in the grade of Chief Secretary to the
Government and appointed thepetitioner to that post". He did not join this post too and
proceeded on leave. After the petitioner was transferred from the post of Deputy Chairman
Planning Commission and appointed Officer on Special Duty for revision of Sales Tax laws
the State Government abolished the post of Deputy Chairman sanctioned under the earlier
order and sanctioned the creation of a new post of Deputy Chairman in the Grade of First
Member. Board of Revenue" on a pay of Rs. 3000/- per month and appointed a First Member
of the Board of Revenue to that post.Besides, on the transfer of the petitioner from the
post of Chief Secretary a person who was admittedly junior to-the petitioner was promoted
as Chief Secretary and was confirmed in that post. The petitioner filed a petition under
Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of his transfer from the post of Chief
Secretary, first to the post of Deputy Chairman State Planning Commission and then to the
post of officer on Special Duty, on the following grounds : viz. (i)
it was contrary to the proviso to r. 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules,
1954 and r. 9[sub-r.(1)] of the Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules 1954; (ii) it was
violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the posts of Deputy Chairman, State
Planning Commission and Officer on Special Duty were inferior in rank and status to that of
Chief Secretary; and (iii) that it was made in mala fide exercise of power, not on account of
exigencies of administration or public service, but because the second respondent was
annoyed with the petitioner on account. of various incidents referred to in the petition and
wanted him out of the way.

E.P. Royappa v. state of T. N

Govindlalji Maharaj, Tilkayat Shri v. State of Rajasthan,
The history of the Nathdwara Temple in the District of Udaipur showed that Vallabha,
who was the founderof the denomination known as Pushtimargiya Vaishnava
Sampradaya,installed the idol of Srinathji in a temple and that later on his descendants built
the Nathdwara Temple in 1761. The religious reputation of the temple grew in importance
and several grants were made and thousands of devotees visiting the temple made offering to
the temple. The succession to the Gaddi of the Tilkayat received recognition from the Rulers
of Mewar, but on several occasions the Rulers interfered whenever it was found that the
affairs of the temple were not managed properly. In 1934 a Firman was
issued by the Udaipur Darbar, by which, inter alia, it was declared that according to the
law of Udaipur all the property dedicated or presented to or otherwise coming to
the Deity Shrinathji was property of the shrine, that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the time
being was merely a custodian, Manager and Trustee of the said property and
that the Udaipur Darbar had absolute right to supervise that the property dedicated to the
shrine was used for the legitimate purposes of the shrine. The management of the affairs' by
the appellant Tilkayat was not successful and it became necessary that a scheme should
be framed for the management of the Temple. On February 6, 1939, the Governor
of Rajasthan promulgated an Ordinance, which was in due course replaced by the Nathdwara
Temple Act, 1939. The appellant challenged the validity of the Act on the grounds,
inter alia, that the idol of Shrinathji in the Nathdwara Temple and all the property pertaining
to it were his private properties and, as such, the State Legislature was not
competent to pass the Act, that even if the Nathdwara Temple was held to be a public temple,
he as Mahoney or Shebait had a beneficial interest in the office of the high priest as
well as the properties of the temple and that on that footing, his rights under Arts. 14,
19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) of the Constitution of India had been contravened by the Act.
it was also urged that the provisions of the Act infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed to
the Denomination under Art. 55 (1) and 26 (b) and (c) of the Constitution. The
question was also raised as to Whether the tenets of the Vallablia denomination and its
religious practices required that the worship by the devotees should be performed at the
private temple and so the existence of public temples was inconsistent with the said tenets
and practices.
The appellant filed a suit for the recovery of money as price of goods supplied against the
Ex-Ruler of Jaipur. Subsequently s. 87-B was introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure
making the provisions of s. 86 in respect of suits against rulers of foreign States applicable to
the rulers of former Indian States. The Ex-Ruler raised the plea that the suit was incompetent
as the consent of the Central Government had not been obtained as required by s.87-B.
The appellant contended: (i) that s. 87-B violated Art. 14 Of the Constitution and was void,
(ii) that s. 87-B did not apply to the continuation of a suit pending

Rupa ashok hurra v ashok hurra

Sri Aurobindo, one of the Indian sages and philosphers, after a brilliant academic and
administrative career engaged himself for sometime in political activities and revolutionary
literary efforts, but later on gave them up to concentrate himself with the life of medition and
integral yoga at Pondicherry, in Tamil Nadu. Madam M. Alfassa a French Lady, who came
to be known as the Mother became a disciple of Sri Aurobindo. Very soon more and
more disciples
came to join him from various parts of India and abroad and thus the Aurobindo Ashram
came into being. The disciples and devoted followers of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, with
a view to propagate and practise the ideals and beliefs of Sri Aurobindo formed a Society
called Sri Aurobindo Society in the year 1960, which at all material times was and is still a
society duly registered under the provisions of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act,
1961. This Society is completely distinct from Aurobindo Ashram in Pondicherry. The
Society was established and registered for the purpose of carrying out in and out side India
the several objects stated in the memorandum of the Society. The management of the
Society vested in its Executive Committee. Rules and regulations have been duly framed for
the management of the Society and also for safe custody and protection of its assets, properties
and funds. Sri Aurobindo Society preachesand propagates the ideals and teachings of Sri
Aurobindo, inter alia, through its numerous centres scattered throughout India by way
of weekly meetings of its members. The Mother as the founder-president also conceived of a
project of setting up a cultural township known as 'Auroville' where people of different
countries are expected to engage in cultural, educational and scientific and other pursuits
aiming at human unity. The Society has been a channel of funds for setting up the cultural
township known as Auroville.
At the initiative of the Government of India, the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organisation being of the opinion that the Auroville project would contribute to
international understanding and promotion of peace sponsored the project by proposing a
resolution to this effect at its General Conference in 1966. This resolution was unanimously
adopted at this conference. By a further resolution passed in 1968 the UNESCO invited its
member States and international non-governmental organisations to participate in the
development of Auroville as an international cultural township to bring together the values of
different cultures and civilisations in harmonious environment with integrated
living standards, which corresponds to man's physical and spiritual needs. In 1970
UNESCO had directed its Director-General to take such steps as may be feasible, within the
budgetary provisions to promote the development of Auroville as an important
international cultural programme. Sri Aurobindo Society received large funds in the shape
of grants from different
organisations in India and abroad for development of that township. The assistance included
contributions from the State Governments of the value of Rs. 66.50 lakhs and the Central
Government of the value of Rs. 26.14 lakhs. After the death of the Mother on 17th of
November, 1973 a number of problems of varying nature affecting the smooth running of the
project cropped up. The Government of India on receiving complaints about
mismanagement of the project and misuse of funds by Sri Aurobindo Society set up a
committee under the chairmanship of the Governor of Pondicherry with representatives
of the Government of Tamil
Nadu and of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Central Government to look into the
matter. The Committee made a detailed scrutiny of the accounts of Sri Aurobindo Society
relating to Auroville and found instances of serious irregularities in the
management of the Society, mis-utilisation of its funds and their
diversion to other purposes. Further, various other serious difficulties had arisen
plaguing the Management of Auroville and rendering
thereby any further growth of the township almost impossible. In the
circumstances the taking over of the management of Auroville became imperative to
ensure growth of the township in tune with its objectives. Keeping in view the international
character of the project and considering the government's involvement in actively
sponsoring the project through UNESCO, the growth and management of the project had
become the primary responsibility of the Government of India. The ideals of the project formed
India's highest aspirations, which could not be allowed to be defeated or
frustrated. Sri Aurobindo society had lost complete control over the situation and the members
of the Auroville approached the Government of India to give protection against oppression
and victimisation at the hands of the said Society. There were internal quarrels
between the various factions of Sri Aurobindo Society. There have also been instances
of law and order situation. Financial management of the projects has not been sound
and several instances of mismanagement, diversion of funds have been revealed. A
large sum of money was given by Sri Aurobindo Society to AURO
construction-an agency whose status. is not at all defined, whose
functions and capabilities for taking up large construction works also had not been made
known. The Government in the circumstances could not be a silent spectator to the
mismanagement of the project and internecine quarrels amongst its members, which if
not checked could lead to the destruction of the project so nobly conceived. The
Government, therefore, decided to issue a Presidential Ordinance. After the filing of the writ
petition the ordinance has now been replaced by the Auroville (Emergency
Provisions) Act, 1980. The constitutional validity of the Act has been challenged
on four grounds: (i) Parliament has no legislative competence to enact
the impugned statute; (ii) The impugned Act infringes Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the
Constitution; (iii) The impugned Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; and (iv) The
Act was mala fide. Dismissing the petitions, the Court