INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
This sentence can not be sustained. There can be no unlawful detention under
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 3241 March 16, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS CABANAG, defendant-appellant.
J.F. Boomer for appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta, for appellee.
TRACEY, J.:
The accused, an Igorot, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya of the crime of unlawful detention, under article 481 of the Penal Code,
which punishes "any private person who shall lock up or detain another or in
any way deprive him of his liberty."
An Igorot orphan girl called Gamaya, 13 years of age was taken from the
possession of her grandmother, Ultagon, in the rancheria of Anao, in the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, by one Buyag, also an Igorot; whether this was
done with or against the will of the grandmother is not altogether clear in the
evidence. We accept the version least favorable to the accused — that of the
child — who testified that in the daytime Buyag came to the house and took her
away, although the grandmother objected, saying "Do not take off that little girl,"
but not speaking when she went away. The man brought her to his house, about
a half mile distant, where she was not confined, but on the contrary was allowed
to go back alone to her grandmother, with whom she would spend a little while,
returning the same day. She testified that on last evening, the grandmother was
angry and did not wish her to go, but did not prevent her. According to her
recollection she remained with Buyag, in the vicinity of her grandmother's
residence, some two or three months.
Buyag testified that more than two years before, in order to help the family after
the father's death and for the purpose of keeping the child at home, he had
bought her for three pigs, twenty-five hens, two measures of rice, and a cloak
worth two pigs, from her mother, with whom she remained until the third year,
when (her mother presumably having died) she was brought away by one
Eusebio, at the instance of himself and another Igorot named YogYog, who had
furnished part of the purchase price. Together they instructed Eusebio to sell
her for a carabao and 50 pesos. Eusebio, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and
sold her to the accused, Tomas Cabanag, for 100 pesos.
In respect to this last sale, the stories of Tomas, Antonia, and the girl
substantially agree. Cabanag had previously been instructed to buy a girl by one
Mariano Lopez of Caoayan, to whom after a few days Gamaya was delivered in
return for the price, which appears to have been 200 pesos. In his hands she
remained for about two months until she was taken away by an officer of
Constabulary. Afterwards this prosecution was instituted. Although Gamaya
made objection to leaving the house of Cabanag she appears to have gone
without actual constraint and at no time in any of these places was she
physically restrained of her liberty; she was not under lock or key or guard, went
into the street to play, returned at will, and was not punished or ill used in any
way, but was employed about the household tasks; in short, she appears to
have been treated by Mariano Lopez as a household servant and to have been
well earned for while in the custody of the accused.
It is proved in the case that it is an Igorot custom to dispose of children to pay
the debts of their fathers, the transaction in the native language being termed a
sale, and the defendant appears to have engaged in the business of buying in
Nueva Vizcaya children to sell in the lowlands of Isabela.
In his sentence, the judge below said:
However much may be said in extension of the alleged custom among the
ignorant Igorots of seizing and abducting children for the sale and even in selling
their own children voluntarily, there is nothing in all this to palliate or extenuate
the conduct of the accused in this case.
The Congress of the United States has declared that human slavery shall not
exist in these Islands and while no law, so far as I can discover, has yet been
passed either defining slavery in these Island of fixing a punishment for those
who engage in this inhuman practice as dealers, buyers, sellers or derivers, the
facts established in this case show conclusively that the child Gamaya was by
the defendant forcibly and by fraud, deceit and threats unlawfully deprived of
her liberty and that his object and purpose was an unlawful and illegal one, to
wit, the sale of the child, for money, into human slavery. This constitutes the
crime of detencion ilegal, defined and penalized by article 481 of the Penal Code
and this court finds the defendant guilty and charged in the information.
There are neither extenuating nor aggravating circumstances found in the case.
The court therefore sentence the accused, Tomas Cabanag, to eight years and
one day of prision mayor and to pay the costs of this instance with the
accessories of the law.
Page 1 of 15
article 481 of the Penal Code without confinement of or restraint of person, such
as did not exist in the present case. (U.S. vs. Herrera, March 28, 1904, 3 Phil.
Rep., 515.)
Under the complaint for this crime it is possible to convict for coaccion upon
proof of the requisites of that offense (U.S. vs. Quevengco, 2 Phil. Rep., 412),
but among those requisites is that of the violence through force or intimidation,
even under the liberal rule of our jurisprudence (U.S. vs. Quevengco, supra;
U.S. vs. Vega, 2 Phil. Rep., 167; U.S. vs. Ventosa,1 4 Off. Gaz, 573);
consequently the charge of coaccion against the accused can not be sustained
upon the evidence.
The Penal Code, chapters 2 and 3, title articles 484 to 490, provides punishment
for those who carry off children under 7 years of age or those who devote
children under 16 years of age to certain hazardous occupations; but none of
these articles can apply to the case before us, except article 486, which
punishes him who induces a child over 7 years of age to abandon the house of
its parent or guardian. Under this article it is possible that on full proof of the
facts, Buyag might be held, but not the accused. It was not design of the law to
prevent parents or grandparents from devoting their children to customary work,
nor from receiving compensation for such work in wages or otherwise. Such
agreements binding out minors are sanctioned in most countries, usually
however, subject to stipulations for their welfare expressly prescribed by statute.
In the absence of proof of what the agreement of the parties or the custom of
the people called for in respect of the use, treatment, and care of the child, the
term of her service and her final disposition, and particularly in respect of the
maintenance of her relations with her grandmother and the prospect of an
ultimate return to her, it is not possible to hold that the arrangement was a
criminal or even an illicit one. The name applied to it by the custom of the Igorots
is not enough to establish that in truth and in effect it was a sale, or anything
more than a contract for services. While there is thing more than a contract for
services. While there is much in this practice to condemn, we do not feel it to be
our province to strain the law in order to bring this local custom of this mountain
people to an end. This condition may present matter for the consideration of the
legislature but not for action by the criminal courts. Not even the abhorrent
species of traffic apparently carried on by the accused justifies a sentence not
authorized by law.
The judge below quotes the Bill of Rights of the Philippines contained in the act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, declaring that "neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist in said Islands." This constitutional provision is self-
acting whenever the nature of a case permits and any law or contract providing
for servitude of a person against his will is forbidden and is void. For two obvious
reasons, however, it fails to reach the facts before us:
First. The employment or custody of a minor with the consent or sufferance of
the parents or guardian, although against the child's own will, can not be
considered involuntary servitude.
Second. We are dealing not with a civil remedy but with a criminal charge, in
relation to which the Bill of Rights defines no crime and provides no punishment.
Its effects can not be carried into the realm of criminal law without an act of the
legislature.
It is not unnatural that existing penal laws furnish no punishment for involuntary
servitude as a specific crime. In the Kingdoms of the Spanish Peninsula, even
in remote times, slavery appears to have taken but a surface root and to have
been speedily cast out, the institution not having been known therein for
centuries. It is only in relation to Spain's possessions in the American Indies that
we find regulations in respect to slavery. In general they do not apply in their
terms to the Philippine Islands where the ownership of man by his fellow-man,
wherever it existed, steadily disappeared as Christianity advanced. Among the
savage tribes in remote parts, such customs as flourished-were not the subject
of legislation but were left to be dealt with by religious and civilizing influences.
Such of the Spanish laws as touched the subject were ever humane and radical.
In defining slavery, law 1, title 21 of the fourth Partida, calls it "a thing against
the law of nature;" and rule 2, title 34 of the seventh Partida says: "It is a thing
which all men naturally abhor." These were the sentiments of the thirteenth
century.
To sum up this case, there is no proof of slaver or even of involuntary servitude,
inasmuch as it has not been clearly shown that the child has been disposed of
against the will of her grandmother or has been taken altogether out of her
control. If the facts in this respect be interpreted otherwise, there is no law
applicable here, either of the United States or of the Archipelago, punishing
slavery as a crime. The child was not physically confined or restrained so as to
sustain a conviction for illegal detention, nor are the acts of the accused brought
within any of the provisions of the law for the punishment of offenses against
minors; consequently the conviction in this case must be reversed, in
accordance with the recommendation of the Attorney-General, with costs de
oficio, and the prisoner is acquitted.
After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith
and ten days thereafter let the case be remained to the court from whence it
came for proper action. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino
and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that
these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty
years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service
between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they
had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were
duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance
Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that
the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date
of the filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have
not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and
has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman
also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill
or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one
month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the
accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary,
in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an
army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.1ªvvphïl.nët
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the
compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war
does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived
from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an
army. This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory
military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal
with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said
that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if
need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his
religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his
country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of
United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not
deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense,
there is no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the
actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in
the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the
State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case
of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to
support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for
determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the
proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65
and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs
to the appellants. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Page 2 of 15
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1573 March 29, 1948
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GOTAMCO SAW MILL, respondent-appellee.
Severino P. Izon for petitioner.
Romeo Perfecto for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the "Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Kahoy sa Pilipinas" prays, for the reasons therein set forth, that we reverse and
vacate the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations dated September 23, 1946
(Annex A) and March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and its resolution of July 11, 1947
(Annex C).
In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers in the main
case (case No. 31-V of the Court of Industrial Relations) declared a strike on
September 10, 1946, "which suspended all the work in the respondent
company"; that on September 19, 1946 (presumably after the case had been
brought to the Court of Industrial Relations) said court informed the parties that
the continuation of the strike would necessarily prejudice both parties, and that
a temporary solution, satisfactory to both parties, must be found to put an end
to it, at the same time, urging both parties to be reasonable in their attitude
towards each other; that ample opportunity was given to both parties to iron out
their differences until September 21, 1946, when the court continued the
conference at which, among other things, the leader of the laborers informed
the court that, although said laborers were not exactly satisfied with the
arrangement, in order to cooperate with the court and with the parties so that
the laborers could return to work and the company resume its operation, they
had no objection to accepting a temporary settlement of P3.50 without meal, as
against the proposal of the company of P2.00 without meal; that after a series
of conferences held on September 23, 1946, the date of the order now under
consideration, the labor leader decided to accept a temporary arrangement of
the wage problem as proposed by management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase
without meal to all striking laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union,
manifested that he would have a hard time convincing the laborers, but in view
of their desire to preserve that harmony which used to exist between the parties,
they were going to accede to this proposition, provided that the management
would permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces of
lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations culminated in an
agreement by which the laborers would return to their work on Tuesday,
September 24, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the respondent
company would resume its operation on said date under the following
conditions:
(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an over-all increase of
P2.00 daily, without meal, over the wages received by them before the strike;
(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring with them home, if
available, small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; and
(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take effect upon the return of
the workingmen to work until the final determination of the present controversy.
The same order then proceeds as follows:
Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties to be reasonable
and advantageous to both, the court approves the same and orders the striking
laborers of the respondent company to return to their work on Tuesday,
September 24, 1946 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the respondent
company to resume its operation and admit the striking laborers. The
respondent company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss any laborer
affiliated with the petitioning union, nor suspend the operation of the temporary
agreement, and the labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-out or strike
during the pendency of the hearing.
From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7, 1947, the
respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the Court of Industrial relations an
urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held for contempt of court for
having staged a strike during the pendency of the main case "in violation of the
order of this court dated September 23, 1946"; that on January 9, 1947,
petitioner filed an answer with a counter-petition alleging, among other things,
that a representative of petitioner conferred with respondent regarding certain
discriminations obtaining in the respondent's saw mill, but instead of entertaining
their grievances said respondent in a haughty and arbitrary manner ordered the
stoppage of the work and consequently the workers did then and there stop
working; and in the counter-petition said petitioner asked the respondent be held
for contempt for having employed four new Chinese laborers during the
pendency of the hearing of the main case, without express authority of the court
and in violation of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. It is
also recited in the said order of March 28, 1947, that on that same date, January
9, 1947, respondent filed with the court another urgent motion for contempt
against the petitioning union for picketing on the premises of the respondent's
saw mill and for grave threats which prevented the remaining laborers from
working.
Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation of evidence
pertinent to the incidents thus raised. Thereafter, the said order of March 28,
1947, was entered, and the court stated therein the three questions to be
determined as follows: first, if there was a violation by the petitioning union of
the order of said court of September 23, 1946, which would warrant the
commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the facts and
circumstances attending the picketing constitute contempt of court; third,
whether there was a violation by the respondent of section 19 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, in taking four Chinese laborers
pending the hearing and without express authority of the court; and fourth,
whether the dismissal of Maximino Millan was with or without just cause.
The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:
(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated September 23,
1946, by the petitioning union and thereby ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes,
special agent of the court, to take such action as may be warranted in the
premises against the person or persons responsible therefor for contempt:
(2) That the question of picketing being closely and intimately related to the
strike which had been found illegal, did not need to be passed upon, it being
imbibed by question No. 1;
(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the question of respondent
having violated section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended,
respondent was thereby exonerated from any liability in connection with the
alleged employment of four Chinamen;
(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and unworthy to work
among his fellow laborers, his petition for reinstatement contained in demand
No. 5 of the main case was thereby denied.
The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the Court of
Industrial Relations, sitting in banc, and denied reconsideration of its order of
March 28, 1947, as requested by the petitioning union's contention is recited
that the provisions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended,
upon which order of September 23, 1946, was based, had not been complied
with; in other words, that the said order was not issued in conformity with the
requisites of said section, because, it was said, before its issuance there had
been no proper hearing and there was and there was no express finding by the
court that public interest required the return of the striking workers. The further
contention is therein recited that, granting that the order of September 23, 1946,
was issued in conformity with said section 19, said provision is unconstitutional
for being in violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Passing
upon these contentions, the Court of Industrial Relations said:
The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with the provisions
of section 19. Said order was proposed and issued on the basis of the
agreement entered into by the parties after the preliminary hearings and
conferences. While it is true that the order of the Court now in question did not
make any express finding as to whether public interest required the return of the
striking workers, it is undeniable, however, that until the numerous incidents
arising therefrom since the certification of the dispute promptly, need not be
stated in the said order because it is a fact which is borne out by the entire
record of the case. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the terms of the order, it
could have objected right then and there and could have appealed said order
within the period prescribed by law, and nor to wait after it had become final,
definite, and conclusive. The record shows that the petitioner in its answer
answer and counter-petition for contempt based its complaint upon section 19
(incidental Case No. 31-V [4]). It is, indeed, strange that after taking advantage
of this order and enjoyed (enjoying) the benefits thereunder, the petitioner now
comes to impugn and challenge the validity. The second motion for
reconsideration is the sad instance where the petitioner attacks the validity of
an order under which it once took shelter.
The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start with, this section is
presumed to be constitutional. Several laws promulgated which apparently
infringe the human rights of individuals were "subjected to regulation by the
State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power". The provisions of
Act No. 103 were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the concern
of the State to promote social justice to insure the well being and economic
security of all the people. In order to attain this object, section 19 was
promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to capital and denies to labor
what it denies to capital. Section 19 complements the power of the Court to
settle industrial disputes and renders effective such powers which are conferred
upon it by the different provisions of the Court's organic law, more particularly,
sections 1 and 4, and "other plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable
it to settle all questions matters, controversies or disputes arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees", "to prevent non-pacific methods in
the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes" (International HardWood
and Venser Co. vs The Pangil Federation of Laborers, G.R. No. 47178, cited in
the case of Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus Co. Employees' Association,
40 Off. Gaz., 115). Section 4 has been upheld in the case aforecited. It
appearing that the power of this Court to execute its orders under section 19 is
also the same power it possesses under section 4 of the same act, it inferentially
follows that section 19 is likewise valid. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs.
Philippine Labor Union, G.R. No. 47796.)
In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union, supra, this
Court said:
Page 3 of 15
In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is to concede to the
Court of Industrial Relations the power to decide a case under section 19 but
deny it, the power to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this
proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the second place considering
that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely
incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously acquired under section 4 of
the law, if follows that the power to execute its orders under section 19 is also
the same power that it possesses under section 4. (40 Off. Gaz., [14th Supp.],
No. 23, p. 178.)
Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of an order such
as those now under consideration as for contempt of court.
We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 is constitutional. It does not offend against the
constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary servitude. An employee entering
into a contract of employment said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts,
among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which is
the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord
and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of
Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of
this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer
shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after
hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that
he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only
after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its
opinion, be promptly decided or settled ...". (Emphasis supplied.) The
voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment —
he has a free choice between entering into it or not — with such an implied
condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. The
resolution of July 11, 1947, states that the order of September 23, 1946, was
issued after a series of preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are
satisfied that these were "hearings" within the meaning of the above mentioned
section 19 of the law. The record certainly reveals that what was done during
and what resulted from said preliminary hearings or conferences were reported
to the court at a formal hearing. As to public interest requiring that the court
enjoin the strike or walk out, or the return of striking laborers, aside from the
legal presumption that the Court of Industrial Relations complied with the
provisions of the law in this respect, we think that, considering the universally
known fact, of which this Court takes judicial notice, that as a result of the
destructions wrought by the late war, the economic and social rehabilitation of
the country urgently demands the reconstruction work will inevitably tend to
paralyze, impede or slow down the country's program of rehabilitation which, for
obvious and natural reasons, the government is striving to accelerate as much
as is humanly possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their
work. And that order was made after hearing, and, moreover, section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing for an order of the court fro the return
of striking workers, authorizes such order, among other cases, "when the
dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled". The provision
says: "... and if he has already done so (struck or walked out),that he shall
forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after
hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its
opinion, be promptly decided or settled, (emphasis supplied). In other words the
order to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or settled, may be issued
"only after hearing when public interest so requires", but if in the court's opinion
the dispute can not be promptly decided or settled, then it is also authorized
after hearing to issue the order: we construe the provision to mean that the very
impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the
court the power to issue the order for the reason that the public has an interest
in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as
well stated by the court's resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt
decision or settlement was a fact which was borne out by the entire record of
the case and did not need express statement in the order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by the
Court of Industrial Relations (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15, as
amended by Commonwealth Act 559, section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court;
National Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134,
Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil Workers'
Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th Supp., p. 71).
However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our
opinion on the constitutionality of the above statutory and reglementary
provisions should it, in the future, become necessary to decide it.
For all theses considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations assailed by the instant petition are hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39115 May 26, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus. SEGIFREDO L.
ACLARACION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, HON. HOSE N. LEUTERIO, COLONEL
RUPERTO B. ACLE, Chief of Police, and Lieutenant FRANCISCO CRUZ,
Warden, Makati, Rizal, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan
branch of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija from October 1, 1969 to
November 21, 1971. His appointment expired on November 21, 1972 while he
was working as a temporary stenographer in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Thereafter, he was employed as a stenographer in the Public
Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission,
where he is now working.
After Aclaracion had ceased to be a court stenographer, the Court of Appeals
required him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases decided by the
Gapan court which had been appealed: Muncal vs. Eugenio, CA-G. R. No.
49711-R and Paderes vs. Domingo, CA-G. R. No. 52367-R. He failed to comply
with the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. He was declared in contempt of
court.
On May 29 and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose N.
Leuterio, Chairmen of the Third and Seventh Divisions of the Court of Appeals,
respectively, ordered the Chief of Police of Makati, Rizal, to arrest Aclaracion, a
resident of that municipality, and to confine him in jail until he submits a complete
transcript of his notes in the said cases.
Aclaracion was arrested on June 21, 1974 and incarcerated in the municipal jail.
In a petition dated July 12, 1974 he asked the Court of Appeals that he be not
required to transcribe his notes in all the cases tried in the Gapan court. He
suggested that the testimonies in the said cases be retaken.
The Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution of August 7, 1974
ordered the release of Aclaracion. Later, he transcribed his notes in the Muncal
case. However, the warden did not release him because of the order of arrest
issued by the Seventh Division.
On August 9, 1974 Aclaracion filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus.
He advanced the novel contention that to compel him to transcribe his
stenographic notes, after he ceased to be a stenographer, would be a
transgression of the rule that "no involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution). He was averse to
being subjected "to involuntary servitude sans compensation". He desired to be
released from the obligation of transcribing his notes. (He filed his petition in
forma pauperis).
The petition was heard on August 20, 1974. It was already moot because, as
already noted, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals had ordered his release
on August 7th. Another hearing was held on September 3, 1974 in connection
with the detention of Aclaracion at the instance of Justice Leuterio. At that
hearing, this Court resolved to order Aclaracion's provisional release on
condition that within twenty days thereafter he would complete the transcription
of his notes in the Paderes case in his office at the Insurance Commission,
Manila.
So, he was provisionally released without prejudice to the final ruling on his
contention that he could not be compelled to transcribe his notes in the other
cases because he was no longer connected with the judiciary and because his
stenotype machine notes were standard notes which could be transcribed by
stenographers trained in stenotype machine shorthand.
On September 4, 1974 Aclaracion was released from the Makati jail. Upon
representations made by the Clerk of Court of this Court with the Insurance
Commissioner, the latter interposed no objection to Aclaracion's transcription of
his stenographic notes either in this Court or in his office in the Insurance
Commission.
On November 19, 1974 Aclaracion manifested that he had transcribed his notes
in the Paderes case in his office at the Insurance Commission after he was
provided by the Clerk of Court of this Court with the requisite supplies.
We have given Aclaracion's petition the attention and study which it deserves.
The habeas corpus aspect of his petition has become moot in view of his release
from jail during the pendency of his case. After much reflection, we have come
to the conclusion that his request that he be relieved from transcribing his notes
in the other cases cannot be granted.
We hold that an Appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to
transcribe his stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to
its appellate jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary
Page 4 of 15
to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due
administration of justice (See State vs. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 5
Pac. 2d 192, 39 Ariz. 242, Note 74, 21 C. J. S. 41; 20 Am. Jur. 2d 440; Fuller
vs. State, 57 So. 806, 100 Miss. 811).
The provision of section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that "upon the
approval of the record on appeal the clerk shall direct the stenographer or
stenographers concerned to attach to the record of the case five (5) copies of
the transcript of the oral evidence referred to in the record on appeal" includes
stenographers who are no longer in the judiciary. (See sec. 7, Rule 122 and sec.
7, R. A. No. 3749).
The traditional mode of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the
recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of court if he does not comply
with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys
the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court).
Another sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer,
promotion, resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he completes the
transcription of his notes. This is provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary
of Justice.
In the instant case, Aclaracion transcribed his notes in the Muncal and Paderes
cases while he was an employee of the Insurance Commission. During the time
that he made the transcription, he received his salary as such employee.
We hold that he could be required to transcribe his notes in other cases,
particularly in the case of Heirs of the Late Pacita Sicioco Cruz, etc. vs. La
Mallorca Pambusco, et al, CA-G. R. No. 49687-R. The Court of Appeals, in its
resolution of November 24, 1972, required him to transcribe his notes in that
case.
The same Court in its resolution of February 20, 1975 in Paterno vs. Tumibay,
CA-G. R. No. 51330-R imposed on Aclaracion a fine of one hundred fifty pesos
for his failure to transcribe his notes in the said case and warned him that he
would be arrested if he failed to submit his transcript within ten days from notice.
The same arrangement should be made by the Clerk of Court of this Court with
the Insurance Commissioner that Aclaracion should be allowed to receive his
salary while making the transcription.
Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes
would constitute involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude
denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another (Hodges
vs. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) or
the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and
against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 961). That situation does not obtain in this case.
Also untenable is Aclaracion's argument that the imprisonment of a
stenographer who had defied the court's resolution for the transcription of the
notes constitutes illegal detention. The incarceration of the contemning
stenographer is lawful because it is the direct consequence of his disobedience
of a court order. *
However, in view of the fact that Aclaracion might have acted in good faith in
not complying with the resolution of the Court of appeals in the Paterno case,
due to the pendency of the instant habeas corpus case (a fact which is inferable
from his letter to this Court dated March 11, 1975), the fine of one hundred fifty
pesos imposed on him is hereby remitted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal. C.J, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr.
and Martin, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16480 December 11, 1920
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGAPITO BELTRAN and PEDRO DE LEON, defendants.
AGAPITO BELTRAN, appellant.
Demetrio B. Encarnacion for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:

On May 10, 1919, Agapito Beltran borrowed from Facundo Ilaw, the owner of a
chineleria, the sum of P74.50. At the same time, Beltran signed a receipt of the
following tenor:
I borrowed from Mr. Facundo Ilaw the sum of seventy-four and fifty centavos
(P74.50), by virtue of our agreement that I shall work while I have not paid, and
that I shall pay every week by installments.
Beltran worked continuously in Ilaw's shop from March 17, 1919, until August
30, 1919. During this period Beltran claims that he paid Ilaw P24 on account of
his debt. Beltran left the employ of Ilaw because of a disagreement with the wife
of his employer and because there was not enough work and material to keep
him busy.
For failure to fulfill his agreement, Agapito Beltran was prosecuted, first in the
municipal court of the city of Manila, and later, on appeal, in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, for a violation of section 1 of Act No. 2098, an Act
relating to contracts of personal services and advances thereunder, and
providing punishment for certain offenses connected therewith. he was found
guilty and was sentenced by the latter court to two months' imprisonment, to pay
Facundo Ilaw the sum of P83.65, and to pay one-half of the costs.
On appeal, the defendant relies on two assignments of error. The first is, that
the lower court erred in not holding that Act No. 2098 has been repealed by Act
No. 2300 of the Philippine Legislature. This court has heretofore held that Act
No. 2098 of the Philippine Legislature is constitutional. (Ramirez vs. Oroco
[1916], 34 Phil., 412.) But we need not pause to resolve the specific point
presented, although parenthetically it may be remarked that it would require
strong argument to demonstrate that Act No. 2300 prohibiting slavery,
involuntary servitude, and peonage in the Philippine Islands, and enacted not
long after Act No. 2098, has by its terms impliedly repealed Act No. 2098,
because a decision on the second assignment of error, going to the facts in
relation with a construction of Act No. 2098, is sufficient to decide the case.
All three sections of Act No. 2098 begin with the words "No person who, with
intent to injure or defraud." Consequently, in order for there to be a conviction
under Act No. 2098, section 1, it must be shown that at the time the contract
was entered into, the employee did so with intention to defraud the employer. In
other words, it is the fraudulent intent to get the money or property of another
and not mere breach of contract which is made a crime by the statute. what is
punished is fraudulent practices and not a failure to pay a debt. Unless the court
is fully satisfied of a element of fraud in the transaction, there would only be a
breach of contract, and for this the defendant could not prosecuted criminally.
Bad faith is the test. (See Ex parte Hollman [1908], 79 S.C., 9; 21 L. R. A. [N.
S.], 242, and extensive note; U.S. vs. Aduna, R. G. No. 15082, decided August
25, 1919, not reported.)
The foregoing interpretation of the Philippine statute is deemed to be correct
notwithstanding our conception of the motives of the Legislature in enacting the
law. The Legislature saw clearly that if Philippine trade and commerce was to
prosper, fraud must be guarded against the contracts between employer and
employee must be enforced. On the other hand, the purpose of the Legislature
could only be carried out by enacting a law which would carefully avoid the
pitfalls of the constitutional inhibitions against imprisonment for debt and a
violation of the freedom of contract. As Mr. Justice Hughes well said in delivering
the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the leading cae of Bailey vs.
Alabama ([1910], 219 U.S., 219), "There is no more important concern that to
safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity be
based."lawphi1.net
That the construction we give to the Philippine statute is correct, is shown by
contrasting it with the law of Alabama on the same subject, as analyzed by the
United States Supreme Court. Before the amendment to the Alabama law in
1903 and 1907, held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, the
Code of Alabama contained a provision substantially the same as our Act No.
2098. The construction which the Supreme Court of Alabama placed upon the
statue as it then stood in Ex parte Riley ([1891], 94 Ala., 82), quoted approvingly
by the United States Supreme Court in Bailey vs. Alabama, supra, was as
follows:
The ingredients of this statutory offense are: (1) A contract in wring by the
accused for the performance of any act or service; (2) an intent on the part of
the accused, when he entered into the contract, to injure or defraud his
employers; (3) the obtaining by the accused of money or other personal property
from such employer by means of such contract entered into with such intent;
and (4) the refusal by the accused, with like intent, and without just cause, and
without refunding such money, or paying for such property, to perform such act
or service. This statute by no means provides that a person who has entered
into a written contract for the performance of services, under which he has
obtained money or other personal property, is punishable as if he had stolen
such money or other personal property, upon his refusal to perform the contract,
without refunding the money or paying for the property. A mere breach of a
contract is not by the statute made a crime. The criminal feature of the
transaction is wanting unless the accused entered into the contract with intent
to injure or defraud his employer, and unless his refusal to perform was with like
intent and without just cause. That there was an intent to injure or defraud the
employer, both when the contract was entered into and when the accused
refused performance, are facts which must be shown by the evidence. As the
intent is the design, purpose, resolve, or determination in the mind of the
accused, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence, but must be ascertained by
means of inferences from the facts and circumstances developed by the proof.
(Carlisle vs. State, 76 Ala., 75; Mack vs. State, 63 Ala., 138.) In the absence,
Page 5 of 15
however, of evidence from which such inferences may be drawn, the jury are
not justified in indulging in mere unsupported conjectures, speculations, or
suspicions as to intentions which were not disclosed by any visible or tangible
act, expression, or circumstance. (Green vs. State, 68 Ala., 539.)
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts, we find nothing to show that when
the defendant borrowed from the complainant the amount of money mentioned
in the receipt, he had made up his mind not to pay his debt, or to injure his
employer. If anything, the fact that the accused worked for the complainant
continuously for three or four months after the debt was incurred, would indicate
good faith on the part of the accused at the time the agreement was signed. In
addition to this the testimony of the accused with regard to the reason which
compelled him to seek work in another place, appears to be more convincing
than that of the complainant on the same point.
Judgment is reversed, and the defendant is acquitted with all costs de officio.
So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43290 December 21, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMBROSIO LINSAÑGAN, defendant-appellant.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Appellant was prosecuted for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax under
section 1439, in connection with section 2718, of the Revised Administrative
Code. After due trial, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five days,
and to pay the costs. From this judgment he appealed, alleging that the trial
court erred in not declaring said sections 1439 and 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code unconstitutional and void. Section 1439 specifies the
persons required to pay the cedula tax, and the pertinent part ot section 2718
reads as follows:
A person liable to the cedula tax who remains delinquent in the payment of the
same for fifteen days after June first of each year and who upon demand of the
provincial treasurer foils thereafter to pay such tax as required by law shall be
deemed to be guilty of a misdemeanor; and the provincial treasurer may, in his
discretion, cause the delinquent to be prosecuted before the justice of the peace
of the municipality in which the delinquent shall be found, and upon conviction
the person so delinquent shalI be sentenced to imprisonment for five days for
each unpaid cedula.
This case was tried and decided in the court below before the Constitution of
the Philippines took effect. But while this appeal was pending, the said
Constitution became effective, and, section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof
provides that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll
tax." This introduces a new element into the case, for while our previous organic
law provided that no person should be imprisoned for debt, it contained no
express provision against imprisonment for non-payment of a poll or cedula tax;
and it is for this reason that the arguments of counsel for the appellant are mainly
directed to support the view that the judgment of convection violates the
provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act interdicting imprisonment for debt.
Under the present state of the law, the question squarely presented for
determination is whether, in view of Section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the
Constitution, the judgment of conviction can stand.
As this is the first case in which the interpretation and application of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines are directly involved, it may not
be amiss to refer briefly to the immediate history of that important and unique
document — unique in that it derives its binding force not only from the will of
the people of the Philippine Islands, but from the authority of the Congress of
the United States.
By the Act of Congress of March 24, 1934, popularly known as the Tydings-
McDuffie Law, the people of the Philippine Islands were authorized to adopt a
constitution, subject to the conditions and qualifications prescribed in said Act.
The law required three distinct steps for the adoption of the constitution. The
first was the drafting and approval of the constitution by the constitutional
convention authorized to be called under the Act; the second was the
certification by the President of the United States that the constitution so drafted
and approved conformed with the provisions of the same Act; and the third was
the ratification of the constitution by the people of the Philippine Islands at an
election or plebiscite called for the purpose of ratifying or rejecting the same. On
July 30, 1934, the constitutional convention met for the purpose of drafting a
constitution, and the constitution subsequently drafted was approved by the
convention on February 8, 1935. The constitution was submitted to the
President of the United States on March 18, 1935; and on March 23, 1935, the
President certified that the constitution conformed substatitially with the
provisions of the Act of Congress approved March 24, 1934. On May 14, 1935,
the constitution was ratified by the people.

The constitution provides for the establishment of a government that, in the
language of the preamble, shall embody the ideals of the Filipino people,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare,
and secure to them and their posterity the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty, and democracy. The constitution also provides for a
republican form of government, follows the principle of the separation of powers,
and contains a bill of rights. It guarantees freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, and freedom of religion. In most of its main features, it is modeled after
the Constitution the United States which was characterized by William Pitt, that
eminent English stateman, as "the wonder and admiration of all future
generations and the model for all future constitutions," and by Gladstone,
another English statesman of renown, as "the most wonderful work ever struck
off at a given time by the brain and purpose of men."
Section 4 of the Act of Congress of March 24, 1934, already mentioned,
contains, among others, the following provision:1awphil.net
. . . When the election of the officers provided for under the constitution has
been held and the results determined, the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands shall certify the results of the election to the President of the United
States, who shall thereupon issue a proclamation announcing the results of the
election, and upon the issuance of such proclamation by the President the
existing Philippine Government shall terminate and the new government shall
enter upon its rights, privileges, powers, and duties as provided under the
constitution. . . ..
The proclamation announcing the results of the election of the officers provided
for under the Constitution was issued by the President of the United States on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Government of the Commonwealth was
inaugurated.
Turning again to the particular question raised in this case, section 2 of Article
XV of the Constitution, provides:
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws
to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be constued, in so
far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under
this Constitution.
It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the
Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for nonpayment
of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration
of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be
based thereon.
It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the case
dismissed with costs de oficio. So Ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard,
and Recto, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25091 November 29, 1968
NILDA SURA, in her behalf and in behalf of her minor child VICENTE
MARTIN, JR., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE SILVESTRE MARTIN, SR., defendant-appellant.
Bartolome S. Palma for plaintiff-appellee.
Adrian H. Villasis and Plaridel S. Katalbas for defendant-appellant.
CAPISTRANO, J.:
Appeal from the Orders of January 9, and February 1, 1965, of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental ordering the arrest and imprisonment of the
defendant, Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt, "hasta que cumpla con ladecision
dictada en esta causa."
Appellant's statement of facts, accepted by the appellee, is as follows:
In Civil Case No. 5580 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
entitled, "NILDA SURA, In her behalf and in behalf of her minor child, VICENTE
MARTIN, JR., Plaintiffs, versus VICENTE SILVESTRE MARTIN, SR.,
Defendant", judgment was rendered on June 20, 1961, amended on July 15,
1961, as follows:
EN MERITOS DE TODO LO EXPUESTO, el Juzgado falla esta causa como
sigue:
Page 6 of 15
(a) Se sobresee el primer motivo de accion de la demanda;
(b) Se ordena al demandado a que reconozca al demandante Vicente
Martin, Jr. como su hijo natural; y
(c) Se condena al demandado a pagar al demandante Vicente Martin,
Jr., alimentos atrasados a razon de P100.00 mensuales a contar desde el dia
10 de Diciembre de 1959, fecah de la presentacion de la demanda, y a pasar
al mismo demandante una pension mensual de P100.00 hasta que el mismo
llegue a la mayor edad.
(d) Se condena al demandado a pagar los honorarios del abogado de
las demandantesen la cantidad de P1,000.00.
Las costas del presente juicio seran pagadas per el demandado.
Asi se ordena.
Ciudad de Bacolod, Julio 15, 1961.
(Fdo) EDUARDO D. ENRIQUEZ
Juez
From the above judgment, the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and
the latter Court, in C.A. G.R. No. 30388-R, affirmed said decision on January
30, 1964.
On May 9, 1964, the Curt of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued the
following order:
Upon petition of counsel for the plaintiff, the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
issue writ of execution, same be forwarded to the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Oriental.
SO ORDERED.
Bacolod City, Philippines, May 9, 1964.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. QUERUBIN
Judge
Pursuant to this aforecited order, a writ of execution was issued on May 9, 1964
by the Clerk of Court, and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental served the
same upon the defendant in Tanjay, Negros Oriental but returned the writ
unsatisfied. The second paragraph of the Sheriff's return of service, dated
September 21, 1964, stated:
The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the
company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable
property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate
of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental,
where debtor legally resides.
On October 6, 1964, counsel for the plaintiff prayed that defendant, for failure to
satisfy the writ of execution, be adjudged guilty of contempt of court. On
November 28, 1964, the Court issued the following order:
AUTO
A peticion del abogado Sr. Villasis que representa al demandado, y con la
conformidad del abogado Sr. Tupaz, per el presente se le concede al
demandado un plazo de 30 dias contar desde esta fecha, para cumplir con la
decision de este Juzgado antes de que se le declare en desacato .
Asi se ordena.
Ciudad de Bacolod, Noviembre 28, 1964.
(Fdo) EDUARDO D. ENRIQUEZ
Juez
The defendant having failed to satisfy said order, the Court on January 9, 1965
issued the following order:
AUTO
Habiendo dejado de cumplir con la orden de este Juzgado de fecha 28 de
Noviembre de 1964, por el presente se ordena el arresto del demandado
Vicente Silvestre, Sr.
Asi se ordena.
Ciudad de Bacolod, Enero 9, 1965.
EDUARDO D. ENRIQUEZ Juez
Notice of appeal from the last aforecited order was filed on January 26, 1965 by
attorney for the defendant who at the same time prayed for the fixing of a bond
for the temporary release of the defendant. On February 1, 1965, the Court
issued the following order:
AUTO
Oidas y consideradas las explicaciones dadas por el demandado, en la silla
testifical el dia 28 de Noviembre de 1964, y no encontrandobien fundadas las
razones alegadas por el, por el presente se ordena el confinamiento de dicho
demandado en la carcel provincial hasta que cumpla con la decision deictada
en esta causa. Se fija en P7,000.00 la fianza que el demandado debe prestar
sidesea apelar contra de orden dictada en esta misma fecha.
Asi se ordena.
Ciudad de Bacolod, February 1, 1965.
EDUARDO D. ENRIQUEZ Juez
The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant, Vicente Martin,
Sr., for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the judgment were illegal, in view
of the following considerandos:
(1) The judgment ordering the defendant to pay past and future support
at P100 per month was a final disposition of the case and was declaratory of the
obligation of the defendant. The writ of execution issued on the judgment with
respect to past support in the amount of about P6,000 required "the sheriff or
other proper officer" to whom it was directed (Rule 39, Section 8, Rules of Court)
to satisfy the amount out of all property, real and personal, of the judgment
debtor in the manner specified in Rule 39, Section 15, of the Rules of Court. The
writ of execution was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other proper
officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view
thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have
committed disobedience to the writ.
(2) The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent.
Hence the Orders of 9 and February 1, 1965, in effect, authorized his
imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.
(3) The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt in
Section 3(b)of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, does not refer to a judgment which
is a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the
parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court as a judgment "which requires the performance of any other act
than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property."
According to Moran:
Generally, any order or judgement of a court finally disposing of an action should
be enforced by ordinary execution proceedings, except special judgments which
should be executed by contempt proceedings in accordance with Rule 39, sec.
9," citing Caluag, et al. vs. Pecson, et al., 82 Phil. 8. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 320.)
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed Orders of January 9 and
February 1, 1965, are hereby reversed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro
and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX,
Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as
City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-66839-42 December 18, 1986
LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE GLICERIO L. CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Executive
Judge, Branch V, Region IV, Regional Trial Court, sitting at Lemery, Batangas,
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BATANGAS, and MARIA LUISA TORDECILLA,
respondents.
G.R No. 71654 December 18, 1986
ANTONIO DATUIN and SUSAN DATUIN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PANO, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch LXXXVIII, HONORABLE ClTY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 74524-25 December 18, 1986
OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PAÑ;O Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY,
respondents.
Page 7 of 15
G.R. No. 75122-49 December 18, 1986
ELINOR ABAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 139,
Makati and FEDERICO L. MELOCOTTON JR., in his capacity as Trial Fiscal
Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati, respondents.
G.R No. 75812-13 December 18, 1986
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ VII and SYLVIA V. AGUILUZ, spouses, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 154, now vacant but
temporarily presided by HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI Branch 153, Court of
First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent.
G.R No. 75765-67 December 18, 1986
LUIS M. HOJAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE SENEN PENARANDA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XX, HONORABLE JUDGE ALFREDO
LAGAMON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch XXII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL NOLI T. CATHI, City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro City, respondents.
G.R. No. 75789 December 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 52, Manila and THELMA SARMIENTO,
respondents.
R.R. Nogales Law Office for petitioner in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 74524-25,
G.R. Nos. 75812-13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for respondent in G.R.
No. 75789.
Pio S. Canta for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 66839-42.
Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 71654.
Abinoja, Tabalingcos, Villalon & Associates for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 75122-
49.
The Solicitor General for respondent in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 66839-42,
G.R. No. 71654, G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75122-49, G.R. Nos. 75812-
13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 75789.
YAP, J.:
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly
known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the
sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely
one of first impression in our jurisdiction.
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the
statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the
informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense,
the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent
trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein
the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The
parties adversely affected have come to us for relief.
As a threshold issue the former Solicitor General in his comment on the
petitions, maintained the posture that it was premature for the accused to
elevate to this Court the orders denying their motions to quash, these orders
being interlocutory. While this is correct as a general rule, we have in justifiable
cases intervened to review the lower court's denial of a motion to quash. 1 In
view of the importance of the issue involved here, there is no doubt in our mind
that the instant petitions should be entertained and the constitutional challenge
to BP 22 resolved promptly, one way or the other, in order to put to rest the
doubts and uncertainty that exist in legal and judicial circles and the general
public which have unnecessarily caused a delay in the disposition of cases
involving the enforcement of the statute.
For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue presented here, we do not
find it necessary to delve into the specifics of the informations involved in the
cases which are the subject of the petitions before us. 2 The language of BP 22
is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or
postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in
mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value.
I
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less
than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of
the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
3 for a pre-existing debt, the drawer does not derive any material benefit in return
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover
the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank. 4
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to
cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult
to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within
five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer
makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder
the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides
that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the
drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto,
giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment
and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the
drawee on such dishonored check." 6
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course
to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
II
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that
are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment.
The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury
it causes to t public interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our statute books
which penalize the issuance of bouncing or rubber checks. Criminal law has
dealth with the problem within the context of crimes against property punished
as "estafa" or crimes involving fraud and deceit. The focus of these penal
provisions is on the damage caused to the property rights of the victim.
The Penal Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 1887 until
it was replaced by the Revised Penal Code in 1932, contained provisions
penalizing, among others, the act of defrauding another through false pretenses.
Art. 335 punished a person who defrauded another "by falsely pretending to
possess any power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency or
business, or by means of similar deceit." Although no explicit mention was made
therein regarding checks, this provision was deemed to cover within its ambit
the issuance of worthless or bogus checks in exchange for money. 7
In 1926, an amendment was introduced by the Philippine Legislature, which
added a new clause (paragraph 10) to Article 335 of the old Penal Code, this
time referring in explicit terms to the issuance of worthless checks. The
amendment penalized any person who 1) issues a check in payment of a debt
or for other valuable consideration, knowing at the time of its issuance that he
does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover its amount, or 2) maliciously
signs the check differently from his authentic signature as registered at the bank
in order that the latter would refuse to honor it; or 3) issues a postdated check
and, at the date set for its payment, does not have sufficient deposit to cover
the same.8
In 1932, as already adverted to, the old Penal Code was superseded by the
Revised Penal Code. 9 The above provisions, in amended form, were
incorporated in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of
estafa. The revised text of the provision read as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commis sion of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or
the funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the cheek
without informing the payee of such circumstances.
Page 8 of 15
The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks issued
in payment of pre-existing obligations. 10 The rationale of this interpretation is
that in estafa, the deceit causing the defraudation must be prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. In issuing a check as payment
or as consideration for its issuance. On the part of the payee, he had already
parted with his money or property before the check is issued to him hence, he
is not defrauded by means of any "prior" or "simultaneous" deceit perpetrated
on him by the drawer of the check.
With the intention of remedying the situation and solving the problem of how to
bring checks issued in payment of pre-existing debts within the ambit of Art. 315,
an amendment was introduced by the Congress of the Philippines in 1967, 11
which was enacted into law as Republic Act No. 4885, revising the aforesaid
proviso to read as follows:
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within
three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be
puma facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
However, the adoption of the amendment did not alter the situation materially.
A divided Court held in People vs. Sabio, Jr. 12 that Article 315, as amended by
Republic Act 4885, does not cover checks issued in payment of pre-existing
obligations, again relying on the concept underlying the crime of estafa through
false pretenses or deceit—which is, that the deceit or false pretense must be
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.
Since statistically it had been shown that the greater bulk of dishonored checks
consisted of those issued in payment of pre-existing debts, 13 the amended
provision evidently failed to cope with the real problem and to deal effectively
with the evil that it was intended to eliminate or minimize.
With the foregoing factual and legal antecedents as a backdrop, the then Interim
Batasan confronted the problem squarely. It opted to take a bold step and
decided to enact a law dealing with the problem of bouncing or worthless
checks, without attaching the law's umbilical cord to the existing penal
provisions on estafa. BP 22 addresses the problem directly and frontally and
makes the act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. 14
The question now arises: Is B P 22 a valid law?
Previous efforts to deal with the problem of bouncing checks within the ambit of
the law on estafa did not evoke any constitutional challenge. In contrast, BP 22
was challenged promptly.
Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the
constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom
of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates
legislative and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during
its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting
amendments to a bill on Third Reading.
The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching
and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court,
involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and
most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the
government." 15
As we enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and
coordinate branch of the government, we need not be reminded of the time-
honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is
presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its
constitutionality. This is not to say that we approach our task with diffidence or
timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its
authority under the constitution we should not hesitate to wield the axe and let
it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute.
III
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is
the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter
to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned
for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." 16 Petitioners insist that, since the offense
under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the
check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt
law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the
check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a
veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.
First of all it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional
inhibition invoked by petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that
evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century in the various
states of the American Union as a result of the people's revulsion at the cruel
and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditors
to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At common
law, money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for
damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against the person or
body of the debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a
debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he
makes the satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the popular ground swell
against such a barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt
came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the
Union. 17
This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at
the turn of t0he century and embodied in our organic laws. 18 Later, our
fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous
practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-payment of the
cedula or poll tax. 19
The reach and scope of this constitutional safeguard have been the subject of
judicial definition, both by our Supreme Court 20 and by American State
courts.21 Mr. Justice Malcolm speaking for the Supreme Court in Ganaway vs.
Queen, 22 stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional
guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from
imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to
prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu The inhibition was never
meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that
damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into
between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has
done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by
the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime."
The law involved in Ganaway was not a criminal statute but the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions (1909) which authorized the arrest of the defendant
in a civil case on grounds akin to those which justify the issuance of a writ of
attachment under our present Rules of Court, such as imminent departure of
the defendant from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors, or
concealment, removal or disposition of properties in fraud of creditors, etc. The
Court, in that case, declared the detention of the defendant unlawful, being
violative of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt, and
ordered his release. The Court, however, refrained from declaring the statutory
provision in question unconstitutional.
Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes,23 wherein a statutory
provision which made illegal and punishable the refusal of an employer to pay,
when he can do so, the salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or
last day of every month or on Saturday every week, was challenged for being
violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The
constitutionality of the law in question was upheld by the Court, it being within
the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police
power. It was held that "one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible
abuses on the part of the employers who hire laborers or employees without
paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them
financial difficulties. "The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment
of an obligation, although obviously such could be its effect, but to banish a
practice considered harmful to public welfare.
IV
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute
prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check
to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment
of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart
of the issue before us.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act
not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to appear elusive and difficult
to conceptualize. But precisely in the failure to perceive the vital distinction lies
the error of those who challenge the validity of BP 22.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person
for non-payment of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is within the prerogative
of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical
to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish.
An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum
in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed
and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the
exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential,
insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. 24 It is a power not emanating from
or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." 25
Page 9 of 15
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of
public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient
that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual
and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to
understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been
reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to
200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central
Bank, it averaged between 50 minion to 80 million pesos a day. 26
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on
demand. 27 It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a
deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain
person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on demand. 28
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount
of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation
that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient
to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an
element of certainty or assurance that the instrument wig be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a
medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks
have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial
and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is
confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the
banking community.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money
supply of the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso demand
deposits; the remaining two. 29 These de deposit thirds consists of currency in
circulation. ma deposits in the banks constitute the funds against which among
others, commercial papers like checks, are drawn. The magnitude of the amount
involved amply justifies the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the
integrity of the banking system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is
like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's economy.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated —
30
The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the
pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place
him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts,
and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except
in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and
is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence obtaining in the
various states of the United States on the constitutionality of the "worthless
check" acts. 31 It is needless to warn that foreign jurisprudence must be taken
with abundant caution. A caveat to be observed is that substantial differences
exist between our statute and the worthless check acts of those states where
the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to remember is that BP 22 was not
lifted bodily from any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to consider that
judicial decisions must be read in the context of the facts and the law involved
and, in a broader sense, of the social economic and political environment—in
short, the milieu—under which they were made. We recognize the wisdom of
the old saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander.
As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to
meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police
power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example,
there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-
impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. 32 Whether
the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been
reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.
We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.
V
We need not detain ourselves lengthily in the examination of the other
constitutional objections raised by petitioners, some of which are rather flimsy.
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of
contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom
to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not
lawful. 33 Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as
mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age,
has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking
system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies
equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of
the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible
for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the
law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture
ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws."
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable
or arbitrary. 34
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of
legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole
act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the
payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it,
there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the
meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the
power to legislate, or the power to make laws. 35 which means, as applied to
the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to
prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that
the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any
manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that
can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive
power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to
the offended party is farfetched.
Lastly, the objection has been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973
Constitution was violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law.
This constitutional provision prohibits the introduction of amendments to a bill
during the Third Reading. It is claimed that during its Third Reading, the bill
which eventually became BP 22 was amended in that the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of the bill as adopted on Second Reading was altered or
changed in the printed text of the bill submitted for approval on Third Reading.
A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this
matter shows that, indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members
on what was the exact text of the paragraph in question which the body
approved on Second Reading. 36 Part of the confusion was due apparently to
the fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the amendment
period), amendments were proposed orally and approved by the body or
accepted by the sponsor, hence, some members might not have gotten the
complete text of the provisions of the bill as amended and approved on Second
Reading. However, it is clear from the records that the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually approved by the
body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved
Minutes for that day. In any event, before the bin was submitted for final approval
on Third Reading, the Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to
investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report, which was approved by
the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the clause in question was ... an
authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately
the provision in question as approved on Second Reading. 37 We therefore,
find no merit in the petitioners' claim that in the enactment of BP 22 the
provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the petition in G.R. No. 75789
and setting aside the order of the respondent Judge dated August 19, 1986. The
petitions in G.R. Nos. 63419, 66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13
and 75765-67 are hereby dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued
in G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted. With costs against private petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75954 October 22, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Manila, and K.T. LIM alias MARIANO LIM, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Failing in his argument that B.P. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Check
Law", is unconstitutional, 1 private respondent now argues that the check he
issued, a memorandum check, is in the nature of a promissory note, hence,
outside the purview of the statute. Here, his argument must also fail.
Page 10 of 15
The facts are simple. Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged before
respondent court with violation of B.P. 22 in an Information alleging ––
That on . . . January 10, 1985, in the City of Manila . . . the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
Fatima Cortez Sasaki . . . Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383 dated
February 9, 1985 . . . in the amount of P143,000.00, . . . well knowing that at the
time of issue he . . . did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank . . . which check . . . was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Fatima Cortez Sasaki the amount of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice. 2
On 18 July 1986, private respondent moved to quash the Information of the
ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was
unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which
was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. On 1 September
1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based
was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in behalf
of the government.
Since the constitutionality of the "Bouncing Check Law" has already been
sustained by this Court in Lozano v. Martinez 3 and the seven (7) other cases
decided jointly with it, 4 the remaining issue, as aptly stated by private
respondent in his Memorandum, is whether a memorandum check issued
postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing obligation is within the coverage
of B.P. 22.
Citing U.S. v. Isham, 5 private respondent contends that although a
memorandum check may not differ in form and appearance from an ordinary
check, such a check is given by the drawer to the payee more in the nature of
memorandum of indebtedness and, should be sued upon in a civil action.
We are not persuaded.
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word
"memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the
maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without any
condition concerning its presentment. 6 Such a check is an evidence of debt
against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, 7 has
the same effect as an ordinary check, 8 and if passed to the third person, will
be valid in his hands like any other check. 9
From the above definition, it is clear that a memorandum check, which is in the
form of an ordinary check, is still drawn on a bank and should therefore be
distinguished from a promissory note, which is but a mere promise to pay. If
private respondent seeks to equate memorandum check with promissory note,
as he does to skirt the provisions of B.P. 22, he could very well have issued a
promissory note, and this would be have exempted him form the coverage of
the law. In the business community a promissory note, certainly, has less impact
and persuadability than a check.
Verily, a memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn
on a bank payable on demand." A check is also defined as " [a] written order or
request to a bank or persons carrying on the business of banking, by a party
having money in their hands, desiring them to pay, on presentment, to a person
therein named or bearer, or to such person or order, a named sum of money,"
citing 2 Dan. Neg. Inst. 528; Blair v. Wilson, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 170; Deener v.
Brown, 1 MacArth. (D.C.) 350; In re Brown, 2 Sto. 502, Fed. Cas. No. 1,985.
See Chapman v. White, 6 N.Y. 412, 57 Am. Dec 464. 10 Another definition of
check is that is "[a] draft drawn upon a bank and payable on demand, signed by
the maker or drawer, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain
in money to the order of the payee," citing State v. Perrigoue, 81 Wash, 2d 640,
503 p. 2d 1063, 1066. 11
A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does
not distinguish but merely provides that "[a]ny person who makes or draws and
issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is subsequently
dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . ." (Emphasis supplied ).
12 Ubi lex no distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
But even if We retrace the enactment of the "Bouncing Check Law" to determine
the parameters of the concept of "check", We can easily glean that the members
of the then Batasang Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as to include
all checks drawn against banks. This was particularly the ratiocination of Mar.
Estelito P. Mendoza, co-sponsor of Cabinet Bill No. 9 which later became B.P.
22, when in response to the interpellation of Mr. Januario T. Seño, Mr. Mendoza
explained that the draft or order must be addressed to a bank or depository, 13
and accepted the proposed amendment of Messrs. Antonio P. Roman and
Arturo M. Tolentino that the words "draft or order", and certain terms which
technically meant promissory notes, wherever they were found in the text of the
bill, should be deleted since the bill was mainly directed against the pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no funds, and not to drafts which
were not drawn against banks. 14
A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank.
Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a
memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial
fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance
itself of a bouncing check 15 and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The
mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or
even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum. 16
We are not unaware that a memorandum check may carry with it the
understanding that it is not be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by
the maker himself when the loan fall due. This understanding may be
manifested by writing across the check "Memorandum", "Memo" or "Mem."
However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private
arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed
by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be
first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision
of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the
very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of
unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless
checks changing hands, the country will once again experience the limitless
circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such
checks will be considered exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common
practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which
creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To determine the reasons for
which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value
of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking
communities. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of
1 September 1986 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, respondent Judge, or whoever
presides over the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, is hereby directed
forthwith to proceed with the hearing of the case until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 122539 March 4, 1999
JESUS V. TIOMICO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIFTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari under Section 2, Rule 125, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to correct, reverse and annul the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment 2 of the trial
court convicting the petitioner herein for a violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
Petitioner Jesus V. Tiomico, (Tiomico) opened a Letter of Credit with the Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI) for $5,600 to be used for the importation of two
(2) units of Forklifts, Shovel loader and a truck mounted with crane. On October
29, 1982, the said machineries were received by the accused, as evidenced by
the covering trust receipt. Upon maturity of the trust receipt, on December 28,
1982, he made a partial payment of US$855.94, thereby leaving an unpaid
obligation of US$4,770.46. As of December 21, 1989, Tiomico owed BPI
US$4,770.46, or P109,386.65, computed at P22.93 per US dollar, the rate of
exchange at the time. Failing to pay the said amount or to deliver subject
machineries and equipments, despite several demands, the International
Operations Department of BPI referred the matter to the Legal Department of
the bank. But the letter of demand sent to him notwithstanding, Tiomico failed
to satisfy his monetary obligation sued upon.
Consequently, he was accused of a violation of PD 115, otherwise known as
the Trust Receipts Law, under an Information 3 alleging:
That on or about the 29th day of October, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro, Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, executed a Trust Receipt Agreement for and in
behalf of Paramount Calibrators Merchandising of which he is the sole proprietor
in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. In consideration of the receipt by
the said accused of three (3) bares one unit Forklift Model FD-30 Toyota Branch
2-J70 Hp and one unit Forklift Model LM-301 Toyota Branch 2-J 70 Hp and one
unit shovel loader Model SOT 130 HP, 6 Cyl-LC #2-16860, for which there is
now due the sum of US$5600.00, wherein the accused agreed to sell the same
and with the express obligation to remit to the complainant-bank the proceeds
of the sale, and/or to turn over the same if not sold, on demand, but the accused
once in possession of the said items, far from complying with his obligation, with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own
personal use and benefit despite repeated demands, failed and refused and still
fails and refuses account for and/or remit the proceeds of the sale thereof, to
the damage and prejudice of the said complainant-bank as represented by
Page 11 of 15
Lourdes V. Palomo in the aforementioned amount of US $5600 or its equivalent
in Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned thereunder, Tiomico entered a plea of Not Guilty, at which juncture,
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor John B. Egana manisfested that he was
authorizing the private prosecutor, Atty. Jose B. Soncuya, to prosecute the case
subject to his direction, supervision and control.
On October 16, 1989, Gretel S. Donato was presented to testify for the
prosecution. According to her, she worked for the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) in 1981 and in 1982, she was assigned as one of the Letter of Credit
processors in the International Operations Department of BPI. Her duty, among
others, was to process letter of credit applications which included that of
Tiomico. The trust receipt executed by the latter was given to her as part of the
documents supporting his Letter of Credit.
The following documents presented in the course of the testimony of Donato
were identified by her as follows:
(1) Exhibit "A" — Letter of Credit;
(2) Exhibit "B" — Pro Forma Invoice;
(3) Exhibit "C" — Letter of Credit Confirmation;
(4) Exhibit "D" — Trust Receipt; Exhibit D1-D4 — signatures thereon;
(5) Exhibit "E" — Statement of Account, the amount of P306,708.17
appearing therein, as Exhibit E-1, and the signature thereto of an unidentified
bank officer, as Exhibit E-2;
(6) Exhibit "F" — Letter of Demand of the bank's legal department; a
return card, as Exhibit F-1, and the signature of the addressee's agent, as
Exhibit F-1 A.
Counsel for petitioner objected to the admission of Exhibits "A", "B", "C" and "D"
on the ground that witness failed to identify the said documents inasmuch as
her testimony regarding the signatures appearing therein were evidently
hearsay. But the trial court admitted the said documentary evidence, despite the
objections raised thereto by the defense. Thereafter, the prosecution rested.
After the People rested its case, petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to
the evidence, theorizing that the evidence on record does not suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the accusation against him. But instead of granting
the said motion of the defense, the trial court ordered a re-opening of the case,
so as to enable the prosecution to adduce more evidence. The defense objected
but to no avail. The trial court proceeded with the continuation of trial "in the
interest of justice".
On September 5, 1990, the-lower court denied the demurrer to evidence. The
Motion for Reconsideration of the defense met the same fate. It was denied.
The case was then set for continuation of trial on December 12, 1990. Reception
of evidence for the defense was set on January 7, 1991. But on January 4, 1991,
three days before the scheduled continuation of trial, the defense counsel filed
an Urgent Motion for Postponement for the given reason that he had to appear
before Branch 12 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila on January 7, 1991.
On January 7, 1991, the lower court denied the Urgent Motion for Postponement
and adjudged petitioner to have waived the right to introduce evidence on his
behalf.
On January 30, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision finding petitioner
guilty of a violation of PD 115, and sentencing him accordingly.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals came out with a judgment of affirmance, the
dispositive portion which, is to the following effect:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds JESUS V. TIOMICO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of PD 115 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify Bank of the Philippine Islands the
sum of P109,386.65 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the Petition for Review by
Certiorari at bar, seeking to annul the decision 5 of the Court of Appeals; raising
as issues:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT PD 115 OR TRUST RECEIPTS LAW IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
(2) WHETHER OR NOT A TESTIMONY CAN BE ADMITTED DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL OFFER AS REQUIRED BY SECTIONS 34 AND
35, RULE 132, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT;
(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS WITH
REGARD TO THE LETTER OF CREDIT AND OTHER DOCUMENT IS
HEARSAY AND;
(4) WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS DEPRIVATION OF DUE
PROCESS ON THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT
DENIED THE MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT BY THE DEFENSE
COUNSEL.
As regards the first issue, the Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of the
Trust Receipts Law and consistently declared that the said law does not violate
the constitutional proscription againts imprisonment for non-payment of debts.
(People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312; People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726; Lee vs.
Rodil, 175 SCRA 100). Such pronouncement was thoroughly explained in Lee
vs. Rodil (supra) thus:
Verily, PD 115 is a declaration by the legislative authority that, as a matter of
public policy, the failure of a person to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods if not sold is a public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. As held in Lozano
vs. Martinez (146 SCRA 323, 338):
. . . certainly, it is within the authority of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain
act deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not
the only acts that the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society
as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The State can do this in the exercise of its police power.
In fine, PD 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional provision of non-imprisonment for non-payment of debt.
In a similar vein, the case of People vs. Nitafan (supra) held:
The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in
the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of
whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to enforce payment
of a loan. Thus, there can be no violation of the right against imprisonment for
non-payment of a debt.
Anent the second issue, the pivotal question is: Should the testimony of a
witness be admitted despite the failure of the proponent to offer it formally in
evidence, as required by Section 34 of Rule 132 6? We rule on this issue in the
affirmative.
Records disclose that the private prosecutor stated the purpose of the testimony
in question although he did not formally offer the same. The proceedings 7 went
on as follows:
ATTY. SONCUYA:
The purpose of the testimony of the witness is to prove that the accused applied
for a letter of credit, for the opening of a letter of credit and for the importation
of machinery from Japan and that those machinery were delivered and received
by the accused as evidenced by the trust receipt and that the accused failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the said trust receipt, your Honor.
COURT:
All right, proceed.
As aptly stressed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, 8 "the absence of
the words, 'we are formally offering the testimony for the purpose of . . .'" should
be considered merely as an excusable oversight on the part of the private
prosecutor.
It should be borne in mind that the rationale behind Section 34 of Rule 132 9 is
to inform the Court of the purpose of the testimony, to enable the judge to rule
whether the said testimony is necessary or is irrelevant or immaterial.
In the case under scrutiny, since the purpose of subject testimony was
succinctly stated, the reason behind the requirement for its formal offer has been
substantially complied with. What the defense counsel should have done should
have been to interpose his objection the moment the private respondent was
called to testify, on the ground that there was no prior offer made by the
proponent. 10
The tendency of the rules on evidence, is towards substantial justice rather than
strict adherence to technicalities. To condemn the disputed testimony as
inadmissible due to the failure of the private prosecutor to properly observe the
rules on presentation of evidence, would render nugatory, and defeat the
proceedings before the lower court.
On the third issue — whether or not the witness can testify on subject
documents introduced as evidence despite her admission that she did not see
the accused sign the said exhibits, we likewise rule in the affirmative.
As aptly held by the appellate court: 11
Gretel Donato testified that she was not present when appellant affixed his
signature on the documents in question (p. 22 ibid). She, however, identified the
signatures thereon (Exhs. "A-1", "A-2", "D-1", "D-2" and "D-3", Letter of Credit;
Exhibit B — Pro Forma Invoice; Exhibit C — Letter of Credit Confirmation;
Exhibit D-Trust Receipt; Exhibit D1-D4 — signatures thereon; pp. 129 and 132
of Orig. Rec.) as those of the appellant Jesus V. Tiomico arising from her
familiarity therewith inasmuch as she was the one who processed the papers
pertinent to the transactions between the appellant and the complainant bank
Page 12 of 15
(TSN, Feb. 5, 1990, pp 4-6). Her testimony, therefore, cannot be considered
hearsay because it is principally based on her personal knowledge of bank
transactions and the documents and records which she processes in the regular
course of the bank's business operations.
It is not essential to the competence of a lay witness to express opinions on the
genuineness of handwritings that he did see the person in question
write.12 It is enough that the witness has so adopted the same into business
transactions as to induce a reasonable presumption and belief of genuineness
of the document. This is due to the fact that in the ordinary course of business,
documents purporting to be written or signed by that person have been
habitually submitted to the witness, or where knowledge of handwriting is
acquired by him in an official capacity. 13
Did the witness gain familiarity with the signature of the accused? The answer
is yes. Exhibits "A" to "D": Letter of Credit, Pro-Forma Invoice, Letter of Credit
Confirmation and Trust Receipt, respectively, were all familiar to the witness
since the said documents bearing the signature of the accused were all
submitted to her for processing. It is therefore beyond cavil that she acquired
sufficient familiarity to make witness competent to testify on the signatures
appearing in subject documents. From the time of the application to its approval
and when Tiomico defaulted, she (witness) was the one who had overseen the
transactions and recommended the actions to be taken thereon. As a matter of
fact, she was the one who referred the failure of Tiomico to pay his balance to
Tiomico to pay his balance to the Legal Department of BPI, prompting the said
legal department to send him (Tiomico) a demand letter.
Furthermore, whether there was due execution or authencity of such documents
was impliedly admitted by the accused. On this point, we quote with approval
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, to wit: 14
On the other hand, appellant impliedly admitted the due execution of the
assailed documents considering that he did not deny the fact that he opened a
letter of credit. Neither did he deny that the signature appearing thereon is his.
What appellant intended to dispute was merely the balance of his past due
account with the complainant bank, thus:
COURT
Denied.
What is the defense of the accused?
Denial that he opened the letter of credit.
ATTY. EBRO
No, you honor.
COURT: What is the defense?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. EBRO.
Q: — Now you identified signatures allegedly of the accused on Exhibit A, which
is the application for the letter of credit, I ask you Miss Donato, were you
personally present when this signature was affixed to the document?
A: — (witness going over Exhibit A) I was the one of the ones who processed
the letter of credit.
ATTY. EBRO
May we ask for an order directing that the witness respond to my question.
COURT
Just answer the question.
WITNESS
A: — No, sir.
COURT
Does the accused deny the signature?
ATTY. EBRO
No, your Honor. I am just showing also that she has been exaggerating.
(TSN, Feb. 5, 1990, pp. 12-13, p. 22)
In light of the foregoing, it stands to reason and conclude that the documents
under scrutiny are admissible in evidence, as held by the trial court.
Anent the fourth issue, petitioner theorizes that the denial of the motion for
postponement sent in by his lawyer violated his constitutional right to due
process.
It should be stressed that subject Urgent Motion for Postponement was not the
first motion for resetting ever presented by the counsel for petitioner. On
December 12, 1990, upon motion of the latter, and without objection on the part
of the prosecution, the reception of evidence for the defense was reset once
more to January 7, 1991, at 8:30 in the morning.
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Where a party had
been afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do
so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. 15 Due process is
satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the Bill of Rights. 16
It is further theorized by petitioner that the lower court should have at least
granted him another trial date so as to enable him to present his evidence, so
that the denial of his Urgent Motion for Postponement infringed his constitutional
right to be heard by himself and by counsel. 17 This submission is
unsustainable.
When an accused is accorded a chance to present evidence on his behalf but
due to his repeated unjustifiable failure to appear at the trial without any
justification, the lower court order's the case submitted for decision on the basis
of the evidence on record, said judicial action is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion because in such a case, the accused is deemed to have waived the
right to adduce evidence on his behalf. 18
Furthermore, records show that in this case the defense counsel did not even
bother to appear for the scheduled reception of evidence for his client on
January 7, 1991, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court did not act upon,
much less grant, the Urgent Motion for Postponement which he filed on January
4, 1991. Lawyers should never presume that their motions for postponement
would be granted. 19
A motion for continue or postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed
to the sound discretion of the Court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by
appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion
resulting in a denial of substantial justice. 20
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is
evidence of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the
movant.21 The inadvertence of the defense of the defense counsel in failing to
take note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict
in his schedules of trial or court appearances, constitutes inexcusable
negligence. It should be borne in mind that a client is bound by his counsel's
conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the case. 22
As gleanable from the records:
. . . Attached to the motion is the Order of said court dated November 19, 1990.
Obviously, when the case was called on December 12, 1990, the counsel for
the accused had already known of the scheduled hearing before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, yet he agreed to the hearing on January 7, 1991.
Counsel's conduct is not consistent with the thrust of the Judiciary to expedite
the termination of cases under the Mandatory Continuous Trial . . . 23
A lawyer as an officer of the court is part of the judicial machinery in the
administration of justice. As such, he has a responsibility to assist in the proper
and sound administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its ends and the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases. A lawyer should not only help to attain these objectives.
He should also avoid improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their
realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting the court in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. 24
Petitioner invites attention to the Affidavit of Desistance by the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI). This issue raised by the petitioner cannot be
entertained as it was only raised for the first time on appeal. 25
Considering that the assailed decision is firmly anchored on prevailing law and
established jurisprudence, the Court cannot help but deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated May 31, 1995, affirming the judgment of conviction rendered on January
28, 1991 by the court of origin AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.
Panganiban, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154037 April 30, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN
VERGARA, JONA SARVIDA, MILAGROS MAJOREMOS, MAJORIE
JALALON, MAY JOY MENDOZA (@ May Joy Sandi), and JOY SABALLA
(@ Josephine Saballa), MABELYN B. VERGARA, RIO SARVIDA,
FRANCISCO MAJOREMOS, in their respective behalves and in behalf of
ROY JALALON, ROMMEL MENDOZA and DELFIN SABALLA, petitioners,
Page 13 of 15
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Ormoc, Branch 12; SPO3 ANGELO S. LLENOS and the CITY JAIL
WARDEN OF ORMOC; and ELEUTERIA P. BOLAÑO, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A.
Santos Ave., Parañaque City. On December 24, 2001, they were arrested by
Ormoc City policemen by authority of a Warrant of Arrest dated November 19,
2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 for Issuance
of Letters of Administration, Distribution and Partition pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12).1
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P.
Bolaño, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers,
praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying with
the probate court's order dated October 9, 1999 directing them to pay their
monthly rentals to respondent Bolaño.2
It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers,
respondent Bolaño included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the
inventory of the estate. The probate court issued the assailed Order dated
October 5, 1999, portions of which read as follows:
1. SUBMITTED FOR RESOLUTION is an omnibus motion filed by the
Petitioner-Administratrix, informing among others, the submission of the
Inventory of the Estate of the decedent, referred as Motion-Annex 'A' thereof.
The Inventory shows that the properties left by the deceased consists of Real
and Personal Properties, as well as Credits and Collectibles, itemized under
letter heading A, B, and C of the Inventory, respectively.
2. The Real Properties are occupied by some lessees, namely: Cargo
Bridge Philippines Corporation, represented by its President Mr. Bernhard
Ashauer, Jr.; Mrs. Lea Amorcillo, Mrs. Milagros Majoremos, Mr. Danilo Aguylo,
Mrs. Marjorie Jalalon, Mrs. Jona Sarvida, Mrs. Analyn Malunes, Mrs. Edna Rubi,
Mrs. Josephine Saballa, Mr. Benjamin Vergara, Mr. Jerry Peligro, Mrs. Mary Joy
Sandi, and Mr. Jaime Cabarse, all inside the Allers' Property Compound at 8110
Dr. A. Santos Ave., San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
xxx xxx xxx
5. It is further shown that all known intervenors, lessees and heirs were
served of the motion and notified of the hearing, with no opposition except
intervenor Berlito P. Taripe, based on his claim against the estate, which may
be treated in due time for claims against the estate. However, the motion under
consideration refers to the return to the court of the true Inventory of the Estate
of the deceased within three (3) months as directed under Section 1, Rule 83
which sets a specific period of time to submit, otherwise it is violated. The
opposition is not tenable.
6. Finding the motion meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. As
prayed for, the Inventory of the Estate attached therewith as Motion-Annex 'A'
(sic) and considered as a compliance of the required return of the true Inventory
of the estate of the decedent.
7. Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are
directed to pay their respective monthly rental regularly starting the month of
August, 1999, including arrears if any, to the duly appointed Special
Administratrix Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolaño, until further notice.
xxx xxx xxx
Let copies of this Order together with the Inventory served to all above-cited.
SO ORDERED.3 (Emphasis Ours)
Copies of the order were sent on October 12, 1999 to petitioners via registered
mail.4
Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolaño, as Special Administratrix,
the probate court issued a writ of execution on March 3, 2000 to enforce the
aforesaid order dated October 5, 1999. The Sheriff submitted a return dated
August 10, 2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he met with petitioners but failed
to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had already collected from
them three months advance rentals.5
On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolaño filed a motion to require petitioners to
explain why they should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the
October 5, 1999 order of the probate court.6 Petitioners were served copies of
the motion by registered mail.7 The probate court granted the motion in its
Resolution dated September 7, 2000, portions of which read as follows:
The Motion to Exclude Certain Parcels of Land as part of the Estate of the
decedent is also denied for lack of merit. The properties sought to be excluded
by intervenor Bertito P. Taripe are titled/registered in the name of the decedent
and therefore they should be included in the inventory of the intestate estate of
Anselma Allers. If intervenor has claims against the estate, he should file a
separate action against the Administratrix in accordance with Rule 87 of the
Revised Rules of Court. As it is, intervenor cannot claim ownership over
properties registered in the name of the decedent by mere motion.
The Return of the Deputy Sheriff of the Writ of Execution is noted.

Petitioner's motion to let the lessees explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for disobeying the Court's order is granted. All lessees listed on the
Writ of Execution are hereby ordered to explain within twenty (20) days from
receipt of this order why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of the
Court for disobeying the Court's Order dated October 5, 1999, and the Writ of
Execution dated May 29, 2000.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis Ours)
Petitioners were furnished copies of the said Order on September 27, 2000 by
registered mail.8
Six months later, in a letter dated March 18, 2001, some of the petitioners,
together with the other tenants of the property, informed the probate court that
they are "freezing" their monthly rentals as they are in a quandary as to whom
to pay the rentals.9
Respondent Bolaño then filed on March 20, 2001, a motion to cite petitioners in
contempt, which was set for hearing on May 11, 2001.10 In its Order dated May
11, 2001, the probate court found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and
ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment
until they comply with the probate court's order for them to pay rentals.11
Petitioners again wrote the probate court on June 11, 2001 asking that the
indirect contempt "slapped" against them be withdrawn. They stated that their
failure to attend the May 11, 2001 hearing was due to financial constraints, most
of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and repeated
that the reason why they are freezing the monthly rentals is that they are
uncertain as to whom to remit it.12
Upon motion of respondent Bolaño, the probate court, per its Order dated
November 16, 2001, issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On
December 24, 2001, petitioners were arrested.
On December 26, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.13 On January 3, 2002, the appellate
court ordered the temporary release of petitioners.14 After due proceedings, the
appellate court rendered its decision on March 26, 2002 denying the petition for
lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. This Court's resolution ordering the temporary
release of the lessees is hereby RECALLED. The lessees are ordered
REMANDED to the custody of the Jail Warden of Ormoc City until they have
complied with the orders of the probate court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed herein
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based on
the following grounds:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ORDER DATED OCTOBER 5, 1999 (ANNEX "E") PARTICULARLY THE
PORTION THEREOF WHICH SUMMARILY DIRECTED THE LESSEES TO
TURNOVER THEIR MONTHLY RENTALS OF THE APARTMENTS OF
BERLITO P. TARIPE TO ELEUTERIA P. BOLAÑO AS SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATRIX, IS UNLAWFUL;
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
MOTION FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT FILED BY RESPONDENT
ELEUTERIA P. BOLAÑO AGAINST THE LESSEES IS NOT THE PROPER
REMEDY AND THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO GRANTING SAID
MOTION AND DECLARING THAT THE LESSEES ARE GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO TO ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST AND
THE SAID WARRANT SO ISSUED AS WELL AS THE ACTUAL ARREST OF
SAID LESSEES IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, ARE UNLAWFUL;
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE
TEMPORARY RELEASE OF THE LESSEES PERMANENT.16
The crux of petitioners' arguments is that they were not notified of the motion
filed by respondent Special Administratrix Bolaño, submitting an inventory of the
estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, which includes the property occupied by
them. Such being the case, petitioners contend that the order dated October 5,
1999 granting the motion and directing them to pay the rentals to Bolaño is
unlawful hence, their refusal to comply with it is not contumacious.17 They also
assail the appointment of respondent Bolaño as Special Administratrix for
having been made without the required bond,18 and that she has no authority
to file the motion for indirect contempt, as her powers are limited.19
When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the
notice was served must prove the fact of service.20 The burden of proving notice
rests upon the party asserting its existence.21 In civil cases, service made
through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with
Section 7 of Rule 13. In the present case, as proof that petitioners were served
Page 14 of 15
with copies of the omnibus motion submitting an inventory of the estate of
deceased Allers, respondent Bolaño presented photocopies of the motion with
a certification by counsel that service was made by registered mail, together
with the registry receipts.22 While the affidavit and the registry receipts proved
that petitioners were served with copies of the motion, it does not follow,
however, that petitioners in fact received the motion. Respondent Bolaño failed
to present the registry return cards showing that petitioners actually received
the motion.23 Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove
themselves, they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of
receipt of the letters.24 Respondent also failed to present a certification of the
postmaster that notice was duly issued and delivered to petitioners such that
service by registered mail may be deemed completed.25
Nonetheless, even in the absence of proof of actual receipt by the petitioners,
the subject orders issued by the probate court are valid and enforceable.
Petitioners cannot deny the fact that they had actual knowledge of the said
orders. They have admitted in their letter dated March 18, 2001 addressed to
the probate court that they received the court's order dated October 5, 1999
"barely 2 months before," 26 or sometime in January 2001. Instead of complying
with the said order, they "froze" payment of their rentals for the reason that they
are caught in the middle of the dispute and are not sure to whom to give the
rentals. When respondent Bolaño filed the motion to cite them in indirect
contempt, setting the hearing on May 11, 2001, again, records show that they
had actual knowledge of the same. In their second letter, dated June 11, 2001,
addressed to the probate court, they acknowledged that they knew of the
hearing set on May 11, 2001, and the reason for their failure to attend was due
to financial constraints.27 They likewise admitted in said letter that they knew of
the court's order dated May 11, 2001 finding them guilty of indirect contempt.28
Petitioners therefore cannot cry denial of due process as they were actually
notified of the proceedings before the probate court. Thus, under the
circumstances, it is not imperative to require proof of a formal notice. It would
be an idle ceremony where an adverse party, as in this case, had actual
knowledge of the proceedings.29
When petitioners refused to remit the rentals to respondent Bolaño per Order
dated October 5, 1999, a written charge of indirect contempt was duly filed
before the trial court and hearing on the motion set on May 11, 2001. As
previously stated, petitioners did not attend said hearing despite knowledge
thereof; instead, they wrote the court on June 11, 2001 asking that the contempt
findings against them be withdrawn. Clearly, they were given the opportunity to
be heard, and as aptly stated by the court, they were given more than sufficient
time to comply with the Order dated October 5, 1999.30
Despite the foregoing, we find that the trial court's finding of contempt and the
order directing the imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The salutary
rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory
idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.31
In Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,32 the Court quoted the
pronouncements of some American courts, to wit:
Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has
been restricted by statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where a
contemnor fails or refuses to obey an order of the court for the payment of
money he may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such order. [Fla.–Revell
v. Dishong, 175 So. 905, 129 Fla. 9; Va. Branch v. Branch, 132 S.E. 303; 144
Va. 244]. (17 C.J.S. 287).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for
civil purpose cannot be resorted to until all other means fail [Mich.–Atchison,
etc. R. co. v. Jennison, 27 N.W. 6, 60 Mich. 232], but the court's power to order
the contemnor's detension continues so long as the contumacy persists [Ark.–
Lane v. Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168 Ark. 700] (17 C.J.S. 289).33
which we hereby adopt as proper guidelines in the determination of whether the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the order of the trial court finding petitioners
guilty of indirect contempt of court and directing their imprisonment for their
contumacious refusal to pay the rentals to the administratrix.
In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used
in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal
offense.34 It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or
implied.35 In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate
of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the
administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason
that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals
because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject
property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional
guarantee against imprisonment.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court to wit:
SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. — When the contempt consists in
the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent
to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he
performs it. (7a)
because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable, under
Section 11, Rule 39, which provides:
SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. — When a judgment requires the
performance of any act other than those mention in the two preceding sections,
a certified copy of judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall
be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or
upon any other person required thereby, or by law to obey the same, and such
party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:
SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. — (a) Immediate
payment on demand. — The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for
money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the
full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment
obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee,
or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the
judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his
authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall
be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the
said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the
writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive
payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the
executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his
possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the
writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account
in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court of the
locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit
to the account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then
deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment.
The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful
fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In
no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made
payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. — If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part
of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of
the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter
the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied
upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise
the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then
on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of
the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real
property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or
any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like
manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. — The officer may levy on debts
due the judgment obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, financial
interests, royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of
manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made
by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession
or control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment
shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from
service of the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor
has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the
report shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for the
judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check issued
in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment
obligee within ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee
requiring such delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the
court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits
sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have
the right to indicate the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to deliver
the amount due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by the judgment obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a)
with respect to delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a)
while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for specific
acts such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific acts vesting title;
sale of real or personal property, delivery or restitution of real property, removal
of improvements on property subject of execution and delivery of personal
property.
Page 15 of 15
The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9
as quoted above. Until and unless all the means provided for under Section 9,
Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a
means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts.36 In
Sura vs. Martin, Sr.,37 we held that:
Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of
court (for failure to satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency)
would, in effect, violate the Constitution.
Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued
refusal to comply with the probate court's order to pay rentals to the
administratrix nor could they be held guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ
of execution issued by the probate court, which directs therein the Sheriff, thus:
Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the
goods and chattels of said lessees you may cause to be made the sum sufficient
to cover the aforestated amounts, but if no sufficient personal properties are
found thereof to satisfy this execution, then of the real properties you make the
sums of money in the manner required by law and make return of your
proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period.38
It was the sheriff's duty to enforce the writ.39
Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution
calls for payment of money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation
in cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the
judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment
obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value
and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon,
sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the
option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on
the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real
property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When there is
more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares,
debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or
personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as
under a writ of attachment.
The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff
to collect from petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail
to pay, from petitioners' personal/real properties sufficient to cover the amounts
sought to be collected.40 It was not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the
sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments,41 and it was due
to the latter's failure that the writ was not duly enforced.
In fine, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the
Decision dated November 16, 2001 of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review on certiorari to be with merit, the
decision dated March 26, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Its Resolution dated January 3, 2002 ordering the temporary
release of petitioners is made permanent. The Warrant of Arrest dated
November 19, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch
12) in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 is DEEMED RECALLED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ ., concur.