G.R. No.

L-25308 February 18, 1926

ARSENIO MACALI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE EULOGIO P. REVILLA, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan,
and BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, respondents.
VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is a proceeding instituted by Arsenio Macali against the Honorable Eulogio P. Revilla, Judge of First
Instance of Bulacan, Buenaventura Ocampo, in which he prays that an order of mandamus be issued
ordering the respondent judge to allow the appeal filed by the petitioner on December 1, 1925, and to
forward to this court the record of criminal case No. 4438, People of the Philippine Islands vs. Arsenio
Macali, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for a review of the judgment entered therein.

The respondents, in answer to the complaint, admit all the facts therein set forth and as a special defense
allege that the petitioner had waived his right to appeal and had began to serve his sentence surrendering
himself to proper authorities for the execution of the judgment and stamping his thumb mark on the order
of commitment of his person to the Director of Prisons.

The bare facts resulting from the pleadings and from the oral argument of counsel for both parties are
the following: October 29, 1924, the respondent Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First
Instance of said province a complaint against the herein petitioner Arsenio Macali, accusing him of the
crime of murder. On November 18, 1925 the said Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan after obtaining the
permission of the court amended the said complaint changing the crime of murder for that of homicide.
On being arrainged upon the amended information on November 18, 1925 and at the suggestion of his
attorney petitioner pleaded guilty. Immediately thereafter the respondent judge, Honorable Eulogio P.
Revilla, rendered judgment sentencing the petitioner to seventeen years four months and one day
reclusion temporal with the accessories of the law to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P1,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency on account of the nature of the principal
penalty, and to pay the costs of the action. On the same day, November 18, 1925, upon hearing the
judgment rendered against him the herein petitioner through ignorance states that he waived his right to
appeal from said judgment and surrendered himself to the proper authorities who thereupon proceeded
to commit him to Bilibid, the petitioner having stamped his thumb mark on order issued for that purpose
addressed to the Director of Prisons. On December 1, 1925, the herein petitioner filed an appeal with the
Court First Instance of Bulacan, stating that he withdrew the waiver of his right to appeal that he had
formerly made and that he thereby appealed to the Supreme Court from the judgment rendered against
him. On December 11, 1925, the respondent Judge of First Instance of Bulacan disallowed the appeal.
Petitioner excepted in due time to this order disallowing his appeal.

If the accused were intelligent and possessed of a certain degree of education his plea of guilty, his waiver
of the right to appeal and his submission to the authorities for confinement would undoubtedly be
sufficient to make the judgment final and subject to execution and to take him out of the judicial power
and put him under the executive control, even though the period of fifteen days fixed in section 47 of
General Orders No. 58, for the perfection of appeals in criminal cases, may not have expired; but when
dealing with an ignorant person without the lest amount of education as the herein petitioner who at the
mere suggestion of his attorney pleads guilty to a grave crime, such as homicide and waives his right to
appeal from a judgment whereby he is sentenced to suffer the afflictive penalty of seventeen years four
months and one day reclusion temporal and to pay as indemnity of P1,000 there is sufficient reason, if
not of a juridical nature, of a social character, to stop and ponder to see if that person has understood the
whole extent of, and all the consequences following such a waiver of a right that the constitution and
statutes grant him. (Section 15 [8] of General Orders No. 58; section 3, Jones Law.) When he found himself
separated from the outside world and from the persons that are dear to him by the thick iron bars of a
jail, the petitioner then felt the consequences of his plea of guilty and of his waiver of his right to appeal
from the judgment rendered against him and hurriedly filed an appeal, withdrawing the said waiver. This
is a very clear indication that he did not well understand the significance and extent of his waiver of his
right to appeal.

In the case of United States vs. Rota (9 Phil,. 426) cited in United States vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), this court
said the following: The procedure for the trial of criminal causes makes no specific provision for the trial
of a cause when the defendant pleads guilty. We are of the opinion, and so hold that Courts of First
Instance may sentence defendants in criminal causes who plead guilty to the offense charged in the
complaint, with out the necessity of taking testimony. However, in all cases and especially in cases where
the punishment to be inflicted is severe, the court should be sure that the defendant fully understands
the nature of the charges preferred against him and the character of the punishment to be imposed before
sentencing him. . . . And in the said case of United States vs. Agcaoili, supra, this court, furthermore, said
the following: "While it is true that a judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant may lawfully be
pronounced upon a solemn plea of guilty on open court and on arraignment entered by the accused with
full knowledge of the meaning and effect of his plea nevertheless where the complaint charges a capital
offense the possibility of misunderstanding or mistake requires the taking of such available evidence in
support of the allegations of the information as the trial judge may deem necessary to remove all
reasonable possibility that the accused might have entered his plea of 'guilty' improvidently, or without a
clear and precise understanding of its meaning and effect."

The waiver of the right to appeal like the plea of guilty must be voluntary that is to say the accused must
understand the significance and the meaning of his act, as also the consequences deriving therefrom. If
in pleading guilty to a grave crime such as homicide, in waiving his right to appeal from a heavy sentence,
such as one depriving him of his liberty for seventeen years, four months and one day, and ordering him
to pay an indemnity of P1,000, in surrendering himself to the authorities because he could not find
bondsman and in stamping his thumb mark in the order of mittimus, the herein petitioner did so, without
knowing the full significance nor the meaning and consequences of such acts, due to his ignorance and
lack of instruction, it cannot properly be said that he voluntarily renounced his right to appeal, and that
he submitted himself voluntarily to serve the sentence imposed upon him; wherefore the said judgment
did not become final and subject to execution and since the fifteen days fixed by law for perfecting an
appeal in criminal cases had not elapsed, the trial court has jurisdiction to admit the appeal filed by the
petitioner.

However as the petitioner has pleaded guilty and was sentenced without any trial, this court cannot
review his case. But this is no bar to the revision of the information, as regards its validity and sufficiency,
since these requisites have not been admitted by the plea of guilty (17 C. J., 32, par. 3295); and also of the
judgment, as regards the qualification of the crime and the degree of the penalty imposed.
Wherefore the petition is granted and the respondent judge is ordered, immediately upon receipt of this
order to allow the appeal filed by the petitioner and proceed in connection therewith as prescribed by
law, without special pronouncement as to co

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46039. August 30, 1938.]
ELIAS ESGUERRA, Petitioner, v. SIXTO DE LA COSTA, Judge of First Instance of Rizal, Respondent.
DECISION
IMPERIAL, J.:

This petition for mandamus was filed by the petitioner to compel the respondent judge to dismiss finally
the information filed in criminal case No. 10546 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and to cancel the
bond put up for his temporary release, with the costs de oficio.

On August 29, 1936, the chief of police of the municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal, filed a complaint
against the petitioner charging him with having committed the crime of abuse of chastity. The case was
docketed as criminal case No. 588 of the said justice of the peace court. The complaint alleged that on or
about August 29, 1936, in the said municipality, the petitioner willfully and unlawfully committed
lascivious acts upon the person of Luzonica Zapanta, against her will, by forcibly embracing her, kissing
her and touching her breast and private parts. The petitioner was arrested and thereafter temporarily
released upon filing a bond for P1,000. Having waived the preliminary investigation, the case was elevated
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where it was docketed as criminal case No. 10140. On September
10, 1936, the provincial fiscal put in a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the compliant was
not signed by the offended party or her parents, and on the 29th of the same month the Court of First
Instance dismissed the case. On October 8, 1936, Raymundo Zapanta, father of the alleged offended party
Luzonica Zapanta, filed another complaint in the justice of the peace court of Cainta against the same
petitioner charging him with the same offense. The complaint alleged the same facts, namely, that on or
about August 29, 1936, in the said municipality, the petitioner willfully, unlawfully and forcibly embraced
and kissed Luzonica Zapanta, touching her private parts for the purpose of satisfying his lascivious desires.
The case was docketed as No. 594 of the said justice of the peace court. The petitioner was again arrested
and thereafter temporarily released upon filing a bond for P1,000. Having waived the preliminary
investigation, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance provincial fiscal thereupon filed an
information against the petitioner charging him with the same facts constituting the crime of abuse of
chastity under article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. On March 23, 1937 the petitioner was arraigned in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and he pleaded "not guilty." On June 22d of the same year the case was
heard and the witnesses for both parties were called. The judge presiding over the Court of First Instance
directed preliminary questions to be offended party Luzonica Zapanta and the latter stated that she was
more than seventeen years but less than eighteen. In view thereof, the judge dismissed the case and
canceled the bond posted by the petitioner, with the costs de oficio. According to the order, the dismissal
by the judge was based upon the doctrine laid down by the Court of Appeals in People v. Cosme Mapotol
published in the Official Gazette of May 20, 1937. On the same date, June 22, 1937, the offended party
again lodged a complaint in the justice of peace court of Cainta charging the petitioner with the
commission of the same offense of abuse of chastity. The complaint alleged the same facts set out in the
two complaints previously filed. The case was docketed as criminal case No. 600 of the justice of the peace
court of Cainta. The petitioner was arrested and thereafter temporarily released upon a bond of P1,000
filed by him. He waived the preliminary investigation and the case was elevated to the Court of First
Instance and there docketed with No. 10546. The provincial fiscal filed in this last case a new information
alleging the same facts and charging the petitioner with the same offense of abuse of chastity defined and
punished by article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in this last case where counsel for the petitioner
answered in writing that the latter is in double jeopardy and asked for the dismissal of the case because
the petitioner had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial and was the victim of malicious and arbitrary
persecution. By order of November 15, 1937 the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss and this
denial brought about the present petition.

The petitioner contends that he is in double jeopardy, that he has been deprived of his right to a speedy
trial, and that he is being unjustifiably persecuted by the alleged offended party.

1. Under the facts, the second complaint filed by the father of the offended party in criminal case No.
10198 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal was sufficient and valid because the alleged offended party
was a minor, wherefore, her father could sign the complaint in case she could not do so personally as was
apparently the case (article 344, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code; U. S. v. Bautista, 40 Phil., 735), The
information being valid, it conferred jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Rizal to take cognizance
of the case and to render final decision therein. Section 28 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the
termination of dismissal upon any ground, without the consent of the accused, of a case brought before
a competent court upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, after the accused has pleaded to the charge and before judgment is
rendered, constitutes jeopardy which bars the prosecution of the accused anew for the same offense,
whether consummated, frustrated or attempted. The petitioner had already made his plea of "not guilty"
to that complaint as well as to the information files by the fiscal in the Court of First Instance based upon
said complaint, wherefore, upon the dismissal of criminal case No. 10198 by the Court of First Instance,
upon the ground that the complaint was defective because signed by the father of the offended party and
not by the latter, the petitioner was placed in jeopardy and he can not again be prosecuted for the same
facts constituting the same offense. The Solicitor-General alleges that the order of dismissal is null and
void because it was entered by the court motu proprio without any motion from any of the parties. We
do not believe that this circumstances alters the legal effects of the order of dismissal. The fact is that the
case was dismissed without the petitioner’s consent, after a valid and sufficient complaint was filed which
conferred jurisdiction upon the court and before final judgment was entered therein (Kepner v. U. S., 155
U. S., 100; 11 Phil., 660; Julia v. Sotto, 2 Phil., 247; U. S., v. Padilla, 4 Phil., 511; U. S. v. Parcon, 6 Phil., 632;
Grafton v. U. S., 206 U. S., 333; 11 Phil., 776; U. S. v. Rubin, 28 Phil., 631; U. S. v. Macalingag, 31 Phil., 316;
Mendoza v. Almeda-Lopez, 38 Off. Gaz., 485).

2. It appears that in less than one year the petitioner was criminally prosecuted for the alleged offense of
abuse was chastity in the justice of the peace court of the municipality of Cainta, Rizal. As a result of the
complaints filed against him he was arrested three times, and to enjoy temporary liberty while awaiting
trial, he had to put up three bonds for the sum of P1,000 each. If the last attempt to prosecute the
petitioner is not stopped, uncertainty and the consequent inconveniences and worries would continue to
assail him. Article III, section 1, No. 17, of the Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused is entitled to have a speedy and public trial. Section 15, No. 7, of General Orders, No. 58 also
provides that in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled to have a speedy and public trial.
If the petitioner was indeed guilty of the offense imputed to him, he was at any rate entitled to a prompt
and public trial free from arbitrary and vexatious delays. We have repeatedly held that there is a positive
remedy for cases of violation of the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. An accused who
is deprived of his fundamental right to be tried promptly is entitled to ask that he be released, if detained,
or that the case against him be finally dismissed (Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil., 650; In the matter
of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U. S. v. Fox [1880], 3 Mont., 512; Kalaw v. Apostol and Alcazar, 38 Off. Gaz.,
464; People v. Castañeda and Fernandez, 35 Off. Gaz., 1269).

3. The Solicitor-General argues that mandamus does not lie in this case because the favorable resolution
of double jeopardy and of the dismissal of the case sought by the petitioner was not a ministerial duty as
the law confers discretion upon the respondent judge to decide both questions one way or the other, and
it is further contended that the motion for dismissal having been denied, there is now nothing for the
respondent judge to execute. We are of the opinion that upon this phase of the case there has been a
misinterpretation of the provisions of section 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which mandamus
also lies in cases where a court deprives a person of the use and enjoyment of a right. The speedy trial
which was denied to the petitioner and the liberty of which he would have been deprived had there been
a judgment of conviction, are fundamental rights not less important than things or objects to which a
person is entitled.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy in connection with
the complaint and information filed in criminal case No. 10546 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which
precludes his prosecution anew for the crime of abuse of chastity allegedly committed on August j29,
1936, in the municipality of Cainta, upon the person of the alleged offended party Luzonica Zapanta, and
that petitioner is entitled to have the said criminal case brought to a close, wherefore, we order the
respondent judge, or any judge who may preside over the Court of First Instance of Rizal, to dismiss
definitively the aforesaid criminal case No. 10546, with the cost de oficio and upon cancellation of the
bond filed by the petitioner; without special pronouncement as to the costs of this suit. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-4549 October 22, 1952

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO CAPISTRANO, defendant-appellant.
JUGO, J.:

Bienvenido Capistrano was charged before the Court of First Instance of Quezon province with the crime
of treason on four (4) counts. He was found guilty by said court and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs.

The attorney de oficio of the appellant states in a petition filed with this Court that after having read,
reread, and studied the evidence, he finds no substantial error committed by the trial court and prays for
the affirmance of the judgment.

The evidence of the record establishes the following:

The accused Bienvenido Capistrano admitted being a Filipino citizen.
Count No. I

Alejo Enriquez Wong and Carmen Verdera testified that the defendant was a so-called Yoin, which means
an armed soldier of the Japanese. Wearing a Japanese military uniform, he rendered services to the
Japanese army as a guard of a Japanese garrison. To the same effect, the witness Placer Canada testified.

The defendant argued at the trial court that there was no evidence showing that he had been appointed
a Yoin or that he was a Makapili. While no written formal appointment was introduced in evidence, yet it
is clear that he was engaged in the work of guarding the Japanese garrison, armed with a gun and wearing
a Japanese uniform and taking part in the military drills of the Japanese army.

Count No. II

At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 8, 1945, the defendant with other Filipino members of
the Yoin and several Japanese soldiers, all armed, arrived near the house of Carmen Verdera in Barrio
Malay, Municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon), and ordered the inmates therein to open
the door. The appellant and his companions entered the house, raised the mosquito nets and ordered the
inmates to rise. The appellant and his companions tied Graciano Fortuna, Carmen Verdera, Alejo Enriquez
Wong, Rufino Rivera, Maria Canada, Brisilio Canada, Remedios Anastacio, Dolores Enriquez, Teodora
Zamora, Presentacion Anastacio, and Placer Canada with a rope which was used as a clothesline. The
intruders then searched the premises and seized from Alejo Enriquez Wong $1,000, U.S. currency, and
P4,000, Philippine currency. They took Graciano Fortuna and other inmates to the Japanese garrison at
Lopez, Tayabas (Quezon) and then to the Yoin garrison in the same town. The motive for the raid was that
Pedro Canada, a brother of Placer, was a guerrilla lieutenant in Lopez and Salvador Fortuna, son of
Graciano, was a soldier in the said organization. One night during the detention of Placer and her
companions in the Yoin garrison, the appellant attempted to sexually abuse Placer and her companions,
but when the women cried and the Japanese came, the defendant escaped. Placer and her companions
were released after one month when they paid to the chief of the Yoin and the appellant the sum of
P2,500 Japanese war notes. The charge was testified to by several victims.

The accused was more than nine (9) but less than fifteen (15) years of age at the time that he committed
the crime. However, the court which had the opportunity to see and hear the accused at the trial found
that he acted with discernment. It should be noted, furthermore, that he appeared as the leader or
commander of the raiding party. Although his minority does not exempt him from criminal responsibility
for the reason that he acted with discernment, yet it may be considered as a special mitigating
circumstance lowering the penalty by two (2) degrees.

Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to the accused because he was over eighteen (18)
years old at the time of the trial (People vs. Estefa, 47 Off Gaz. No. 11, 5652; 86 Phil. 104).

In view of the above special mitigating circumstances of minority, the penalty imposed upon the accused
is hereby modified by imposing upon him four (4) years of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P10,000
and to indemnify Alejo Enriquez Wong in the sum of P6,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in the payment of the fine and the indemnity, with costs.
G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE DELIMA, defendant-appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.

Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house of
Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender.
The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority
fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon.
These peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him.

The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalties. He appeals from that judgment which must be reversed.

That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender,
and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon
in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it
proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.lawphil.net

Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby
acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.