P.E.T. CASE No.

003 March 31, 2005

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Protestant,

vs.
NOLI L. DE CASTRO, Protestee.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a Resolution1 dated January 18, 2005, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed the
jurisdiction over the protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of protestee Noli L. de
Castro for its outright dismissal. The Tribunal further ordered concerned officials to undertake
measures for the protection and preservation of the ballot boxes and election documents subject
of the protest.

On February 4, 2005, protestee filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said resolution.
Protestee contends therein that:

THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN RULING THAT IT CAN RE-CANVASS THE

ELECTION RETURNS AND OTHER CANVASS DOCUMENTS DESPITE THE
AVAILABILITY OF THE BALLOTS.

II

THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAS THE POWER TO

CORRECT MANIFEST ERRORS IN THE ELECTION RETURNS OR CERTIFICATES
OF CANVASS.

III

THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN TRANSFORMING ITSELF INTO A

CANVASSING BODY.

IV

THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN RULING THAT THE INSTANT

PETITION/PROTEST ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION SUFFICIENT TO CONTEST
PROTESTEE’S VICTORY IN THE 10 MAY 2004 VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.2

Protestee argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best
evidence are the ballots;3that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of
canvass or election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies;4 that once the canvassing
bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made;5 that
since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts
based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts, it cannot
perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns;6 that the averments contained in
the protest are mere conclusions of law which are inadequate to form a valid cause of
action;7 that the allegations are not supported by facts;8 and that the allegations were merely
copied from a pleading in another election protest.9 He further claims that since the errors sought
to be corrected are no longer clear and obvious, it would be impossible for the Tribunal to correct
the alleged errors at this stage.10
In her Comment, protestant avers that protestee’s motion was merely a reiteration of the issues
already resolved by the Tribunal.11 However, although protestee’s contentions may be mere
reiterations of his previous pleadings and arguments, and he does not raise new substantial
issues, nonetheless, in order to write finis to the controversy on jurisdictional issues, we now
revisit our resolution of January 18, 2005.

Protestee contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of
votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC). But it is not suggested by any of the parties that
questions on the validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-
President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included
therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.12 There is no necessity, in
our view, to amend the PET Rules to perform this function within the ambit of its constitutional
function.

We also note the apparent ambivalence of the protestee relative to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over
re-canvass of the election returns. He claims the Tribunal’s authority to re-canvass is "inexorably
linked to [its] constitutional mandate as the sole judge of all contests relating to the presidential
and the vice-presidential elections."13 Contrarily, he states that the Tribunal cannot re-canvass
and must resolve the protest through revision of ballots. If he contends that the Tribunal has the
authority to re-canvass, there is no reason why it cannot perform this function now. We agree
that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election contest where
the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved.14 However, we do not
find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of the protest, considering that the protestant
concedes the correctness of the ballot results, concerning the number of votes obtained by
both protestant and protestee, and reflected in the election returns.15Protestant merely seeks
the correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of
transposition and addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these
circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.

On the matter of sufficiency of the protest, protestee failed to adduce new substantial arguments
to reverse our ruling. We hold that while Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal16 on requisites of sufficiency of election protest is still good law, it is inapplicable in this
case. We dismissed the petition in Peña because it failed to specify the contested precincts.
In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where
she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form
and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to protestee’s title to his office.
In our view, the instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law,
that need to be proven in due time.

Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stress
that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only
sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case
pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules.17 Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots,
nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors,
pursuant to the Tribunal’s rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.18

On a related matter, the protestant in her reiterating motion19 prays for ocular inspection and
inventory-taking of ballot boxes, and appointment of watchers. However, the Tribunal has already
ordered the protection and safeguarding of the subject ballot boxes; and it has issued also the
appropriate directives to officials concerned. At this point, we find no showing of an imperative
need for the relief prayed for, since protective and safeguard measures are already being
undertaken by the custodians of the subject ballot boxes.
WHEREFORE, protestee’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY for
lack of merit. Protestant’s reiterating motion for ocular inspection and inventory-taking with very
urgent prayer for the appointment of watchers is also DENIED for lack of showing as to its actual
necessity.

Further, the protestant LOREN B. LEGARDA is ORDERED to specify, within ten (10) days from
notice, the three (3) provinces best exemplifying the manifest errors alleged in the first part of her
protest, and three (3) provinces best exemplifying the frauds and irregularities alleged in the
second part of her protest, for the purpose herein elucidated.

Lastly, the Tribunal hereby ORDERS the Commission on Elections to SUBMIT, within 30 days
hereof, the official project of precincts of the May 2004 Elections.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-05-1978. March 31, 2005

ATTY. FLORANTE S. LEGASPI, Complainant,

vs.
ALEJANDRO L. TOBILLO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro,Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is an administrative complaint1 charging Alejandro L. Tobillo, Sheriff IV of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 39, with Grave Neglect of Duty
arising from his alleged refusal to implement the writ of possession in Civil Case No. R-4240.

Complainant is the counsel of plaintiffs Spouses Dr. Daniel Panganiban and Dr. Paula
Panganiban in Civil Case No. R-4240, a case for a sum of money and damages with prayer for
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

On 16 June 1993, by virtue of a writ of attachment issued by the court, Deputy Sheriff Emmanuel
Latorza levied a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-65686 of the
Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro registered in the name of Cesar Al. Bautista.

On 01 March 1994, the trial court rendered a decision,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants-spouses Cesar Al. Bautista and Placer Bautista, as follows:

In re: Civil Case No. 4240

1. Ordering the defendants-spouses Cesar Al. Bautista and Placer Bautista to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P1,122,000.00 representing the obligations of the defendants to the plaintiffs covered by
the following checks:

CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT

PDB No. 38005575 June 12, 1993 P630,000.00

UCPB No. 202348 June 17, 1993 42,000.00
PNB No. 222693 June 18, 1993 10,000.00
PNB No. 216208 July 4, 1993 5,000.00
PNB No. 219272 July 4, 1993 5,000.00
UCPB No. 184158 July 4, 1993 100,000.00
UCPB No. 184169 August 4, 1993 100,000.00
PNB No. 219273 August 4, 1993 5,000.00
UCPB No. 184196 August 18, 1993 100,000.00
UCPB No. 184197 August 18, 1993 100,000.00
PNB No. 222696 September18, 993 5,000.00
PNB No. 222695 August 18, 1993 10,000.00
PNB No. 222694 July 18, 1993 10,000.00

On 14 April 1994, a writ of execution was correspondingly issued. On 16 June 1994, Clerk of
Court V Rolando A. Caguete, commanded3 Emmanuel A. Latorza, Sheriff IV of the RTC of
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 39, to cause the execution of the said judgment, thus:

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid
judgment; to levy the goods and chattels of the defendants, except those that are exempt from
execution and to make the sale thereof in accordance with the procedure outlined by Rule 39
Revised Rules of Court, and in such cases made and provided, together with all your lawful fees
for the service of the writ.

In case sufficient personal property/ies of the defendants cannot be found whereof to satisfy the
amount of said judgment, then you are directed to levy the real property of said defendants and
to sell the same or so much thereof in the maner provided for by law for the satisfaction of said
judgment. Likewise, return this writ into Court within sixty (60) days from receipt with your
proceedings duly endorsed at the back thereof.

On 28 December 1994, the parcel of land in question covered by TCT No. T-65686 in the name
of Spouses Cesar Al. Bautista and Placer Bautista was sold on execution by Sheriff Latorza.
Being the highest bidders, a certificate of sale4 was issued in the name of plaintiffs Spouses Dr.
Daniel Panganiban and Dr. Paula Panganiban. Said certificate of sale was duly registered with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on 10 November 1998 and annotated on
the back of TCT No. T-65686 under Entry No. 2217, Doc. No. 2217.5

Despite the lapse of one (1) year period, spouses Bautista failed to redeem the same. Hence, a
final deed of sale was issued6 by Clerk of Court VI and Ex Officio Sheriff Luningning Y. Centron
in favor of plaintiffs on 10 October 2001. As a consequence, TCT No. 115958 was issued in the
name of plaintiffs.7

On 02 March 2002, a certain Milagros Pascual filed an omnibus motion8 to intervene and prayed
to adopt attached amended complaint as a complaint-in-intervention. She claimed that she has a
legal interest in the subject matter of the case, having bought the land covered by TCT No. T-
65686 from Spouses Cesar Bautista and Placer Bautista.

On 12 March 2002, the court denied9 the motion on the ground that the same was filed after the
case has long become final and executory and that the intervenor’s right is protected in an action
for annulment of sheriff sale earlier filed by said intervenor.

On 27 August 2002, plaintiffs filed a motion10 for issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to
Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure considering that defendants failed to
exercise their right of redemption within a period of one (1) year.
On 13 September 2002, the court issued an order11 for issuance of a writ of possession and
directing the sheriff of the court or any other proper officer to order the defendants and all
persons claiming right under them to vacate the mortgaged property described in TCT No.
115958 and to surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs. Correspondingly, a writ of possession
was issued12 by Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Josephine Caranzo-Olivar.

On 06 November 2002, respondent Sheriff Alejandro L. Tobillo, replaced by Sheriff Latorza who
retired on 16 April 2000, submitted his report,13 thus:

This writ of possession was received by the undersigned Sheriff on October 14, 2002 and served
on two (2) successive days, that is, from October 16 up to October 17, 2002, the proceedings
thereon being:

That on October 16, 2002, the undersigned caused the service of the writ of possession upon the
defendant Cesar Bautista at the Provincial Jail Center, Camilmil, Calapan City. Said defendant
personally received a copy of the said writ and affixed his signature at the back of the original
copy thereof which was attached to the record.

That on October 17, 2002, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the undersigned tried to cause
the service of the writ upon the intervenor Milagros Pascual who is residing at San Antonio (Pier)
Calapan City. She personally received and signed on the same writ to acknowledge receipt
thereof. Through conversation with her, the undersigned learned that the property subject of the
writ is near her residence at San Antonio, Calapan City. The intervenor Milagros Pascual told the
undersigned not to proceed thereto and instead, she would be the one to talk to her sister
Normelita Marasigan who is presently occupying the place but the undersigned did not accede to
her request. Both the undersigned and the intervenor Milagros Pascual went to the property
subject matter of the writ, was able to talk to Normelita Marasigan and informed her as to why the
undersigned is present thereat and that is, to inform them that the said land no longer belongs to
them nor to defendants-spouses Cesar Bautista and Placer Bautista but it is now owned by the
plaintiffs-spouses Dr. Daniel Panganiban and Dr. Paula Panganiban as well as Sps. Dr.
Normando Legaspi and Angelita Legaspi by virtue of a court decision dated March 21, 1994. The
undersigned repeatedly insisted that they have to vacate the property subject of the writ and
gave them a period of fifteen (15) days to prepare and bring or take out all their belongings but
the intervenor Milagros Pascual told the undersigned that she will first relay this matter to her
lawyer.

The undersigned is initially returning this writ of possession for the information and guidance of
the Honorable Court.

Complainant claimed he made several follow-ups for respondent to implement the writ, but the
latter failed and refused to do so.

On 04 August 2003, respondent filed an urgent motion/manifestation,14 asking the court a quo to
issue an order directing either the continuance or discontinuance of the implementation of the
writ of possession considering that he was informed of the certiorari case filed by defendants in
the Court of Appeals.

On 08 August 2003, the court a quo issued an order15 directing the continuance of the
implementation of the writ of possession until such time that a restraining order will be issued by
the trial court against the implementation of the same.

Up until recently, the writ of possession appears not to have been implemented. Complainant
claimed that respondent sheriff’s act of willfully and unlawfully refusing to implement the writ of
possession for more than one (1) year despite follow-ups, constitutes gross neglect of duty and
conduct unbecoming of a public official. A complaint was, thus, filed against Sheriff Tobillo.
On 30 March 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required16 respondent to file his
comment within ten (10) days from receipt.

On 03 May 2004, respondent filed an urgent ex parte motion17 for extension of time to file
answer, and was favorably acted upon by OCA on 17 June 2004.18

In his answer,19 respondent denies that he refused to implement the writ of possession. He
maintained that he sought the proper guidelines from the court by filing an Urgent
Motion/Manifestation asking the court to issue an order directing the continuance or
discontinuance of the implementation of the writ of possession, as he received a copy of the
petition for certiorari filed by defendant Milagros Pascual in the Court of Appeals. He stated that
complainant did not make any formal effort to pursue his legal actions. He also stated that on 28
November 2003, the duty to implement the writ of possession was transferred to the Ex Officio
Sheriff. He likewise maintained that the filing of the instant administrative complaint is premature,
considering that the court has yet to rule on the motion filed by complainant to cite respondent for
indirect contempt.

In his reply,20 complainant averred he was constrained to file the administrative complaint
because respondent refused to implement the writ despite follow-ups. He said he informed
respondent that the writ of possession should be implemented considering that the Court of
Appeals has not issued any restraining order to stop the implementation of the writ.

On 21 December 2004, the OCA submitted the following recommendations:

Respectfully submitted is our recommendation that the instant case be RE-DOCKETTED as a

regular administrative matter and respondent Sheriff Alejandro L. Tobillo be ordered to pay a
FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts shall be
dealt with severely.

We agree in the findings of the OCA except for the recommended penalty.

Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. They are tasked to execute final
judgments of the courts. If not enforced, such decisions become empty victories of the prevailing
parties. As agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and
utmost diligence because in serving the court’s writs and processes and implementing its orders,
they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient
administration of justice.21

The duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no
discretion on whether or not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up"
its implementation.22

Sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with
utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless
restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly
delayed. Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily as
possible.23 Their unreasonable failure or neglect to perform such function constitutes inefficiency
and gross neglect of duty.24

In the instant case, the court perceives a bit of lackluster attitude on the part of the respondent
sheriff in the enforcement of the writ of possession in Civil Case No. R-4240. It appears that the
decision was rendered on 01 March 1994 and respondent implemented the writ of possession
dated 10 October 2002 by serving a copy thereof to defendants on 16 October 2002 and to
intervenor Milagros Pascual on 17 October 2002, but the same remained unacted upon as
intervenor Pascual told him she would still consult her lawyer. From then on, respondent sheriff
did not make any action on the writ. It was only on 23 and 25 July 2003 when he tried to enforce
the writ again but failed to do so as intervenor Milagros Pascual informed him that she had filed a
petition for certiorari and injunction in the Court of Appeals. Instead of proceeding with the
implementation of the writ, respondent filed a manifestation in the lower court asking whether he
would continue with the implementation of the writ. Despite receipt of the order25dated 08 August
2003 directing the continuance of the implementation of the writ, respondent implemented the
subject writ only on 15, 22 and 29 September and 14 October 2003. The writ remained
unimplemented as the occupants refused to vacate the subject land.

Pursuant to the writ issued, respondent should have ousted defendants/intervenors from the
subject lot. He failed to do so. That the occupants refused to vacate the premises as they would
still consult a lawyer and that they filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, were not
valid excuses. The pendency of a petition for certiorari with any court is not sufficient excuse to
defer the implementation of the said writ more specifically that the trial court had already ordered
him to continue implementing the writ. Indeed, it was incumbent upon him to proceed without
haste and to put the winning parties in possession of the premises and employ such means as
may be necessary to enforce the writ.

The fact that respondent handed a copy of the writ to the defendants and filed his return does not
mean that he had already discharged his duty. The essence of his job was to give the plaintiffs
full control and possession of the subject lot. He miserably failed to do this.

Respondent’s procrastination which resulted in the long delayed execution of the court’s
judgment is truly deplorable.26 A judgment, if left unattended would be an empty victory for the
prevailing party.27 Rendered inutile is a decision left unexecuted or delayed indefinitely because
of the sheriff’s inefficiency, negligence, misconduct or ignorance. Moreover, the parties who are
prejudiced tend to condemn the entire judicial system.28

All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence, and efficiency.
As officers of the court and agents of the law, they must discharge their duties with due care and
utmost diligence. Any conduct they exhibit tending to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary will not be condoned.29

Time and again we have ruled that high standards are expected of sheriffs who play an important
role in the administration of justice.30 This was further expounded in the case of Vda. De Abellera
v. Dalisay:31

At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are indispensably in close
contact with the litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige
and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and
lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in
the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice.

In serving court writs and processes and in implementing court orders, they cannot afford to
procrastinate without affecting the efficiency of court processes and the administration of
justice.32 Given their important functions as frontline representatives of the justice system, they
should be imbued with a sense of professionalism in the performance of their duties. When they
lose the people’s trust, they diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary.33

It is undisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of
judgment.34 The officer charged with this delicate task is the sheriff. Despite being exposed to
hazards that come with the implementation of the judgment, the sheriff must perform his duties
by the book.35 Respondent Tobillo failed to perform what was expected of him.
Clearly, respondent Tobillo failed to observe the degree of dedication to the duties and
responsibilities required of him as a sheriff.36 Through his failure, he breached his sworn duty to
uphold the majesty of the law and the integrity of the justice system.37 The court cannot
countenance such dereliction of duty, as it erodes the faith and trust of the citizenry in the
judiciary. As an implementing officer of the court, Sheriff Tobillo should set the example by
faithfully observing, and not brazenly disregarding the Rules.

In the case of Tisado v. Tablizo,38 a sheriff39 who failed to enforce the Writ of Execution was
suspended for six months without pay. In the more recent case of Gonzales La’O v. Hatab,40 we
dismissed respondent sheriff41 for his unreasonable delay in executing the judgment of the trial
court in an ejectment case. In the case of Dilan v. Dulfo,42respondent sheriff43 was ordered to pay
a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos, for failure to implement the writ of execution as the occupants
adamantly refused to vacate the premises. In this case, respondent has been an accountable
officer of the court for more than twenty years and, thus, is presumed to have imbibed at least
the fundamental rules and principles in implementing the writ of execution. But considering that
the offense he committed appears to be the first and he is new to the position having been
appointed Sheriff only on 08 October 2001, the Court is inclined to grant him certain leniency
without, nonetheless, being unmindful of the fact that he had breached the provisions of the
Rules of Court. For this reason, the Court is wont to impose the payment of a fine in the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos.

WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Alejandro L. Tobillo, is hereby found guilty of gross neglect of
duty, and a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos is imposed upon him. Upon receipt of this Decision,
respondent or the Ex Officio Sheriff44is hereby DIRECTED to immediately implement the subject
writ. He is warned that a commission of the same offense or a similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal records.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1585 March 31, 2005

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1505-MTJ)

ATTY. JOSE C. CLARO, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE RAMON V. EFONDO, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Sipocot-Lupi, Camarines
Sur, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

In an amended verified Complaint dated October 13, 2003, Atty. Jose C. Claro charged Judge
Ramon V. Efondo, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Sipocot-Lupi, Camarines Sur, with
negligence and inefficiency, and ignorance of the law.

According to the complainant, he was the counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 517
entitled "Pelagia Opiana v. Victoriano Escriba" for declaration of ownership and recovery of
possession with damages pending with the MCTC, Sipocot-Lupi, Camarines Sur. He presented
evidence before then presiding Judge Daniel Joven to prove that the plaintiff was the owner of
the subject property and entitled to its possession. A Motion to Admit Answer-in-Intervention was
filed by Delfina Escriba-Castillo which was denied by Judge Joven. This prompted the former to
file a petition for review on certiorari assailing such denial before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch 56, presided by Judge Lore R. Valencia-Bagalacsa. Upon
the filing of the said petition, Judge Valencia-Bagalacsa ordered the suspension of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 517.1 The petition for certiorari was eventually dismissed.2

The complainant alleged that while he was furnished with a copy of the decision, no entry of
judgment was issued by the RTC; neither did he receive a copy of the entry of judgment of such
decision. Thereafter, to his surprise, the respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of the main
case,3 Civil Case No. 517, despite the fact that the evidence for the plaintiff had already been
presented even prior to the filing of the petition for certiorari. The complainant then filed a motion
for reconsideration4 thereof, upon which the respondent Judge issued an Order5 dated February
21, 2003, giving the opposing counsel a period of 10 days within which to comment on the said
motion for reconsideration before considering the same as submitted for resolution. However, the
motion remained unresolved despite the lapse of three months from such date; as such, the
respondent Judge was guilty of gross negligence and inefficiency. The complainant alleged that
the respondent Judge was likewise guilty of ignorance of the law for issuing the order dismissing
Civil Case No. 517. The complainant further contended that the respondent Judge should have
issued an order submitting the case for decision, since the plaintiff therein had already presented
her evidence before the trial was suspended upon the filing of the petition for certiorari.

In his comment, the respondent Judge clarified that he did not preside over Civil Case No. 517; it
was an inherited case which was never set for trial on the merits during his tenure as Acting
Presiding Judge of the MCTC of Sipocot-Lupi, Camarines Sur. He further alleged that the
complainant never moved for the court to hear the case since he assumed office in such capacity
on March 8, 2002. Hence, the Order of dismissal dated January 30, 2003.

The respondent Judge admitted, however, that he remembered the pending motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal only when he received a copy of the present
administrative complaint on December 12, 2003. He then acted on the pending motion with
dispatch that very same day. While the respondent Judge "[dared] not ask for total absolution for
his lack of foresight" in preventing the delay, he explained that it was caused by mere
inadvertence, thus:

Originally, the record of Civil Case No. 517, after it was dismissed on January 30, 2003, was
shelved together with all the other disposed and terminated cases. In view of the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal order, the case record was retrieved and was included in those
records with pending incidents for the immediate attention of the undersigned. It had a marginal
note, like the other cases with pending incidents, stapled to the expediente cover indicating that a
motion for reconsideration is submitted for the resolution of the undersigned. The record is
placed, same as the other cases with pending incidents, at the sofa inside of the Judge’s
Chamber or on the desk for the undersigned’s perusal and examination. This is the simple
practice the court has adopted in order that motions and other incidents are resolved without
unnecessary delay. But before the undersigned could resolve the motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal Order in Civil Case No. 517, the prompt resolution of which was likewise derailed
because the undersigned’s attention was riveted on answering the earlier complaint (OCA IPI
No. 03-1359-MTJ: Nablo v. Judge Efondo), comes the complainant’s motion filed on March 11,
2003 for the undersigned to inhibit in several cases, including Civil Case No. 517. However, the
motion to inhibit was promptly acted upon by the undersigned on March 27, 2003 after a
thorough examination of all the cases involved therein. Not contented, complainant also filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order dated March 27, 2003 denying his motion for inhibition
(Annex 6). There were, therefore, two (2) motions for reconsideration already filed by the
complainant. But the motion for reconsideration of the Order dated March 27, 2003, denying his
motion for inhibition, was first resolved. It was denied on April 25, 2003 (Annex 7). When all the
copies of the Order dated April 25, 2003 were transmitted to all the counsels concerned, the
clerk-in-charge mistakenly removed the marginal note attached to the cover of Civil Case No.
517, believing that there is no more incident to be resolved by the undersigned because the
motion for reconsideration as noted in the expediente has already been resolved. He erroneously
presumed that the note pertained only to the motion for reconsideration of the Order dated March
27, 2003 denying the motion for inhibition, which was already resolved, and forgot about the
motion for reconsideration of the Order dated January 30, 2003 dismissing Civil Case No. 517.
On the belief that there was no more incident to be resolved, the clerk-in-charge unknowingly
returned and kept the record of Civil Case No. 517 in the filing cabinet together with all the other
disposed cases. (Please see the Joint Affidavit of Clerk of Court Pablo M. Echano and the clerk-
in-charge Rogelio Sagario as Annex 8)6

While the respondent Judge admitted that "proper and efficient court management is the judge’s
responsibility and he alone is directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions
and cannot conveniently put the blame on his staff’s mismanagement of the case records," he
pointed out that he has, with utmost diligence, considerably reduced the dockets of the courts in
which he sits by expediently acting on all the pending cases before him.

Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the respondent Judge pointed out that not every
error of judgment renders a judge liable for no judge is beyond error. He also pointed out that the
complainant’s remedy was to file an appropriate judicial proceeding to assail the Order of
dismissal dated January 30, 2003 before the present administrative action could prosper. Since
the complainant had already filed a notice of appeal which was given due course, the charge of
ignorance of the law should be dismissed for being premature.

In its Report dated September 2, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator made the following
evaluation and recommendation of the case:

EVALUATION: Under Section 4, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, a motion for reconsideration
shall be resolved within 30 days from the time it is submitted for resolution. Clearly, as admitted
by respondent judge in his Comment, there was delay in the disposition of the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal order in Civil Case No. 517 because it was only resolved on 12
December 2003 or almost after it was heard on 21 February 2003. Although it appears that the
proximate cause of the delay was the negligence of respondent’s clerk-in-charge who
inadvertently removed the marginal note on the cover of the case record and placed the records
in the filing cabinet for disposed cases, respondent may not be absolved. It is settled in
jurisprudence that:

"A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement by Court personnel.
Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. Court personnel are not the
guardians of a Judge’s responsibility." (A.M. No. R-465 MTJ and A.M. 87-9-2310, 29 June 1989,
174 SCRA 581, 586)

With regard to the charge of Ignorance of Law, we agree with respondent that it is premature
because the issue involved in the charge is the subject of an appeal before the appellate court.
Moreover, the questioned order of the respondent was done in his judicial capacity. As a general
rule, the acts done by a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though erroneous. [These] acts become subject to disciplinary action only when they are
attended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or bad faith (Abeira vs. Maceda, 233 SCRA 520).

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are
the following:

1. The instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

2. The respondent judge be declared guilty of the less serious offense of undue delay in
rendering a decision or order and be fined in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt [with] more severely; and

3. The charge of Ignorance of the Law be DISMISSED for lack of merit.7

In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated October 13, 2004, the parties expressed their
willingness to submit the instant administrative matter for resolution based on the records and the
pleadings filed.

By his own admission, the respondent Judge was unable to decide a pending motion within the
30-day period provided for in Section 4, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. He is thus guilty of undue
delay in rendering a decision or order, which, under Section 9, Rule 1408 of the Rules of Court is
classified as a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more
than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.9

Indeed, judges should dispose of court business promptly within the period prescribed by law or
the extended time granted them by this Court.10 This is mandated by Canon 3 of Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, and by no less than the Constitution itself.11 Canon 6 reminds a judge
to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is
often justice denied.12 Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the
public in the institution of justice, lowers its standards and brings them into disrepute. Every
judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision; he must not delay the judgment which a party
justly deserves. The public trust reposed in a judge’s office imposes upon him the highest degree
of responsibility to promptly administer justice.13 The Court, however, is not unaware of the heavy
caseload of judges and the rigors of travel that they sometimes have to make because of detail
to vacant salas. It is precisely for this reason that the Court has been sympathetic to requests for
extensions of time within which to decide cases and resolve matters and incidents related
thereto.14 Indeed, a certain degree of latitude is allowed to judges, who are granted a reasonable
extension of time to decide and resolve cases upon proper application and on meritorious
grounds.15

The Court agrees with the Court Administrator that the charge of ignorance of the law against the
respondent Judge must be dismissed. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy
where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or
a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or
dishonesty.16 The remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order to
the higher court for review and correction.17 Furthermore, a judge’s failure to correctly interpret
the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable.18 The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal or administrative – for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with
fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment.19

Considering the respondent Judge’s candid admission of his inadvertence20 and that this is his
first offense, the Court finds that a fine of ₱5,000.00 is appropriate in this case.

WHEREFORE, for undue delay in resolving a pending motion, respondent Judge Ramon V.
Efondo is FINED an amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00). He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with by the Court more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1556. March 31, 2005

PURITA LIM, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

In a verified letter-complaint1 dated June 5, 2003, complainant Purita Lim charged respondent
Judge Cesar M. Dumlao of the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Isabela, with Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.

Complainant averred that she filed two criminal cases for carnapping and theft with the Regional
Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, against a certain Herman A. Medina. On May 8,
2003, Medina was apprehended and detained at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Santiago City Jail, by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by then Presiding Judge Fe Albano
Madrid of Branch 35.

On May 9, 2003, respondent judge issued three separate orders for the release of Medina on the
ground that he had posted bail with his court. Complainant alleged that respondent judge
frequently approves bail bonds for cases filed in other courts and outside the territorial jurisdiction
of his court. He also issues search warrants for implementation outside of his court’s jurisdiction
which, resultantly, are often quashed and the corresponding cases dismissed because the
articles seized were inadmissible as evidence.

As proof, complainant attached copies of Search Warrant Nos. 2002-120,2 2002-173,3 and 2002-
1804 issued by respondent judge. Search Warrant No. 2002-120 was ordered quashed on
September 2, 20025 by Judge Anastacio Anghad for being infirmed and fatally defective. The
crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the MTC of San Mateo, Isabela and no
"compelling reasons" were stated in the application to justify its filing before the MTC of San
Mateo, Isabela. What is more, it was found that respondent judge did not conduct a thorough and
extensive inquiry to the deponent and his witnesses as required by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure6 in order to establish probable cause and the justification for the application.

Search Warrant No. 2002-173 was also ordered7 quashed by Judge Anghad on December 18,
2002 as probable cause was not actually ascertained and searching questions and answers
were not conducted. In another case, Search Warrant No. 2002-1808 was likewise quashed and
the articles seized by virtue of the warrant were declared inadmissible in evidence9 because the
applicant failed to prove "extreme and compelling circumstances" and the warrant issued did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In view of these instances, complainant requested for an investigation into the activities of
respondent judge. On June 30, 2003, the Court Administrator referred the complaint to
respondent judge requiring his comment thereon within ten days from receipt,10 but he failed to
file the required comment notwithstanding his receipt of the order on July 28, 2003 as evidenced
by the Registry Return Receipt. The Court Administrator sent a 1st Tracer11 dated October 28,
2003 which respondent judge received on November 19, 2003. On June 28, 2004, this Court
resolved to require respondent judge to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
or held in contempt for his obdurate refusal to file his comment.12 On December 8, 2004, with still
no response from respondent judge, the Court resolved to dispense with the comment.13

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr. and Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, submitted to this Court a Memorandum dated
February 15, 2005. In said memorandum, the Court was informed that respondent judge has
been charged in six (6) administrative cases, including the instant case, to wit:
1. MTJ-01-1339 (Efren Morales vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for Abuse of Authority. Respondent
was fined P5,000.00 in a decision dated February 13, 2002.

2. MTJ-01-1350 (Lorenzo Pascual, et al. vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for Gross Negligence and
Gross Ignorance. Respondent fined P10,000.00 in a decision dated July 20, 2001.

3. MTJ-03-1519 (Reynaldo Sinaon, Sr. vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for Grave Abuse of Authority,
Misconduct, Dereliction of Duty and Ignorance of the Law. The case is pending.

4. 03-1442-MTJ (Ester Barbero vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for Abuse of Authority. The case is
pending.

5. 97-394-MTJ (Artemio Alivia vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for Anomalous Reduction of Bailbond.
Case pending.

The OCA’s evaluation stated:

The respondent’s failure to submit his comment as required is further evidence of his defiance of
directives issued by his superiors. It is, furthermore, indicative of his admission of the charges
pending against him. Indeed, the practice of respondent accepting and approving bail bonds of
detained persons who are charged of crimes in courts other than his own constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.

We believe, however, that in the determination of the penalty, we should consider the fact that he
presides over four (4) courts to wit: MTC, San Mateo, Isabela as presiding judge; MCTC,
Alfonso-Lista-Aguinaldo as acting presiding judge; MTC, Ilagan, Isabela as acting presiding
judge, and MCTC of Tumauini-Delfin Albano also as acting presiding judge.

Thus, the OCA recommended:

Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court with the recommendations
that the respondent Judge be required to pay a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
for his obdurate refusal to file his comment on the complaint. Further, respondent judge be
required to pay a fine of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) and warned that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more drastically for approving bail bonds for
accused persons who were detained in places outside his territorial jurisdiction.

We agree with the recommendations of the OCA, except as to the penalty.

Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial
court judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the
province, city or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other
than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said
place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.

It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant against Herman Medina were
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant
of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said court. The order of
release therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should have been issued by that court, or
in the absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City.
In this case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the time
of the posting of the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day respondent judge
ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago City,
Isabela were at their respective posts.

It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused
arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 as
quoted above must be complied with before a judge may grant bail.14 The Court recognizes that
not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does
not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment.15 Where, however, the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.16

Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is
expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve
Medina’s bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves
little room for error. In the case of Español and Suluen v. Mupas,17 we have stated:

Thus, a judge who approves applications for bail of accused whose cases were not only pending
in other courts but who were, likewise, arrested and detained outside his territorial jurisdiction is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and violates Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It
must be emphasized that the rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this
Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules
undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure
strict compliance therewith at all times in their respective jurisdictions.18

It is settled that one who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court
the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all
times.19 When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence
of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the
law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law
by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.20

Respondent judge’s predicament is further aggravated by his unauthorized or irregular issuance

of search warrants not once but a number of times. To our mind, his violations cannot be
excused as mere lapses in judgment but blatant and conscious disregard of basic rules of
procedure.

Moreover, records show that he has been previously charged and found guilty of similar charges.
Respondent judge has been previously fined Five Thousand Pesos for notarizing the revocation
of a Special Power of Attorney in violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-
90.21 In another case, he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and negligence in the
performance of duties for issuing a temporary restraining order and granting a party’s motion
without the benefit of a proper hearing. He was fined Ten Thousand Pesos.22

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court characterizes gross ignorance of the law and
procedure as a grave offense. The penalties prescribed for such offense are: (1) Dismissal from
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government owned or controlled
corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.

In Gomos, et al. v. Adiong,23 the respondent judge therein was suspended from office without
salary and benefits for six months after he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. We
took judicial notice that previously, he was fined in the sum of P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of
the law and another P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, respondent judge appears undeterred in disregarding the law. He has continued to
exhibit such behavior that betray an unconcerned stance about the previous penalties he has
received and the warnings previously given that any repetition of similar infractions shall be dealt
with more severely. Thus, we are imposing a penalty more severe than a fine. Given the
circumstances, suspension from office for six (6) months without salary and benefits is
reasonable.

We agree with the OCA that the respondent judge must be held administratively liable for his
unjustified failure to comment on an administrative complaint. This constitutes gross misconduct
and insubordination. We held in Imbang v. Del Rosario, that:

The office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. It is gross
misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit indifference to
the resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly and
substantially. After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere
request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply
accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court’s
lawful order and directive. (Emphasis supplied)24

In that case, we fined the judge in the amount of P10,000.00 for his failure to comply with our
directives. In the present case, a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as recommended by
the OCA is reasonable penalty for respondent judge’s repeated failure to file his comment on the
complaint.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Cesar M. Dumlao of the Municipal Trial
Court of San Mateo, Isabela, is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse
of Authority and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of six (6) months without salary
and other benefits with a WARNING that a repetition of the same shall merit a more serious
penalty. He is likewise FINED the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for his obstinate
failure to file comment on the complaint filed against him despite proper notice.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1461. March 31, 2005

MA. TERESA D. COLUMBRES, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ANICETO L. MADRONIO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is the letter (with annexes) dated June 8, 20011 of Ma. Teresa D.
Columbres, addressed to and directly filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) but
eventually referred to the Court, relative to certain actuations of Judge Aniceto L. Madronio,
Sr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan in
connection with Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99), entitled Lucille S. Columbres vs. Ma. Teresa
Columbres, an action for forcible entry with damages filed against the letter-writer by her
stepmother, Lucille S. Columbres. More specifically, the letter submits for the Court’s
consideration the propriety of Judge Madronio’s actuations/inaction in the same case, to wit: (a)
issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction without the benefit of hearing; (b) ordering
writer Ma. Teresa Columbres as defendant in the same case to surrender to the plaintiff therein a
Volkswagen car not involved in the suit; and (c) failure to act for an unlimited period of time on
Teresa’s motion to lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in said case.

The background facts:

On October 22, 1999, in the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan then presided by
Judge Madronio, Ma. Teresa’s stepmother Lucille S. Columbres filed against her a complaint2 for
forcible entry with damages, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99).

The complaint alleged that on or about the second week of October 1999, defendant Ma. Teresa
with several companions, by means of force, strategy and stealth unlawfully entered Lucille
Columbres’ premises at 144 San Ildefonso Poblacion, San Jacinto, Pangasinan and carted away
personal belongings and goods found in her store amounting to ₱300,000. Before leaving, the
intruders even padlocked the house and the store. Despite demand, defendant refused to vacate
the premises. Plaintiff thus prayed that defendant Ma. Teresa be ordered to vacate the premises
and its possession restored to plaintiff and for the defendant to account for valuables and stocks
taken from plaintiff’s store, plus damages and litigation expenses.

In her answer3 dated November 5, 1999, defendant Ma. Teresa denied the material allegations of
the complaint and asked for its dismissal, and the award of her counterclaim for damages,
incidental expenses and attorney’s fees.

Meanwhile, on November 3, 1999, plaintiff filed a Motion For Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction4 so that she may be restored to the possession of the premises in question.

On November 25, 1999, defendant Ma. Teresa filed her Opposition5 to the aforementioned
motion, arguing that said motion, aside from having been filed out of time under Section 15, Rule
70, is also not verified, contrary to the requirement of Section 4, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court.

As evidently no writ of preliminary mandatory injunction has yet been issued by Judge Madronio,
plaintiff filed on December 3, 1999 an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of the desired writ.
On December 14, 1999, after considering the allegations in said motion and the earlier
opposition interposed by the defendant, Judge Madronio granted said urgent ex-parte motion
thru his handwritten notation6 at the bottom of the same motion, to wit:

Granted as prayed for but the movant is hereby ordered to post a bond of P30,000 to answer for
any damage which the defendant may suffer.

On December 16, 1999, Judge Madronio formalized his handwritten notation by actually issuing
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction7 addressed to the City and Provincial Ex-Officio Sheriff,
RTC, Dagupan City reading, as follows:

GREETINGS:

A verified complaint and an Urgent Motion to Reiterate Motion For the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction having been filed before this Court against defendant Ma.
Teresa Columbres, praying that a preliminary injunction issue against said defendant restraining
her from continuing with the performance of certain acts mentioned in the complaint and in her
urgent motion and the affidavit of the plaintiff, as well as the evidence presented for the purpose,
and it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that this case where a Writ of Injunction should
issue, sufficient reasons having been alleged and the bond required by law having been given
thru surety in the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, to the satisfaction of the Court;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned Judge, that, until further orders, you the said Ma.
Teresa Columbres and all your attorneys, representatives, agents and any other persons
assisting you or acting in your behalf, to restore the possession to the plaintiff of the residential
house/ premises in question which you forcibly took possession through force, strategy and
stealth by padlocking the same and to refrain from carting away personal belongings of herein
plaintiff from the residential house/ premises, particularly the Volkswagen Car (Emphasis
Supplied).

On December 23, 1999, plaintiff Lucille Columbres filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Break
Open,8 alleging that despite the earlier writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, defendant Ma.
Teresa padlocked the gate of the premises.

On January 20, 2000, defendant Ma. Teresa filed a Motion To Lift Writ of Preliminary Injunction
And To Reconsider Order to Surrender Volkswagen,9 therein denying having carted away
plaintiff’s personal belongings nor padlocking the latter’s room. As regards the Volkswagen car,
defendant claimed that it has always been in her possession and is not involved in the forcible
entry suit.

In her subject letter of June 8, 2001, Ma. Teresa represents that as of said date, her aforesaid
motion, filed way back on January 20, 2000, was merely sat upon by the Judge and remained
unresolved "for an unlimited period of time".

Required by OCA to comment on the letter, Judge Madronio, by way of a return indorsement,
submitted his Comment10 on July 27, 2001.

In said Comment, Judge Madronio denied Ma. Teresa’s allegation in her letter that he issued the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction without the benefit of hearing. He alleged that Ma.
Teresa was furnished with a copy of plaintiff’s motion therefor and that the latter in fact filed her
opposition thereto, adding that he issued the writ only after due consideration of the allegations in
the motion and Ma. Teresa’s opposition. He averred that Ma. Teresa, despite having been
furnished with a copy of the writ, defied the same, thus constraining him to issue a break open
order as prayed for by the plaintiff.

Anent Ma. Teresa’s lament that he merely sat on her motion to lift the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and to reconsider his order to surrender the Volkswagen car, the judge
averred that he had already resolved and denied the same.

In the same Comment, Judge Madronio, while admitting having granted plaintiff’s motion for a
writ of preliminary injunction thru mere handwritten notation at the bottom of the motion,
explained that he formalized the grant by actually issuing the desired writ on December 16, 1999.

In a Resolution11 dated November 20, 2002, the Court had the case docketed as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest within ten (10) days from notice
whether they are willing to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. No response was
received from both of them. Hence, in a subsequent Resolution of April 12, 2004,12 the Court
required the parties to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for such
failure, and again to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.

On June 20, 2004, respondent judge manifested his willingness to submit the case for resolution
based on the pleadings at hand.13

In its Memorandum Report, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that respondent judge be found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for which he should be ordered
to pay a fine of ₱10,000 with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
Indeed, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted the application
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99) without any notice of
hearing. Section 15, Rule 70 on Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer, in conjunction with Section
5, Rule 58, on preliminary injunction of the Rules of Court, respectively read:

"Sec. 15. Preliminary Injunction. – The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within
five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him
in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof".

"Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary

injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice,
the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-
day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time
and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order" (Emphasis Supplied).

The above provisions expressly prohibit the grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and
prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. But courts are authorized to issue ex-
parte a temporary restraining order (TRO) if it should appear from facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter
could be heard on notice. The TRO, however, shall be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the
judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. At the
end of such period, the TRO automatically terminates without need of any judicial declaration to
that effect, leaving the court no discretion to extend the same.14

In Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99), the plaintiff filed her motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction twelve (12) days after the complaint for forcible entry was filed. Opposed by defendant
Ma. Teresa, the plaintiff again filed an ex-parte and urgent motion for the issuance of the writ.
Without conducting a hearing within the time prescribed by law, respondent judge granted the
motion based merely on the allegations in the application therefor and the opposition thereto.
Thus, no opportunity was given both parties to be heard and to introduce evidence on the
propriety for the issuance of the injunctive writ.

We also take note of the fact that the motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
belatedly filed, in contravention of Rule 70, Section 15 of the Rules of Court which explicitly
mandates that the application for injunction must be filed within 5 days from the filing of the
complaint. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly administration of justice.15

We likewise find irregular the directive of the respondent judge in the writ he issued on December
16, 1999 for defendant Ma. Teresa to turn over the Volkswagen car to plaintiff. Recovery of
possession of personal property is misplaced in a forcible entry case, a summary action to
recover material or physical possession of real property when the person who originally held it
was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.16
We have ruled that judges should not be disciplined on account merely of occasional mistakes or
errors of judgment. However, it is equally imperative that they should be conversant with basic
rules in order to merit the confidence of the citizenry.17 In the present case, respondent judge’s
disregard of the basic rules of procedure and his failure to abide by them constitute an offense of
grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.

Lastly, on Ma. Teresa’s allegation that respondent judge merely sat on her motion to lift the writ
of preliminary injunction and to reconsider the directive vis a vis the Volkswagen car, respondent
judge claims that he had already resolved the motion by denying the same. However, no
evidence was ever presented by him to substantiate his claim. There is no way for us then to
determine whether the motion was actually resolved within the reglementary period or, worse, if it
was ever resolved at all considering that, as alleged by the complainant, she was not given a
copy of said alleged resolution.

Under Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the Constitution, judges of lower courts are required to decide
cases or resolve matters within three (3) months from the date of their submission for resolution.
However, in cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, first level courts are allowed
only thirty (30) days following receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the
period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.

It bears repeating that the public’s faith and confidence in the judicial system depends, to a large
extent, on the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and other matters pending before the
courts. As we emphatically stated in Sanchez v. Vestil,18 and reiterated in Bernardo vs. Fabros19:

This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the
disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges
are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency
and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them.

As to the recommended penalty by the OCA, the amount of ₱10,000 appears to be

commensurate with respondent judge’s infraction. In Adao vs. Lorenzo,20 which is akin to the
case at bar, we imposed the same amount of ₱10,000 for grave abuse of authority and undue
delay in resolving an incident in a civil case.

Considering that respondent judge already retired from the service, the ₱10,000 is ordered
deducted from the ₱50,000 previously withheld21 from his retirement benefits, precisely on
account of the pendency of this case and another administrative complaint against the same
respondent judge.22

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Aniceto L. Madronio, Sr., former Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan is hereby found GUILTY of
grave abuse of discretion and gross inefficiency and is meted a fine of ₱10,000.00, the amount to
be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5128 March 31, 2005

ELESIO1 C. PORMENTO, SR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALIAS A. PONTEVEDRA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a verified Complaint2 dated August 7, 1999, Elesio C. Pormento, Sr. charged Atty. Elias A.
Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct, praying that on the basis of the facts alleged
therein, respondent be disbarred.

Complainant alleges that between 1964 and 1994, respondent is his family's legal counsel
having represented him and members of his family in all legal proceedings in which they are
involved. Complainant also claims that his family's relationship with respondent extends beyond
mere lawyer-client relations as they gave respondent moral, spiritual, physical and financial
support in his different endeavors.3

Based on the allegations in the complaint, the rift between complainant and respondent began
when complainant's counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648 filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City was dismissed. Complainant claims that respondent, who was his lawyer in the said
case, deliberately failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of the
order of dismissal by the trial court, as a result of which, complainant was deprived of his right to
appeal said order. Complainant asserts that he only came to know of the existence of the trial
court's order when the adverse party in the said case extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
executed over the parcel of land which is the subject matter of the suit. In order to recover his
ownership over the said parcel of land, complainant was constrained to hire a new lawyer as
Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action for the recovery of the subject property.4

Complainant also claims that in order to further protect his rights and interests over the said
parcel of land, he was forced to initiate a criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of
the alleged new owner of the said land. Respondent is the counsel of the accused in said case.
Complainant claims that as part of his defense in said criminal case, respondent utilized pieces
of confidential information he obtained from complainant while the latter is still his client.5

In a separate incident, complainant claims that in 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at
Escalante, Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was
prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership of
the property, complainant alleges that he heeded respondent's advice to build a small house on
the property and to allow his (complainant's) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order
for complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainant's
nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with the
Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. 528.
Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant's nephew.6

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct by representing

clients with conflicting interests and should be disbarred by reason thereof.7

In his Comment,8 respondent contends that he was never a direct recipient of any monetary
support coming from the complainant. Respondent denies complainant's allegation that he
(respondent) did not inform complainant of the trial court's order dismissing the latter's
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648. Respondent claims that within two days upon his receipt of
the trial court's order of dismissal, he delivered to complainant a copy of the said order, apprising
him of its contents. As to his representation of the persons against whom complainant filed
criminal cases for theft,9respondent argues that he honestly believes that there exists no conflict
between his present and former clients' interests as the cases he handled for these clients are
separate and distinct from each other. He further contends that he took up the cause of the
accused in the criminal cases filed by complainant for humanitarian considerations since said
accused are poor and needy and because there is a dearth of lawyers in their community. With
respect to the case for ejectment filed by complainant against his nephew, respondent admits
that it was he who notarized the deed of sale of the parcel of land sold to complainant. However,
he contends that what is being contested in the said case is not the ownership of the subject land
but the ownership of the house built on the said land.10

On December 21, 1999, complainant filed a Reply to respondent's Comment.11

On January 19, 2000, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.12

On February 18, 2002, respondent filed a Rejoinder to complainant's Reply adding that the
instant complaint was orchestrated by complainant's son who wanted political vengeance
because he lost the vice-mayoralty post to respondent during the 1988 local elections.13

On February 20, 2002, complainant filed a Sur-Rejoinder to respondent's Rejoinder.14

Thereafter, the parties filed their respective Position Papers,15 after which the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.

In his Report and Recommendation dated February 20, 2004, Investigating Commissioner
Agustinus V. Gonzaga found respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of
suspension for one month.

In a minute Resolution passed on July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to annul
and set aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead approved the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, to wit:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-387

Adm. Case No. 5128
Elesio C. Pormento, Sr., vs. Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDED [sic], as it is hereby ANNULED and SET
ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commission, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit of the complaint.

We do not agree with the dismissal of the complaint.

At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation
is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling
reasons.16 Formal investigations entail notice and hearing. However, the requirements of notice
and hearing in administrative cases do not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, as
actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to
propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies.17Due process is fulfilled
when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in
support of their arguments.18

From the records extant in the present case, it appears that the Investigating Commissioner
conducted a hearing on January 16, 2002 where it was agreed that the complainant and the
respondent shall file their respective position papers, after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.19 No further hearings were conducted.

It is also disturbing to note that the abovementioned Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
annulling and setting aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, is bereft of
any findings of facts or explanation as to how and why it resolved to set aside the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead dismissed the complaint against
respondent.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with
his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from
the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.
(Emphasis supplied)

In Cruz vs. Cabrera,20 we reiterated the importance of the requirement that the decision of the
IBP Board of Governors must state the facts and the reasons on which such decision is based,
which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record. We held therein that:

[A]side from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out
to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of
them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board
of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.

Noncompliance with this requirement would normally result in the remand of the case.21

Moreover, while we may consider the act of the IBP Board of Governors in simply adopting the
report of the Investigating Commissioner as substantial compliance with said Rule, in this case,
we cannot countenance the act of the IBP Board of Governors in merely stating that it is
annulling the Commissioner's recommendation and then dismiss the complaint without stating
the facts and the reasons for said dismissal.

However, considering that the present controversy has been pending resolution for quite some
time, that no further factual determination is required, and the issues being raised may be
determined on the basis of the numerous pleadings filed together with the annexes attached
thereto, we resolve to proceed and decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on
record, in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of the case.22

Coming to the main issue in the present case, respondent is being accused of malpractice and
misconduct on three grounds: first, for representing interests which conflict with those of his
former client, herein complainant; second, for taking advantage of the information and knowledge
that he obtained from complainant; and, third, for not notifying complainant of the dismissal of his
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648.

We shall concurrently discuss the first and second grounds as they are interrelated.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

Corollary to this, Canon 21 of the same Code enjoins a lawyer to preserve the confidences and
secrets of his clients even after the attorney-client relation is terminated. Rule 21.02, Canon 21
specifically requires that:

A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
In addition, Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states:

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest in or connection with the
controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all

concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets
or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from
others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed.

Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of

the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.23 Another
test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of
a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.24

A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the
subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of
the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.25 Conversely, he may properly
act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter
wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there being in that instance no conflict of
interests.26 Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyer's new
client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former client's action, the
lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for
the former client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel.27 As we
have held in Maturan vs. Gonzales:28

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as
well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with
care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A
lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof.29

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however
slight such adverse interest may be.30 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to
maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.31

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent represented herein
complainant's nephew and other members of his family in the ejectment case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 528, and in the criminal complaint, denominated as I.S. Case No. 99-188, filed by
herein complainant against them. The only established participation respondent had with respect
to the parcel of land purchased by complainant, is that he was the one who notarized the deed of
sale of the said land. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent obtained
any information from herein complainant that can be used to the detriment of the latter in the
ejectment case he filed.

While complainant alleges that it was respondent who advised him to allow his nephew to
temporarily occupy the property in order to establish complainant's possession of said property
as against another claimant, no corroborating evidence was presented to prove this allegation.
Defendant, in his answer to the complaint for ejectment, raised the issue as to the right of the
vendor to sell the said land in favor of complainant.32 However, we find this immaterial because
what is actually in issue in the ejectment case is not the ownership of the subject lot but the
ownership of the house built on the said lot. Furthermore, the subject matter of I.S. Case No. 99-
188 filed by complainant against his nephew and other members of his family involves several
parts of trucks owned by herein complainant.33 This case is not in any way connected with the
controversy involving said parcel of land. In fine, with respect to Civil Case No. 528 and I.S. Case
No. 99-188, complainant failed to present substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
violating the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests.

However, we find conflict of interests in respondent's representation of herein complainant in

Civil Case No. 1648 and his subsequent employment as counsel of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 3159.

The subject matter in Civil Case No. 1648 is Lot 609 located at Escalante, Negros Occidental,
the same parcel of land involved in Criminal Case No. 3159 filed by herein complainant against
several persons, accusing them of theft for allegedly cutting and stealing coconut trees within the
premises of the said lot. Complainant contends that it is in this criminal case that respondent
used confidential information which the latter obtained from the former in Civil Case No. 1648.

To prove his contention, complainant submitted in evidence portions of the transcript of

stenographic notes taken during his cross-examination in Criminal Case No. 3159. However,
after a reading of the said transcript, we find no direct evidence to prove that respondent took
advantage of any information that he may have been acquired from complainant and used the
same in the defense of his clients in Criminal Case No. 3159. The matter discussed by
respondent when he cross-examined complainant is the ownership of Lot 609 in its entirety, only
a portion of which was purportedly sold to complainant. Part of the defense raised by his clients
is that herein complainant does not have the personality to file the criminal complaint as he is not
the owner of the lot where the supposed theft occurred. It is possible that the information as to
the ownership of the disputed lot used by respondent in bringing up this issue may have been
obtained while he still acted as counsel for complainant. It is also probable that such information
may have been taken from other sources, like the Registry of Deeds, the Land Registration
Authority or the respondent's clients themselves.

Nonetheless, be that as it may, it cannot be denied that when respondent was the counsel of
complainant in Civil Case No. 1648, he became privy to the documents and information that
complainant possessed with respect to the said parcel of land. Hence, whatever may be said as
to whether or not respondent utilized against complainant any information given to him in a
professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him
from appearing as counsel for the opposing side. As we have previously held:

The relations of attorney and client is [are] founded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.34

Moreover, we have held in Hilado vs. David35 that:

 Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial,
of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause.36

Thus, respondent should have declined employment in Criminal Case No. 3159 so as to avoid
suspicion that he used in the criminal action any information he may have acquired in Civil Case
No. 1648.

Moreover, nothing on record would show that respondent fully apprised complainant and his new
clients and secured or at least tried to secure their consent when he took the defense of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.

Respondent contends that he handled the defense of the accused in the subject criminal case for
humanitarian reasons and with the honest belief that there exists no conflict of interests.
However, the rule is settled that the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests
applies although the attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.37 Moreover, the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not
make the prohibition inoperative.38

Respondent also asserts that when he accepted employment in Criminal Case No. 3159, the
attorney-client relations between him and complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 had already been
terminated. This defense does not hold water because the termination of the relation of attorney
and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client.39

Thus, we find respondent guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.

As to the third ground, we find that complainant failed to present substantial evidence to prove
that respondent did not inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648.
On the contrary, we find sufficient evidence to prove that complainant has been properly notified
of the trial court's order of dismissal. The only proof presented by complainant to support his
claim is the affidavit of his daughter confirming complainant's contention that respondent indeed
failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim.40 However, in the same affidavit,
complainant's daughter admits that it was on December 4, 1989 that respondent received the
order of the trial court dismissing complainant's counterclaim. Respondent, presented a
"certification" dated December 11, 1989, or one week after his receipt of the trial court's order,
where complainant's daughter acknowledged receipt of the entire records of Civil Case No. 1648
from complainant.41 The same "certification" relieved respondent of his obligation as counsel of
complainant. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that respondent duly notified complainant of
the dismissal of his counterclaim. Otherwise, complainant could not have ordered his daughter to
withdraw the records of his case from respondent at the same time relieving the latter of
responsibility arising from his obligation as complainant's counsel in that particular case.

As to the penalty to be imposed, considering respondent's honest belief that there is no conflict
of interests in handling Civil Case No. 1648 and Criminal Case No. 3159, and it appearing that
this is respondent's first infraction of this nature, we find the penalty of suspension to be
disproportionate to the offense committed.42 Moreover, we take into account respondent's
undisputed claim that there are only three lawyers who are actually engaged in private practice in
Escalante, Negros Occidental, where both complainant and respondent reside. One of the
lawyers is already handling complainant's case, while the other lawyer is believed by
respondent's clients to be a relative of complainant. Hence, respondent's clients believed that
they had no choice but go to him for help. We do not find this situation as an excuse for
respondent to accept employment because he could have referred his clients to the resident
lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office or to other lawyers in the neighboring towns. Nonetheless,
in view of respondent's belief that he simply adhered to his sworn duty to defend the poor and
the needy, we consider such situation as a circumstance that mitigates his liability. Considering
the foregoing facts and circumstances, we find it proper to impose a fine on respondent. In Sibulo
vs. Cabrera,43 the respondent is fined for having been found guilty of unethical conduct in
representing two conflicting interests.

Respondent is further reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to

refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the
Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.44

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found GUILTY of representing conflicting

interests and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to be heedful of
the requirements provided for in Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court as discussed in
the text of herein decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165491. March 31, 2005

ROBERT E. OLANOLAN, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CELSO A. TIZON, Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Coming to this Court via this verified petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for injunctive relief, petitioner Robert E. Olanolan urges us
to nullify and set aside the en bancOrder1 dated September 8, 2004 of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in EAC No. 61-2003denying his motion for
reconsideration of an earlier Resolution2 dated March 31, 2004 of the Commission’s Second
Division, the nullification of which, along with said Division’s other incidental issuances, are
likewise sought in this recourse.

The factual antecedents are, as follows:

Petitioner Roberto E. Olanolan (Olanolan) and private respondent Celso A. Tizon (Tizon) were
among the candidates for the position of punong barangay of Barangay 76-A, Bucana, Davao
City in the July 15, 2002 barangay elections.

After the voting exercise and canvass, Olanolan was proclaimed the winning candidate, having
garnered a total of 4,278 votes as against the 4,268 votes for Tizon, the second placer, or a
margin of ten (10) votes.

Tizon attributed his loss to anomalies allegedly perpetrated by, among others, the chairperson,
poll clerks and members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). Accordingly, on July 25, 2002,
he filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City an election
protest,3 docketed as Election Case No. 844-G-2002, which was eventually raffled to Branch 7
of the court. In it, Tizon prayed for the revision of ballots cast in seventy (72) two precincts
located at Bucana Elementary School and thereafter the nullification of Olanolan’s proclamation
and his (Tizon’s) proclamation as the elected punong barangay of Barangay 76-A, Bucana,
Davao City.

Inasmuch as Olanolan’s answer with counter-protest was belatedly filed, the MTCC would, as
stated in its decision, infra, enter a general denial for him.

Subsequent developments saw the constitution by the MTCC of a 3-man revision committee
which, after conducting a revision and recounting of ballots in the contested precincts, submitted
a Revision Committee Report dated September 19, 2002.4

During the protest proceedings, it was observed that the ballots used in two (2) of the contested
precincts, i.e., Precincts No. 598-A and 608-A, were without COMELEC watermarks and other
security features. In fact, page 65 of the revision report contained the following entries:

"B) In precinct 598A with a total number of 56 votes for OLANOLAN and 29 for TIZON was
excluded from the recounting on the following grounds:

1) That the color of the ballots is different from the ballots which were already recounted taken
from the previous boxes;

2) That upon examination, the ballots in this precinct do not have security code shadow while in
the other ballots which were already recounted from the previous ballot boxes have their security
code shadow".

In the same proceedings, the BEI chairman of Precinct No. 598-A, Benigno Silvosa, admitted to
receiving from the Davao City Treasurer’s Office the election paraphernalia for that precinct the
day before actual voting and then bringing home the same to his residence.6

On December 18, 2002, the MTCC rendered judgment7 dismissing Tizon’s election protest
mainly on the strength of the following premises:

In the case of Marcelino Libanan vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jose
Ramirez, G.R. No. 129783, December 22, 1997, the court affirmed the ruling of the Tribunal in . .
. HRET Case No. 95-020 to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back
is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any of these other authenticating marks, to wit:
(a) the COMELEC watermark (b) in cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not
readily apparent, the presence of blue and red fibers in the ballot.

In the instant action, petitioner [i.e.,Tizon] failed to show convincing proof that the absence of the
COMELEC watermarks particularly on ballots belonging to Precinct 578-A [should have been
Precinct 598-A] rendered the same invalid. Nonetheless, even if the COMELEC watermarks are
not visible to the naked eye, the ballots under this precinct bore the initial of the BEI chairman at
the back of the same. As held, it is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot
can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

xxx xxx xxx

The allegation in the Petition . . . which refers to anomalous conduct of the Chairman of the BEI
of Precinct 598-A . . . in the person of Ben Silvosa was unsubstantiated. The court is convinced
the alleged anomaly did not exist. (Words in bracket added).

In time, Tizon appealed to the COMELEC whereat his recourse was docketed as EAC No. 61-
2003.
On March 31, 2004, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution,8 setting aside
the appealed decision of the MTCC and declaring Tizon, as protestant-appellant thereat, "the
duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay 76-A, Bucana, Davao City in the July 15, 2002
barangay elections having obtained a total of 4,221 votes as against the protestee-appellee’s
4,196 or a margin of 25 votes". The Second Division ratiocinated:

On the other hand, a cursory reading of the questioned decision of the court a quo reveals flaws
and/or shortcomings that militate against the validity of the findings and conclusions contained in
said decision. Predicated therefrom, we find it necessary to disabuse the minds of the parties
anent their contentious allegations by examining and appreciating the ballots and all election
documents the results hereunder discussed.

Petitioner Olanolan received a copy of the resolution on April 14, 2004. Two days
thereafter, April 16, he filed, via registered mail, a Motion for Reconsideration.9 For his part,
private respondent Tizon sought, in an earlier motion,10 the execution of the aforementioned
March 31, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC’s Second Division.

Pursuant to an Order of April 26, 2004,11 the Second Division elevated Olanolan’s Motion for
Reconsideration (MR), together with the case records, to the COMELEC en banc, noting that
"only seven (7) sets of the said MR were filed and that no payment of the required motion fee
was made by movant." In the same Order, the Second Division likewise elevated to the en banc
Tizon’s motion for execution pending appeal.

Barely a week after, or on May 4, 2004, petitioner Olanolan submitted a manifestation12 enclosing
therewith a postal money order in the amount of ₱500.00 to cover the required legal fees for his
Motion for Reconsideration.

In the herein assailed Order dated September 8, 2004,13 the COMELEC en banc denied the
desired reconsideration on account of Olanolan’s, as movant therein, failure to pay the motion
fee and to submit the required number of copies of his motion for reconsideration. In the same
Order, the COMELEC en banc directed the Second Division’s commission clerk to immediately
issue an Entry of Judgment and the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to remand to the
MTCC the records of the case, stating in this regard the following:

Considering that there is no valid motion [for reconsideration] to speak of, the provision of
Section 13 (c), Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure applies, to wit:

‘Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolution. – xxx

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a

Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions
and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following
its promulgation.’

hence, the Resolution promulgated by this Commission (Second Division) on March 31, 2004,
copy of which was received by protestee-appellee’s counsel on April 14, 2004, had become final
and executory on April 15, 2004. (Italics and underlining in the original).

After the decreed issuance of Entry of Judgment, the COMELEC’s Special Second Division,
acting on Tizon’s earlier motion to execute the questioned March 31, 2004 Resolution of the
Division, directed, in its Order of September 16, 2004,14 the issuance of the corresponding writ,
which the division clerk did issue on even date.15

Hence, petitioner Olanolan’s present recourse, claiming in gist, that the COMELEC en
banc acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in –
1. denying his motion for reconsideration of the March 31, 2004 Resolution of the Second
Division on grounds of non-payment of legal fees and non-submission of the required copies of
the motion; and

2. declaring the same Resolution as final and executory on April 15, 2004, or fifteen (15) from its
promulgation on March 31, 2004, on the theory that his motion for reconsideration of such
resolution is, for all intents and purposes, not filed.

Petitioner Olanolan also imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Second Division in
reversing the MTCC decision and in ordering the issuance of a writ of execution that eventually
led to the implementation of its (Second Division’s) March 31, 2004 Resolution.

In the Court’s en banc Resolution of November 9, 2004, we directed the parties to observe the
status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed resolution and order of the
COMELEC.16 In compliance with this injunction, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government took the necessary measures which eventually enabled petitioner Olanolan to
actually assume the office of punong barangay on December 6, 2004.

It is petitioner’s posture in this recourse that the twin requirements on payment of fee for motion
for reconsideration and the submission of the necessary number of copies of such motion are not
jurisdictional caveat, but partake of the nature of mere technical rules which should not be made
to prevail over the collective will of the voters of Barangay 76-A, Bucana, Davao City. It is, he
adds, thus gravely abusive of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc to predicate its
assailed denial action on non-compliance with such technical requirements.

We are not persuaded.

The term "grave abuse of discretion", in its juridical sense, connotes, as Litton Mills Inc. Inc. vs.
Galleon Trader, Inc.,17 and a host of other cases teach, capricious, despotic, oppressive or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such
degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of
passion and hostility.18 The word "capricious", usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary",
conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand
of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.

As it were, the COMELEC en banc, in issuing its assailed Order dated September 8, 2004,19 did
no more than follow its own rules issued pursuant to no less than to its constitutional mandate to
promulgate "its rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases"20 as well as to issue
"its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices . . . ."21 The
rules on payment of legal fees and submission of pleadings are embodied in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 7(f) of Rule 40 and Section 1, Rule 7, thereof,
pertinently providing, respectively, as follows:

Rule 40, Section 7(f):

"Sec. 7. Legal Fees. – The following legal fees shall be charged and collected.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) For filing of a motion for reconsideration on a decision, order or resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . P500.00 (as amended)

Rule 7, Section 1:
"Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. – Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10)
legible copies. xxx,".

Complementing the aforequoted Section 7(f) of Rule 40 is the succeeding Section 18 of the
same Rule, prescribing the COMELEC’s option in case of non-payment of prescribed fees, thus:

"Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. – If the fees above prescribed are not paid, the
Commission may refuse to take action until they are paid and may dismiss the action or
proceeding."

Petitioner’s lament that what the COMELEC en banc did was improvidential as it could have
merely refused to act on his motion for reconsideration until the required fees were paid, while
understandable, is untenable. Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections22 succinctly explains why:

Petitioner cannot invoke to his aid the provision of Section 18, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure for the simple reason that under said Rule, the COMELEC is precisely given the
discretion, in a case where the prescribed fees are not paid, to either refuse to take action on the
case until the fees are paid, or to dismiss the action or proceeding. The COMELEC, unfortunately
for petitioner, chose to exercise the second option.

The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal.

Consequent to the COMELEC’s en banc Order declaring its Second Division’s Resolution of
March 31, 2004 final and executory, the assailed issuance by the latter of the corresponding writ
of execution to implement said resolution can be sustained as correct and doubtless within its
jurisdiction. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a writ of certiorari, certiorari being limited to
resolving only errors of jurisdiction; it is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment,23 if such be
the case.

In all, this Court finds that the COMELEC en banc committed no error in denying, for reasons
stated in its assailed Order dated September 8, 2004, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the Second Division’s Resolution of March 31, 2004.

Given the foregoing premises, there is hardly any need to delve into the question of whether
grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance by the COMELEC of an Entry of Judgment on
the assailed Second Division’s March 31, 2004 Resolution that led to the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution. Such issue has been rendered moot and academic by this
disposition. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justifiable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.24 In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which a petitioner would be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the status quo ante order issued by this
Court on November 9, 2004 is hereby RECALLED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160368. March 31, 2005

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL BANK, Petitioners,

vs.
PEDRO L. CABRERA, Respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This case stemmed from two anomalous withdrawals totalling ₱202,000 against the savings
account of one Philip Inocencio, a depositor of the Sixto Antonio-Pasig Branch of petitioner
Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank. Such anomaly was imputed on respondent Pedro L.
Cabrera, the Assistant Manager-Service Head of that Branch who had been with the petitioner
bank for almost two decades.

The anomaly was discovered on 4 April 1998 when Inocencio went to the Branch to have his
passbook updated. Customer Service Assistant (CSE) Corazon Alejandro, the branch personnel
who attended to him, discovered that there was a discrepancy between his account balance as
appearing on the bank’s computer and that appearing on his passbook. The computer reported a
balance of only ₱99,061.71, while the passbook reflected a balance of ₱301,841.43.

Inocencio was referred to Customer Service Support (CSS) Alcelino Gregorio, who made a
verification of the unposted transactions on the passbook. In the process of conducting a
verification, Gregorio noticed that pages 1 and 2 of the Daily Trial Balance and Transaction
Register (DTBTR) print-out dated 23 March 1998 and debit supporting documents were missing.
He then asked Inocencio to give him more time to verify the discrepancy and told the latter to
come back to the branch at another date. Thereafter, Gregorio reported about the missing pages
to Cabrera and requested the latter’s assistance. Cabrera then undertook to personally look into
the matter.

On the afternoon of 15 April 1998, Cabrera informed the bank’s Area Operations Officer for
Eastern Metro Manila Area Arnulfo M. Villalobos that he was successful in locating a withdrawal
slip for ₱202,000 dated 21 March 1998. He further informed the latter of the following:

1. The withdrawal slip was validated using the terminal of CSE Amparo Advincula.

2. The withdrawal was approved by Assistant Manager-Sales Head Jose Enriquez, Jr.

3. The typewritten account no. 5433-03251-7 was altered to 5443-03251-7 (correct account
number) by crossing out the first number 3 and superimposing number 4 on top.

4. The amount in words was torn off leaving the words "two thousand pesos" with visible traces
of cigarette burns.

5. The computer validation was torn off and likewise had traces of cigarette burns with only the
date of transaction left visible.

6. The withdrawal was post-reviewed by Cabrera himself as Service Head.

7. The denomination breakdown of the amount paid was not indicated on the reverse side of the
withdrawal slip.

8. The client’s signature on the withdrawal slip differed from the specimen signatures on the
signature card on file.

9. Pages 3 and 4 of the Electronic Journal reading on 21 March 1998 of Advincula were missing.

The next day, or on 16 April 1998, the petitioner created a Fact- Finding Committee to investigate
the anomaly. Pending investigation, Cabrera was placed under preventive suspension.

The investigation allegedly revealed that a week before the incident, the respondent verbally
requested a one-day leave of absence on 21 March 1998 to attend his eldest daughter’s
graduation. His request for leave was approved by Branch Manager Rogelio B. Blaquera on 20
March 1998. On the same day, at 12:25 p.m. to 12:27 p.m., a balance inquiry, last transaction
inquiry, and passbook updating on Inocencio’s account were made on respondent’s computer
terminal. On 21 March 1998, despite the fact that he was supposed to be on the official leave,
the respondent reported for work in the morning. Blaquera then offered him to take a half-day
leave after lunch. However, in the afternoon, he was seen getting in and out of the Branch a
number of times.

When the Electronic Journal of Advincula was retrieved from her computer terminal on 17 April
1998, it was discovered that on 21 March 1998, at 1:39 p.m. and 1:40 p.m., two unauthorized
withdrawals amounting to ₱22,000 and ₱180,000, respectively, were made against the account
of Inocencio. Advincula categorically stated that she did not process the said transactions. The
corresponding amount of ₱202,000 were taken from her unlocked drawer while she was in the
Ladies’ Room. According to her, as a matter of practice, she would not secure her cash and
other valuables in lockable areas or sign off her terminal whenever she would leave her counter.
When the unauthorized withdrawals were made, only Corazon Alejandro was in the teller’s
counter.

The Teller’s Electronic Journals, Error Correction Summary Report, and DTBTR print-out also
allegedly showed that the respondent approved or overrode transactions using his password or
supervisor’s code #15 between 1:22 p.m. and 3:51 p.m. and that he delivered coin requisitions to
the tellers and received cash deliveries from them between 1:28 p.m. and 3:02 p.m. of 21 March
1998.

For his part, the respondent denied having made a balance inquiry and passbook updating on
Inocencio’s account, and claimed that either Blaquera or Gregorio accessed his computer
terminal. He was supposed to be on vacation leave on 21 March 1998 to attend his eldest
daughter’s graduation. But having learned that his reliever was not available and considering that
his daughter’s graduation was still in the afternoon, he decided to report for work in the morning.
He left the bank at 1:20 p.m. When he returned at about 5:30 p.m., the bank was already closed.
To prove his presence in his daughter’s graduation, he submitted photocopies of (1) the program
paper where the name of his daughter was listed as among the graduates; and (2) a picture of
him, together with his spouse and his daughter, at the venue of the graduation.

After conducting an investigation and evaluating the evidence gathered, including the written
explanations of Cabrera and the other personnel assigned to the Branch, the Fact-Finding
Committee concluded that Cabrera was culpable in view of the following circumstances:

a. The series of deliberate and premeditated acts before the execution of the planned
unauthorized withdrawals - balance inquiry, last transaction inquiry and updating on SA # 5443-
0-3251-7 under the name of Philip Inocencio were done on 3.20.98 at 12:25 p.m. to 12:27 p.m. in
his own computer terminal.

b. On 3.21.98, although he was supposed to be on official leave, he unexpectedly reported for

work which prompted BM/Blaquera to advise and offer him to just knock-off in the afternoon. At
1:39 p.m. and 1:40 p.m., the unauthorized withdrawals of ₱22,000 and ₱180,000, respectively,
were made using the teller’s terminal of CSE/Advincula and took the corresponding total amount
of ₱202,000 from the unlocked drawer of aforesaid CSE who at that time was out of her teller’s
cage/counter. In that afternoon, he was seen going-out/getting-in the branch for several times
and have accessed to branch transactions and computer terminals despite the fact that he was
supposed to be attending his daughter’s graduation day – the very reason of his request for a 1-
day VL. This was vehemently denied by him claiming that he was no longer in the branch when
the transaction took place. He said he left the bank at 1:20 p.m. and never touched/handled any
bank transactions/records and computer terminal afterwards. However, it was the other way
around as confirmed by several branch personnel and supporting documents/transaction media
on hand.
c. The sudden appearance and presentation of the forged withdrawal slip for ₱202,000 which for
several days had been missing. The withdrawal slip was altered to distort the facts and several
documents/print-outs related to the case were destroyed/missing to conceal the anomalous
transactions. He has full access/control/custody of all these vital records.

d. He violated the single occupancy of bank/branch premises during Mondays (off-working day).

e. As SEH, he is directly responsible for the following procedural lapses in the branch, such as:

1. CSE – not securing case and other valuables in lockable area and not temporarily signing-off
computer terminals when leaving their positions/areas.

2. CSS – not microfilming source documents and other transaction media required to be
microfilmed.

Acting on the report and recommendation of the Fact-Finding Committee and the
recommendation of BBS-Administration Group,1 the petitioner bank terminated Cabrera’s
employment on 22 July 1998, with forfeiture of benefits, on the ground of violation of Par. 1, Sec.
1, Art. V of the New Code of Discipline, specifically, "taking, converting or misappropriating Bank
funds, money, property for personal profit and benefit"; serious misconduct; and fraud or willful
breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative as provided
for under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 282 of the Labor Code. He was likewise required to
pay the amount of ₱202,000 "representing the amount irregularly withdrawn PLUS cost of
recovery thereof."

Having been disgruntled by this turn of events, Cabrera filed on 10 August 1998 a complaint for
illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against the petitioner. After the parties submitted their
respective position papers and replies, Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera rendered a Decision2 dated
29 February 2000 dismissing respondent’s complaint and declaring that the petitioner sufficiently
established by substantial evidence that the respondent committed serious misconduct resulting
in the loss of trust and confidence reposed on him by the petitioner.

Cabrera appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). But in its Resolution3 of
21 February 2001, the NLRC dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision rendered by
Labor Arbiter De Vera had become final and executory because Cabrera’s counsel, Atty.
Reynaldo M. San Juan, received a copy of the decision on 24 March 2000 and the Appeal with
Memorandum4 was filed only on 5 June 2000, way beyond the 10-day reglementary period.

On 19 April 2001, respondent Cabrera moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of his
appeal. Such motion, however, was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution5 of 16 May 2001.
Hence, Cabrera filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.6

While finding Cabrera’s appeal with the NLRC to have been filed out of time, the Court of
Appeals gave credence to the allegation of Cabrera that said infirmity was due to the gross
negligence of his former counsel Atty. Reynaldo San Juan. It then proceeded to declare the
illegality of Cabrera’s dismissal for failure of the petitioner bank to adduce substantial evidence.
The presence of Cabrera at the bank on 21 March 1998 despite his approved leave of absence
and his presentation of the missing withdrawal slip for ₱202,000 are not sufficient bases for
concluding that it was Cabrera who made the fraudulent withdrawals. Moreover, not a single
person claimed to have seen Cabrera enter the teller’s booth of Advincula at the time of the
questioned withdrawals. Thus, in its Decision7 of 26 March 2003, the Court of Appeals ordered
the petitioner to immediately reinstate the respondent to his former or equivalent position and to
pay him full back wages from the date of his illegal dismissal up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
Its motion for reconsideration8 having been denied in the Resolution9 of 9 October 2003, the
petitioner filed this petition arguing that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in (1) giving due
course to the petition for certiorari of Cabrera, which merely raised factual issues; (2) reversing
the Labor Arbiter’s decision, which had become final and executory; (3) holding that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cabrera’s appeal; and (4) reversing the factual
finding of the Labor Arbiter that Cabrera was validly and lawfully dismissed for cause when said
decision is supported by evidence.

The arguments raised by the petitioner boil down to two basic issues: (1) the propriety of giving
due course to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the undisputed fact that Cabrera’s appeal
with the NLRC was filed out of time; and (2) the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ finding that
the dismissal from employment of Cabrera was illegal.

Section 223 of the Labor Code clearly states that decisions of the Labor Arbiter shall become
final and executory unless appealed to the NLRC within ten days from receipt of the decision. It
is a settled fact that Cabrera’s appeal to the NLRC from the decision of Labor Arbiter De Vera
was not seasonably filed. His motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his appeal was
likewise filed way beyond the reglementary period. Ordinarily, such infirmity is fatal and would
have put an end to the case.

It must be stressed at this juncture that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. A strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice should not be allowed; technicality should
not be permitted to prevent the equitable and complete resolution of the rights and obligations of
the parties.10 No procedural rule is sacrosanct if such shall result in subverting justice.11 The
Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
purposes of justice requires it because what should guide judicial action is that a party is given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose
life, honor, or property on mere technicalities.12 Thus, in New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. v.
NLRC,13 as in other meritorious cases, the Court allowed, in the higher interest of justice, an
appeal from the labor arbiter’s decision to the NLRC which was several months late.

We now proceed to determine whether the case at bar is a meritorious case that merits a liberal
application of the rules on appeals. Cabrera claims that it was the gross negligence of his
counsel that caused the late filing of his appeal and motion for reconsideration. He followed up
the case with his lawyer, who promised that he would appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision, only to
find out – when it was already too late – that his lawyer reneged on his obligation. A reading of
the records, especially the pleadings filed by Cabrera’s former counsel Atty. San Juan, shows a
shoddy and haphazard legal service rendered to Cabrera. The pleadings filed for Cabrera leave
much to be desired. The Discussions/Arguments14 in his 6-page Position Paper consisted of only
two paragraphs. Likewise, the discussion in his Reply15 was superficial, and no attempt was
made to substantiate the factual allegations. To top it all, Atty. San Juan slept on his duty to
appeal the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter and to move for the reconsideration of the
dismissal of respondent’s appeal. Certainly, such incompetence and negligence are so gross that
it effectively deprived Cabrera of his day in court, so to speak.

A thorough review of the records indicate that the evidence presented by the petitioner consists
mainly of the report of the Fact-Finding Committee. No independent finding of facts was done by
the Labor Arbiter; he simply adopted the findings of the committee. Thus, in his decision, he
echoed the committee’s conclusion that it was Cabrera who committed the fraudulent
withdrawals based on the following alleged circumstantial evidence: (a) a balance inquiry was
made on the account of Inocencio using the computer of Cabrera; (b) Cabrera reported for work
on the date the withdrawals were made when he was supposed to be on leave; (c) Cabrera
claimed to have left at 1:20 p.m. on 21 March 1998, but some transactions showed that he was
still in the bank premises even after 1:20 p.m.; and (d) it was Cabrera who produced the
withdrawal slip for ₱202,000 dated 21 March 1998.
We are not unmindful of the fact that a bank owes great fidelity to the public it deals with, its
operation being essentially imbued with public interest. In turn, it cannot be compelled to
continue in its employ a person in whom it has lost trust and confidence and whose continued
employment would patently be inimical to the bank’s interest. The law, in protecting the rights of
labor, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company, which itself is
possessed of rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect. 16

The respondent is not merely a rank-and-file employee of the petitioner bank. He was an
assistant manager of the Sixto Antonio-Pasig Branch of the petitioner. His position thus carried
authority for the exercise of independent judgment and discretion characteristic of sensitive posts
in corporate hierarchy where a wide latitude could be supposed in setting up stringent standards
for continued employment. 17

However, it is long settled that it is the employer who has the burden of proving the legality of the
employee’s dismissal.18 For the respondent to be validly dismissed from the service, the
petitioner bank must prove by substantial evidence the bases of the breach of trust or serious
misconduct levelled against him. Substantial evidence has been defined as "that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."19 It
is such amount of evidence as to induce a belief that the employee is responsible for misconduct
and that participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by the
job.20

In this case, the allegation that a balance inquiry on the account of Inocencio was actually made
by Cabrera was not supported by substantial evidence. In his Memo21 for Cecilio L. Cortez,
FFC/Head, dated 22 May 1998, Cabrera emphasized that he was even the one who discovered
the use by the perpetrators of the fraud of his computer terminal for such balance inquiry and that
he reported it to the bank manager. It would thus be ironic for him to volunteer that information if
he had a hand in the anomalous withdrawals.

The presence of Cabrera at the bank after 1:20 p.m. of 21 March 1998 was not substantially
proved either. Notably, the declarations of the bank employees as to respondent’s time-ins and
time-outs on that fateful day were almost identical and are thus highly suspect. Aside from
coming from the mouths of the bank employees who were under investigation themselves, they
were not duly sworn and subscribed to. And even if they were reduced into affidavits, such would
hardly constitute the relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate,
since the respondent was not given the opportunity to test their veracity.22

Likewise, in an attempt to establish respondent’s presence at the bank’s premises at the time the
anomaly transpired, the Fact-Finding Committee’s Report enumerated several transactions
allegedly participated in by Cabrera, such as the approval or overriding of certain transactions,
delivery of coin requisitions to the tellers, and receipt of cash deliveries from the tellers. The
bases for such finding were allegedly the Teller’s Electronic Journal, Error Correction Summary
Report, and DBTR print-out, but these were not presented at all. Neither is there any testimony
or affidavit of the tellers concerned stating that, indeed, said transactions were done by Cabrera.
In any event, far from serving to pin down the respondent, these transactions could even show
his innocence. If he were the culprit he would not have dared participate in these transactions
which would not anyway facilitate the fraudulent withdrawals, since these transactions would
leave a paper trail and establish his presence at the time the withdrawals were made.

At any rate, the mere presence of Cabrera at the bank does not establish his guilt for the
fraudulent withdrawals. Significant is the fact that not a single bank personnel claimed to have
seen Cabrera enter the teller’s booth of Advincula at the time the questioned withdrawals were
made. With the allegations of some of the bank’s employees of having seen Cabrera go in and
out of the bank several times on that fateful day, it is simply incredible that Cabrera could enter
Advincula’s booth without anyone noticing it. Equally baffling is why the Fact-Finding Committee
just accepted hook, line and sinker, so to speak, the explanation of Advincula that at the time the
questioned withdrawals were effected, she was in the Ladies’ Room and that she left her counter
without securing the money and other valuables or without signing off her terminal. It is such a
convenient excuse that cannot sit well with this Court. Moreover, it taxes one’s credulity that
Advincula would not notice that a gargantuan amount of money was taken from her unlocked
drawer on that day.

The presentation by Cabrera of the missing forged withdrawal slip bolsters his innocence rather
than his guilt. It must be recalled that Gregorio turned to the respondent for assistance in
threshing out the problem on Inocencio’s account. The respondent then undertook to personally
look into the matter. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, with the years of training and
experience behind the respondent, he need not be told on how and what to look for in order to
resolve the problem; it was not surprising that he would come up with the withdrawal slip. If he
was the culprit, he would not have presented said withdrawal slip at all. Being an Assistant
Manager- Service Head, Cabrera must not have been so stupid as to produce a document that
would incriminate him if he, indeed, was the guilty person.

Considering the dearth of evidence that would prove the guilt of Cabrera, the termination of his
employment cannot be sustained.

With respondent’s dismissal from the service being illegal, the reinstatement and full backwages
decreed by the Court of Appeals are in order. However, if reinstatement is no longer viable as an
option, a separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service should be
awarded as an alternative.23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 65961 is AFFIRMED with the modification that if
reinstatement is no longer feasible and viable owing to attendant circumstances, a separation
pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service is hereby adjudged in favor of
respondent Pedro L. Cabrera.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158251 March 31, 2005

HANFORD PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED and VICTOR TE, Petitioners,

vs.
SHIRLEY JOSEPH, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003 and its
Resolution dated April 29, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 60701.

On July 17, 1978, petitioner Hanford Philippines, Inc. (Hanford) hired Shirley Joseph, herein
respondent, as a sewer.

On August 10, 1998, respondent voluntarily tendered her resignation effective September 17,
1998,2 which petitioner accepted the following day.3

Petitioner then paid respondent her last salary, 13th month pay and the cash conversion of her
unused vacation and sick leave.
On November 19, 1998,4 respondent sent a letter to petitioner requesting payment of her
separation pay pursuant to Section 1, Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
quoted as follows:

SECTION 1. Regular employees or workers separated by the COMPANY because of reduction

of personnel and employees or workers who may be separated without cause, or those
whose services are terminated or are separated from work due to suspension or cessation of
operation shall be entitled to a termination pay in accordance with law. The COMPANY shall
give termination pay to those who voluntarily resign due to the reasons heretofore
stated subject to the following terms and conditions:

a) 1 to 30 years of service shall be paid 20 days for every year of service;

b) 16 to 20 years of service to the COMPANY shall be paid 15 days pay for every year of service;

c) 11 to 15 years of service to the COMPANY shall be paid 10 days pay for every year of service;
and

d) 5 to 10 years of service to the COMPANY shall be paid 5 days pay for every year of service."5

Petitioner denied respondent’s request on the ground that under the Labor Code, voluntary
resignation is not one of the grounds which justifies the grant of separation pay.6

On December 17, 1998, respondent filed with the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for the
payment of her separation pay against petitioner Hanford and co-petitioner Victor Te, docketed
as NLRC NCR CN. 00-12-10238-98.

On May 20, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision7 granting respondent’s petition and
ordering petitioners to pay her separation pay in the amount of ₱93,820.00 as authorized by
Section 1, Article IV of the parties’ CBA.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered its Resolution8 dated
April 14, 2000 affirming the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.

Forthwith, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration

but was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution9 dated July 24, 2000, prompting them to file with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.

On January 23, 2003, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision10 dismissing the petition.

The Court of Appeals held that the parties’ CBA clearly provides that petitioner Hanford shall give
termination pay to those who voluntarily resigned due to the following reasons: reduction of
personnel; employees or workers who may be separated without cause; and those whose
services are terminated due to suspension or cessation of operation. Here, respondent
voluntarily resigned. This separation from the service is one "without cause" as provided by the
CBA. Hence, pursuant thereto, petitioner is entitled to a separation pay.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. However, it was denied by the Appellate Court in a
Resolution dated April 29, 2003.11

Hence, the present recourse. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a
resigned employee is entitled to separation pay under Section 1, Article IV of the CBA.12
Respondent counters that the Decision of the Court of Appeals should not be disturbed. She
worked with petitioner company for twenty years but decided to resign believing that pursuant to
the CBA, she is entitled to a separation pay. She also avers that several former employees of
petitioner, namely: Astor Madamag, Danilo Suplito, Domingo Bobis, Rosita Bobis, Evelyn
Cunanan, Fe Viray, Doris Angeles and Dula Imperia, were granted separation pay pursuant to
the CBA and petitioners’ policy and practice.13

It is well to note that there is no provision in the Labor Code which grants separation pay to
employees who voluntarily resign. Under the Code, separation pay may be awarded only in
cases when the termination of employment is due to: (a) installation of labor saving devices, (b)
redundancy, (c) retrenchment, (d) closing or cessation of business operations, (e) disease of an
employee and his continued employment is prejudicial to himself or his co-employees, or (f)
when an employee is illegally dismissed but
reinstatement is no longer feasible.

In Hinatuan Mining Corporation and/or the Manager versus National Labor Relations and Margo
Batister,14 we held that while it is true that under the Labor Code, an employee who voluntarily
resigns may not be granted separation pay, as in fact, the general rule is that an employee who
voluntarily resigns is not entitled to separation pay, however, there is an exception, that is, when
it is stipulated in the employment contract or CBA or such payment is authorized by the
employer’s practice or policy, as in this case.15

As aptly held by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, it is very clear from the
CBA that when an employee or worker voluntarily resigns due to, among others, "separation
from the company without cause," such as voluntary resignation, then he is entitled to a
separation pay.

Moreover, records show that petitioners granted the employees mentioned earlier their
separation pay upon their separation by reason of their retirement. Under the Labor Code,
retirement is not also a ground for the grant of separation pay. If petitioners could be liberal to
those employees who retired, there is no reason why they should not also extend such liberality
to respondent considering that she served petitioner for twenty one years.

Our ruling in Philippine National Construction vs. NLRC finds application here, thus:

"In the interpretation of an employer’s program providing for separation benefits, all doubts
should be construed in favor of labor. After all, workers are the intended beneficiaries of such
program and our Constitution mandates a clear bias in favor of the working class."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.