10, 1986 hearing, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits
and other papers accompanying it; and that notices shall be directed
FACTS: to the parties concerned stating the time and place for the hearing of
the motion. Failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw.
1. Azajar purchased thru the agent of Cham Samco 100 kegs of nails of
various sizes and paid P18,000 in full. However, Cham Samco only 2. Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and
delivered a part of the quantity ordered. Azajar filed a complaint give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion as
before the CFI of Cam Sur. well as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of
the motion for resolution.
2. Instead of submitting an answer, Samco filed a motion to dismiss on
two grounds: failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and 3. Without the notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with
that venue was improperly laid. reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse party
would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be
3. The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of resolved by the Court.
Court.
4. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant and not on the
4. Contending that such notice was fatally defective, Azajar filed a court.
motion to declare Samco in default, which the court granted. Azajar
was allowed to present evidence ex parte and the court rendered 3. G.R. No. 163785 December 27, 2007
judgment against Samco.
KKK FOUNDATIONVS. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS
5. The TC justified its order of default in this wise: that instead of filling
an answer to the complaint, Samco filed a motion to dismiss which is FACTS:On March 1, 2002, petitioner, filed a complaint for Annulment of
not a motion at all because the “notice” is directed to the Clerk of Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage and/or Nullification of
Court instead of the party concerned (as required by Sec.5, Rule 15, Sheriff’s Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO
RC) and is without the requisite notice of hearing directed to the CC and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.3 Petitioner alleged that: (1) the auction
and not to the parties, and merely stating that the same be submitted sale was made with fraud and/or bad faith since there was no public
for resolution. It is without the requisite notice of time and place of bidding; (2) the sheriff did not post the requisite Notice of Sheriff’s Sale; (3)
hearing. the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was fatally defective since it sought
to foreclose properties of two different entities; (4) the foreclosed properties
6. Aggrieved, Samco went to CA for recourse, but the CA affirmed the were awarded and sold to Imelda A. Angeles for an inadequate bid of only
decision of the TC. However, on motion for reconsideration, CA P4,181,450; and (5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of land covered
reversed itself and declared that technicalities should be brushed by individual titles but the same were sold en masse. On March 7, 2002,
aside so that Samco can be given a day in court. Judge Calderon-Bargas issued TRO preventing Angeles from consolidating
her ownership to the foreclosed properties. On even date, petitioner and
ISSUE: WON the failure of Cham Samco to set its motion to dismiss for Angeles executed a Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to
hearing on a specified date and time and for not addressing the same to the pay Angeles the bid price of the eight parcels of land within 20 days. The
party interested is fatal to his cause. parties then filed a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement.On April 1,
2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise
Agreement since the other property owner and other trustees of petitioner
were not consulted prior to the signing of the agreement. Angeles opposed
HELD: Yes. Although the Court sided with CA that technicalities should be set the motion.Judge Calderon-Bargas issued an Order stating that Record shows
aside to Samco to be afforded with his day in court. that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement and Motion
to Approve Compromise Agreement both failed to comply with Sec[s]. 4 and
1. The law explicitly requires that notice of motion shall be served by
5, Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure. Both proceedings have no specific date of
the appellant to all parties concerned at least 3 days before the
hearing. The reason why the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement up to
now has not yet been acted upon was that it has no date of hearing.Thus, requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements
these are considered mere scrap[s] of paper. The TC approved the renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the
Compromise Agreement. Angeles then moved for the issuance of a writ of strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid
execution. The TC required petitioner to comment on the motion within ten (10) application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially
days.TC directed the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of execution. On the same if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
date, the trial court received petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
Comment with Entry of Appearance which was denied on October 10, 2002. contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
Petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the October 3, 2002 (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and
Order.Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. The judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse
CA denied the petition and ruled that petitioner was not deprived of due party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
process when the trial court issued the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, complying with the procedure prescribed.A notice of hearing is an integral
2002 Orders since it was given sufficient time to file its comment. The component of procedural due process to afford the adverse parties a chance
appellate court did not rule on the second and third issues after noting that to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the October 3, 2002 Order had not adverse party is given time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
yet been resolved by the trial court. It did not resolve the issues even after the Records show that while Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on December 12, contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time
2003,11 ratiocinating that the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for of the hearing. However, scstill find that petitioner was not denied
reconsideration did not operate to reinstate the petition because at the time it procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
was filed, petitioner had no cause of action.Hence , this petition. Execution, the trial court issued an Order dated September 9, 2002 giving
petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the motion
ISSUES: WON the trial court seriously erred: (1) in issuing the October 3, only after the reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner
2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders without awaiting petitioner’s was given time to study and comment on the motion for which reason, the very
comment; (2) in granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution although purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.Procedural due process is
it lacked the requisite notice of hearing; and (3) in issuing the writ of not based solely on a mechanical and literal application that renders any
execution since it varied the tenor of the decision dated June 28, 2002. deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed
to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and
HELD: inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding.
On the first issue, we note that in its September 9, 2002 Order, the trial court On the last issue, SC note that the Compromise Agreement approved by the
gave petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment to Angeles’s Motion for trial court in its Decision dated June 28, 2002 merely provided that petitioner
Issuance of Writ of Execution. While petitioner claims that it received the would pay Angeles the bid price of P5,500,000, for the eight parcels of land
Order only on September 21, 2002, Angeles counters that petitioner received subject of the auction sale, within twenty (20) days. Upon payment, Angeles
it on September 12, 2002. We are more inclined to believe Angeles’s would execute a Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a Deed of
allegation since the trial court itself declared in its Order dated October 10, Cancellation of Mortgage, and surrender to petitioner the titles to the eight
2002 that the Order dated September 9, 2002 was personally served upon parcels of land. Nevertheless, when the trial court issued the writ of execution,
petitioner on September 12, 2002.13 Thus, petitioner had until September the writ gave Sheriff Bisnar the option "to allow the consolidation of the
22, 2002 within which to file its comment or to request for an extension of subject real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles."
time. Consequently, petitioner’s motion for extension and comment were not
seasonably filed and such procedural lapse binds petitioner. Undoubtedly, the writ of execution imposed upon petitioner an alternative
obligation which was not included or contemplated in the Compromise
Anent the second issue, a motion which does not meet the requirements of Agreement. While the complaint originally sought to restrain Angeles from
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 1514 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless consolidating her ownership to the foreclosed properties, that has been
piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial superseded by the Compromise Agreement. Therefore, the writ of execution
court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a which directed Sheriff Bisnar to "cause the Register of Deeds of Morong,
notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory Rizal, to allow the consolidation of the subject real properties in favor of the
defendant Imelda Angeles" is clearly erroneous because the judgment under • Liwag opposed the said motion and said that the allegations in the
execution failed to provide for consolidation. Because the writ of execution complaint filed are sufficient and contains the facts needed for a cause of
varied the terms of the judgment and exceeded them, it had no validity. The action to exist and Santos’ motion is indeed evidentiary in nature Trial Court
writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it
may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Neither may it go • Granted the motion and directed the plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars
beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the with respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant’s motion
execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds
it, it has pro tanto no validity.20 • When plaintiff failed to comply with the order of the court, the complaint
was dismissed with costs against the plaintiff
ISSUE: 1. WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for bill of
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated particulars filed by Liwag.
November 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73965 are MODIFIED such that the writ of HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. • BILL OF PARTICULARS ARE DISCRETIONARY UPON
execution issued on October 11, 2002 by Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas is THE COURTS o The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or
declared NULL and VOID. bill of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as
usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that
SC ordered that the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of regard will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of
Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, which is hereby ORDERED to issue another writ of discretion or a clearly erroneous order. o Complaint was indeed drawn and
execution against petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc., in conformity with the suffers from vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant properly
Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the trial court. This is without prejudice to to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court in an
filing a new motion for consolidation by respondent Angeles. orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.
Rule 12 – Motions for Bill of Particulars • RULES ON BILL OF PARTICULARS ON THE GROUND OF VAGUE
COMPLAINT o If an action (like this case) is one for the annulment of
1. SANTOS V. LIWAG (G.R. No. L-24238 November 28, 1980) documents that have been allegedly executed by reason of deceit,
machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent
DOCTRINE: The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill means. o Deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats,
of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as however, are largely conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without
usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that a statement of the facts to which such terms have reference are not sufficient.
regard will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of The allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud,
discretion or a clearly erroneous order. EMERGENCY RECIT (Very short case – deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be
please refer to the facts below) inferred as conclusions. § In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that
all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use of
FACTS: • June 8, 1964: Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo Liwag deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and other
with the CFI of Manila, which seeks to annul certain documents which were fraudulent means without the particular-facts on which alleged fraud, deceit,
alleged to be done with malice, threats, false pretenses, machination, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated.
misrepresentations, and other fraudulent means, with damages and costs.
• FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER TO FILE OF A BILL OF
• July 4, 1964: Santos filed a motion asking the court to order Liwag PARTICULARS RESULTS IN DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT o Hence, it was
(petitioner) to submit bill of particulars on certain allegations of the complaint proper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a bill of
believed to be vague and conflicting, and that he be informed of the charges particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the trial
filed against him to prepare an intelligent and proper pleading necessary court correctly dismissed the complaint.
and appropriate in the premises
2. FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her 6. On January 4, 1958 it denied defendants' motion for
husband ULPIANO PASION, reconsideration of the order of denial. On January 24, defendants
assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL vs. BRUNO MERCADO and filed their record on appeal (to this Court from the order of
ANTONIO DASALLA December 13, 1957), but as they subsequently filed a petition for
relief from the judgment by default, they asked that consideration
Facts: and approval of their record on appeal be held in abeyance until
said petition had been resolved. The request was granted.
1. On November 25, 1956 plaintiffs filed this action to recover portions Defendant's petition for relief, which was filed on January 28, 1958,
of a parcel of land in Isabela, and damages. Under date of was denied on March 21, as was also, on September 20, 1958 their
December 4, 1956 defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars, motion for reconsideration of the order of denial.
with notice of hearing on December 8, but since the motion was
actually received in court only on December 12 the court set it for 7. On October 4, 1958 the court denied likewise their motion for a writ
hearing on December 22. of preliminary injunction to restrain execution of the judgment by
default. Hence, this appeal.
2. On December 17, however, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, with a prayer that consideration of their motion for a bill Issue: Whether or not upon denial of a defendants' motion to dismiss the
of particulars be held in abeyance pending resolution of their motion reglementary period within which to file an answer resumes running even
to dismiss. On December 22, 1956, the date set by the court for the though the motion for a bill of particulars of the same defendants is still
hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars and by defendants for pending and unresolved.
the hearing of their motion to dismiss, the court issued an order
postponing "consideration" of both motions to December 29. Held:
3. On March 7, 1957 the court denied the motion to dismiss and Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the
ordered defendants "to answer the complaint within the reglementary time to file a responsive pleading. In the case of a motion to dismiss, the
period provided for by the Rules of Court." Hearing of the case on period starts running against as soon as the movant receives a copy of the
the merits was set for October 29, 1957, notice of which was duly order of denial. In the case of a motion for a bill of particulars, the
received by defendants. Defendants not having filed their answer, suspended period shall continue to run upon service on the movant of the bill
plaintiffs, on October 17, 1957, moved to have them declared in of particulars, if the motion is granted, or of the notice of its denial, but in any
default. On the same day the court issued the order of default event he shall have not less than five days within which to file his responsive
together with another order commissioning the clerk of court to pleading.
receive plaintiff's evidence.
When appellants filed a motion to dismiss they requested that resolution of
4. On October 21, 1957 defendants moved to cancel the hearing their previous motion for a bill of particulars be held in abeyance. This was
scheduled for October 29, on two grounds one of which was that their but practical because if the court had granted the motion to dismiss, there
motion for a bill of particulars had not yet been resolved. The motion would have been no need for a bill of particulars. Resolution of the motion for
to cancel was set for hearing on October 26, 1957. When the purpose was necessary only in the event that court should deny, as it did,
defendants arrived in court on that day they learned that an order of the motion to dismiss, in which case the period to file an answer remained
default had been issued, so they immediately filed a motion asking suspended until the motion for a bill of particulars is denied or, if it is granted,
that the same be set aside that their pending motion for a bill of until the bill is served on the moving party.
particulars be resolved and that they be given a reasonable period
thereafter within which to file their answer to the complaint. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
5. On December 13, 1957 the court denied the motion and rendered to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
its decision in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants. stipulation of facts.
No action having been taken thereon until the present, the period to 5. She filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court but the SC
answer has not yet expired. The lower court, therefore, erred in declaring referred it to the CA. The CA denied her petition.
appellants in defaults and in taking all the subsequent actions it did in the
case. Issue: WON the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of
sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to
The order of default issued and the decision rendered by the trial court are
set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings, pursuant to the properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
Rules.
Held: Yes. A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting
3. Salita vs Magtolis the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined
as "those facts which the expected evidence will support." 10 As stated by
Facts: private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
1. Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman
established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove,
Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila.
and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those
2. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the
the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity. complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient
cause of action. 11 A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters
3. The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such
Quezon City. Therein it is alleged that petitioner came to realize that information may be obtained by other means. 12
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of
the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action,
thereafter."Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage, respondent and to require more details from private respondent would be to ask for
(Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already been
essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to adequately apprised of private respondent’s cause of action against her thus
understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a —
newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to
marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand
her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified
4. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she
of particulars. She argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother,
statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules of Court, from which
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner
such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding the
can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private
questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order
respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was unable to
upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive
understand and accept the demands made by his profession . . . upon his
pleading.
time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for
more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts
— facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. 13 For sure, the
additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or
omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not
the function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14
RULE 16 – Motion to Dismiss been dismissed because it is a mere relitigation of the same issues previously
adjudged with finality, way back in 1956, between the same parties or their
1. RAMOS vs PERALTA privies and concerning the same subject matter. We have consistently held
that the doctrine of res judicata applies where, between a pending action and
2. Lee Bun Ting and Ang Chia vs. Hon. Jose Aliagen, Rafael one which has been finally and definitely settled, there is Identity of parties,
Dinglasan et. al. subject matter and cause of action.
Facts: In a previous cases [G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee We find that in the ultimate analysis, Civil Case No. V-3064 is but an attempt
Bun Ting, et al.] decided by the SC with the same set of private parties, it was to reopen the issues which were resolved in the previous case. Contrary to the
found that private respondents sold to herein petitioner a parcel of land contentions of private respondents, there has been no change in the facts or in
located in Roxas City, Capiz through a conditional sale. Lee, the buyer, on the the conditions of the parties. Posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court
other hand avers that it was an absolute sale. Both trial court and CA ruled in cannot retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same
favor of buyer Lee. The SC found that Lee is normally not allowed to proceeding where the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be
purchase the property on the count of the constitutional prohibition (Section 5. civil or criminal in nature. The determination of the questions of fact and of
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be law by this Court on June 27, 1956 in case No. L-5996 has become the law
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations of the case, and may not now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.- the same questions in a subsequent litigation between the same parties and
Article 13, 1935 Consitution) But since it was also found out that the buyers their privies the same subject matter.
(private respondents) are in pari delicto for selling the property in spite of the
constitutional prohibition they are proscribed from assailing the sale made
between them and herein private respondents. 3. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. HERMOGENES HIPOLITO and LEONOR
12 years after the above mentioned case was promulgated, the present case JUNSAY, defendants-appellees.
for the recovery of the lot was instituted with the same contention of the G.R. No. L-16463
respondents Dinglasan that the sale should be null and void on account of the
constitutional prohibition.
FACTS: June 18, 1959 – a complaint was filed alleging that defendant
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners in this case on the ground of res Hermogenes Hipolito and Leonor Junsay obtained various sugar crop loans
judicata. An opposition thereto was filed by plaintiffs, with the averment that from plaintiff PNB through its Victorias Branch, evidenced by promissory
the decision in the prior case "cannot be pleaded in bar of the instant action notes.
because of new or additional facts or grounds of recovery and because of
change of law or jurisprudence. The amount of the notes was a total of P9,692.00. Defendants only paid
P3,905.61, leaving a balance of P6,786.39, which, added to accrued interest
The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss. of P5,213.34, summed up to P11,999.73 as of January 17, 1957.
Issue: Whether or not the motion to dismiss should be granted Despite repeated demands, defendants failed and refused to pay said
amount. May 7, 1957 - defendants went to Atty. Francis I. Medel of the legal
Held: Affirmative. The decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael department of plaintiff's Victorias branch and offered a plan of payment of
Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al." constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. V- the account
3064 before the respondent court. Said Civil case, therefore, should have
For reasons unknown to plaintiff and probably due to the transfer of RULING: NO. The dismissal is erroneous. In a motion to dismiss defendant
defendant Hipolito as supervising teacher to some other province, his hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of fact contained in the
proposed plan of payment did not materialize. Said offer of plan of complaint.
payment was an acknowledgment of defendants' just and valid obligation.
The prayer is for the court to order defendants to pay to plaintiff the said An examination of the complaint herein does not indicate clearly that
amount of P11,999.73, with accrued annual interest thereon ( rate of 5% prescription has set in. On the contrary, it is belied by the allegation
from January 17, 1957 up to the date of payment, plus attorney's fees concerning defendant’s offer of payment made on May 7, 1957. Such offer
equivalent to 10%.) hypothetically admitted in the motion, worked as a renewal of the obligation.
An offer of payment works as a renewal of the obligation and prevents
Defendants moved for a bill of particulars – denied. Defendants moved to prescription from setting in.
dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action already prescribed.
attached to the motion: a joint affidavit and defendants averred that they It is true that defendants attached to the motion a joint affidavit of merit
never made any acknowledgment of indebtedness nor offered a plan of wherein they deny having made an offer of a plan of payment. The denial,
payment, but on the contrary had always maintained that plaintiff's action being a contrary averment of fact, would be proper in the answer to the
had prescribed. complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the contradictory allegations
would require presentation of evidence. Denial of allegations in a complaint is
Plaintiff’s opposition - contending that the prescriptive period had been not proper in a motion to dismiss.
suspended by "EO No. 32, known as the Moratorium Law," and interrupted,
pursuant to Article 1973 of the old Civil Code, by plaintiff’s written extra- ** A denial of an allegation of a complaint, as for example the denial of an
judicial demands as well as by defendants’ acknowledgment of the offer of payment which would prevent prescription from setting in, would be
indebtedness. proper in the answer to the complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the
contradictory allegations would require presentation of evidence
Defendants reply to plaintiff's opposition - citing Bachrach Motors Co., Inc.
v. Chua Tia Hian, stated that EO. No. 32, if at all, suspended the prescriptive The same is true of the other allegations in the complaint concerning, the
period "only for 2yrs, 4 months and 16 days, from March 10, 1945, or only demands for payment sent by plaintiff upon defendants and the partial
up to July 26, 1948," - that the alleged written extrajudicial demands payments made by them, all or some of which may have a material bearing
constitute self-serving evidence; and that defendant Hipolito’s letter of on the question of prescription. In other words, the ground for dismissal not
February 16, 1959 cannot be considered as an acknowledgment of being indubitable, the lower court should have deferred determination of
indebtedness. the issue until after trial of the case on the merits.
Lower court – dismissed the complaint: ruled that the 7 promissory notes The order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower
constituted 1 single obligation, that the last promissory note dated June 23, court for further proceedings.
1941, should be considered as the true date of the written contract, from
which the 10-year prescriptive period and such period has been suspended
4. #11.G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
for 2 years, 4 months and sixteen 16 days (by reason of EO No. 32) until
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,
said Order was declared unconstitutional.
vs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant’s denial of the allegations constitute as REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE
grounds for the dismissal of the complaint LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G.
HERNANDO, respondents.
have been made but that the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that
FACTS: no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."
1. Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since 3. BUT the instant case presents no occasion for the application of
he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this the above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we
ground in his answer. already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of "brothers
2. @ PRE-TRIAL: Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr.: NOTED THAT: GUERRERO and and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend
HERNANDO were related as brothers-in-law then JUDGE gave "sisters-in-law".
petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to 4. The requirement that the complaint or petition should allege that
allege that the parties were very close relatives, their respective earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but that the
wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should same failed is mandatory
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but 5. The enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same
failed and considered this deficiency a JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT. family does not comprehend “sister-in-law”/ “brothers-in-law” are not
3. MR was filed by GUERRERO: brothers by affinity are not members listed in Art 217 of the NCC as members of the same family and
of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a since Art 150 repeats the same “members of the family” court finds
compromise – DENIED: "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts no reason to alter the existing jurisprudence
towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege 6. 2nd ISSUE: The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to
same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between
cognizance of the case." members of the same family, absent such allegation in the complaint
4. Case was dismissed without prejudice: No amended complaint filed being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for
lack of cause of action.
5. ISSUE: ON APPEAL: GUERRERO:
a. whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the 5. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 vs.
of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule COURT OF APPEALS and MUNICIPALITY OF
16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a NORZAGARAY, respondents.
compromise before a suit between them may be instituted
and maintained; FACTS:
b. whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that 1. On February 1, 1985, the Municipality of Norzagaray filed a
earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which complaint for recovery of taxes against the petitioner in the Regional
efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
2. Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period to answer,
HELD: the petitioner filed two successive motions for extension of time to file
1. The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to responsive pleadings, which were both granted. The last day of the
strengthen it as a basic autonomous social institution. This is also second extension was May 28, 1985.
embodied in Art. 149, and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family 3. On May 25, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
Code, which provides: complaint on the ground of the plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue and
2. Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word "No", the lack of a cause of action. The motion was denied "both for lack of
requirement is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must merit and for having been improperly filed."
be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise
4. On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner in 1. The trial court may in its discretion and on proper motion extend
default for having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of responsive
responsive pleading during the extension granted. This declaration pleadings.
was made on August 2, 1985, and evidence for the plaintiff was 2. During the original reglementary 15-day period, or any extension
thereafter received ex parte resulting in a judgment in its favor on of such period, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss the
February 4, 1986. The judgment was affirmed by the respondent complaint.
court in its decision dated April 7, 1989, which is the subject of the 3. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant is allowed another
present petition. fifteen days from notice of the denial to file the responsive pleading.
The full 15-day reglementary period starts all over again.
ISSUE: WON the Motion to Dismiss was seasonably filed. 6. Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental Br. II
Facts:
Ruling: 1. Borje is the counsel of the water consuming public of Ozamis City, he
There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed seasonably, allegedly received a blank water bill, with no indication of the meter
within the period of the second extension granted by the trial court. It readings, no. of cubic meters consumed and the amount to be paid,
is true that such a motion could not be considered a responsive hence he refused to pay said bill which lead to the disconnection of
pleading as SC have held in many cases. Nevertheless, it is also true his services;
that in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that 2. He brought an action for damages w/ preliminary injunction against
"within the time for pleading,a motion to dismiss the action may be MOWD in the respondent Court;
made" on the grounds therein enumerated, including the grounds 3. The Court then issued an order enjoining MOWD to disconnect the
invoked by the petitioner. water service and subsequently to reconnect the service;
Moreover, it is clearly provided in Section 4 of the same Rule that: 4. MOWD then filed a motion to dismiss based on 2 grounds: 1) lack of
Sec. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion to dismiss is denied or if jurisdiction of respondent Court and 2) another action pending
determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer between the same parties for the same causes;
within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he 5. Respond Court dismissed the case but not based on the grounds
received notice of denial or deferment, unless the court provides a above mentioned but because there was no malice or bad faith in the
different period. severance of the water connection of petitioner and that MOWD had
The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days before already reconnected the same.
the expiration of the second extension. Notice of its denial was
served on the petitioner on July 29, 1985. From that date, the Issue: WON, respondent court gravely abused its discretion in
petitioner had 15 days within which to file its answer, or until August dismissing the case based on the ground which is not alleged in the
13, 1985. It was unable to do so, however, because of the default motion to dismiss of MOWD
order issued by the trial court on August 2, 1985. On that date, the
petitioner still had eleven days before the expiration of the 15-day Held: YES.
reglementary period during which the petitioner was supposed to file 1. The dismissal of an actions on grounds not alleged in the motion to
his answer. dismiss is improper for in so doing, a court in effect dismiss an action
The Court recapitulates the rules as to the filing of a Motion to dismiss motu propio w/out giving Borje a chance to argue ithe point w/out
by the defendant as follows: receiving any arguments or evidence in question.
2. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 8, it enumerates the grounds upon which an 3. On November 6, 1997, MINCI relayed to CCC that Danfoss Inc. was
action may be dismissed and it specifically ordains that a motion to still checking the status of their order. CCC replied that every delay
this end be filed. The only instance in which the court may dismiss in the delivery of the order will cause loss to their company, so CCC
upon a court’s own motion on action is, when the “plaintiff fails to requested for early work out and immediate shipment to avoid
appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an further loss.
unreasonable length of time or to comply w/ the Rules or any order 4. But, on November 9, 1997, Danfoss Inc. informed MINCI through fax,
of the Court. that the reason for the delivery problems was that some of the
3. The dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial supplied components for the new VLT 5000 series (this may be a part
of due process, if from a consideration of the pleading it appears of the converter which is the subject thing in this case or a machine to
that there are issues of fact which cannot be decided w/out the trial create the converter) did not meet the agreed quality standard. So,
of the case on the merits. Danfoss was canvassing for another supplier for the said VLT 5000
series. In the fax, there was no clear message as to when normal
xxx Summary or outright dismissals of actions are not proper where production will resume.
there are factual matters in dispute which need presentation and 5. Upon receiving the relayed information, CCC surmised that Danfoss
appreciation of evidence. … Short cuts in judicial processes are to be would not be able to deliver their order. There was also no definite
avoided when they impede rather than promote a judicious commitment of the delivery from Danfoss and MINCI, so CCC
dispensation of justice xxx informed MINCI that they intend to cancel its order. The order was
cancelled on November 13, 1997.
7. DANFOSS, INC., Petitioners, vs. CONTINENTAL CEMENT 6. Hence the complaint for damages filed by CCC with the RTC of
CORPORATION, Respondent. Quezon City against Danfoss and MINCI on November 5, 1998. In
G.R. No. 143788 September 9, 2005 reply, Danfoss filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
CCC’s contention : Due to the “impending” delay in the delivery of its
FACTS: order, it suffered more than P8 million and was compelled to look for
1. Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) is an agent of another supplier.
Danfoss, Inc.’s products here in the Philippines. On September 1997, Danfoss’s contention: The case should be dismissed on the ground that
CCC ordered two unit 132 KW Danfoss Brand Frequency it did not state a cause of action.
Converter/Inverter from MINCI to be used in the Finish Mill of its 1) The letter of credit was opened on September 9, 1997, so,
Cement Plant in Bulacan. In the terms of conditions of the original since the agreed delivery period is 8 to 10 weeks from the opening
purchase order, the two unit Frequency Converter shall be delivered of the letter of credit, the due date is until November 19, 1997.
by Danfoss within 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of 2) Although Danfoss was having a problem with its supplier prior
credit. The letter of credit opened by CCC in favour of Danfoss on to CCC’s cancellation of its order, CCC only surmised that Danfoss
September 9, 1997. could not deliver within the due date agreed upon.
2. On September 17, 1997, MINCI informed CCC that its order are 3) Neither Danfoss nor CCC agreed to change the date of
already ready for shipment and MINCI requested to amend the letter delivery. Only the port of origin was changed in the letter of credit.
of credit changing the port of origin/loading from Singapore to Danfoss has until November 19, 1997 to deliver the order, CCC
Denmark (Singapore is the Asian Regional Office of Danfoss, the cancelled the order on November 13, 1997.
Head Office of the company is Denmark). CCC complied and the port 4) CCC never made an extrajudicial demand for the delivery of its
of origin in the letter of credit was changed. order on its due date as it cancelled the order before the due date.
5) Damages sought for by CCC could not have accrued yet since The trial court erred in ruling that the issue of whether or not the
the order was cancelled before the delivery was actually delayed. defendants incurred delay in the delivery of the equipment within the
period stipulated was a debatable question. It said that trial on the
7. RTC ruled in favor of CCC. According to the RTC: “...the issue of merits was necessary and the parties had to adduce evidence in
whether or not the defendants incur delay in the delivery of the support of their respective positions.8 But what was there to argue
equipment in question within the period stipulated is a debatable about when, based on the allegations of the complaint, petitioner was
question which necessitates actual trial on the merits where the parties not yet due to deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter
have to adduce evidence in support of their respective stance. when respondent cancelled its order? It still had six days within which
8. CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the Motion for to comply with its obligation. The court a quo should not have denied
Reconsideration of Danfoss. petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint (for its failure to state a
cause of action) when, on its face, it was clear that petitioner had not
ISSUE: WON there was a cause of action in the complaint filed by yet reneged on its obligation to deliver the frequency
CCC against Danfoss converter/inverter on the date mutually agreed upon by the parties.
Moreover, the obligation itself was negated by no less than
HELD: No, there was no cause of action in the complaint for damages respondent’s own act of cancelling its order even before the
filed by CCC. prestation became due and demandable. Where therefore was the
SC ruled that “In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of breach? Where was the damage caused by petitioner? There was
cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the none.
complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the Consequently, it was wrong for the CA to affirm the order of the trial
complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for its
the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment thereon in failure to state a cause of action.
accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the
motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts 8. Lu vs. Nabua (eto lang talaga facts ng case, please read rule 16
alleged in the complaint.” sec 2 and 3)
The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy Realty
case. The CA motu proprioproprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for Corporation v. ALS Management and Development Corporation where
failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a we noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only
compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion
Court. to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to
dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor
ISSUE: of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio
dismissal can proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver;
May the appellate court dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for which is but logical because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.
A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a
complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional
defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full
course. The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without
a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the
petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged
error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any
defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to
dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition
precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as
error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals.
The respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court
considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial
court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did
not provide us with any argument to have it reversed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.
GRANTED
Rule 17 – Dismissal of Actions turn issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz
and the City Sheriff from enforcing or implementing the restraining order of
1. GO v CRUZ December 3, 1981, and from continuing with the hearing on the application
for preliminary injunction in said Civil Case No. C-9702. The scope of the
FACTS:
injunction was subsequently enlarged by this Court's Resolution of April
On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing Co., Inc. brought an action in 14,1982 to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained
the CFI of Manila against Dante Go, accusing him of unfair from proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by
competition. California alleged that Dante Go is doing business under the California against Dante Go.
name and style of "Sugarland International Products," and engaged like
ISSUE: WON Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court applies in the present
California in the manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta was
case.
selling his products in the open market under the brand name, "Great Italian,"
in packages which were in colorable and deceitful limitation of California's HELD: No.What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of
containers bearing its own brand, "Royal." Its complaint contained an the action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with the
application for preliminary injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately Court (either personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said
cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale and distribution of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit
products, and to retrieve those already being offered for sale. message of the Rules. "The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices,
orders and other papers with the court, "according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the
About two weeks later, however, or on November 12, 1981, California filed
Rules of Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of the court either
a notice of dismissal.
personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other hand, signifies delivery of
Four days afterwards, or on November 16, 1981, California received by the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby through their counsel
registered mail a copy of Dante Go's answer with counterclaim dated of record, unless delivery to the party himself is ordered by the court, by any of
November 6, 1981, which had been filed with the Court on November 9, the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal service, service by mail, or
1981. substituted service.
On November 19, 1981 a fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila
among others the sala of Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, Court after the filing of Dante Go's answer butbefore service thereof. Thus
including that filed by California against Dante Go. having acted well within the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted
Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought about
On December 1, 1981, California filed another complaint asserting the same the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need of
cause of action against Dante Go, this time with the CFI at Caloocan City. This any order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected
second suit was docketed as Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned to the without regard to whatever reasons or motives California might have had for
branch presided over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz. bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without
prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise "stated in the notice" and it being
On December 3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order the first time the action was being so dismissed.
against Go.
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in
On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go filed the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the
the present petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the
nullification and perpetual inhibition. On December 11, 1981, this Court, in action. In truth, and contrary to what petitioner Dante Go obviously believes,
even if the first action were still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance -No legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in the Caloocan CFI
would not affect the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the second suit. The based on the same claim.
pendency of the first action would merely give the defendant the right to move
to dismiss the second action on the ground of auter action pendant or litis 2. G.R. No. L-35989 October 28, 1977
pendentia.
JALOVER vs. YTORIAGA
Dante Go vs. Hon. Cruz, City Sheriff and California Manufacturing (1989)
FACTS: This involves a land dispute filed by Ytoriaga and Lopez against
[Facts] Hedriana and Jalover in the CFI of Iloilo. They claim that they the owners of
the lot, covered by TCT by virtue of the effects of the current of the river
- California Manufacturing filed a case against Dante Go for unfair based on the principle of continuous possession and alluvion. They alleged
competition alleging that the latter’s pasta products (Great Italian) such that Jalover , without their consent had the portion of the land surveyed and
as spaghetti and macaroni are packed with confusing similarity and even placed concrete monuments thereof and even took possession of the
colourable imitation with the former’s Royal Pasta products. land. Jalover , alleged, inter alia, that he is the owner of the land as sole heir
of his mother, who owned the land pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code
- 2 weeks later, California filed a Notice of Dismissal without prejudice of the Philippines. Ytoriaga and Lopez offered documentary evidence and
upon admission thereof, rested their case. Jalover prayed the court to dismiss
- 4 days after it received Go’s answer with counterclaim the complaint with costs against Ytoriaga and Lopez Issues having been
joined, the case was set for trial. Trial was postponed many times stretching to
- Fire broke out at the Manila City Hall and burned the records therein
a period of more than 6 years, until January 26, 1970, when the case was
including the case filed by California
called for trial, and then Presiding Judge Ramon Blanco dismissed the case,
- California filed another complaint based on the same cause of action for failure of private respondents to appear in court, since the Plaintiff did
against Go in the CFI Caloocan. not take the necessary steps to engage the service of another lawyer in lieu
of Atty. Atol, who since several years ago has been appointed Chief of the
- Caloocan judge issued a restraining order directing Go to cease and Secret Service of the Iloilo City Police Department. Two years later, private
desist from manufacturing and selling his products. respondents' lawyer, Atty. Amado B. Atol, filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that the said respondents did not fail to prosecute because, during
- Go claims that the case in Manila is still pending and that the dismissal the times that the case was set for hearing, at least one of said respondents
sought by California is no longer a matter of right. He further accused was always present, and the record would show that the transfers of hearing
California of forum shopping at Caloocan judge’s sala. were all made at the instance of petitioner or his counsel; and, moreover,
private respondents had already finished presenting their evidence.
[issue] Whether or not the dismissal of California is in accordance with the Rules
respondent Judge Venicio Escolin, who succeeded Judge Blanco in Branch V,
of Court thus allowing it to file a subsequent case
issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
[ruling] Yes, it is in accord with RC. Section 1 Rule 17 mandates that notice of order of dismissal had become final long ago and was beyond the court's
dismissal must be filed any time before service of answer. power to amend or change. Private respondents then filed a Petition for
Relief from Judgment dated July 10, 1972, claiming that the order of
-California filed its notice of dismissal in CFI manila after Go’s filing of answer dismissal dated January 26, 1970 was void because of lack of due process
but before service thereof. Thus, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal and for having been obtained thru fraud, for the petitioner had
of the action pending in Manila court, without need of any order or action by misrepresented to the court the status of the case by making Judge Blanco -
the presiding judge therein. who was not the Presiding Judge when private respondents presented their
evidence and rested their case in 1963 - believe that trial had not even presented by a party in the regular course of trial and now forming part of
begun. Petitioner opposed the petition for relief contending that private the record. The ends of justice would be better served if, in its deliberative
respondents were served a copy of the order of dismissal on February 5, function. the court would consider the said evidence together with the
1970, and, therefore, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of evidence to be adduced by petitioner.However,relief from judgment under
Court, the petition for relief should have been filed within 60 days from Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court is not the appropriate remedy. A
February 5, 1970, and within 6 months from January 26, 1970, when the petition for relief is available only if the judgment or order complained of has
order was issued; hence, the filing of the petition was beyond the already become final and executory; but here, as earlier noted, the order of
reglementary period.The petition for relief was given due course,setting aside January 26, 1970 never attained finality for the reason that notice thereof
the orders dated January 26, 1970 and June 23, 1972, and setting the was not served upon private respondents' counsel of record. The petition for
continuation of the trial for September 15, 1972. Hence, the present recourse relief may nevertheless be considered as a second motion for reconsideration
by petitioner. or a motion for new trial based on fraud and lack of procedural due process.
ISSUE: WON the prior case was validly dismissed for failure to prosecute Fermin Jalover vs Porferio Ytoriaga, Consolacion Lopez (1977)
HELD: NO [facts]
It will be noted that, as found by respondent Judge, private respondents, as - This involves a land dispute filed by Ytoriaga and Lopez vs. Jalover
plaintiffs, adduced their evidence and rested their case on September 4, in CFI Iloilo.
1963, or more than six years before the dismissal of the case on January 26,
1970. It was, therefore, the turn of petitioner, as defendant, to present his - Ytoriaga and Lopez claims that a land which was once under water
evidence. In the premises, private respondents court not possibly have failed automatically belongs to them based on the principle of continuous
to prosecute they were already past the stage where they could still be possession and alluvion. They alleged that Jalover, without their
charged with such failure. As correctly held by respondent Judge, private consent, had that portion of land surveyed and even placed concrete
respondents' absence at the hearing scheduled on January 6, 1970 "can only monuments thereon and took possession thereof.
be construed as a waiver on their part to cross-examine the witnesses that
defendants might present at the continuation of trial and to object to the - Jalover, in his answer, alleged that his mother and Hedriana are co-
admissibility of the latter's evidence." The right to cross-examine petitioner's owners of said land; that he, as heir, is entitled to that portion.
witnesses and/or object to his evidence is a right that belongs to private
- Ytoriaga and Lopez offered documentary evidence and upon
respondents which they can certainly waive. Such waiver could be nothing
admission thereof, rested their case.
more than the "intentional relinquishment of a known right," and. as such,
should not have been taken against private respondents. - Continuation of trial was ordered transferred until further assignment,
thus, causing the postponement of said case for a period of more
To dismiss the case after private respondents had submitted their evidence
than 6 years.
and rested their case, would not only be to hold said respondents accountable
for waiving a right, but also to deny them one of the cardinal primary rights - When the case was re-called for trial, Ytoriaga and Lopez failed to
of a litigant, which is, corollary to the right to adduce evidence, the right to appear. Judge Blanco dismissed the case for their failure to
have the said evidence considered by the court. The dismissal of the case for prosecute.
failure to prosecute, when in truth private respondents had already presented
their evidence and rested their case, and, therefore, had duly ,prosecuted - 2 years after, Ytoriaga’s counsel filed an MR but denied. Counsel
their case, would in effect mean a total disregard by the court of evidence filed a petition for relief of judgement. It was given due course.
[issue] Whether or not the prior case is validly dismissed for failure to [ruling] Partially. Failure to comply with a court order has the effect of
prosecute. adjudication upon the merits (Sec 3 Rule 17). Thus, failure to comply with the
court order in CC 3015 justifies the dismissal on the issue of annulment of
DOS.
[ruling] No. Private respondents (Y and L) could not have possibly failed to However, present case is not deemed dismissed as to the issue of filiation and
prosecute as they were already past the stage of presenting their evidence. Pacson, as she is not impleaded in the prior case.
Their absence during the time the case was re-called for trial was a mere
waiver of their right to cross-examine the witnesses. 4. G.R. No. L-18707 February 28, 1967
The dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute when in truth they have CASEÑAS vs. ROSALES
already presented their evidence and rested their case would, in effect, mean
a total disregard of the court of the evidence presented by them in the FACTS: Arañas and Caseñas filed with the CFI of Agusan, a complaint for
regular course of trial. specific performance and enforcement of their alleged right under a certain
deed of sale, and damages against the spousesRosales. They alleged that
Further, said dismissal never attained finality as the notice thereof was not sometime in 1939, Agustin O. Caseñas acquired from Rodolfo Arañas under a
served upon their counsel of record. deed of assignment, the latter's rights and interest over a parcel of land , that
Rodolfo Arañas in turn, acquired the said property from the spouses Jose A.
3. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez under a deed of sale ,under the terms of
which, however, the actual transfer of the aforesaid land unto the vendee
Ligaya, Jaime, Silvina, Fausta, Pablo all surnamed Mina vs. Antonia
would be made only on or before February 18, 1941; and that despite the
Pacson, Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina (1963)
above documented transactions, and despite the arrival of the stipulated
[facts] period for the execution of the final deed of transfer, the vendors spouses
refused to fulfill their obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot to the
- Case 1: The Minas are claiming to be the illegitimate children of vendee, Rodolfo Arañas or his assignee, the herein appellant, Agustin O.
Joaquin Mina while married to Pacson. They are claiming that the Caseñas. After the defendants-spouses had filed their answer to the above
DOS allegedly signed by Joaquin when he was ill was fraudulently complaint, but before trial, the counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the
obtained. They pray for the annulment of the DOS and their trial court that plaintiff Rodolfo Arañas and defendant Jose A. Rosales had
recognition as illegitimate children. both died. In view of the said manifestation, the lower court,directed, the
surviving plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseñas, to amend the complaint to effect the
- Court in Case 1 ordered that Pacson be impleaded. The Minas failed necessary substitution of parties thereon. The said surviving plaintiff, however,
to comply with said order, thus, it was dismissed. failed altogether to comply with the aforementioned order. LC dismissed the
case for failure on the part of the counsel for the plaintiffs to comply with the
- Case 2: The Minas filed another case, this time impleading Pacson but
order of this Court which shows abandonment and lack of interest on the part
with the same cause of action and including Medina and Cresencia.
of the plaintiffs. Casenas, filed with the same CFI of Agusan, another
- Defendants filed a MTD on the ground of res judicata. complaint against the widow and heirs of the late Jose A. Rosales "to quiet,
and for reconveyance of, title to real property, with damages. This suit
[issue] Whether or not CC 3015 (case 1) effectively bars the present case referred itself to the very same property litigated under Civil Case No. 261
and asserted exactly the same .The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
several grounds, namely: res judicata, prescription, lack of cause of action,
failure to include indispensable parties, and that the contract subject of the of Civil Case No. 261 was void, it clearly may not be asserted to bar the
complaint was void ab initio. After the plaintiff had filed his opposition to the subsequent prosecution of the same or identical claim.
above motion, the lcissued the order under appeal dismissing the complaint.
Of the above grounds, though, the lower court relied alone on the defendants' A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
plea of res judicata, lack of cause of action and prescription. right or rights of the other (Ma-ao Sugar Central vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666)
and both these elements were clearly alleged in the aforesaid complaint.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the lower court was proper.
The resolution of the issue of prescription may be deferred until after the case
HELD: No, the SC remanded the case to the court of origin. is tried on the merits where the defense pleaded against said issue is the
existence of a trust over the property in dispute.
When certain of the parties to Civil Case No. 261 died and due notice
thereof was given to the trial court, it devolved on the said court to order, not Agustin Casenas vs. Concepcion Sanchez de Rosales, Romeo Rosales, et.
the amendment of the complaint, but the appearance of the legal Al. (1967)
representatives of the deceased in accordance with the procedure and
manner outlined in Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court. In the case of [facts]
Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, the SC held that an order to amend the
- Case 1 prays for the execution of DOS in favour of Casenas: filed by
complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed by the
Rodolfo Aranas(assignor) and Casenas(assignee) vs. Jose Rosales and
aforequoted rule has been effected, is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no
Sanchez.
duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said
complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. In a subsequent - Rosales and Sanchez filed an answer before trial. Counsel for Aranas
case, Ferriera et al. vs. Gonzalez, et al., G.R. No. L-11567, July 17, 1958, and Casenas manifested the death of Jose Rosales and Aranas. The
this court affirmed a similar conclusion on the determination that the court ordered Casenas to amend the complaint. Casenas failed to
continuance of a proceedings during the pendency of which a party thereto comply, thus, it was dismissed.
dies, without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the
rules, amounts to a "lack of jurisdiction." - Case 2 (present case) prays for quieting and reconveyance of title in
favour of Casenas. Sanchez claims res judicata.
The facts of this case fit four squares into the Barrameda case abovecited,
save for the minor variance that in the former two of the litigants died while [issue] Whether or not dismissal in the prior case effectively bars the present
only one predeceased the case in Barrameda. Here, as in Barrameda, during case
the pendency of civil case, notice was given to the trial court of the deaths of
one of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants in it. Instead of ordering the [ruling] No. The order to amend the complaint is not in accordance with the
substitution of the deceased's legal representatives in accordance with Rule 3, procedure of the RC. The court should have ordered the counsel to make a
section 17 of the Rules of Court, the trial court directed the surviving plaintiff substitution of the deceased by the legal representatives of the deceased.
to amend the complaint and when the latter failed to comply therewith, the Casenas’ failure to comply with the order of the court did not validly justify
said court dismissed the complaint for such non-compliance. We must hold, the dismissal of the said case.
therefore, as We did in Barrameda that inasmuch as there was no obligation
on the part of the plaintiff-appellant herein to amend his complaint in Civil
Case No. 261, any such imposition being void, his failure to comply with such
an order did not justify the dismissal of his complaint. Grounded as it was
upon a void order, the dismissal was itself void.Consequently, as the dismissal
Where the parties are unable to arrive at a stipulation of facts and do not
reach an amicable settlement of their controversy, the court must close the
RULE 18: PRE-TRIAL proceedings and go forward the trial of the case. The CFI Manila committed
serious error in dismissing Dy Pac’s appeal from the City Court’s decision
Filoil Marketing Corporation vs Dy Pac & Co. (1988) solely on the ground that the parties failed to comply with the order.
FACTS:
Filoil commenced an action for collection of sum of money with interest against Rodolfo Paredes, Tito Alago, Agripino Baybay vs. Ernesto Verano and
Dy Pac on the ground that the latter fails to pay, notwithstanding repeated CosmeHinunangan (2006)
demands, the amount due to it for petroleum products bought on credit. FACTS:
At the hearing set, neither Dy Pac nor its counsel appeared. Filoil was allowed In Civil Case 2767, a compromise was entered into regarding the complaint
by the City Court of Manila to proceed ex parte. The said court rendered a for the establishment of a right of way.Hinunangan granted a 2m-wide right
decision on the same date ordering Dy Pac to pay Filoil. of way in favour of Paredes, Alago and Baybay in consideration of
P6,000.00.
Dy Pac appealed to CFI Manila which immediately set the case for pre-trial.
It ruled that: A complaint for specific performance with damages was filed by Hinunangan
“[…]plaintiff and defendant, who are hereby ordered to prepare a on the ground that Petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of
stipulation of facts based on their exhibits already marked and submit the the compromise agreement.
same to the court… the parties are warned that if they cannot submit the
stipulation of facts, the Court will dismiss the appeal.” Petitioners denied the allegation contending that respondents were not actual
residents of the barangay and that the lot covering the passage of right of
CFI Manila dismissed the case for failure of the parties to submit the required way was sold by Hinunangan to Paredes. Petitioners filed a MTD on the
stipulation of facts and ordered the immediate return of the records to the ground of lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD.
City Court for execution.
Pre-trial was set on April but was reset on June. However, it did not push
ISSUE: Whether or not the case can be dismissed on the ground that the through either because none of the parties appeared. On Nov, the RTC was
parties failed to submit a stipulation of facts. informed of a proposed settlement. The case was reset to January 2004. On
January, private respondents and their counsel were present. Petitioners were
RULE: also present but not their counsel.
No. There is no law which compulsorily requires litigants to stipulate at pre-
trial on the facts and issues that may possibly crop up in a particular case, RTC allowed respondents to present evidence ex parte for failure of the
upon pain dismissal of such case. The process of securing admissions whether defendant’s counsel to appear.
of facts or evidence is essentially voluntary, since stipulations of facts, like
contracts, bind the parties thereto who are not allowed to controvert ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of counsel for petitioners at the pre-trial,
statements made therein. Courts cannot compel the parties to enter into an with all petitioners themselves present, is a ground to declare them in default
agreement upon the facts.
RULING: No. Absence of counsel at pre-trial does not ipso facto authorise the
judge to declare them in default. Sec. 4, Rule 18 imposes duty on litigating
parties and their respective counsel to appear at pre-trial. Sec. 5 penalizes 9. The hearing did push through on 23 January 2004. The private
the failure to appear of either plaintiff or defendant but not of their counsel. respondents and their counsel were present. So were petitioners
Baybay and Paredes, and co-defendant Alago, but not their counsel.
A judgment of default against one who failed to attend at pre-trial or even 10. RTC allowed respondents to present their evidence ex parte, “for
to file an answer implies a waiver only of their right to be heard and to failure of the defendants’ counsel to appear before the RTC.
present evidence to support their allegation but not all their other rights. 11. Motion for recon – DENIED.
12. Petition for certiorari – CA – dismissed for failure to attach duplicate
Paredes vs. Verano orig copies of annexes to petition as well as other pleadings relevant
Facts: and pertinent to the petition.
1. The legal battle between the parties began with a complaint for the 13. Motion for recon with motion to admit additional exhibits – DENIED.
establishment of a right of way filed by the petitioners against CA ruled that even with the submission by petitioners of the required
respondents. The complaint culminated in a judgment by compromise. pleadings and documents, the instant petition must nevertheless failed.
2. In the Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme Hinunangan It conceded that under Sec 5 Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
granted a 2 meter-wide right of way in favor of petitioners in Procedure, it is the failure of the defendant, and not defendant’s
consideration of the amount of Php 6,000.00 which petitioners counsel, to appear at the pre-trial that would serve cause to allow
agreed to pay. plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
3. Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of Issue: Whether the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial, with
the Compromise Agreement, respondents filed a complaint for all defendants themselves present, is a ground to declare defendants in
specific performance with damages against petitioners. default and to authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte.
4. In their answer, petitioners denied having violated the Compromise Held: No.
Agreement, and alleged that like them, respondents were not actual Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and
residents of Barangay Tagnipa where the “road right of way” was their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may
established and that respondent Cosme had already sold his only be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall
remaining lot in the vicinity to petitioner Paredes. appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
5. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of action. settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter
TC-DENIED. into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
6. Pre-trial was initially set for 24 April 2003, but this was reset to 3 Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear
June 2003. But the pre-trial set on 3 June 2003 did not push through when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for
either because none of the parties appeared. So, pre-trial was reset dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless other-wise
to 11 November 2003. However, petitioner Baybay was present in ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be
court along with other defendants was called. RTC was informed then cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to
of a proposed settlement between the parties, although Baybay render judgment on the basis thereof.
qualified his reaction by telling the court that he would first have to Section 4 imposes the duty on litigating parties and their respective
inform his lawyer of the said propodal. counsel during pre-trial. The provision also provides for the instances where
7. RTC reset the pre-trial for 23 January 2004. the non-appearance of a party may be excused. Nothing, however, in Sec 4
8. Before the new pre-trial date, counsel for petitioners filed a provides for a sanction should the parties or their respective counsel be
Manifestation of Willingness to Settle With Request for Cancellation absent during pre-trial. The penalty is provided for in Sec 5 which penalizes
dated 5 January 2004. the failure to appear of either the plaintiff or the defendant, and not their
respective counsel.
The absence of counsel for defendants at pretrial does not ipso facto The service of summons upon petitioner first attempted by personal service,
authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the and subsequently by substituted service more than meets the requirements set
presentation of evidence ex parte. Nothing in the rules of court sanctions the by the Rules of Court.
presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant
is absent during pre-trial. The Rules do not countenance stringent construction
at the expense of justice and equity.
FACTS:
Arradaza boarded a jeepney owned and operated by Maidin and Lebita.
Following the jeepney was a dump truck registered in the name of Guanzon.
The two vehicles collided. Arradaza sustained injuries. Despite several
demands, Maidin and Lebita failed to reimburse Arradaza of the actual
damages he incurred. Arradaza filed a case against Maidin and Lebita. The
latter filed their answer arguing that it was the truck driver who was at fault.
Therefore, Guanzon, being the employer, failed to exercise the diligence of a
god father in selecting and hiring the driver.
2 years later, Guanzon filed a MTD on the ground that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her because of the defective service of summons.
RULING: Yes. The motor vehicle registration of the truck is under the name of
Guanzon with address at Manresa, QC. The service of summons therein failed
because Guanzon was not known in the said address. Upon inquiry with the
SEC, it was found out that Guanzon was the director of Guanzon Lime Dev’t
Company with address at Caloocan. Service of summons was effected there
through Susan Ador, of suitable age and working in the premises.