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CASE DOCTRINES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE AY 2017-2018

Introduction

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the
CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court, to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the
authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax
cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is
deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable
reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. 29 that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body,
then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction." 30 This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, 31 where the
Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has
jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court." 32 The
rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v.
Geronimo 33 and Bulilis v. Nuez. 34
||| (City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, [February 4, 2014], 726 PHIL 9-28)

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion
to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant.|||

An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between
the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4)
among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. 22 Thus, under therelationship test, the
existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations makes the case intra-corporate. 23
Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an
intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights
and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation." 24 In other words, jurisdiction should be determined by considering both the relationship of
the parties as well as the nature of the question involved.
||| (Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corp. v. Cullen, G.R. No. 181416, [November 11, 2013], 720
PHIL 732-749)

When as in this case the attention of the trial court is drawn to its lack of competence and authority to act
on the case, certainly the trial court has a duty to vacate the judgment by declaring the same to be null
and void ab initio.
||| (Sandoval v. Cañeba, G.R. No. 90503, [September 27, 1990], 268 PHIL 72-77)

Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no
authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case.||| (Magpale, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 97381, [November 5, 1992])

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A notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is
not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. Without any subsequent
definite demand to vacate the premises, subject to no condition, the lessee did not incur in default which
would give rise to a right on the part of the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.|||

Where the controversy hinges on the correct interpretation of a clause of a contract of lease, that is,
whether or not it contemplated an automatic renewal of the lease, the action was not for unlawful detainer
but one not capable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, beyond the competence of a municipal
court.||| (Vda. de Murga v. Chan, G.R. No. L-24680, [October 7, 1968], 134 PHIL 433-442)

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. 23 Since
the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and
not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and
void. ||| (Padlan v. Spouses Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, [March 20, 2013], 707 PHIL 83-94)

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be filed
with the Court of Appeals whose decision may then beappealed to this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the same Rules. 9 A direct recourse to this Court is warranted only
where there are special and compelling reasons specifically alleged in the petition to justify such action.
Such ladder of appeals is in accordance with the rule on hierarchy of courts.|||(Quesada v. DOJ, G.R.
No. 150325, [August 31, 2006], 532 PHIL 159-167)

Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the Certificate to File
Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly no pangkat was
constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible
settlement. The efforts of theBarangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached.
Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance with the law. It is
noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or
the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. 17 This is true
notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall
constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be construed together with
Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is
significant that the Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the Lupon
under the Local Government Code.||| (Lumbuan v. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 155713, [May 5, 2006], 523
PHIL 317-325)

he Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who
committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., "[I]n the
absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of violation
of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present
case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986] Even before considering the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or
alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices."
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of any

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allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily
connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.||| (People v. Cawaling, G.R. No. 117970, [July 28, 1998], 355
PHIL 1-45)

Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals, 21 we held that "notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b)
of R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute aPangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts,"
the same "Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted
earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case." Here, while the Pangkat was
not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the BarangayChairman for
conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners' violation of
the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not
require strict adherence thereto. 22
||| (Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195, [November 18, 2004], 485 PHIL 416-425)

General Provisions (Rule 1, Sections 1 to 6)

Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when
it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial
Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which
provides — Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . . . STcAIa||| (Tamano v. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, [June
29, 1998], 353 PHIL 775-781)

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of
aresident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted
to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the
country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4)
any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 32
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void.

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||| (Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, [January 17, 2005], 489 PHIL 631-648)

We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance is an
action in personam. 37 In Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction and Development
Corporation, 38 we ruled that an action for specific performance praying for the execution of a deed
of sale in connection with an undertaking in a contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, is
an action in personam.
Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. 39 Therefore, it
cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can respondent be considered as
privy thereto since his signature and that of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed
of sale.
||| (Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, [February 24, 2009], 599 PHIL 354-368)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; VENUE OF ACTIONS; RULE; BREACH OF CONTRACT

GIVES RISE TO A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR FOR RESCISSION;
CASE AT BAR. — Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an answer to the issue of
venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions), shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried
in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides. In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in
accordance with the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for
specific performance or for rescission. If petitioner had filed an action in rem for the conveyance of real
property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the ground of lack of cause of action.
2. ID.; ID.; CIVIL ACTIONS; PARTIES; MISJOINDER AND NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES NOT A
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION; REASON; NECESSARY PARTIES; NON-INCLUSION
THEREOF DOES NOT PREVENT THE COURT FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE ACTION; CASE AT
BAR. — Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the court's own
initiative at any stage of the action. The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and
noncompliance with the said order would have been ground for dismissal of the action. Although the
Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without impleading the companions
of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately proceeded with the case as far as her 20
percent share in the claim was concerned, independent of the other 16.5 percent. This fact means that
her companions are not indispensable parties without whom no final determination can be had. At best,
they are mere necessary parties who ought to be impleaded for a complete determination or settlement of
the claim subject of the action. The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of
such party.
3. ID.; ID.; DOCKET FEES; ASSESSED VALUE OF REAL ESTATE, SUBJECT OF AN ACTION, NOT
CONSIDERED IN THE COMPUTATION THEREOF WHERE ACTION IS NOT CAPABLE OF
PECUNIARY ESTIMATION; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner insists that the value of the real property, which
was the subject of the contract, has nothing to do with the determination of the correct docket or filing
fees. The RTC ruled that although the amount of damages sought had not been specified in the body of
the Complaint, one can infer from the assessed value of the disputed land that it would amount to P50
million. Hence, when compared to this figure, the P210 paid as docket fees would appear paltry. We hold
that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the case and to trifle with
the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the assessed value of the real
estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the filing fees. But the Court has already
clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific performance, which is classified as an action
not capable of pecuniary estimation.

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4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT THEREOF WITHIN REASONABLE TIME, ALLOWED BUT IN NO CASE
BEYOND REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. — Besides, if during the course of the trial, petitioner's 20 percent
claim on the Fourth Estate Subdivision can no longer be satisfied and the payment of its monetary
equivalent is the only solution left,Sunlife Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion holds as follows: "Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period."
||| (Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development Corp., G.R. No. 146594, [June 10, 2002],
432 PHIL 927-943)|||

REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ACTION IN PERSONAM; PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS

REQUIRED. — We agree with respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam,
the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent a personal service of
summons within the forum. We have explicitly so ruled in Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 765, pointing
out without such personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of due
process. In the aforecited case this Court, through Justice Roberto Concepcion, now Chief Justice, ruled
as follows: . . . "It is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like
the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntary submit himself to the authority of the court. In
other words, summons by publication cannot — consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of
Rights — confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants. 'Due process of law requires personal
service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to
determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a
voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute
compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. . . . 'Although a state legislature has more
control over the form of service on its own residents than nonresidents, it has been held that in actions in
personam . . . service by publication on resident defendants who are personally within the state and can
be found therein is not "due process of law," and statute allowing it is unconstitutional.' (16A C.J.S., pp.
786, 789; Emphasis our)"
||| (Citizens' Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera, G.R. No. L-32170, [March 31, 1971],
148 PHIL 381-386)

In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule
4, 20 a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These
include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real
actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts — the court which has territorial
jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies. 21
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract
or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to
the person or property. 22 The venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and
municipal trial courts — the court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as
indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4. 23
In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real action,
considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. 35 An action for
cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is,
therefore, a real action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the
subject property lies.||| (Go v. UCPB, G.R. No. 156187, [November 11, 2004], 484 PHIL 869-879)

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1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; ACQUIRED BY TRIAL COURT ONLY UPON
PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. — The rule is well-settled that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
2. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE BODY OF THE
COMPLAINT RATHER THAN BY ITS TITLE OR HEADING. — It is necessary to determine the true
nature of the complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct
amount of docket fees therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or
heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the
execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional
memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was actually a real action,
affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
3. ID.; ID.; REAL ACTION; DEFINED. — In the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, this Court
held that a real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in
Section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an
action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE FILED IN THE COURT WHERE THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED. — It has also
been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for the
issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover the
parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action. In such a case, the action must be filed in the
proper court where the property is located[.]
5. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES; BASIS FOR DETERMINING AMOUNT THEREOF SHALL BE
THE ASSESSED VALUE OR ESTIMATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. — In the case at bar, therefore,
the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated
as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be
the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant.
||| (Gochan v. Gochan, G.R. No. 146089, [December 13, 2001], 423 PHIL 491-508)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE; RENDERS NULL AND
VOID AND COMPLAINTS AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS WHERETO. — The rule is well-settled
"that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in
court." Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon
the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court are null and void. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby
vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in
the amended pleading. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; CONTENTS; AMOUNT OF MANDAMUS MUST BE SPECIFIED NOT ONLY IN
THE BODY BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER. — All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The court acquires jurisdiction over any upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee.

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||| (Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919 (Resolution), [May 7, 1987],
233 PHIL 579-586)

1. STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY. — Private respondent claims

that the ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at
the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private
respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this
Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was
insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS UPON PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED
DOCKET FEES. — It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject- matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. ID.; ID.; PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS; NOT CONSIDERED FILED
UNLESS PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE IS PAID. — The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS CLAIM NOT
SPECIFIED IN THE PLEADING. — Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
||| (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, [February 13, 1989], 252 PHIL 280-
292)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; REAL ACTIONS COMMENCED AND PROSECUTED

WITHOUT AN ACCOMPANYING CLAIM FOR DAMAGES; WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE, ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. — The actions in the case at bar are principally for
recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's
jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising
from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite
obviously, an action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de posesion)
or the title thereof, or for partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real
property — in other words, a real action — may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying
claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action would fall within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.|||

4. ID.; ID.; TRIAL COURT AUTHORIZED TO ALLOW PAYMENT OF FILING FEES WITHIN
PRESCRIPTIVE OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. — The requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints,
petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only
in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered by the clarification and additional
rules paid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. No.s 79937-38, February 13, 1989. What
has been revised is the rule that subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount

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sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS A CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN THE PLEADING. —
A new rule has been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the pleading — i.e., damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading — as to which the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
6. ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF MONEY OR DAMAGES; AMOUNT CLAIMED MUST BE
SPECIFIED NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE PLEADING BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER. — Where the
action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the
aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed
for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES WHERE NO AMOUNT BEING CLAIMED IS SPECIFIED OR FEES PAID ARE
INSUFFICIENT. — Where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages
and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading
will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words, the
complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be
expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and
payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where
the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again,
the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the
balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance
of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.
||| (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao Del Norte, Branches 1 and 2, G.R. Nos. 88075-77 (Resolution),
[December 20, 1989], 259 PHIL 927-939)

1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH DAMAGES; ADDITIONAL FILING FEE

CONSTITUTES A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT WHEN DAMAGES AROSE AFTER THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT. — The trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court wherein it is
stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has
been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer,
say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there
is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE IN THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES. — In the latest
case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, this Court had occasion to make the clarification that
the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing
of the complaint or similar pleading . . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the
complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages
as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties
claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the
court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for
then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO STATE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN
THE AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT. — The amended and supplemental complaint in
the present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary
damages prayed for. As ruled inTacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the

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record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time,
the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the
exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period.
||| (Ayala Corp. v. Madayag, G.R. No. 88421, [January 30, 1990], 260 PHIL 741-746)

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in

its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately
files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a
change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
(5a) HCIaDT
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's knowledge and
belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to
be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion, refused to
allow the deficiency in the Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPA's Motion for Reconsideration
with attached Amended Petition for Certiorari.
In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount of P54,898.50 as docket fee, based on the
amounts of P10,000,000.00 representing the value of unwithdrawn molasses, P100,00.00 * as
storage fee, P200,00.00 * as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P500,000.00
as attorney's fees. The total amount considered in computing the docket fee was P10,900,000.00.
NOPA alleges that Campos deliberately omitted a claim for unrealized profit of P100,000.00 and an
excess amount of storage fee in the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer and, hence, the amount that
should have been considered in the payment of docket fees is P11,502,875.98. The amount allegedly
deliberately omitted was therefore only P602,875.98 out of P11,502,875.98, or merely 5.2% of said
alleged total. Campos's pleadings furthermore evince his willingness to abide by the rules by paying
the additional docket fees when required by the Court. ETaHCD
Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no deliberate intent to
defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should be applied, and the Motion
to Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.
||| (Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental, Br.
52, G.R. No. 179878, [December 24, 2008], 595 PHIL 1158-1172)

After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in their motion to serve
supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from
challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. 38 If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot
thereafter challenge the court's jurisdiction in the same case. 39 To rule otherwise would amount to
speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court. 40
Moreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to
continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal
in the manner authorized by law. 43 Only when the court issued such order without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief
will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. 44 Such special
circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case.|||(Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No.
140954, [April 12, 2005], 495 PHIL 422-440)

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Cause of Action (Rule 2, Sections 1 to 6)

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding
the acts committed by the defendant. 19 Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or
essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. 20 To be taken into account are only the material
allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not
considered. 21
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint. 22 Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
asserted by the defendant.
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the
opposition without merit. TEDaAc
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as
parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for
the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous
or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
||| (Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. No. 152272,
152397, [March 5, 2012], 683 PHIL 415-430)

The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47 (c), Rule 39 is "conclusiveness of judgment." This
rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the
same. 32 It refers to a situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to
the matters actually determined or which were necessarily included therein. 33
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of "bar by prior judgment," viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and cHaCAS

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(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action. 34
In determining whether causes of action are identical to warrant the application of the rule of res judicata,
the test is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would
suffice to authorize a recovery in the first even in cases in which the forms or nature of the two actions are
different. 38Simply stated, if the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action.
This rule ( Sec. 4, Rule 2) proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into
several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based on it. 42 Because the plaintiff cannot
divide the grounds for recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief
which he claims to exist and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely upon them by
piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same wrong or injury. 43
||| (Del Rosario v. Far East Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 150134, [October 31, 2007], 563 PHIL 149-
165)

3. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. — Res adjudicata requires that there must
be between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action the following elements: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two
(2) preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN CASE AT BAR AROSE FROM
ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION. — It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the other or others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by
which a party violates a right of another. These premises obtaining, there is no question at all that private
respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal
retaking of possession of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs
arise. Simply stated, the restoration of possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the
MeTC and the demand for damages with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the
forcible entry by petitioner into the leased premises.
6. ID.; ID.; SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION; PURPOSE IS TO PROTECT DEFENDANT
FROM UNNECESSARY VEXATION. — A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the
amount of damages may be recovered in one case and the rest, in another. In Bachrach v. Icarangal we
explained that the rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations between the same parties in regard to
the same subject of the controversy and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation.Nemo debet
bis vexari pro una et eadem cause.
||| (Progressive Development Corp., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123555, [January 22, 1999],
361 PHIL 566-585)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT; "CAUSE OF ACTION", CONSTRUED. — A cause of action is

understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the
same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal
obligations. However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. The singleness
of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of one person.
Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts only one cause of action arises.

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2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY OF PARTY UNDER ONE REMEDY, BARS RECOVERY UNDER THE
OTHER. — The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action
involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not
necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by
the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the
rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which,
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
||| (Joseph v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-41423, [February 23, 1989], 252 PHIL 560-566)

CIVIL PROCEDURE; PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES; JURISDICTIONAL TESTS; HOW

FURNISHED. — In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under
Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state
also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the
parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
||| (Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps, G.R. No. L-66620, [September 24, 1986], 228 PHIL 360-367)

Parties to Civil Actions (Rule 3, Sections 1 to 22)

Under Section 2, 15 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, or one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit." 16 A real party-in-interest is one with "a present substantial interest" which means such interest of a
party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the
evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand. 17 cCTESa
Now, is petitioner Rayo a real party-in-interest? Initially, we recognized herein petitioner as the co-
assignee of the subject real properties as shown in the March 25, 2002 deed of assignment. However,
while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, we find that petitioner has no present
substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment proceedings and nullify the order granting the
writ of possession.
||| (Rayo v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 165142, [December 10, 2007], 564 PHIL 528-
540)

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. 45 Strangers to a
case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. 46 The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to act not only of the absent
party but also as to those present. 47 The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests
on the petitioner/plaintiff. 48
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties
may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just. 49 If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs
failure to comply therefor. 50 The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
||| (Domingo v. Scheer, G.R. No. 154745, [January 29, 2004], 466 PHIL 235-284)

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As the rule now stands, the failure to invoke this ground ( failure to state a cause of action) in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer would result in its waiver.

The first paragraph of Section 1, 42 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within which to
file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should be filed within the
time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Equally
important to this provision is Section 1, 43 Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the
following grounds: 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res
judicata; and 4) prescription.
Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived in the event
that they are not timely invoked. As the respondents' motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which
should be timely invoked, material to the resolution of this case is the period within which they were
raised….
…Based on this discussion, the Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based on the
grounds invoked by the respondents which they have waived for failure to invoke them within the period
prescribed by the Rules. The Court cannot also dismiss the case based on "lack of cause of action" as
this would require at least a preponderance of evidence which is yet to be appreciated by the trial court.
||| (Pacaña-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., G.R. No. 168979, [December 2, 2013], 722 PHIL
460-484)

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of
the controversy be one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court. An action does not become a class
suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit
depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should
allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest,
and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, 3 in order that the court
might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the
number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the
subject matter of general or common interest. 4
The complaint in the instant case explicitly declared that the plaintiffs-appellants instituted the "present
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court in behalf of CMI subscribing stockholders" 5 but
did not state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders so that the trial court could not infer, much
less make sureas explicitly required by the statutory provision, that the parties actually before it were
sufficiently numerous and representative in order that all interests concerned might be fully protected, and
that it was impracticable to bring such a large number of parties before the court.
The statute also requires, as a prerequisite to a class suit, that the subject-matter of the controversy be of
common or general interest to numerous persons. Although it has been remarked that the "innocent
'common or general interest' requirement is not very helpful in determining whether or not the suit is
proper", 6 the decided cases in our jurisdiction have more incisively certified the matter when there is
such common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. By the phrase "subject matter
of the action" is meant "the physical facts, the things real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the
like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant." 7
…\It has been likewise held that a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint. 24 It is to be noted that only the facts well
pleaded in the complaint, and likewise, any inferences fairly deducible therefrom, are deemed admitted by
a motion to dismiss. Neither allegations of conclusions 25 nor allegations of facts the falsity of which the
court may take judicial notice are deemed admitted. 26 The question, therefore, submitted to the Court in
a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is not whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

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true, for these are hypothetically admitted, but whether the facts alleged are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action such that the court may render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein.
||| (Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-23136, [August 26, 1974], 157 PHIL 551-
578)

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LIBEL; VICTIM MUST BE IDENTIFIABLE. — In the case of
Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is
essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962), although it is
not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared that ". . .
defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person whom the imputation is case, affords
no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the personality of
the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons, 42 Phil. 760). This principle has
been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of persons, as in the case at
bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity , the more difficult it is for
the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLASS SUIT; NOT A CASE OF; PLAINTIFFS DO NOT HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CONTROVERSY. — We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in
representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues
that the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on
behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters. We find petitioner's contention meritorious. The case at bar is not a
class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Band
and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment
or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47
Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiff has a separate and distinct reputation in the
community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.||| (Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-63559, [May 30, 1986],
226 PHIL 99-108)

MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — It is

settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only
issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court laid
down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute." After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.||| (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R.
No. 101083, [July 30, 1993])

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS; WHEN A PARTY TO A

PENDING ACTION DIES AND THE CLAIM IS NOT EXTINGUISHED, SUBSTITUTION OF THE
DECEASED IS REQUIRED; PURPOSE. — When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not
extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically
governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, . . . . The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every

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party's right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in
the suit through the duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against
the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A FORMAL SUBSTITUTION BY HEIRS IS NOT NECESSARY WHEN THEY
THEMSELVES VOLUNTARILY APPEAR, PARTICIPATE IN THE CASE, AND PRESENT EVIDENCE IN
DEFENSE OF THE DECEASED. — The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without
the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments. In those
instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or the heirs
upon whom no judgment was binding. This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is
not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in
defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUBSTITUTION BY HEIRS IS NOT A MATTER OF JURISDICTION BUT A
REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS. — Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a
matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when
the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute
for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision. The alleging party must
prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
||| (Spouses De la Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, [July 28, 2005], 502 PHIL 803-815)

Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and
property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On
the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application
should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of
Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
||| (Spouses Algura v. Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, [October 30,
2006], 536 PHIL 819-838)

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the
doctrine of transcendental importance. 31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, 32 the United States Supreme Court wrote
that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided
three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus giving him
or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a
close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to
protect his or her own interests". 33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued
viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in
constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil
Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring
suit. 34
||| (White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, [January 20, 2009], 596 PHIL 444-472)

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Venue of Actions
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; VENUE; DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN JURISDICTION
AND VENUE, CITED. — The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court on
the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between
jurisdiction and venue. Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It
relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to
venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the
subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties
rather than the substance of the case. Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the
merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may be had.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT IF DEFENDANT FAILS TO CHALLENGE VENUE IN A MOTION TO
DISMISS. — Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the
courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to
challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules ofCourt,
and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action
be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IMPROPERLY LAID UNLESS AND UNTIL DEFENDANT OBJECTS TO IT IN A
MOTION TO DISMISS; REASON. — Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and
purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience
the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to
object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
4. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION; OVER DEFENDANT, HOW ACQUIRED. — In the instant case, even
granting for a moment that the action of petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over
"all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in
accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. With respect to the parties, there is no
dispute that it acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now petitioner, the moment he filed
his complaint for annulment and damages. Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant, now private respondent, either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to
its authority, or by the coercive power of legal process exercised over his person.
||| (Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74854, [April 2, 1991], 273 PHIL 1-7)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; VENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC
OFFICIAL. — From the provision of Article 360, third paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute
an action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the
alleged libelous articles were printed and first published.
2. ID.; ID.; IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A NOTION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO A
RESPONSIVE PLEADING. — Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss
prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all
practical intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to
the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR BY FILING ANSWER. — Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in
the court below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss,
pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner had already submitted himself

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to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint with Counterclaim. His
motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to
hear and decide the instant civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may be
waived and such waiver may occur by laches. Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper
venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive
pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue
which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must
be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATES TO TRIAL AND NOT TO JURISDICTION. — Indeed, the laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather
than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
||| (Diaz v. Adiong, G.R. No. 106847, [March 5, 1993])

As a general rule, all personal actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff. 7 However, by written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be changed or
transferred from one province to another. 8 Besides, when improper venue is not objected to in a motion
to dismiss it is deemed waived. 9 In other words, venue is waivable. It is procedural, not a jurisdictional
matter. It is intended to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts.
The rules on venue simply arrange for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts
and do not relate to their power, authority or jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. prLL
||| (Philippine Banking Corp. v. Tensuan, G.R. No. 104649, [February 28, 1994], 300 PHIL 434-444)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION; VENUE; AGREEMENTS THEREON ARE EXPLICITLY ALLOWED; RULE.
— Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions, whether
real or personal, or involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise.
Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action
may be changed or transferred from one province to another." Sec. 3, Rule 4, Rules ofCourt. Parties may
by stipulation waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal
privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to the third persons. It is a general principle
that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation would be against
public policy.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; STIPULATION; RESTRICTIVE OR PERMISSIVE; RATIONALE. — Written stipulations as
to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or
merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law (Rule 4 specifically). As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. Since convenience is the raison
d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be
deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties'
convenience. In other words, stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should
be interpreted as designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in
relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expounding the venues indicated in said
Rule 4.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY REGARDED AS PERMISSIVE OR COMPLIMENTARY TO RULE
4 OF THE RULES OF COURT; EXCEPTION. — An analysis of these precedents reaffirms and
emphasizes the soundness of the Polytrade principle. Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties'
intention in their agreement governing the venue of actions between them. That ascertainment must be
done keeping in mind that convenience is the foundation of venue regulations, and that the construction
should be adopted which most conduces thereto. Hence, the invariable construction placed on venue
stipulations is that they do not negate but merely complement or add to the codal standards of Rule
4 of the Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and
suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and

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exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescription of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not
to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive but merely permissive, or complementary of said rule. The fact
that in their agreement the parties specify only one ofthe venue mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for
their actions different from those specified by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to characterize the
agreement as a restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place
named by them, E.G. — "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save —,"
"particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," etc. regardless of the general precepts of Rule 4 and any
doubt or uncertainty as to the parties' intentions must be resolved against giving their agreement a
restrictive or mandatory aspect. Any other rule would permit of individual, subjective judicial
interpretations without stable standards, which could well result in precedents in hopeless inconsistency.
||| (Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119657, [February 7, 1997], 335
PHIL 415-440)

4. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; VENUE; AGREED VENUE THAT IS NOT MADE EXCLUSIVE DOES NOT
PRECLUDE OTHER VENUES. — The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in
writing on the venue on which an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the
venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties
must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties'
intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any
venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while
considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. In the absence ofqualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered
merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
5. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; GROUNDS; IMPROPER VENUE; PRESENT AS
CASE WAS FILED IN THE PLACE WHERE SOLE-PROPRIETORSHIP BUSINESS IS FOUND. — Under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule is venue in personal actions is "where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at
the election of the plaintiff." In the instant case, it was established in the lower court that petitioner resides
in San Fernando, Pampanga while private respondent resides in Parañaque City. However, this case was
brought in Pasay City, where the business of private respondent is found. This would have been
permissible had private respondent's business been a corporation. However, as admitted by private
respondent in her Complaint in the lower court, her business is a sole proprietorship, and as such, does
not have a separate juridical personality that could enable it to file a suit in court. In fact, there is no law
authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court. A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely
recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit
by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its
business name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does not vest a separate legal
personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court.
||| (Mangila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125027, [August 12, 2002], 435 PHIL 870-886)

Well established in our jurisprudence is the rule that the residence of a corporation is the place where its
principal office is located, as stated in its Articles of Incorporation.
||| (Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Goldstar Elevators Phils. Inc., G.R. No. 161026,
[October 24, 2005], 510 PHIL 467-477)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; CONFERRED BY LAW BASED ON THE

FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT. — It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the
facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint, we

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find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the
allegations thereof, respondent's cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which
is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance
that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS ARE CONFUSING JURISDICTION WITH VENUE. — Petitioners are
confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated
jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is
the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a
relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law
and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties. In
the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature
were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not
jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would
respondent's failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Respondent's failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon
motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS TO VENUE IN CIVIL ACTIONS ARISING FROM LIBEL MAY BE WAIVED
SINCE THEY DO NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION. — It is elementary that objections to
venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of
jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of
the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is
a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.
In contrast, in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential
element of jurisdiction.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO ALLEGE PLACE WHERE LIBELOUS ARTICLES WERE PRINTED AND
PUBLISHED IS NOT FATAL IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM LIBEL; VENUE IN A
CIVIL ACTION IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL. — Petitioners' argument that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were
printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of
the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of
venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case before us
is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional. The cases cited by petitioners are not applicable here.
These cases involve amendments on complaints that confer jurisdiction on courts over which they
originally had none. This is not true in the case at bar. As discussed above, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter upon the filing of the original complaint. It did not lose jurisdiction over the same
when it dismissed it on the ground of improper venue. The amendment merely laid down the proper
venue of the case.
||| (Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, [September 23, 2005], 507 PHIL 620-630)

At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action,
have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action,
however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be
able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. 6 In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. 7
||| (Spouses Lantin v. Lantion, G.R. No. 160053, [August 28, 2006], 531 PHIL 318-324)

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Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts (Rule 5, Sections 1 & 2) and Kinds

of Pleadings (Rule 6, Sections 1-13)
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM, EXPLAINED; TESTS TO
DETERMINE WHETHER COUNTERCLAIM IS COMPULSORY OR NOT. — A compulsory counterclaim
is one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. If it is within the jurisdiction of the court and it does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
such compulsory counterclaim is barred if it is not set up in the action filed by the opposing party. Thus, a
compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but it should instead be asserted in
the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it. To determine whether a
counterclaim is compulsory or not, we have devised the following tests: (1) Are the issues of fact or law
raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicatabar a subsequent suit
on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical
relation between the claim and the counterclaim? Affirmative answers to the above queries indicate the
existence of a compulsory counterclaim.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF THE DISMISSAL OF THE MAIN ACTION RESULTS IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COUNTERCLAIM ALREADY FILED, THE FILING OF A MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IS AN
IMPLIED WAIVER OF THE COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. — A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary
to the proceeding in the original suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim
presupposes the existence of a claim against the party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no
claim against the counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed, more so where
the complaint is dismissed at the instance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if the dismissal of the
main action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a
motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of
the motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim. Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss
and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies. In the event that a defending
party has a ground for dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only
one remedy. If he decides to file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. But if he
opts to set up his compulsory counterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative
defense in his answer. The latter option is obviously more favorable to the defendant although such fact
was lost on Forbes Park. The ground for dismissal invoked by Forbes Park in Civil Case No. 16540 was
lack of cause of action. There was no need to plead such ground in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
since the same was not deemed waived if it was not pleaded. Nonetheless, Forbes Park still filed a
motion to dismiss and thus exercised bad judgment in its choice of remedies. Thus, it has no one to
blame but itself for the consequent loss of its counterclaim as a result of such choice.
||| (Financial Building Corp. v. Forbes Park Association, Inc., G.R. No. 133119, [August 17, 2000],
392 PHIL 895-905)

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is
mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court
limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is
a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular
fact. 34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and
the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
Worse, is the trial court's third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading
(Answer) of De Lima, et al.

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The Return in Amparocases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it
should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the
claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for
decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit.
||| (De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528 (Resolution), [February 19, 2013], 704 PHIL 235-251)

As the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint
does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent
adjudication of the court, provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not
labor under any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the
court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any relief
thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The court's authority to proceed with the
disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the
counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on
its own merits and evidentiary support.
||| (Dio v. Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc., G.R. No. 189532, [June 11, 2014], 736 PHIL 216-
229)

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal of the complaint
due to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action". 35 |||

…As fittingly expressed by petitioner in her Reply:

Pertinently, it is relevant to note that respondents never denied in their Comment that
the institution of the case a quo was premature and violated the principle of judicial
stability. Stated otherwise, respondents admit that they are the ones who have invited
the court a quo to interfere with the rulings of the Pasay Court, which fortunately, the
former refused to do so. To allow the respondents to cite their own unlawful
actions as a shield against the harm that they have inflicted upon petitioner
Padilla would indubitably allow the respondents to profit from their own
misdeeds. With due respect, this cannot be countenanced by the Honorable Court. 43
||| (Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp., G.R. No. 207376, [August 6, 2014])

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular
action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the
insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be
raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court,while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have
been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

… At once, it is apparent that the CA based its dismissal on an incorrect ground. From the preceding
discussion, it is clear that "insufficiency of factual basis" is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Rather, it
is a ground which becomes available only after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. The procedural recourse to raise such
ground is a demurrer to evidence taken only after the plaintiff's presentation of evidence
…At the preliminary stages of the proceedings, without any presentation of evidence even conducted, it is
perceptibly impossible to assess the insufficiency of the factual basis on which the plaintiff asserts his
cause of action, as in this case. Therefore, that ground could not be the basis for the dismissal of the
action.

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However, the Amended Complaint is still dismissible but on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, as correctly held by the RTC.
||| (Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, G.R. No. 197380, [October 8, 2014], 745 PHIL 171-185)

Parts of a Pleading
A party's failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the
party's failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping
must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders
the petition defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a
jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are
alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not
sign the verification. A party's representative, lawyer or any person who personally
knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. 22
In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a pleading need not be verified,
unless there is a law or rule specifically requiring the same. Examples of pleadings that require
verification are: (1) all pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure; (2) petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only
questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2; (3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasi-judicial
bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme
Court under Rule 45, Section 1; (6) petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions
under Rule 47, Section 4; (7) complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for
appointment of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 1; (10) application for support pendente lite under
Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of
constitutional commissions under Rule 64, Section 2; (12) petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section
1; (14) complaint for expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for indirect contempt under
Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-
corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies; (17)
complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules on
Corporate Rehabilitation; and (18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages as well as petition for summary proceedings under the Family Code.
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be
accompanied by a certificate against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No.
04-94, which took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Court. It is not disputed herein that respondent's complaint for damages was accompanied by such a
certificate.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. When
circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it
and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served. 23
||| (Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, [May 30, 2011], 664 PHIL 529-547)

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In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the certificate of non-forum

shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that
the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and
the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of
the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as
similar to the current petition.
The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is
fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both petitioners and thus
warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. We have consistently held
that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties.
With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed
for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge
of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.
The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules when they filed their
motion for reconsideration, but they refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to make
all of them sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, they still failed to comply.
Thus, the CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution. 12
||| (Vda. de Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 154704, [June 1, 2011], 665 PHIL 184-
198)

At the outset, the Court notes that the petition supposedly filed by petitioners Jocson and
Tuising was not signed by Jocson's counsel. It was Tuising's counsel who signed in behalf of
Jocson's counsel. Tuising's counsel had no authority to sign the petition in behalf of Jocson. The
records are bereft of any proof that Jocson ever authorized Tuising's counsel to be her counsel or to
act in her behalf. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, otherwise the pleading produces no legal effect.
Furthermore, only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for Non-Forum Shopping.
Jocson did not sign the Verification and Certification. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the petition for review on certiorari to be verified. 18 A pleading required to be
verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. 19 Although Tuising
belatedly filed on 24 September 2004 a "Special Power of Attorney" allegedly signed by Jocson and
authorizing Tuising to file the petition for review and to verify and to certify the petition, no explanation
was given by Tuising why the Special Power of Attorney was belatedly filed four months after the
petition for review was filed on 12 May 2004. The lack of a certification against forum shopping or a
defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless
there is a need to relax the rule under special circumstances or for compelling reasons. 20We find no
compelling reason for a liberal application of the rules especially in this case where the petitioner who
did not sign the verification and certification for non-forum shopping already filed with the trial court
a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution.
||| (Argallon-Jocson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162836, [July 30, 2009], 611 PHIL 730-742)

Petitioner's contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with an appended
certificate of non forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in the pleading is absolutely specious. It
negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the
Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar parties
as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.

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||| (Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149660, [January 20, 2009], 596
PHIL 491-499)

FORUM SHOPPING is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in

different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule
on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or
increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. It is an act of
malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets. What is
critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of
whether the court in which one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the
action. 81 SDEHCc
Equally settled is the test for determining forum shopping. As this court explained in Yap v. Chua: 82
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise
stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. 83
Litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious". 84 It requires
the concurrence of three (3) requisites: "(1) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (2) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other". 85
In turn, prior judgment or res judicata bars a subsequent case when the following requisites concur: "(1)
the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and the second
actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action". 86
Applying the cited concepts and requisites, we find that the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-37004 is
barred by res judicata and constitutes forum shopping.
||| (Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 197530, [July 9, 2014], 738 PHIL 773-810)

Verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that
the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct. 11
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" of presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons." 12Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of the Court, requires that the certification should
be signed by the "petitioner principal party" himself. The rationale behind this is "because only the
petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in
different courts or agencies."

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||| (Zarsona Medical Clinic v. Phil. Health Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 191225, [October 13, 2014], 745
PHIL 298-312)

Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings

The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that every pleading shall contain in a methodical
and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary
facts. 22 And in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must
be stated with particularity. 23
"Ultimate facts" means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action, or such facts as are
so essential that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
inadequate.

Petitioners' Second Amended Complaint betrays no more than an incomplete narration of facts
unsupported by documentary or other exhibits; the allegations therein partake of conclusions of law
unsupported by a particular averment of circumstances that will show why or how such inferences or
conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with sweeping generalizations and inferences derived from facts
that are not found therein. While there are allegations of fraud upon the claim that the subject titles were
fictitious, spurious and obtained under "mysterious circumstances," the same are not specific to bring the
controversy within the trial court's jurisdiction. There is no explanation or narration of facts as would show
why said titles are claimed to be fictitious or spurious, contrary to the requirement of the Rules that the
circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity; otherwise, the allegation of fraud would
simply be an unfounded conclusion of law. In the absence of specific averments, the complaint is
defective, for it presents no basis upon which the court should act, or for the defendant to meet it with an
intelligent answer.|||(Cañete v. Genuino Ice Co., Inc., G.R. No. 154080, [January 22, 2008], 566 PHIL
204-224)

In other words, respondent' denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded
to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to
the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has
been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself
is admitted.
||| (Guevarra v. Eala, A.C. No. 7136, [August 1, 2007], 555 PHIL 713-732)

If indeed Steelcase had been doing business in the Philippines without a license, DISI would nonetheless
be estopped from challenging the former's legal capacity to sue. cSTCDA
It cannot be denied that DISI entered into a dealership agreement with Steelcase and profited from it for
12 years from 1987 until 1999. DISI admits that it complied with its obligations under the dealership

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agreement by exerting more effort and making substantial investments in the promotion of Steelcase
products. It also claims that it was able to establish a very good reputation and goodwill for Steelcase and
its products, resulting in the establishment and development of a strong market for Steelcase products in
the Philippines. Because of this, DISI was very proud to be awarded the "Steelcase International
Performance Award" for meeting sales objectives, satisfying customer needs, managing an effective
company and making a profit. 21
Unquestionably, entering into a dealership agreement with Steelcase charged DISI with the knowledge
that Steelcase was not licensed to engage in business activities in the Philippines. This Court has
carefully combed the records and found no proof that, from the inception of the dealership agreement in
1986 until September 1998, DISI even brought to Steelcase's attention that it was improperly doing
business in the Philippines without a license. It was only towards the latter part of 1998 that DISI deemed
it necessary to inform Steelcase of the impropriety of the conduct of its business without the requisite
Philippine license. It should, however, be noted that DISI only raised the issue of the absence of a license
with Steelcase after it was informed that it owed the latter US$600,000.00 for the sale and delivery of its
products under their special credit arrangement.
By acknowledging the corporate entity of Steelcase and entering into a dealership agreement with it and
even benefiting from it, DISI is estopped from questioning Steelcase's existence and capacity to sue.
||| (Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections, Inc., G.R. No. 171995, [April 18, 2012], 686
PHIL 59-75)

Effect of Failure to Plead (Rule 9, Sections 1-3) and When to File

Responsive Pleadings (Rule 11, Sections 1-11)
A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the court in default. Loss of
standing in court, the forfeiture of one's right as a party litigant, contestant or legal adversary, is the
consequence of an order of default. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the
proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his pleadings
would be acted upon by the court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him. 14
Indeed, a defending party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default.
However, the grounds that may be raised in such an appeal are restricted to any of the following: first, the
failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the complaint; second, the decision is contrary to
law; and third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed for. 17 In these
cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the pieces of evidence that were presented by the
plaintiff during the ex parte presentation of his evidence.
A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from raising any other ground in his appeal
from the judgment by default since, otherwise, he would then be allowed to adduce evidence in his
defense, which right he had lost after he was declared in default.
||| (Otero v. Tan, G.R. No. 200134 (Resolution), [August 15, 2012], 692 PHIL 714-730)

A compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an answer is not initiatory in character, and therefore, is not
covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94. In the case at bar, the counterclaims
pleaded by petitioners are compulsory in nature.
||| (Spouses Ponciano v. Parentela, Jr., G.R. No. 133284, [May 9, 2000], 387 PHIL 621-628)

In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners
was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of

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the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits,
no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no
motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the
trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the
Court of Appeals.
The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the respondents were
concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was shown not alone by the absence of a
motion to dismiss but on the respondents' insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the
subject properties. Nor could it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial Order specifically limited the
issues to the validity of the deed and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs
of Dr. Favis. Respondents not only confined their arguments within the pre-trial order; after losing their
case, their appeal was based on the proposition that it was error for the trial court to have relied on the
ground of vitiated consent on the part of Dr. Favis.||| (Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922,
[January 15, 2014], 724 PHIL 465-479)

On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it
was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however,
that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees
are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.
||| (Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, [January 7, 2008], 566 PHIL 1-39)

As in other civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them
by a preponderance of evidence. 19 Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence,
not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. 20 This principle holds true, especially
when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say,
the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved 21 with
preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.
||| (Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 151098, [March 21, 2006], 519 PHIL 791-812)

Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served separately on the
counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct the counsel to
inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice
renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be
attacked directly or collaterally.
||| (De Guia v. De Guia, G.R. No. 135384, [April 4, 2001], 408 PHIL 399-409)

Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provide:

Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the
plaintiff. . . .
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided,
however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is
without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there
are two or more defendants. (Italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

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The word "shall" in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
underscores their mandatory character. 10 Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the
nature of the Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits covered thereby. To
admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers — the very mischief that the Rule seeks to
redress.
In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation of the above-said Rule. Liberal interpretation
or construction of the law or rules, however, is not a free commodity that may be availed of in all
instances under the cloak of rendering justice. Liberality in the interpretation and application of Rules
applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
||| (Luna v. Mirafuente, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1610, OCA IPI No. 04-1548-MTJ, [September 26, 2005], 508
PHIL 1-9)

Motion for Bill of Particulars (Rule 12)

And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless
already states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which
should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other
means.||| (Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, [June 13, 1994], 303 PHIL 106-114)

"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity" 44 to "appraise the other party of what he is to be called on to answer, and so that it may be
determined whether the facts and circumstances alleged amount to fraud." 45 These particulars would
necessarily include the time, place and specific acts of fraud committed. 46 "The reason for this rule is
that an allegation of fraud concerns the morality of the defendant's conduct and he is entitled to know fully
the ground on which the allegations are made, so he may have every opportunity to prepare his case to
clear himself at the trial." 47 cIEHAC
||| In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for
dismissal since such a defect can be cured by a bill of particulars.52 Thus:
Failure to allege fraud or mistake with as much particularity as is desirable is not fatal if
the general purport of the claim or defense is clear, since all pleadings should be so
construed as to do substantial justice. Doubt as to the meaning of the pleading may be
resolved by seeking a bill of particulars.
A bill of particulars may be ordered as to a defense of fraud or mistake if the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake are not stated with the particularity required
by the rule. 53
The above-stated rule, however, does not apply to intra-corporate controversies. In Reyes, 54 we
pronounced that "in cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate
Controversies a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to
show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to
invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction." This is because fraud in intra-corporate
controversies must be based on "devices and schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors,
business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation which may be
detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of any
corporation, partnership, or association," as stated under Rule 1, Section 1 (a) (1) of the Interim Rules.
The act of fraud or misrepresentation complained of becomes a criterion in determining whether the
complaint on its face has merits, or within the jurisdiction of special commercial court, or merely a
nuisance suit.
||| (Guy v. Guy, G.R. No. 189486, 189699, [September 5, 2012], 694 PHIL 354-377)

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Filing and Service of Pleadings (Rule 13)

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing,
the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances
of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is
not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. ||| (Aberca v. Ver, G.R.
No. 166216, [March 14, 2012], 684 PHIL 207-232)

Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules, personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general
rule while resort to the other modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to the
other modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes
indispensable. 18 If no explanation is offered to justify resorting to the other modes, the discretionary
power of the court to expunge the pleading comes into play.||| (Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161219, [October 6, 2008], 588 PHIL 775-785)

A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice
and hearing, as well as proof of its service, 25 save only for those that the courts can act upon without
prejudice to the rights of the other parties. 26 A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is a
worthless piece of paper that cannot and should not be acted upon. 27 The reason for this is plain: a
movant asks the court to take a specific course of action, often contrary to the interest of the adverse
party and which the latter must then be given the right and opportunity to oppose. 28 The notice of
hearing to the adverse party thus directly services the required due process as it affords the adverse party
the opportunity to properly state his agreement or opposition to the action that the movant asks
for. 29Consequently, our procedural rules provide that a motion that does not afford the adverse party this
kind of opportunity should simply be disregarded. 30 cdasia
||| (Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385, [February 20, 2013], 704 PHIL 315-334)

Jurisprudence reiterates that "[l]itigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases." 74 This court has held that "equity aids
the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights[,]" 75 and a party should "periodically keep in touch with
his counsel, check with the court, and inquire about the status of the case." 76||| (Bracero v. Arcelo, G.R.
No. 212496, [March 18, 2015])

Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the latter
mode of service being a method extraordinary in character. 7 For substituted service to be justified, the
following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's residence or upon a
competent person in charge of the party's office or place of business. 8 Failure to do so would invalidate
all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
…
Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree
with the trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired
jurisdiction over her.
||| (Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, [December 12, 2006], 540 PHIL 1-7) The proper service of
summons differs depending on the nature of the civil case instituted by the plaintiff or petitioner: whether it
is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. Actions in personam, are those actions brought against a person
on the basis of his personal liability; actions in rem are actions against the thing itself instead of against

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the person; and actions are quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his or her interest in a property to the obligation or loan burdening the
property. 26
Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there are only four instances
wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons
by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when
the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant
claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
(4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines. In these
instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of
court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. 27 IDEHCa
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in
rem, but not if an action is in personam.
When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. 28Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon
the defendant. The said extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will
be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. 29 On the other hand, when the
defendant or respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, 30 and the action involved
is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring
jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
||| (Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corp. , G.R. No. 172242, [August 14, 2007],
556 PHIL 822-852)
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts between the
parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its
obligations to the defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff
for entering into such contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches
a property within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the action will be converted to
one quasi in rem.|||
…
In view of the above, we therefore rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is
deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.||| (NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia)
Ltd.v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., G.R. No. 175799, [November 28, 2011], 677 PHIL 351-375)
Note that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received
the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. 18 Here, petitioner failed to show that the
security guard who received the summons in respondent's behalf shared such relation of confidence that
respondent would surely receive the summons. Hence, we are unable to accept petitioner's contention
that service on the security guard constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service.
Neither did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over respondent by the latter's voluntary appearance in court
proceedings. Note that a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of

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said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. 19 In this case, records show that respondent, in its special appearance,
precisely questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of invalid service of summons. Thus, it
cannot be deemed to have submitted to said court's authority.
||| (Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 163287, [April 27, 2007], 550
PHIL 711-718)
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem. ||| (Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corp. , G.R. No. 170943, [September 23,
2008], 587 PHIL 713-724)
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner;
and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is
filed and submitted to the court for resolution.
Measured against these standards, it is readily apparent that respondents have acquiesced
to the jurisdiction of the trial court as early as June 17, 2003, when they filed their Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to Prosecute. Significantly, the motion did not categorically and expressly raise the
jurisdiction of the court over their persons as an issue. It merely (i) "reminded" the court of its
purportedly conflicting Orders in respect of summons by publication, (ii) alleged that because
petitioner "has not lifted a finger to pursue this case against movants-defendants", the case may be
dismissed for failure to prosecute, and (iii) prayed additionally for the deletion of the Notice of Lis
Pendens indicated at the back of the transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties. We
note, furthermore, that the motion failed to qualify the capacity in which respondents were appearing
and seeking recourse.
…
Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when the respondents'
motion for inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge Napoleon
Inoturan from further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of
the case, respondents manifested their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled
that the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on
impugning the court's jurisdiction.||| (Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, G.R.
No. 171137, [June 5, 2009], 606 PHIL 615-640)
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant's address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it
requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the
defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is,
therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
||| (Spouses Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, [October 15, 2014], 745 PHIL 589-607)
Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized. 9 The rule now likewise states "general manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate
secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." 10 It has now become

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restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision,
following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person excludes all others,
orexpressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the persons expressly
listed in the rules. 11 If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it
could have easily done so by clear and concise language. 12 cTDaEH||| (Green Star Express, Inc. v.
Nissin-Universal Robina Corp., G.R. No. 181517, [July 6, 2015])
n this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified because
previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts
were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official
duty. Also, the person who received the alias summons was of suitable age and discretion, then
residing at Vasquez's dwelling. There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez's residence, as
evidenced by his employment contract, executed under the supervision and authority of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of
employment and seafarer's information sheet, both bearing POEA's letterhead, his address in Metro
Manila was what was correctly mentioned in the alias summons that Bejer received. She must have
informed Vasquez one way or another of the suit upon his return in October 2000 after finishing his
nine-month contract with Fathom Ship Management. TacADE
||| (Montefalcon v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, [June 17, 2008], 577 PHIL 383-400)
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and
independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of
the judgment or order complained of. 68 Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition,
as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been made by his
counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, 69 Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.
Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon's certiorari petition outright for non-compliance with Section
3, Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule
13 of the Rules. The service of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his
counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in this case.
II.
On a related note, the Court further observes that jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already
been acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation dated May 5,
2011, filed by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had consistently represented
Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo and even before this Court.
||| (Reicon Realty Builders Corp. v. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, G.R. No. 204796,
[February 4, 2015])

Motions (Rule 15)

Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due process
is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application that renders any deviation
inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their
objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any
action and proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, we believe that Respondent Court
committed reversible error in holding that the Motion for Reconsideration was a mere
scrap of paper. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court received Sui's Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not immediately
resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed petitioners to file their comment and also leave to file a rejoinder if
Sui files a reply. 38 These circumstances justify a departure from the literal application of the rule
because petitioners were given the opportunity to study and answer the arguments in the motion.

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||| (Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Cheng, G.R. No. 170232, 170301, [December 5, 2006], 539
PHIL 37-52)

A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the
court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The
rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be
unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition. 14 The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide due
process to both parties and ensure impartiality in the trial. 15
Also, without proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving
no judicial cognizance. 16 The rule mandates that the same shall not be acted upon by the court. Proof of
service is mandatory.
||| (Boiser v. Aguirre, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886, [May 16, 2005], 497 PHIL 728-737)
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. 23 Considering the circumstances
of the present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially complied with. ACHEaI
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby. 24 Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the
substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required
extension was due to respondent's counsel's illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood,
compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was
interposed to delay the appeal. 25 As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of
the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended period.
Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the
issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time . . . is not a litigated motion where notice to
the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex
parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence
and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As a general rule, notice of motion is
required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice
demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that "ex
parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under
circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice
or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion." 26
||| (Sarmiento v. Zaratan, G.R. No. 167471, [February 5, 2007], 543 PHIL 232-248)
As held in Maturan v. Araula, 11 the rule requiring that the notice be addressed to the
adverse party has been substantially complied with when a copy of the motion for reconsideration
was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party, coupled with the fact that the trial court acted on
said notice of hearing and, as prayed for, issued an order 12 setting the hearing of the motion on 26
March 2004.
We would reiterate later that there is substantial compliance with the foregoing Rule if a copy
of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party.
||| (Areza v. Express Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 176697, [September 10, 2014])

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In Anama v. Court of Appeals, 29 we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of
the rule is to safeguard the adverse party's right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a
reasonable opportunity to study the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice
rule may be dispensed with.
As correctly pointed out by the CA:
In the instant case, when the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their comment
on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while
the [three]-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when
respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners . . . the
opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion.
||| (Microsoft Corp. v. Farajallah, G.R. No. 205800, [September 10, 2014])
Motion to Dismiss (Rule 16)

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; RULE THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS IS
TO BE CONSIDERED A HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE
COMPLAINT; APPLICATION OF THE RULE. — Now with regard to complainant's argument that it was
error for the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the complaint against respondents because, by filing
a motion to dismiss, respondents are deemed to have admitted the allegations of the complaint against
them, suffice it to say that the rule that a motion to dismiss is to be considered as a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the complaint applies more particularly to cases in which the ground for
dismissal is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. When it appears on the face of the
complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under the facts alleged, the defendant may file a
motion to dismiss hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint. By filing such a motion, the
defendant in effect says that even assuming the facts to be as alleged by the plaintiff, the latter has failed
to prove that he has a right which the former has violated. The rule does not unqualifiedly apply to a case
where the defendant files a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the
person of the defendant or over the subject matter or over the nature of the action; or on improper venue;
or on lack of capacity to sue of the plaintiff or onlitis pendentia, res judicata, prescription, unenforceability,
or on the allegation that the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made. In such cases, the hypothetical admission is limited to the facts alleged in
the complaint which relate to and are necessary for the resolution of these grounds as preliminary matters
involving substantive or procedural laws, but not to the other facts of the case. On the other hand, when a
motion to dismiss is based on payment, waiver, abandonment, release, compromise, or other form of
extinguishment, the motion to dismiss does not hypothetically, but actually, admits the facts alleged in the
complaint, i.e., the existence of the obligation or debt, only that the plaintiff claims that the obligation has
been satisfied. So that when a motion to dismiss on these grounds is denied, what is left to be proven in
the trial is no longer the existence of the debt but the fact vel non of payment by the defendant.|||

The Investigating Commissioner properly dismissed the complaint in this case on the ground of res
judicata, it appearing that it involves the same incident and the same cause of action as Administrative
Case No. 3825

(Halimao v. Villanueva, A.C. No. 3825, [February 1, 1996], 323 PHIL 1-12)

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REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; AVERMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT

DEEMED HYPOTHETICALLY ADMITTED UPON FILING OF MOTION TO DISMISS GROUNDED ON
FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION; LIMITATIONS TO THE RULE. — The flaw in this conclusion
is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the complaint are deemed
hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a
cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to such rule, i.e., that a
motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations oflegal conclusions;
nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere
conclusions of law; nor allegations of fact that falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor
matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult
the opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record
incorporated in the pleading, or by a document referred to; and nor to general averments contradicted by
more specific averments. aHSAIT
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF MOTION TO DISMISS; COURT NOT RESTRICTED TO THE FACTS
ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND INFERENCES DEDUCIBLE THEREFROM. — A more judicious
resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the
consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may
consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which
the courts are bound to take into account and they are also fairly entitled to examine records/documents
duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the demurrer to the complaint.
||| (Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125861, [September 9, 1998], 356 PHIL 555-570)

It follows then that the statute applies only to executory contracts and in actions for their specific
performance. It does not apply to actions which are neither for violation of a contract nor for the
performance thereof. There can be no dispute that the instant case is not for specific performance of the
agreement to sell the building and to assign the leasehold right. Petitioners merely seek to recover their
partial payment for the agreed purchase price of the building, which was to be paid on installments, with
the private respondents promising to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance, together with the
assignment of the leasehold rights, within two (2) months from the payment of the agreed downpayment
of P20,000.00. by their motion to dismiss, private respondents theatrically or hypothetically admitted the
truth of the allegations of fact in the complaint. ||| (Asia Production Co., Inc. v. Paño, G.R. No. 51058,
[January 27, 1992], 282 PHIL 469-481)

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of
action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The
deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a
motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been
observed.||| (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad, G.R. No. 85502, [February 24, 1992], 283 PHIL
400-410)

CIVIL ACTION; MOTIONS TO DISMISS; PLEADING GROUNDS AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES;

PRELIMINARY HEARING, RESTS ON THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT. — Section 5, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court is not mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It rests largely on the sound
discretion of the trial court. The use of the word "may" in said provision shows that such a hearing is not a
matter of right demandable from the trial court. Where the provision reads "may," this word shows that it is
not mandatory but discretional. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and
possibility. Moreover, a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of action
is not necessary||| (Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94733, [February 17,
1993])

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REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; AS A GENERAL RULE, IN

CASE OF DENIAL THEREOF, MOVANT SHOULD FILE AN ANSWER AND GO TO TRIAL;
EXCEPTION. — It is significant that this case is elevated to the Court of Appeals and now to
this Court because of the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss the amended petition of MERALCO.
Unquestionably, it is but an incident to the main case and the ordinary procedure would have been to file
an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal (Newsweek,
Inc. vs. I.A.C., 142 SCRA 177 [1986]). But this general rule is subject to certain exceptions, among which
are, if the court in denying the motion to dismiss acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. The reason is, it would be unfair to require the defendant to undergo the ordeal and
expense of trial under such circumstances as the remedy of appeal would not be plain and adequate.
More importantly, petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action, so that there is no need for a full blown trial (Newsweek, Inc. vs. I.A.C., Ibid). In addition,
applying the rule enunciated in Gayos v. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]) and reiterated in Alger Electric,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 43 [1985]), that it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to
always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seedsof future litigation, it appears that the disposition of the incident as well as the main issue in the
case at bar is in consonance with an efficient administration of justice, now that the facts are before
this Court.||| (National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84695, [May 8, 1990], 263 PHIL
868-876)

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; GROUNDS; LITIS PENDENTIA;

APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR; THE RIGHTS ASSERTED AND RELIEFS PRAYED FOR BY
PETITIONER IN THE MAKATI CASE AND THE RIGHTS ASSERTED AND RELIEFS PRAYED FOR BY
RESPONDENT IN THE QUEZON CITY CASE ARE ALL BASED ON THE VALIDITY OF THE PRE-
TERMINATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RETAIL AGREEMENTS. — The firmly established rule 1 is that
one of two actions will be dismissed on ground oflitis pendentia if the following requisites concur: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two
(2) cases should be such that judgment in one would amount to res judicata in the other. Undisputably,
the parties in the Makati case and the Quezon City case are the same. Petitioner is the plaintiff in the
Makati case and the defendant in the Quezon City case; and respondent is the defendant in the Makati
case and the plaintiff in the Quezon City case. The rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for by petitioner
in the Makati City case and the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for by respondent in the Quezon
City case are all based on the validity of the pre-termination of the Exclusive Retail Agreements. In view
of those similarities in the two actions, a final judgment on the merits in one would be a bar against the
other on the ground of res judicata.||| (Pacsports Phils., Inc. v. Niccolo Sports, Inc., G.R. No. 141602,
[November 22, 2001], 421 PHIL 1019-1032)

While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by former
judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a
later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the ruling in
the earlier case. 42 In other words, the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment or order becomes
conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest,
as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or
incident before the court in a later case; the binding effect and enforceability of that earlier dictum can no
longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in
the earlier case. |||

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We reject, based on these discussions, Hacienda Bigaa's position that there could be no res judicata in
this case because the present suit is for forcible entry while the antecedent cases adverted were based
on different causes of action — i.e., quieting of title, annulment of titles and accion
reinvindicatoria. For, res judicata, under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, operates even if no
absolute identity of causes of action exists. Res judicata, in its conclusiveness of judgment concept,
merely requires identity of issues.||| (Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. v. Chavez, G.R. No. 174160, [April 20,
2010], 632 PHIL 574-600)

Elementary is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both mandatory and
jurisdictional, and failure in this regard renders the decision final and executory.|||

This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the following elements:
(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4)
there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action. The application of the doctrine of res judicata does
not require absolute identity of parties but merely substantial identity of parties.
There is substantial identity of parties when there is community of interest or
privity of interest between a party in the first and a party in the second case even
if the first case did not implead the latter. 43
To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any proceeding regarding real
property assessment. Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its petition for review docketed as G.R. No.
165113, it did so not only on its behalf but also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assailed decision in the
earlier petition for review filed in this Court was the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.
67490, in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decision in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on petitioner
FELS under the principle of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are substantially "identical parties"
as to warrant the application of res judicata. FELS's argument that it is not bound by the erroneous
petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing.
||| (FELS Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 168557, 170628, [February 16, 2007], 545
PHIL 92-115)

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; GROUND; FAILURE TO STATE A

CAUSE OF ACTION; A CASE OF; FAILURE TO SHOW ABSOLUTE ACCEPTANCE OF CONTRACT OF
SALE IN CASE AT BAR. — Where in the light of the telegram-reply of Yao to Any. Gamboa's letter of
July 12, 1978 there was not an absolute acceptance of the Contract for the sale of Land under Article
1319 of the Civil Code, petitioners' contention that the complaint of respondents state no cause of action
is correct.

REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADING AND PRACTICE; MOTION TO DISMISS INVOKING THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS; DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF. — A motion to dismiss invoking the Statute of Frauds may be filed
even if the absence of compliance does not appear on the fact of the complaint. Such absence may be
the subject of proof in the motion stage of the proceedings. (Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, Vol.
I, p. 494, 1979 ed.) It follows that it becomes incumbent upon the plaintiff to bring out what note or
memorandum still exists in his possession in order to enable the court to expeditiously determine then
and there the need for further proceedings.
||| (Yuvienco v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. L-55048, [May 27, 1981], 192 PHIL 183-198)

REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO DISMISS CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — [T]he order denying
the motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of petition for certiorari. Petitioners should have filed an

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answer to the complaint, proceed to trial and await judgment before making an appeal. As repeatedly held
by this Court: "An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the
extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer
and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case
of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. . . . Under certain situations,
recourse tocertiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial court issued the order
without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or
(c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly
relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's
baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the
court dockets by another futile case."
2. ID.; ACTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF PERSONALITY TO SUE CAN BE USED AS
GROUND FOR MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT EVIDENTLY
STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION. — A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that
the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. Lack of personality to sue can be used as a ground for a
Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of
action.
SHOULD NOT BE USED AS GROUND FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS. — [T]his Court enunciated
in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, that the doctrine offorum non conveniens should
not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not
include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.||| (Bank of America NT&SA v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120135, [March 31, 2003], 448 PHIL 181-198)

Since the rule provides that the "preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to
dismiss had been filed", such hearing shall therefore be conducted in the manner provided in Section
2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, 32 which reads:
SEC. 2. Hearing of motion. — At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit
their arguments on the question of law and their evidence on the questions of fact
involved except those not available at that time. Should the case go to trial, the
evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of
the party presenting the same.
It is, therefore, inconsequential that petitioner had already filed an answer to the complaint
prior to its filing of a motion to dismiss. The option of whether to set the case for preliminary hearing
after the filing of an answer which raises affirmative defenses, or to file a motion to dismiss raising
any of the grounds set forth in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules are procedural options which are not
mutually exclusive of each other.
Moreover, as petitioner correctly pointed out, respondents failed to oppose the motion to
dismiss despite having been given the opportunity to do so by the RTC. Therefore, any right to
contest the same was already waived by them.
II. On whether the complaint for reconveyance should be dismissed
We agree with the RTC's and the CA's rulings that petitioner's argument on the failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action is unavailing. When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint
states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint
and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. 33 The test, therefore, is
whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be
rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein. Where the allegations are sufficient but the
veracity of the facts is assailed, the motion to dismiss should be denied. 34

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||| (Associated Bank v. Spouses Montano, Sr., G.R. No. 166383, [October 16, 2009], 619 PHIL 128-
139)

Further, it is now specifically required that the resolution on the motion shall clearly and distinctly state the
reasons therefor. This proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily dismissing the motion for "lack of
merit." Such cavalier dispositions can often pose difficulty and misunderstanding on the part of the
aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the
same, usually on certiorari. 23
The questioned order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss with a mere statement that there are
justiciable questions which require a full blown trial falls short of the requirement of Rule 16 set forth
above. Owing to the terseness of its expressed justification, the challenged order ironically suffers from
undefined breadth which is a hallmark of imprecision. With its unspecific and amorphous thrust, the
issuance is inappropriate to the grounds detailed in the motion to dismiss.
While the requirement to state clearly and distinctly the reasons for the trial court's resolutory order under
Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules does call for a liberal interpretation, especially since jurisprudence dictates
that it is decisions on cases submitted for decision that are subject to the stringent requirement of
specificity of rulings under Sec. 1, Rule 36 24 of the Rules, the trial court's order in this case leaves too
much to the imagination.
||| (Lu Ym v. Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, [February 23, 2005], 492 PHIL 397-409)

Dismissal of Actions (Rule 17)

As noted at the onset, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now requires that upon the filing of such notice,
the court issue an order confirming the dismissal. 30 The new requirement is intended to qualify the right
of a party to dismiss the action before the adverse party files an answer or asks for summary
judgment. 31 Still, there is no cause to apply the 1997 Rules retroactively to this case. A plaintiff's right to
cause the dismissal of his complaint under the old rules was unqualified. Procedural rules may not be
given retroactive effect if vested rights would be disturbed, 32 or if their application would not be feasible
or would work injustice. 33 Since respondents possessed an unqualified right to cause the dismissal of
their complaint without need of confirmation by the trial court, as enunciated in the 1964 Rules, they did
not err in asserting that their first complaint was withdrawn on the day of the filing of their motion to
withdraw, and the lower courts were correct in agreeing with respondents on this point.||| (O.B. Jovenir
Construction and Development Corp. v. Macamir Realty and Development Corp., G.R. No. 135803,
[March 28, 2006], 520 PHIL 318-328)

DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS; DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE HAS THE EFFECT OF AN

ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — Citing Section 3 Rule 17 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court held that the rule enumerates the instances where the
complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation
of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if
he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to
prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to
the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. . . . The order dismissing
Civil Case No. 1600 reads: For failure of the plaintiffs as well as counsel to appear on several settings
despite due notices, precisely for the reception of plaintiffs' evidence, upon motion of the defendant
through Atty. Mark Arcilla, this case is dismissed for failure to prosecute. It is clear from the afore-
mentioned order that said case was dismissed, upon petitioners' motion, for failure of private respondents
and their counsel to attend several scheduled hearings for the presentation of their evidence. Since the

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order did not contain a qualification whether same is with or without prejudice, following Section 3, it is
deemed to be with prejudice and shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits. A ruling based on
a motion to dismiss, without any trial on the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still be a
judgment on the merits.||| (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797, [February 13, 2006], 517 PHIL
572-587)

DUTY OF PLAINTIFF TO PROSECUTE HIS ACTION WITH DILIGENCE; NEGLECT THEREOF

WARRANTS DISMISSAL OF CASE. — In every action, the plaintiff is duty-bound to prosecute the same
with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable him to obtain the relief prayed for and, at
the same time, minimize the clogging of the court dockets. The expeditious disposition of cases is as
much the duty of the plaintiff as the court. It must be remembered that a defendant in a case likewise has
the right to the speedy disposition of the action filed against him considering that any delay in the
proceedings entail prolonged anxiety and valuable time wasted. In the case at bar, three years have since
lapsed from the filing of the complaint on May 3, 2002 and the order of dismissal on April 27, 2005.
Petitioners' failure to prosecute their case and proceed with the trial during the span of three years leads
to no other conclusion than that petitioners have no interest in seeing their case terminated at the earliest
possible time; or that petitioners' case is unmeritorious from inception. Whichever the case may be, the
dismissal order of the trial court stand and is now immutable.||| (Ko v. Philippine National Bank, Laoag
Branch, G.R. Nos. 169131-32, [January 20, 2006], 515 PHIL 276-283)

A satisfactory showing by the movant of the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect is
an indispensable requirement for the setting aside of a judgment of default or the order of default. After
going over the pleadings of the parties and the decision of the respondent court, we find that the motion
to lift the order of default was properly denied for non-compliance with this requirement.
The defendants were less than conscientious in defending themselves and protecting their rights before
the trial court. They did not pay proper attention and respect to its directive. The petitioner has not shown
that his and his wife's failure to attend the pre-trial hearing as required was due to excusable neglect,
much less to fraud, accident or mistake.
The petitioner insists, however, that they had a meritorious defense which the trial court should not have
disregarded. A meritorious defense is only one of the two conditions. Even if it be assumed for the sake of
argument that the private respondents did owe Josephine Ramnani P900,000, as alleged in the
counterclaim, that circumstance alone is not sufficient to justify the lifting of the order of default and the
default judgment. The obvious reason is that a meritorious defense must concurwith the satisfactory
reason for the non-appearance of the defaulted party. There is no such reason in this case.
The appropriate remedy is an ordinary appeal under Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court providing
in part as follows:
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for
relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with
Rule 38.
||| (Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101789, [April 28, 1993])

If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared in default retains the right to
appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations
of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to
set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying such right to appeal unless
the order of default has been set aside, was no longer controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of
the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.
||| (Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, [October 30, 2006], 536 PHIL 868-886)

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When the delayed filing of an answer causes no prejudice to the plaintiff, default orders should be
avoided. Inasmuch as herein respondent was improvidently declared in default, its Petition for Certiorari
to annul its default may be given due course. The act of the Commission on Higher Education enjoining
petitioner from using the word "university" in its corporate name and ordering it to revert to its authorized
name does not violate its proprietary rights or constitute irreparable damage to the school. Indeed,
petitioner has no vested right to misrepresent itself to the public. An injunction is a remedy in equity and
should not be used to perpetuate a falsehood.

We agree with respondent. Lina v. Court of Appeals 7 discussed the remedies available to a defendant
declared in default, as follows: (1) a motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3(b), Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court, if the default was discovered before judgment could be rendered; (2) a motion for new
trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still
available; (3) a petition for relief under Rule 38, if judgment has become final and executory; and (4) an
appeal from the judgment under Section 1, Rule 41, even if no petition to set aside the order of default
has been resorted to.
These remedies, however, are available only to a defendant who has been validly declared in default.
Such defendant irreparably loses the right to participate in the trial. On the other hand, a defendant
improvidently declared in default may retain and exercise such right after the order of default and the
subsequent judgment by default are annulled, and the case remanded to the court of origin. The former is
limited to the remedy set forth in Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 of the pre 1997 Rules of Court, and
can therefore contest only the judgment by default on the designated ground that it is contrary to
evidence or law. The latter, however, has the following options: to resort to this same remedy; to
interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the order of default, even before the
promulgation of a judgment by default; or in the event that judgment has been rendered, to have such
order and judgment declared void.
In prohibiting appeals from interlocutory orders, the law does not intend to accord executory force to such
writs, particularly when the effect would be to cause irreparable damage. If, in the course of trial, a judge
proceeds without or in excess of jurisdiction, this rule prohibiting an appeal does not leave the aggrieved
party without any remedy. 8 In a case like this, a special civil action of certiorari is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.
Herein respondent controverts the judgment by default, not on the ground that it is unsubstantiated by
evidence or that it is contrary to law, but on the ground that it is intrinsically void for having been rendered
pursuant to a patently invalid order of default. 9
||| (Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, G.R. No. 139371, [April 4,
2001], 408 PHIL 483-502)

Pre-Trial (Rule 18)

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important
procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, 36 pre-trial is a device intended to
clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties. 37 It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and
resolution of the case. 38 Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of
dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

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(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to

avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. 39
The purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the
court as well of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial, or
totally dispense with it.
Generally, pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a
case are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at the
pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact they intend to raise at the trial. 42 However, in cases in
which the issue may involve privileged or impeaching matters, 43 or if the issues are impliedly included
therein or may be inferable therefrom by necessary implication to be integral parts of the pre-trial order as
much as those that are expressly stipulated, the general rule will not apply. 44 Thus, in Velasco v.
Apostol, 45 this Court highlighted the aforesaid exception and ruled in this wise:
A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is
to be or may be taken up during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein
or may be inferable therefrom by necessary implication are as much integral
parts of the pre-trial order as those that are expressly stipulated.
||| (LCK Industries Inc. v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, [November 23, 2007], 563
PHIL 957-976)

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE; DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL

COURT TO DECLARE A PARTY NON-SUITED FOR NON-APPEARANCE THEREON, MUST NOT BE
ABUSED; CASE AT BAR. — A pre-trial cannot validly be held until the last pleading has been filed, which
last pleading may be the plaintiff's reply, except where the period to file the last pleading has lapsed. The
period to appear and file the necessary pleading having expired on the Acropolis Trading Corporation, the
lower court can direct that a pre-trial conference be held among the answering defendants. however,
though it is within the discretion of the trial court to declare a party non-suited for non appearance in the
pre-trial conference, such discretion must not be abused. The precipitate haste of the lower court in
declaring the respondent bank non-suited was uncalled for and deserved a second look. Considering the
fact that the counsel for the plaintiff/respondent bank did arrive for the pre-trial conference, though a bit
late and that counsel for the defendant was himself also late, the trial court should have called the case
again. An admonition to both counsels to be more prompt in appearing before the Court as scheduled
would have sufficed, instead of having dismissed the complaint outright. Unless a party's conduct is so
negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-
appearance, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the
desired end.||| (Calalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103185, [January 22, 1993], 291 PHIL 488-
502)

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CIVIL LAW; AGENCY; SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY; WHEN POWER OF ATTORNEY

COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH TO INCLUDE AUTHORITY TO APPEAR AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
— It is also error on the part of the Court of Appeals to state that the power of attorney given to the four
(4) Citibank employees is not a special power of attorney as required in paragraph 3, Article 1878 of the
Civil Code and Section 1 (a), Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. In the case of Tropical Homes, Inc. vs.
Villaluz, the special power of attorney executed by petitioner bank therein contained the following
pertinent terms — "to appear for and in its behalf in the above-entitled case in all circumstances where its
appearance is required and to bind it in all said instances". The court ruled that: "Although the power of
attorney in question does not specifically mention the authority of petitioner's counsel to appear and bind
the petitioner at the pre-trial conference, the terms of said power of attorney are comprehensive enough
as to include the authority to appear for the petitioner at the pre-trial conference."
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRECIPITATE ORDERS OF DEFAULT FROWNED UPON BY
SUPREME COURT; REASON THEREFOR; WHEN PARTY MAY BE PROPERLY DEFAULTED. — We
reiterate the previous admonitions of this Court against "precipitate orders of default as these have the
effect of denying the litigant the chance to be heard. While there are instances, to be sure, when a party
may be properly defaulted, these should be the exceptions rather than the rule and should be allowed
only in clear cases of an obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect to comply with the orders of the court.
Absent such a showing, the party must be given every reasonable opportunity to present his side and to
refute the evidence of the adverse party in deference to due process of law".||| (Citibank, N.A. v. Chua,
G.R. No. 102300, [March 17, 1993])

Hence, we pronounce that the absence of counsel for defendants at pre-trial does not ipso facto authorize
the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the presentation of evidence ex parte. It bears
stressing that nothing in the Rules of Court sanctions the presentation of evidence ex parte upon
instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pre-trial. The Rules do not countenance stringent
construction at the expense of justice and equity. 37 As the Court has previously enunciated:
We cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of
justice in a straightjacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there
would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this petition,
are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the
circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is
the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty or
properties on technicalities. 38

Due process dictates that petitioners be deprived of their right to be heard and to present evidence to
support their allegations if, and only if, there exists sufficient basis in fact and in law to do so. 39 There
being a manifest lack of such basis in this case, petitioners would be unjustly denied of the opportunity to
fully defend themselves should the Court affirm the questioned orders which were evidently issued by the
RTC with grave abuse of discretion. The better and certainly more prudent course of action in every
judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than dispose of a case on
technicalities.
||| (Paredes v. Verano, G.R. No. 164375, [October 12, 2006], 535 PHIL 274-292)

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Intervention (Rule 19)

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by
such proceedings. 16 It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court
to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with
defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or
proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by
leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person
becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such
proceedings.

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4)
or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the
custody of the court or an officer thereof. 18 Moreover, the court must take into consideration whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor's right or interest can be adequately pursued and protected
in a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the legitimate heirs of Estanislao
Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima. True,
if their allegations were later proven to be valid claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the interest contemplated by
law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. 19 Otherwise, if persons not parties to
the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated,
expensive and interminable.
||| (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Miñoza, G.R. No. 186045, [February 2,
2011], 656 PHIL 537-549)

DISCRETION OF THE COURT TO PERMIT OR DISALLOW THEREOF, NOT REVIEWABLE BY

CERTIORARI NOR CONTROLLED BY MANDAMUS; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The
permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the rules to give to the court the
full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. The discretion of the court, once
exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such
discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner. As a general guide in determining
whether a party may intervene, the court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. In the present case, there is no showing of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court. It denied petitioner's motion for intervention by reason of its
findings, which were affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, that the intervention would only unduly
delay the case and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; that herein petitioner has
no legal interest in the matter in litigation; and that at any rate, his rights, if any, can be ventilated and
protected in a separate action.

INDEPENDENT CONTROVERSY CANNOT BE INJECTED THEREIN. — In general, an independent

controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence such intervention will not be allowed
where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper

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where there are certain facts giving intervenor's case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it
clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim
in a separate suit.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERELY COLLATERAL OR ACCESSORY OR ANCILLARY TO THE PRINCIPAL
ACTION; CASE AT BAR. — Coming back to the petition at bar, it is to be noted that, at this point, there is
no pending principal action wherein petitioner may intervene. A decision was already rendered therein by
the trial court and no appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment in that main case is not final and
executory. Intervention is legally possible only "before or during a trial," hence a motion for intervention
filed after trial — and, a fortiori, when the case has already been submitted, when judgment has been
rendered, or worse, when judgment is already final and executory — should be denied. Petitioner would
do well to reflect on the doctrinal rule that an intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to
the principal action, and not an independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or
subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is not
pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be based.
||| (Big Country Ranch Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102927, [October 12, 1993])

Certainly, intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an independent
proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original
parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the intervention
may be based.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN ALLOWED AFTER RENDITION OF JUDGMENT; EXCEPTIONAL CASES
WHERE INTERVENORS ARE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. — In exceptional cases, the Court has
allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial court. In Director of Lands vs.
Court of Appeals, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment
was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. Recently in Mago vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court granted intervention despite the case having become final and executory. It must be noted,
however, that in both these cases, the intervenors were indispensable parties.
||| (Looyuko v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 102696, 102716, 108257, 120954, [July 12, 2001], 413
PHIL 445-468)

Calendar of Cases/Subpoena/Computation of Time (Rules 20, 21, and

22)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES AT TRIAL; SEC. 9, RULE 23, RULES OF
COURT, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — Section 9, Rule 23, of the Rules of Court excusing a witness
from appearance before a court, judge, or other officer of the province in which he resides, if the distance
exceeds 50 kilometers from his place of residence to the place of trial by the usual course of travel,
applies solely to civil cases and not to criminal cases. Consequently, the refusal by respondent Judge, to
the case at bar, to grant the prosecution's motion to arrest a material witness in a criminal case, or in the
alternative, to cite him for contempt, amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
||| (People v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-24154, [October 31, 1967], 128 PHIL 809-815)

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year

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is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil
Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. TIaCAc
||| (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., G.R. No. 162155,
[August 28, 2007], 558 PHIL 182-192)

Rule 34 and 35 (Judgment on the Pleadings/ Summary Judgment)

Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, 28 provides that a judgment on the pleadings is proper when an
answer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A judgment on
the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief. 29
In this case, the separate Answers filed by the respondents definitely tendered issues, as it made specific
denials of the material allegations in the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, which would bar
recovery by petitioners. Moreover, it was erroneous for the RTC to require the filing of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings and for the LBP and the DAR Secretary to file the same since in the first place,
the latter are neither plaintiffs in the case nor counter-claimants or cross-claimants.
What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary judgment, a procedural device
designed for the prompt disposition of actions, which may be rendered if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, after a summary hearing, there is no genuine
issue regarding any material fact, except as to the amount of damages, and the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law, and which may be applied for by either a claimant or a defending party.
||| (Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 156304, [October 23, 2006], 535 PHIL 819-
834)

For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there
must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the
party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no
genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the
opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment. 27
In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by the opposing party
not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment?
||| A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. To forestall summary judgment, it is essential
for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of genuine issues, as to which he has substantial,
plausible and fairly arguable defense, i.e., 29 issues of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon
which reasonable findings of fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party, although a mere scintilla
of evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment will be insufficient to preclude entry
thereof.||| (Bitanga v. Pyramid Construction Engineering Corp. , G.R. No. 173526, [August 28, 2008],
585 PHIL 537-554)

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and
useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the

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Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not
in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.
Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A "genuine
issue" is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary
judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount
of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is
proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine||| (Bungcayao, Sr. v.
Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, [April 19, 2010],
632 PHIL 391-401)

Rule 36 (Judgments, Final Orders and Entry)

Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by judges in the performance of
their official duties renders them administratively liable. 11 In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, acts done in their official capacity, even though erroneous, do not
always constitute misconduct.12
Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption or malice may be the subject of disciplinary actions. For
administrative liability to attach, respondent must be shown to have been moved by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred or some other similar motive. Verily, judges may not be held administratively liable for any of their
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as they acted in good faith. 13
||| (Lacurom v. Tienzo, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075, [October 9, 2007], 561 PHIL 376-386)

Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is
granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. 20 In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional origin. 21 The
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional 22 and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the
judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, 23 for it is more important that a case be settled
than it be settled right. 24 Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the
land.25 Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the
winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. 26
The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is
"not a question of technicality but of substance and merit," the underlying consideration therefore, being
the protection of the substantive rights of the winning party. 39 Nothing is more settled in law than that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether
it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 40
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Court must guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies. The only exceptions to
the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tuncentries which cause no

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prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. 41
||| (Peña v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 159520, [September 19, 2006], 533
PHIL 670-691)

Rules 37 and 38 (New Trial or Reconsideration/Relief from Judgments,

Orders, or Other Proceedings)
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; NOT PROPER WHERE NEW
EVIDENCE WILL BE INTRODUCED. — Under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules ofCourt, a party may file a
motion for reconsideration on the ground, among others, that ". . . the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision or final order, or the decision or final order is contrary to law." It requires the motion to point out
specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law, making specific reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence presented or to the provisions of law alleged to be violated. It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 that
a motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence. Petitioners correctly
contend that if respondents wanted to present further evidence, they should have filed a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence.
3. ID.; ID.; NEW TRIAL; GROUNDS; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE; WHEN PROPER. — For newly
discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, (a) it must have been discovered after trial, (b) it could not
have been discovered or produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence, (c) it must be material and not
merely collateral, cumulative, corroborative or purely for impeaching a witness, merely important evidence
being not enough, and (d) if presented, would probably alter the result of the action.
||| (Cansino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125799, [August 21, 2003], 456 PHIL 686-695)

In the instant case, we find the negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearings for the
reception of evidence inexcusable. The trial court scheduled the hearing for the reception of petitioner's
evidence seven times. The initial hearing set on February 28, 2001 was cancelled because petitioner
allegedly had influenza. The hearings scheduled on April 26, 2001 and May 10, 2001 were cancelled and
moved to October 25, 2001 and December 13, 2001. Petitioner was represented by Atty. Carpio, Jr. as
collaborating counsel during the hearing on October 25, 2001 but no evidence was presented. Instead,
the hearing was cancelled. On December 13, 2001, Atty. Bañares, petitioner's new counsel, appeared but
he requested for a resetting. On February 14, 2002, Atty. Bañares moved to postpone the hearing to
February 28, 2002 as previously scheduled. On February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares arrived late.
Scrutiny of the records disclose that the hearings were postponed or cancelled without any justification.
However, the trial court accommodated the requests for postponement or resetting in order to accord
petitioner due process. Under the circumstances, we find petitioner's counsel's failure to attend the seven
scheduled hearings without justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable neglect. As such, it cannot be a
ground for new trial.
In addition, the Rule requires that motions for new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence must be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e., affidavits showing the facts (not mere
conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the movant may prove in
case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve no purpose and would just waste the time of
the court as well as the parties if the complaint is after all groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective. 24
||| (Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corp., G.R. No. 167245, [September 27, 2006], 534 PHIL 839-
850)

A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court.

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First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for
relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the
original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. — Only petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary
proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the
Supreme Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally
cognizable by this Court.
||| (Purcon, Jr. v. MRM Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 182718, [September 26, 2008], 588 PHIL 308-317)

The remedy of a party whose notice of appeal is denied by the trial court, although such notice is filed
within the period therefor, is to file a motion for reconsideration of such order and, if the court denies such
motion, to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. If the party is prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing his notice of appeal within the reglementary
period therefor, his remedy is to file a petition for relief, in the same case, from the order of the trial court
denying his notice of appeal. This is provided in Section 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which reads: ICHDca
SEC. 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. — When a judgment or final order is
rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition
in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course.

Such party is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court if he was not prevented
from filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Such relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy
of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either
because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.
||| (Yusuke Fukuzumi v. Sanritsu Great International Corp., G.R. No. 140630, [August 12, 2004], 479
PHIL 888-896)

Rule 39 (Execution)
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. In such a situation, the prevailing party is
entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court.|||

Jurisprudentially, the Court has recognized certain exceptions to the rule as where in cases
of special and exceptional nature it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the
suspension of its execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when
certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the
execution of the judgment unjust. 17

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None of these exceptions avails to stay the execution of this Court's decision in G.R. No.
159352. Premiere Development Bank has failed to show how injustice would exist in executing the
judgment other than the allegation that respondent corporations are in the process of winding up.
Indeed, no new circumstance transpired after our judgment had become final that would render the
execution unjust.
||| (Premiere Development Bank v. Flores, G.R. No. 175339, [December 16, 2008], 594 PHIL 477-
491)

The law mandates that in the execution of a money judgment, the judgment debtor shall pay either in
cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to
the latter. Nowhere does the law mention promissory notes as a form of payment. The only exception is
when such form of payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor. But it was obviously not acceptable to
complainant, otherwise she would not have filed this case against respondent sheriff. In fact, she objected
to it because the promissory notes of the defendants did not satisfy the money judgment in her favor.
If the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode
of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the money judgment shall be satisfied by levying on the
properties of the judgment debtor.
||| (Dagooc v. Erlina, A.M. No. P-04-1857, [March 16, 2005], 493 PHIL 563-569)

In that sense, the case of Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 13 SCRA 611 (1965), cited by
petitioners, must be distinguished from the instant case. On the question ofwhat should be done in
the event the highest bid made for the property at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is in excess of the
mortgage debt, this Court applied the rule and practice in a judicial foreclosure sale to an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale in a similar case considering that the governing provisions of law as
mandated bySection 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, specifically Sections 29, 30 and 34 of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court (previously Sections 464, 465 and 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure) are
silent on the matter. The said ruling cannot, however, be construed as the legal basis for applying the
requirement of a levy under Section 15 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court before an extrajudicially
foreclosed property can be sold at public auction when none is expressly required under Act No.
3135, as amended.
Levy, as understood under Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in relation to
execution of money judgments, has been defined by this Court as the actwhereby a sheriff sets apart
or appropriates for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ, a part or the whole of the
judgment-debtor's property. 5
In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the property sought to be foreclosed need not be
identified or set apart by the sheriff from the whole mass ofproperty of the mortgagor for the
purpose of satisfying the mortgage indebtedness. For, the essence of a contract of mortgage
indebtedness is that a property has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the
debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to answer
the amount of indebtedness, in case of default of payment. By virtue of the special power inserted or
attached to the mortgage contract, the mortgagor has authorized the mortgagee-creditor or any other
person authorized to act for him to sell said property in accordance with the formalities required
under Act No. 3135, as amended.
||| (Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81552, [May 28, 1990], 264 PHIL 364-374)

The alternative judgment of reimbursement is applicable only if the conveyance of the lots is not possible,
but it has not been shown that there is an obstacle to such conveyance. As the main obligation of the
petitioner is to execute the absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas, its unjustified refusal to do so
warranted the issuance of the garnishment order.

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Garnishment is a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing
to him from a stranger to the litigation. 3 It is an attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to
subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person or money owed by such third
person or garnishee to the defendant. 4 The rules on attachment also apply to garnishment proceedings.
A garnishment order shall be lifted if it established that:
(a) the party whose accounts have been garnished has posted a counterbond or has
made the requisite cash deposit; 5
(b) the order was improperly or irregularly issued 6 as where there is no ground for
garnishment 7 or the affidavit and/or bond filed therefor are defective or
insufficient; 8
(c) the property attached is exempt from execution, hence exempt from preliminary
attachment 9 or
(d) the judgment is rendered against the attaching or garnishing creditor. 10
Partial execution of the judgment is not included in the above enumeration of the legal grounds for the
discharge of a garnishment order. Neither does the petitioner's willingness to reimburse render the
garnishment order unnecessary. As for the counterbond, the lower court did not err when it fixed the
same at P500,000.00. As correctly pointed out by the respondent court, that amount corresponds to the
current fair market value of the property in litigation and was a reasonable basis for determining the
amount of the counterbond. LLjur
||| (Manila Remnant Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107282, [March 16, 1994], 301 PHIL 289-
299)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION; ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION TO

A PURCHASER OF PROPERTY, A MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COURT. — It is the ministerial duty of
the Court upon mere motion to issue a writ of possession to the purchaser of property sold in an extra-
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage after the one year period for redemption has expired without
any redemption being made.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF A PARTY WHO CLAIMS TO BE ACTUALLY HOLDING THE PROPERTY
ADVERSELY TO THE MORTGAGOR, CITED. — A party who claims to be actually holding the property
adversely to the mortgagor has the right to be notified of, and to be heard on, the application for a writ of
possession.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LESSEES NOT CONSIDERED THIRD PARTIES "ACTUALLY HOLDING THE
PROPERTY ADVERSELY" TO THE MORTGAGOR, REASON. — The lessees of the mortgagor cannot
be considered third parties "actually holding the property adversely" to said party from whom they derive
their rights to the possession to the property; their rights to the possession to the property; their rights
cease with those of the mortgagor, and a writ of possession is enforceable against them.
||| (Spouses Malonzo v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-53998, [May 31, 1989], 255 PHIL 653-661)

Petitioner herein invokes seasonably the exceptions to immediate execution of judgments in

ejectment cases cited in Hualam Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Court of Appeals 39 and Laurel v.
Abalos, 40 thus:
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring
about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution
inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is
not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate
execution of the judgment. 41
Noteworthy, the foregoing exceptions were made in reference to Section 8, 42 Rule 70 of the
old Rules of Court which has been substantially reproduced as Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997

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Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, even if the appealing defendant was not able to file a
supersedeas bond, and make periodic deposits to the appellate court, immediate execution of the
MTC decision is not proper where the circumstances of the case fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions. Yet, Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules does not provide for a procedure to
avert immediate execution of an RTC decision. DSEIcT
This is not to say that the losing defendant in an ejectment case is without recourse to avoid
immediate execution of the RTC decision. The defendant may, as in this case, appeal said judgment
to the Court of Appeals and therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, as held
in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 43even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are
immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. 44
In the present case, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for a
writ of preliminary injunction because the RTC has yet to rule on respondents' Motion to Issue
Writ of Execution. Significantly, however, it also made a finding that said application was without
merit. On this score, we are unable to agree with the appellate court.
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. 45 Status quo is the last
actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
||| (City of Naga v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 174042, [July 9, 2008], 579 PHIL 781-802)

4. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; MAY BE STAYED WHEN SUPERVENING EVENTS BRING
ABOUT MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF PARTIES; NO JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS IN
CASE AT BAR. — The court may stay immediate execution of a judgment when supervening events,
occurring subsequent to the judgment, bring about a material change in the situation of the parties. To
justify the stay of immediate execution, the supervening event must have a direct effect on the matter
already litigated and settled. Or, the supervening events must create a substantial change in the rights or
relations of the parties which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable
making it imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of justice. In this case, there is no
judgment on the merits, only a judgment on a technicality. The issuance of the writ of possession in favor
of Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star is also not a judgment on the merits. A writ of possession is an order
whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of real or personal
property.||| (Silverio Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants Inc., G.R. No. 143312, [August 12, 2005],
504 PHIL 150-165)

Rule 40 (MTC to RTC)

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the
Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer
dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the
case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower
court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice. 19|||(Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, [September 15, 2006], 533 PHIL
466-476)

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Rule 41 (Appeal from RTC)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDER DENYING THE PARTIES' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CONSTITUTES THE FINAL ORDER WHICH FINALLY DISPOSED OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A
CASE; CASE AT BAR. — In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the
order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12
days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed — for
having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days
after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We
reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration ofan
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman, et al. where
we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order
which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain
petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE; DELAY IN THE FILING OF AN APPEAL; WHEN MAY BE EXCUSED. — In
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however, we
declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be
applied rigidly. ThisCourt has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a
party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities. In de la
Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must
be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused
on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to
strong considerations of fairness and justice. In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due
course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that
merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten
to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a
clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always
tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FRESH PERIOD RULE. — The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to
the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on
justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15
days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply
to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Courtof Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
||| (Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, [September 14, 2005], 506 PHIL 613-629)

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1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JURISDICTION; APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF COURT IS

CONFERRED BY LAW AND MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE MANNER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF; ACQUIRED BY PERFECTION OF APPEAL. — The general rule holds
that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and must be exercised in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions thereof and such jurisdiction is acquired by the appellate court over the
subject matter and parties by the perfection of the appeal. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. In fact, it has been
long recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. EcHAaS
2. ID.; ACTIONS; APPEALS; STRICT REQUIREMENTS, RELAXED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. —
Nonetheless, this Court has on several occasions relaxed this strict requirement. In the case of Toledo, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court et. al., we allowed the filing of an appeal where a stringent
application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. Thus, for a party to seek
exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong
compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must
be shown, in order to warrant the Court's suspension of the rules. Indeed, the Court is confronted with the
need to balance stringent application of technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial
significance to relax said rules based on equity and justice.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The case at bench squarely meets the requisites postulated by the
aforequoted rule. If respondents' right to appeal would be curtailed by the mere expediency of holding that
they had belatedly filed their notice of appeal, then this Court as the final arbiter of justice would be
deserting its avowed objective, that is to dispense justice based on the merits of the case and not on a
mere technicality. In essence, the Court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity
considerations have been adequately met by respondents to overcome the one day delay in the
perfection of their appeal. Considering the factual and legal milieu obtaining in the case at bench, the
petition must be denied.
||| (Trans International v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128421, [January 26, 1998], 348 PHIL 830-841)

Rule 42 (RTC to CA)

. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; DISMISSAL OF APPEAL; FILING OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DEEMED AN EFFECTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF
APPEAL. — Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners
should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on
the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as
a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from
the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the
Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial
of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that
respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS; PROPER MODE OF
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. — Petitioners invoke to the ruling in
People v. De la Cruz that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a
motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different. De la Cruz is a
criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the
proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed
perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of

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Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal
is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
||| (Ross Rica Sales Center Inc. v. Spouses Ong, G.R. No. 132197, [August 16, 2005], 504 PHIL 304-
320)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,

REQUIRED; EXCEPTIONS. — It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as
a general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is
sought. This rule, however, is not without exceptions when the questions raised before this Court are the
same as those which have been squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a
motion for reconsideration in said court beforecertiorari can be instituted in this Court, is no longer
prerequisite. This rule is subject however, to exceptions among which are the following, namely: 1) where
the issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved; 3) in case of urgency; and (4)
when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised in
and passed upon by, the court below. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION. — The issues raised by petitioners in this petition
are substantially the same as those asserted by them in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dated February
14, 1994, before the Court of Appeals. The argument that respondent has no right to expropriate
petitioners' mineral areas under Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been raised, argued, and
submitted by petitioners for resolution by the appellate court in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To further
file a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals would simply be to repeat their arguments.
For this reason, we hold that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not fatal to the
allowance of their action.
||| (Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115104,
[October 12, 1998], 358 PHIL 245-261)

Rule 43 ( Quasi-Judicial Agencies to CA)

ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 27 OF R.A. NO. 6770 SPECIFIES THAT APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IS TO BE EXERCISED OVER "FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF LOWER
COURTS," COMPOSING THE INTEGRATED JUDICIAL SYSTEM. — The very provision cited by
petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over
"final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system.
It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the
decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals, as specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial
agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is
required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and
already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PRECLUDE APPEALS FROM
QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE SUPREME COURT VIA RULE 45. —Apropos to the foregoing,
and as correctly observed by private respondent, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of
Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative
or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of
law. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but
only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of

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Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was
precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies. EDA
||| (Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, [September 16, 1998], 356 PHIL 787-811)

Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of
Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial
agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the
agencies 16 enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
We cannot agree with petitioners' submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial
proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 17 we held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding.
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or
resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners' petition for review.
Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review properly under Rule 45, petitioners want us to reverse
the findings of probable cause by the DOJ after their petition for review under Rule 43 from the court a
quo failed. This much we are not inclined to do, for we have no basis to review the DOJ's factual findings
and its determination of probable cause.
First, Rule 45 is explicit. This mode of appeal to the Supreme Court covers the judgments, orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or any authorized court
and should raise only pure question of law. The Department of Justice is not a court.
||| (Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, [October 19, 2005], 510 PHIL 137-149)
. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO APPEAL CARRIES WITH IT STAY OF DECISIONS PENDING APPEAL. — A
judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Section 27of the Ombudsman Act provides
that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure
or reprimand, or suspensionof not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. In all
other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all other cases therefore, the
judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no
appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal
becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory
judgment" in respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. In other words, the fact that
the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the
stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being
appealable would be rendered nugatory.
4. ID.; NO GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLE THAT MANDATES THAT ALL DECISIONS OF QUASI-
JUDICIAL AGENCIES ARE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. — The general rule is that judgments by lower
courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become final and executory, execution pending
appeal being an exception to this general rule. It is the contention of respondents however that with
respect to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and administrative bodies, the opposite is true. It is argued
that the general rule with respect to quasi-judicial and administrative agencies is that the
decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even pending appeal. The contention of respondents
is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies
are immediately executory.

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||| (Lapid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261, [June 29, 2000], 390 PHIL 236-253)

Rule 45

In Ligon v. Court of Appeals 38 where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under
Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court," this Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive. 39
To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is
that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors
of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45. 40
This Court, however, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was
filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. 41
The records show that the petition was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65. 42 Following Delsan
Transport, the petition, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," actually avers errors of
judgment which are the subject of a petition for review.
The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5 44 of Rule 15 in connection with Section 2, Rule 37 of
the Rules of Court is mandatory. 45 Absence of the mandatory requirement renders the motion a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no
authority to act upon. 46 Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of
the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency. 47
||| (Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank, G.R. No. 163988, [November 17, 2005], 511 PHIL 735-751)
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; WHEN QUESTION OF LAW EXISTS. — A question of law
exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts, or when the
query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses,
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole and probabilities of the situation.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF COURT OF APPEALS, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL; CASE
AT BAR, EXCEPTION. — Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only
questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts as to
the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals. However, in the
instant case, we find that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Court of Appealshence, we grant the petition.
3. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION; ONLY STATEMENTS IN
COMPLAINT CONSIDERED. — It is well settled that in a motion to dismiss based on
lack of cause of action, the issue is passed upon on the basis of the allegations assuming them to be
true. The court does not inquire into the truth ofthe allegations and declare them to be false, otherwise it
would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to the plaintiff. Only the statements in the
complaint may be properly considered, and the court cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold
preliminary hearings to ascertain their existence. To put it simply, the test for determining whether a
complaint states or does not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting
hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the judge may validly grant the
relief demanded in the complaint.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT BASED THEREON COULD ONLY
RAISE QUESTION OF LAW. — In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there

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cannot be any question of fact or "doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts," simply
because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law
to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any
appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or "doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a
cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal
and logical opposite ofthe other.
5. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; TEST IN DETERMINING WHERE ISSUE RAISED IS ONE OF FACT OR OF LAW.
— The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by
the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a
question of fact.
6. ID.; ID.; APPEAL BY PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45; ONLY ISSUE IS PURE
QUESTION OF LAW. — Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that private respondent raises
pure questions of law which are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by
way of a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45.
7. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION; DOCUMENTS
CONSIDERED. — In a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action, the trial court can
consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so
doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such
documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on
these documents would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but
would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these
supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure
questions of law, and not questions of fact.
8. ID.; ID.; DIFFERENCE WHERE COMPLAINT DOES NOT ALLEGE SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION
AND WHERE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUSTAIN CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGED. — It is apparent that
JADEBANK, as well as respondent appellate court, confused situations where the complaint does not
allege a sufficient cause of actionand where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged.
The first is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be
determined only from the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other
matter aliunde. The second is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested
his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim.
The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises
precisely because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the
evidence wanting. AHSaTI
9. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; IMPROPER MODE OF APPEAL TO COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE
DISMISSED OUTRIGHT. — JADEBANK's appeal having been improperly brought before
the Court of Appeals, it should be dismissed outright pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
||| (China Road and Bridge Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137898, [December 15, 2000], 401
PHIL 590-604)

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Rule 65
We find the contention of the petitioner meritorious. In the case of de Ocampo v. Republic, L-19533, Oct.
31, 1963, 9 SCRA 440, this Court said. "The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is:
does it leave something to be done in the court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final." In the instant case, it is evident that the respondent court resolved
no new or other matter in the order of July 8, 1986. Such being the case, it necessarily follows that the
order of May 27, 1986 should be deemed as a final order in so far as the issues resolved therein are
concerned. An order which decides an issue or issues in a complaint is final and appealable, although the
other issue or issues have not been resolved, if the latter issues are distinct and separate from the others.
Thus, the respondent court was without jurisdiction to modify or reverse the earlier order after the
expiration of fifteen (15) days from and after receipt thereof by the parties, considering that there was no
motion for reconsideration filed by then private respondent Go Chu.
We find the contention of the petitioner meritorious. In the case of de Ocampo v. Republic, L-19533, Oct.
31, 1963, 9 SCRA 440, this Court said. "The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is:
does it leave something to be done in the court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final." In the instant case, it is evident that the respondent court resolved
no new or other matter in the order of July 8, 1986. Such being the case, it necessarily follows that the
order of May 27, 1986 should be deemed as a final order in so far as the issues resolved therein are
concerned. An order which decides an issue or issues in a complaint is final and appealable, although the
other issue or issues have not been resolved, if the latter issues are distinct and separate from the others.
Thus, the respondent court was without jurisdiction to modify or reverse the earlier order after the
expiration of fifteen (15) days from and after receipt thereof by the parties, considering that there was no
motion for reconsideration filed by then private respondent Go Chu.
||| (Day v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Br. XIII, G.R. No. 79119, [November 22, 1990],
269 PHIL 630-643))

Even if we were to accept this petition in the broader interest of justice, it must still fail for the trial court
correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Cases Nos. 1683-91-C, 1684-91-
C, 1685-91-C, 1686-91-C, and 1688-91-C. Jurisdiction thereon was originally vested in the National
Housing Authority (NHA) underP.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344. Under E.O. No. 648 of 7
February 1981, this jurisdiction was transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) which, pursuant to E.O. No. 90 of 17 December 1986, was renamed as the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board.
We agree with the trial court that the complaints do involve unsound real estate business practices on the
part of the owners and developers of the subdivision who entered into Contracts to Sell with the
petitioners. By virtue of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344 and our decision in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, the
NHA, now HLRB, has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. In addition to involving
unsound real estate business practices, the complaints also involve specific performance of the
contractual and statutory obligations of the owners or developers of the subdivision. The claims for
annulment of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan" in favor of HABACON and the certificates of title issued to him
and for damages are merely incidental. cdll
||| (Fajardo v. Bautista, G.R. Nos. 102193-97, [May 10, 1994], 302 PHIL 324-335)

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Rule 46
Guy vs CA
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be
executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for
dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of
justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been
flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party,
this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the present
controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with
impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.

Molina vs CA
We likewise rule that in the present case, the alleged failure to attach all pleadings and documents is
not a sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. In appropriate cases, the courts may liberally construe
procedural rules in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.13 We have held that
lapses in the literal observation of a procedural rule will be overlooked when they do not involve public
policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident, when they have not prejudiced
the adverse party, nor deprived the court of its authority.14 In the instant case, petitioners' failure to
append: (1) herein respondent's Answer to the Petition for Review filed on January 2, 1997; (2)
petitioners' Memorandum filed on April 28, 1997; and (3) respondent's Memorandum filed on May 16,
1997, all of which were mentioned in the petition for certiorari before the appellate court do not touch on
public policy, nor do they deprive the appellate court of its authority. No right of respondent is
prejudiced or adversely affected.

NYK International vs NLRC

Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the disputed document although stamped as
"certified true copy" is not an authenticated original of such certified true copy, but only a xerox copy
thereof, in contravention of paragraph 3 of the above-quoted guidelines. Hence, no error may be
ascribed to the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright pursuant to paragraph 5
of Administrative Circular No. 3-96, which provides:

5. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the party using the documents required by Paragraph (3) of
Circular No. 1-88 to verify and ensure compliance with all the requirements therefor as detailed in the
preceding paragraphs. Failure to do so shall result in the rejection of such annexes and the dismissal of
the case. Subsequent compliance shall not warrant any reconsideration unless the court is fully
satisfied that the non-compliance was not in any way attributable to the party, despite due diligence on
his part, and that there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to make such other
disposition as it may deem just and equitable. (Emphasis supplied.)

The members of this Court are not unmindful that in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, we
have disregarded similar procedural defects in order to correct a patent injustice made. However,
petitioners here have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule. Petitioners are hereby
reminded that the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued
except in the exercise of judicial discretion.11 Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it
only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.

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Rule 47 Annulment of Judgment or Final Orders

In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 26 Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a
trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to
the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. 27 The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court. 28 On the other hand, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case the
judgment or final order and resolution are void. 29 Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either
on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered
void. 30 acEHCD
In his petition for annulment of judgment, Aquende alleged that there was extrinsic fraud
because he was prevented from protecting his title when Bulawan and the trial court failed to implead
him as a party. Bulawan also maintained that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person
and, therefore, its 26 November 1996 Decision is not binding on him. In its 26 November 2007
Decision, the Court of Appeals found merit in Aquende's petition and declared that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over Aquende, who was adversely affected by its 26 November 1996
Decision. We find no error in the findings of the Court of Appeals.
||| (Bulawan v. Aquende, G.R. No. 182819, [June 22, 2011], 667 PHIL 714-729)

The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief
from judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment
is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even
summoned to appear therein, cannot make use of a petition for relief from judgment. 52 Indubitably,
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar cannot avail themselves of the aforesaid ordinary remedies of motion
for new trial, petition for relief from judgment, or appeal, because they were not parties to the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193 in which the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 sought to
be annulled was rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar also cannot seek the annulment of the 11
January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and
executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only
two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a
party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation
that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected
thereby. 53 EHaASD
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court. 54
It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is to have the final
and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment sought
to be annulled, as in this case, is still on appeal or under review by a higher court, it cannot be
regarded as final, and there can be no renewal of litigation because the litigation is actually still open
and ongoing. In this light, the arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that the judgments or final
orders need not be final and executory for it to be annulled must fail.

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This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity. Given that
the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was still pending appeal before
this Court, the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance of the Petition for annulment of the same
judgment, for if it had done so, then it would risk promulgating a ruling that could be contrary to and
inconsistent with the ruling of this Court on the appeal of the judgment.
||| (Lopez v. Esquivel, Jr., G.R. No. 168734, 170621, [April 24, 2009], 604 PHIL 437-470)

EVEN THOUGH PETITIONERS WERE NOT MENTIONED IN THEIR PETITION FOR PROBATE, THEY
BECAME PARTIES THERETO AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF
HEARING. — Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to
the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the
petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the decedent. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to
bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in
the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the
notice of hearing.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS COULD NO LONGER RESORT TO A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT DUE TO THEIR FAILURE TO MAKE USE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION OF
THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE RULES AND TO RULE OTHERWISE WOULD ALLOW
PETITIONERS TO BENEFIT FROM THEIR OWN INACTION OR NEGLIGENCE. — As parties to the
probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or
reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is
essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of
further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the
Decision became final and executory. Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it
had become final, they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their
motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or almost
four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy. For
failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could
no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own
inaction or negligence.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IS A REMEDY IN LAW INDEPENDENT
OF THE CASE WHERE THE JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED WAS RENDERED AND A
PERSON NEED NOT BE A PARTY TO THE CASE AND IT IS ONLY ESSENTIAL THAT THE ASSAILED
JUDGMENT WAS OBTAINED BY FRAUD AND COLLUSION AND THE PETITIONER WOULD BE
ADVERSELY AFFECTED THEREBY. — An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such
action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It
is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on
only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a
party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that
the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
||| (Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156021, [September 23, 2005], 507 PHIL 682-696)

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Rule 56 Original and Appealed Cases

As a general rule, petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed
before this Court may only raise questions of law. However, jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions to this rule. In Almendrala v. Ngo, 17 we have enumerated several instances when this
Court may review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals on appeal by certiorari, to wit: 18 (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings
are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In this case, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are different from those of the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter. These conflicting findings led to the setting aside by the Court of Appeals of the
decision of the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter. In view thereof, we deem a review of the
instant case proper.
||| (Triumph International (Phils.), Inc. v. Apostol, G.R. No. 164423, [June 16, 2009], 607 PHIL 157-
184)

Rule 57 (Preliminary Attachment)

A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy by virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party
may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party
taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of the judgment that may be
recovered. 57 The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on
defendant's property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such
property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the
means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of
or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors|||

In the case at bar, there is no question that no counter bond was given by the Spouses Magaling for the
discharge or dissolution of the writ of preliminary attachment, as their position is that the provisional
remedy was irregularly or improperly issued. They sought the discharge or dissolution of the writ based
on Sec. 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Under said provision, when the attachment is
challenged for having been illegally or improperly issued, there must be a hearing, with the burden of
proof to sustain the writ being on the attaching creditor. 59 That hearing embraces not only the right to
present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and meet
them. It means a fair and open hearing. 60 Herein, there is no showing that a hearing was conducted
prior to the issuance of the 19 February 1999 Order of the RTC discharging or dissolving the writ of
preliminary attachment. That Ong was able to file an opposition to the motion of the Spouses Magaling to
discharge the preliminary attachment is of no moment. The written opposition filed is not equivalent to a
hearing. The absence of a hearing before the RTC bars the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment for the simple reason that the discharge or dissolution of said writ, whether under Sec. 12 or

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Sec. 13 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, as amended, shall be granted only "after due notice and
hearing"||| (Magaling v. Ong, G.R. No. 173333, [August 13, 2008], 584 PHIL 151-183)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHRASE "AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION," CONSTRUED. — Rule 57 in
fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter." The
phrase, "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint —
which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks "the commencement of the action;" and the reference
plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT MAY BE ISSUED EX-PARTE. — What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an
action is properly commenced — by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and
other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the
pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of
summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts:
for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint or other
appropriate pleading (counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the
writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and
substance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; HEARING ON APPLICATION THEREON, GENERALLY NOT NECESSARY. — In Toledo
v. Burgos this Court ruled that a hearing on a motion or application for preliminary attachment is not
generally necessary unless otherwise directed by the Trial Court in its discretion. And in Filinvest Credit
Corporation v. Relova, the Court declared that "(n)othing in the Rules of Court makes notice and hearing
indispensable and mandatory requisites for the issuance of a writ of attachment."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS OF GRANT. — The only pre-requisite is that the Court be satisfied, upon
consideration of "the affidavit of the applicant or of some other person who personally knows the facts,
that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 . . . (Rule 57),
that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the
amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover,
is as much as the sum for which the order (of attachment) is granted above all legal counterclaims." If the
court be so satisfied, the "order of attachment shall be granted," and the writ shall issue upon the
applicant's posting of a bond executed to the adverse party in an amount to be fixed by the judge, not
exceeding the plaintiff's claim, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to
the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall
finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — In Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of
,
Appeals, decided on April 18, 1989, decided on April 18, 1989 this Court had occasion to emphasize the
postulate that no hearing is required on an application for preliminary attachment, with notice to the
defendant, for the reason that this "would defeat the objective of the remedy . . . (since the) time which
such a hearing would take, could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property before a writ of attachment issues." As observed by a former member of this Court, such a
procedure would warn absconding debtors-defendants of the commencement of the suit against them
and the probable seizure of their properties, and thus give them the advantage of time to hide their
assets, leaving the creditor-plaintiff holding the proverbial empty bag; it would place the creditor-applicant
in danger of losing any security for a favorable judgment and thus give him only an illusory victory.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; HOW DISCHARGED. — There are two (2) ways of discharging an attachment: first, by the
posting of a counterbond; and second, by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BY COUNTERBOND. — The submission of a counterbond is an efficacious mode of
lifting an attachment already enforced against property, or even of preventing its enforcement
altogether. When property has already been seized under attachment, the attachment may be discharged
upon counterbond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57. But even before actual levy on property,
seizure under attachment may be prevented also upon counterbond. The defendant need not wait until

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his property is seized before seeking the discharge of the attachment by a counterbond. This is made
possible by Section 5 of Rule 57.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BY MOTION TO DISCHARGE ON GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS
IRREGULARLY OR IMPROPERLY ISSUED. — Aside from the filing of a counterbond, a preliminary
attachment may also be lifted or discharged on the ground that it has been irregularly or improperly
issued, in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 57. Like the first, this second mode of lifting an attachment
may be resorted to even before any property has beer levied on. Indeed, it may be availed of after
property has beenreleased from a levy on attachment, as is made clear by said Section 13.
||| (Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93262, [November 29, 1991], 281
PHIL 386-403)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ANCILLARY TO A PRINCIPAL PROCEEDING. — Attachment is an auxiliary remedy and
cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against
the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself
cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED APPEALED WHERE MAIN ACTION IS APPEALED. — Where the
petitioners moved for the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment by the respondent court on the
basis of the judgment in their favor . . . the consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the
attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so
also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a
separate case independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such
action.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF NONPAYMENT OF BOND. — Coming now to the argument that the
attachment was automatically lifted because of the non-payment of the premium on the attachment bond,
the Court feels it is time again to correct a common misimpression. The rule is that the bond
is not deemed extinguished by reason alone of such non-payment.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCHARGED ONLY WHEN JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. —
Finally, on the correct interpretation of Rule 57, Section 19, of the Rules of Court, we hold that the order
of attachment is considered discharged only where the judgment has already become final and executory
and not when it is still on appeal. The obvious reason is that, except in a few specified cases, execution
pending appeal is not allowed.
||| (Spouses Olib v. Pastoral, G.R. No. 81120, [August 20, 1990], 266 PHIL 762-769)

As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,

service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective
outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. cdtai
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by
means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service on her attorney, petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third mode, namely, "in any . . . manner the court may
deem sufficient."
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides. 8 Moreover, there are
several reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid

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service ofsummons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service of summons on
petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and
certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to
be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an
answer.
||| (Spouses Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, [January 22, 1996], 322 PHIL 96-111)

REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; ATTACHMENT; INDEPENDENT VINDICATORY ACTION

MAY BE FILED BY THIRD PARTY WHOSE PROPERTY HAS BEEN WRONGFULLY LEVIED UPON BY
ATTACHMENT. — Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly sets forth the remedy that may be
availed of by a person who claims to be the owner of property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a
third-party claim with the sheriff and if the attaching creditor posts an indemnity bond in favor of the
sheriff, to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his claim (Abiera vs. Court of Appeals, 45
SCRA 314).
2. ID.; ID.; INJUNCTION; COURTS MAY NOT INTERFERE WITH JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER COURT
OF COORDINATE AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION BY INJUNCTION; RULE IS APPLICABLE
ONLY WHERE NO THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT IS INVOLVED; PURPOSE OF THAT RULE. — Generally,
the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction,
is applied in cases where no third-party claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying
the judgment or process of another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the
proper appellate court. The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of
coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.
3. ID.; ID.; ATTACHMENT; INTERVENTION IN AN ATTACHMENT PROCEEDING; CUMULATIVE AND
SUPPLETORY TO THE RIGHT TO BRING AN INDEPENDENT SUIT. — Intervention as a means of
protecting the third-party claimant's right in an attachment proceeding is not exclusive but cumulative and
suppletory to the right to bring an independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a third-party claim to
property levied upon cannot operate to bar a subsequent independent action by the claimant to establish
his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from the order denying his original third-party claim.
||| (Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66321, [October 31, 1984], 218
PHIL 143-151)

Rule 58 (Preliminary Injunction)

As an adjunct to the main action subject to the latter's outcome, 34 on the other hand, a writ
of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites, to
wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is
clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. 35 Concurrence of the foregoing requisites is evident from the fact that
STRADEC has been deprived of its rights to its shareholdings and to participate in SIDC's corporate
affairs as a consequence of the impugned loan and pledge as well as the transfer of the shares to
respondent Wong and CTCII. For these reasons alone, we find that STRADEC is entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain: (a) CTCII from further exercising proprietary rights over the subject
shares; (b) SIDC and its officers from recognizing the transfer or further transfers of the same; (c) the
implementation of the resolutions passed during the 20 July 2006 SIDC stockholders' special
meeting; and, (d) the SEC from acting on any report submitted in respect thereto. Far from amounting
to a prejudgment of the case, the restraint of said acts is merely in the service of the office of a writ of
preliminary injunction,i.e., the restoration of the status quo ante as well preservation and protection of
the rights of the litigant during the pendency of the case. 36 aITDAE

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||| (Strategic Alliance Development Corp. v. Star Infrastructure Development Corp., G.R. No.
187872 (Resolution), [April 11, 2011], 663 PHIL 94-112)

A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the
protection of substantive rights and interests. 12 An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded.
Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to
prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice
and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. 13 Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule
of Court, 14 a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary
injunction could be heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3)
the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. 15
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of
the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that
end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. 16 Hence, the exercise
of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is
grave abuse of discretion
||| (Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, G.R. No. 183367,
[March 14, 2012], 684 PHIL 283-295)

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXPLAINED. — An original action for injunction is

outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however. Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original
jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court's jurisdiction to
grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to actions or proceedings pending before it, as Section 2 of
Rule 58 of the Rules clearly provides: SECTION 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. — A preliminary
injunction may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. . . . or in a petition
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus under Section 7 of Rule 65, thus: SECTION 7. Expediting
proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the
proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.||| (Allgemeine-Bau-
Chemie Phils., Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 159296, [February 10, 2006], 517
PHIL 451-458)

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-
equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: 22 no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. 23 The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein
has jurisdiction over bits judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its

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execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. 24 EHTCAa
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is
considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the
suit. 25 A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of
justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. 26 To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents
arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of
justice. 27
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in
issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation.
The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to
nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution,
under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, 34 speaks of and which this Court has operationalized
through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 35
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by
issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain 36 Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a
co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of
P2,726,189.90 from MSU's account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was
aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-
equal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSU's allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order. 37
The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of
the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of
execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Court's
deliberations, finds no application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third
person, other than the judgment obligor or his agent; 38 a third-party claimant of a property under
execution may file a claim with another court 39 which, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may
issue a temporary restraining order. In this case, the petition for injunction before the respondent
Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or
exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a
motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not from any
other court, 40 or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari. 41 In this case, MSU filed
the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek
recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.
||| (Cabili v. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, [September 6, 2011], 672 PHIL 398-418)
Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that
courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners' constitutionally protected right to health and
whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision on prior
consultation with the affected communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with
jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law
divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
||| (Hernandez v. National Power Corp., G.R. No. 145328, [March 23, 2006], 520 PHIL 38-58)

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Rule 59 (Receivership)
REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; RECEIVERSHIP; NATURE; RECEIVERSHIP COURT
HAS AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE REASONABLENESS OF EXPENDITURE. — A receiver is a
representative of the Court appointed for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property in
litigation and prevent its possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the
parties. The receiver is not the representative of any of the parties but of all of them to the end that their
interests may be equally protected with the least possible inconvenience and expense. It is inherent in the
office of a receiver not only that he should act at all times with the diligence and prudence of a good
father of a family but should also not incur any obligation or expenditure without leave of court to
supervise the receiver and see to it that he adheres to the above standard of his trust and limits the
expense of the receivership to the minimum. It is generally the receivership court that is in a better
position to determine whether a particular expenditure is reasonable and justified or not and its ruling
therein may not be disturbed by this Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLERICAL SERVICES EMPLOYED BY RECEIVER MUST BE WITH LEAVE OF
COURT FOR REIMBURSEMENT TO BE PROPER. — The receivership court's reasons for withholding
approval of the reimbursement in question are precisely because "whatever amount he (the receiver now
seeks in addition thereto (P10,000.00) would be improper. Moreover, he is now estopped from claiming
any further amount as compensation for alleged clerical services employed by him as such receiver
without prior approval or authority of this Court." We find these reasons to be cogent enough in the
premises, especially because appellant's alleged employment of a clerk was made without prior leave of
court. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the court a quo abused its discretion, much less
gravely.
||| (Normandy v. Duque, G.R. No. L-25407, [August 29, 1969], 139 PHIL 800-807)

Rule 60 (Replevin)
REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; REPLEVIN, CONSTRUED. — Replevin, broadly
understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action
itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by
another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the
pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and
generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a
mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam — in rem insofar as the recovery of specific
property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the
gist of the replevin action is the right ofthe plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by
reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein. Consequently, the person in
possession of the property sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only necessary party
defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the
property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the
immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a
clear title thereto, for seeking such interim possession.
||| (BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102998, [July 5, 1996], 327 PHIL 716-728)
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; REPLEVIN; MAY RESOLVE ISSUE ON OWNERSHIP; REASON. —
It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of possession.
Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of
possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant's plea and
by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the possession of
the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.
||| (Chiao Liong Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106251, [November 19, 1993])

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EMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; ACTION FOR REPLEVIN; CHATTEL

MORTGAGEE MAY MAINTAIN SUCH ACTION. — There can be no question that persons having a
special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgagee,
may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take
possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the
mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them. This is
irrespective of whether the mortgage contemplates a summary sale of property or foreclosure by
court action.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF MORTGAGEE TO MORTGAGED CHATTEL. — As early as the
case of Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Summers (42 Phil. 6), We explained that when the debtor defaults,
and the creditor desires to foreclose the mortgaged chattel, he must necessarily take the mortgaged
property in his hands, but when the debtor refuses to yield the possession of the property, the creditor
must institute an action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a
preliminary to the sale contemplated under Section 14 of Act No. 1508. The right of the mortgagee to
have possession of the mortgaged chattel after the condition of the mortgage is breached must be
therefore deemed to be well settled.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVITS; REQUIREMENTS. — All that is required by the affidavit
contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 60 is that upon applying for an order for replevin, the plaintiff must
show that he is "the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof"; that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant with an allegation on
the cause of detention; that the same has not been taken for any tax assessment or fine levied
pursuant to law nor seized under any execution, or an attachment against the property of such
plaintiff or if so seized that it is exempt from seizure. The affidavit must also state the actual value of
the property.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST FOR SUFFICIENCY THEREOF. — In determining the sufficiency of the
application for a writ of replevin, the allegations thereof and the recitals of the documents appended
thereto and made part thereof should be considered.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY THEREOF IN INSTANT CASE. — Where the petitioner has
alleged in the complaint for replevin that "it is also expressly agreed between the parties that in case
of default on the part of defendant, as mortgagor therein, the mortgaged motor vehicle shall be
delivered, on demands to plaintiff, as mortgagee therein, free of all charges, and should the
mortgagor not deliver the same as aforesaid the mortgagee is authorized to take possession of said
property wherever it may be found . . ." (par. 4); that defendant Taguba "failed and refused, as he fails
and refuses, in spite of repeated demands, to pay the plaintiff P81.49 of the said installment due 15
April 1969 and the thirteen (13) installments due 15 May 1969 thru 15 May 1970, thereby making the
balance of said note, the sum of P17,659.49, and interest from 19 June 1969 to become immediately
due, payable and defaulted" (par. 6), and that "the mortgaged motor vehicle is now in Rizal in the
possession of defendants who have no legal right to the possession thereof, plaintiff having made
demand for the delivery of the said motor vehicle pursuant to the terms of the chattel mortgage
notwithstanding which demand defendants have failed and refused to do so" (par. 7), and these
allegations of the complaint were by reference made part of J.M. Laureola's affidavit, it was error for
the court a quo to hold that petitioner has not sufficiently averred its right to the possession of the
property sought to be recovered.
||| (Northern Motors, Inc. v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-32674, [February 22, 1973], 151 PHIL 484-493)

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Rule 61 (Support Pendente Lite)

HUSBAND AND WIFE; SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE; ADULTERY AS A DEFENSE IN ACTION FOR
SUPPORT MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. — Adultery of the wife is a defense
in an action for support. However, the being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficiently to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other,
in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. More affidavits may satisfy the
court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough that the facts be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
||| (Reyes v. Ines-Luciano, G.R. No. L-48219, [February 28, 1979], 177 PHIL 742-757)

It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The
evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their
children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for
the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the
child.||| (Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, [March 18, 2004], 469 PHIL 852-868)

Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be
resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and
for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they
constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary
because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. 20 The subject
orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
Moreover, private respondent's obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the
assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the
proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested
for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente lite. 21 A few years later, private
respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same,
and in addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact underscores the provisional
character of the order granting supportpendente lite. Petitioner's theory that the assailed orders have
ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore
untenable. TCDH
||| (Calderon v. Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, [January 9, 2013], 701 PHIL 301-312)

Rule 62 (Interpleader)
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals
due to conflicting claims on the property. 38
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether
personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed
by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the
said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person
against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one
liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there
arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a

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case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not
a cross-complaint. 39
||| (Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, [April 6, 2005], 495 PHIL 55-69)

. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; INTERPLEADER; A REMEDY TO DETERMINE CONFLICTING CLAIMS

ON PROPERTY. — The actions of interpleader under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a
remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one
or other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double
vexation in respect of one liability.|||

PARTY WHO HAS SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED A RIGHT CANNOT BE LATTER IMPLEADED.

— A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and
compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a
collateral attack upon the judgment.||| (Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Won, G.R. No. L-
23851, [March 26, 1976], 162 PHIL 233-250)

Rule 63 (Declaratory Relief)

Petitioners' above posture is valid to a point. However, the execution of judgments in a petition for
declaratory relief is not necessarily indefensible. In Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation[PDIC] v.
Court of Appeals, 27 wherein the Court affirmed the order for the petitioners therein to pay the
balance of the deposit insurance to the therein respondents, we categorically ruled:
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that
proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract
subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from
an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 ofthe
Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is
such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil
actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the
peculiar rules governing special civil actions. 28 IHEaAc
Similarly, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur: 29 the Court
upheld the lower court's order for a party to refund the amounts paid by the adverse party under the
municipal ordinance therein questioned, stating:
. . . Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an
ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or
proper, if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violation of an . . .
ordinance, should take place." In the present case, no breach or violation of the
ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by
the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was
still proper because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still
remained to be resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary
suit for the recovery of taxes paid . . . In its petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-
appellee alleged that by reason of the enforcement of the municipal ordinance by
respondents it was forced to pay under protest the fees imposed pursuant to the said
ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that the
respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to respondent Municipal

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Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The inclusion ofsaid allegation and prayer
in the petition was not objected to by the respondents in their answer. During the trial,
evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was introduced. Respondents were
thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would happen if the
ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
||| (Department of Budget and Management v. Manila's Finest Retirees Association, Inc., G.R. No.
169466, [May 9, 2007], 551 PHIL 90-110)
In this case, the petitioners had stated in their petition that respondents assessed them
interest and penalties on their outstanding loans, initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner
Rafael Martelino as evidenced by the notice of extra-judicial sale 28 and threatened to foreclose the
mortgages of the other petitioners, all in disregard of their right to suspend payment to Shelter for its
failure to complete the subdivision. Said statements clearly mean one thing: petitioners had already
suspended paying their amortization payments. Unfortunately, their actual suspension of payments
defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their supposed right to
suspend payment, for their guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction over the
action for declaratory relief because its subject initially unspecified, now identified as P.D. No.
957 and relied upon — correctly or otherwise — by petitioners, and assumed by the RTC to be Rep.
Act No. 8501, was breached before filing the action. As we said in Tambunting, Jr. v.
Sumabat: 29 EaHDcS
. . . The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract,etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues
arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation
of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has
already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. . . . Under such circumstances,
inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party,
there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final
order. 30
Under the circumstances, may the Court nonetheless allow the conversion of the petition for
declaratory relief and prohibition into an ordinary action? We are constrained to say: no. Although
Section 6, Rule 63 might allow such course of action, the respondents did not argue the point, and we
note petitioners' failure to specify the ordinary action they desired. We also cannot reasonably
assume that they now seek annulment of the mortgages. Further, the records support the Court of
Appeals' finding that this issue was not raised before the RTC. 31
||| (Martelino v. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 160208, [June 30, 2008],
579 PHIL 145-162)

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BONUS

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