REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

MERLYN MERCADERA
G.R. No. 186027, December 8, 2010

FACTS: On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly
constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it
appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048.

Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general is now authorized to effect
the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil
registry entries. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the
correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped
with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their
office as mandated by R.A. No. 9048."

Mercadera then filed a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live
Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). Upon receipt of the
petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order, dated June 10, 2005, for the hearing of said
petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
assist in the case. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the testimony of Oga and several
photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera
never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions.

In its September 28, 2005 Decision, the RTC granted the petition and ruled that the documentary
evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition.
Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the
discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified.

The OSG timely appealed praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. For the
OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name "is in truth a material correction as it
would modify or increase substantive rights", which would have been proper had she filed a petition
under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.

The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, the appellate court affirmed the
questioned RTC order.

On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) filed its Comment on July 3, 2009.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER RULE 103.

HELD: Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or
both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent
special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that
is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. Essentially, a change of name
does not define or effect a change of one’s existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing
therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.

Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to
"acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," also as enumerated in
Article 408 of the same law.
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a
correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which
entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that
requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.

A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law, there
must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be
prejudiced by the use of his official name. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the
enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently
misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name
are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply
sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition,
Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given
name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to,
"MERLYN." The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember.

Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The
publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices
sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding.
Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte
when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were procedurally defective. Wherefore, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF ANTONINA B. OSHITA.

ANTONINA B. OSHITA,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. L-21180 March 31, 1967

“The above grounds are not exclusive. The matter of whether to grant a petition for change of name is left to the
sound discretion of the court. The petition should be granted where there is proper and reasonable cause and where
there is no showing that the petition was motivated by fraudulent intent or that the change of surname will prejudice
public interest.”

Facts:

On February 15, 1962, Antonina B. Oshita filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a petition to have her name
changed from "Antonina B. Oshita" to "Antonina Bartolome". The petition was signed by the petitioner herself and
was "subscribed and sworn to" by her before the Deputy Clerk of Court. The requirements for the publication of the
hearing of the petition were duly complied with. Asst. City Attorney Roque M. Barnes, acting in behalf of the Solicitor
General, filed a motion to dismiss the petition upon the grounds (1) of lack of jurisdiction, in that although the petition
was subscribed and sworn to by petitioner, it was not verified in accordance with the provisions of Section 6, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court; and (2) that the petition does not state a cause of action. The petitioner-appellee filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for hearing.

Issue:

(1) that the lower court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because the petition was not verified as
required by Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and

(2) that no sufficient reason had been shown to justify the change of the surname of the appellee.

Held:

This appeal has no merit. It is admitted that the petition is not verified in the manner as prescribed in Section 6 of
Rule 15 of the old Rules of Court (now Section 6 of Rule 7 of the new Rules of Court), because what appears is a
simple jurat by the Deputy Clerk of Court that the petitioner had subscribed and sworn to, the petition, before him.
While it is true that under Section 2, Rule 103, it is required that the petition for change of name be verified,
nevertheless, no provision exists in the rules which declares that such a requirement regarding verification is
jurisdictional. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply intended to secure an assurance that
what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply
a condition affecting the form of pleading,1the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. The court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking, or act on the pleading
although it is not verified if the attending circumstances are such that the strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice or the law may thereby be served. This view finds support in the ruling
laid down by this Court in several decisions.

In the case of The Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Macadaeg, et al., L-14174, October 31, 1960, the petition for
certiorari was attacked as fatally defective because it was not verified as required by the provision of Section 1 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court (now Section 1, Rule 65 of the new Rules of Court). In resolving this question, this
Court held:

First, respondents claim that the petition, not being verified, is fatally defective. We do not think so. It is true
that Rule 67, sec. 1, of the Rules of Court, require that the petition for certiorari be verified, the apparent
object thereof being to insure good faith in the averments of the petition. Where, however, the material facts
alleged are a matter of record in the court below, consisting in pleadings filed or proceedings taken therein,
and the questions raised are mainly of law, a verification as to the truth of said facts is not an absolute
necessity and may be waived (42 Am. Jur., sec. 42, p. 177), as this Court has done in this case when we
gave due course to the present petition. In fact, many authorities consider the absence of verification a mere
formal, not jurisdictional, defect, the absence of which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and
act in the case (71 C.J.S., 744-745). (Emphasis supplied).
Likewise, in the case of Tavera vs. El Hogar Filipino, Inc., et al., 98 Phil. 481, this Court held that "lack of verification
of a petition filed in a probate court for the sale of real property belonging to the estate of a minor is not a jurisdictional
defect."2In a land registration case, notwithstanding the provision of Section 34, Act 496, which requires that
opposition to an application for registration of land should be sworn to by oppositor, this Court held that an "unverified
opposition is sufficient to confer standing in court to oppositors." 3

In the light of the rulings laid down by this Court in the decisions afore-cited, it is clear that verification is not a
jurisdictional, but a formal, requisite. While the petition now before Us was not verified, it was, however, subscribed
and sworn to by the petitioner, and We believe that the lower court did not commit a reversible error when it denied
the motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court was not affected
by the absence of the proper verification of the petition. It may be stated here, though, that the lower court should
have required appellee to have her petition verified before setting the case for hearing, in order to have the petition
conform with the rule.1äwphï1.ñët

The appellant also contends that no sufficient reasons had been shown to justify the grant by the lower court of the
petition for a change of name. The appellant urges that under Article 364 of the Civil Code legitimate children shall
principally use the surname of the father. This provision, however, is not absolute because under Article 264 of the
same Code, it is provided that legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the father and of the mother.
Hence, if there is sufficient reason, the change of a child's surname from that of the father, to that of the mother, may
be authorized by the court.

In the instant case, it has been shown that the petitioner-appellee is the legitimate daughter of Buena Bartolome and
HishimatsuOshita; that upon reaching the age of majority she elected Philippine citizenship and took her oath of
allegiance; that being already a Filipino citizen she desires to adopt a Filipino surname; that her older brother and
sister who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using the surname "Bartolome"; and that she desires to
have the surname "Bartolome" instead of "Oshita", because she felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing
Japanese surname. The lower court further observed that "It cannot be denied that there had been ill feeling among
the Filipinos against the Japanese due to the last Pacific war. Although normal relations between the Philippines and
Japan have been established the ill feelings still persist among some Filipinos especially among the less educated
who had unpleasant experience during the war." There is no showing that the appellee was motivated by any
fraudulent purpose, or that the change of her surname will prejudice public interest. We believe that the lower court
acted correctly when it considered these circumstances as reasons sufficient to justify the change of name as prayed
for by the petitioner-appellee.

Moreover, the matter of whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The following, ruling of this Court is relevant:

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of "proper and reasonable cause" is left to
the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the Court and not all
the best evidence available.
In the present case the trial court found to its satisfaction that petitioner was in earnest in his desire to do away with
all traces of his former Chinese nationality and henceforth to be recognized as a Filipino. Such desire is in line with
the policy of our naturalization law that applicants for naturalization should fully embrace Filipino customs and
traditions and socially mingle with Filipinos.

[G.R. No. L-31563. November 29, 1971.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu and LUA ONG representing the minor BABY ONG, alias LUA AN
JOK, Respondents.

Facts:

On June 11, 1968 Lua Ong (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), father of the then minor Baby Ong,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, with Judge Santiago O. Tañada (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent judge) presiding, a petition for change of the name of his son Baby Ong to Lua An Jok. On June
25, 1968 the court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on November 23, 1968 and directing the
publication of the said order in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in Cebu City and in
the province of Cebu, once a week for three consecutive weeks.

On the day of the hearing, because no one, not even the provincial fiscal in representation of the Solicitor
General, appeared to interpose any objection to the petition, the respondent judge referred the case to his
deputy clerk of court, requiring him to submit a report on the evidence adduced.

On November 26, 1968 the respondent judge issued an order granting the petition, authorizing Baby Ong to
use the name An Joc Lua 1 and directing the local civil registrar of Cebu City to cause the proper entry to be
made. On March 5, 1969 the assistant provincial fiscal, on behalf of the Government of the Republic,
interposed an appeal to this Court. By resolution dated February 2, 1970, we required the oppositor-
appellant to file a petition for review on certiorari instead of submitting copies of the record on appeal, as
the appeal raises only questions of law. On March 12, 1970 the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
Government of the Republic (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.

Issue:

1. Whether or not publication of the order reciting the purpose of petition and setting the date and
place of the hearing thereof is necessary in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction in an action for
change of name.
2. What are the compelling reasons to justify grand of petition for change of name.

Held:

1. Yes.

An action for change of name constitutes a judicial proceeding in rem, and a court acquires
jurisdiction to hear and determine the corresponding petition only after publication of the order
reciting the purpose of the petition and setting the date and place for the hearing thereof at least
once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Such publication,
however, to be valid and effective, should contain the correct information as to (1) the name or
names of the applicant, (2) the cause for the change of name, and (3) the new name sought.
Moreover, the title of the petition should include (1) the applicant’s real name and (2) his aliases or
other names, if any. The title should also recite the name sought to be adopted. All these,
notwithstanding that the body of the petition or of the order includes all the information
aforementioned.
 2. To justify a change of name there must existing a proper and reasonable cause or compelling
reason. The following have been held to constitute proper and reasonable causes or compelling
reasons. (1) a ridiculous name, a name tainted with dishonor, or a name extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; (2) a change in civil status; and (3) need to avoid confusion.

In Re: Petition of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang

Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and
Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s
name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was
born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his
middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian
may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it
cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he
reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name,
added the RTC.

Issues:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an
illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father
in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as
his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification,
and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from
his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand
and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30
2005, 454 SCRA 2155).

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for review on certiorari

Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on
the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil
Registry Office and was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any
response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi.
Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Decision: The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse.
Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to
alien’s national law.

The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of divorce on
the petitioner and respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said
decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition
is void.

The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court ordered
t6he remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the ruling.

REPUBLIC vs COSETENG-MAGPAYO Case Digest

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO
(A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG)

G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011

FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who,
as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN
RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO
TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office
stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.”
Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he
carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as
his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of
Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein
compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper
Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-
20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial
court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte

By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil
Registrar ofMakati City to:

1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF
PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to
"COSETENG";

3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and

4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]…
(emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to
the Court on pure question of law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should
be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
2. Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of
the name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate.
HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic)

1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

*** Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the
Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since
childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought
to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the
Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of
confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent
denies his legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation
to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not
suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."

******** Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule
108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)

2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil
registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case,
and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made
parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth
certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by
respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother
were made parties thereto.

Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct.

Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties
as respondents in the case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil
registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or
claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby."

Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is
that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that
given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the
above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which
provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition
(15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment
on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been
impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA,

G.R. No. 186053November 15, 2010

Facts:
Nisaida was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother
Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina. Her father later died and so her mother married
another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.As they could not find any record of her birth at the
Malolos civil registry, respondent’s mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under
the surname of her mother’s second husband, “Hakamada.” Later on, it surfaced that her birth
was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name
“NisaidaSumeraNishina”. Hence, she filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a verified
petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos,
Bulacan, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 106-M-2007. After hearing the petition, RTC
granted respondent’s petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos “to cancel the
second birth record of NisaidaSumeraHakamada issued in 1993 and to change particularly the
surname of respondent from Nishina to Watanabe.A copy of the Order was received on by the
OSG which filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal. Before the Court of Appeals,
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of
appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue:
WON filing of a record on appeal is necessary in this case.

Held:
No. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or
judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. It contemplates
multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal – in addition to
the notice of appeal – is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain
with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.In the present case, the filing of a
record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined
by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation
of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City

Principle:

In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo SicadBraza, Jr., also known as PablitoSicadBraza, were
marriedon January 4, 1978..Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. During the wake
following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her co-
respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza as her and Pablo's son.

Ma. Cristina file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a
petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. Contending thatPatrick could not
have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on
account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for
(1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and
his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza";
2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick to submit Parick to
DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and
3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose,
the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

Patricks filed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry,
the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test,
hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue:

Whether or not thecourt a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action
to correct entries in the civil registrar?

Ruling:

No, the petition fails.

In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the
civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with
which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR | G.R. No. 189538 | February 10,
2014

DOCTRINE:Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage. What the respondent
sought is the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which
is the marriage certificate was a forgery. In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did notdeclare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.

FACTS:

 Olaybarrequested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR).
She then discovered that she was already married to Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24,
2002.
 Olaybardenied having contracted the marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband. Moreover, she averred that she did not appear before the solemnizing officer, that the
signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.
 Shefiled a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the
wife portion.Olaybarimpleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband,
as parties to the case.
 During trial, Olaybar testified on her own behalf. Further, Olaybar presented Natinga as witness, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not Olaybar.
A document examiner also testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was
not that of Olaybar, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and
rectify the terrible mistake.
 The petitioner opposed and moved for reconsideration, contending that: (1) there was no clerical
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the
wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
 The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity
was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible
for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void
marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Is the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding? – NO

RULING:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of
a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

In Republic v. Valencia, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is undisputed that the
procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was
likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in
the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the
court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several
documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the
trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from
respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. The court thus
made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and,
therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage
was celebrated.

While the Court maintains that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, it held
that it cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence
of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Olaybarsought, not the nullification of marriage
as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth
as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM

G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007 [Change of name or sex]

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have his first name
changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his petition. CA, however,
upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court decision, holding that
there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the intervention of
sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with
Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as
clerical or typographical errors are involved.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this petition filed by
Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major changes in statutes
that underscore the public policy in relation to women.

You are here: Home ∼ 2013 ∼ August ∼ Case Digest: Republic of the Philippines v.
Cagandahan

CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES V. CAGANDAHAN
Published by paul on August 12, 2013 | Leave a response

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from
Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It
appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital AdrenalHyperplasia
which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male
and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up
with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in
court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally,
thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.”
The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the
fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by
the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme
Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons and the consequences that will follow.

Silverio vs. Republic Republic vs. Cagandahan

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The
Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground
of Sex Reassignment
Respondent undisputedly has CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA (CAH). This
condition causes the early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics. A person,
like respondent, with this condition produces
too much androgen, a male hormone. A
newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled
with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris
with the urethral opening at the base, an
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more
male than female; (2) normal internal
structures of the female reproductive tract such
as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as
the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice,
facial hair, and failure to menstruate at
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children
are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that
involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the
term intersexuality to apply to human beings
who cannot be classified as either male or
female.[22] The term is now of widespread
use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is
the state of a living thing of
a gonochoristicspecies whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither
exclusively male nor female. An organism
with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different
ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been

The status of a person in law includes all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married
or not. The comprehensive term status…
include such matters as the beginning and end
of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various
aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession. (emphasis
supplied)
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate
As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The Court recognizes that there are people
whose preferences and orientation do not fit
neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at
expected to conform to either a male or female
gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern
medical science in Western societies,
some intersex people with ambiguous external
genitalia have had their genitalia surgically
modified to resemble either male or female
genitals.[24] More commonly,
an intersex individual is considered as
suffering from a disorder which is almost
always recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in
order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or
female.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with
a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondents body
system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent
has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases
of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its
course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born
with. And accordingly, he has already ordered
least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like
taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body
into the categorical mold of a female but he did
not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead
taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics.