RULE 131, SECTION 3, PAR.

FF – “That the law has been obeyed”

CASE TITLE: THE MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

GR No. 42317. September 21, 1934

SYNOPSIS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by the Manila Electric Company
against the Public Service Commission praying that its order that the former
desist from enforcing its regulation be declared null and void. The Court ruled
in favor of Manila Electronic Company since there is a presumption that the
law has been obeyed when Public Service Commission failed to prove that the
said regulation is in violation of section 16 (c) of Act 3108.

FACTS:
Manila Electric Company is enforcing a measure or regulation wherein a
customer who does not have any outstanding sufficient deposit with the
company to guarantee his account for electric service and who is disconnected
for non-payment of bills, shall not be reconnected unless the bills in arrears are
paid and a deposit to guarantee future accounts is made. The deposit shall be
equal to the amount of the approximate consumption for two months. It shall
bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent a year, and shall be refunded at the end of
one (1) year, if the customer has promptly paid all electric bills rendered during
that period.
However, Public Service Commission sent a letter to Manila Electric
Company ordering the latter to desist from enforcing the said measure or
regulation because it is contrary to the provision of section 16 (c) of Act 3108.
It is also stated in the letter that “the burden of proof shall be upon you
(Manila Electric Company) to show that such regulation, practice, or
measurement is not unjust, unreasonable, unduly preferential, arbitrarily or
unjustly discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of law.”
Hence this petition for certiorari filed by the Manila Electric Company
against the Public Service Commission praying that judgment be rendered
declaring null and void said commission's order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a presumption that the measures or rules
adopted by public service companies are unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary.
HELD:
No. Nothing in the provision of section 16 (c) of Act 3108, otherwise
known as the Publie Service Law, or in any other provision thereof establishes
or discloses the presumption that the measures or regulations adopted by
public service companies are unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary. Section 334,
No. 31, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes the disputable presumption
that "the law has been obeyed". If compliance with the law is presumed, it
should be presumed that the petitioner Manila Electric Company has complied
with the prohibition contained in section 16, subsection (c), of Act No. 3108,
not to adopt any unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary measure or regulation, and
that the measure or regulation which was adopted by it and of which it gave
notice to the Public Service Commission, is just and reasonable. Inasmuch as
this presumption exists in favor of the petitioner, the burden of proof rests
with the person claiming that said measure or regulation is unjust, unreasonable
or arbitrary, to show that his allegation is true.
Therefore, in requiring the petitioner Manila Electric Company to show
that the measure or regulation which it attempts to enforce is just and
reasonable, the Public Service Commission violates one of the rules of
procedural law.

[in favor of Petitioner]

CASE TITLE:
SANTOS-YLLANA REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
RICARDO DEANG and FLORENTINA DEANG, respondents.
G.R. No. 190043. June 21, 2017.

SYNOPSIS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse and set the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of
the RTC and finding petitioner Santos-Yllana Realty Corporation liable for
damages to the respondents spouses Ricardo Deang and Florentina Deang.
The Court rendered a judgment favoring the petitioner by ruling when the
petitioner moved for the Writ of Execution such enjoys the disputable
presumption under Sec. 3(ff), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence that
the law has been obeyed.

FACTS:
 Florentina Deang (Florentina), doing business under the name and style
of “Rommel Dry Goods,” is a former lessee of Stall No. H-6 at Santos-Yllana
Shopping Center, which is located on Miranda Street, Angeles City, Pampanga,
and owned and operated by petitioner since 1975.
Due to Florentina’s failure to pay her rents and other charges due on the
rented stall, petitioner filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Damages against
respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Angeles City. The
MTC rendered a Decision based on a Compromise Agreement that the parties
executed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution due to Florentina’s failure to
comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement. Respondents objected,
alleging that the amount due to petitioner had already been paid in full. But
Angeles City MTC issued an order granting the issuance of the Writ of
Execution, and the same was accordingly issued.
Respondents moved to quash the Writ of Execution but Sheriff Sicat of
the RTC of Angeles City implemented the Writ of Execution and padlocked
respondents’ stall. The stall, however, was ordered reopened by the MTC
within the same day due to the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration.
During the hearings on the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents
reiterated their claim that they had already paid the rental arrearages and other
fees and charges due to petitioner; hence, the Motion for Execution should be
rendered moot and academic.
However, Angeles MTC issued an Order upholding the Writ of
Execution and commanding the sheriff to immediately implement the same.
Consequently, Sheriff Pangan, implemented the writ and padlocked
respondents’ stall
Aggrieved by the implementation of the Writ of Execution, respondents
filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Injunctive Relief against
petitioner and Sheriffs Sicat and Pangan before the Manila RTC, alleging that
the Writ of Execution was illegally implemented. The trial court observed that
the undue haste by which the Angeles MTC issued the Writ of Execution
violated respondents’ right to due process and to question the propriety of the
issuance of the Writ. Consequently, it held that the enforcement of the Writ
was tainted with malice and bad faith on the part of petitioner. The trial court
held the petitioner as well as Sheriffs Sicat and Pangan, jointly and severally
liable for the damages being claimed.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the ruling on appeal. But the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petitioner must be held jointly and severally liable
with the Sheriff when it moved for the Writ of Execution before the MTC.

HELD:
No. Petitioner clearly elected to exercise its right to move for the
execution of the MTC’s Decision pursuant to Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. The rule allows for the immediate execution of judgment in the event
that judgment is rendered against the defendant in an unlawful detainer or
forcible entry case, provided that certain conditions are met; thus, its move to
execute the MTC judgment enjoys the disputable presumption under Sec. 3(ff),
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence that it obeyed the applicable law
and rules in doing so.
A reading of the RTC’s judgment shows that it was not conclusively
proved that petitioner committed bad faith or connived with the sheriffs in the
implementation of the Writ. Moreover, no less than the CA, in the body of its
Decision, absolved petitioner from any fault and participation in the injury
inflicted upon respondents by reason of the haphazard implementation of the
Writ of Execution.

[in favor of the defendant]

CASE TITLE:
FRANCISCA H. RAFOLS, FLORACION RAFOLS, AMPARO RAFOLS,
CESAR CIMAFRANCA, CRISOSTOMO RAFOLS and RICARDO
RAFOLS, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARCELO A. BARBA, defendant-appellee.

GR No. L-28446. December 13, 1982.

SYNOPSIS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
ruling against the plaintiff that their cause of action has already prescribed. The
Supreme Court ruled that it is appropriate to apply the presumptions that the
law had been obeyed when the plaintiffs failed to prove that they were not
given notice.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellants Rafols are the wife and the four (4) children of
Nicolas Rafols, a resident of Cebu City, who died testate. His estate was the
subject of administration in Sp. Proc. No. 154-R of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, entitled “Testate Estate of Nicolas Rafols” in which a certain Vital T.
Montayre, now deceased, was appointed administrator.
 Montayre, thru counsel, sought authority from the probate Court to sell
a parcel of land belonging to the estate in order to pay taxes, expenses of
administration and other indebtedness of the estate. The said motion was
granted. The land authorized to be sold was a parcel of cogon land with an area
of approximately 100 hectares situated in Barrio Bunga, Toledo City.
A certain Marcelo A. Barba purchased the land for the stated and a deed
of sale was executed in his favor by administrator Montayre which was later on
approved by Judge Juan L. Bocar who manifested such approval on the face of
the deed of sale.
More than fifteen (15) years after the execution of the deed of sale in
favor of Barba, Rafols instituted the declaration of the nullity of the said deed
of sale against Barba before the CFI of Cebu on the ground that they are not
notified of the hearing for the application to sell such land nor the approval of
such sale. In Rafols’ answer, it was alleged that he bought the land in good
faith, that Rafols is in estoppel, and that the action had already prescribed.
The CFI held that the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations thus it has already prescribed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI correctly ruled that the action has already
prescribed.

HELD:
Yes. While it is true that it is true that when an application is made by an
administrator to sell real property of the estate for the payment of debts,
expenses and other obligations of the estate, an application must be filed with
the probate court which may grant the same on written notice to the heirs,
devisees and legatees. (Section 2, Rule 89, Rules of Court, formerly Section 2,
Rule 90, of the old Rules of Court which was the rule in force at the time of the
transaction herein involved.) It is also the rule that a sale of property of the
estate without such notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees is void.
However there is no clear showing that the authority granted by the
probate court to sell the parcel of land in question was without written notice
to the heirs, devisees and legatees. Plaintiffs-appellants offered no proof as to
such alleged lack of notice. They rely solely on Exhibits “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”
and “D-1” which were presented not by them but by defendant-appellee during
the hearing of the motion to dismiss to support such contention. Exhibit “A”
is the motion of Atty. Emilio Lumontad, counsel for the administrator, praying
that the administrator be authorized to sell the land in question. Exhibit “B” is
the order of Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg granting said authority for the purpose
of meeting the obligations of the estate. Exhibit “C” is another motion of Atty.
Lumontad praying that the sale in favor of defendant-appellee be approved.
Exhibit “D” is the deed of sale and Exhibit “D-1” is the approval of said sale
indicated by Judge Juan L. Bocar on page 2 thereof. Plaintiffs-appellants
capitalize the fact that in none of said documents or papers does it appear that
they were served or given notice of the same.
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstance pointed out by
plaintiffs-appellants does not suffice to annul the sale in question. The lack of
any indication on the documents mentioned that they were served with copies
of the same does not necessarily mean that they had no notice thereof. In the
absence of a positive showing that the requirements for securing the authority
to sell had not been complied with, it is appropriate to apply the presumptions
that the law had been obeyed; that official duty has been regularly performed;
and that private transactions had been fair and regular. (Sec. 5, pars, m, p and
ff, Rule 131, Rules of Court.)