Frontier of Faith

A History ofReligious Mobilisation in the

Pakhtun Tribal Areas c. 1890-1950

SANA HAROON

OXFORD
VNlVF.R lTV PR.h S
 OXFORD
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 CONTENTS

Maps and Figura ix

Adn(J'fl)/dg~mmts xi
.Ahbrroilltions XJV

Not~ on translituation xv

Introduction 1

1. Ethnography, Cartography and the Construction

of the North-West Frontier Tribal Areas 6
Encountmng the triht: ethnographu undmtanding of
the PaVJtun north-wtJt 9
Ctmstntcttng thefrontier 12
Delimitation ofthe Durand Lint and th~ uparalion ofthe
Brituh-sitk trihe'ftom Afghanistan 14
T1x creation ofthe Tribal Areas 21
ColonUll ethnography 25
An inadWTtmt arma-Yaghistan, 'land ofthefru' 29

2. hlamic Revivalism and Sufism among the Tribal Pakhtuns 31

Discourses ofauthmtidty: the tazJ.irah and the Sufi silsrla 32
Pin and Sufis among the Palthtuns up to the ninttunth untury 34
Tht prrimundi line ofAkhund Abdul Ghajfor: rnstitution
and ideology 40
The Hadda Mulla Najmuddin 43
Hap Turangzar and tht perpetuation ofthe lladda Mulla's line 52
Amr-!Jil maruf- mo!Jilising the rf'Jiwzlist agmda 55
The Hadda Mulla's line in the Trihal Areas 60
viii C011:TE'I;TS

3. Religious Authority and the Pakhtun Clans 63

The mullas' authority and ~illage-/)(md rtligrous pracliu 67
The mullas and tribal inltr-relations 73
Unanimity among the mulltJJ 77
The militariJation ofrtligious authority 82 ~1APS AND FIGURES
4. Patrons of the Saints g

Darul Ulum Deohand and the Tnhal AretJJ ss Maps

Nationalist Afghanistan and the Trihal ArttJJ mullas 100 The Indian North-We:.t Frontier c. 1900 xvi
Amanullah's policies after the Wars lOS The Tribal Areas c. 1930 xvii
The revolts of1924 and 1928 and the utility of Major rribal groups, roads and railways c. 1930 xviii
Ammwl/ah's patronage 113
figures
5. Consolidating Autonomy 1923-1930 120 1 Dominant mullas among the eastern Pakhruns during
The Wazirista11 and Khyber rtsistanm 120 the late nineteenth and early twentieth cenrury 44
The valorisatio11 ofAjab Khan Afridi 126 2. Mullas of the Akhund Ghaffur-1 Iadda
The Mohmand hlodt.ade 1926 7 131 Mulla line in the twentieth century 51
Contarmng the Malakand states 138 Shajarah of the Fazal Wahid llaji Turang-za• engraved
Mulla Mahmud Althunzada and tht Shias ofOrakz.ai 142 m marble. The plaque is displayed at the ite of the
Haji's masjid in Ghaziabad, Mohmand Agent.}' 54
6. Confronting the Nat1on, 1930-1950 147 4. The spiritual genealogy of the Tribal Areas mullas 56
5. Muhammad Ali Kasuri's Naqsha-yi Yaghistan 94
.Administered dutmts politics and the Afruii mobilisation of1930 147
Th, Faqiroflpi ISS
Tht War and the nrw politics ofpartition 162
Kashmir and thefirstlndo-Paltistan War 169
The PaVltunistiln mMJtment 175
An autonomous national.frontier 183

Epilogue-hlamist and the Utility of Autonomous Space:

From the Afghan jihad to AJ-~eda 186

Glossary 204
Bihliogr.lphy 208
Index 231
 ACKNOVvLEDGEME 'T

I ha\·e accumulated many debts of gratitude while working on thi~

srudy. Fmt, this research would not have been possible without a
Research Student Fellowship and a fieldwork grant to consult the
archives in Pe:.hawar and Islamabad in 2001, both granted by the
School of Oriental and African Stt~dies, and a fcllow:.hip grant
from the l <;Obcl Thomley bequest, granted through the Institute of
Historical Research, in 2003. A post-doctoral fellow hip grant from
the Past and Present Society in 2004 made rcvi 1on and completion
of the manuscript possible.
My greatest mtellectual and per onal debt JS to Dr Avril Powell.
Her advice and caution regarding source material and htstorical
them~ and her unfailing attention to detatl corrected the coW"e
that this study would take early on. Profe)~or Peter Robb at SOAS,
Dr i\lukulika Banerjee at UCL, Dr Sarah Ansari at Royall Iolloway
College, Professor Barbara Metcalf at Univcr!>it} of Caltfornia,
Dni Dr Ale.x M cKay at the WeUcome Trust, Dr Robert Nichols
at th Uruversil) of Pennsylvania, Professor Andrew Porter .lt Kings
College London, Professor Peter Man.hall, and Dr Faisal Devji at
the ~ew School have provided valuable comment and sugge tions,
both in semmars and in conve~ation.
My thanks to Dr Andrew Cook, curator of maps at the British
Libraryforhisgenerositywith his time and his thoughts in tntroducing
me to the map collection and cons1dering way~> to under tand and
'read' ther-e documents, and to Dr ebastian Ballard who drew the
map for this book. Also, many thanks to Leena Mitford for her help
v.ith the Urdu collection, and to the rest of the staff at the Oriental
and India Office Collection for their help and for making the working
cby there~ much more pleasant. In addition, z.1hra Re-u at UCL
provided \':l!uable help in translating some key Oari document .
 xii ACK:-.10\VLEDCE.\IE:'\TS ACK~OWLEDG E~tf:NTS xiii

In Pe:.hawar, HumairJ and Mustafa Kasuri, and Khahda and whose opinion and advice I have solicited every day and who made it
Gohar Zaman h.1ve my deepe t gratitude for taking me in and possible for me to sustain the energy and momentum it ha nken to
making my research there possible. Zahuullah Khan Salub and write this. This book is dedicated to him and to our rwo son' R.v..t
Bhatti Sah1b at the Peshawar Archives, ~lr Arnjad Khan at the FC and Rafay.
headquarter; m Shabqadar, Profe c:or Obaidur Rahman at Pel>hawar
Univecity, Salimullah Khan Sahib at the l'\arional Documentation
Centre, lslanubad, and Wiqar Ali Shah Sarub at Q!:ud-e-Au.m
University rendered valuable assistance in tracing archival ource
and pen;onal coUecr10ns. Abubakar Siddique proved a good friend
and ally in Peshawar and his journalistic writings on the Tribal Area
put forward an important view about the region, its politics and it
future. J lc introduced me to Agha Sahib Ghularn Nabi Chaknawan
and my time spent with the latter hearing about his experiences and
with his wonderful and affectionate family were the best part of In)
time spent in Peshawar.
The readings and responses of three people have been particularly
important in the years over whkh I developed this study from a
doctoral dissertation into a book. Professor Francis Robinson at
Royal J IoUoway commented on the place of revivalism in the "'ider
world oflndian I lam Professor Ian Talbot suggested ways in which
a project of . ignificancc could emerge from the details of frontier
history. Finally Dr Davtd Page, as a reader for Hurst and Co..
sent me a thorough and generous set of comments, questions and
ugge tions from which the book took on its current form and scope.
I have benefitted enormously from their methodological critique:.
and their cxpeni~e in the field of modem South futan Islamic
history In addition I would like to thank Michael Dwyer and the
late Chri!>topher riurst for their editorial support and feedback. An)
errol"> of fact or omi~ ion are mine alone.
Thank you ro my family and friends whose love, confidence and
support has gotten me through these last few years, particular!)
to Aass1a, Saad and Nida, whose friendship, criticism and love 1~
unrestrained, to Silvat and Rizvan Ali and Arnna and Change-z for
their ~upport and a.fiection; and to Nadia, Lynn, Ahmed, Misbah,
Ob.ud andYu~meen for humouring me through years of being 'alrno t
done'. i\lv greate'>t debt is to my parents Tahirah and Mohammad
I Jaroon and to Zulfi, who has stood behind me every step of the way,

--
\
~
 ABBREVIATIONS NOTE 0 TRANSLITERATION

AINC All India Nattonal Congre s Transliteration has been according ro the rules laid down in the
BAR Border Administration Report Library of Congress romanisation tables with some changes. The
BL British Library 'denoting the ayn has been omitted where tt occurs in the middle of
cc Chief Commissioner a word, as in the case ofjamaat, but retained where it occur~ at the
DC Deputy Commissioner beginning of a word, as in 'u/omo. All other diacritical mark!t have
DCOP Deputy Commissioner's Office Peshawar been omitted. With the exception of a few words, notably 'u/oma
DOFCS District Officer Frontier Constabulary Shabqadar and huzurgan, plural forms are indicated by addtng s to the singular
DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of the word, as in fotwas rather than fotawa. In the case of some
lSI Inter crvices Intelligence Arabic words adopted into Urdu, 1 have used the tandard Arabic
JP Jinnah Papers traruliteration, as with shari'o, hadith and madrasa.
JUH JamiyaruJ Ularna-yi Hind
JUI JamiyaruJ Ulama-yi Islam
JUS JamiyaruJ Ulama ·yi Sarhad
l\1MA ~1unahida Majlis-i Amal
MPD ~1ohmand Political Diary
NAI National Arcluves Islamabad
NDC National Documentation Centre (Islamabad)
NWFP North We t Frontier Province
NWFPIBD "'lorth We t Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau
Diary
NWFPPD North West Frontier Province Provincial Diary
NWFPPA North-We t Frontier Province Provincial Archi'"es
OIOC Oriental and India Office Collection
PA Pohtical Agent
PO Polincal Officer
PDPA People' Democratic Parry of Afghanistan
RBC Rare Book:. CoUectton
SCNAJ Shrudai Collection, National Archives I lamabad
SRPORC .ufur Rahman Papers, Obaidur Rahman Collection
TNSM Tehnk i Nifaz 1 Shariat-i Muhammadi
 /

• 2S

------
AFGHANISTAN

N 0 A

l. The lndtan ",.,on h· \Vesr Frontier c 1900

INDIA

2. The Tribal Ateu c. 1930

 " .
(~
'
0

- AFGHANISTAN
\
<'•.
~
Th~
INTRODL'CTIO~

area now known as the Federallv Admini rered Tribal Arc.':l~

(FATAl adjoining the Kh)bCr Pakhrunkhwa province of modern 9

day Pakistan has been the scene for a ~cries of armed mobilhation~
led by religious leaders. This study is an examination of rcligiou)
organisation and mobilisation in the 'Tribal Areas' with an Jtttrnpt to
analy-;e the...e in the contexl: of the ambiguous administr.ltlvc st.uus of
the region. Designated both as a strategic zone of defen'"e for Brithh
India, and as inhabited by a 'tribal' popul.ttion which wuld nor be
readily incorporated into' ertled' society, the region was denied access
to the judicial, legislative and civic in:.tirutions ofgre.ltcr British India.
Isolation of the Pakhrun 'tribal' belt from ~olonLtl India impacted the
~owth, influence and rhetoric of a fraternity of Pakhrun religious
KHOST leader or 'mullm'. Dominant in the area!t of Swat, l\1ohmand,
Bajal.r, Khyber, and Kurram, with link.~ to the mor<. southerly areas
of North and South \Vaziristan, members of this religious fraternity
intermittently led upri ings against lhe colonial :.rate Some of these
mobilisations were coordinated and ideologi<:ally motiv-.\ted, others
were isolated and based in clan politics.
Idenri~ing the structures of and tracing the histc>rk intersections
of these two 'land~capes'-the geographic and religious-I will follow
the ways in which nationalist actors tn Afgh.tnist;tn and British lm!.a
engaged the discourse of the frontier and drew the Pakhtun mul/or
an to their national project:.. Mutually corn mined to the notion of the
'frontier' as an administratively isolated region, all three groups relied
IN D lA on the concept of cultural, soc1al and politic.tl ~egregation of the
frontier Pakhruns. Considering the hi~tory of religious mobilisation
3 Major tribal group , ro;ads and railwa) in the Pakhrun nonh-wcst with particular reference to it!> unusual
administrative ~iruation distances it from dchates about cultural
prcdi po ition and fanatici"m and instead draw:. our focus to the
 2 FR0:-.1 rtER 0 1-' FAITH
way:. in which I.lamht mobilic;ation in this region was re pondmg to
geographic and nationali t di. courses rather than creating them.
Stn1cturf oftht study
This study is organized into six chapters and an epilogue Chapter 1
covers the h1story of the colonial cartographic project wh.tch created
the North :vest Frontier Tribal Areas and bound it com:eprually,
admm1stranvcly and geographically to the identification of Pakhrun
'tribes'. An organisational and ideological counterpart to the colonial
management of the frontier was the fraternity of Pakhrun mullas
equally invested in the notion of regional autonomy and tribal
social ~rganisation. Chapter 2 describes the structures binding this
fratermty of 111111/as together, positing that they constituted a 'religiou~
landscape' which roughly overlaid the Tribal Areas region. Chapters
1 and 2 together define the structural, discursive, and organisational
~earures of the frontier whkh were later engaged by nationalist actors
tn Afghanistan and in British India.
~hapter 3 dc~cnbc!> the nature of the mullas' religious authorit)
wh1ch was linked to Pakhrun tribal living and ideals of'pakhrunwali',
the Pakhtun tribal code of conduct. Among these religious leaders,
tho •e connected to the renowned religious fraternity of the Hadd.t
\1uUa appeared to be dominant through the late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century. The conditions of Tribal Are~
autonomy, rooted in ocial, political and administrative segregation,
accentuated the role and importance of the mullas operating in this
region. Chapter 4 identifies the ways in which nationalist actors in
Mghamstan and British India engaged this network of religiou
leaders alternately for their religious leanings and as regionalliaisol\5
with the P.1khtun tribes. Despite its great distance &om the centres
of pohtilal organi~arion m India and Alghanistan, the frontier proved
a criticaJ military organisatiOn ground for both anti-colonial acthi~t~
in India and for the Afghan am irate up until decolonization of the
f n~i.m sub-continent m 1947. Greatly strengthened by their patrons.
Tnbal ~cas mullas emerged as articulators of a regional po ition,
c~unselhng member~ of the religious fraternity and consulting with
mbes to reaffirm and preserve the conditions of self-government.
J~TRQ()UC I 10:" 3
Chapters 5 and 6 look at the major upri ings through the
nationalic;r period-1923-1930 and 1930-195o-to con ider the
discourse, methods, and outcome of mulla·lcd upri ings. During
the 1923-30 period, directly following the Third Afghan \Var,
religious diicourse was strongly coloured by the anti-colonial, pan-
Islamic rhetoric inspired by the Afghan Amir Amanullah Khan, yet
the settlement:. negotiated between tribal leaders and the Briti h
administration and endoNed by the religiou:. leaders were focu ed
on prcsel'\ing the conditions of regional autonomy. Durinp- the 1930
to 1950 period, the rise of nation:Ui~t feeling in the ad~ini tcrcd
iWFP ~pilled over into the T ribaJ Areas, inspiring ~igmfk1nt militia
mobili ations towards the border:. of tht settled districts. Still, there
was no perceptible impulse on the part of the natioruhsts or Tribal
Areas· based leaders to discuss the integration of the Trib.ll Areas with
the settled distrtcts. Religious, tribal, and nationali t commentator>
on Tribal Areas participation in nationalist politiclt c.lstc the tribal
Pakhruns as allies of resident:. of administered lndia.
The la:.t c;ections of Chapter 6 and the epilog\lc deal with the
period after partition of the subcontinent and creation of P.1kist.1n to
suggest some of the continuities in the pre- and po:.t-partitiun period.
After 1947, isolation of the region on topographic- rrategic grounds
as a frontier, and on cultural grounds as a 'tribal belt', wa:. pre erved
m the admtrustration and then the constitution of the new Pakistan
mte. 1'h.it-t} years later this periphery became the epicentrc of the
resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghani~tan as it w.ts a region
distanced from civil structures of monitoring, to whkh the Pakistan
government had no clear social or political respon'>ibJIJtv. I Icnce
military organisation, mobilisation, and resettlement of populations
could t.lke place discreetly and with little direct challenge from the
local population.
Unlike in the coloniaJ period, this time the nationalist ngendJ could
be enacted directly through the government of Pakistan, without the
reliance on locaJ allies, and so the old fraternity of Pakhtun mullaJ
"'35 not discernibly part of these mob1lisations. I lowcvcr the dual
lslami t and nationalist ideal permted. After the Sovtet withdrJwal
from Afghani~ tan, the emergence of the Tali ban 10 Afghanistan in
the mid-nineties owed much to thh model as many of the religious-
 I'RO:-:TJFR OF FAITH 1:'\TRODUCTIO:-: 5

military commander who came to prominence had been decpl~ As a hinterland of ready allie:. and :.uc~oe sivc, contradictory
involved in the ann mtetjih,rdand had !>ten ba~J in the Pakistan- jihads in support of Pakhtun ethnici m, anti~colonial nationali n;,
side Tribal Area during the 1979-1990 period. Paki tani terrirorWism, religious r~ivalism and anti-Americanism,
the rel~':l.nce of the Tribal Areas to contemporary I lamist and
Hzstory and tht prtsmt militant paradigms is undeniable. However, the commitment of
In the year~ ~ince thio: book W.ls researched and first published, the the Tribal Areas religious leader-hip to tdeological ugench:> i tied
need to understand the administrative starus of Paki~t.m's TribJ.I duecdy to the claim to regional autonom}. Within the Tribal Are~
it is precisely that autonomy which creates an unregulated space in
Areas has become incre;tsingly more urgent. There <.hould bt no doubt
which a militarized religious leadersh1p can oper.ue. From out ide,
that the 1ssues which pl.tgue this region-among them incrca,in~
patrons have long recognized the po sibilities the autonomou~ Tribal
mdicahzatlon, nulitanl}, disenfr.mchisement, social inequit) .
economic underdevelopment and the persecution of women-where Areas and its systems of religious-military leadership afford.
not directly caused by the administrative exclusion of the T rib.U
Areas from Pakistan, arc at the very least greatly exacerbated hy
it. Many in the administration and from among those engaged m
the politics of wh;n i~ now the Khyber Pakhrunkhwa province h.m:
continued to justify the exdu~wn of the Tribal Areas on political and
cultural grounds, pointing to the costs and infrastructural problems of
integration and the 'odal feature~ which distinguish it from the rc~l
of Paki ~tan. I )ence the state priori rises management of the region
through .1 sptem of privileges to, and patronage ofloc..U m.t.lik:>.
The evenb of 2001 and the sub~quent \Var on Terror called
the role of rdigiou<: leadership in eastern Mghanistan and the
Pakistan Tribal Areas into a global potlight when the Pilistan-,iJe
Tribal Arcus ~Uegedly became the redoubt of AI ~eda member .
Journalist) have prO\·ided proof of the direct linb of this movement
to the Alghanji/.l.r,/, and the lslarnist, anti-American re~istance has
been compared with the colonial-period mobilisations of Pakhrun
mullm to highlight the problems of conventional "~arfare and role
of religion in the rnountainou::. region. Although history echoc-
rhe militia-b.l'ed mobilisation by lslarnist leaders in the tribal belt
in more recent time , it should not be assumed that the ideas and
pcrson.tlitic~ ofrhc late nineteenth and c;uly twentieth century Trib.tl
Areas arc the intclle~..·ruaJ or organisational root of the antt- 0\1Ct
jihad and the po t·9/ll in:.urgcncy. I lowever the need to understand
the logic and impcrJti\'cS of religious mobilisation within the conte.\1
of the .tdministrative autonomy of the Tribal Areas (or FATA as it is
now 1..'alled) remaim.

1 was checked in 1842, when the bloody end of the Fir t Af "han \ Var
ETHNOGRAPI IY, CARTOGRAPHY Al~D
TilE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ORTH-
WEST FRONTIER TRIBAL AREAS
India, as cartogr.1phically defined by the twentieth cenrury, \\'.15
bounded in the north west by a region that was described as an
autonomous tribal 'lOne. The small genealogically linked communitie
that populated the region were left outside the administrativestrucrure
of 'senled' India-the sy~tcms of land administration, policing, );~w,
and politics of the Indian provinces. Instead, they were organised
into five agencic~ South-Waziristan, North-Waziristan, Kurnm,
Khyber and .Malakand-which were controlled by the pol tal
department of the Government of India rather than the pro,incial
government. The c.ma autonomous status of the region, known a.> the
Tribal Areas, sugge~ted that the divi~ion was a sociological one-th.tt
the nature of the highland community was different from the naturt
of the pea antry of the agriculrural region. The differentiation oi the
North-West Frontier Tribal Areas and the identification of the tnbe
were IJ.rgely con ..equences of the strategic concerns expressed by, and
the pr<X:e e of, the imperial cartographic project. The process of
creating 'region' wa!l not just a depiction of a pre-e.xisting political
land)capc, but was itself an instrument of change as the ~en\.""t of
cartography wa~ underlaid by a ~cries of administrative proce)~ tlut
urcumscribcd and rationalised a d1fferentiated political . pace.
The western and north-western frontiers of India assum((i
importance for the Briush in India with the beginnings of Ru,~.an
expan..,ion an Central A sia in the 183<1.. This early history, ot the
Great Game of amperial manoeuvring, stealthy expansaon and the
c.areful confrontation between emprres, Jed British India into a
erie of political alliance with and intervention:. in the north·\\~
THE ~ORTH -\\' EST FRO="TIER TRIBAl. ARI:AS 7
Indian 'native' stares of Kalat and Kashmir, and with the Afghan
ami.rate at Kabul This 'forward' move was accelerated by the dedine
and ultimate dissolution of the Sakh empire after 1839, le.1ding to
the British anne.utioo of Sindh an 1843, and the Punj tb in 1849.
However extension of direct Briti h authority tow.ud Cc1 tral A ia
with the killing of British occupying forces in J\fghanisun evidenced
the co-,t of a permanent garrison. As the new amir Do t Muhamm.td
Khan (1826-63) began to consolid.ue hi~ authority, imperi.1l policy
became the conciliation and maintenance of 'friendly rcl.uions'
with Afghanistan. Direct colonial authorit) extended through the
~cultural plains ofJacobabad, Dera Ghazi Khan, and the Peshawar
area while Dost Muhammad Khan extended his influence through to
Jalalabad and Kandahar.
The processes of imperial consolidation in Jndia <tnd Afgh.tnistan
left a number of highland communities and small politac:. between
them. This tract of land extended from the north-western and
'\\'eStern most limits of the Maharaja of Kashmir's authority down to
the native state of Kalat and included group of both Pak.htun and
Baluch ethnicity. Contemporary Afghan, Indian and Briti:.h observers
of the Pakhrun communities noted that they were village-ba cd clans
that imested authority in a headman known as the khan or molilt. It
was observed that clans mustered jirga1 or councils consisting of all
the male members of the communi(), withan which older members
had more clout than younger members Clans participated in a wider
organisation of communities to which they were linked ancestrally,
deemed to be a tribe, within which total unanimity was maintaaned
by a tribaljirga of representative males from the particapant dans. A
number of eparate tribes occupied the region and competed strongly
for natural resources and patronage of Afghan .1nd Indian courts.
This } rem of anternal tribal unanimity and inter· tribal riv.ury was
unden.tood to underlie rhe relations and concerns of alllommunitics
residing in the Pakhtun tribal tracts.
During the period 1849-76 British Indian frontier defence and
policy towards the tribes were two sepamte assues. Afghanistan in
the south and Bokhara and Kokand north of the Oxm river were
 8 FIW:\TirR or FAITII
t~e frontier buffer qates for Britain and Ru~c;ia re pectively,s and the
rnbec; berwcen Afghani tan and Briti h India were onlv of co~'ml
i
co ~he revenue gener.ating di trier of we tern Punjab. fence tribal
polscy WJ marked only by a concern wtth c;enling <llld then protecting
the revenues of the Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan di~tricts. The
compacts ~tns.:k with the north·wc~tem Pakhrun rnbe were aimed
at safeguarding road~, and preventing rrespa<. by the tribes imo the
settled, .tdministcred district:. of the Pakhrun north-we r. If any
member of the :assured' tribe~ who had entered into treaty relation
~1th the DCsot the administereddistrictscommined murder or pillage
Ill the adminssrered districts or on the roads, or allowed such act to
be initi.ncd from their territory, the malik of the offending tribe was
expected w lu~nd over the offending party and compensation.' Pohcy
towards the tnbes of this region was engineered ro check and control
criminality and ensure the safety of British subjects and interesb in the
.u.lministered districts. Tribalism was an internal, provincial concern,
scpar•t.te from the irnpcnal consideration of frontier building.
Th1~ changed when Russia annexed Kokand and advanced on
I Ierat in 1876 Afghans.,tan's Amsr Shcr Ali Khan resisted Briri h
~tTort to l'On ohdate reg•onal influence, and although he was ousted
10 the Cl'Ond Afghan vVar which ensued, a new government in
England and viceroy in Indsa called for a more cautious, le s expen,i\'e
frontier policy.• lienee the frontier retreated back to the bordm of
Briti h India' and came to reh on British influence among the tribes
of tt e Khvlx:r, k.urram and Comal passcs.6
1. J lc:ruy Ra\~ hnson, ',\ lemorandum on the rcorgani,ati"n of the \~esrcm and
n~rth· wcsrem fronriers', 28July 1ST OIOC UPS 18/A 17.
2. ·~orr cu,~n~ rhc memorundum b~ C:,tr Robert andeman cxplanatol) of
rhc: funm: pohcy robe pursued or the Baluch•"tm Frontic:r',Janum 1
In OIOC Cur10n Cnlle~tion, 1\1 5 LLR Fll/S·t • 7:
J. ~ 1rl Me)er anJ Sh.m:en BJ.ur Bn .a~ Tr;um<Jmml l(Sh(lt/O'WS (\Va,hm~on
DC, 1999), p 189. • Tn S mla, 1897).
·t. Set llri;&n Rohson, 'I'M Road IIJ Kabul-liN S((rmJ Ajghan War JGih - 1 I
(Lontlnn, 1986).
'i. Sec G. ). Alder, Hnluh India's Nflrthrrn Fronli", J,f/65-1895 (Phmouth.
1961), pp. 58-72. • on Ha1ara, Bannu, P~haw.u, Koh:ar and Dc:l'll I m:ul Khan in Punjah
6. 'ee the I real) of Gandarnak. ~produced in Clu.rles Aitchison, A C«/tth#tl
of Trratin, Engagrmmls and Sunwi1 &I.Jting /() India and Nn~l!/Jounng
Cquntrin (Cakuna, 1909). • FnmJirr Tnho smu tht AnrttXIlfl()fl ojlhr Pmyoh.
THE :'\ORTH-\\'E:ST FRO:-> 111-:R ' I RIRAI. t\RC,\S 9
Encounlmng the tri!Je: ethnogmphir undustanding
oftht Pakhlun north-west
Bntish military and political exploratory mi ion into the nunh-wt.-st
began with the occupation of Kandahar during the ftr5t Anglo-Afghan
War (1839-42), and the annexation of the Punjab in 1849.7 Th~e
expeditions along \\ith the ~enlement of the revenues of the Punj.tb
in the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera I mail
Khan and Dera Chazi Khan inspired the tll'$t erie of encounter5
with the htghland Pakhruns.8 Information on the n.uure of the
'Patharb, as they were called, was gathered from ac..:ount' of the
tribe~ of Dera Ghazi Khan, Bannu, Kohat anJ Pe-;h.twar .b prep.ucJ
br their respective Deputy Commsss1oncr'i... Expedition~ .tg.tinsr the
frontier tribes further increased the Punjab government'!> knowledge
of the Pak.hrun communities outside the administered distrkt5, ;tnd
the total fighting strength of these communirie!>. This in!(mnation
was compiled and published in popular <lCl'OUnts of expeditions
in the north-west. 10 Historical interrogation by .mthmpologbt-
admini~trators evidenced that these Pakhtun communities were
brgely genealogtcally homogeneous and orally recorded their descent
7. Earuer surv~ included Lieuttnilnt Lce.. h I 17 'Dt npuon of rhe
Khyber P~ .nd of the tribe:. inh.1b11ing •t', C.apr.ain J. Biddulph'~ 1865
'fnbcs on the :-.:orth· We.t Frontier of Punj.lb, and )ury.c:on Bellew'~ 1864
'Report on the Yu u&ais' (noted in the: Politk.1l and C.,c,ret Depanrncnt
Ubraty Li,t). Certain tribal gencalogie.' \\ere !Jrcr compaled .and puhhshc:d
more comprehen ively in government pubhcaunn5. ec 1-:. G. ll.1~tin~,
Gmralogklll Trtt of tht Pohuwari SarJ.m o/ thr B.~ro~l:.u 1·~1n11/y (Lahore,
1880); E . G. H ~tings, Gmtalogua/ Trtt of tht KunJ,Jhari S.mlars of lh(
&znzlzAi Farmh (Lahore, 1880). A. I I \1.1. <lO, Report on tht M.lhwJ 11nd
Wiz:iriTnl>t'(~nnla, 1893), Captam Swayne lml C~puin A. Nirhols, Tr~/1,11
of lht AjridiJ. Omhtm, \1ohman.ls 11nd AIOZ<Ji· }'u•ufr..lil (Siml.1,
189.. '• Captain Swayne, Tribal Tahlts of lht Huntf"'J.~llr 1111d Ntighhouring
PUI 1J Cuslonwry /..irw--.1 sdrc/i()njrom lht rrcords ofthr Punjah GO'f!tmmrnl,
\'OI I (Calcutta, 1881}. p. t.
9 &nkment rcpom of deputy commi ioncrs were the ha~i~ lor the \CCtions
Cuuoffklryl..u,_ <\cevol II .pp.ll9-SO.
10. See for ~ample, Paget, &cord of th l~ptdJIWnt fl$1liml tht Nflrth-Wtsl
 10 FRO:-;TIER OF FAITH
from a Pakhrun forefather Cla ical Pakhrun tribal genealogies
produced tn literary text:. uc.h as the MaVrzan-i /lfgh111zi, 11 fltz)'af-1
Afghani,13 and Kh,llid-i Afgh.mi,SA and oraJ accounts of communm
descent were correlated to military and settlement "un·ey to describe
community size, location, organisation, interlinkage and precedence
among the 'border tribe:-'. 15 Hence the tribal genealogical tree became
the format for the org-anisation of statistical data on the communities
of the north-west highlands in 'tribal tables'.
The entire region from the Maharaja of Kashmir's dominion
down to the n<ltivc state of Kalat, and the border of the adminbtered
distrkts to the passe~ through the Hindu Kuo;h was surveyed joinclyb)
the mtlitary and politie<ll dcp<lrtments. The suNey reports produled
both topographical descriptions of land and tribal tables dexnbing
tribe-dan genealogies. Tribal tables for important tribal group
including the Afritlis, Wazir~ and Mtthsuds were prepared 10 1893.16
11. C. M. Macgregor, Cmlrlll A11o. A Contn!Juttonlownrth tht Btlltr KfUifdtdgt
if lht 'l'opcxr<~phy. Hthnogrophy, Stotifft<s and lliuory oftht N~Jrt!rll'nr
Frt.nltn-oj8ritllh India, vol I (C:tlcum, 1873), preface.
12. Part' of the M,l~lrzon-i AJf.h..tm (or MoVruzn-i Islam), written ~ the
Akhund D~rwcta in the ~ev~nteenth century, were translated and printed
in Engli h as orly as 1860 in R.1verty, Gu/Jhan-t Roh (London, 1860).
13. 1/ayat-i.1(ghilm, a hr tory of the: Afghan people, was written by ~1uhammad
llmu Khan in the nineteenth centul) An Engli h translation of the work
w;1 • published a early as 1865 Sc Heruy Priesdr, Aj~l:~nistan tmJ riJ
Inhabitants (London, 1874).
14. An I:ngh h tran latiun wa tiN pnnted in 1875. See Tre\'or Plmnien.
Tnrnslatiom oftht Ka/UI·t .AfgAmi (Lahore, 1S75)
15. A hy 11.\V. Bellew in AjghanistafltlnJtht.AfghJfiJ: lxing• britfbistcry,ftht
«JUntry, anJ attount oj;ts fWplt (1879, reprint Delhi, 1982), p. 216.
16. The morclamuu J>uhh~hed volume~ ofthese gcncalogie. arc l\.tcrk' ~rrur:
lht i\fahlfiJln.IJ; E. I lowell, Mrzh 11 \I'"Of'""Ph rm tht G01K1?11Mnl's R.tkticm
Wtlh tk MaltsuJ Tri/tt (rtpnnt K.trachi, 1979); L. W Kmg, Mcnot;raph '"
tiN Or.1h.11r Country tmd C/.1· , (r~print Lahore, 1984); H.W. Bellrw, A
Gnttr..tl Rtport ~n tht l'wujr..1is, I 864 ( L:Ulore, 1994); and probably the most
siKmfi~;lnt 3nd widely known .rudy of the tribes of the north·we~t fronuer,
Olaf C<~roe's Tht H1t"am (London, 1965). The milita.ry dc:putmc:nt and
pol111nl otgency rewrd contained detailed genealogies of all the: f'ronua
tribes with note> on the fonnation of new dan unit.. and included 'Tnbal
Tahlcs of the Afndi , Or.1k.z:m, ~lohmand~ and A.koza.r-You,ufzah'.Tribal
Tables of 8uncrv.:~ls and Neu~hhounng Tribes', and 'fnbal Tables of the:
~lah ud .1nd Wam Tr1hc ',compiled by J E Swayne, Inrdligen~e Branch.
and Capum \ NKhol· (Srmu, 1897). OIOC UPS/20 B160-4.
TH~ '-:ORTH·\\'EST FRO:-;TI~:R TRIB,\1, ,\R~: \S 11
These table nored the place of the tribe in the P~khtun genealogy,
the clans and sub-groups wimin the tribe, the number of men in each
group, and the m.~lik of each dan. The numher of'fightin • men' in
C2Ch clan, and me area that each group controlled were highlighted
m these tabubr ethnographic ummarie . The tribal gcnealogie were
drawn and connected, and then summarLed in 11 Dittionary oftiN
Patlxm TriO~ oftiN ~'arth-lflm Frrmlitr of lndia in 1899 that liqeJ
the tribal structure as a six-tier } tem. 17 Each group de rihed in
the dictionarv was listed as either under the da sificntion of 'tribe',
'clan', 'divisi~n·, 'sub-division of division', 'section of 1\Ulxlivi ion', or
under 'other minor fractions'. This information wa' fir~t repre~cnted
comprehenstvely in the single-sheet map of Afghanistan publi hetl
byt"le <;urvey oflndia in 1889, which contained both the topogmphy
and tribal groupings in a single representation of the rcgion.18 The
map provided with the dictionary showed the approximate location
of tribal ettlements. 19
Jt W'lb thus that £he tribal organiSatiOn Of the frontier regton
was mapped.JO In the south, around the Zhob river, were the Zhob
J~. Ahmedza.i and Kakar Pakhruns, who entered into treaty
rtbtion with the khanate of Kal.at to guarantee their own politic.1l
independence. These factions were later tnc.:orpomted mto the
B2luchistan province. Above these were the WaZLrs and Mahsud ,
tribes of a common de$Cent, but antagonistic. to one another, henc.:e
recognised as eparate tribes. The Wazir and ~lahsuds controlled the
land north of the Zhob ri\·er and south of the Kurram ro.td, including
the Gomal and Tochi passes. Below the Khyber Pass were the Afndi
and Orakza.i tribes, of a common de cent but difTercntiaretl among
themselves by the fact that the Oralo.ais were Shta. The Khattak
17. Qllaner Master General India rn the lntcU•gcncc: Brllndl, /1 Diction11ry of
t~ 1'111Jvn Trrh 1 ttn tlx North·Wrst Frontin-oj India (Calcutta, 1899).
IS Map ol Afghani tan, publi hed under drrectlon of Colonel Thullrcr, Survey
o£Jn a Office, Calcum, 1889. OIOC W/UPS/21/1122.
19 lntdligcnce Branch, J'11ap to.Aflompuny 11 Dtrlummy oftlu P111h.m 'l'rthts on
tiN North-lf'tsl Frontinoflndra (CaJ~uttil, 1899).
20. Territorial1Sarion of the clan rdent1t\ i discu cd in diffc:rcnt tc:nn m the
anthropologiCll '~ork on de$Cendency and inhcrit.tn<e rc:laung ru the 13te
nineteenth centun'. See Po~ul Tiru~. 'Honour the Balcxh Buy che P~hrun',
MfJdrrn.As1.1n St,Jr (Cambridge, 1998), p. 667.
 12 I'RO:\Tit::R OF FAITH
trihe lay ca t of the Afridi. , while above the Khyber Pm and Kabul
river lay the rough and dry Shin"'"ari, .Mohmand and Bajaur bnd
Abo\'e <tnd be,ide~ thc.e trib.U land lay three stat~. each ruled b)
an authorit} that levied ta.xc~ and ovcr-aw internal ~O\t~rnance and
dispute man.tgcmenr. To the north· east "''a' Sw.u, who-c kin~ and
btc;r '\l1anguls' cnntrollcJ the most fertile and productive land an
the region tho,c of the. Yusuf7.ai Pakhruns. Dir was to the west ot
Swat, .uul its N.twab w.ts struggling to consolidate his polit}'· In th(
far north was the Chitr.ll v-Jlley ruled by a l\lehtar whose authorit)
W<ts deeply contested.
Com/meting thefrontier
With the gradual retreat of the British from Central As1a and tht
identification of the llindu Kush highlands as a zone of srrategtc
defence, the latter 'trib<tlly' inhabited regions were assigned tht
role of the lnd1an north western frontier. Administrative and
military pohcy in the region had two agendas: the prcpar.1tion of
the highl.md~ for poss1ble military mobilisation, and the conciliation
and inmlvement of tribal groups as facilitators of frontier policy, not
.tntagonht to it.
Becau~c of budgetary concerns and the continued concern O\'Cr tht
Anglo· Afghan rcl.uion~hip, organi-.ation ofa c;trategic frontier "ithin
the tribal region w;h not ba~cd on a policy of military garri'oning b~
regular troop~. It developed rather as a fom'afd zone through which
troop~. ma~ ed at Peo;hawar, Qletta, Dera Ismail Khan and Den
Chan Khan, could be mob1lised ro assume an offensiVe po!\irion
in Jal.tlab.td and Kandahar. 21 Jn 1880 a period of road, railway and
telegraph con trutr10n through the frontier was begun as 'one oithe
measures to contain Afghani~tan·.u Expenditure on railway' and
ro.td~ through the tribal region (including Baluchistan) amounted to
21. Dt'SCription ol routes and position~ on the nonh·west frontu:r. OIOC L
,\JII.Jl7/ 1317/1 l!.
22. Fre.lcmk Rohcrh, <..omm.&ndcr in Chief Indian Anm, 1c.l85-93 in lmrr
tu Forc1gn Sccrtt~l) India, 4 April 1880, quoted in IU It ~luumdcr 71:1
lndurn •'*'"') ,,J lh~ Mdrn,t iftk Puryo1h (Dclhi, 2003), p. 55. For ll bnd
hiswry nf the c:_lpan ion of tnns·lndtU communi~'2rion , c .\lammdtr
pp. 50-64.
THE ~ORTH·\\'J::ST I ROI't lll'R I RIH \1. ,\IU:A~ 13
almost 8 million rupees O\"er the period 1882·91. B) 1890 there \\ere
5i1 mil~ of metalled and unmetalled 'imperial' road c.'X'tcmling from
Kohar. Pesha\\'af and Den I -mail Khan. About 200 mile uf these
roads were being worked each year, at a co t ofabout 200,000 mpces
a year.n Between 1884 and 1900, O\er 100 million rupee were pent
on extending the :\orth·\Ve tern Railwa\ up to the Tnbal Areas
to open up routelo aero s the pas..e:..l.. The 'orth -\Vc tern Raih\".1\'
5) tern was extended to the foot of the kh\·ocr Pa at Fort Jamrud
and the Punjab railway connected Attock to Dcr.t I nuil Khan.2s
UI\C} began for a railway cro-;smg the Khyber, ~tnd a rail connecting
Kohar and Thai.
Becauc;e the highlands were never occupied, development of the
region as a forv.~Jtd zone emerged around a model oftrih.ll go\'crn.Uicc. 26
By this scheme, the Pak.hrun tribal communities rh.n inh.tbircd the
highlands were paid allowances to protect the ro<ld~ and to en urc the
security of the inner border with the adrnini,tercJ district .l7 Thic;
model meant that frontier policy wa~ rrib.1l policy .tnd t•iu wnu.lE
The tcaregy of tribally managed frontier defence wa~ referred to
as th 'forward policy' and was largel) put into cflc\:t through the
Distr r Commissioners (DCs) of Dcra Jsm;ul Khan, Bannu, Koh.tt,
Pcsh.. 'tar and Hazara-district!> wh1ch at this time. were qiJI part of
the Punjab. These DCs negotiated monet.~ry ettlcments with tribes
near the border with the administered districts or <;cttled ncar road
running through the Tribal Areas by which they ttlh.~ated m.lll
allowance in rerum for which the tribe mustered militias or tribal
23. Punjab Public Worb Admini tr.ation Recllrd 18'.1(}-1 111 IS'JS-'.1.
24 M:u <~nder, Tht lndr.m Army, p. 56
25. Rob.:rt Sandeman, 'A note: on the r-;orth· \-Vt":>t l'runllc:r .md Our Pnhcy in
A(i ~n ,tan',30June 1887 O IOC IIPS/18
26. The archito t of th1s ochemt W.l\ Rol>tn Sandcrnan who, ~~ D1 tnct
Commi 'ioner Oer.a Ghazi Khan in 1867 nc:guu.ucd scttlcmc:nh w11h the
1\larri and Bu)l;ll tnbe~, gn.nung them allnwan1cJ and otrm in return for
mU$tcring 'levies' to protect the roJd and border of the 't·ttlcd revenue
gene-- t•ng d triers.
27. Tm: CrcaghCocn, Thtlndto,Polilil411Strtrrt{L.ondon,l971),p.l53.
28. MajN General E. H. H CoUcn, \ le•1 "nndum- the Ctntrotl A ian
question and our future mil1tal') pohq 'i1mla, IH92. 010(. 1/PS/18/A
26.
 14 J'RO~Tit::R or f.'AITH
'levies' ro police the rcgion.29 Payment to tribe~ for the protection
of roads and the border~ of the admini tered di trier became the
comer tone of regional policy·-.t mean) of control without dirtct
intervention.
Dtlunitation oftht Durand Lint and tht separation
oftht 'British-sidt tnbt'jrom Afghanistan
Mter the initial hostilities of 1878 were over, negotiations ova the
separation of Afgh.m and Brittsh-Indian Strategic interesb began.
The first demand by the British wa~ the renunciation of all Afghan
claims to political authority over what was demarcated as the 'narural'
[ndo Afghan frontier:
The Khyber .md M1chni passes leadmg from Jalalabad into the Peshawar
d1~trict, and over the independent tribe~ inhabiting the territory connectcJ
With thc~e pa~-.es. IAI~o.] the District of Kurram, from Thai to the crest
of the Shuurgard.m pa~:.. and the districts ofPi~hin and Sibi, wtll remam
under the protc,tion and control of the Briti5h government.
The~e demand were ratified under the creaty signed between the
Briti'h Agent to Afghanistan, Cavagnari, and the Mghan Amir,
Yaqub Khan, at Gandamak in Mghanistan in 1879. Under the terms
of the T rc..try of Gandamak,
The Briti h government [would) retain in its own hanch the conaol oi
the Kh) bcr and ~lichni passes, and all relations with the indtp(ndent
tribes of the territory directly connected with thc~e Po1~ses.31
In negotiation!> with the amtr, Cavagnari treated the 'independence'
of rhe P.tk.htun tribe of the l\11chni and Khyber passes a an
e~tablishcd phenomenon, and emphasised the British commitment
not to occupy thc-.e 'independent' territories, but merel) to maintain
29. For example, an allowance of 1000 rupees per annum \Vb allocarcd to the
Alu Khcl Afndi , who occupied temtory ncar Pe-.hawar, before 186i
Sec ''natemcnt howmg 1 nbal Allowances in the North-\Veo t Frontta
Provm~ , 1931' OIOC L PS!tl-'3 150.
:\0. 'Narnuvc of C\" r t m \(Khan. un from Au~t 1878 ro December l
and connected ~·orrcspond~nce', p. 53. OIOC UP l&'A 43.
3 1. Term of the treaty of Cancl.trnak. Articl 9, 1b1d., p 65.
THE ~ORTH·\\'EST FR0~1:TIER TRIHt\1. ARP.AS 15
their longstanding autonom\ ' Yet 1t w: clear that thi tate of
autonomy was la.rgdy a myth. Chri tine '\o..lle' work highlight the
role of the eastern Pakhruns m the \fghan tare during the reign of
Amir Do t ~1uhammad Khan. he argues that the ' o·called border
tribes' were tied to the Afghan state through an allowance y tern.
loreo,er, ~orne group:. identified a 'independent tribe ', ~ch as the
Twis ofKurram, were already paying revenue' to the Afghan tate by
1850.l' While it was true that the Kh)bcr and Mh:hni pas e were not
highly profitable and had largcl}' remained o11t ide the tax net of the
Mghan amirate, other connection.; existed between the authority in
Kabul and the 'tribes' of the eastern highland~ One uch connection
was the tribal relationship with the B.tdshah of Kunar who possessed
large bnd holdings in the area we!tt of Bajaur and south of ChitraJ.35
The revenue-paying Badshah of Kunar h;ld a~ ted .ls the amir's agent
among the tribes of Bajaur and Mohmand. 16 Another tangible
connection was through the Khan ofLalpura, the dominant Mohmand
lhan who,e lands lay east of Kunar. The Khan of Lalpur.t's extensive
land holdings and authority had led the am1r to al·cord Lalpura the
St2tu of a small state, and the khan great pcrson1tl privileges in
rerum for military cooperation. 37 The'e privilc~cs included the right
to a quarter of the tolls collected on the Khyber Pa s.» In return for
lhese privilege , the amirate often interfered in the succession of the
Lalpura title andjagirs.39 The I lakim ofjalal.tbad would .u<;o call on
32. Ibid., p. 62.
33 Chrisnnc Noelle, State and Triht m Nmrtunth-Crntury Ajgh.mislan
(London, 199i), pp. 163-90.
34 Ibid., p. 174.
35 The Bulshah ofKunar W2lt also n:l·ogni cd a~ a pir .tnd enjoyed great pi ritual
repute in addition to his wealth and political ro~ition. ! lis imponance
indtcatea that authority was excrd ed at muluple, oficn cwtrlaJ•pinp; level~
among the ea~tem Pakhtun communities. The Bad~hah w,\5 one of the
only ptn of the eastern Pakhrun w1th such 1gnifkant and protitahle land
hold10g1, bur be'ausc: he cunailed hi~ influenl<: cnt of the Durand Line, his
ase is not d1$CUS$Cd in chapter 2, although it i extremely 1ntcrtt.ting.
36 'Relation~o of the Amir of Afgham tan w1th the Khan of l..:tlpura and the
Badstuh of Kunar', Oban, 1882, p. 4. OJOC 1./f>S/18/A 47.
37. Sec: 1'\ oc:lle, Triht .mJ ~tal , p. 181.
38 W. R.. :\1crk. ThtM~h, nth (1898, rcpnntl..ahorc:, 1984), pp. 46-50.
39 'odie, TrihtanJ Stair, pp. 181 -2.
 16 rRO:"JTII~R OF FAJTII
the Khan to collect revenue from the outlying Shtnwa.ri villages. The
Khan of Lalpura managed a relationship between the am irate and tM
Mohmands who were de. cribed in the classic British ethnographic
study of the tribe as being independent. Some of the e independent
Mohmands shared the privilege of collecting Khyber toll on bdulf
of the amir, and were allocated allowances for senices rendered to
the amirate through the Khan of Lalpura. Amtr Abdur Rahman \1."15
concerned with and oversaw the allowances paid by Lalpura to the
more easterly Mohmand:. as a means ofindirect control.~ 1
In 1893 Mortimer Durand began negotiations with the new Amir
Abdur Rahman Khan (1880 1901) over the deUmitation of a border
between the Indian north west frontier and the Afghan Eastern md
Southern Provinces. Creation of the frontier was represented to Amir
Abdur Rahman as the constitution of a zone of 'neutral pro\inces'
between Nghanistan and India,•J entailing the amir's acceptance
'for the fir:.t time ... that independent border tribes have nothing to
do with Mghanistan.'41 When the amir questioned the tdeil of the
tribal tracts as a 'neutral' rcgion,.u the theory of the traditional SOc:W
and political autonomy of the independent tribes was put forward
as a reasonable premise for the demand that the amir 'exerci ;e no
mterference' in Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Afridi territOr'), Kum.m.
D.1war, alJ Mahsud Waztri territory, almost alJ Darwesh Khel country
and the Zhob and Chaghai regions whkh had been incorporated mto
rhe Baludustan Agency to the south.~s The language of the Durand
('om mi. sion report:. demanded a delimitation of the pohtical interNs
and authority of the Afghan amir within a border. In negoriarioru
with Amir Abdur Rahman, Mortimer Durand asked the amir for
40. Merk. Tlx Mohflwlds, p. 46.
41 lb1d., pp. 57-9.
42. SultOln Mahomed Khan, TIN I.ift ofAbdur R.ah11U1n, Amir ofA.fj,l:vrtist.m.
vol 11 (London, 1900), p. 159.
43. Viceroy of India to the Political and Secret Depanment, 18 No\. 1S9j,
p. 91 OJOC UPS/3/332.
44 \bdur Rahman de ribed Afghani tOll\' interests in dC\'Clopmen m
Ch1tnl and Bajar, and KofTed at the Brio h refen:nce$ to 'so--olled ncutnl
pronnc:c:s', in Khan, TIN Lift ofA/tJ,.,. R..lht"Wn, p. 159.
4S. Viceroy oflnd.a to the Pohttcal and St:crcr Oqnrtment, 18 No\·. 1S93
17
Tiff. ~ORTH·\H 1 FRO~TIP.R I'RIB.\L AREAS
his commitment that he would define the extent of hi ' phcre of
int1uence' and his political suzerainty:
To the north the dominions of the l\1ehtar of Chitral were .uready
politically e:.tabli. hed as being out~ide Kabul's direct authority.
Below, in .M ohmand and Bajaur, the diw.ton was harder. The cxa~:t
location and definition of the 'independent' clans out ide the ~phere
of the amirate's authorirv were debated with the arnir, and ettled on
me basis of the amir's e~onomic inrere t o although Lalpura wa·
nuintained as part of Mghani tan on the ba •~ that it ''us a revenue·
gcner:uing region for the amirate, the amirate)' social and politic-~)
intere t in the communities east of L.tlpura was dented and the am1r
forced to sever tics with the eastern Mohmand dans. The lack of
Cbrity or rationale behind the prcci e points of division of interests
between Afghan and Indian 1\lohm.tnd bel':lme a central i sue Juring
the later years of Amir Abdur Rahman's reign (1880-1901) and the
early year:. of Am!! Habibullah's reign (1901-19).~ 1 In 1895 Abdur
Rahman as erted his right to the whole of the 1\Iohmand tract. In
1905 HabibuUah abandoned thi:. claim but maintained the Afghan
ownership of the Bohai Dag valley.~
Further south, the amir did not query the Anglo-Afghan border
along Mridi, Tun and Orak:r.ai territory. Waziristan however d1d
present problems. Our of a concern to mainram the integrity of the
tribal group that surrounded the roads and passes, Durand drew the
\:Vaziri3tan border ro accommodate the Wazir, Mahsud and Afridi
tribal scnlements within the Indian north west frontier. I Iowever
there was an exi~ting rdattonship between the Wazirs of Wana and
Tochi and the Mghan government at Kho)t. Durand argued for the
separation ofvVaziristan from Kho~t on the premise that there was
'lirue population and wealth in the country' of the \Vazin; that could
benefit t\fghani~tan, while on the other hand keeping together all
the Waztr chtns in India would maintam rhe social integrity of the
46. Durand to Lansdowne, Indiki, 24 0d. 1893. 'Letters of Durand to Vkeroy
lndU'. OIOC Dunnd Paper;.
47 1. Mont ath Mtmo ~ding tht cJemarl'<anon of the: Dunnd Line in
~1ohnuoo C.c.-~ntJ)' 1923. OJOC UPS/181\ 198
.C • Stt Lud ~ AcLmec,Afgh.Jnulom f9(){)...191J Cahfomia, 1967), p. 79.
 18 FRONTIER OF FAITH
tribe and the region ..., The genealogy of the Wazir tribe was used to
demarcate the extent of the T riba.l Areas on the border with 1\host,
but thi~ was a difficult ethnographic dissection owing to the proximin
of'\Vazir' and 'Khostwal' -.ettlementl>.
The amir d1d not di~putc the reference to the T riba.l Areas and its
population a~ tribal nnd culturally distinct. In fact, he affumed the
'unruliness' of the e.tstcm Pakhtuns in a letter to the \iceroy. But he
questioned the British-imposed segregation of the Tribal Areas from
Afghanistan, stating his authority over the 'tribes'.
If[ these frontier tribe!>] were included in my dominions 1 hould be able
to make them light again~t any enemy of England and m}"SCU: b) tht
name of .1 religaous w;tr, under the flag of their co-religious Mu~lim ruler
(myself) ... I will gradually make them peaceful subjcch and good fnends
of Cre;lt Bntain. But if you cut them out of my dominions, th() "'iD
ncather be of any usc to you nor to me.'IO
Resisting this circumscription of the 'influence' of the AfQ;han
court, Amir Abdur Rahman attempted to represent his mreresh in
this allusion to religion, but this was dismissed summarily \~ith no
real interrogation of the nature of the Afghan amirate's connections
with the 'frontier tribes', e.xcept to consider it as politica.l 'e.xpedienc)
1n h1:. dealing:. with the British, and a greedy expansioni. m.
Still, Abdur Rahman refused to compromise on the delimianoo
of Waziristan on purely tribal line . He pushed his claim to Birmal,
which Durand \\101 unwilling to concede in order to maintain the
integrity of the tribc. 52 Durand identified the amir's re,btanct
<1 ternming from a point of honour, the amir had said that his
intcre~r in the \Vaziri lands was nom-name.n But Birmal Wlb also
a regional market place and a hub for commercial exchange. Tradin
communirie:. from within Afghanistan carne here to trade every year.
4Q. Durand to l.ansdnwne, lndiki, Jl Oct. 1893, in 'Lcners of Durand to
Vtcemv India',
SO. Khan, .Tht l.ift ofAMur R.,Jmwfl, p 158.
51. Dur.tnd 10 I.o~~nsdo\\nc, Indiki, 1 '\o,· 1893, ibid.
52. In his lr:trcr to Lansdowne of31 O.:t. 1893, Durand wrote:') have told [tht
amir] that J have no authonry to •p1tr up the \Vaziris.'
53. Durand tcll.ansdm,ne, ll O.c. 1893, in 'Lcrrcr.. of Durand'.
THE :-.:ORTH·\\'EST FRO:-.'TH:R TRIBAl. AREAS 19
The Af~han amirate's claim to Birmal a cned the e interc b above
the 'rulrural' policy of maintaining tribal integrity.
In the case of Birmal, the amir·s 'grand idea ' of honour were
b:uely entertained by Durand until the amir indulged in ,.. hat
Durand patroni. ingly referred ro in hi personal corre pondence \\ith
Lansdowne, Viceroy oflndia, as 'the l>ulks'.Sol It i of note that when
Durand informed Lansdowne of this conce ion, heal o rated that it
was acceptable because 'tribe ' from the 'Am1r's ide' oc~.:upied Binnal
for half the year in any case, rationalising the conce:.~ion on the ba,is
of tribal occupation.ss
Durand's suggested frontier line drew major communications
features, roads and railwa)'li, and the p.1sses, into the Briti)h 'sphere', as
agreed under the Treaty ofGandamak. In the ~.:our~c of ne~otiations,
disputes over the definition of Afghan strategic intere:.t:. in the ca)t
also aro~e partly due ro the incomplete and sometimes inconsiqent
mappings of the eastern Pakhrun areas. Peroval S)kc observed in his
Hiuqry ofA.fkhanistan that portions of the frontier had nor yet been
sur. eyed by 1893.56 In one phase of the negotiation the .unir brought
his own map, on which a road \vas marked 'with two red cro e~.'-a
road that had evidendy nor been featured on the British maps, but
one the amir believed had to be considered a m<tjor geographic
feature although it was not currently in uc;e- -it had been abandoned
because of resistance by the people of Sharrun who would regularly
fire on the road leading from the river to A)mar.57 The amir claimed
Durand repre~nted the region 'all wrong I know. I have been to
these puces-your maps are guesswork.'58
The dispute over marking the border, in it~ many complexities, was
about marking zones ofeconomic. interest and political involvcmcnt-
ddinable spheres ofinfluence. Durand denied Afghanistan's claim to
areas where there was no palpable, engaged rclatton'lhip between the
communities re ident in the region, and Kabul, or no identifiable
54. Dunnd to Lamdowne,lndiki, 4 No\> 1891, abid
SS. Durand to Lamdowne, lndiki, 30 0-r. 1893, ibtd.
S6 P. ykes, History ofAfihanil/1111 {L(lndon, 1940), p. 176, <juntcd in J. R. V.
Prescott, M11p ojMa111lanJ AuJ by 'rrr.,ty {~lclbc>urnc, 1975), p. 181.
57 Durand to Lansdowne, lndiki, 3 ~o\", IS'H, Letter of Durand to Viceroy
lndJa.
S • l>urand quoted the amir in hi lcnc:r to l.o~~n s.ICJwn<', thut
 20 f'RO~TIF.R OF FAITH
strategic development of the region. At the conclusion of .Mommtt
Durand's talks with Amir Abdur Rahman, the implication) of the
delimitation were dear and accepted by Abdur Rahman, although
grudgingly. At British insistence, all Mghan officials in the areas
assigned to India were rccaJicd, and British authority over the Tribal
Areas was acknowledged. ~
Mghan and British intere~ts still overlapped the border K.•.bullwJ
traditionally collected ih toUs at the Khyber, Gomal, and Sh..rrun
Passes. After the delimitation of the Durand Line, one A(..~
customs officer wa!t allowed to remain at Kh):bcr to calculate the
value of goods leaVJng l nd1a.14 In addition, border communitle on
both sides were still connected by proximity, family ties, and trade
networks, both legal and illegal. But the agreement was that the
Afghans would not 'interfere' with the tribes across the Durand Line.
This meant that the amir could not recruit across the border, pay an)
subsidies, or formally entertain representatives from clans or tribes
on the British 'side'. The Durand Line treat} and the sub~equent
agreements regarding the demarcations of the border marked a
transformation of Mghan ~tate relations with the eastern tribe . The
tribes of the Hindu Kush highlands were formally released from
responsibility to the Afghan amirate.
The border necessitated a new system of settlements between
communities politic;illy divorced, but in close functional contact with
one another. Amir llabibuUah Khan (1901-19) highlighted a need
for such a system by anaciUng a 125-page list of petitions recei\'td b)
the am irate since 1893 from tribe:. on the Mghan ide of the border,
.l!>king for compensation from tribe!> on the Briti h side of the border.•
Before 1893 the rais of Kho~t. the Hakun of]alalabad, the B1d,tub
of Kunar or the Khan of Lalpura would ha\'e attempted to effect a
settlcment,.z but the (.Jrcum'-\:ription of their authority by the border
59. Khan, Tht Lij( ofAMur Rflhman, p. 158.
60. Terms of the ttnl) of G.mdamak. Arncle 9, quoted 10 'Namti~c of C'\'COts
in \fgh.tni,t.lll', p. 65
61. F ndo ure to lencrfrom ,\mir ofAfghanhran ro the V tccroy of India.ll Jill}
1909 In ·~orth Wor Frontier Joint Comrni)'toner' OIOC UJXI ll 3i.
62 Se-- Chn,nnc '-:oo:Uc for the rtbno~<.htp between Afghan auth. •no~ ·~t the
Samt 1 l\.l~hnqt or F.a tern Provin~c. and the highland tnbes, Stlllt r'..J
Ink, pp. 163-9~.
THE -'ORTH·\\'EST FRO:-.'TIF.R TRIBAL ARI-:AS 21
now nude tiUs impo -sible. Instead a joint Indo Afghan Commi ion
:-as e t2blic;hed in 1910 to settle di~pute:. u the Kurram -.ection of
the Indo-Mghan border and at the Tochi-Khost border. Settlement
of fine and penalties were fmt paid over by the respective British
and Afghan commissioners, and then settled internally between the
com.mi ,jone~ and the groups involved in the dispute.6J Thi new
'Stem removed the frontier tribe entirely from any ort of direct
"
Afghan authoritative influence.
In tr)ing to circumscribe the authority and 'politilJ phcre
of oontrol' of the amirate, the Briti<oh called for a ces ation to all
Afghan papnent:s and im·olvement with tribes on the Briti~h ide
of the border that might extend the amirate's political authority.M
Payments in rerum for labour were however allowed to pass. It was
only when the Afghan government uwoked a moral, social or miHr.uy
connection to the 'independent tribe:.' that this was considered to be
•intrigue'.
The trtatron oftht Tribal Artas
\Vith the dehmitation of the Dur.tnd Line, the north west frontier
was not just a system of defence against the Russians-it was
equally being organised as a frontier against Mghanistan. The outer
line conclusively separated the Pakhruns of the l Iindu Kush from
Mghanistan and brought them into l3ritish India, and excluded
Mghani tan a an arena for strategic defensive organisation. This
delimitation necessitated a regularisation of the position of the tribes
now within British India, and a consolidation of defensive positions
through the area between the Durand Line and the border with the
administered d1stncts.
A y tem of unperial defensive management through further
extension of allowances and tribal levies was flfSt attempted 10
1878, in the Khyber. The outbreak of the second Anglo-Afghan
War nec:e:. itated the securing of supply lines to Kandahar, and the
63. Letter from Rc»e Keppel, Ch•ef Commi ioner, N\VFP, to the Foreign
Depan~t, 2 0«.. 1910, in 'North West Fronner Jomt Commi ,joner'.
64 Tenns of the treat) ofGand.tmak. 1\rttdc: 9, quoted in 'Na.rr.uive of e\ients
m Afg!uni ran', p. 65
 22 FRO~TIER Of' f ,\ITII
prorec:tion of pas e into India. The DC Peshawar ~-alled on ~
Afridh in Kh)ber and Turis m Kurram to provide troop to protca
the pa es for the Briti h and keep rhem open before rhe war a 'm
commenced-an effort th:n was managed by a Political Agtnt
stationed at the Khyber Pa~ . AllowancC!i were agreed for the Afii&s
amounting to about 38,000rupec::..65 A tribal levy, named thejfZilild:iJ.
later renamed the Khyber Rifles, was established under a Politial
Officer re~pons1ble to the District Commissioner of Peshawar.
In 1892 the Sh1a Tun tnbes of Kumun were asked to raise a
militia, on the same lines as in Khyber, to guard the Pen'rd 1\ •w
Pa~s.~~~> In Wazirbtan agreements had been made with the Sh1r .ni.
Mahsud and Darwesh Khcl War.ir tribes to open passage rhrwgh
the South W;t7.iristan Coma! Pass-relations managed through
a Political Agent est,\blished at Wana. In 1894 the government of
India asked the Secretary of State for India for sanction to include
Tochi in the British sphere of authority and received pcrmi ,jon to
send a Political Agent to the Tochi vaUey. 67 Orde~ were sent out
for the esrahli,hmcnt of garrisons at Wana and Spin con~i tin~t of
battalions of n.ltive infantry but these regular troops were withdnl\'/D
by 1896 bel'3u~e the expen~e of occupation could not be justified.
FinJ.lly tribal levies were esrablishcd in their place in Tochi and Wam
under the upcrvhion of their Political Agents, along the line of tht
Kh\i>er militia. The primary responsibility of these militias wa~ dtc
protection of road through the region.
Allowance~ paid to the maliks of the T ochi vaUey O.uwesh
Kh 1 \Vazir tribe, the ~I.th ud tribe in the \Vana area, the Turis m
Kurram and the Afridi in the Kh\i>er were to be divided betwttn
cl \lh contnbuung men to the ~cheme, in proportion to each elm's
import.tnce S1mtlarly, agreemcnh were made regarding the financial
liJbility of '"'"h dan if a 'criminal' transgression originated from the
-
65. S.:e ')tatm1cnt ot Tnbal Allowanc~ 1931'.
66. cc (JII ·lfm r;j tht Nt7rth-11'tst Fronturfom Bajflur anJ t~ Indus KohiJ/..-r:
on tht nqrth to tbt M~tri //ills on tlx ~uJh, vol. II (Simla, 1887), IC(tJon on
•The Kunun Valley'. 'flus expcntlirun: wa~ borne b} the anny rather thsn
the Punj:~b Gm-rrnrncnt.
67. Cun.on, Contidenual ,\lcmo on Present and Furun: P ltloc n 1 1 Todu
Valle). 19 June 1899. In Curzon CoUection. OIOC ~1 · El R!Fl l
315A.
THE :"ORTH·Wf: T FRO~TIER fRIBA!. ARgAs 23
territorie· or wa.s committed by the men of any dan within tribe.
The distribution of allowances and thC'. rc. portSibllitic of the tribe
~ ~een by the various PolititJ . \s:;cnt • The allowan c )'Stem,
based on a collective tribal re pon b.hl) .tcctpted on behalf of the
tribe by the maliJ., im·oked both the genealogy of the trihe-dan,
and the 'culture' of coUectiYe tribal action. llowevcr the pot) ment of
illngi3 demonstr.&ted that the model rc:.ted on the conciliation of the
Pakhrun elites rather than a culture of egalitariani rn and con en u -
dm'etl action. ;\llaliks and /d;om who a'"cepted allcm;lncc were turther
rewarded with privileg~ that accrued to them personally. Of the total
85.000 rupee:. being paid annu~tlly in otllow.mce in 1931, ,tlm<ht
65,000 rupee~. or 7 per cent of the total d1shurscment , were p.tid
in 'special allowances' or lungis as per~on:ll ,tllo~-.uion to maliks of
assured tribes."
The year:. 1892-97 marked great upheav.1l and finotl con olidation of
the tribal regions. The ruler ofChitral, who h.tJ Jcccptcd the .tuthority
of and been controlled through the .Mah.u·:~ja nf Kashmir, d1ed I lis
successor Umra Khan joined with the ruler of ~w'lt to attack Dtr J.nd
cut offoutside access to the British Agent 10 Chmal. The Briti h were
forced ro take direct action, and moved in through I loti l\larJJn and
Peshawar through to Bajaur to la) •aege to Chitr.ti.69 Thc need for direct
mtervention in the affair:. of Otr, S\v.lt and Chitral made it obviou~
that these statel> could no longer be controlled through Kashmir.
Hence, these polities entered the :.pcctrum oftrib.tl politics. In 1895, a
Politiol Agent Malakand was e:.tabli hed, rc ponsiblc for the !.tares of
Oir, S\vat and Chttral and answer.1ble directly to the Viceroy' oOice,
bringing the total number of tribal agcnctc:. to 5 !:iouth Wa:~irimn,
'onh-Waziri tan, Kurram, Khyber and Malakand.
In 1899 Curzon assumed v•ccroy.tlt}' in lndi.t und immediately
turned ht attention to the con. olidarion of .m irnpcri.tl frontier
which was bemg compromised by budgcrary concern!. of the Punjab
government. He also believed thar 'the conduct of the cxtcrnaJ
rebtions w1th the tribes of the frontier should be more d1rccrly...
l-Igures c-~.kubtt-d from tnfomlation rcprc~ntcd in 'Sratcm(nt of Tribal
Allowances, 1931'.
69. Henry Ncwman,'Umra Kh~n :and the. U 11ral C2r paign oft ~95-wrnpJic:d
from the civil and military gnettc.' 1 1~ •rc, d )
 24 FRO~ fiER OF' FAJTll
under the control and upervision of the Government of India'.
l Ience in 1901 rhe five administered district1> of Dera I mail Khan.
Bannu, Kohat, Pe ha.,var and J lazara were separated from the Punjab
and their respective Deputy Commissioners made to report to a
new Chief Commissioner based tn Peshawar. The five appcndtge
tribal agencies of South Wazirisran, North-Waziri tan, Kumun,
Khyber and Malakand were combined into the Tribal Areas and
their respective Polirit...U Agent:. also made respon ible to the Chief
Commissioner Pe~hawar. Together, the five fully administered
districts and the adjoining 'tribal tracts' or independent territories
constituted a newly formed North West Frontier Province.
The bigge~t change that tht'> entailed was that expenditure on
the frontier was part borne by the Indian Army bur the remainder.
some 60 per cent, was now borne by the administered dismcts which
comprised the revenue generating section of the pro.,ince.71 The
regulatory structures of the administered districts were not e.xtended
and the Tribal Areas were left as a non-administered region. Mer
feature~ of the colonial relationship with the tribes of the Pakhtun
north-west were confirmed and maintained within the modified
organisation of the NWFP. The Punjab frontier S}1>tem of raisin~t
'trib<u levies' and paymg aJiowances to tribes for 'good beha.,·c r'
remained the main~tay of the relationship between the Chtef
Commissioner and the Pakhtun dans. Alongside this, the Frontcr
Crimes Regulation (FCR) enacted in 1872, which empowered the
Depurv Commi ~ioner to convene ajirga to hear a ca e 'in accordana
with Pathan custom', rem.tinc:d in effect in the Tribal Areas.72 1k
fC R re,rricted British interc tin judicial administration in the Tribal
Arc :h to !>Uch cases in which 'di pure.... or di. agreement ber.\een the
peoples on either ~ide of the admini rrative border' arose.73 In ases
70. Ibid.
71. 'The Adminimaun Crc:atiun of the fronrier'.l\'\VFP Enqu1rv Co ~mitttc
1922-4, Procccdanv:'li vol. I. OIOC V/261247 1
72. Baha, NWFP Atl"'i"'stmti "· pp. 9 10.
73. I I. N. Bolton, Secretary tn the CC. ~WFP, to PA Khybcr,16Junc- 1910, tn
'Combined}' a Case Aga.n t .nd By the- Afri<fu', Dcpul) Commissiona
Ofliu: Peshawar (hereafte-r l.>COP), File 1-10; ·~tcmorandum on Border
Ju nee-, 12 i\lav 1910', bv W. R. f 1..\l·rk. CluefCommissioncr l\'\\l"P, tn
'CombincdJiria Ca.<.e 1\~m tand B) tL. Afridis'.
THE ~ORTH·WE T FRO:-.:TIER J'RIBAL AREAS 25
Where administered-,ide intere~t' were not involved, the colonial
adrrunistrative system did not engage at aU.
Colonial tthnography
Ethnogr.aphtc understanding of the Pakhtun north-west had une
aucial social impltcaoon: the ~trategy of frontier construction, the
move forward and con~olidation and mobiti~ation within the border
125 dependent on the ocial definition of population inhabiting the
mrion as tribal. Yet the 'tribe' wa not n natural and uncontc ted
formation. Historical and anthropological cholarship on the concept
of the tribe has already established thi as a deeply problematic
category. Terence Ranger Jinks the tribal construct ro the tr.u.litions
invented' by the colonial government to f<tcilimte governance. ~ In
his work on the history of the Pc~hawar valley Pakhtuns, Robert
'ichols points to the danger of using colonial ethnographtc tract
and the 'segmentary lineage theory' as a Sj"tcm of social analy i and
history writing since these 'non-historical static frameworks may
hck the flexibility to reveal change over time, hierarchy and cJao;s,
mdividual initiative and ecological imperatives'. \ Akbar Ahmed on
the other hand argues that although it was an intervention, Bnt1sh
administratton ultimately preserved the traditional, pre modern
order of Pakhtun tribal society and C<lpturcd a sociologically 'pure'
expression of tribal social structure and values. 'I• An analytical position
perhaps lies between these two arguments, in understanding 'trib.tl
unanimity' and the genealogical order as a political construct," yet
accepting the currency of the discour'e of tribe.
It is\\ithoutdoubt that the single dimensionality ofthe undcrstand-
m~ of the frontier Tribal Arc~ was an inaccurate representation of
social organi arion of the Pakhrun highbnd communities. This was
m-ealed by the clum!>yaccounting for non-genealogically linked groups
74 Terence Ranger, The lnvcnuon ofTmd•ucmm Coloma! Africa' in Terence
Ranger and Eric Holhbawm (cd .), 7'h. lnwntron ofTraditiM (Cambridge,
1 3), pp. 211-62.
t> RO I" \; hoi , S11tlrng tiN Fronlrn (l\2rachi, 2001), pp. 6-9.
76. Ak r ~ med, Pd}t11rr futtD"'J ami S«rt~'l (l.(mdon, 1980)
77 l>.t H. rt u~t$ th• formulation 1n D.t\ id II art and Akbar S. A.hmeJ,
(cds ), /Ja, in Tribal S«ictin (London, 1984), tntnxJuct:ion.
 26 FRO~TI£R Of FAITII
in the region. Phenomena like the yC<U'ly pas age of the P0\\1ncWt
traders from Bokhara aero the Coma! pa into Dcra I null Klun
in the Punjab were understood and repre~nted a' nomadic mlW
participation in the regional trading sysrem.78 Ho\\C\'Cr the \"Cf'i
transit agreements negotiated between the Powindahs and tribes and
clam along their trade route , and the compact:!. and rel.uionships
the~e engendered, demonstrated rhat the Powindah tribe wa not
governed by the n.trrow .tnd linear soda! and geographic relationships
sugge!.tcd by the tribal Kenealogy. 1 Similarly inca es "here unrelated
communities were settled with or near another genealogiall)
homogeneous tribe these received only pa-;sing mention as 'vassals'
or dependent settlers and .tnom;llies within the system of tribe-cbn
social organisation, in the tribal genealogies drawn up by colonial
udministr;uor~. 110
An is~>uc of gre.uer polit1cal significance was that the rran ribed
tnb;\1 genealogic~ which identified individuals with representatJ\'t
authority for ..1 tnbe d1d not allow for dissent or re-negotiation of
authority within tribal group:.. Identified representative members
of the tribes or dans were allo~ated large per.;onal allowances which
confirmed thw authority. A letter to the Political Agent Khyber
from two Zakk:t Khcl 11Wiih dil>cu' ing thelt efforts to en ure mba!
commitmtnt uggc t the ort of impact the colonial understandin
of the tribal ) rem had:
We collected 111! the /...:1kb Khd ...\\C hdd manyjirgas with them and
soltcited and entreated them in every W2). hut for all the exernons tlut
we made, they gave u o tlat refu al ...we ho~ char, ii men. cartridges ett
are given tu u , we will firmly occupy Baz.ur and break the b:ldthone ot
the Zakka Khcl. The other Afridt "ill not take tt ill, and che ~rms and
~:.~uses o(raid \\til he c.\tirpatcd .•• \\'hen we, the Kh)ber malil:.s, had the:
Kh) ber Rille Companies, \\ith the government's help. and the allowmccs
78. •rhc Pnwtmbh Trnde' tn •rraJc R<lutcs to Afghani ran', Parlaamcntan
Papers. 1874,p. II J, Bl , RBC V/4 session IS74 v.49.
79. \Vans ~luhamrn:ul \\'11m, •fJgh.mutan's Dmmy .:mJ thl FAJtrm P.uhhn:.
(Peshawar, I'.198), p. 105. \Vuir argues thanhe Powulthhs were a protected
group. whom mo 1 nf the regtonal dans had pledged to protec.t and 11\-mgt
m asc uf any hann coming to a membc:r of their rnbc.
RO. Dtttumary ifthl P.uhan TrikJ, p. ii, i\lc:rk. Tlx Moht1'U1nd1, pp. ~ l-6.
THE ~ORTH-WEST fRO~ fiFR I"RIDAI . ARJo:AS 27
in our banJ.., we used n '"llakc a vel') good sarisbta [agreement) of the
Khw.r~ and of all the: Zakka KhcJ.tl
~ the A.tiidi representation demonstrated, the Briti h catcgori,J·
tlOnS of the tribes made hierarchies, which may otherwi e ha\c been
subde, ab.;oJure, and encouraged a coer~ivc as en ion of representative
authority.
Incident!> ofdissent indica red the tcnsiom created by the social and
political model of the tribe. In thec-a e of the orne d.tn , \cnlementli'
with the British were not reached for many years. The Or.tha1 Stun
Khel in Tirah refused to take allowances initi.tll} •.tnd were onl)
brought into the allowance sy~tem in 1899.1l Thi~ rcfus;tl emerged
in resistance to the British politic;tl .md social model of the tribe.
Some indJvtduals deemed the idea of collective trib.ll re:.ponsib1hty
to the Brittsh government as 'absurd'.11 But others, most often
those benefiting from the monetary reward~ offered by the Brimh,
defended the model of the unanimous tribe and worked to ensure
mtcmal coordination and guarantee the actions of all members of the
tnbe.
Although the British conceprualising of tribe skewed social
tnlances and nusrepresented the ~od;tl po~ition of some regional
groups. seeking the 'truth' of tribal ocial organisation our~ide of and
untouched by colonial discourse is to an extent to start from the most
basic prejudice of the colonial administrative :.y~tem that envi. ioned
1 temporally and ideologically isolated tribal re;tlity. There was no
autonomous tribal mind. A dialogue was taking place between the
British and the local Pakhrun population in the north west. The
definition of the tribe was nor impo~ed-it was an ;tcccptable model
rooted in 'some reality of patrilineal kinship' groups that 'cooperated
1. 'Lc:tter frnm \hlib Jabbar 1\.han and 'Jur Ahmc:c.l Khotn, ZJklu Khcls,
to the PA Kh}bc:r, Tir.th, 4 0d. 1904' m Fndthur~s uf a \CUtt de pa1eh
to His M ~e.,ry\ Secretary of Sr.uc fi1r Indio&, 5 j.JOu.~ry liJOS, Z;tklu K.hel
AtTain, p. 204 OIOC UPS/10/45.
n Rs 1000 wai sancuonc:d for tl e Tirah Stun 1\hc:l in 1R113 hut the dan
rtfwcd the alloWlUlce Sec 'Statement ofTribal Allowan~l:l', 1931' OlOC
UPS/12/3150.
Extra t from Khyber Politu:al Dtat), ol .May 1907, in 'Attitude of 7.-ab
Khcb, dtscu r n with jirxa as to .!i posal ol allowantc , I907 tn 1\onh
WClt Frontier 7...-kka Khel Afl':tirs, pp. 65-7. OIOC L/P,,/10/45.
 28 FRO:-.=TIER OF FAJTH
against external threar',14 combincd with the admini rrarivetcchniqucs
and discourse of frontier-building.
Production and reproduction of the Pakhtun gcne:U~ through
history had been inspired by religious, literary and political intluenm
on tribal self-conception. The British ethnographic project was jus:
another part of this history. As compilations of myths of desttnt
and living memory of the time, the Pakhtun shajarah or gen~
formal1scd ,\ sy~tem of membership in the Afghan or Pakhrun ethnic
group. Seventeenth to nineteenth-century literary produaion of
shajamhs in the eastern Pakhtun areas was focused on 'authenticating
n Pakhnm descent narrative, but were largely sponsored by, or linked
to the interests of, the court at Delhi. T he Mughal emperor Jehangu
commissioned the very early work Makhzan-i A./khani, in 1613.15 Thc
Yusufzai Akhund D arweza's Tazk.irot-al Abrar wa Ashror, wrirtm
around 1623, elaborated a Pakhtun descent narrative, focusi"6
on lineage of the Yusufzai, with a view to morally and socb.ll)
condemning the .tnti -Mughal movement of the Roshaniyyas. One
of the l.tst tcxb of this variety was Tarilt.h-i Poshtun, a comprehensh~
annotated sh11jarah comm1ssioned at the Bhopal court in the bte
nineteenth century as a tribute to the Pakhtun ancestry of the royal
family.n The tribal genealogy was also commonly invoked in ir oral
form in which it was fluid as it was deeply influenced bv the personal
affiliations of the narrator. In addition to commemodting a histOIJ
of ettlement, the orally recaed genealogies were romantic chims to
a .;hared Pakhtun heroic past, and were often performed by poets
such .ls Khushal Khan Khattak. With the beginning of the Bricish
84 Sec ChJrlr l mdholm, 'lmageli of the Pathan: The usefulness of colocW
ethnography' in C.harlc:s Lindholm (ed.), Fronli" Pmp«tiuJ, p. 15.
85 ~ce \lichols, .fitttlmg tiN Fronti", pp. 25-33, for the production of an wly
c ~tern Pakhtun diS<:oun.c: of tribe and ethnicity.
8b. The Rtnhani))J' were a miUcnarian group led by Ptr Ro~han B~ba in a
itandoff Jgain~t AkbJr'' army ncar the end of the sooeenth centun. 5«
Nichols, Stilling thr Frontirr, pp. 36-37, also -.ee Khahq Ahmed ~­
AY.Jran,/ R,ltgion (Delhi, n.d.), p. 68.
87 Sh ·r ~luhamm;~d Gand;~pur, Taril/ri Pashhln (Kuachi, 1991).
8R 1\hu h.,.! Khan him elf ervcd 01.\ m~p•rat:ion to a rwentieth-ccntwy P.khMl
writer, .;\1ecra Jan S>':l.l. Syal quote Khw.hal Khan in hi~ mtrodU<.'"lion to bh
comptlallon ofP.&khrun gencalogi~
THE :-.IORTH·WI:;ST FRO:-:TJJ::R TRIM!. ,\H.t-; ,\ ~ 29
ethnographic project, oral recitation of the genealogy ·wns u cd to
dairn dan legitimacy and recognition by Oi trier Commi ioners.
Briti h cartography-ethnography wa simply another embodiment
of the 'mdigenous' narrative of tribal descent. The contributiom of
the frontier Pakhtuns to the colonial di,course of tribe and frontier il>
best C\idenced in repre:,enration:. by 'tribes' to admini tmtors in the
Tn'bal Areas and Pec;hawar. These group accepted the wnceptual
fnternity and organi ational structure of the tribe to negotiate the
term of their autonomy within the parameters of the Tribal Areas
admini rrative-ethnogrnphic construction. To do chic;, genealogically
linked dans organised representativejirgas to negoti.uc compacb with
the administration. By participating in the S)stem of aclmini trJtion,
puries from within the Pakhtun region were contributing ro the
colonial defmition of the tribe. ~
An inadvertmt arena-Yaghistan, 'land ofthtfru'
References to the Tribal Areas as 'Yoghrstan' were made a~ early as
1868 in colonial titerarure. .o Colonel Brazier Creagh of the Indian
Anny commented on the significance of tht term when dc~cribing
his u:wels of 1893-4:
when we went to the fronrier it wa~ called Yaghillfln (plundering land); it
"-.u a forbidden land, and no Engli~hm3n had ever been there before ... It
w.u im~•ble to go [in~ide); and if you did your bone:. would be left
there.fl
The word Yaghistan, derived ostensibly from yaghi that had diver e
meanings from oily or slippery, to uncontrollable or unm.tnage<tble,
1'25 also in u~e in Mghanistan to mean the 'land of the rebellious'
daring the nineteenth century, in what Christine Noelle terms a
'dWectical confrontation' between the eastern Pakhtuns and the
89 See LaJ Baha on the agreement~ rc:.\chc:d bcrwccn the Bmi\h and
Mohmands. AfricL , \Vazin., ere., N WF P lldminulrollion unJ.-r BnttJh
R.Mk,J90J-/919(Lahore,1978).
Mccr ~loonshee \ 1unphool, 'On Gtl~it and Chura!' Pr()(ttding1 ojthr Rf1J01
GtDgr.phir.S«itty qj'Lomlon, 13,2 ( 1868 9), pp. 130-J.
91 Den)" Brav and Colonel Brazier Creagh, 'The I lighbnd~ of Pen.im
B.t!uchistan· D•.cu~Mon', G. r;graphtr}Po~rn11/, 78, 4 (O<t. 1931 ), p. 340.
 30 FRO:-.ITIER OF FAITII
state.92 Amir AbJur Rahman used the term in hi memoirs also m
refer generally to the 'unruly' e;htCm Pakhrun popu!Juion who \\-crt
to be divided ben...-een Afglunbtan and British India.'1
Between 1844 ~md 1900 the tcnn began to be refined in Indo-
Afghan literarurc to retcr to the 'independent' tribe of the 1hndu
1\.u~h. a political de ignation of 'tribal type' that was beginning to
corrc~pond to the politi\.'nl· trategic identification of the highland-
frontier.94 While the Afghan usc of the term had clearl} not bcco
.;o ~pecific, the Briti h negotiation of the Pakhrun ethnic bloc
tletermincd the highland Pakhrun to be the y.1ghis. The drawing 0!
the Durand Line dem.mdcd the Afghan definition of the same tribes
as the yaghir-thosc Ollr!olde the amirate's sphere of direct authorin
and control. In his I 899 article in the Geogn1phic ]otm1111, Colonel
Raverty of the Indian Army further refined the term Yagltistun to rd'cr
ro those Pakhruns who resided specifically within the tribal tracts ~
The geography ofTribal Area" separation was inherently coloured In
the myths of warrior tribe and the impossibility of Jdministranon
in the region, reinforced, no doubt, by the publication of w·m ron
Chur~hill's account of the luttle~ between the Briti>h and t~ Mad
1\luUa in 1\lalakand in 1898.96
Loo~e accommod.ttion of the region within the borders ofa rapid!)
changing twentieth-century British India may have consolidated a
frontier but it did little to di!.pcl pos~ibiliries for armed mobilisation
within the region. The di cour cs that had created thi' region and
made it an imperial frontier al o circumscribe<!_ it in a manner that
deeply influenced religiou , politic-al and military orguni ation 0\'C'
the century to come.
92. l'ocllc, Stau ur1.! 7hht rn Nrnttl'l'nth-«ntury Afgh.lnista'l, p. 162.
13. Kh.tn, Tlx !.fftofnh.lur Ralmwrt, p. 159.
1 rccc:nt srudy, Brj"Qrr Ta/iloan Gm. ,,/oxitf of the Afghan jihad (California,
94. Charles ~1. .\lacgregor, CmtralAsw. Part I, rol, 2 (Calrutt.a, l i.J), p. 1
quoteJ in :-:ocne,
Stott nntl Triht, p. 162.
95. II. G. Raver!)', 1ne Grograph11:al Terms 11rah• anJ •Afglwlisu:l•
GtOgraphualjwrna/(189'.1), pp. SH
96 Winston Chun:hUl, The ~lalaland Field Force:' (1898}, rqmnt m Fr=hm
and Hl:r.J(~cw York, 1995).
2
ISLA...'\1IC REVlVALISl\1 A'JD SUFISM
~'\lONG THE TRIBAL PAKHTlf.'.JS
Underlying the ethnic-tribal continuum that was consolidated into
the frontier and the Tribal Areas .u the end of the nineteenth century
was a network of religious ftuH:non.u-ie:., the mullas. Thi~ w.1s the
ptrimuridi line of Akhund Abtlul GhafTur, unafied by the chain of
transmi sion of knowledge passed down from the spiritual·rcligiou
instructor, the pir, to his devotees, the murid1. The transfornution
of the line under the influent:e of reformist ideology during the
nineteenth and twentieth cenrurie:. was concurrent with the politkal
procc~ converting the eastem Pakhrun highlands into the frontier
of Briti h India, and the pedagogy and politic:. of member~ of this
ptrimuridi line came to dominate religious organisation in the
autonomous Tribal Areas.•
A \'Cty important srudy of this pirirnuridr line has already been written by
the anthropologist David Edward , 1/m;n ofthr Agr: A1oral Faultlrnn on
tht Afghan Fronlirr (California, 1996). Edward ' exceptional srudy of ahe
Hadda l\full2s piritual life and his rnr~rrdr-primarily tho e who remained
on the: Afghan ide of the border after the delimitation of the Dur01nd
Une-recounts iru.tanccs of the lladda \ lulla'5 magical and temporal
powers and influence to explore rtugious belief~\ 11 'lived reallty'. In lm more
2002}, Edward applies h1 under-tanding of the liadda Mulla'• \pirinul
life and soci21 ~·tion in late nineteenth ccnrury Afghani t.lll w gain
better umkr&tandmg of rdigiuu pohu~s posed 1n oppo ttJon to the So\iet
am-asion. ~ly undn'!'t200.mg of the lladd.J ~1ulla and the ~entrahry of ht
spmrual line and legacy in Tnhal An-a' rdigiou orpni arion i deeply
in1luenccd by Ed~-a.rds'compclhng dcscnpttons of thts tlu we character.
 32 FRO~TIER OF rAITII
Discourses ofauthenticity: tht tazldrah and tht Sufi silsila
Systems of Sufi rehgtous practice in Afghanistan and northern India
were varied and widely dispersed. The Naqshbandiyya t.luJadd1din'2
silsila or Sufi order of the nineteenth and twentieth ccnturv Pakhrun
reg10ns was one of many Sufi sisilas in the region. 'Jaq~hbandl))'2·
Mujaddidiyya lariqa or method was based on the teachings of the
sevenreenth-cenntry north-Indian Su.tl philosopher he1kh Ah~
Suh10di, also known as Mujaddid AlfSaru (1564-1624), andde\'elopcd
further by his spirirual and methodological succes or, hah Will Ulhh
(1703-1762) 2 whose writin~ elaborated Sheikh Ahmed 1rl 1ndi'
emphasis on shan 'a as the basis for social practice.' .1q hbandl))'2-
Mujaddidiyya thought presented a means for confronung the 'cri,is of
!slam', meshing Sufism with a return to the text of the <2!•ran, h,;Jtth
and authoritative commentaries 1n order to re-introduce prinLJple of
indhridualised religious pmctice and de-emphasise the role of the prr
as spirirual medhuor. It was rare however, in the Pakhrun regions,
for Naqshbandtyya-Mujaddidiyy.l lariqa to be practised e;~clu~i'"c~ .
~deriyya, Suhrawardt and Chjsbtiyya thought intermigled ,~;th
the Naqshbandiyya Mujaddidiyya in the oral transmission of tttriq:z..
which \v:ts itself open to innovation by the sages Within the order.
Because of the secrecy surrounding the substance of ufi ped-agogy,
the fact of adherence by murids to their pirs was more socially evident
than the content of rhe1r spiriruallearning. In its social, economic
and pohtical context, the pirimuridi line \v:ts as important as a (ocia3
instirution as an ideological trend.
The line of the oral tran~mis~ion of knowledge from pir to muriJ
w.h cxpr~scd in the production of la:dlirahs or compibtions of
biographies of religious authorities. Tazlirahs traced the ped2~
lineage of religious authorities in a rughly formilised narrative c.rucia!
to e~tablishing the authenticity of spirirual authority within silsi/as.
The strength of the line of transmission of knowledge was the mark
of interpretive authority-a varying degree of emphasi was plaetd
2 ~e San1d Athar Abba ltni, MIIJitm &1!ttV11isl .\ffiWtnn~/1 tn Ncrtlxm
l'llita ,~·1& Sixtmuh anJ Stwl'ltrmth CDtttniu (Delhi, 1965).
3 l),.c ~larcu K. llcrmanscn's cxccllcnt l:t'a1'U.lation of rhi imponmt "'Otk-
Tf Ccrulusiw Arglimmt.from God Sl»h 11'4/t Allah of Ddhis H11ffil1 A
ai·Boltgha (Lcidcn, 1996).
I L\J\tiC RE\'1\'Al.IS~I \1'\D SUFIS~! 33
on spintual intuitivene and upemanmll power to complement that
spirirual authentidty. 4
The orgmisarion of the pirimuridi line of Akhund Gh.ttlur
m the eastern Pakhrun highland~ provided a living account nf the
sub tance of religiou:. formation out ide the highly intcllecruali cd
and rationalised lazl:irah form. The Jilri/a was a crucial point of
cohesion within the spectrum of e.• tern Pakhrun I lam given the
mm· ~ Terent bases for rdigiou tatu and identin acros the
rtgic., ~me religiou~o categories uch lb say)'iJ and m~.m de ~.ribcd
pe!'SW!1..l.~tc..:. said to descend from the Prophet ~luhammad. Briti h
records de~ribe the e as 'caste' categories within the -.oci;tlland ~.':lpc
of the tribe Qazu were legal function.1ries of the Atgh.tn st.ltc,
often trained in madrasas. Akhund and huzral were tcnns of re~peu
reserved for piou!> people who may or may not have also po c~ ed
qualities that sayyids, miyam and q11zis {)(> esc;cd. The u e of the
term hadJhah implied that the rcligiou~ leader was descended from,
himself pos~e:-,ed, temporal power. Thi !J)t category w,1 not
rtsen"Cd for religious functionarie , but certain religious function.uie
could po se s this title. It is impo~:.ible to gcner.ilise the function
or sran1s of all religious leader~, given these distinctions between
them. I fowever, very different per:.onalitics came together under the
ideological umbreUa of a Sufi silsila.
Study of the evolution of Islam in the Tribal Areas is hampered
by rhe ab ence of literary production by which to trace reilg10us
mterpretations or the precise narure of religious practice in the
Pakhrun areas. But the ta:dt.irah form provide:. a template by which to
consider the strucrures of religiou organi~arion in the Tribal Areas-
the chain of tran~mission of knowledge. Thi ba)ic principle of the
i.lJila formation-the transmi sion of religious knowledge from pir
to muridand the assertion of thio; pedagogic line- joined the religious
functionaries of the Tribal Areas in a pirimuridi fraternity. Coupling
colonial inteUigence information with h.tgiographic literature makes
It possible to trace the genealogy of this rhaaM of the si/sila and the
fraternal compact between the 'mullm' of the Tnbal Areas who c-.1rnc
to dominate religious organisation in tho e areas.
4 Anhur Buehler, Slffr flmt ofthe Propbn tk lruiwn Naqshbarultyya tlnd tht
Ruuft!N Mttli41tn.K Sufi Sha)kh (South Cllrohna, 1998). ·
34 J.'RO~TI ER OF FAITH
Firs and Sufis among tht Pakhtuns up to tht nintlunth cmtury
The Pakhrun communme of the north-w~r frontier had ~nlcd in
Sw·at, Bajaur and the Pe hawar valley during the Yusufza.i migrations
in the early sixteenth cenrury. Religious functionarie~ wert death
part of a political and odal landscape from the beginning of thest
migrations. Pir Rosh an or Bayazid Ansari (1525-60) who later staged
a revolt against the Mughal Akbar; Sayyid Ali Ghawwas Tirmill
(d. 1583) and I Iazrat Akhund Panju Baba (d. 1630), all came to
prominence among the Yusufzai or Mandanr clans soon J.fter tbt
Peshawar valley was settled, establishing bases where they could
practise and train their murids. In some cases the clan-p.mons of
pirs were more generous than others, as in the case of Shaikh Adml
Milli who was granted lands by the YusufLal-Mandanr dans in tht
I lashtnagar Peshawar Area in the early sixteenth cenrury.~ M1an~
Jahanzeb of Swat recollected in his memoirs that the Yusufzais h3d
granted permanent, pnvarcly-owned lands to the 'religious families'
when they settled the Peshawar valley, while land tenure \Yal> fixrd
at only ten years for tribal land owners.• This was because Pakhrun
communitie had accorded a mediatory role ro pirs, who often acted
as neutral arbitrJtors 10 dtsputcs.7
Mughal accounts suggest that emperors took advantage of tbt
organi..,Jtion of society around th~e pirs, vesting an arnounr of
authority in them as the eyes and ears of the imperial govemmml
in outlying and politically volatile regions. The ]thangir Na111ilb ~
orne in~ighr to the nature of Mughal patronage of a religious l~tr
in the Pakhrun areas. Jchangir, a faithful patron of the NaqshbandiY)'2
order, gr.1nted allowance to several pirs in rerum for thetr 'parricubr
love and loyalty' to him~elf as Mughal Emperor.• Aurnngub also
appealed to pirs in the Pakhrun areas, using them as a mean' of
5. In ljazulllaq OlJddu i, Taritray Sujja-yt Snrhad (Lahore, 1966), pp. 5.3-4.
quoted from Akhund Darweu·s Tazltrat-u/Abrar WaAJbrar.
6. t.liangul Jahan:zeh and Fredcrik Barth, TIH lAst Wah ifSulill (Oslo, 19S5
p. 24.
7 OiJddu,l, 1adtrl1)• p. 439.
8 1\hwaja Q1 1m, Sl aykh P1r and l\lulla Asiri were some of the religious mnl
honoured w1th )ehany.1r'~ attenriom. See Wheeler Thackston' cranslauoo
of the 7iau~·ij.thwngm Wa.,hingron, DC, 1999}, pp. 145, 205, 273.
JSLA:.IIC RE\' 1\'.'\ LIS\1 r\!'l) SUI-IS"I 35
asserting state controi.J \Vithout a functioning machinery of state
in the region, organisation and mobilis;mon of ocierv wo~s effected
through local religious funcoonaries. State patrona~~ of pin in the
Pashrun areas reinforced their social authority and per;onal wealth,
ID2king it possible for thbe pin to build up large woq{pmperties and
domimte regional religious organi ·arion.
The arbitrator-role was formalised by the Afghan tate, which
accorded a juristic role to pirs in the creation of the 'modern' tate,
during the eighteenth and nmeteenth ccnturic . Ahm..:d 5hah
AbdaL (1723-73) engaged the Naq,hbandiyya madrasa through
Kunduz, Tashkent, Kokand and Balkh, in the eighteenth century,
in oppo ition to Chinese penetration in Turke:,tan. 11 Dunng Amir
0 t ~luhammad Khan's reign (1826 63), religious authorities
voere brought into a state-monitored domau1, in part to regularise
a legal code for the nascent and fragmented Afghan state.u
In the absence of mechanisms of state governance and il strong
central command, the Dost Muhammad Khan regime depended
on village-level religious functionaries to c.reatc and implement
bws, to register births, deaths and marriages, .tnd to act as the
9. ~red from 'Munaqib HaJi Bahadur Sah1b Kohan' an Qlatldu i, Tazliray,
p. 3iJ. Khushal Khan Khattalc.. a Pakhrun Mahhnd poet philosopher, was
in\1tcd to serve me Mughal emperor Aurangub in return torj.r.~in of land.
Khartalc believed himself ~lighted by Aurang7..ch and rejc~:rcd hif authonry,
resigning hasjagm and refu ing ro erve rhe emperor, and was subsequently
imprisoned. See Mutalht"loal Khushal Kh,;m Khallu~. /lu Urdu Tatj,z'm,Jh,
introduwon bv Doetor Sayyid Anwar·ul·H~cl (Pe~hawu, 1956) AI o
sec Khushal Khm's poem, K~h Tu,., SamJho ~th Yth Duniy11 KJ'' //at, 10
MuJAlhi"b11t pp. 174-91. Pir Haji wa w~mcd by his friend not to go to
Delhi, but he insisted dut he would, ro repre$Cnt the truth at any C<'•ts.
10. Muhammad Ibrahim Ac:a'i, Ditllonary of Pmhtun Qa/I,Jt!t I.RW 11nd
Pur:uhmnl (K.bul, 1978), quoted in Wuir, Afghanistan's Dt"slrny, p. 105,
124.
11. Sec Robert MeChe ney, Waqf at Balkh: A Srudy of the Endowments .11
the Shrine of'Ah Ibn Abi Talab' (PhD the~i\, Princeton UniVc:r~ity, 1973),
p. 300; and]C>lo Com mans, Ru~oJtiN Indo Ajglwt Empirt(Dclht, 1999), pp.
64-6.
12. Olivier Roy argue~ that the Nghan rate'• dnve towards legitimi arion and
modcmisanon led Armr [)o, t ~l uhammad (1835-63} to employ 'uk1ma
and ampo.c s&rri'a as a mean of rationali mg me control and cunaiJing
tnbalism. blom anti RniJtanu in AJXhuniJiun (Cambndgc, 1986), p. 15.
36 JIRO:"'TIER m· FJ\ITII
mouthpiece of the tate. h also u:.ed religiou leader to u wu........
militarily the far reache of the ea tern Pakhtun land . Armr OM
i\luhammad had nboli hed ta.~es for the ea tern Pakhtuns I
the tate paid allowance to the clans in the Kh) her region
the Peshawar valley, in return for which the tribe were requ::
to provide military ~ 'i tance in men and logi tical support r
Afghan Gmernrnent. The loo e structure of the earl) ninet
century Afghan c;rate and its reliance on religiou leaders
that civil admini tr.nion in mall outlying ,·ilJages wu m
hand of lnl\11 religious )e;uler!>, giving them the freedom and
authority to dispcn~e justice individually, \\ithout reference
precedence or .1 leg.tl code. 11 These religious leader. made d
on m.llters of l.1w und mhcritance, and were most numerou m
E.tstern and Southern Provinces where '>hortagc of farm -land
dcric.\1 <>l't'U~Mtion the most popular form of livelihood. £,-en A
Abdur R.thman who was committed to bringing waqti under
~upen;J,Jon alloc.ued 126,000 Afghan rupees co religiou figures
'Wtl'l.ifil in KJnd.thar alone in 1877 8. 1' Becau~c pin often t
the patronage of the 'rate ,1nd became invested with the authorirr
of the n1lcr, the ubstance of religious authority exte
the pedagogic and divine-intercessionary mandate •
•md became linked to temporal power.
Abdul Gh.tffiJr (1 793-1878), ~on of a Safi-~ lohmand U4.1~.....
from upper Swat, received hl first training 10 Sur, tariqa from
I lauat Ji of the K.tbul ~lujaddidiyya line, in P~hawar in the
p.trt of the nineteenth century. Abdul Ghaffur's trainin:: with ~
Ji w2s cut short when he was accused of nor foU0\\1ng the tanq.
enough. 15 J lc then wenr to Akhund ~1uhammad Sh<" b, a pu
h td taken !J,lit it the ~deriV)-a order, bur also in the '\a~ hbmdn
Suhmwardi and C.. h1shtiyya orders. Abdul Ghaffiu recc:.!\ ed his
rigorou:. tr.tin1ng from Akhund Muhammad Shoaib and t
1J. Scm•il Naw td, Rtlrx11;UJ Rnf<;nu fr, Sfll·i.U CIJangt ;, Aj~hanist~m 101~
(California, 1998).
14 1"\odlc:, Statra11J Tribt, p. 27R.
15. Muhamm.ad A •f Khan, ' lntrodu~'tion', 10 l\1iangul Abdul Wudud
'J'ht Su;ry t~J Swat ( P~hawar, 1963), p. xliu.
16. <ll••ldu •· 'l'ar.lrrav. p. 559.
I LA~llC Rf.VIVAl.IS\1 AND UIISM 37
multiple silsila affiliations, raking bait in the '\ q hbandiyp17 , well
as the ~deriyya silsila.' l\Iultiple silsila .lflihanon ''a-. commonly
a feature of Indian ufi teaching. 19 ~1uhammad c;,hoaih himself
taught all four tariqas to his rudent and Abdul Ghafiur refined and
practiced' th.i intermingled teaching after hi pir's death in 1819.»
The multiplicity of silsila affw:ltion) was unified by the charismatic
personality of the pir and rran mi sion of knowledge through hi
person.
Abdul Ghaffur attained the tide of akhund a a m.•rk of hi
learning and mastery of tariqa. Popular account of Abdul GhatTur's
life de cribed his dedication to prayer and his ascetic life ryle until
1835 \\hen the Mghan Amir Do t Muhammad Khan began an
ofTen ivc against the Sikh kingdom of Ranjit Singh (1780-1839)
wtth its capital in Lahore. Amir Dost Muhammad appe;tled directly
to religious authorities to sanction his rule, referring to the campaign
against the Sikhs as a 'jihad and sent appeal to the Yusuf1..1i pirs to
ralJv /ashk.Jrs to hls aid. 21 Ak.hund Chaffur was recruited into this
~
effort, and he brought 'many ghazis and studcnh' to the battlefield at
Peshawar:12 It was after his political engaRtment with and as)istancc
to Dost l\luhammad Khan that Akhund ChafTur attained his great~t
prestige and importance .
In rerum for his assistance to Am1r Do~t Muhammad Khan,
Abdul Chaffur was awarded lands 10 war, Lundkhwar and Mardan
amon'7 the Yusufzai. 21 These rewards were con iderablc-the
Akhund's langarkbana (a combination of an open community kJtchen,
entertaining quarters and almshouse) .u Saidu in lower Swat fed 500
17 Khan, introduction, Tht Story of Sw<ll, p. xl1it. Kho~n <JUOtCS J Briri~h
miliwy-political officer, Bellew, stating that Abdul Ghafiur 1ook b,m in
the Naqshbandiyya order.
1 . lbMJ., p. 551.
19 This trend was generally recogni~able aero'~ Nonh India at tim time.
Claudia Liclxskind norc:t. that the mJ.i~~tltl nashrn of the Khanqah yi
~miya pa~d on inhiarion into multiple ordcl'\. Sec: flitly on rts Knw
(Delhi, 1998), p. 141.
20 From HayaJ-t Afghani, quoted 10 Qyddu•i, Ta:Jtra)', p. 559.
l l ~odle, Stall tmd Tril>t, p. 15.
22.. llnytz~-r AJihilt~r, pp. 209-11, quoted tn Quc.idu i, 'lin:Jrr.1y, p. 559
23 JbMJ.. p. 560.
38 1-'ROZ..Ilt:R OF FAITII
men a da\o md hi \\calth wa ufficient ro prO\ide for the runni.ng
the rate ot S\\ :n e t.tbli hed 70 years later by his grandson M~
Abdul Wudud. 4 Abdul Ghaffur's reputation attracted de,·otees from
great distances, rurnin~ Saidu into a thriving dty whose econotiW
revolved around the langarJ:h,ma The langar~nu and the Akhun&
reputation were up ported by the sale ofghu from the 1\khund' ~
herds oflive:.to~k. Dunng thc'e years Abdul Gh:aifur conferred on a
cheme for a united throne of Swat and selected a c ndidare for ,. a
In 1849 Akhund Abdul Ghaffur nominated mid Akbar _Juh.
a San1d 10 the line of the Ptr Baba, as the amar ot .1n I Iamie su:e
of w,\t. Sa)'\·id Akh.tr Sluh, a descendant of Ptr Saba of
had served under ~ayyad \hmed of Rai Barcilly a a sc retary, so
he brought knowledge of administration and hl.lmic juri prudena
with him. 211 Yet S.1yyid Akbar was a weak ruler and produce-d no
c.1pablc heir!>, ,\t least in the opinion of the Akhund. Akhund 4hib
financed and propped up his candidate for c.ight }ears until ~'}"Ja
Akbar Bad h.th\ dc,tth in 1857 when the A.khund a surned control
him elf.
The development ofAkhund Ghaffu.r'spirimuridilinc v r. t om
the result of Afghan p.1tronage and the emergence of th~.. t stttt:
it!> establishment ~tnd development were deeply tied to h .. I~
anfluences on ham Ahmed Shah Abdali had induced de,cendants
Mujaddid Alf Sana ro move to Kabul after his ra~d on Delhi .... . --
On their arrival and with patronage from the court of Ahnl\.... ~ _
and later Timur Sh.th (1772-93) and Shah Zaman (1793 -1
gained pre-emmer cc at the Afghan court. They were :llso ~·cd
land in Kabul, Koha~tan, j alalabad, KancWtar and Her.at Where
the influence of the '\ q hbandiyya-~1ujaddidiyya line ~\ to ·
tronge t.29 TI1e ~lupddJdiyya silsi/a 1n Afghanistan produced three
24. Khan, Tht StfWJ I s... .tt, p. I.
25. ~luhammad A~rf 1\h<tn, 7jmlJJ r Rry.n.Jt- r Swt~t (Lahore 195 ', rqxt::!.
Swa1 2001), p. 83
26. Flay11t-r Ajgbom, pp. 209-211 in O!Jddu~i. TlnArrt1y. p. 559 and Khm. 1&
Story cjSwat, p. l~•ii .
27, QudJu~i. TazJ:iray, p. 553.
28 !Oun, TtlriAh-• Rip . . · : S.. at, p. 64.
29. Ibid., pp. 279-81; ant! '\aWJd, Rrll~~~~~ &~nsn, pp. 15--6.
ISLA"IIC REVI\'ALI \I ,\:\1> SL FIS\1 19
aujor linc~-the Hazrats of her Baz.aar bra cd an Kabul, the 1lazr.u
of Karrokh in Herat, and the ll:mat' of Charbagh in Jablab.td.30
These pcrsonalirie were deeply inve~ted in anter·tribal competitions
for power, and performed the dasturbandi (the coron<ttion or,
literal.l), tying of the turban) ceremonie:. at the succe:.sion of the title
of amir.S1 Akhund Ghaffur maintained do e links with the Kabul·
iwed religiou~ leader Hafiz Ji, a 1\1buli ~lujaddidiyya and the mir
iz {head preacher) of Kabul, and hi) son, al~ known a I laliz
j1, who r~ther were central definers of Amar Do.,t ~luhammad
Khan' religiou policy both dunng the 1835 Sikh war, and aftcr.32
Hafiz Ji had olicited Akhund Ghaffur' a' astance in the Afgh:tn
mobilisation again:.r the Stkh longdom and greatly rrengthened the
bner' reputation by his patronage.
The econd great ideological influence on Akhund Ghaffur
was the incorrectly termed 'wahhabi' mc>\'ement led by ayyid
Ahmed of Rai Bareilly.33 Thh movement, initiated in the 1820~,
wu a militant interpretation of h<th Wali Ullah's call to c.oca.u
and political reform. The 'wahhabi ', led by Shah lc;matl, Sh.1h
Wali Ullah's grandson, and Shah Ismail\ student and clo.e fnend,
ayyid Ahmed of Rai BareiUy, led campaigns against both the Sakh
kingdom, and recalcitrant local Pakhtun tribes in order to create
a space in which Shah Wali Ullah's vision could be realised. The
movement culminated in the Battle of Balakor in 1831 in which
yid Ahmed was killed. Many of Sayyid Ahmed's mujahidin
remained on at Buner in rhe south of Swat under the protection of
Akhund Ghaffur and began a new ansurrecrion against the British
m 1862 under his leader:.hip.34 This movement was termed the
IDO\-ement of the 'Hindu~tani fanatie:.' by the British and widely
30 Nawid, ~ligious Ru~mts, p. 16.
31 Ibid., p. 17.
ll Nocllc, Stalt and Trik, pp. 15, 56; ce also Nawid, Rtligu;us Rttf'Dnus,
pp. 20-1.
13 See Qeyamuddin Ahmad, Th Walth.1!Ji MIJ'f)(mtnl m lndta (Calcurta,
1966).
J.4 List ~ Ut:Jint P~cns m A.Jkhanutlln 1888 Srmla, 1888). OlOC U
PS/2ol26.
40 I RO~TIER OF fi \ITII
advertised by the wahh:abi trial~. and then in Homer's boo O:tr
lt~dia11 Musalmom.35 Ir i clear that during hie; time in the Pakh
area Saniu Ahmed had al o truck up a clo(.e relation hip wn
the Akhund of Swat Abdul Ghaffur while promoting the tenets
of ~hah \Vali Ullah' philo~ophy :among the Pakhtun _,. The
movement for the promotion of the e principle , termed 7 arup-
yi l\Iuhammadiyya', called for trier adherence to the word of
Q•ran and authenticated hadith,and ob ervance ofthe indhi dualised
ritu.tl practi\.CS of the t:tith such a prayer and fasting. in tad
the rcliJrlce nn the pir as mediator between the indi\idual md
God. S.•yyid Ahmed conferred and colluded with Akhund AM::!
Gh;tftitr in pur~uit of religious reform of the Pakhrun commurun
in line with the~e principles. 17 Akhund Ghaffur strongly upported
rhc revivalist prinuplcs and Instructed his murids in the tenets
reviv;llism, .h well as llsking them to promote these tenet thro
travel, prc.1ching .1nd personal example. These religious functionmes
.1nd their revivalist imperative established the dominant face
I lam in the ca~tern Pakhtun areas.38
'J'he pirimuridi line ofAkhund Abdul Ghaffur:
imtilulion and idrology
A wa tradition, Akhund Abdul Ghaffur rook on a number of
who pledged their allegiance ar hls hand and were entru,rcd >t• a
social mi ion of reform and reviralisarion ofl Iam-an impc.rari\"e
''hidl the Akhund \\.h s;1id to have devoted hls life. A trusted f:w
murids were appointed a:. J:halifar whose service:. to their pir included
tho e of S<rihc and of official representatives. The J:halifas
trusted enough to rcpre enr their pir'r authority and spirirualit) to the
layman in the pir's lifetime and were entrusted with taking forn
35. Sec Janab Maubn:.t Muhammad Jaffer Thane,<:eri Kizla P.mi(L.ahore. 1
for an arcount of the trials and Tiunes~eri's .,ub<-equenr depomnc:m
mtanment at :\1alta. Also .c:e \V \V. Hunter, 011r bulurn Mum:'b!::~
1872 (reprint l..ahorc, 1964)
36. Ghulam Ra ul,\lehr, Sarguu•ht-i MujahiJin (Lahore, 1956}, p. 336
37. l\lchr, 'i''"ggi'UJJht-i Mui.JhiJm, pp. 335-7.
38. Khan, 1imHrl R'J'lral-t SWt~t, p. 64.
41
his teachings after his death:19 Akhund Ghaffur tiU t.tught hi murids
the parncubrs of Sufi religious practice ac'"ording to the ecrc'"y and
n~ rsufi tonqa, but he also tried to make the teachings ofl lam
genen.. and acces..ible. Sufi pedagogy was no longer imply confined
to a close circle--the focuc; changed to making knowledge availnble
md disseminating It widely. In it new form I lam exi ted outside
me confine:. of the Sufi dorgah and the rigours of tariqa. It driving
unperative was to engage the I<X~ Pakhnm population in rcvh~tli t
rdigiou practice, and de-empha i~e the place of the hrine and the
ufi piras intercedent:. between man and God.
The innovnrion in Akhund Gh,tffur's ped.lgogy created a network
of his dcpurie:. who took the practice of religion co the village lcvd.
Of his many murids some of the most important were the l\.fulla
~ajmuddin in Hadda Sharif (d. 1901 }; the Smor Fatpr Saadullah
Khan (1824-1914) from Buner who was mvolved tn Swat politic.::.;
Mu.l.U Atkar of Khost (active in 1888), \lull a Babra 10 BaJaur (active
1882); the Hazrat Abdul \Vahab of MankJ harif (d. 1904); Mulla
Khalil (active in 1888) and the I hj• ahib Bedmani (d 1883} in
Mohmand; \Va.li Muhammad Khan m Ttrah (d. 1887); .md 5;ayyid
Akbar \\ho became the amir-badsh,lh of Swat.
Akhund Abdul Ghaffur had not "'mpl} alYected the ideological
bent of reg10nal religious pcr-;onalitic , bur brought about the
relocation of his murids as in the case of r lazrat Abdul Wahab
who moved to Manki Sharif after participating in the Akhund's
1 62-J j ihod Mulla Abubakar Akhunzada from Ghazni moved to
Makhrani in Swat as the Akhund's murid.41 The Akhund appeared
to send away tho~e who fell out of favour as well. When a dispute
ar~ between !\lulla Khalil and ( laji Sah1b of Bedmani, the Akhund
forced Mulla Khalil out ofSwatY Akhund Ghaffur's greatest conflict
was wit~ Hazrat Sayyid MarufBey, the Kotah Mulla who had moved
to upprr Swat-Kohisran from Swabi and partiLipared in Sayyid
Ahmed _ movement as well. The Kotah Mulla was a supporter of
hah Shuja, the British sponsored Mghan Amir who briefly held the
39. Ibid.. pp. 9Q-l.
~dJu i, Tclmry. pp. 584-91.
41. l.ur DjLr#Jing Ptrwm tn AJi.hanulan 1.\II''I.
u. Ibid.
42 1-'RO:-.IIER OF fi\ITH ISLAMIC REVJ\'\U ~I ,\:'I'D SUFIS~t 43

throne of Kabul from 1839 to 1843.~ 1 The Korah ~lulb had
the Do t !\luhammad Khan faction in 1835 and provided the 8
Y.i th infimnation that led to the Akhund's defeat and tlight from
battlefield at Peshawar in 1835. Akhund Ghaffur focused effi
undermining and c. dudmg the Kotah ~lulla from the doawn
rcligiou leadership m war. He referred to the Kotah Mulb
disciple of the ixrcenth century apo tate, Bayyuid Roshan
and the practitioner of heretical rituals. 44
Akhund GhafTur' cxdu ion and dic;crediting of the
Mull.\ demonstrates the manner in which the former ron.soll~CU::e:l
and promoted hi!. own presence in Swat by asc;ertlng int~
.tuthority.~ 1 lie ~tlso threatened supporters of the Kotah Mulli
armed .macks if they dad not evict the Latter from Buner.
Ghaffur finally managed to convince rhe Bunerwoili to push the
Kotah Mulla out of the village where he was hosted. 00 Thi 1ncidc:I
demonstrates Akhund Ghaffur's will to consolidate and regu!l:
regional religiou:. authority. Competitors could not be tolerattd.
even allowed to remain in Swat. Hence, the dominance of his lint•
the late nineteenth century was engineered by Akhund Gtuffiu
cflort rilther than by chance.
The Akhund' regional influence, in no small part tctiUila
from hi alliance wtth Dost Muhammad Khan and the great fi
he received after 1835, was repre~nted by and exercised
hi muri.lf. Akbar Bad~hah was the mo t ob..ious e.umple of
but the murid who came to great prominence bter "' the Had.:!:
~lulla Najmuddin who had c;erved as a khalifo to Say)id Ahmed
Rai Bareillr.47 All of Akhund Ghaffur's murids brou.,ht thcr ~
influence t~ their rclarion!>hip \Ytth Akhund Abdul Gh..ffiu, ~
a compo~ite that would dominate the Pakhrun Tribal ArC2Swdl
the twentieth century.
The Hadda 1\tfu//a Najmuddin
wat and the Akhund's great fortune went to hi children, Abdul
Hanan and Abdul Khaliq. l\liangul Abdul llanan ruled until his
death in 1887 after which his brother ~Hangul Abdul k.h~liq took the
throne. ~either ruled for long enough to consolidate a following, nor
"ith the ~arne charic;ma as their father, and therefore neither wa an
effective ruler. !\liangul Abdul Khaliq, the more piritu.tll) inclined of
the rwo, studied religion under the fhJ• ahib of Bedm.mi for orne
\"CarS before he died in 1892. But Abdul Ghaffur' polatal'al power
~d his mande were inherited by hi" murtd, the \1ulla i\ajmuddin of
Hadda. The Hadda Mulla Najmuddin .UTived in Saadu Sharif after
receiving his ttaining in the Shilgarh and Ghazna area, '-Ollth west of
jalalabad, and received instruction from Akhund Ghaffur after he took
hait in the ~deriyya silsila alongside the Karbogh••Y M ulla Sahtb and
Mivan of.Manki Sharif, among other!>. Nter a pcnod of rr.uning, the
Harlda Mulla was appointed a khalifa or emi ~arv of Akhund GhatTur,
:md it was in this capacity, both during the Akhund' lifetime and for
a funher ten years after his death, that the lladda 1\lulla con olidated
and extended the Akhund GhalTur's pedagogic line .1~ the dominant
one through the eastern Pakhrun region.~

43. Qvddu•i, 1iz:Jiray, p. 563.

4-t. fbuJ., p. 572.
45. lbJJ., pp. 561-73.
46. Ibid., p. 573.
47. ~luham1112U Ah Ju:.uri, Mwh.lhidzt-i Kahul wa YQ:hU/.m ( '
pp. 41-2. 4 Qufdusi, TQzJITiry, pp. 579-82.
44 l'RO:\TII-:R OF FAITH I LAMIC REVJV,\LJS~I \:-11> SUFI ~I 45

Swabi lladcb Bajaur/Mohm1lDd WannKU wne that the British forw·ard movement wa I)Cin initiated fmm
- I bJda ,\1 J!U the east. The H adda Mulia's major effort were !(,"used on resi ting
Cujjar ~Julia
"-ota \Julia Soh :\Julia I bmzulbh
Najrnuddin d. 1915 these pre~~ure~ and encroachment:. on hi n:glonal uuthority. t\ large
II znt ~I uood t\arboghal put of the H adda ~lulla':. effort was to oppo e Abdur Rahman Khan
S,alub \lwu SJbib
and his a...c;ertions of authority in any way po iblc. Ahdur Rahman
Ha Sabb
Bc.:imanJ d. 1883
)bsood ~lalb cxpbined the Hadda ~tulia's partkular antagoni m to him elf in a
l\ Julia K.balil letter to the uperintendent Pe:.hawar in 1897:
d. 1888
(appmummly) Ju t as in the old <Uys of Europe the popes used to pmfe to be the sole
Tinm Swat Khost ' Punjabo' arm disposers of heaven and hc:U, and the: people: also accepted the word of
'olo"Orthlcs pri~t<-, w too these mui!JJs claim to posse the &:amc: p<n~cr
~Julia
Mahmud Mulla Abul>.Jlur Mulla Atkar
Haj• \lulh Akbar and during the:.c: last few yea!'$ they have mrcd up my m\n Afghan
Akhunud.1 Akhunt.tda ofKhost
Q.w Sah1b Gu uat
subject:· to rebel against mc ... thcre is a vtll.igc l.tllcd J ladth whu:h h
Mull.1 Sapri S.1ntiJki Mull~
inhabited b}' chammon or leather tanncn but bc(au~c it ts there ttlcnct of
Mulla s~yyid Akhao Spink;~r11 Mull.• I l.1zt1t ~h)-m
this mi:.ehic:v )U!> :\.1ulla Najmuddin, hi dt~dplcs have: n.uned th1~ impure
Por Manki Sharif vilhgc: H adda Sh:arif, that •~ to say, lladd.t the nnhlc, .tnd Ius pup•l ami
Dlr Unknown Other disciple regard him as a prophet. What cill.lmiw:s .~re there that they
Abdur Rahim Sahib ha\-c: nor uffercd and what blooJ is there th.u they have: not hc:d by
Palam l\.lulla ~u.ldus l\.lulla his senseless oommands?... Every mulln for m;~ny years dc:nnunlcd me: 111
various ways as a ~fir and at their bidding their di "iplc: fi>11ght .tgain t
F;u7Muharrmad
Shah Bah~ s.hib
Akhun7.:t.da
me and their hO\bO were d~troyed and ther them clve were killed. For
founcen years they nisc:d e\'cry part of Afghan~t:tn again 1 me, both
Fig.l Dommant mull:h among d:e e-J.Stem Pakhtuns during the late mncrttr.th in the plain country and in the hill~. till thou and of men perished on
and c.trl)· twentieth ccnrury4' both rides and KVC:ral of the mu/lo agitatort them c:l\c:S \\.ere killed with
thousands of the disciple: of th~c: rurbulent priest ."

Akhund AbduJ Ghaffur's death and Hadda Mulla's succes~ion in
1878 coincided wtth the beginning of Amir Abdur Rahman's reign
(1879-1901)-a period of consolidation of Afghan state authoril) .
The rcligiow. leadership no longer had the administrative, JegaJ and
military independence it had earlier.IQ Instead a centraJ bureaucracy
and army began to emerge. Mghan state authority began to mtrudc
into the eastern Pakhtun tribaJ regions from the west at the ~arne
49. Thi~ table is a compilation of darn deri\'ed from three particular c;oun'tS'
British inrelligent:c: reporting on mullas compiled in Listr ofLtudinJ Ptmm
m Ahhanistan, the: Whoi Who NWFP, 1914, and recorded in the ''\\ P
ProVJnt.:ia.l Dime:. from 190L-30; Ijazul Haq Qyddusi's Ta:hrlll S •
SJrh.Jd; and hagiographic accounts of the live5 of l\lulla Sahib Chakn r,
llaj• Salub Turangui and the Sabra Mulla Sahib.
50 ocUe, St.llt and Trih~. p. 278.
The Hadda :\tulia aJ o mobiJi ed in rc ponse to the Briti~h
camp2i~ in ChnraJ in 1893, and he spoke out again~t the penetration
ofthe region b) raHway lines and cantonmenh pa r J>c.,haw.tr.52 Joined
by other mul/as of the Pakhtun Areas (Alxlul Karim Clumarkandi
explained, 'be~au e the Hadda Mulla Salub Gluzt hun~clf was an
enemy of the kafir, hence some-rather aJJ his mm id! were enemies
of the forangi'll) the Hadda Mulla rose to real promincm:e in the
51 t.c:ner from Amir Abdur Rahmo~n to C()mrni,,iuncr o~ntl Supt"nntc:ndcnt
Pcshlwu 01\ision dated 18 Aug. 1897', in ' P;~r~t·rt Reg.mllflg Briti~h
Relations \Vith the Neighbourin Tribes on the J'l:orth-Wt I I'ronticr or
lndi2 and the .Military Operation~ Undcrukcn A .un 1 them Dunng the
Year 1897-1898'. BL RBC, Ba.Jfour f'apc:rs 1-9.
52. See 'Lc:ttC'r of the l\lulbh Adda to all ~lullahJ and Elttcrs of the Alridi :1nd
Orakzai Tribes, n.d.', tbid.
53 Abdul Karim Cham.trk.andJ, S.IrgUZ.uJI-t·l .\lll)ilb,.dm (l..ahorc:, 1981 ), p. 34.
 46 FRO~Tlr::R OF FAITH
battle ofMalaLnd (1897 S)again t the British, ob~nc:d b\ Win ton
Churchill aadullah Khan or the: Sanor Faqir, also called the 'Mad
!\1uUa' b) the Brittsh, together With the Hadda ~luUa, organised
the Bunenvals and ~Iohmands in an attack on the Briti h post at
Chakdarra 2nd the \1alakand Pas .55 In a letter to 'all the mullasand
elder-; of the Afridi and Orakzai tribe:.' I Iadda .Mufu ,aid:
The l.tjirs have t.tken f!Olo'CSbion of all Mu~lim countrie:;, and owmg to
the hu:k of spirit on the pm of the people are conquenng C'\'try region.
They have nnw re.t~hed thct-e countrie) of Bajaur and s~at, but though
the people of thebe pl.tces ~howed want of courage 10 the lxoginning.
they have nnw reali~ed their mistake and having repemed and become
a~hamed of their former deed~, they attack them (the lajin) dayanJ night
.md h.wc tjllltC confounded them. 1 have myself informed the people of
Laghrnan .md Kunar and the Mohmo1nds, Ningraharis and Shinwms
<tnd they are all prep.tred to take part in the fighting.... 1 h;m deputed
Mulla AbduiLth, Akhunzada of the Mohmand country to attend on }'DU
[the mullm and elder)], and, Cod willing, he wiU reach you. Please let me
know whatever deci..ion you may unanimously arrive at. So that it m:t)
be acted upon. lfyou dedde to end for me there, J am willin~ to come,
but if you wi~h w come here, I al'o agree. If you chooo;e to commencr
fighting there, 2nd de~ire me to fight in this direction, I am ready to do so
!t
hut i~ necc: ~111) to fax the time and day of fighting ~ that by the gracr
of God the \~Ork may be accompli hed.S6
Bccau c the I ladda '\1ulla's moblisations and hjs rhetoric were
anti-Briti~h. he has been largely read as a reactive leader oppo,ing the
tool and appearance of the modem state and 'forces ofchange'.57 But
it i important to ee his effort as more than just a backlash against
colonial encroachment-the I ladda Mulla wa con~olidacing the
Ak.hund's network of rcligiolb leaders aero,·· the areas muruall~- ~
between the Afghan~ and British as being autonomous -Swat CfJ rral,
54. Chu"hill, The J\.la13kand Field Force', Frrmtim and Wan, p. 66.
55. 'fdcgram from Vi~c:roJ to Sc\ret.u\· State India 1 I Aug. 1897, in 'Papcn
Rc trding Bnush Rc:lat•on w1th the ~e1ghbouring Tribe$ on the North·
\\ r I Fronurr uf India.'
56. l.c.nc:r From J\.lulla 1\dd" to all ~1ull;u and Elders of the Afridi and Orahai
T nb<.-s (n.d
57. ~!alum and R m a\, Rtpr.rt"" t~ Trihts ifD.r, s.._..t ami B<~jwr fCKtthtr
tJ:tfh I~ l.H . Ahtland Sllm RPniZMi, rP· ~10.
ISLAMIC RE\'JVAI.l~M AC':D SIJFI. ~1 47
Dir, Tinh, Mohmand, Bajaur, and to a I( cr extent, \Vu7jri tan.
This interpretation is supported by C\Cnt in 181JO du~ing which the
Hadd2 Mulla. along \\ith other regional rcligiou leaders, upponed
Umra Khan's attack on and 'eizure of powerin Dir; in ISY- when he
supported Umca Khan\ failed claim to the throne of hitral;5 and
m1897 when the Hadda ~lulla cnt the artor raqir to take O\cr the
P'tr Bma' :.hrine in Upper w.1t, to incorponte the region into hi
sphere ofinfluence.59 In 1893, 1897 and again in 1899, he initiated
mobilisations against the British in the newl) fi>rmed Tribal Areas,
~tin~ communication~ line.. and militia post in l\ltlakand.
Alienated by the Hadda ~lulla\ anri-Bnu h t:UllC, .tml under
piCSSUre from the British supported ~.twab ut' Dir who felt thrc.ncncJ
by the 1\liangul-Hadda l\luUa alliance, it"'·' in this period rlut the
i\'21 Mianguls under the young M 1angul '\bdul \Vudud Kh.tn began
to break from the Hadda MuUa's lmc l\11angul Abdul Wudud h.lll
irutiallyjoined the Sartor Faqir's attacb on \1alakand and Chakd.ma,
but then backed off, blaming the Buner.vals fi>r inciting the people.
He claimed he wru. 'losmg hold of people owing to the IS.trtur] Faqir's
miracles'."' Distancing rum~elf from the \khund' line. the Miangul
chose the Pir Baba of S\vat's shrine m \Jankj Sharif ,\'i hi fiunily'
spuirual affiliacion and appointed the P .t ani Mull a, murid of the
P'u of ~bnki Sharif who differed with the lladda Mulla on points
of rdigiou interpretation and had not taken part in the 1 93 and
189i mobilisation , to manage the o,hrine.61 While they (ontinued
to re\-ere Akhund Ghaffur both as their J>" and ancc tor, Mi;mgul
Abdul \Vudud and his descendants plit frorn the Akhund' piritual
line that now pivoted on the personality of the J IadJ \ l\luiiJ.I>l This
event marked the end of the possibility of <l wat um1r.1t~ controlled
by the Hadda Mulla and a religious base in tllJI .trc;l. But the f l.ldda
S Henry Newman, Umra Kban ami th, ( htlral (;,unp.tign Oj /li9'i in
Correspondence relating to Chmal', HI RBC 8 P.t:l/41 (I) voi.IJ.
59 Maj r Deane ro PA D1r, s~-.r. C h~~ral 21 Julr 1897, p. 65. OJOC U
~1emo20.
60. KJun. mrrodu..non, Tlx St"ry 1 ~\Y'.ll, pp. J(} 1 '(nrropclntlerKe relating
ro Chitral'.
61 n~; WhoNWFP, J9U.
62 Qpddusi, TazJ.iray, p. 59.
 48 FRO~TIER Of F'AJTIJ
~luUa still managed to successfully con olidate hi authorit) in me
Tribal Area , in~pite of lo~ing the political and financiallega..) of
the Akhund Gh:tffur. And he did c;o by organi ing hi frateml
counterparts in the pirimuridi line in support of his mobilintions.
The structure and formation of the pirimuridi line begs CXliJilirutJOC
for the mechanisms by which it brought a conscious commonalit) ri
purpose and self representation to an otherwi~e highly differenw
group of leaders. Some of the Akhund Ghaffur's murids had altenu:c
lineage~ through the I lazrab of Charbagh, Badshah of lslamf.XI!
and Burkh.tk and the Shah~adas of Rehankot in Dtr These wert
legacies of great significance for the murids as rhe} were 10 posscss10t1
of waqf properties that had come down through their O\\n dirC\"1
family lineages.'·~ Moreover, sometimes direct descendent of pm
such as the Akhund's own sons who inherited his lands 10 5wot• and
Mardan chose not to actively promote the line.' 5 Social d1treL ocr
was inevitable because of the economic disparities between ditTcrctn
members. Some members were poor village preachers with no J'(rsonal
wealth. Other~, like the Hazrats, came out of the KabuJ ~lujaddidi))
line and were widely recognised in Mghanistan. The Shahuths ot
Rehankot were an old religious line based in the Dir area, while tlx
Bad,hah of Kunar owned vast tracts ofland on the Afghan side oftht
border, we t of the Durand Line. Others were successful traders. 8.t
the,.\ luUa Ch tk.naw;\r who imported and distributed sugar and wheat
in the Tribal Arcas. 66 Meanwhile proof of ideological confonn:tr
between member of the Akhund Ghaffur-Hadda ~lulla Line cannor
he extrapolated from the sub:,tance of muridi training beause of the
63 'Luter fwn Sufi S.&hib to the ~lulli Sahib of Siah, the ~lui.LJ oi Ab Kbc!
(SJ)')-i d Akbu), B.1d~hah SaJub, ~laWcArrun Khan, Malik Sher \tuharn:%
Khan, \!ali~ Y.1r \ luhammad Khan, Khawas Khanm Samand.u and the
"'''"h of Kamu Khcl, Aka Khel and other l\1alib and People of Tat.
7 Rah1u• San• 1315 [ 5 September 1897]' in 'Papers Regudu1g B
Relauon, wnh the Ne·~hbounng Tribes on lhe North-We-t Fronncr
India'.
64. Nilw1d, Rtligiam R~lf>OnHJ, appendix.
65. Khan, T/x Story if S o~t
66. lntemcw Ghularn '\ab1 Chaknawari, P~hawa.r, 8 Feb. 2002.
ISL-\~IJC RF.\'1\'AIIS~l Al'l> MlrJS~I 49
"'ide Vllriacion in the sort of training received by difl"erenr muridJ in
Akhund Ghaffur's line and the different int1uenccs on thcrn."7
Members of the Akhund Ghaffitr-Hndda ~1ulla pirimuridi
fraternity were connected to that line and ro one another only by the
fu:t of the bait-the undertaking of the murid to hi pir to devote
himself to irlstruction by the l:mc:r.61 ;\lember hip of the silsila
was conferred by the bail ir,elf, irrc pcctivc of the c>cial, rultura.l,
economic or political circumstances of the murid, and o this dcvkc
\'aS the in<-trument of creation and exten ion of the pirimuridi line.
As the tool of induction into rhe pirimuridi line, the rne(h.mi"m of
its perpetuation, and the guarantee ofih olidariry, the b.1i1 gave the
pirimuridi line its coherence. The significance of the pirimuridi line
was in the c;olidarity of its members, in its persistence, in the spre<td
of it fame, and the extension of 11:. influence. The pirimuridi line of
the Akhund Ghaffur-Hadda Mulla, unified by the bail and dircded
by the Hadda Mulla into the twentieth century, bct:ame the vehicle
for the dis.,emination of a reviv-.tlist ideology of rcligiou~ practice
through the eastern Pakhrun region:., and, with its cre.uion, the
Tribal Areas.
The HaddaMullain tum went back to J ladda and c;etdcd there after
the death of Akhund Abdul Ghaffur. Acknowledged and respected
as a pir in his own right, and having attained wide renown tor hi
j ihail gam t the BritiSh, the f ladda Mulla drew pro~pcctive murtdJ to
himse1J Some learning was evidently imparted m the lladda l\luJla's
f!UlfJD or base. It appears however that most muridr learned through
apprenticeship-the Hadda MuUa was said to have up to 200 murids
and lhalifaJ at a time who would travel everywhere with him until
such a time as they were ready to go forward us reprc!.enr.uives of the
Hadda .MuUa's will/' Other murids of the I Jadda Mulla •uch <\S the
Butkluk Haz.rat Sahib, Mulla Babra, .md the Sartor Faqir Saadullah
(1824-1916), the Hazrat Sahib Charb.tgh (d. 1919), Mir S<lyyid Jan
67. Peter llardycoin$lht tenn 'ideologic-al d1s,' to under tand Mu,Jim rcligiou~
soci.ll o~iS3tion and unanim•ty in north lmha in 'Uiama m Bri1i~h India',
jwrno!DjlnJian 1/irtary, Jubilee vul, (1973), pp. 821-45. Thi Mmcturc of
~JUry is cannot however be applied to the mullm of the Po~khtun rcg•ons.
Ridurd Eatnn, SujiJ ofByo~pur(Pnnceton, 1996), p. xxv1i.
69. ChamarbndJ, SiJrgii%DJhl·i Mujo~hiJm, p. J4.
 50 FRO~TJER OF FAITH
ISLAMIC REVJVALJS~I A~[) SUFIS~! 51
Badshah oflslampur, the Sarkanri Mi}art Sahib, Sufi Alam Gul and
Malab.od
.l\lulla Sah1b Tagao were reported to h2ve received s1milar initiation
Moh.m.md Bajaur
into the I ladda Mulla's line.70
tuji T arangzai ~tudda ~lulh) BJbn MW1a (lladda ~1 ulla)
The regional dominance of the Akhund Ghaffur-Hadda Mulb Akhwxl ~luhAmmad Shoaib
line and it re~i-.-al• t mes age was not uncontested. The prescriptions )1n S.wb O....U (Babra Mulb)
(fuJI T unnc-zai
of religious thought and practice promoted by the Akhund Ghaffur- .sufi Sdlib Bu.rbanuddio (Hadda ,\1ulh) IUma Mulb (lladda Mwb)
Hadda Mulla lme were challenged both from withm the Akhund Spm ~l.y11n (Unknown)
Ghaffur's line, as m the ca e of the Pir of Manki Sharifs opposition SpiAbra ~tuBa (Akhund Swat) tolauh~ lbnh•m K..mA ~ lladda ,\Julia)
~ Mulb ~Hadda Mulh)
to the I Iadda Mulla's religious method, and from without, as
exemplified b} the Kotah Mulla's opposition to Akhund Gh.dfur. B~ Mulla ~Hadlb MuUa)
- - Swat
Spmlura \Julia (II ki.l1 ~lulla)
Tensions between the I Iadda Mulla and the Pir ofMankl Shanfled ~~~ Salub TT (Hadd.t Mulla) Sutur F•q•r (llaJ,b ,\Julia)
to a split in the Akhund Ghaffur's pirimuridi line i~elf with some Gud ~tulla (Hadda Mulla) s~nd~ki !\lull;~ (ll;uiJa \lulla)

claiming the Sufi legacy of the Pir of Manki Sharif, and others that Ma.hammad Ayub (lhj• Turangul) GuiJar J\tulla (JI.•dd.t ~JuliA)
~JuliA Abubabr Akhun1.a.Ja
of the Tiadda MuUa. llowcvcr it was the lladda Mulla's spiritual SlWour Mulloa (1-laj• Turangui)
(Akhund Swat)
antecedents who were the more prominent in the twentierh-centw) SWnri Miyan (Hadda Mulla) Abdul Jabbar Bad h1h (Akhund Sw·11)
T ribaJ Areas. I lis murids were widely established at villages across the Miyan Kuai (Haji Turangui) MaUIVI Pakhh (lhj• Turan~~·)
Pakhrun non administered regions where they continued to promote ~tulla Buzurg ~ Haji Turangz.ai) Cujjar l\lul!A II CllaJ• Tur.ang-n•)
the 1Iadda Mulla's teachings. The pattern of their settlement cenrr -1 Patha Mulla (llaji Turangz.ti)
around the Tribal Areas and into the Ningrahar-Jalalabad K..r I Dir
triangle to the west. Mulla Shahu Saba (I hJda ~tulia)
It was rhus that the legacy of the Hadda Mulla was extended b) Shah1...U Rchankot (I b11 'J'unng.w)
hi murids 10 Mohmand and Shimvari, Bajaur, Swat, Ttrah, Khyber W azirlJtan Tirah, Ot111aa.i and Kh1bcr
Orakzai and 1n Waziristan. The. e murids of the Hadda Mulla took MuUa Mahmud Akhunz.a,Ja
La1a P'"tr Khost (Akhund Swat)
forward hi~ agenda ofsocial reform as inspired by the rC\ivalht school (Akhund Swat)
MoJ!b lhmzullah (Akhund Swat) hq~t Al•ngAr (San<bki ~1uUa)
in the area) where they ettled. On the next is a table of kno"n
Mcilla Powtncbh Mulla Hamzulhh) Sa))~d A•ghar (unknown)
mullas of the twentieth century who promoted his teachings, lio;ted b)
lWbogbay Mulla Sah1b (Alchund Swat) Niub Mulb (Sufi Alam Gul)
di:.trict and noting their pin in parentheses. 'Mapping' the geographi
Malb Hmamuddtn (Karboghay Mulb) llaj1 Abdul l laq (M•y~n Manki)
distribution of these affiliated mullas describes the regional influence
Dildar .\iuUa of
and reach of the Akhund Ghaffur-1 Iadda Mulla line.'1 M~11Wboghay Mulla)
Namn Mull.a (ll~dJa Mulla)

iShilcb Chulam S1ltWar (Karboghay Mull.&) Sufi Sah1b Drabga~ (Sufi S.1h1b Burkhak)
~lauh, Makhfi m Salarz.ti
Mulla Sayyid Akbar (l ladda MuUa)
Dzur (Haj1 Tunngui)
Tor Mulh of I pinki Tangi
Mulla llayar Khan (SayyuJ AkhM)
(flaji Turangui)
70. Jnc4, Uyi S.1h1h Turan.'{Zili. p. 41. M.wi ~lalla (llazrat Charbagh/Lala Pir) SaY)'Id Wvlf (Sa)'Yid Akbar)
71 ln" table ha been comptlcd u~ing the following source.': the Pcsluwu
Shew ~lulla (Karbogluy Mulla) (hu Chubm llabib (Mull.t Sayy1d Akbar)
1), rnct Wb,'s Who, 1930; Who's Who NWFP, 1914; Q!tddu,i, TdiriZf.
l\lchr, S<Jrgu:.JJhl·i Af11jahiJin; and NWFP l nrclLgcncc and PI'O\incUl
~tulia Ah.lw MliWI (MuUa SaYY'd Akbar)
Dl:t.rtc: for the pcnod 1915-1930.
 52 l'RONTIF.R OF F,\ITII ISL:\~liC Rf.\' IVAI.IS:\1 \~()S U FIS.\! 53

Kbo.c
tm-dled to Deoband. He stayed at the Darul Ulum long enough
.\lulb ,\rlur (Akhund 'wac)
S.alubuJ.l F aal IWii strike up a deep friend ..hip with the chancellor there, !\laubna
(.\lulh .I~).J \ldw) MuunuduJ Hasan. \Vhen he discovered that a group of 'u/ama of
Masal.\lull.t (II Wllr Charb.tgb) Sl,JidAlm.u :\1":·~ ~.\lhu
Dcoband ,~re travelling to !\lec'-"2 to undertake llaj, he decided to
1-- --
Kanda..ttar-:\inphar-Jalalabad
pn the party, and went on to perform h.ywith l\1aulana ~1ahmuJ . ln
f- 1ccca, Fazal \Vahid was introduced to Haji l md.tdullah, a member
1hn ,, s~h•b c h agh (f laJ.b ,\lulb) Manbn
.\tulia Tnppri in Ganc.larnak the so-called wahhabi movement. After the haj, Fazal \Vahid took
\tauh'l I mat! (1\mu .\lulb)
(ll.tdc.la ,\tulia) the title ofHaji, and became popularly known a llaji ofTurangzai,
Tagan ,\lull.& (I hJ.Ja Mull a) Shahzada Mauhi (II&Jt Tunngz;u)
a ude comprLed of the ride gramed to one that perform the h.y, and
Akhuni.IJ~ 1'~~g~~n rragao 1\lulb)
the IWJle of the town to which he belongedP
P~,ha Mull~ (llad<l.il\lulla)
In .Mecca, Haji Turangui took the h11it at I I 1ji I rnd.tdullah's
lJ,tall I f.tJd~ Slurif(II,IIIJa Mulla)
bmd, and promised that he would rake up Savyid Ahmed of
s~nitl Ahh.l~ 1\.td,fMh (B,,J,hah &reill)'s mission, kept alive by I laji Imd.tdullah, 11nd promote
"l.unpur/ llotrat Ch~rh.1~h)
mn-alism and opposition to the Bntash among the Pakhtuns. 74
llad,h.th TI!I(JrlH (lladd.t Mulla)
When he returned to the Pakhtun north WCl't, he went in carlh of a
Sufl S.th1b Hcdrn.lni (llutkhJk Mulla)
rr.:mh~ spiritual teacher-and found one in I ladda, in the !\tulia
l\t.r S.t~)l<l J~n B.tdsllJh of
ljmuddin. Here Faza.l Wahid did bait :lt the hand of tht I ladda
I l.unpur (ll add.t l\lulla)
fulla, committing himo;elf to Akhund Ghafli.ar's pirimuridi line and
Fig. 2 ,\lul/.li uf the J\khund Ghatfur-lladd.a Mull a line in the twentieth «ntw} to his mi ion to spread Shah Walt Ullah's revivalbt me age among
the Pakhrun tribe:.. 75 The Haji's double bait, fir;t at the hand of llaji
Haji Trmmgzai and tht ptrp!tuation lmdadullah and then the Hadda Mulla, marked the llaji Turangai's
rwo allegiances-to revivalism, and to the piriruallinc of the I ladda
of lht lladda \J1ulla's line
lulla S;UUb. When the Haji took po~ition a~ the lul-ill mulla at
Ot the J ladd1 \1ulla's succe~so~. Faul Wahid (1842-1937), from a lakarai in ~lohmand, and control of the land allotment, mmjid and
mall \'illage an the Pakhrun Utmanzai area, was the mo~t important. /;:ifra associated wuh this position, he used his placement to tulfil his
FazaJ Wahid, who came to be known as the Haji Salub Turan~, commitment! to both the revivalist cau<.e and his pirimuridi line.Th
had ~tarred hi education \\ith Mulla Ahubakar Akhun:uda. one Alongside the Haji Turangz:u, the three other mullas rose to great
of AkJnand AbJul Ghatli.ar's muridJ, at an early age. He tudied the p:ominence within the pirimuridi line, and in the Mohmand agency
O!tran and Far:.i literature with ~lulla Abubakar up to the age of these w re the Mulla Chaknawar, Mulla Sandaki and Mulla Bahra.
14. After thi!> he was admined into an 'lslami madrasa' at the ncarb) The M1 ~a Chaknawar (1884- 1930) was from Ningrah;u, near Kabul.
village of Tchk.tl, in whkh he :.rudied for ix years. This madr~l4 He tud ed briefly under the TIadda Mull a in the ~deriyya tariqa,
wa~ cJo,cJy connected to the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya rem and after the f Iadda Mulla's death in 1903 continued his education
movement impircd hy Mujaddid A1f Sani and funhered b\ Sh 10 'tariqa and ta;did' (method and elucadation) under the I l adda
Wala Ull.l.h, and taught his principles. Haji Turang-zai's k.hah.Ja -
haographcr claimed that this early education and its revivalist bent''~ iJ Ibid., p. 42.
ro intluence the llaji for the rc:.t of his life. ·z In 1878, Fazal Wahtd 74 Ibid.. pp. 42-3.
15 Ibid.. pp. 40-1.
72. Am Javed,llllji S11hib Tur11n~i (Lahore, 1981), pp. 39-40. • Ibid., p 54,
54 FROl'\TIER OF FAITH
I\tulia' muridnnd Mt~lffo, the Butkhak J lazear .ah b. AbdUl hakoor
.\1 ~luj.tddidi . Although hi ba~e was in ~tngrah...r in Afglurusun.
he tr.1ded, tmclled and preached amo01.1; the ~ lohmand tribes. and
became a dose upportcr of the llajt T urangui, gainin~ prominentt
within the Tribal Area .77 ~tulia wdaki wa a murUI of the Akhund
GhafTur and wa from Sanda in upper S'"at. He had forged links wub
his mujahidin at Asma~t in the south of Swat during the Akhund
Ghaffur's mobilisaoon
ag'.Unst the British.Aftertht
movement wa di banded.
Mulla Sandaki orgmiscd
the Swati!t an contc. ts for
the throne of 5w.tt and
Dir, and abo establi bed
a base for himself among
the Shmwaris in Tanh.
The Mulla Babr-.1 had been
a murid of the Akhund
Gbaffur.7li lie had also
found his introduction to
regional politics in Buncr.
and had putidpated an
the mobili~ation~ in Dir.~
After the Akhund' death
Mulli Babra .;wore b.Z!
at the hand of the Haddl
fig. 3 luj.uah ot Fazal Wahid JJaji ~lulla Na.1muddin and
'l'uranguu engra,~d an marble. lhe plaque
established ham elfat 2 bast
IS da pla\cd at the •ne of 1hc: I Jaji's maJjiJ
an Ch.mahul,l\lohmand Agc:nC) in Bajaur.
77. ~1c:cra Jan 'yal, N om)ah Gbnz1 Chal.na'tNr Mulla Snh1/r (Pc.,h.l·war, 1999)
p. 20.
78. llu ain Ahmnd ~htlni. 1',hnl-i R~1hmi R.Ji,aol (Lahore: 1966), PP.
160-6.
79. Go\'l!rnmc:ntoflntla:a, 'Who's Who .Afghani tan, 1888'.
RO 1\g un. MmbilhiJat, p. 43, and Barbtullah Bhopa.li quo1cd in Mchr
Sargu%JIJ!I·t Mu;abttlm, p. 186.
I LA~IJC REVl\'ALIS~t ,\1\D UI'IS~t 55
Amr-hil maruf-mohilising tht rt:vivalist agmtla
Islamic reform encapsulated m N.aq~hbandiyya-r\lujaddidiyya thought
\\"lb beginning ro erode Sufi practice~ and to 'c:.'<ert pre urc on Sufi m
and its institutions, both from within and without' Akhund GhafTur
and the Hadda ~1ulla were not alone 10 tha a Sufi thinker aero-.
north India and at other ~deriyya and 'laq~hbandl))':l lhanqahs in
the Pakhtun and northern Punjabi regton) had also come in contact
'1\ith Mujaddidiyya thought, both through the effort~ of Shah 1 mail
and through other personalities, and were beginning t<> how greater
mtetest in hadtth literature and Qaranic study. Different Sufis
acknowledged and responded to revavalist imper.ltl\e an different
'1\':lVS, some taking on its discourse and other... maintainang traditional
rit~al~ unchanged. The engagement of the Akhund Gh,tfTur'l> line
with the revivalist l\ 1ujaddidiyya thinking \V'J~ not unique, bur it was a
more extreme and wholesale respon e to the revavalist imperative than
that of many other Sufis who came in contact wath Shah Wali Ullah
and Abdul Auz's thinking. The traditional Sufi method of bait and
the chain of transmission of pedagogy connnued to give coherence to
the Akhund Ghaffur-Hadda MuUa line, but thi pedagogy took on
the imperative of social and religious reform as a guiding princi~le.
This revivalist amperarive in the Akhund Ghaffur-Iladda Mulla tine
took the title of amr-bil maruf wa naht anal munkir, the movement
for'the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice'--a sodal mission
that was to give the tine its greatest cohesion and form it:. primary
agend1 in the twentieth century.
The Naqo;hbandiyya-Mujaddidtyya influence in the P<lkhtun
regioi_ was re-enforced by a second great influence on the twentieth
century Tribal Areas. This was the madrasa Dantl Ulum Deoband
m Sodwanpur in the United Provinces which h<ld been set up by
thinkers both initiated an Naqshbandiyya Mujaddadiyya 111riqa and
trained in the Islamic sciences, and who sought to promote Shah
Wali truah's teachings. The influence of the madrma on the practice
and teaching of Islam in the Tnbal Areas was exerted through
studentli who moved to the Pakhrun north west after completion of
their training. The son of the Baray Mulla Sahib of Charsadda in
81 Liebeskind, Putyon its Knm, p. 251.
 56 J'R0;-.:1'1 ER OF FAIT I I lSLA~JlC R£\'1\'l\LIS~ I MW SUFIS~! 57

Spiritual Genealogy of the Tribal Areas Mullas: TheAkhund Ghaffur-1ladda Mulla Line
Tunngzai Shahuda of Rdu.nk.ot b IS90
d. 19JS Slutlow \1 ulla
Gluta ~twan S.thib
B:adshah Gull, II and Ill
Chul.un R.asul ;-.;uun
:--::ub~l~ll.a

Toru \Julia

Fakir lp• 1-'akJT Salub SJ, 1

~1:m.i ~tulia \IAulana ,\J..Iulllan~«J
Shatkh l\luhamma.t Aum

Abdul M.t~tun

Fa~o~l Maula S~h•h

Mull.a P"winJah I
.\ huM ,\t>Jul l lAnan
Wwn~lulJ,
M
l\.lulla Powinda
Faul Dmb.IS91i l
1-i g. ~ 1hc pintual gcnt"alt>)()' of the Tnbal Arcb m11Uas. (Compiled from coJonW
mtclhgcn~c i<lUM·s, Dcobwdt wntlngll. and ~ddu~i's TazAtray S11fya-yi SDW)
 58 f'RO!\.'TIF.R OF F'AJTH
Peshawar Di~rrict, Abdul Auz, who came to be known as the Pakhli
~1aulvi, was educated in the Darul Ulum Deoband. Fazal Rabbi ci
Ha7~ra went to study at DaruJ Ulum Deoband and then mm't'd tn
Pe.hawar and then to the Tribal Areas after finishing hi traill1ll6
Taj Muhammad from ~lardan who received some religio\b eduaooo
and then forged connections with Deoband, became a secondary
lichool reacher in Pec;hawar Islarn~a college where he met Ha
Turangzaa. The most important of these Pakhtun Deobandis
Maul.\na Saatur Rahman, a Pakhtun from Mathra who had tudicd
in the Danai Ulum Dcoband, then moved to teach tn a madrasa stt
up by Obaidullah Sindhi in Fatehpur near Delhi.~<~ Saifur Rahm1D
brought many Pakhtun students to Fatehpur ro study wtth him. Ic
1914, he returned with these students to his home town of !\lathra
in Peshawar District, and then moved on to Mohmand in the Tri!W
Arcas.8 '
Religious practice had once been dominated by Suti riru21,
enacted within the arena of the dargah. Revivali~t influence mearJ
that religious pr~tctace was shifting away from Sufi tariqa towards a
standard Qaranic reaching. The progression of this rrend wasob\iOUS
in _Akhund Ghaffur's own family. Akhund Ghaffur's younger son,
Maangul Abdul Khaliq, pursued religious learning after the Akhund's
death in 1877 I le took bait at the hand of the Haja Sahib ofBtg
:t\lanai (a mrm·l of Akhund Ghaffur) and devoted himself to studr
under the l IlJI 5ahab. Anecdotal accounts about ~liangul Abdcl
1\haliq uggc t that he was deeply influenced by revivalist thm.tV1L
I lc paid ZJ.l~ll every year and supported shaikhs trained in principles of
sh.Jri'a in order ro adjudkate disputes and decide punishment on the
ba ic of 'Criptur.u law.87 Yet he maintained his father's /angarkharu:-
the mark of the Sufi pir---drawing devotees to him.
82. ',\taulvi r:ml R.tbbi ali01 Pakhli l\lauJ~, l\larch 1922-1923' OIOC U
PS/ 11 /217 file 3096. ' Tramcript of intenriew of Sh:thnda ~huJvi with Am Javed, j,tvctl, 1/aji
8.l Ah..lul Ghafl.ir Kh;~n, Af,.,., Z111d11gi 11urjaddojtlxd(Lahore, n.d), p. 53.
84. lbad ., p bO; ' Paper:. Regardang Recem Activines Among WahabiS, 1916'.
OIOC I PS/ 111111.
85. 'l\1pcr Rcgardang Rc,cnt Activities among Wahabu 1916'.
86. Khan, 1"/x Story oj'Sw.11, p. lxl·.
87. Banh, Tix IA•I W<~(t if Su\lt, pp. 23-4.
88. Khan, The StDr) 11j s.. 11, p. lxix.
ISL \\llC RE\'1 \'AI.ISl\1 AND SlJHS:\1 59
Miangul Jahanz.eb, great grandson of Akhund GhatTur who
received hls earliest religiou:. edu~"iltion under a local mulltJ \\ho
ght him the Qyran, and then went on to rudy under a maulvi
me I larrua CoUegiate School, said that 'the: religiou trndition
from ... the Akhund of Swat, continued h) m) grandfather, wa lo t;
dlough the influence deriving from our de cent from uch a aim and
scholar continued."' Account:. of religiou P' d •oro· in the region :.111
oote madrasas aimed at imparting a fonn:tl Qannic educuuon. The
cmtraliry of tariqa to the pedagogy of the ,\khund GhaOlar-1 ladda
1ulla line began to diminish. Akhund Ghaffiar' line w,\ moving out
from the teaching of a clo~e and guarded Sufi lm iq.1 that could only
offer an intercession between the common m.m .1nd God, tow.ards
mival~t Islam that was being taken from village ro village, and
p on to per on. Shahzada Maulvi from Char .1dda who vi~itcd the
1.l.ib Turangz.ai in Lakarai in rhe Trabal Areas claimed to have
_:>rm"d hi bait and been deputed as a Haltj<J after only a single d.ty
of training. His mi :.ion as a murid was to 'work fi>r the improvement
of society through amr-bil marufwa nahi an.1/ munkir...~nJ rcrnJ.in
am-oh-ed in the teaching ofi~lam.'110
Like the Hadda ~tulia, the Haji TurangzJa, Mulla Chakn.twar,
Smdalci i\lulla and Babra MuUa maintained lJrge retinue of muri.lr,
tdibs and Malifas. 1 Many member.. of the e retinue were armed, and
scn'W to enhance the mulla's profile, to protect the mulla, and often
bdp him enforce his religious directive among the PalJuun tribes.9l
B tit seemed that under the I Iaji Turang-tai at least, murulr did not
ncccssarily receive long instruction in the intric.tc:ics of Sufi lariqa.
While many murids spent year:. of their lives in the crvice of the I I.aji
Tw-angzai during which time they may well have been imroduccd to
Barth, TIN !AJt U'ali ofS'II.Iilt, pp. 16, 33-W.
&hih Tt~ranpt, appendix pp. 515-6.
Intavitw Ghulam Na.ba Chakn~wari, Pe~hawar, 3 l'eb. 2002, l\lohrnand
Political D1ari~ (hencefonh MPD fullowcd by d.Hc) 1926; NWJ.J>
Provincial Diaric (henufonh 1'.'\VFPPD follm~cJ by date), 191 S 21
92 See MPD 1920-9; "'WFPPD, 1915 30; Javed, 1/.yi S11h1h Turangzt~i.
p. 452. The muJJa·s u oe of the lai/JI:nr wall bed·~ .ctl in detail in the la;,t
ltttion of this chaptcT.
 60 fRONTIER OF FAITJI
Sufi lariqll in itli complcxitie , Haji Turangzai also clearly introd1
the po ·ibility of muriJs receiving only the initiation in and
obligation co promote simple re\.1valist principles. Thi-. was a cllitmn
shift in the pedagogy of the line from Akhund Ghaffitr's time whet
the lladda Mulla Najmuddin and !\1iyan J\lanki had bttn required
to reside tor a number of years "'1th Akhund Ghaffiu to rccmt
instruction in both Sufi tariqa as weU as Shah Wah Ullah's mission.
The pirimuridi Hne had become a vehicle for the cfj, eminatJOC
of principles of individualised religious practice derived from S1uh
Wali UUah's thought without necessarily also impart~ng eithu the
fuU philosph1caJ strucure of Shah WaJi Ullah's Naq hbandi)ya
Mujadidiyya Sufi thought, or the accompanying s}o,;tems fi
~deriyya practice that Akhund Ghafn1r's murids had been initiattd
in. The muridi bail at the hand of his pi1· was still the marker and
tool of inclusion into the pirimuridi line, but under the influence: of
Naqshbandiyya M ujaddidiyya revivalism, the line was expandi:
rapidly and irs pedagogy had changed sufficiently to tramfonn me;
from a spiritual intermediary to a conductor of and ad\1ser in nuttcn
of religious ritual and belie(
This transition was reflected by the fact that by the end of the
nineteenth century, titles like akhundand pirwere being supplemented
by, and in .;orne ca c discarded for, the title 'mulla'. While this
term has pejorative connotations in the contemporary period.
did not o;eem to have such implication at this time among the triM!
Potkhtuns-it was rather u-;ed as a catchall renn for religious leaders.
whether they were althunds, sayyids, hazrals, Sufu, fhtiMs, mip:
or fi1qirs. I suggest, wathout putting too fine a point on it, dtat the
rran ition to the general term 'mulla' conveyed a transition in rdi
pedagogy towards u more generalised and disper.ed, vi.llagc-blsrd
form of rcligiou practice and emphasis on the individualised model
of revivalist Islam.
Thr 1/adda Mulla's line in the Triha/Areas
Although the I h dda l\lulla's death and the failure of the 1~i­
mobili~ation w;as followed by the separation of the Tribal Areas. his
ucccs or. kept the pirinmridi fraternity together and brou~ht it t
domin.tte religious organi~ation in the newly formed admini tratJ\~
ISLAMIC RE\'IV\1 I ~I M\D Sli i"J S ~I 61
m!ion. In 1908, the ufi ahab of Butkhak mohili ed a !OJhkar of
5.000 ~lohmancb in an anac.k on Sh:thqadar, the British-occupied
fort on the border \\1th the :.dman tcrcd di!;trh.t . The lashJ:.ar
mcluded 2,000 Mohmands from the Atghan ide of the border,
and was supported by the Mar J.\')1d Jan Bad hah of I Lunpur in
K.unar, the arbnn Miyan, the artor Faqir, the Miyan Sahib of
Tsappri, and ~lulla Sanid t\kbar. It wu aid that the lmhkar had
been primarily encouraged b) clement at the Afghan court who
hoped to compromise the Briti<;h p<hition and ccurc concc ions
from the colonial governmenr.'l Bur the Mohmand) l.uer u ed
their participation to impress their importance upon the colonial
government and secure tribal recognition and JllowJnces in their
own right. This effort by the I ladda Mulla'~ .;upp<>rtcrs .md devotees
addre sed .regional autonomy and organi .uion in~~ new way~cek.ing
to enter and nor to undermine the new order of the Tribal ArcJ~ .
The vague motives and quick withdl'J\Vo\1 of upport from
Mghanistan meant that this short-lived mobili ation marked the IOtit
m2jor movement by the I ladda Mulla's c:ontemporarie and direct
accomplice~. The heavy losses sustained by the /11Jhlwr had perhaps
unpressed upon the religious figures and the participanng dans that
this \va,s a futile and dangerous endeavour. The British re~pon~c had
not been trifl.ing-2 ca\-alry and artillery unib and 2,600 solidcrs had
met the Mohmand advance, out of a total field force of almo t 13,000
men .~
The Hadda :\lulla's efforts to undermine Abdur Rahman's
authority and Briosh encroachment in the north we t had domtnJtcd
hi political cffom. through his lifetime. I lis ucce' .ors refined his
zenda to continue ro revitalise religion and purge P,tkhmn ~ocicty of
un-lslamic practice:., bur to do c;o having recognised the British design
of the Tribal Areas and the tribal reliance on coloni.tl allowances.
The mullas integrated their mis~•on with the now pcrv.ts1ve idea that
communi tie of the Tribal Areas were sonally and culturJ.IIy d1stinct.
Haji Turangza.i who had been deeply anvolvcd in providing religious
93. :-.lotr, 21 \fav 1908, in 'Frontier di turhancc:s, d1.11'Y of event , \pnl-May
1908'. OIOC UPS/18/A 167.
94. 'Frontier d. turb.mce ', :appcnd1x B oompo ition uf c11lumn :UJd :.appendix
C composttion of the ~t:a.lilind Field l"orte.
 62 F'RO:-.ITJER OF FAITII
training through the c tabli hmenro£150 maaraJas in the administered
districts of the \lorth-WClit Frontier Province abandoned his land
and commitment:. tn the administered areas to move to the Triln!
Areas in 1914. He, along with his prrimuridi 'brothers', the Blbn
Mulla, the Sand.tki Mulla and the Mulla Chaknawu as well as num
other les known mullas, lived out the re:;t of their live' in the scoice
ofTribal Areas Pakhrun ociety.<n
95. J.a\cd, II11JI ~aMJ limmt,..J•; Interview Dr Ahmed Yousuf. 14 Fc:b. 2002.
lntm i• w ~n:uur Ghula.m "'ah1 Clu.knaw'llri, 3 Feb. 2002.
3
RELIGIOUS AliTJIORin· A~D
THE PAKHTL 1 CI A~S
An:llysi of c;ocial leadership in Pakhrun tribal communitic began
with the political anthropologist FreJerik Bmh\ work, which
was ground breaking for its systematic consideration of tribal
Interrelations and oppositions. Barth's analy .b of rhc .mc.:e rrally
derived tribal line resulted in his hypothesis that Sufi , or \aim~· were
'outsiders' to the Pakhtunjirga- rylc politic.:al a~:.tmbiJc und a ~crtcd
no political power there. 1 Sub. equent anthropological .tnJ hi rorkal
studies of Pakhrun polmcal relarion~hip were trongly affected by
his compelling appraisal of the cultural order of human and collective
social action reprec;enred as rhe ' egmenrary lineage theory' to explain
the social and political rivalries that dominated through the region.
But in accepting his theory wholesale, re~archcr~ have maintained
Barth's extrapolation that individuals who were not participJnt in
the tribal genealogy were nor significant members of tribal c;ocicry.1
Aklnr Ahmed sugge:;ts that the actual structure of the tribe did not
in..-ol\"e rcligiou authority in any form except in opportunist seizure
of power in siruations where 'traditional' maliki authority wcakcncd. 3
Fredcrik Ban h. Polihral LbJdmhip cunong Sw.tl Pt~Mttmt (London, 1965),
p. 17.
2 The mmt 1mporont of these 15 Chrisunc Nucllc:'• uncqu.tllcd wmk
on the his ton of ';tat and Trihc m Afgh.miJt.tn, p. I 55 Sec 01.lso Lout~
Dupree, 'fril>al \V01.tfarc tn Afghani tan and Pakimn· A Rc.tlcctinn tlf the
Segmentary L nea~e SyMem' in Akhu Ahmed and D.tvJ(I J l.m, Mmt m
TriM/ S«ittir.s (London, 1984); and ( hc:rry Lmdholm, 'I he Swot I P.tk.htun
farruly as a Polincal Traming Ground' in Charles Lindholm Frontitr
P'"pmivn (Mr.lchi, 1996)
3 Akbar S. Ahmed, 'fri~ and St tc m \Vmrutan' m Ri~hard Tapper (cd.),
'f'IN Ccnjlia o.fTnk Ill J StaJ in lr<~n •···' Ajgh.rniJtan (l..cmJon, 1983) •
..
64 FRO~TIER OF FAITII
Chri ten en' work on the late nineteenth-cenrun·
•
f ront1er sugge t that religious leade~hip W:b in pired by millcmnr:
cntiment and opportunistic moti\'es and completely sep2t1tt f:
and oppo ed lO' ecular authority' in the region.4
These understanding~ of history and ociery, relWlt on
and tramcribcd genealogie which described homogeneous
and tribes of comrnunitie descended from a common III}
forcf;1ther ~is Abdur Rashid, cannot accommcxlue the mcmbcn!:.:t
of mulltu in Pakhrun society as their participation was fu
.md not genealogiCal. By such reasoning, reinforced by dte flc
that organisation of the stlst!a and shajarah were rooted in scpm::
myth~ oflineage, sy:.tcms of representation and sources of pa
mullm have been understood ro have been a mere 'clients' of chc
trib;u system and inc1dental to its functioning. Yet 1n the space
non adminiHered Tribal Areas, religious practice, deeply influcnad
by Naqshbandiyya Mujaddidiyya revivalism and the vilbgc
cornmunity-ba~ed activities of the mullas, gives lmle e\idcnct
real distinction between tribal ~ocial organisation and motn
and the .tctivities of the mullas. Mullas participated in '~
e<>mmunity living: trading, interacting and inter-marT)ing within
clan unit. In almost all case mullas were ethnically Pakhrun, ud
many en c were originally from the clan that they en'Cd.
It i difficult to reconcile the moral and judicial authority of
mul/ar with the more ' ecular' council or jirga that heard as
puni hcd the guilty on imilar points of conduct if o;ecular a
and rcligiou authority are considered in oppo ition to each
They mu t be understood as concurrent and overlapping re2lms
turned to each other for legitimi5ation. The mulla was pmiciptti
the tribal jirga and was often asked to dispeno;e justice on the
of the e tablished and indisputable principles of sh.lri'fl.s The'
4. R 0 . Christen en, 'introdu~:tion', in McMahon, &port on tlx Trihatf
Sw.11 an./ Hajour togtthn u•itb tht Utm.Jn-Kixl a fiJI $.J, Rlzr:i:J:r (Pcs!ur.:
1981).
5. Ka uri, MuJhabidJt, p. 55 IU~uri c:b.ims the mulla wu head of the
council-a daim not ub tanuated by any other account~ . His cb::ripel~
makes 111 lea 1 this much clear. that the mu/la wu a fully integrated
of the \.illagc or clan-lc:vc:l council although he wu not considcrtd
blood mc:mhc:r of the tnbc i~
,
RELIGIOUS AUT HORITY ,\NO 'J m: PJ\1\11 f'll~ CI J\~S 65
uUa \\"25 p...rtiopant in maliJ:i and jirga management a he would
attend jirgas, re.ld prayers before, and finally approve the deci ions
of ajirga at the conclusion of a meeting. Ilc wa open to affect the
decision making proces and offer advice according to hi m · ment.
The mu//acould also himo;elfinitiate proceeding a~ain tan individual
suggest strategy towards other clan or the Britio;h by approaching
the mmiJ: and elanjirga. Real distinction between malil:i and mulla
authority are hard to identi~·, undermining the thesi that these
re essentially conflicting and competing form of authority. In an
equitable exchange of support, mul/as confirmed ,,1/illi authority and
the inc.tirutional integrity of the jirga while the malilu lcgitimi~c.:d rhc
mm/a sdirectives.
Religious authority affumed and srrengthcned the structures
and coalescences of the tribal structure in the politics of cl.m·tribe
representation to the colonial authorities as well, demonstrating
their engagement with not only community pracricc5 but with the
conremporary discourse and repre entation of the tribe.• In ~\ddition,
the long standing relationship between the Kabul court and the
malilu of the eastern Pakhrun region fo tered the eng-agement of
mJJI/as with the tribal srrucrurc. The amirate would uo;c mul/as to
nlly the eastern Pakhrun dans. Mullas would identif) the leaders of
communities, the maliJu, and o;end them ahead to Kabul, Jalalabad or
1\mdahar as required to receive instructions .md allowances, thereby
strengthening both the profile and the finances of the malih. MulltlJ
:ere not capable of undermining the social hieran:h1e!i and structures
of tribal existence, as has been pointed out by m;my anthropologists,
but it is important to note that they did not seek t<> do so.
6. rn i('Yeral in~unces. ,ul/as helped 11) to ec.:ure gncl<l terms of. cttlcmc:nt'
between the clan and the Polltic:U Agent. ln one ca~c: the Faqsr of Alingu
wrote to the Pohtical Officer Mohmand on 'hc:h.llr of the Safi clan to
albv tensions bctwc:en the community :tnd the ;tut hortti~ ;~nd to ~ccure
allo'wances for them. In :1 different .on of l'3'0C, Mulla Mahmud Akhunuda
lu.rttd a mas ive campaign against the Slua Orrdu..tt to puni h them for
as.king the Deputy Commi •ioncr J>c. hawar for terntorial rcwgnition and
~':ltlces as a tribe, trying to prevent them, u Shta and oh advcrsaric~
of hi own fa\.-oured clan•, from gcmng thts M tu The: Mull.& t.lahmud
Akhunzada's movdllent :~g;Un$f the Shta Or.tkl..ti i diKu •cd in greater
detail in chapter 5.
 66 FRO:'\TIER OF F.\11'11
Mullasofthc Ak.hund GhafTur-Hadd• r\luUa line saw thcmsclm
as culmrnlly engaged \\ith Pakhtun <-ociety and particiJWU
paldJtunwalt, the utmritten cultural code of Pakhtun tribesmen
held the preservation of honour and e.xacting of rC'\"Cnge as it prum:y
ocial principle . The mutual affirmation, influence 10d COJrtStJrair~
of the mullas and P.akhtun tribal culture lay in the fact that
acted a cu todi.m ofP•1A:h.tunv.:a/i, and uc;ed their religious autbo:b'
to pa binding judgement~ rooted in ptlkhtunv.:ali in the arena oftbt
trib.1ljirg.1.7 'L l.unic iodination and Pakhtun culture' came t~
in the definition nnd m;tn,tgement of honour, crime, and morali
In situations where murder had been committed, mullas
oversee the p;lymenr of blood money or pur the murderers to d
on the spot, as required under the tribal code."lr should be noted th1t
while the payment of blood money had historically been praroccd
Muslim sodcries other than the frontier and was a generally ccepttd
point of Jhari'a, the mNIIas advocated and supported tnan} cnbc:r
uniqcly trib.tl custom a., long as they were nor e.'\pre sl) forbiddc::
in rhe O!•ran, or h.uhth One important example of uch a pncta:t
wn~ the burning of the hou~e and possessions of criminal offend
In one particul.lr in:.tance, a murder committed by a member the
Gullai ~tohmand clan undermined the truce that had bttn
by the Ilaji Turnngzai. In respon~. Haji Turang7~ raised a
to burn dO\\n house ln the Gullai village and applied a fme dw
payable by the dan a a whole.
De pitc thi balancing of religious and cultural pri.nciph.
and mul/a and mali!.:i authority, tensions did often arise where
applkation of rcligiou pre~:ept by the mulla and the cui rural pncntts
preferred by the community could not be reconciled. In one
Mulla Babra demanded the execution of alleged rapi- , but
7. Tlu }llchrom~:uyha bt-cncxaminedbyl\awidtnR. 5 ~Raper.sn:.p.
and AkhM S \hmcd in 'Rehg10u Presence and s~. . . 'xilism m
s.,.icty', Akhar Ahmed and David HIUt (cili ). fig,., Ill Trih.:l
(London, 1984).
8. \luh~mmad Dawi, .m Afghan writer and poet, ahout the 1\lclb
Chtknawar. Syal, Ncm)Uii Ghati, p. -18.
9 lfi 1921 the K:uboglu ~lull.t o~cr;aw the execution of\Vattlnl m~
of members of the Kocdad 1\hc:l clan. Set KWI-l'PD, ~Ia} 1923
10. 1'\\\'FPPD. 9 ;\larch 191S
REUGIOUS AUTHORITY A:>;O rilE t•AKirJ UN CI.'\NS 67
proposed punishment was rejected by one of the dan invtllved. 11
In many other in cances, when the mull.u of the I ladda ~tulia line
enforced points of social reform ordained under ilmr lui mar'![ uch
eliminating the payment of bride-price and f(uhidding danc:ing
flays at weddings, the mu/las' puni hment were very unpopular
tnd trongly criticised. The.;e tu'>-.le bet\\cen rdigiou and ~:ulmral
mrerpreters could go either way, depending on the rcsour~c and
persuash·eness of the particular mulla involved and there were
mstanccs where dans entirely rejected the dire~:tive of mullas. But
t• is incorrect to extrapolate that in uch ituations hl.un retreated
from the mainframe of socict). Rehgious leader..hip w.\s nor merely
spontaneous and opportunistic- the mullm' authority and agendas
emerged from the social and political drcumstancc:. of the twentieth
century Tribal Areas and were sustained by the combuled wiU and
cffom of the mullas themselves. In situations where thetr directives
were contested, the mullaJ, like all other group in the Tribal Areas,
fought fiercely to protect their intere..c~-sometime ~ucceeding
and sometimes failing. But the reality of the mullt~r' participation in
\illage and tribal life remained and underlay the relev-anle and impact
the Hadda Mulla's pirimuridi line to politics and ociety in the
twentieth-century Tribal Areas.
Tht mullas' authority and villagt-based rtligious prtuliu
The Mulla Chaknawar's son emphasi ed that the village mmjid was
the primary basis for social panicipation by the IIadd a Mulla's murids
mPalthrun tribal community life, saying: ·,,asjids had a very important
role in the movement-this is where Pakhtun culture and Islamic
culture met.'u It was as managers and mamtainers of masjid, leaders
ofcongregational prayers and commentators on questions ofscripture
that mullas claimed a place and stake within the homogeneous and
insular elm unit. Their daily functions and phtccs of rcsiden~:c were
m the milSjid, and their income was from rcligiou!> alms g•ving in the
mmjiJ and from produce from the lands attached to that structure.
11 MVFPPD, dim 32 1915
U l n~mcw Senator Chulam Nabi Chaknawari, Pc: hawa.r, 3 Feb. 2002.
6S FR0:'•;TJ ER O F J.~\IHI
It wa through the institution of the mllJjiJ and its attacbcd
langarl:hana or alrn house that the Hajt Sah1b Turangzai"
to ettle in the Tribal Area and to forge a relation hip \\1th the
indcpcnderu Pakhtun dan . When the I iaji mo\ed to the T
Areas in 1915, he tou~d the frontier and had C\'eral offers
village in need of m111/as for their masjids.u J le ultimatd) accepted
an offer from the Safi l\lohmand to move to Lakarai to owuge the
old Gud Mulla' masjid.l 4 The I laji later accepttd land trom the
~1ohmamh-an estate he named Ghaziabad-placing him ou
the limit~o of the 'l.tfi villages and according him orne auronorm
~rants, however he maintained a presence in villa~ mayids of the
Mohm.tnds, visiting these regularly and even establi-hing a crw
maljld m G.tnchtb in 1918 in order to establbh a connection w:
the ( (alimz;u Mohmant.l clans in this area.•s Similarh·, the M
Ch.tknaw.u built a mmjitl .tnd established a langarlth.u"uz at IAlpur.l
and Dak.ka, t h then built one at Somb in Gandab. 17 He kept a dose
eye on the m•tintcnance and management of the maijids, prm
money for their upkeep, and closely monitoring the subordim:e
mull.1s in charge of the:.e interests.
The mullm' social participation was deeply dependent on me
patronage of Pakhtun clan1o Without guaranteed indepcnde!:1
sourl'.C~> of income or claims to land, mullas needed their host
to invite them to live in their villages and pledge moneta~) ~
a "'ell a guarantee to protect the masjids and their mullas
attack or rohhery.11 But the mullaJ' management of this ~-r
meant th;lt they were in charge of a functional, inclu i\-e and ,,brJ:::
13. )ll\l'<l, lla1i Sahi6 Turang-..11i, p. 251
14. 'llaji S.ah1b ofl'urangui and hi~ Connections m Tnbal Tcmtor}'· N\\'FP
Provmml Arch1ves (hereafter NWFPPA Special Branch. ftlc: 979.
15. Javed, 1/a;r SJ/Ji6 'limmgz.u, p. 2i8.
lb. 1\h\-bcr PniJtical D1al)' (hereafter KPO), 10 June 1921.
17 'D1mc and Report on the Mulh Chaknawar Acnviua 1924--
!I.WJ.PPA,file ofthc lA.putyCommi"Jonc:r'sOfficcP~hawu~
IX OP) ·~!Jscellanrou Rcpom and Oiarib 1924--.
18. Pa hto folklore ltll> of faqars and mu/las who c.laimed san at
moJqucs, and n:{ Cl\td food and clothe. after pro\ing their spinru.al
See F. II. ~la)lun, ':itory of the Ttn.h Faqir', Ptuhto Fo!l Stmn (Locdoa.
1911. rcpnnt 1 larrabad, 1980).
RELIGIOUS AUTHORln' AI'D TIIF. PAI\IITll~ C t.A:-.:!'1 69
artna of male village life which gave them authority and power mer
ru mtmbers. Relevance of the masjitl to daily life in the village wa
great because of the daily and weekly communal prayers performed at
the maJj id. \Vorshippers would remain to eat at the langarlh,ma and
would meet visitors and exchange new1o in the hujr11. The mal}ill and
its parts constituted a octal space within the village.•• Maint•ining
the hujra and making provisions for meals for gue t were the direct
responsibility of the mullas and the fund) for thi came out of their
;n budgets.... Hol>t villages were e.'<pected to provide a quantity
of food, but making up a c;hortfaU fell to the mullm who extended
hospitality to all worshippers. 21
frequent congregation within its domam meant that the masjid
"'aS also a location for the exchange of information, storie , rumours
or more general gossip. 22 This sort of cxth<tnge was made more
signit1cant by the fact that information was hard to lOme by in the
Tribal Areas. A combination of social and administrative segregation
and difficult terrain meant that newspaper:. were rare. In addition,
fC\\ Pakhtun re idents of the Tribal Area could read well enough in
Pashtu, leave alone Urdu or English, to make enc;e of ncw-;papcrs
19. MUhdum Tasadduz Ahmad c:xpltins that evc:ry Yu•uf:t.ti Vlll:tge had a
mosque, and evtry mllSJid hui a hujra. IIi' dt$4;ripMn relate: putll"UlatiJ
to the Yurufui ofSw:u, but hold true atrOSJ Malakand and MohmAnd. In
S«W Qrxanisllhon ofYusu.fulr Swat (Lahore, 1962).
20 AzizJaved describes the /angarkhana •h being .ln absolute prcrcqui\ite to the
mobilization of and political authority over the Pakhtun peoples. lie argues
that in order to bring tribe men together and ttl reach a political con cn\UI
arnon;t them, they twi to be brought to one ccntr.u lcxanon .md hou~cd and
fed there. Haji Sahih Turangzoi, p. 46.
21. Anz ).t"-ed notes that the abundance of the f laj1 Turang1.1i'a lang''' was a
point of pre<uge. Hap Sahih Turangzai, p. 46 Muhlmmad Ali K.1suri\ very
unportant account of hh travels in the frontier Tribal Area$ dc,aibe the
food he w:u fed at the Haji Turnngz.1i'alangorlth.mn 1n Ch.tm.uk.~nd 1n great
dcuil and explains the 1mporuncc of the mul/a's mthma11dari. Murh.rhrdat,
p. 47. Also ec Miy:ln Akbar Shah, Azadi K1 Tola1h (I~J.uUJb.td, 1989),
p. S7
22 lar n Sokefeld describes 'go ip' at one of the pnrnary indic:uor. of the
tcotJ .... ne of coloma.! control an hi ~rudy of tbc Chitral region, 'Rumoun;
and Poliria on the Nonhero Frontier: TI1c Bnu,h, Po1khtun Wala and
Yagboran', Modnn AJran Studin 36,2 (2002), pp. 299-340.
 70 FRO:-o:TJF.R OF FAlTII
when they did ec them . •lfullas on the other hand were often
able to read Urdu. nd Pa-;htu, and were weU pia ed to rccrn-ebc:z%3
of llC\\ through networks of murids and travdlcrs who were
or directed to them by ~.:oUeague in Afghani tan and lndil.. Tb:
~\lulla Powindah wu aid to run hh own dal network
'jagirs of the Mah ud dan~. the mm of Kho t, and the a
I..ahurc and Pe hawar', while the llaji T urangtai' son nwn
u more infcmn.tl ) rem of $ending and re~eiving mes~
tr.wcllcr ,v en uring reliable communk""ation with coUcagu
mul/,u, induding the llaji Turang-ai, l\tulla Chaknawar and
Babra were part of lahligh networks, pac;sing regularly from '
to vill.tge within the TribaJ Areas, the administered distrias
Afghani~t.ul, ami bringing new:. back with them to their host\
In .tddition, ncwsp;tper~ received from Afghanistan and lncfu
the Suajul Allhhm, Lamindar, AI Hila/, Pionrtr :1nd Souln ''
rc.td out in m.t~jitls, '• .tnJ travellers would bring their toms the:!:.
C.ttf)ing news into the TribaJ Areas was dangerou . Anybod}
delivering letters to or l"arrying letters or newspapers from the T
Areas tn Briti h lndi.1, or viu v.:rsa, was uspccted of aiding the
Bnu h movement there and subject to arrest.27 Bur there w.lS a
demand for news-about on-going wars, the nationali t m.O\"':X:X:E::
in India, ~olonial governance, and intrigue at the Afghan~
event aero the Tribal Arc:as.15 There was little discriminanon
the sources of information. Go..sip and rumour were reported
23. 'Daan Book of Fronricr Conuabular\' ~lir Hamz.ah 1922123.1.\'WFPP.
Spc ia1 Bran h tile 459. • local powers.
24. !Jakim ~tuh:ammad Kanm, tM ~on of ll:aJa 1\.U, b Tunnguu
ll.tki.n J\luhammad Abdul .\had, said that m..ch of Hap T'Wli!::::C~1
tune "".U pent either going on 'd(lral (preaching miSSIOns) or
tm'tllen on drm11 themselves. Tramcript of intc:f\icw appendix
.'iJ1h1/J 'l'ut,mguti, p. 514.
25. Kasun, MushahiJ.u, p. 53.
26. ~WFPPD 191 'i-7 contain frequent mention of tM dissaninr.ian
'h~»ule prup.agantl.l' tn marjt'Js in the fronuer.
27. Nntc on tmest nfShahtlltla Bulurull.t\ m~ngcr in 'Chanurb.'1d
1916',1'\WJ'PPJ\, Polatu."al Officer ~lohmanJ. lllc 46.
28. 1lte Sirujul,1Mbar,l.Amindar!J.nd SllrhaJwcre the m~t popubrnn1>=:C::S
being sent Ill Tribal Areas.
'
RELIGIOUS \UTHORITY A:->D Till: P,\KIII Ui'\ C I.\1\S 71
the same authority as sub,tamiatcd ne\ and rhe teller a umc:d the
rl:,-.ht to embellish his repom, uch as tho~ of German ad\-an~.:e ,
~i.shed with the declaration that the Turks \\CCC ~ooming to liberate
India and that all of Germany had embra~.ed I lam.29
As the administntion in Pe hawu made: the delivCf)'ofnewspaper
more difficult in order not to 'ignite' the: en ihilitie of the volatile
frontier population during and after the: }C:lr of the First World
War, the value of informanon and the importance of the hearers of
news onJy increased. \Vhen :\1uhammad Ah K1 uri, who travelled to
the Tribal Areas in 1919· 20, led the pra)C~'> and gav<:. J , '' or ennon
on the occasion of the eid prayer:. when he arri\'ed in Ch.unarkand,
he claimed that people orne 'in great numbers, walkmg many miles'
to hear him speak beouse they knew he w.ls going to bring 'news of
the situation in India, and the war'.30
When the religiou congregation g.uhered, it received both
spiritual and political tuition. Channelling out~iJe information that
impacted on local opinion and decision-making, the mmjid was at
once: a :.pirirual centre and a political vehicle. The 111111/as' main ocially
interactive and authoritative function extended their pedagogic role
to the di cussion and representation of political issue:.. Becau e the
religious congreganon demanded politic-.tl direction and information,
mullas, as leaders of congregatiOns, were in po~itions to comment on
issues of particular intere:.t, and were encour.tgcd to do so. I lc:nce they
could use the traditional Friday sermon to comment on the content
of new:. and its implications for the local population, and to push an
agenda in relation to the Afghan and Briti'h governmenb as well as
By vinue of their roles as caretakers of mmjids and-by extra-
polation-of village reLgious pra~.:ticc, 11m/las also haJ the ability to
cxoommunicate members of the clan from the religious community on
rnoral ground . They could refu e to allow transgressors to participate
in prayers in the masjid, refuse to perform a nilwh or death rites for
such transgrec;~ors, and could insist that anybO<.Jy ~ccn to have relations
of any sort with them, whether I)C~onal or even commercial, would
29 ~'WFPPD, 1914-S.
30 Kasun, Mushohd11t, p. 48.
72 FROSTIER OF FAITII
have to endure the same fate 0 tracism \V.li 5"-ift and absolute.
wa rar h ch 11lcnged on the threat of further puni hment. The soo
the Mull Ch"lknawar explained:
Removal from S<X:ic:t) [was a terrible punbhment).••bcausc the
lr'iln grc:swr would for C\er live alone. If ~mcone died 1n his f:.unllv
one else could help him bury [the dead]. If there was a wedding oo
would an end. If anyone did attend he would be omaciscd
o traci ·d) would not be treated as a member of socict). [and
evcntu.1lly ec:k ti.>rgivcncss] be~au e he could not live c.:omforublv
the Tribal Are.ts without such ~ recont:iliarion.ll
A tr.wcller through the 1920 Tribal Areas described an incida::I
when a renowned malik of a Bajcturi clan died. Haji S hib T~
was mvitcd to perform thcjana:z;a which the Rhan of the neigh~
Jar clan could not attend because he and his clan had been ostraciscci
hy the l laji Sahib. The khan used the occasion to beg the I laji ..
forgiveness and promhed never to cross him again, whereupon he
was .til owed to attend the jano:z;a and once again freely mingle
other dans. 31
Rel1giom excommunication also meant that mullas would refuse
to conduct political negotiations on behalf of'wrongdocrs'.ln
where entire clans were shunned, as was Malik Anmir' Guxbb
llalim1.ai dan in 1927, they would have no acce ) to the arbitr.ltJOC
and reparations "}'!>tern in effect through the mullaJ. If the: \ilbge
raided or attacked, mullas would not effect a rerum or compensntoo
for property lo t or damaged.~
The level of interdependence of c;ociety made religious acommu-
ni~"ation a particularly brutal punishment. There was no life
31. lntervtcw Ghulam Nabt Cluknawari, Pe!>hawar, 8 Feb. 2002;
M~~thahiJ.u, p. 53.
32. lbtd
3l Shah, Aw.li li T(l/arh, p. 58.
34 fht llahmui tand ofr again~t the Malik Muhasil Kuda Khd. a
\trongl} supported b) l laJ• Salub, was ~trongly critic.zcd ~ the H
When the\ I Ltlimzais Wlshcd to make term~ \\lth M.ilik MDh2sil.
ho~d to go through the Babro~ Mulla beau~ the Ha11 Salua would
thc1r l"l~. The: Babra ~1 ulla then refused to inren-cne n bciWf
Anmir which resulted 10 a continuaoon of the ho•tilioei for months
compcn auon being won by M.ilik Anmir. N\VFPPO,Jan.-Fcb.. 1 IS
RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY A!':l> T ill:: l'.o\1\IITUN Ct.A;-.;S 73
the Pakhrun chnsman in the Tribal Areas out ide the dan sy tern.
Personal safety as well as acce s to road), w-.uer, oil, food and help were
prmidcd through the tribal system and found with difficuhyouhide it.
Cb.ns and villages in the Tribal Area~ were rcligiou ly homogeneou ,
a feature of society that required all members to participate in the
csublbhed rituals of religion. The religiou community that the mullo
ldl. [lbe dircaly influenced was, by definition, the entirety of male odcty.
Hence the mullas' spiritual authoriry tran lated into odal control
dw, because it encompas ed all publicly active members of the clan,
• far-re2ching.JS
Tht mu/las and tribal inltr-rtlotiom
The di pcrsed clans and rribec; that made up the Tribal Areo1s were
largely independent of each other. Subsistence-level agriculture in
mms the villages meant that there were few mtegrated market:; ~nd !>ociaJ
intenetions, including marriage, were re tricted by rrib.U genealogy.
Polities were at the same time closely connected by resources such as
land, water and roads.36 Tenstons created by gcogr.tphic proximity
~led with social and economic confinement go1ve ric;e to a complex
em ot tnter-village and inter-rribaJ relationship marked by intense
competittons berween clans, even tho e of the c:ame lint.-age, which
often turned violent and sparked blood feuds that could go on for
gtnuation . Cultural concern with the defence of honour underlay
these tens1ons. Neglecting to avenge the death of a kin man was to
lose face permanently, and suggest to orher tribes that the clan was
umblc to defend itself. No participant in a feud could ever afford
35 The rdation$hip of the mulla to the marjid, and of the m.ujiJ to publtc male
society ~ nor, of coUJ'I'e, re~otricted to the T r.bal Arc:,u. This wa," reality 10
:any :\luilim community, whatever its admini~rr.UIV<' lt.ltc, whether Pakhrun
01 othcrwi;c. This ~ection considel"i the relcwncc of excommunication from
dut public ~p:ace given the particular administr:tt1vc circ.:urnstance• of the
TnbaJAreu.
36 Leon Poullada, dnlwing on 1950~ and 1960 .lnthropologic.U literarure,
lW1lCS women as another of the< 'compcuuon gencraung' re~ourc~.
llawtwr, the utility of this suggc~non i Iunited a the btcr anthropological
theory an lu.rdlv be corrobor:ated from early twc:ntieth·ccntury colonial and
Mghan 60\lrc~. Sec Leon B. Poullada, Rrfmn and Rt/ttlliDfl in lffgh.lflisllln
1919-1929 (lthaa, NY, 1973), p. 23.
74 FRO~Tif.R OJ-' 1-'\ITU
ru lay JO\vn hi weapon \\hen he \'laS in the inferior pos1tio
cowardice \\Ould have been an unacceptable ~nd dangerous adJmissbc
of weakne . Thi meant however that the ~.:ycle of violence
what were often ncighhouring village could potenti2ll) wt fortm.
bringing aU commercial and productive acthity to a halt u
m~le members of hoth kin hip group had been eliminated. I
interest of progrc and the pr~crvation of life, opposing pztxs
would enter into brokered 'truce:.' to halt feud without losing~
the it\l.ltion that the opposing dans were from the arne tn"be,
mighr h;lVc recourse to a CO!T)monjirga. But more often than not,
only .trbitrator <II.XeJHable to two oppo:.ed partie!> was a mulla.
On~.c .1 mulln lud accepted and been accepted at a m~~sjid, he
hi~; successors were deeply attached to the tribe with which ~
were .111iliated This primary relationship, generally handed
from pu to mum/, connected certain lineages of pirr to ~
cl.tm, .md uften led pm families to marry into the communities tb:T
-.crvc:d.l7 But despite their gre;tter commitment to their h t
mul/,u prided them clvc on, and were recogni ed for, their
neutrality .md primary commitment to upholding shan'a. 'l1xv
maintained .ttlili.uion~ with \'illages and clans other thm their bas:!
either a \'isiting preachers or through the pirimuriJi fraremin
meant that mullaJ could command authority over different
C:\"Cn if the e dan were at odds with one another, and they tcndrO
be ac,eptable arhitr-ators to all concerned parties in iruations
rruce5 nec:ded to he created between warring partie:., or rqunnacs
C.\1\Ctc:d from criminal offenders. Religious renown wa as an
traveller to the Tribal Area , Miyan Akbar Shah, descnbcd it, 'no
than a pa port to all ofl'aghislan and Afgharu tan'. llaji T~
worked dircl tly in~ lohmand \'illages and Shinwari \i.lbges in B
hut throu~h the pirimuridi network made appearance in Afridi ams.
Swat Yu,ufi'.ai village~. and Dir. 1\lulla Sahib Sabra \\ ptimm;
act1~c among the i\lamunds 10 Charmung, and the Cluknrn!
l\1ulla had influence over most ]\lohmand and ome h wan
The l'aqir of Alingar, based m Alingar, was pnm.m!. i.nfluccill
]7. Interview Ghubm l\.oh (.h;tknawari, P~hawar, 3 Feb. 2002.
38. Stu h. ..dz:ntli l• 1izlllJ,I, p. 60.
RELICIOL S .\UTHORITY MW t liE I'M.:IJIII~ Clt\N~ 75
among the Shinwarb, bur made appearance among the Yu ufzai and
Mohmmds a well.
Miyan Akbar Shah's memoirs of hi tra\'cl through the frontier
described the \;olence of blood feud and the •enq of mullas in
ttSOhin~ them. 'Hi:. entry into Dol'IU~on in Bajaur wa met with
me chilling spectacle of c;rreers empty of men; here, it wa aid, men
did not die natural deaths-they died by the bullet of an cnem). o
tcmble was the enmity that whene\·er fighting broke out, the I!Jji
ahib would be summoned immediately to c:rl."ate a tig.lb llr trul"c
between the hostile parties, and until that time every man would
remain hidden in his hou e to avoid being the next C".l ualf).l'J In ~uch
roles mullas were facilitators and pivot~ of inter-group .tnd inter·
personal relations in the Tribal Areas, essenti;tl to the m.tintenancc of
normalcy.
Mo..r promment mullas of the twcntic:th·ccnrury Trib.tl Area)
were documented as having spent signitkant arnountll of their time
tm"Ciling to scenes of dispute:,, and offering hinding -:olution:. to the
parties involved.~ Haji T urangz:u spent a majorityofhi time travelling
from village to village through Mohmand .tnd B.tj•n•r ctTecting new
settlements and patching up old ones between Mohm.tnd faction .••
The various group:. involved were comtrained to accept hi dcci ion),
wfwever mey might be, and would enter inro p<tCt:. to tha~ effect
before he would even hear the cac;c .AJ Then the di<:pute:. would be
presented, the rransgre,sors identafied, and suitJble c:ompcn arion for
lhe wronged parties decided.•l
39. Ibid., p. 56.
1\'\\'FPPD, 1915-30, ~pcctfically note the daplnmatic' inuiauvc: of ~Julia
Mahmud Akhunuda and ~t ulia San'id J\khar amun~t th~· Afridi , ~tulia
Faul Din in Wntru.tan and the Bahr~ Mulla, ~1ull.l ( h~kn;Aw;u, S.mdaki
MU!Ia, and Haja Sahib Turang-t.u in \1lhk.and B.~Jur .ln<l l\luhrn.1nd.
Mentions are made of ~crallc~ c:r known mu//.1J, hua1hc c were invariably
connecrcd with the better known mul/.u.
41 MPD, 1923.
42. lntenic:w Ghubm '\/aha Chakn:awari, Pe,hawar, 8 Feb. 2002.
43 The oificc of the: Chaef Comma ~toner "'JWFP reported ~1ulla .\tahmud
Akhunzada's involvement in brokcrin <1 1n11t Jlld deciding the amount
of blood moneY that had to he paid to the f:amily of a murdcrl.'d Ab Khcl
Afrid1• Later ~tulia Mahmud also hrokc:red a tnacc hclWcen K:.ambar Khcl
and Malikdan Kh~l :--.'\Vl PPD 1915· 6.
76 FRO:"TIER 01-· FAITH
In inJJtion where random and :.poradic fighting ·wa taki
between two rival faction , mullas had a "lightly dit1erent role.
than merely a ccrtaining who WllS to blame and fini~ the
part), they would et term for a cea e-f11e, mapping the bouncb:rie5
between \illage , and ystem for access to o;hared resources
as Wolter. Finally they would decide an amount payable
by either party breaking the peace. These cease-f11es had a
life and had to be reviewed, renewed and patched up ~
demanding a long·term eng.tgcment and that the mu/la be fi
with the situation. llaji Sahib Turangzai, who brokered the
fire and tn1ce hctwccn the Yusufzai and Kandahari ~lohmands,
expected to oversee its effectiveness and re-establi~h the t:ruec
it W<\S broken. u
It was ;tlmost impossible for opposing factions to appro2ch
other through any other means than mulla led arbitration. Tb:
inclusion of on I} some dans in the British system of regulauoo ~
that political agents could not be effective arbitrators within
region. lienee even those tribes who accepted Bnn~h allowances
had refu ed mullas who had advocated oppo ition to the British,
dependent on the arne mullas to initiate dialogue with clans
the allowance oy~tem.<ll This dependency on mullllJ as atbi
wa so great that when the \illage of Utmanzai in the adminis:tmC
di trict was raided by Mohmands from the Tribal An. the a
of Urmanzai opened negotiations through the HajJ ah Tun.~:o:I
who erured the return of their stolen o;heep.M. In the cJSt
in.;rance of recognition of religious authority, Colonel Bruce of
lndi.tn army contacted Mulla Mahmud Akhunzada \\hen a B
girl, Molly EUi , w.lS abducted by Ajab Khan, an Afrid' \''ithou:
other mean-. of opening a dialogue with the capro~. C nd Bnx:
asked the Mulla to arrange a meeting between Bno.;h rer '\!SCOtt
and Ajab Khan who was a devotee of Mulla 1\tahmud, so du:
44. ~1PD, 1926.
45. 1'-:WFPPD, 20J:an. 1916.
46. 1bc Burh~n Khclll)k.cJ H:aji Tun.ngui to fon:c the Isa 1\hd to mum
st•llcn ~hccp . ~1PD, 3 ~lay 1924.
RELJCIOU~ AUTHORITY A~O 'fiH: Pi\Jo:JI l'lJN CI.A~S 77
settlement could be reached and the girl relea ed unharmed. 47 The
negotiations, which \\·ere conducted :lt ~Julia Mahmud' home,
emhlished that the mulla was the on!) reliable nod universally
acapted agent of diplomacy between the Pakhtun dan .
The position of the mulla wa~ guaranteed by the fact that there
no other form of inter-party organi .&tion or government. The
son ofChaknawar mull.t de,cnbcd what thi meant:
In Afglwli Wl there was an ex1sting hulumat. But in the t!d'ffl•)'i glwr
there were no police, no influen~e of ~tate. Jt all went by the rit•<~j of the
rution :and the nun and the mullar. There \\ere internal opposition<-
enmities :and friendsh1p -but they all ac.:ccptcd the dcci~illn nf the
mufla:"
In the absence of a government, there were no in~ritutionaliscd
legal or political systems in the frontier Tribal Areas. Brit1sh political
agents and Mghan authorities each had orne authority over some
tribes, but because no single authorit) extended over the different
groups and their interactions in the Tribal Area!>, these administrator
could not arbirrate berween clans-even informally. It was this power
\'2CUUm that the mullas were able ro fill. The condition of the tribe,
defined by and relegated to the non-administered region, necc:. ita ted
the invol\'ement of the mul/as.
Unanimity among the mullas
Coherence and unity of the pirimuridi fraternity of mullas evoked
a practical solidarity between mullar. This was expre sed in regular
conferences between mullm about their religious and diplomatic
aahities on behalf of their tribes in order tbat they could maintain a
consistent approach among themselves. Regular rneet10gs of mullas
47 lnttrview ;>.:a.~k Muhammad Ch.uJzua.y, son of Ajo~b Khan Afndi, 10 Aug.
2002. A copy of the letter from Colonel Bruce " 111 the pos~cs~ion of Naik
luh:tmmad Gluziw:ay MoUy Elli ' kidnapping i da cu ed 10 greater
dctailsn ch..pter 6.
4 lntttvl w Ghulam Muhammad Om of Gandab l l.llanll.U, 13 Aug. 2002.
49 lntavi ow Senator Ghulam N.W1 Ch:akn:awan, Pe ho~w.u, 8 Feb. 2002.
78 1-'RO:'\TII::R Of 1-'Al I'IJ
took place at ll.1dda and jalalabad in ea tern Afghani tan. In a
thi con ultation was aimed at dccidin~on a tandard punishmcm
for collaborators with rhe Briti h who undermined the interests
other trihcs or dan .51 In another ca,e, when the ~tulia Chaknrtn:
had failed to prevent the i\lu,a Khel ~Iohmand chn from aroeptt~
Briti h allow2ncc , a meeting\\~ convened to upport him and
him on a f\arurc. c.:our c oiaction.51 Even the llaji Turangzairelu
~upportcd ~lul11 \lahmud Akhunzada's political dirccth-es which b:
disagreed \\ith m the interc'b of maintaining indi potable rdig
.tuthority. The mullm' belief in their unanimity WllS demon
on .Ul on:,tsion when tht Babra MuUa was unable to attend a ~
jirga meeting of Mohmand~ at Bagh at which he wa~ e.·•pected
so trusted ll.tjt Tur•tngni to appear in his stead to hear and decide
the wievance:. of the Mohmand dans. This sort of organm
meant thnt the mullm were more than a group of loosely co~
leadcr!l-thcv were ,\coherent and self-aware leadership group \\
intenMl whel>ion wa~ under:,tood to be crucial to it' ucccss.
I.oc.ttion .tftcctcd the way in which mullas organised, and dlm
were trnngcr and more consi tenr exchange~ of information
agenda between tho e mul!tlS in closer proxim1t\ ro one another Tbt
Lata P1r of Kho t met more regularly with the ~1clla PO\\incbh
~tulla llamwllah in Wazinmn than with the ~lohmand and B
mullas;S4 and imilarly Mulla Sanid Akbar in Ttrah met ~
with 1\Julla 1\lahmud and other Tirah mul!aJ, workin~ " ith tbcc
SO :'\WFPPD 1914-30 h:m: ircquenr menri• n cf '-ongregauom of
meeting at II ad<h or at the Chamarbnd b~. " e of these are as
3 Apnl191 'i, 29 Jan. 1916,j irxas for regional •... hdd at H:ldd.t;
1916, Jl~ji Turang7.ai i sues a frrman oa.lhng ior wpport to the 1i
CaliphAte at a Jl'fO in I ladda.
51. i\WI'PPD,l2 July 1916.
52. 111c j nga of mul/.11 advi~d the Mulla Chaluuwar not to worry, :and
to uy tn puni h the ~lu a Kheh and sugge,red that he anstead usc
bil maruftn mflucncc the \lu Khd'll bch;n;our in 'DWIC:S and
on the ~lulla Chak.nawar' '-'\Vl'"PPA, DCOP. ~li.scellmcous D
Rcp<lrt 1924- 7.
53. 'Contidenual .\1nhmand Report 1915-16' '\'\VFPPA, Political
~lohm:and, file 106.
S I. l.a!J Pircall tnrunuyinJIW. NWFPPD. 18~1arch 1916, and :-.'WFPID
19 l'ch. 191h.
RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY A="D Till: PMOI ru;-.: C I ,\NS 79
on the resolution of local dispute and pt.n hrnent for Afridi .55 In
... wat, Bajaur and Mohmand rhe Mull.a 'nndaki, the 1\tulla Babra,
lulb Chaknawar and Haji Sahib T ur. nnui formed the primary
nexus between themseke .56 \Virhin their respective region , mullas
maintained the coherence of the wider pirimuri.li fraternity, crther
rcconcilin~ or excommunicating those who differed from the lladda
group·s interpretations in the manner that the Lala P1r had t(,r 1hly
reconciled the antagoni oc ~1ulla llarnzullah and ~lull.t Powindah
to one another,~ and that ~JuU.1 Sandaki c:xc.:ommunicatat '>•yyid
Abdul Jabbar Shah in Swat on the ba 1 of an nccu arion that he was
secretly ~diyani.
The ,..,ul/as' unanimity extended to their intcrt~h in regional
politics. The Haji Turang-L:.ti's support of the Kh.m uf Nawcgai was
Ween up by his pirimuridi brothers. When the Mull.t Chaknawar
thttatened to stan a campaign of house burning when the ~lusa
Kheljirga refused to take his advice regarding Briti h policy, he w.1
promised complete moral support from llaji Sahib Turang-1~ti, ~lulla
Sandaki and Mulli Babra who committed to .tpplying pre ure on the
Musa Khds to force them to come to an <~ppropriatc understanding
wu t e ~1ulla Chaknawar.59 ln one case the Faqir of Alingar, murid
of Sanda.Ju Mulla, called repeatedly for a mobili arion again t the
Bn h t a time when the Haji Turangz•ti was nor willing to agree
to rt. The Haji advic:ed him again t the jihad, going "o far a~ to refuse
him help.60 \Vhen the Faqir finally decided to undcrt.tkc an attack
on the Briri"h at Shabqadar on his own, the I Iaji joined it at the last
aunutc, despite his misgivings.111 The mullm cho c to pre ent a unified
55 KPD, 26 ::'.la) 1923.
56 javN, HiiJI Sahtl T,.ranpt; Ka~uri, ,\fush.thtJ.Jt; The ll.1ji Tur.mp;ai,
Blbra Mulla and Sandalo Mulla jointly 5tnt out lcttcr~ to cnlouragcj ihod.
NWFPPD, 24 March 1917
51 The Mull~ lbmtullah w.1~ the l\lulla Pmvancbh'\ pir, hut chOcrcnctt had
amen between them Reported in Who'a Who NWFI', !9J.I.
1...ener from Mulla Sandalc1y tn llaji 'Juran~r' a and mhcr M.thb and
Mullas in '\'WFP' Reproduced an ~WFPPD, 2-ll\lar"h 1917.
S9 1>aancs a d Rtpon' on tht Mull;.~ Chak.nawar'
60 f\'WFPPA DCOP, ~1ohmand Rert(m 1915-16; MPD 1927, pp. 6-7.
61 MPD, 1927, pp. 6-7.
 80 I'RO:\ rn:R m· F\ITII
politiC'.U front, a wa made clear by group attendance of Mohm2.lld,
Afridi, wat and Bajaur mullas at the amir of Afghanistan' JrrgJ
Jalalabad in 192 3.~ then again in 1929.63
Lc cr mu/101 cmnpcted for the support of and llfliliation to morr
chari matk and p<>\\c.ttul personalitie who could gread) maease
their own tl\t\1 and the more prominent mu/ltu uo;ed their influc:n
to back up weaker member of the line. 1 The mo r dramatic cnmpk
of thi was in 1915 when the Gujjar MuUa wa-. killed by the Dir
Levy for'-es and the Sandalo ~lulla and H aji Turanguti led a
of 3,000 men to confront the Otr Ievie and avenge his death.65 This
ort of rnutu<tl support wa!> central to maintaining the rele\-ancc anc:
import.m~.:e of <lll) one religiouc; leader within the greater Truw
Areas. Drawing on tnternal consensus and ~:~olidMity, mullas"
the line tried to support each other's directive in order dut
excommunicated by one mulla, a d.m was left without a c to the
dnmin.tnt rcligiou~ order of the frontier. During a time when the
I l.tlinw~ti !\ lohm~tnd cbn was ostracised by the I laji Turan~
decree dut it wa forbidden for any religious enices to be performed
in the 1Ialimni village was reaffirmed by the .Mulla Ctukn2\\l'a.r
.\Julia Bahra. When a on of a I Ialimza.i maltlt died, the mclil.lud
pay an unknown mu//,J of Alingar the princely sum of 30 rupees
conduct the et\ice on the ly.66
·n,i ctli1rt to maintain a unified front and prevent rdigion from
becoming divided and )c,- potent was largely managed b) H2ji
Turangt.ai. I le wa the primary in:.tigator and leader of meetings
Jl,ulcb, uggc ting that he, more than any other, bad taken on the
defining leader hip role among mu//as of the Akhund Ghaffur'
J le invited partie to lladda 'sharifor H adda the pure, for mecfu
on di pure , a in thecae of the l\lohmands in 1926 ,6~ and~
62. l\IPD, 1922-23,
b3. Border Adnun1 tnuon Report (hereafter BAR) 1922-3. OIOC \ ' 1
1\PD, 2ti J\l:w 1923.
64. Two 'I'irah ~wllm were c:ompcnng for ~luUa SaV'I.d Akbar's
~WFPPD, 4, 1I Sept. 1915.
6'i. l'Wl·l,PD, 2, 9 O~t. 1915.
6l1. ~tPD, 26 Feb. 1927.
67. ~lPD 1926, p. 72.
.
RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY i\:'W Tin: PM\IITU:-.: CI.A:--;S 81
be ~ Hadda as a point from which to di eminate ca h and
ammunition to his supporter .61
De pite the effortS ofHaji T urang1ai and other mul/m of the lladda
fine to ~o.bli..h a ~ingle line of religiou:. leadership aero the region,
there were strong and cono;istent opponent to the group. A discussed
chapter 2, rhe ~lianguls of Swott under ~liangul Abdul \Vudud
rqected their direct sptritual lineage from Akhund Abdul Ghaffur
through the Hadda ~lulla, and instead claimed de lCOt from the Pir
Bma f "vat (d. 1637). As well as invoking otn alternate piritual
line2gt, the ~lianguls created a group of their own lo).tl mu/1111, mo·t
prominent among whom were the Pir of Manlu Sh.trif and lm on
the Mi\ 10 Manki, who distanced themselves from the I l.tdda ~l utla'~
ideolo~ ..:al movement and from the politil.:al conformity demanded
bj the Haji Turang-zat and other prominent member.. of Akhund
GbmUr'l> line."' The Shinwari 1\lulla .1nd Mt)an ~l.mk.i publicly
dullenged the reLigious interpretations of the I l.~t Turangni and
Sandaki Mulla.10 The Miyan of~lank.i Sharif was equally critical and
derisive of the Hadda Mulla and hts legacy, c.11ling it u sham. He
derid~d the riruals of prayer of the I ladda Mulla's follower~. claiming
that raising the forefinger during prayer was not rcligiou)ly pre,.cribed
llld should not be practiced.71
The mu/las of the I Iadda group re:.ponded to such challenges by
guherinn together notable intellectuals affiliated with variou!> mmjids
llld madrasas and issuingfotwas on the validity of their dictate~ or
forcing consent through sheer intimidation. In one ca e <l jirga of
renowned mullm of the region produced a treati e caiJed 1/aququl
1Ufjal, a sharia-based rationalic:;ation of the lluji's correctness in
ailing for military action against the Briti'\h.7J ln otherc.a'\es dis<;enting
zdlarv."Cre militarily coerced into ~ubmission to the I ladd.1 group as
:-.o"\VFPPD 3 April 1915.
69 The ~lull a Spinbra had been afliliated with the I l.!dd.1 l\ Julia in 1897. I le
appears to h;.t\"C al•o been di~tanced by the rift htrwctn the ~lJ.tnguls and h1s
fathtr on the one side, and the I laddd Mull~ dnd his ,urit/1 on the other.
Wllo'i WhoNWFP. 1910.
- ~"WFPPD, 13 '-:ov 191 5, NWFPPD, 18 <>cpt 1915.
71. Qyddusi, TtnlmlJ• p. 59.
-2. jdunzcb Khalil, \.1u1.1hiJw MIJ'Ittmnrt rn Mo~la~nJ an./ Mohm.mJ Agm<y
(Pcstuwar 2000), p. 261 .
 82 FRO:'\TII-:R OF FAITII
in theca c of the Shinwari Mull a who ...e uppomr 'hou rcre bure:
down on the order of the Haji Turangzai when he briefly opposed
the latter." Conte t tion of the pirimuridi line' religious u
and interpretation could have deeply compromi cd that p.
the) wem on tn dominate religion and political action in the T
Area . Thi \V<l partly due to ih acquiring powerful and rc:sourc:cfd
patron in Aftrhani mn and Briti)h India, events whiCh are dt:K;UI5SC:IQ
in greater dcr.til in the following chapter. But the dominance o the
line wa more directly linked to the coercive powe~ of the: mulbs
their milit.trisation.
The militari.ration ofrrligious authority
Diplomatk inita.\tlves and soct<tl dictates by mulla1 we~ trategl
hacked up by their lmhRarJ. Thc:;e armie were manned h}
'regul.tr~'-the !hai/.:hs or deputies and the talihs or tudc:nts---1md
im~b'ltlar~-P.tkhtun villagers participating in specific mission --and
were u cd to demonstrate: hi popularity and generate emhu •
the mullm' decisions a well as being used to cru(h dissent and c.nfi
punishment . De.~riptions of military mobilisation b} mullas
the mo t important and detailed account~ in colonial recoun
of rdigiou leader hip in the Tribal Areas. Pashru literary and
aCl'OUnt l"211ed to mind dramatic amag~ of the ~tulia Chaim:rw:a:
in white mbc ,74 the Babra .Mulla on hi· ho~. the Black ~P:il.tn>w.
and l l1tji S.1hib Turang-u.i and hie; deputie galloping from '
villa e to c-all hi devotee to barde?~ These ~p~enrations accura
.;uggest that the:: mullas' lmh~n were the backbone: of their au""_.•••
The ize ofa lashkarwa panty a measure ofstrength and Delrsu~in­
ahilaty a a mul/a with grc::at renown attracted more: fighting
llaji S.1hib Turang1.ai, the ~ tulla Chaknawar and the Babra
had retinue: of at le.tst 40 men each, which could be backed up
rhou nd) of vill ager~." The: mu/lm would convene ltzShl:an for th.""tt
73. Kluhl, M11jahitlm MIJ{rrmmt, p. 259.
74. Ac.ount hy S} I, NIJm.t"'' G~Mu. pp. 23-4.
75. Ahmed You uf, 8,1hr.ry M111/a Sahib, pp. 33-4.
7l•. lnamit\\ Ghulam ;\luh mmad Dtn,l3 Aug. 2002.
77. lntcrvlt\\ S;acc:d Maq ud Shah.
RELICIOLS AUTHORITY A~D Tin: P/\KirllJN CI .1\~S 8.1
specific t:ypes of mi''ion.... The: fir;t:and mo t important wa to cnfor\:c
truce or e:<act penalty fin«:l> on behalf of the clan that they en·ed.
In such ituations, the mullas would lead their lashhzrs to a ubject'
villi~ and have their men tand guard while the tran gre sor' house
destroyed Resident of the hou e \~ere cleared out and then
tt would be set on fire: while the tran gressor' belongings would be:
appropriated by members of the: lashk.Ir a~ corn pen arion for their trip
to the village. Uor;e of the laJhlcar could be more ubtle a wc:ll. Shah
described an occasion when the 1\lulla Sabra brought hi~ Men to the:
house: of a truce breaker and remained there for two weeks until the
dissenter agreed a new .;ettlement. Cu.-,tom required the 'host' to
provide: food and accommodation to has 'guc~ts', the 'vi it' almost
bankrupting him. The convening ofa /arhlmr by the mulla was rooted
m Pakhtun cultural codes of defence, pride:. .tnd the usc of force to
back up a clan's position. Pakhrun clansmen, even tho·c tanconnc:cted
\nth the dispute:, supported these overt show~ of trength .wd military
ozgarusation by mullas in support of their diplomatic functions among
thecommurutie . In one cac;e I laji Turangni led a c.tmpaign .tgainst
a dm dut had broken a rruce made under oath on the {4arJn. Musa
Khe1 clan" whic.h were unconnected to the original treaty participJtc:d
in this campaign. \ Vhen questioned, a rcprc entative jirgtl explained
that breaking the oath was an unacceptable: viol.ttion of tribal codes
and the anctity of the Qyran, and they were duty hound to punish
the tran ~sors. H aji Turang-1~'li led his camp.tigns as a champion
ofPakhtun tribal values, an agenda that was diflicult to re ist when it
bad no direct impact on the participant\ in teres h .
The: second reason for the mu/101 convening /arhlc11n w.ts to punish
moral transgressors. Mullas would usc their pcl"\()n.tl retinues to
enforce punishment against those who h.1d defied their directives
by humiliating the guilty party or partte , or in most extreme
7S This ckcision would be: ratified hy a trihal JI'X"· 'l11c mullo wnuld rarely
act Without the sanction o( a relevant jirga-tu ncgb:t this would be
Wlt.unount to a declaration o(w,u again\t IllS hust ct1n .
79 Shah,Az:adi Ki T11lash, p. 27.
ore by Deputy Commissioner Peshawar, Jl M.uch 1927. NWFPPA,
DCOP, file 212 o(1927, "'01. 1.
 84 FROSTI£R Of' FAlTII
cir um tan es burning hou c and confi.,cating goods and \'aluablcs.
llaji Turang1.ai organi ed hi slxikhs to attack the Da,,czai Mohn:w:ds
in 1926 on the acru arion that they were 'addicted to immoralin
did not p.ty , ny heed to rcligiou injuncrion.82
' l11e third rca on, by far the mo~t ignificant for the de-.'Clopmcr:I
of rdigiou politics o\Cr the next half centurv, was the use of
by mullas enfim:ing their polirkal dircctiv~.'l For reasons
will be discu ed in greater depth in the next few chapters,
of the I l.tdda line had on ~ever.U separate instan'~ ,pposcd dx
British intervention in the Tribal Areas. Tribal -\rt SUpport:%5
of the Briti h who were gaining a disproportionate. power
wealth throu~h their .tllhmce, <Uld government inc;tallation such
cherkpo~t,., mmmuntcations lines and garri3on:. were the b
tarKets in this regard. Mul/as would gather lashl:ars and dose m
a '>pcofic objective- usu:tlly Jn army check-post, but occnsiotulh
entire British c.unp or clivi~ion, or a whole clan. Attack was
and vic tory w.ts ded.tred when members of the atta,king /ashl:ar
able to enter the camp and pillage ammunition supplie and
qucks and get aw.ty with ~ubstantial booty.14 The<.e attacks, "ittthcr
on the Briti h or on local tribes, were not intended to take or
land or po itions but to dc~tabilise adversarie~ in order to c:xact resp:a
ancl \:On idcration from them.
~ l ilitari at ion of the mullal' authorirv and the incrcasi~~ inf1uc:r:a
of the I laddo1 ~lulla' line, led now by Haji Tura.ngzai, ''
Cruli.tlly linked to the milltari<>ation of the Tribal Area.. popuhnoo
general. The C(onomy of arms trading in the Tribal Areas from
1880 onwards was ... upported by an illegal traffk in \\Capon from
81. lntcniew ~bhk Faul lladi. grandson of Malik Anmir of the G
l lalum;u, 13 Aug. .2002.
8.2. ~IPD, 1926.
81 ll1c Babr.a ~ J ulia thn~tencd ro blacken the faces ofBurhan Khd .tM:-=~
'\/WI PPD l J~n . 1915
84 C.hulam l\luharnmad Din ~rated that \ierorv wa.s dcducd in the ba::X
Gullo Sar J:ang when I Jaji Turangui's lasbbr man~ ro ldii 4
uOi<e:·r and make nff with ammunition and even clothes Uken from
bcxl•c of killed or wounded Briri~h soldier... E\-en the battalion
uken and rhe nch material apportioned between the pan•opa
Interview Ghulam .\luhammad Om, 13 Aug. 2002.
RELIGIOU i\UTBORITY ,\1"() 1'111: P.\KII 'IlJ:-1 CI.AN ss
Persian Gul£.85 \ Vith the creation of triballc,ic in the larc nineteenth
ccnrwyand the employment and arming oflcx---al lhnsrmltm, "capon
aprured from or 'urrendered by k.h.madars upplementcd thi
st:pply. Local expertise in the manufacture of arm began to grow in
the ~ce ofgovernment regulation of U\:h cnterpri c, r.and dt$pite
dfons to control arms trade through blockades and polida.l control,
the \'Olume of we2pons lr.lded in the Tribal Area wa utllcient to
arm the majority of the Tribal Area male population. Reli~iou
militancy was as much fashioned by thi~ illegal arm tr~de as it w.1
by ideology, agnatic rivalry and the Pakhtun code ofhunour.
Despite the nlWlce~ in motivation behind convening a /,uhktzr,
both on the part of the community and the mullt~s, the fact of mui/J
leader hip led the mobilisations to be referred to ;h jihadr-br the
w/hs, the clansmen, and the Briti~h . 87 Trumpet <.':llls .md the beat
of drum,.. brought participant!> to the mceung place and rhc mulla
or his depunes would lead the charge. One dan~rnan de aibcd the
gathering of a /OJhkar as he had witnessed tt:
The Turangzaj Baba would ~ay-the gom i lOming (he would l"'.lll them
:ora) and ,.,.-e should stop him-by fon:e-he is dt.~trO}IO~ hlam and he
is destroying our laws. [Tunngui Baba] would give kdurc and people
would li ten, and after the lecture) people Wl)uld join in with him. The
mulla would announce the t.:ommen,crncnt of the jdmtl l\1cs engers on
horses [Y..'Ould] de~igru.te a place where people houiJ wngreg"Jte. [1ru)
uAS] generally the hujra of a IJahila. All rhc Bai1a1, Khwaaua, S.afi and
K2ndahari would together de)ignatc a pl.t\:e ,.. here they 'hould meet-in
Nabaqqi or Safi or Kandahari or Ato Khel -loornething do e [to the
u.rget] as a pomt of :mack- then from there they would attack.
As the mu/101' means of raising lnshlt.an and the participant
dcmonsrrated, control over the communal ~pace of the mtujid, the
power of the sermon, and access to and recognition by different clan
communities formed the foundation of religious alathoriry. Despatc
the 'Islamic' leadership and anti western rhetoric of the mobilisations,
E5 Blha, NWFP Adminislrolton, pp. 77 ·R; Warn:n, lf'tt mlltln, pp. 30-l.
See Arnold Keppel, Gun Runnmg Jnd tht ln./wt North·Wm Frontitr
(London, 1911).
£7 Syal. NcmyaN Cbn.t, p. 57.
Interview Ghulam Muhammad Dm, 13 Aug. 2002.
 86 fRO~Til-:R OF FAITII RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY A~D Till-: 11AKIITUN CI.ANS 87

the underpinnings and main ray of the c mobiii tions" and MghJ.nistan, the Pakhrun mullas built up annie and pursued
participation of the Pakhtun mullas and rhe l'Ondltion ofaut""'""'~ political ~ndas. These events allowed them to am a greater military
the region rather than pecifil ideologkal concern . and political strength, heightening the ~ignifiance of their acthitic
Thi i not hm\cvcr to uggest that mu/la-led militanc) 1nthin the autonomo\b region, and their authority among the rribc .
benign or tribally·conrrolled phenomenon. Although these ~
of militant mobilisation were rooted in tribal i sues, thC) .,.,..........,w
mullas a military power :md independence of action which the
could u e in pun.uit of personal or ideological objeCU\-cs, bo::ot1ni!:;:
a coercive intlucnt:e "'ithin the tribal o;cr up. The in tancc m 1915
when rhe Gujj.lr Mull.1 brought his IOJhltar do"'n to the Chahb.rn
government chclkpo~t in D1r as retaliation ag-.tin t the N:m'2b
Dir' territori.ll encroachments and h1s complicity with govcmmcm
W;IS urh an example. The Gujjar Mulh1 ~ct up c-.unp in the \
Arangi, anJ used this vantage point to smpc at the 1'\awab of D
lmhkars. ' I le operated there for some days, but was fin:ill) atacb:d
by Dir's ~oldier~ and killed along with four of hi rh.uiW» and uz
Within d.1y:. .1 /arb/tar of 100 men from Jandol led by the .u;:
Turang-1~1i etlmc down tn Arangi to punish the village~ for all
their mu/111 to be killed before them and in retaliation looted
burned rhc hou e of the village"'-. 1 \Vhilc the Gujjar Mulla's •
mobilisation p.1rtly erved the intere:.t~ of the people of jandol
impranical mobili arion against the Nawab of Dir, a far stro
better equipped and richer pam, was aJc;o rooted in the d
regional mu/lm to oppose the ~a,\ab and his aspiration' to m001~
dominance. llaji .Turangu• mvoked Pakhrun cultural principles
ba i for fordng the men ofJandol to take action against the
villagers in order to preserve the power and status of the miJlk:s of
pirimuridi line.' 1
The ubMance and persistence of the muiiJJJ "jihadJ, whiCh blwnd
the boundarie between rribal and cultural ohjectin::. and the
own agentl.l~, arc dealt with in depth in the following chapters. \\
upport from their lex--a! Pakhtun tribal patronc;, and group in I

89. MVFPPD, diary 37 1915.

90. !':WFPPD, d1;u) 38 1915.
91. NWJ'PPO, th;uy 39 1915.
92. Mu//ainvulvcmcnt in the polin ofOir, s,,;u,Jandol, Kharand N·,._...,..,_
rhc :0. l.tlabn.t rates-is di5CU~ in dcu.il m chapru 5.

4 innovations in popular religioul> practice.2 Uluma and rudent at
PATRONS OF THE SAI~TS
Bcl'<Ht ~e it w.ts outside the borders of both admini temi Incfu
Afghani•a.tn, removed from the Brinsh colonial c;}"Stem of co
;tnd policing and beyond the responsibility ofMghani tan's anur, '~
a l'rul'ial frontier, the Tribal Areas came to con!>tltU[e a liminal
within British India with the potential to compromi e the
Although cont<tined and segregated, the population of the
l'Ould not be entirely conrrolled through pressure on Afghanisun
trib.tl policy. Durtng a brief period of the early twentieth ccn
two group~ .tv<uled themselves of the po~sibilities it offered
o;triking .tt the government oflndia by using the region as a
ground t(u an .trmed mobilisation. The first of the e was a
of 'u/ama of the madrasa Oarul Ulum Deoband near Lucknow
north-India; the other wa the government of the natioruilist
Arnanullah Khan in Afghani!>tan. Preparation for and execunoo
milita'} ambition were not undertaken independently b)
group-both relied on the military capabilities of the
mull.ls to populari e their agendas and mobili e the tribes. \\
the torie of the e efforts in the Tribal Areas were minor i
in both Afghan and Indian Muslim histories, the e\'cnt ofl914:
engaged the mullos of the Tribal Areas in uch -a way as to
increase their <:tanding and pre ttge.
Darul Ulum Deobaml and the Tribal Areas
5omc de cendent:. of the reformtst philoc;opher Shah Wali
dc:vclopeJ a progmmme of study incorporating and ttmming
his writing which beg.m to be imparted at a m.1drasa csrab
PATRO:-.IS OF 1'111:·: s \1:-.; rs 89
m the town < f Oeoband in 1864.1 In rigorou debate and rudy at
t Darul Ulum Oeoband, Shah Wali Ullah'~ o;ucce sm 'bifi.tn.-atcd
t . ..:. and rC\ivalist tendencie ' within hi work-cmph.t i ing
L C<::Lrmbr ideology but rejeaing it gene"i in Sufi thought and
pnctice--and promoted progr.unme for the remo\"al of heretical
Deoband saw themselve as being part ofa tradition ofinterpretation
and defence ofl lam in increa ingly ho)tile )urrounding,, and much
of their religious commentary also came to focu on the definition of
the lndim Muslim community <lnd the importam:e of itl> solidarity
and protection.
With the start of the twentieth century a wider deb.tte ensued
across India over the means and substance of .t political consolid;ttion
ofthe Indian Muslim idcntity. 1 The idea of p.m-hlamism, a univcr~•tl
luslim identity, most famously articulated by the Per~ian p<>litical
md religious philosopherJamaluddtn al Afghani (1839 ·97), began to
gam ground in India around 1910.4 Pan l<.l.tmism ~uggcsted a global
solidarity that emerged from sh;ued rcligtous values. The inception of
pan-Islarnism was inseparably Linked to it~ alltrtgo, .tnti· coloni.Uism,
as the former highlighted the fact that the condttion of coloma!
:repres ion were shased by Muslim communirie~ acro~s the world.
Usm~ the Urdu pre~l> to publicise their ideas about Muslim ocial and
political formations, many Indian Muc;lims voiced ~onccrn about
lhdr o"n government fighting a war against the Caliph who Wol~
protector of thefaziralul Arab-the 'acred lands of Arabia, Palestine
and Iraq.
In 1914 Maulana Mahmudul lla an, chancellor at Dcoband,
conceived a movement for the Liberation oflndia by which armed unib
would be deputed to organise the Pakhruns of the Tribal Areas, and
rally support an Mghanistan in order to destabilt~e the Britbh Indian
1 This and all further commentary on the DanJI Ulum Dcuhand is ba~ed on
Barbara Mercalfs ~rudy /s/amu Rtt•awl in Brllilh India. Dro!o.md, I 86(}
]~ (Princeton, 1982), except where ochcrwi~c mtcd
2. Hemumcn, Hujjul, p. xxxav.
3 MushiruJ H2lan (ed.), Communlll un.! Plln·lalllmi,· Trtm!J in C4/oni11l/ndaa
(Ddhi, 1981), p. ~;
<C Ira Lapic:lu , A Hutoryo/hlamit Somtits (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 516-18.
90 FRO~I'II!R OF r\ITU
government and pro.,. ide a wnvcnient point for the Turkish anm
open a new front ~£,rain t the Briti h. The movement was rooted
the new and cxdting politic of anti-colonialism and fW1·l bmxsn
galv:mi ed hy the tart of the Fir..t \Vorld War, but the founders
the mmement highlighted the difference in their militaristic ou
and the politic of non-violent non-cooperation which domtm
the: nationali t Indian uena at that time.
Wnhout violence: I1L't hdifWJ), evicting the anxrn. from Htlu!US~mJ
impo stble. For this (\iolc:nt cviaion of the angrn.] 2 centre, "'OpOOS
mujah1din were nc,cssJry. I lence, it was thought tlur ~mcnts
\\ c.tpons :and rc~ ruitment of ~oldien. ~houJd be wnductc:d in the aJO
the 'free tribe11'.'
The Tribal Areas base of the movement was cho en fori
of ncm·;ulministration-c<mditions that would m.tkc: orga~
11nd pl.mnmg .1 military mobilisation against the coloni.tl govcmmtt!
e.l ..icr Obaidull.th s.ndhi (1872 1944), a Sikh convert to I b.m
an alim tlf the D.mtl Ulum Dcoband who had studied and ~
under ,~\lnhmudul I la~.m, was one of the primary mirubt
the politkal ideology of the movement based in the Nonh-\\ cs:
Frnmier. .Maulana llu sain Ahmad Madni, a enior scholar at the
Darul Ulum who de cribed the fronrier-ba. ed jihad in great
in hi :autobiographicaJ works, was another.6 Madni's commcn
wa an intcllectuali ed appraisal of the need for thi movcmcn:
an integral counterpart to the political proce,., in India. He S2id
Gandhi, Kehru, \1aulana Bari, Dr An. ari, ~laulana MUhamnud
and fl.1aulana Sh.tukat Ali were all in their places at the 'beadquarua
of the ant1 ~olomal movement. Starring a complementary offi
in the Tribal Area.-; would re-enforce the demand of the rutio
and be'-'llu e militancy was the hi~torical prerogati\--e of the frontxr
trihc~, the cuntradiction between such a methodology and the stna
non-violence propounded by Gandhi and the Con~ess P~
5. Jlu un 1\hmJd \1adnt, Murh-• Hayat (Karachi, 1953) dupta 6.
6. ~Iatini wrote NIIIJih !lu_Yul while in pri on in 1942, :as an account
ltli: ami ht Wltne s to evt:nts that he felt were ofim misn:prcsmtcd. T.
RtJhml Rumal w:u a more focu!-Cd summary account of lhc: mD\"aDCC:
the Jam:tat·i ;\ lujahtdtn, probably written in the 1950s.
PATRO!IJS OF Till: l>\INn 91
imlevant. Oba.idulla.h mdhi' "riting desaibed hi own be lid that
the frontier movement fulfilled the need for a party 'founded on Sh h
\\'ali Ulhh' ideal:; and pro,·ided a ccntrnl hase lilr or&ranisauun .tnd
mobilisation from which a politil"lll and rcligiou agenda could be
p:omoted.1
This way f thinking of the Trib;U Areas and it population wa
rtinforced b) Doobandi writings on the Pakhrun ~luslim a a
distinct and eparate population from the ~1u lim uf Briti h India,
l!ld on the connection between the Tribal Area and the ~lu lim pa t
m India. Highly idealised apprai ah of Pakhtun <>~; iety and hbtory
messed that 'the youth of the free tribes [azm/ 'J<IPfli/j h.td alway:.
been engaged in jihad and were stron~-t wtlled and hmvc'. The I bdda
1ulla'sjihads against the British in 1893 and 1897 were cmpha~ised
as a mark ofPakhrun commitment to tndepcntlence und pre .crvation
of thdr religious culture. Another Deob.lndi, M.tul.lna i\luhammad
l~-.m. suggested that if sufficiently rc enforced by the financial and
pOlitiOll resources of the Dcobandis, the Pakhnm would aid the pan-
ISbmi ts in their fight against the British •n order to rc.tli e greater
political sovereignty for themselvc . Obaidullah Smdhi wrote th:tt it
their distinct nature as p.2haris or people inhab1tmg the mountain)
that separated them from Pakhtuns in the lowland~ e.tst .tnd wc~t of
them and allowed them to accept hlam and aid l\lahmud Gha7.na,•i
and hi incursions into India in the eleventh century~ 1\ladni wrote
C\-en more extensively about the hi~toric importance of San·1d Ahmed
of Rai Bareilly's jrhad which wa.. Intended to recl.um a space and
d:gnity for the practice of the ~1u)lim faith, and the participation
7 Obakiullah Sindhi, 'Shah Wall Ull11h /fur u, K1 1'rhrtl [ ~hah Wali lJUah
and his Mo\-emenr], mrrodunion tn Maul:tna Sayy1d Mulwnmau 1\.ltyan,
Tdnil-i S&ilh-ul Jflml (Lahore:, 197R), pp. ti, \'ii. Sindhi's c: ~ay on Shah
Wali Ullah ~ wrmen afrc:r 1939 hut Stndhi'• writing' on the movement
compiled .n Zalt Dnm ~nd ht leucr to Iqbal C)h.tidJt \\trc: wrmcn
betwttn 1924 and 1937. 'Dle e wnung cmhh~h Oh~ulull.th Smdhi's
political outlook durin and directly after hi )l:.tfl of lllvol\cmcnt with the
ffiO\'anent of the J:unut·t .Mujahtdm.
ns: r T•hril-i Shaiih·u/ JlinJ, p. 73.
9 ind ~ z-tr Da1ri, p. SO.
92 f"RO~Ttt:R OF f"AITII
of rhe tribal Pakhtunl> in du movemenr. 10 The hi tory of the T
Area pnx!uced in Deobandi texts fle!>hed our the map of lndU
it Mu lim' pace ', im·oking a historical notrrative oflslarn in Incfu
h 1~c. c.."'ntemporary ~tu~lim ~ociety.
Dwbandi belief in the movement was abo rooted in political
and '0c..1al appr;.ti al of the Pakhrun tribe . In a lerter to bhm
I IJ~.tn, one of hi tleputie~ in the frontier ..aid:
The independent tcrritorie l}ing bet\l.cen the Indian fronucr
Afgh;tnimn from Watiri•tan down to Alai ncar the Kashmir borde:
is lull nf ,df·rc:.pccting high ~pirited Afghans who an: wdl c:q
with 'artrid~c:. uf every dcsc:ription ... thc'e people a eordutt; ro
tre.ny hctwecn Great Brit.tin and Afghanistan .tre Briti h ubjc:cts.
uwing rn the1r inno~te spirit of national honour they h.&\"e not reoogn.!sd
the 'ovcre1gmv of the Briti~h or the am1r (or Nghanistan] and
independent W.mmtan, Tir.1h and l\lobmand country [do not
luvcl khans to rule ewer them. 11
Considered u., one people, fragmented and dhideJ, wtthout 1
go\Ocrnment or politkal direction, yet narurally imbued \\ith a
of identity otnd dc~ire to rc~i.,t impcriali<~m, the Pakhtuns wac
perfect rcc..'fUits in ~l aulana t\lahmud's cause. The word lag
was adopted by the Jamaat 1 ~lujahidin in reference to the T
Areas, hut u ed now to mean 'land of the free Afghan tribes'.
Maul ana Obaidullah Ssndhi was one of the 'uiAma sent to OlJ!::m=s:
the movement in Yagh1stan.'= Along with t\laulatu Fazal
of Lahore .md 1\laulana Fa1..U ~lahmud of Pe h;~war, he began
re c tablhh .tyYid Ahmed of Rai Bareilly's old military bzcs
Chtmarlund 10 the Bajaur area and As mast in Buner as ne\o; poli
10. ~lar.lm part"ulouly pointed out that this programme h:~d Hmdmr.:n:-cc::=
an.J ann·Briti h cun~cms-it wa~ not1lnri-Hmdu. He cmplus:iscd
rnm<tmcnt had 1nduded Hmdu and that the jihlztl was directed
Ranju Sin h, onl) msof.aJ .lS !Unjit Singh wa- an c:.xtension of me [as:
lnd1.1 Company's power and 1nflucncc:. l-11 concludm~ tatcmcnt
mo~cmtnt was that 'the primill) motive of thi, jaftUlllJ was to
fiuc1gncr lrmn ' llindu~tan' and to establish a democntk: rule
WIIOtl'). Sec!\ lndm. Ttlonk-i &hmi RJ.mmzl, pp. 41S-4i.
11. Bukhan l\lulla to ,\l.thmudul Hoban, 4 Aug 1916 in" fglun Thr
S1lkcn Letter la-c 191&-1918'. OIOC LIP H} 633.
12. ~ladni, N.1!J h t I 1<1Jill. chapter 6.
93
and military centres for the organhation of the religiou warrior
or the jamaat-i ,\fujabidin.° Fund from India were channelled
t the Chamarkand ba.~ for the purchase of arm , a printjng pre~
and o:her paraphernalia of revolution. The objective of the leader
the mon~ment were de cribed as being: 'to enli t volunteers', to
ae2re enthu.;iasm for confrontation' and to recruit and train the
m'Olurionary' tribe5 into an army of liberation.•• The 1\alat and
M;Wan tribe (of south Baluchimn) would then att.1ck KMachi;
the tribes of Ghazni (in Afghaniqan) would att.tek Q•ctta; the
Mohmands and l\lasuds (off\.lohmand and W.wristan in the Tribal
~,) would attack Pe~hawar; and the l\.oh1 rani tribe (of upper
... wat) would join with the mvadtng TurkJsh .mny .ts .t front line of
attack when they confronted the Briri~h .trmy. 1s
The temtory that compri~cd this .uea of operation .tnJ milit.uy
organi arion was thoughtfully mapped by one member of the j;tmaat
as the interim land between the Indus River to the cast and K.tbul
to the west, Kashmir and Bukhara to the north .md Baluchistan to
the south. and included Kabul and Kandahar, Pc~haw.tr, Kohat .tnd
Bwwa.lpur. suggesting that the natural ethnic extension of YaghiJtlln
had to include the Pakhrun areas ea t of the non·admm•stcred
districts, and west of the Durand Line. The dtrailed hc.ut ofYaghistan
nwked on the map was of the Jamaat 1 ~1ujothidin' opcrauon in
the non~dministered areas-Dir, Sw.lt, Bunc:r, Asmar, Shalxpdar,
Iohmand, Ac;mast, Chamarbnd and Habra.
The appearance of the Jamaat·i ~lujahidin in the Trib.u Areas and
theirO\"ert anti-colonial imperative led British intclligen'e to believe
tlut these 'Hindustani Fanatics' were directly organising milit;mcy in
13 The actavi ts in the Tribal Areas called tlu·m~lvr hy v.triou~ n.unc~
indudtng the }amtyyot-i 1/u.J,u//a}J, the 1/tndmt.mi Mt!i•thitlm, .111d the
fuj11hiliirr Cha,.,arland The Bruish rrlcrrctl w tlu·m .1~ the 'I J.ndustani
fanatics'-1 tem1 coined during the \Vahhab1 trials fclr pJrttcipanl5 in
a)Yld Ahmed of R.ai Barcilly' mo,emenl. For consi~tcrwy, J w11l rcler to
them as the Jamaat·i ~ tujahidin Ghul.un !Usul Mchr's prefcrcntc lor thi
title guidn my own use of it.
14 Madni, .Varph-t Ha)al, chapter 6.
IS MJdni, Tthrik-i Rnhrni Rurn,11, chapter 9,
94 1-'RO:>."rJ ER Or FAIT II
~;~~.?~~·
(~/lfVJII,l.P)
!
lk"tii""J(I • • - f, I ~~~
1-ig. 5 1\luhamm 1d Ali Ka~uri'~ Narrho-yi YaghiJtan~
the rcgion. 17 1Iowever the influence of the Jamaat-i Mujahidin in
Tribal Area wa:. deeply dependent on the local mullaJ as thej
dep~:nded on the e crucial intermediarie to mobilise the T
Are.t population. The Jamaat-a ~1ujahidin' orga.nb:uion vithin dx
region delegated rcsponc;ibility to the mul/aJ, rd}ing on their
a mediators of the land and population without seeking to
their knowledge and control of land and population • .Madni
the movement that:
we \\C:re only ucccssful insofar as we acquainted wme thoughtful
with the fervour of nationalism; and when Haji Turangz.ai and his pcqit
M.med the war again t the Briti~h in sarhad, we u'>Cd to suppl) them
important infonnation, by which they gained a great ad\'antage.
16. Kuun, ,\IUJhahiJat, p. 1,
17. ) ..\I, Ewart l ntcUJgcn~e Bureau Po.bawar to Forci~ and
Department, March 1923 OIOC UPS. 11 21i.
18. ~bdni, Tthri~-t Rnh,, R~fll<ll, p. 156.
PATRO!"S Of' Tm: S\1~,. 95
~luch was made of the importance of the mulla in the Deohandi
writings on Pakhrun ..ociety. Madni described Pakhtun =t the ideal
a reli~ou-ly ob~n'li.Jlt society becau e mult.u were part of thcir
'tutiom. of justice and ocial order. These mullas were cen a
&shioning and onr.mi.,ing ocicty, and n the be t facilitators ltnd
guidesofPakhrun qaumiJ·at, in the w·ay that it would crve the Indian
politiol cause and c;erve the Pakhrun . Muhammad Ali Ka uri argued
dw the mullaJ had a central role in l"aghi.~tan, ,tnd the dominant
i:illuence in the village council. lie aw all soi: i.tl and political
thority as deriving from the e per onaliraes. 19 ~l.tUiana Bark.ltulhh
IJIP!auded the role of mulltlJ and 'ulama ,\s over ce~ of nwr-JI conduct,
indicating their authoriry to burn the hou~e of tho e indincd to
disobey them.JO They maintained in titution' of community dialogue
md o~nisarion that were seen to ri\'al the Briti h .11 u lrn.·allevcl.21
They pre,enred not only a means of combating the Briti h in the
present, but were capable of creating a future order that would restore
dignity to Jc;lam and to indigcnou, custom and ci\'ili-;ation.
Links between the mul!aJ of the lladd.t line and the Dcobandis
the twentieth century had been e tabli~hed by the llaji Turang-lai
111 1875 when he joined a party of 'ulama from Dcoband to perform
Haj.22 Haji T urangzai went on to spend a few )"t.ll" an Dcohand and to
c:cment this relationship. In 1914, when ~laulana l\.lahmud asked the
Haji Sahib to move from Utmanzai into the T rib.tl Area to undertake
jihad, the H ja Sahib incorporated Maul.tna Mahrnud's agenda into
own ininarive of islah or social improvement and brought other
member of his pirimuridi line to a sist the movement of the Jama.n-i
lujahidin.13 The first assistance the lot"'.llmu//ar rendered was to help
settle t1 c mujahidin arriving in the Tribal Are.\s. l luji Turangzai and
the Mula Sandaki guided parties of mujahidin and their f.unilics into
Buner nd Chamarkand and negotiated the term'> of their settlement
19. Kasun, ,\.1ushahiJJt, p. 30.
Jl 'Ai!Jzn Muqadda1·1 Dmi BnyAht1lr·i P.tth.mut.m',IIPI'CrHhx f\. lrhr, Snrgu1.111hti
IIIJ'ahUiin, pp. 521-33.
21 'Ailan Muga.IJilJ-i Dmi 8,~1 Ah.tli·i Po~thnnict.m', pp. 542-t
22. Jn~ ll.yi Sai)I/J Tur.m,'(Zilt, pp. 4(}·2.
2l Ewyon the llaji Turangzai by Ahdul Gbaltur Ba, ha, appendll( Ja~cd, 1/nji
&zl:ih Trnan[;"..Jt. p. 525.
96 FROSTn:R OF FA1TII
with the local rcsidents.l" The Haji Turangzaj ~
and cttled 120 families of members of the Jam:ut-i .Muj2hi
the Trib.ll Area .25 After Haji Turangzai's demonstration
commitment to the movement of the Jamur-i Mujahidin and
ability to organi e their activitie:. in the Tribal Areas, 1
Mahmudul I la an ent letter asking all his student j ass.oci:ltes
the region to pledge their commitment to the Hajt h and
hi:. in truction in thejihatf.lb Haji Turanp con~ultcJ ~th the
of the mujahidin at Chama.rkand to decide a date and ruat
arrack The Mulla Sandaki and Mulla Babra met reguluf) wuh
J.unaat i Mujahidin member5 to discuss strategy, at their nC\\ base
Cham;ukand, .md other rimes, at the mullas' own homes.21 In 191
I l.Di Turangni jointly issued a jimtan with the Jamaat·i Mujahi<f::
ro the local tribes calling for a war against the British.29
The mullas most deeply involved in the movement ofthejanun
Mujahidin were I Iaji Turangzai and Mulla Chaknawarin ~lohmcl
the Mulla S.tndaki and Mulla Babra in Swat and Bajaur, ~lulb
AkbM, Mulla Abdul I Ialeem and Mulla M ahmud Akhunuda
the .\ fridt:. 0 and Mulla I lamzullah in Waz.iristan.)1 These
of the pinmundt line of the t ladda M ulla were referred to as
bmurgan-i Yaghistan or the elders of Yaghistan who had org.miscd :t
conl·crted oppo:.ition to the colonial government. T a"ticall.eal:i.cn~
and organharion of the military wing of the Jamaat-i 1u:·~~
wa:. entirely entru ted to the local mu/lm who were respormbk
organi ing the .M ohmand, ~1ahsud and Kohtstani P~tun 'ai!:lcs
24. l"WrPPD. 11 Sept. 1915.
25. Ibid.
26..Madm, 'J'thri'l-1 R~Jh"'1 Ru111al, pp. 16~; between 1915 and 1 1
Jama:u·i Mujahidin .cnt deputations to the 1 laji Tunngzai. ~mdaki
and ~ l uUa Bahra. :"11\VFPPD 1915-6.
27 'lWFPPD, 14 Aug. 1915.
28. NWFPPD, 1915-6.
29 NW f'P P[), Sept 19 15, NWFPPD, 28 Ocr. 1916.
30. Chamarkandi, Surtu%1ld•t-l \ lujuhuim, pp 1Q-30; Ka~ Mld!ll~r.
pp. 43-4, 'Allan ~luqadda.s i Dini Bay Ahali-i Pathmistan'.
31 . A dcpunnon of members of the Jamut-J .Mujaludin based m
v1 ite.l the ~J ulia ,\Jahmud tn 1920, pre•enting him wuh a
1word NWl'PPO, 28 Feb. 1920.
PATRO:-o:S OF Till. 1\1~TS 97
l1ltO a formidable military force.-u l\1oreovcr, the mujahidin them elves
mosdy operated under mu/la leadership a in one in tonce in 1919
when 300 mujahidin swore bail at the hand of Mulla Chaknawar to
fi;ht under hi command during the Third Anglo-Afghan War.n
upport from theJamaat-i l\ I ujahidin~rre<~tlyincrea ed the tanding
1M Tribal Areas mulla , not lea 1 because of the ammunition and
am supplied through Chamarkand and entru ted to the mulla1
for distribution among the 'tribe •. In ju t ix month 3000 rupees.
SO horse:. and 303 rifle were .;ent to the Mohm.tnd dire~:tly from
the Jamaat·t ~lujahidin; 30,000 Kabuli rupee were p.l eJ on the
wjabidin's advice from Amir I Iabibullah' court ro the Lala Pir of
~r for onward clistribution to the Wazir.. und ~I 1 ud ; .tnd 30,000
rupees Kabuli were granted by I hbibuUJ.h's ministtr to the Jam.ttH·i
1ujahidin to distribute in Yaghistan. ~ J\, .oci.ttion with the Jama.u·i
1ujahidin abo heightened the profile of the mullm who had hitherto
CC\U used ophisticated methods of self-projection like printing
pmses. lmpres~ed by the methods of the Jamaat 1 MuJ 1hidin, such
po ting proclamations ofj1h,1d on tree~ through M.udJn,35 the J bji
Turangzai acquired his own printing pre in 1916. The membe~
of the Jamaat also spoke highly of the mu/101 in their own otddrc~ e
the Joal population, thereby clev-.lting them in h.-al e rimation~.
In one widely clistributcd pamphlet, the Jamaat wrote:
With the help of the 'u/am.1 of the faith you will, in the land:. of the
J.&z/':fot, ~ able to give your progeny knowledge of the art and science
and you can su.nd ~houlder to ~houlder wuh the other progrcs ivc and
miliscd nations of the world in the field of \Uccc and culture."
Rather than actively leading and engineering a military ~trategy
£ YaghiJtan, the member.. of the Jama.H i Muj;thidin restricted
d:cmsclve to funcling and supporting the actlvtttes ofthe mulltJr. They
CUCOUfai!:cd the religious ncrworks to mobilise militarily, but around
l2. M.1dso, Tthri} 1 &shmi Rumo/, p. 173.
33 E.nr r fmm CJD ncw,lctrer, 30 June 1919 NWI·PPA, Spe~1.1l Branch
l\'WFP File 403, p 35.
34 :\VFPPD, 13 ~ov., 30 Od. 1915; 6 "1a> 1916.
lS N\\'FPPD, 4 Sept. 1915.
l6. Sec ~'\VFPPD, 2 Scpr 1916.
li 'Ailan ~1uqadd~-J Dmi Bay Ahah·1 P.uhani tan', pp 521-2.
98 FRO:"TH:R OJ.' f.'AITH
mu//a-directcd agendas. TheJamut-i Mujahidin imigor2ted the
pirimuridi networks by prO\iding funding tom ·· lcdjihmls.
With their financing, the llaji Turang7.ai, the .uttJaki 1ulb
Babra ~luiiJ built 'co:Uirion 'and armies, o ren 1bl} m suppon ofdx
Jamaat' cau e. hut really in pursuit of lex--a! agendas and poli
Th1 wa demon rrated when money and ammunition supplied to the
S rtor FutJir and tht. andaki ~lulla in 1915 v. c:nt to 1St m a
p()wcr ~tn1ggle Jgatn t the Nawab ofDir. 1 \Vh1le invoh'Cment of the
mujahidin in the Tribal An~a~ no doubt affcded rcli¢ou discourse
und encour~lgcd anti·coloniali m, the membe~ of the Jamut did
direct frontier-h;tscd mobilisation around anti-colonial aam
They .tllowed mullm w put forward punishment of dan in recopt rX
metJUitablc:. ;ulowances, and containing over ambitiou~ rulers m the
reg10n as thc1r prime objectives. The Jamaat's <upport contn"buttd
more to the consolidation of the muli(Jj' authority and unanimity ~
to the nationali!>t movement in India.
After a short time e rablishing a presence at Charnarbnd
A .. ma..t, Oh.lidullah Smdhi and other Deoband1 'u/.1ma who h2i!
joined the movement mduding Maulana Abdur Raziq and 1aub::1
aifur Rahm:m-moved to Afghanistan to further the movement br
SC:l~ring favour and financial a.; ·i tance from the A(~han am.tr
preparing fora Turk.i h mobiUsacion through the country. Mgh
was the mo t obvious place in which to politicaJly or~ bec~sc
llaj t Turangz.:u was reported to be building :a c:o:alitaon of tribes to
rhc: 8nri h. Around the arne time he orga.niscd the Bunel'\..ds m c
on Dtr. NWFl'PD, 7, 21 Aug. 1915.
J'J. 'WFPPD, 1.1 !\.larch 1915. Thi• mobilis:anon •~ explored m grater
m chapter 5.
40. Resident ar Asma 1, iome of whom h.td been born there: and whose
harl bc:tn sc:nled there from the time of Sanid Ahmed's 1110\"anCnt.
dr;~wn intll lcnumg ~uppon to the newly atn\ed dt ident because
hi tone connc:.. tJOns between Chamarkand and A~mast liCII\'lml, H~
cemed thear involvement W2~ limited as the 'amir' at ;\must, Naam:.a.
\HIIte a Ieifer to the Coanmi 'ioner at Topi den)ing any sympum far
lt.s idcnr , claimang that the A'mllot q:ttlemenr wu on!) a<a 2 *pa.-tr
dcvurccs n:tarcd fmm the world' :and that thC) n:j«ted • mo\er:xd
inauaretl h)· the Dc:oband p.uty. Amar Niarnaru.l.bh .,., l22lh
Qlt)"Urn, C. I.E. Topa, n:c.:ct\cd 26 December 1916.ln H
1909-1918'. National Documentation Ccntn: Islamabad (hcnccfor'
!':DC), 4 S'fB. 11, 268.
PATRO:"S OF Till-: AIN rs 99
its ttong hi'toric connection to !\1u lim rule in India, to I Jamie
onali t and pan-J Jamie movement in Turkey and Iran, and a)
the only contemporary overeign ~1u lim statc:.41 Meanwhile a party
politically disenchanted srudent of G wemmcnr College Lahore
indudi~ Iqbal Sh:uda.i, Abdul Karim Ch:tmarkanJi and MullJmmad
Ali Kasuri, 'migrated' at Maulana 1\lahmud' invitation and joined the
·dents at Chamarkand. In 1916, the organi crs at Chamarkand
pcpared to finally propose the plan to the Onoman Viur. This laltt
mitiari'e was the undoing of the movement as the !etten. ent to the
Ottoman~ and to Maulana Mahmudul I Ia nn appri,ing him of the
pr~ess of the movement, written on pieces of silk to avoid detection,
.-ere intercepted by the Criminal Invesng.uion Dep.lrtrnent:41 The
content of what would come to be called the 'silk letter:.' wa:. enough
ft r ~bulana Mahmud and :ill the other Deobamh:. involved Ill the
movem..:nt to be charged with edition and for Maulan<l l\1ahmud,
Maul;wa :\1adni, and Maulana Muhammad l\1•yan to he ~ent to a
prison urnp 111 Malta.
\VhiJ Dcobandi institutional support to the movement and the
Tnbal Areas mullas o~teno;ibly ended with the deportation of the
Dcobandi 'ulama, the Chamarkand and A!>masr ha es remained
operative under the management ofMaulana Ba,hir and Fa!.alllahi
while .Maulana Saifur Rehman and I laj1 Ahdur Raz1q became more
esublished in Afghanistan. 41 The e 'ulama occ.as•onally reappeared
41 Mulu.mmad Hussain Kh1n, Afghun B.r.!rha}) AM IU•II Am,mu/la6 Khan
Khalll:.iullah A1t~lhl 1 lfu~m.1 Ki AzimuhJb.m ChJihstm Dt J ~J-D.lll<~rr
(Lahon:. 1924), pp. 1~251.
42. 'Mgbani ,~.The Silken Letter Ca'e 1916- 1918'.
0 Otnidullah Smdhi w.u not among the c. During h•~ early yc.tn. 1n Kabul,
O!nidullah Sindh• tned to cre:ate a military comp~u between the Turks
and GenYWlS and Afgh:tns. lie worked closely wuh rhc Turko·Germw
ffilUion to Kabul m 1915, along with l\l<lubna Bark.Jrull.th Bhopall
and !Uja :\lahcndr:l Pratab, members of rhe Indian Nattonal PiU't)' who
1imibrly came to Afghanistan to org:tn1se ant• colonial acttvity Obaidull:th
indh1'~ interests became deeply mfluenced by the Indian N;~tional Party's
communi t outlook :tnd he took a different coum than other ulama
who stayed on to work in Afghanistan as religious ~.:hol.ar;, teachc11 and
administratOr$, uJtim:ately lea\llng Afgh:ani\tan for Europe m 1922 (Sindhi,
Ut1 Datri, pp. J()-50). Mc:tnwhilc many of rhc Lahore rudent5 conunued
OQ to Afghanist:an, and then on to Europe or Nonh AmeriC'a, ending their
eonnecuon to the Tribal Are:u.
 100 FRO~TIER OF FAJTII
in later years as f.'lcilitators of a rapport between the Tnbal
and the government of Af~thani tan and as champions ofT
Area independence and the importance of its mullnr.'" Perhaps
importantly, the mullas of the Tribal Areas maintained connf't'TM"H~
with the DMUl Ulum Dcoband, ~nding later generations thctt
md)." 5 They would later come to contribute to the organi non
the Dcoband legacy in the territorie which became Pili tan in 1 ~
i uc which will be explored further in the last chapter. Ultima
the failed and ill-conceived movement of the Jamaat-i lup.hid::!
did u greJt deal more to illuminate and con olidate the geognp
~ub-.tun,e, and r.:onccrns of the pirimuridi networks in the T
Arc;b .Uld to enrich the mui/(IJ than to promote an anti-col
Insurrection .unonK the Pakhrun tribes.
Nntionalist Ajghanisttm and thf Tribal Arfas mullar
Eastern P.lkhtuns of what became the Tribal Are.lS
maintained informal military ties with the Kabul amirate. me
thc~c tic were cstabli~hed directly between the Afghan ~ove.mmcnt
and the groups in question while others were established th
political and landed intermediaries such ~ the Mohmand KJun
Lalpura who distributed allowances to the more e terfy Mohnunds
on behalf of the Afghan c;tate.<l6 A common method whereby the
court or it agent ho~d communicated with and ~ecurcd milian
commercial commitment from the eastern Pakhruns \li'2.S throc:t..l
the intc:rces ion of Pakhtun mullas who would commit to nih
/,uhk.llrJ on behalf of the am irate in return for grant and pmilc:2cs
from the court-a military compact that had been demonstrated
44 lnth;m 'Jama, panicularl) those of the Darul Ulum Dcoband. h2d
wdoomc m Afghani tan for their cc...dlcnt training 10 the religious sac:cas..
' ll•cy were highl) sou~ht aficr tor their rc:achjng crnicnuals, and m:re
crnplo}c:tlm the ~:c:ntral and n:gtonal ju~ricc dcpanmc:nrs. Once thq
cu Algham tan, thc:sc ulamn bc:amc deeply involved 10 atllirs ofthe
61.1tc and nuint.linc:d connections to British lndU and ~tuslim ru
poliucs there: a Afghan. Cite: Chamarkandi, S~-i Mu;..hit/. p.. 14
and ~l!ldni, Naqsh-i II"Jo~t, rr- 607-8.
45. 'U 1 of&~udcnt who pauc:d from the D.ar-ui-LIJum, Dcohand'. ~·wFPPA.
Spccaal Bran h files. an "Youth and Srudc:nt ~lovcmcntJ;'.
46. This i dik'U sed in gre.atc:r dcwl1n clupcer 1
PATRQ'.;S OF nm SA IN'l 101
the mobilisarions of 1820-35. Thi relation hip w:a Ji rupted with
the separation of the 'independent' tribe of the Tribal Area from
Afgfwllstan by the terms of the Treaty of Gandam.1k of 1878 and
then the demarcation of the Durand Line: in 1893. By the tcrrn of
these treaties, Amir Abdur Rahman (1879·1901) wa pre uri ed to
sco.-u relations with the trans border tribes.
Amir Habibullah Khan (1901-19) inherited the 1878 treaty that
nude Afghanistan a British protectorate.47 He received 01 commitment
dut the British would not interfere in Mgha.nistan's 'intcmal affairs'
beyond the Durand Line as well as a guarantee ofu permanent sub~idy
tO be used for the payment of troops and import of munition-.
4
In
mum, Habibullah ·was asked to confirm his acc:cptanc.:e of the Durand
Line and the termination of his own state's interests at that juncture.
Huubulli.h's interelit in formalising the Anglo Afghan rclation~hip
wu indicated by his public proclamation ratifymg the Anglo-Mghan
agreements m 1905."' However he declined any commitment to
wuhdrawing his influence from the British-side Tribal Areas. I Ie
llso declined to discuss demarcation of the still vague border between
Afghani tan and India as it ran through Mohanand, Khyber and
Waziristan.
The Tribal Areas formed a namral military frontier for Mghanistan
16Jinst an aggressive and untrustworthy Bnt1sh India whic:h, even in
these late days of the Great Game, periodically thre01tened to invade
tt to counter Russian advances from the north. While I labibullah
hesitated to uc;e his connections to the Tribal Areas m the early years
ofhis reign because he was unwilling to jeopardise his rclatiomhip
with the British, members of his court mo~t significantly his brother
nru.IL..h Khan and uncle Abdul ~yyum Khan were ~o harshly
cntical of the agreements with the British and their ramificatiOns for
the Afghans that HabibuUah began to turn a bland eye to his family's
47 See Adamec, .A)ghanuton 19()()-1923, chapters 1-2.
'Dnfi of Agreement Sub~idi:uy to the: Ddiniuvc: Trc:aty of Fric:nd~hip and
UIUOtl between the Briti'h Government anti I Ii IItghnc: Amar llabibuUah
Kh2n, 1904' in 'Afgharusta.n HMG Rc:lation~hip' OIOC UPS/10/18.
4 1imory of the negotJarions wnh ha• I!Jghnc the Amar l lahabullah Khan
at 1\abul Dw:mber 1904 to March 1905' OIOC UPS/10/17.
 102 fRO!' IIER OF I'AITII
patronage of the Tribal Area communi tic .50 Under the direaioo
Na rullah Khan, the Afghan court conrinurd to pa) all 'anCCS
tribes in Buner, Mohmand and \Va1.iri ran, u ing now longst.an:d::~
connc tions to the pirimurid•' fraternity of the Akhund Gtu.fE:r
lladda ~lulla line tu pa these on.51
Amir I lahihullah Khan was assa~~inatrd in 1919, possibf)
the conniv:tncc ofr\a rull.th Khan, and Habibullah' son Anun
Khan took the throne. 51 On claiming the throne, Amanulhh
imrncdtarcly dcd.trcd in an open darbur, in fronr of the Bn
A~cnr to Kabul, that Afghani~tan "''as thereafter 'a indepcndtt•
. t.Hc .ts other state .md po"'er~ of the world ... no foreign power
be ;tltowcd to interfere internaUy and externally \vlth the affarn
J\fgh.uti'>t.tn.'Sl On 4 M.t} 1919, Afghan troop~ mo\cd into 8
in Tir.th, un the Bntt'>h side of the border. This mohili tion
Amanull.th\ .ltrtmpt tu overrurn the protecroratc tatu a corded
Afgh<tlli!.tatl under previous Anglo-Afghan tre.ttie . In aft
the frontier tribesmen, Am.muUah suggested that hi declar.anoo
war h.ul been timed to coincide with the Indi.m nationalist
ag-.Ain t the Rowl.ttt Act and theJaUianwala Bagh .tffair.S4 Aman
also phra cd hi aggre ~ion as the Afghan respon"e to the British
to mm l' 'forward' and e rabli,h gamsons m Waziri-.tan.55 A man
dedar:uion of war wa a highly popular move that WllS appb
by both prominent Afghan religious personalitie:>-the Badstuh
I lampur "'ho had presided onr Sardar Obrullah Khan' tf.:-..,.,.,..#..,._""-
·o. jenmlcr Su~gel, Hntlgomc B•itom, Rldlw 11rultht Fmol rn.-glrfi
Ana (!':ew York. 2002), p. 71.
S1. l'or example Amir llabibullah Khan communiaatcd W'ICC to the \\
and 1\lah uJ dans to help them settle their antcmal hostiliucs uuUQ;~~m
Lala 1'1r ol Kho t ""d .Mulla Ham:rulb.h. Later, the 1\lahsuds wt'n
:111 :~udtcncc ar ht court only through rhe intc~-mrion of the Lab Plr
:\WFPPJ>, 14Aug.l915,8April 1916.
52. l.udwig ;\dam~·. AJkhamstan /9()(}-/92 1 (Cal•fomJa, 196i) chapter
Sl. Q10tnf in 1bid., p. 110.
S-1. This was :&n in~Jdent where Briti>h rroops opened fire on
dcmonstr.uors m J.Ulianwab Bagh in Amritur on 13 April. 1919
I'Jl· 110-2. 5en7ll ~awid makes the same link in her srum ot Kdln=~'
RtJpqnHJ, p. 61.
55. 1\d~mr •• Ajghoniuarz/900-/9JJ, p. 110.
PATRO:\!) OJ" TJH: ,\1:\ I~ lOJ
ame of his own accord to confirm the arnirate of Amanullah Khan
and hi c:ill to jihad again:>t the Briti h, 56 and &taternent nf support
from other ea.-.tern Pakhrun mullas soon foUO\\C<I 57--and a newly
ancrged group of Afgh.m narionali r deeply intlucnccd by the pan-
lshmism ofJamaluddin al-Afghani.ss
Fi~hting was organised in t\\O epanue effi,rts--..1 ri ing of the
i:ldcpendent tribes in the fronrier T ribai Area , and mob iii at ion uf
Me:b.an regulars tO me Anglo-Afghan border. The m.t k, COIIleiH:d
two offcn:.ive wa\-es, relied hc.wily on the upport of the P.tkhrun
communi tie:. in the Tribal Areas a~ a mean~ of prote~: ting the Afghan
front by disrupting the Briti~h movement throuKh the region to the
border. and as a means of dh·crting British troop) into ~kirmbhc:>.
But t\m.mullah Khan could not directly mohili.;e the tribe:. a the
force behind British will meant th.u Am.tnull.th wuld nut receive
tnbal representatives at his court, nor directly gr.uH subsidies to
British- ide tribes to act on hi. behalf bt hi .tctinns be con trued
expanc;ionist instead of merely reactive and n.uionali~tic. The
only w:ay he could rally the communirie of the .1uronornou region
was to invoke the moral, military and rcprc cntative authority of
me C2Sfem Pakhrun mullm and employ members of the Jarnaat·i
1ujahidin who had mo\'Cd to Afghani ran in 1917- 19 as mediators.
Amir Amanullah accepted a petition o;ubmittcd to him in 1919 by the
.fmwt-i Mujahidin and Tribal Arc.\<: mullm offering their ervicc
u 'representative ' of the 'frontier tribe ' and ,, authoritie in the
region.
The petition bearing the \tamp of the 'Jamiyatul llizbullah' or
the 'Party of the Army of God' looked to Am;\nullah's p.ttronage
fa 'union of the frontier tribes' under the authority of the region's
ullas.s9 Haji Sahib Turang7.ai and Maulana lLishir of Ch.tmarkand
56. Ludwig Adamec, lltstorital ami PoltttMIIflho's Who of IIJi.h.mutan (Graz,
1975).
57. W WJ:.oAfghonist.:rn. 19.10 OlOC l.JPS/2011l220/2.
s M ScL ma.si, Afglounist.m ul tlv Rrgmnmg of tltt r '11/itth Cmlury
N. ,., tmd journalitm in Afgh.mitlall: A Stu.Jy of tf. • S. ·r111 11/ A~h/w
( ':aplcs. 1979), pp.51-61.
59 'Pcution ro Amanulbh Khan from a (,mup of Rcrr~cnliltl\cs from the
Frontiers [ 1337?)'. 1\ppcndlJ[ \.1uh.unmad W h /~moli, ,\tu;ahiJ i Afgh.ln
Mow!Jma /lllji A Mar Rllz. q (Kabul, 1967 , f'P· 7 qJ
 104 FRO:'\TIHR OF' l<'A1TII
igned n rchrion.tl rcprcscntari"e , and the 'tribal' ignatoncs wm
predominantly mullor and included onlv a few maliJ:s. The mu/14s
committed their upport on behalf th~ tribe of Mohmand.
Swat, Buner, and Dir included l\lulla AbduJ llamcc:d, rcprcsen
of Mulla Khalil 11nd i\Julla Babra, ~lauJ~i Amiruddin. h
i\luhnrnrnaJ You ufand ~lauJVJ ahtb Kama from ~l ohnund
Bajaur and Kaka Miy·.m ahib, the Pacha i\lulla, Chmar Muib
the Tor Mulh1. 60
The e mullar a ked for recognition of their control and ut
of ~Ktion in rcgion.tl .tffairs in return for their loyalty to the anun:t
s.ty1ng:
we have ~cnt .111 .tgrccmcnt 'igned and fingerprinted that we will be
on our pronusc ... Prc~cntly we will agree to obey hi, C.Xlclkna , A11J1t
Am.lllull.th Khan Gh.lli [conqueror] but remain independent m
intern.\! .tn.ur, We have a strong bond with Afghani tan in reuooc
our langua!te, rdig10n, nationality and Ltnd.'1
The petitioners promi ed Amanullah that they would bring 'cmr
~ingle man in the are.t ... to fight' and committed their loyaluc:s
the sovereign government of Afghanistan 'no matter how muCh
Briti h go\'crnmcnt threatened', offering their strategic ddi
po ition to Atghani tan in exchange for material, politic:al
moral upport from the A(~han court.62 The pctirionc:rs promised
to mobilise 20,000 armed Mohmands at Shabqadar and
tl \I"Lai, Utmankhcl and Mamund in Bajaur. The r-en \li'Ould be
kd by the ~lulla Babra, Jhji Turangzai, ~li~an uluui, and
8Jd hah ofl lam pur into the Swat \-alley to pre\ent a'-<:ess b) Bn
rcintcm.cmenrs through I I ott Mardan and No~hera .
The ca\'car in the pledge ofloyalry--that'we Will remain inckpendt:t:
in our internal affair ' was repeated twice in the text of the pctiuon. l::
return for their support, the petitioners asked AmmuJJJ.h to m:oa:sc
and defend the .tutonomy of the Tribal Areas region:
60. 'Petition tu Amanullah Khan'.
lll. 1\ (opyofaffid<~\'itscnt b) tribe Khwaiz.ai [~lohmand] to Maum Ob.wl~
k.t n a authcmal rcprC$Cntati\'e to Amir Arn1.1lullah Khan. .t\ppcnlb
/1lrnai, MujahUI-i Afgha,, pp. 83-5.
6] Petition to Amanullah Khan'.
PATRO!" or Til E SAINTs lOS
\Vc sent our represcnuoves to you to daril) the fact that the people of
the frontie" were al\\'2) and are free no,\ ... \\C hope that hi highness
will not underestimate the gr.&\it) of the nuanon."
This trategic and moral alliance rc:aflirmcd the hi toricallv
cstiblished precept-that neither the amir nor the frontier muii:U
and tribe:. were interested in including the region in the formal,
bounded \''Crsion of the Afghan state. It ,..-as on thi premi e th.n
Amanullah acl:epted the offer of the Tribal Area petitioner from
Mohmand and Bajaur to rise Jg:tinsr the Britt~h in hi support.
Assembling a special darbar 10 Kabul rn M.l} 1919, Am.muUah
atkd for ajihad, giving orders that Mry.tn 5ahrb S.trk.Jnri, Badshah
ahib ofhlampur, MuUa Sahib Chaknawar .1nd ll.tji Turang1..u ra1'e
forces in Mohmand."" General Nadrr Khan, later to bcc:omc Nadtr
hah, amir of Afghanistan, was told by AmJnull.th to consult with
the Sabra ~tulia Sahib in organising an eastern Pakhtun front from
Kun.ar through Bajaur as he could mobtlbe the Charmung, M.unund
and Salarza.i clans.'• Meanwhile Maulvr Sa.l11b Kam.t and the. new
Jan ahib Doda were appormed to protect the Afghan front from a
possible offensive launched through Swat and D1r.
bintaining this strategy of indirect mobrlisauon in Waziristan,
Amir Amanullah deputed I laji Abdur Raztq, the DeobJndr member
of the Jamaat-i Mujahidin who had resettled in )Jlalabad after 1916
and taken up employment as an authority on 1hari'a and a member
af the loal parliament, to organise the mobilisation! R.lZlq had
spent rime in \Vaziristan as a member of the JarnJat i Mujahidin
and built up strong contacts with the local tribes and mullas. Amir
Anu.nullah approved allowances to the Wazir~. to be p<tid out by
Abdur Raziq as military salaries. Abdur R:mq man•tgcd to enlist
1,500 British trained JWasJadors among the AhmedzJi Wazir~ alone
63 1bid.
64 Extract oflerter from Amanullah to l laji Tun&ng-1ai, 10 May 1919, 'Lencr
from the Y1ceroy to the Se~:rerary of St:tte for Jndt.\ 6 May 1919', in 'P;~pc:rs
Regarding Hostilities With Mghammn' OIOC llMIL./17/14/ol.
65 Yousuf, Da &brity l\.1ul/n Snh1h, p. 44
66 AmanL.I.th Khan to the lhJI Mulla Ahc.lul Ra1iq Khan, 1Y haban 1337,
Appcn u: Zalmai, Mu!Jh1d·; Ajghan, pp. 6(}. 1
67 Letter fn•m Ama.nullah Khan to I laji Mulla Abdul Raztq, n.d., tbid .
106 l RO:O.TIER 01-· fAIT II
u~ing a royal an tion of20,000 Kabuli rupee ."'A a gifted miliun-
commander, Ahdur R.tziq wa.; al o entru ted \\ith or~nising the
ri:.ing~ of rhc tribe acm the region as .t whole: :a.nd was given
ofllci~tl scal.111d cxprcso: .tuthoriry by Amanullah too\·'- e the wuoo
,tnd the lighting of the nw/iis .tnd tnhes of 'Oar, t, Chitral
(Hher~ .~round th.tt arc.t'.6"
It was planned that the tribal lasbkan ~ho ld coUeu at \"UUIO
point aero s the Trib.tl Areas includin~ ~ tbqadar and Lalplm
in ~lohmand, the 1\h}ber Pas<; and Tirah. ~lulla Chakruwzr
arranged food tn rnoth'llte the bloc:kaded l\lohmand clans,
I Jaji Turangzai, B.tdsh.th Gul, the l\Iulla Babra and ~luUa ~
managed to mise .1 !tHhlwr of 40,000 men. 1 The e mulla-led lt:shb:n
aided the Afghc~n army's .tdv.tnce from Oak.ka, the l:m outpost
the Afghanist.ut Khyber Agenc} border, through the Khyber P
towards Landt Koral, the l.tst British outpost on the Khyber P
In North-Waztmtan,/mh/umofWana \Vazir clan carried out
on mtlttary po t o&nd c.tmps. However, after t1r t makin1! soo:
advances into l\ lohmand, Kurram and ChJman. and intlictin~ ·
damage on the Briti h forces 10 \Vazmc;tan and the Khyber P
the Afghan reg\ll.tr were driven back beyond the Durand Line ana
mul/a-led lashkar:s di~pcr~ed under attack by the Briti h- ide frotmer
malitia and the eftc~.:r' of the blockade on the ~lohmand d.ans. On 31
\by, Amanull.th Klun called for a cease-fire, mobilisation wi·
6~ ') 1:- Pcat'i, Resident \\ mr t.lll, ·~ tc:morandum on mtcn'ICW wi:h
w of the Wana a I C.. lui Wazus at Tank. 25 Dcttmbcr 1 15 a
'RelatiOns wtth At h r1n. printed coi'TOponJenc:e 1921-23'. OIOC L
PSJ10/104'J.
69. 1:-innan from Amanulhh Kh n to the: Faithful llaj1 ~lulh Abdul
Khan, 19 Sha1>an 1317 \ppcndtx Zalmai,l\11!)ahi4-• AfKht:n, pp. 62
70. Firman from Amanullah Khan to the Faithful llaji .\tulh Abdul
Khan, 29 Sh.moal 1:137. Appendix Zalm.U, MujahiJ-iAfgh:zn. pp. -il
71. Na\'ld, Rtl1gkus Rn}'Dnff'S, p. 56.
72. General StaO'Jndia, Mi!ttmy Rtpt II.JihaniJt,, (S
73. FofOb'tl anJ Pohtial Dcp.utmcnt Govcmn c:nt · I :a, .A Pr6."U ~
.tlffam.from Ft/mJary 1910 to Stptmr/Jtr J9r '1 , 1928), p. 4 OI
UP ' 12018285.
M.TRO~S Or Til F. s \1="\Ts 107
the T nbal Are<lli were halted and rhc T rihal-Arc-J~ p.lrticipant were
mnrded for their c;upport and a~ked to rand down .74
During the negotiations thar followed, \manull.th wnunined
early on to an Afghani:.tan delimited at tht Durand Line .md the
danarcarion of prevtously un-dcmarc:.tted part of the horder
running through 1\lohmand in order m secure Britic;h acquiescence
his rule.75 But the Pakhrun tribal question wa~ not ettled by thi
mo\\kdgement as the Briti h representati\e demanded that the
Mgfwt government use it influcn(e mcr the tribe to control 'tribal
cssion' and the Afghan reprcsent.ttivc maintained th.u these
communities and this region in all reality belonged to Atgh.mi~tun
and the Afghan amir was their natur.u lco~.der and protCltor.70
Negotiations between the Government of India and the amir.ne nf
Mghani tan continued, amadst new tears about Bol~hevik O\'crturc to
Mghanisran and Afghan fear of a Briti h occupation of\Va1.iri tan
the frontier authoririe~ began ~urvc) for a metalled road to \ Vana
South-\Vaziristan, and dc:tided toe tahlish a permanent garrison
Razmak, also in South \Vaziri t:tn. 77
The final re olution wa th.lt both parries agreed to 'inform the
other in the furure of any military operations of nujor importJil(C:
1\Uh may appear necessary for the maintenance of order .unong the
frontier tribe~ residing within their respeuive sphere~· in order that
such actions not be construed as a British forward move or Afghan
agrcssion. The Afghan delegation also accepted the separation of
frontier tribes and committed that Afghanistan wo\lld not maintain
•-4 Although they \\Crt cauuonc:d again t an) direct aggrc 1011 :.~her the
ccasdirc. ~adir
K1un a ked the mullal to rcmain in a stile t'f nuhrary
preparedness until such a ume as a uitable agreement ha1l hl"Cn rl.';l hcd
between the rwo govcmment5, Aware o( the w:uchful Bnu h, the J\lghan
government managed wme of 1U frontier mihury prcparcdnc s thrnuKh the
Jamut-i Mujahidin who c.1rned prt cnh and me~~agch between K.thul ;~nd
the n:ullar of the Tribal J\re;n. {';WI J>J>[), Fcb.-Apnl 1920; Gcncrallitall
India, Milittl') R.tport Ahh,m llom (~unl 1, l'J41), pp. 116-7.
75 AtmnuUah to the Viceroy, I0 ~La~ 1919 in 'Papers Rcganlmg lin uluies
wtth Afghani~tan'.
7 ~Adamcc,A.Jlhut~iJtan 19()()../911. pp. 126-9•
~ OjflliallltSIDrJ if0p11tlfml on thr .V~Jrtb-Wrst Frt~ntitr, 191()-/0.15
(DethJ, 1945}. pp. 1-31.
108 FRO:\TIHR OJ.' F\ITII
independent relation) with them, and would 'refrain from ma
jihad and upplying arm on the Briti h sjJe of the bordci
f.ollu" ing thi agreement :a ub idy to the am irate wa renewed
\\ ith promi cs of material ~upport of telegraph techno! , and
Ia t major Anglo-Afghan treat)· was ratified." In 1922, ~
i ucd a firman decl.uing that he \'laS nor going to in\'Oh'e himsdi
the ntTair nf the fror ucr tribe~. and by 1923 the regular allov
of the sort p.tid to the Wana Ahmedzai \Vazirs 2nd the M t.c. •.A.,__
e tinwed .u about 70,000 Kabuli rupeec; to the ~ lahsuds and 20
ro the:. Wuir~-were cut off
Amtmu/lah's politits after the Wars
The early yc.trs of Am.tnulJ,th's reign arc badly unde~tood because
his many .tpp.trcndy contradicting policies. He had been attnlx:
with .bpir.ttiOns to succeeding the Ottoman Caliph. yet had
n.ttionahst and modernist ambitions which led him into \ ~
the British in India and mstigated two civil wars in the course
reign; he was accused by the British of religious ambitions fi
patronage of Pakhtun mullaf, yet was clearly curtailing the authori!
of the ultima in \f~hanistan. The events and Amanullah' poiicXs
of the year 1920 4 require clo~er examination to resoh't' tbcs:
contradictions and establi-.h where Amanullah tood with regards
hi ulamtJ, the Indian nationalists and the mullas in and
ea tern border region.
78. Aruclc XI, ' l'reary hc!"cen Grear Briwn .md Afghanistan'.
79. ·~tussoorie Confen:n~c 1920'. OIOC UP 11 195.
0. 'P.uhro proclamation from Arnanul.Wl KJun to the tnm..fronria
bearing seal of Armnullah.' ~larch 1922, Ill 'Fronocr Transgrcmons 1 .tr
24'. p. 386.
81. ·~tcmumndum on Anu·Brio§h Con pmlC) and Jnmgue wnh .1\t,!;tn:~o:::
;~n.J the Indo-Afghan Fronoc:r·, April 1922-Jan. 1923. OJOC UPS
Al95.;\flc:r thi~ umc theonl) 'ignifiant bequelot by Amanulbh roche\\
tn~-s w.& .1land grant in B1rm.U on the Afghan ~1de of the border
\Vazu1 from the Bnti h ide of the border :u a mean• of m1in
soo.ll 11ntl economic: commHmc:nt to these clans without undcmltinir:g
Durand Lint \Va. it'$ from thc Briti'h ide haJ to immigrate to the
ide of the border to t.tke ad\'afltagt of this grant. ') lcrnonndum bJ
Pear , Rcsi,lcnt Waziri tan, 9 Feb. 1924', in 'Rclauon wtth ~~::s:a=.
11J24'.
PATRO~S OJ.' THJ.' S.\1:-\IS 109
As the Allied Power:. began negotiation mer the fate of the
Turks, it began to be \\idcly felt in Briti h India that there wa a
contradiction in the staru::. of l\Ju,Jirn Bnn h uhjcct in that they
G'iRd their allegiance ro the Onom 1n C liph but \\ere bound hy
the fore.i~ policies of the Briri h gO\emMent. A number of pan-
lsbmist Indian nationalists engineered the 'khilafill' mo\'cment-thc
word both meaning 'oppo,irion' and maintaining reference to the
Caliphate. This was a country-wide l.:'.lmpaign of flt))lt ICJI oppo ition
to the British go\-emment be~oau e ofih rejection of \ Iu lim demand
Co: the preserv·arion of the l\ lu-.lim holy land, .tnd the title of the
Caliph. In 1920, in the middle of the Anglo Afglun ulk , le.tdcr
of the lhilafot movement in Jndi:t c;llleJ for .1 m.\s - migration or
'hijralof the Muslims of India to Afghanismn on the premise th•tt
the Allied Powers had betrayed the f\ fu,fims by stripping the Caliph
ofhis lands, hence British ruled Ind1a wa~ no longer .J,zrullslnm, a
pbce where l\1uslims could abide peacefully, but rather dtlrul harh, or
a place of war and persecution. The fiuw.u i :.ued by leaders of the
V:ilafat movement led to the migration of30-40,000 lndi:m l\lu lim
across the Durand Line, through the Kh)bcr and Gomal pa~ e:. and
into Afgharustan between March and Apnl 1920." The migl'ation
was facilitated by local 'Kh•lafat Committees' cattered through the
admini tered part of the NWFP, affiliated in principle though not by
any organisational ngour to the nauon.U Khil.tfat Committee.''
As the migrants began to pour aero 'the border, the misgivings of
the Afghan government were firsc conveyed to Indians in Afghanistan
including former members of the Jamaat 1 Mujahidin. The Afghan
General Nadir Khan asked the latter to convey to the leader~ of the
hijrat movement, the government's rc crvations about Nghunhtan's
82. Qpreshi, P1171-M11m m Bnrish lndi.m P()/itics, p. 181.
Mushirulll:uan, 'Religion and Politic\ 111 1nth.r The 'lJI.lm.a and the: Kht!afot
Movement' in ~Ju,hirul ll~ an (ed ), Communal and P.m lslamu rmuh ;,
CA1rmi41 lmlta (Delhi, 1981), pp. ll-4, :tl..o KC Qu·c h1\ c umatc•, Pom·
blam in Brit h Indian PahlttS, pp. 214-5.
The Khilafar Comrnmees pen• tc:d even after 'failure' of the lhilafilt
movement. Thc..c organi ation and their impono~n'c later on will be
cfiscussc.d in more det:UI in chapter 6.
110 F'IHJ:\TH:R OF F ITU
ability to an.:ommodate the mas ivc influx ofhumanit). 1c:2ln'
Amanullahgrnntedonly30,000Afghan rupcestoCencnl N:adu
to meet the nectl of the migrantS, and firWly closed fglunisu::
border. to the Indi.tn Mu lim migrant in Augu t 1920.•
The awkward hijral period, coinciding with Amanullah•
and hi patronage of the Jama;u-i l\lujahidin, uggcsted pan-I
moth-at ion and even aspiration to the title of Caliph on tht par!
of Am.mullah Khan. But the amir' vi<:ion was far more prll6
.tnd limited th.lll thi~. The condu,ions of the First World War
the Third Anglo-Afghan War had grc01dy altered the condi
of the Trih.d Are.ts. The brief atTair between Indian ann-
nationalism 01nd Atghanist;ln ended, as d1d Afghanhtan' i~
need li)r ,1 frontier fimv;trd zone against the Briti h. Under Bn
prc~sure t<l enfcm·e the Anglo-Afghan Tre.uy of 1921. Anun
tried to restrict milit.ms.nwn among the Trib.tl Area Pakhruns
under his own refimni)t agenda, he sought al~o to subject relig
,1nd the power of the; 'u/ama and pirr to the authorit) of the
lie recalled Ahdur Rlliq from Afghanistan after the latter
new tledaration of phad a~ainst the British government in 1922
In a letter to the .i\lull.l Chaknawar, the admini tration at Jabhhad
reminded the mulla th tt 'there b a CO\'enant between the
granted government of Afghanistan and the Briti h gm.'C'ttmer:!
[and] agreemt nt b, l God-gifted government cannot be brokrn
a ked that ~lull c.uhib Chaknawar.;hould deo;i t fromoillingfi
2gain t the Bnu L and rerum home. The directive to huh -
Slul(W says that General ~adir Khan \\TOte ro the presidcn: ot
mu;abidm a1 C hamarkand, asking them to send a reprtscnta~
India 10 'Fuguavc Hight !rum Country to Countryoflqbal haidai
Cullectton N;uaonal Archav~ I lamab;~d (hereafter C~AI), N'
p. ll),
86. ~utc,l an <litre ha, P,m -blam m British JnJum l'clura, p. 210 f
Special Branlh tile on the 'l lijrat Movement', :-;oc 12/S 3.
87. Proclamatum of I l.1mic independence ;and the thmc of rc:volunoo
nd St"alcd by I laJ• Abdur R.mq. in 'AfghJ.Oi tan-l'ronuer At _,_ ___..,Y'
1\0dur lhaik'. OIOC I PS 1011019.
88. Letter from tht I..,.. ~ \dmanmranon of Jalilibad to the 1'\
llonnurahle ,\hJ!Ia Sahab Chaknawu d.m.-d [Aug. 1922). Rqlf'O(Iua:d
~!cera Jan Syal, /1. •.! Ghnr, p 135.
PATRO~S OF Tllf: ~.Al:"T 111
Cbabuw:u- wb backed up by the threat that hh gm ernmcnt gnmted
·es· would be confi cated if he did not comply." In an eflon ro
ttmralise political and legal control Amanullah .I o rc rrictcd the
freedom and authority of the Afghan i1lama over the interpretation
and application of law. In another firman the nmir a ked that mullas
m the Ea:otem Pro\ince desist from l-ampaign of lahligh and social
adic:uion in Mghan terrirory.90
But althou"h Amanullah had to dcfu~c the post -war ten iom in
the Tribal .A.reas to curb Britic;h uspicion and contain the power of
m11 or the religious party in Afghanistan, he qiiJ needed 11 mean
of maintaining connections to the communitie c.\ t of the Durand
Line. Amanullah continued to patronbc the Trib.ll Arc.l' mullar to
preserve the peace within and integrity of the Trib<ll Areas as the
north-eastern border of Mghanistan and trc.ucd them wtth '' great
deal of ~nero~ity in order to secure their loyalric!, m him.91 These
rr.llllaJ were invited as a group to :mend the state jirga .u Kabul in
1922 and organi ed attendance of British-:.ide tribe men with them
to p:ay their respects to the amir in the national independence-day
cdcbration:. in 1923. 2 Purses of thou ands of rupees were awarded
to the mullas when they presented themselve at the Afghan court,
and horses, guns and cartridge:. were .;em to them under orders of the
anur.n In 1927 Badshah Cul collected u urn of 12,000 Afghan Rupee:.
on behalfof the Haji~ gift that arrived an Gha:t.iahad 'in silver laden
donkeys'. In addition he \vas given '12 rifles, 6 revolvers, <.1nd a
Ibid
Royal firman from Amar Amanull.\h ~han rclcived by Mulla Sah1b
Chaknawar, June 1926. Appencluc S~.1l, Nomy.rli Gh.Jzi, p. 129 Mulla
Chaknawar wu one of the few cot. tern Pakhrun f/1UIIa1 an the unusual
position ofserving communine:. on both ~ides uf the bonier.
91 KPO, 3 March 1923.
2. I,SOO Afndis and 2,500 Mohmand ilccompanied thear mullas tn the
\fghan indcpendencc·day celebrarioru in 1923. Am.muUah w.t\ c rim.m:d
co M\"C pen1 up to 100,000 K.1buli rupees in girt,, cnterr.unmcnt and
preparations forth~ gue~r Repon from Mani~tcr at K~&hultcl Setretaty
of Ute for India, ~luch 1923 an 'Frontier 1r01n •rc ion , 1923 2S'; and
BAR 1922 3
93 'AntJ-Brit 1-a Con pll'IC) and lnmgue wuh \tyluna tan ;~.nd the Indo·
Afghan Fro"ucr OIOC 1./PS/18/A 195.
112 1-!RO:-:TIER OF FAITH PATRO:-:S OF llfF. SAINT 113

con ignmrnt of \.";lrtridges together with robes of honour for himsd! The revolts of1924 and 1928 and tht utility of
nd hi on ' ... Similar gift were conferred on Mulh ~}')id ilrnanullah spatronagt
nod Mul~a Mahmud Akhuo7.Jlda whc.n they presented th.emsd\"a
In 1924, a number of religious authoritic in Afghani tan declared
nt the Atghan \.OUrt. Sabra Mulla Salub rcceivt~d 10 rill a
Amanullah's constitution as contrary to sh.1ri'a, and Amanullah a
and 3,000 Kabuli rupees for his own personal use.H lulla
hc.retic. 1 The coalition of rebels voiced it anger at rate control over
Chaknawar recci\'eJ gifts ~nt personally to him by Amir Anun
matters which had long been matters dc~.;idcd under shari'a and hence
a grant of 5,000 Kabuli rupees to end him on Haj, and a penslOD ci
deemed the concern of the 'ulama. There wa .Uso a great outCl)' against
1,000 Rupees for life.96
IIWldatory conscription and women's edul".ltion.101 Rebel 'u/,,m,, tlcd
Aside from the~ person.U gift.,, AmJ.nullah Khan surppOltl~
to the Afghan Southern Province where they were h.trboured by the
the fmnticr mull,lJ with endowments to enh.1nce their rdi
hngal clans. The clans refuo;ed to hand the db)idents over to the
prel>tige, but o~ly i~ the Tnbal \reas. Mulla Chaknawar· ,..asfo/
Afghan authorities and began organising an armed mobilisation. The
Gandab w.1s buth wtth a 2,000 rupee grant from \mir Amanulb.h
Mangal clans were supported by the Ahmedz..1i Ghilz~tis in Khost
1tJ21,'~7 and the former along with the I laji Turangzai, lu.hz,a(b
and headed by Abdul Karim, a claimant to the Afghan throne A
Reh.mkot, M.tUivi Makhfi and the Indian Mujahidin, also receimf
lmhkar of 6,000 Mangals gathered in the south c;bt. Army troop
money from the Afgh<lns to set up schools throughout the T ~
m Khosr were insufficient ro counter the attacks of ho~tile lashkars
Are.1 ."'' The e _b_cqucsts could be made with political im~
on army line and posts-moreover Amanul1.1h w,\s not sure of the
as far as the Bnn5h were concerned, limit rcligiou authorit) 0\'C'
loyalty of his general Nadtr Khan or of hi army.10J I Ie is~ued ca.LI.s
cm~rn~nities in Afgh.mi tan, and :.till serve the amir' purposes
for military assistance through the governors of the Eastern and
rn.untnm orne connection with the British· ide Trib.U Areas. 1bc
Southern Provinces, summoning the Khyber Afridi~ :and the \Vuir
rcli~ou_ taturc of ~he e functionaries cloaked the amir' grants m the
:and ~t.Jtsud clans ofW aziristan to Jalalabad. 101 Supporters had only
nmb•gu•ty of devotion, and allowed him to harness the politioal
to present themselves and join the government force:. and would be
regulatory p<w. crs of rcligiou~ authority which had been rdincd
ISSUed with rifles wh1ch they could retain aftcrwJrd as a reward for
con olid:.ucJ by the mul/m of the Akhund Ghaffur-Haruu 1ulb
services rendered. 11)4 AmanuUah appealed particularly to the mullas
in the Tri~al .t~ca . I lence Amanullah maintained his \'U)" terlUOJ;5
of the Tribal Ar~. drawing now on his conciliatory policy towards
hold on Afgham ran and connection to his militarv hinterland
the enormou pre urcs on him. •
them.
Amanullah's military summons was reiterated within the Tribal
Areas by mullas of the Akhund Ghaf'fur- I t.dda Mulla line, including
9-'. N\VFPPD, .28 \Jar 19.27. the Haji Turangzai, MuUa Chaknawar, the Ustad of I ladda, the
95. Ahmed You uf, D.; Buhrll) \.1111111 Suhih, p. 44 Akhunzada of Tagao and Lala Pir of Kho-.t I laji Abdur Raziq
9b. 'hrrn~n of Anur Am.tnullah Kh.tn, 1307 [1930]'. Appcnda yal.
Ghn:r, p. I :n . 100. Nawid, R.tligious RLspons~, pp. 100-4, 114.
97. 'R(nm:~ti•m of mosqu and .chool ~t.ablished bc:r.\ccn Ghabni and 101. Ibid., p. 102; Poullada, R'.form and R,hl/rrm in AJkh.mistan, pp. 16Q- 3
m the G.mdab by tht Chakn.:~war ~1ull2 in 1923'. 1\'W:FPPA. DCO 102. Forejgn and Polirica.l Depanmem to Secretary of State for India, 20 Apnl
Sp«ial Report and hit . 1924, in 'Afghanistan: the Kho t Rebellion' OIOC liP5/10/1112
98. l'he rcnnwnc<l muU11 of 01r who acted b the: Nawab's am'lSOf on 103. ~bcona..:hic, British Mtm•ter to K<~hul to Sc~rtt.try uf State for Fortign
matters. Affair.;, 29 Sept. 1924, ibid.
99. ·~onh·Wcst rroll(m: Inrrigu~ m D1r111Jld Bajaurct~'. OIOCUPSfl 104. VJCcroy Forci~ and Political Dcpartmcm to Unt~h .Mtn1 tcr at IUbul, 27
1'\WI'PPD, Apnll92J. &ptcmber 1924, ib1d .
114 ~' RO~TIF.R OF Fi\ITfl
wa also deputed hack to Waziristan to aid thi mobilis2tJon.
I.mhJ:an of Wnzirs, Mah~ud , ~lohmand and Atndis from the
Briti h- ide Tribal \rea~ were brought in from the eat to jom me
Afghan army at K1ndahar, Jalalabad and Urghun to tl') to cncitdc
the rchd .10b A /. 1hf r of 4,000 Afghan regulars upported b) trih2!
volunteers gathered at Cardez, and another 2,000 men collected
Kandah.u.101
The agem:y of the eastern Pakhtun mullas in countering the
Kho t in~urgenC) wenr beyond just military organi tion. 'The
ll.~i Turang7.a1, ~1ulla Chaknawar, the Ustad of Hadda and the
AkhunZ,lltl of r .tgao particJpated in a deputation to negotiate
the rebel leaders and initiate a dialogue between the ~1an$t11s
1
rhe Afgh••n governrnent. ~ Amanullah's polig. of cultiv-ating support
among these religious authorities paid dividends as the rebds bq;t:l
to .ldv.tnce towards Kabul. Mulla Sahib Chaknawar and Haji
Tur.mgni travelled among the Pakhrun tnbes ofeastern Afghanisnn.
trying to re·e:.tablish some loralty to the amir.
The uprising was put down by the end of the vear and AfJ
government authority re-established in the outhem Provmcc.
Afridi and Wazir , and mullaJ who had a sisted Amanullah >m:
rewarded with gifts of rifles and ammunition, and honours
conferred on them. l\1aconachie, British minister at Mbul. su~
that while the a i tance rendered to Amanullah b) T rib.a.l Am.s
partie wa not de irable, he did not c:ee that he had much choict
hut to solicit thi a :.i ranee. Maconachie recommended wt che
government rurn a blind eye to the Tribal Areas mobilis2tions
lOS. Mmi ltr at K:~hul to Sc,retan· of u.te for Foreign Affairs, lndi2 Officr.. U
1\ ug. 1924,lhid.
106. NWrP lntdhgencc Buruu Otlr) (hereafter :\'\VFPIBD
'1\ho t Rebdhon-Britt h Stde Paroopation' OIOC I...,P\
107, Forctgn and Political Department to Secrct:aJ) of Sate f •lr
1924, ibtd
108. ~1mi~trr .u Kabul to Se..:rctarvofStatc for Foretgn Affairs lncfu Offia.l7
Aug. 192 t, an ' \ll ham tan: Kho t Rebellion'.
109. NWJ'PIBD, 9 Oct. 1924, '\nti Brio h Co"'J'inc)
Afghant~tan and on the Indo-Afghan Frontier'. OIOC L..
110. 'Anti Bnu h Con ptracy and Intrigue in Afglwlistan
Afgh.m l"ronticr'.
PATRO~S OJ' Tm: S,\INTS 115
191~. as long as Amanullah did not eek to indudc the c partie
m 1m,: public demon cration of hi" power and popularity.111 The
Khost rebellion put Amanullah's frontier poli9· into effect and was
teStimony to its potential. His patronage of mullas' a~.:tivities among
the Tribal Areas popubtion allowed him to support the leadership.
miliwycapabilities and social authority of the ea tern Pakhrun mullas
Wltbout contradicting his own national policy of ccntrali ed authority
and miliury and religious control, or unduly anragoni~ing the British
Gm-emment oflndia.
With renewed confidence, Amanullah puf<>ued hi~ Jgcmh of
reform until September 1928 when the I bfit Sah1b of F.tqirabad
led a revolt of the Shinwaris against his government backed up by a
JJ!fJ:;J signed by 400 Mghan 'ulama accusing Arn.mullah of heresy. 111
The di idents denounced him for his centralism~ and modernist
reforms and prepared to march on Jalalabad. Otscontent was growing
rapidly, but the mullas of the Akhund Chaffur I ladda t\lull.t line
set themselves apart from the dissident and remained tn support
of Amanullah Khan. Mulla Chaknawar tried to rally support for
Amanullah among the Mohmands, and repcateJtr approached the
Mghan and British-side groups for commitments ofsupport. 111 Mulla
Oulcnawar and Haji Turangzai tried to reach cc:a e-fire agreement)
\nth the rebels, iso;uing afa two in up port of Amanullah,114 and llaji
Turan~ despatched a lashhzr of 2,000 Salls and Kandaharis to
)alabhad under Badshah Cul. 11 ' A jirga was convened at lladda in
December 1928 to debate support to Arnanullah and was attended by
the MWJa Chaknawar, Akhunzada ofTagao and Badshah ofl ~lam pur
as \\et some government ministers. The artcndecs maintained
their loyalty ro Amanullah while recommending that he withdraw
some of hi propo:.ed reforms.' 1'
a.1924
'1
111 Maconachte, Briush Mmtster to Kabul to 5nretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, 29 Sept 1924, m 'Afghant~tan: Kho't Rc:bcllion',
112 Nawid, R.tltg.osd R.tsponm, p 155
113 CC :\WFP to Vkeroy, 24 Nov 1928, m 'Afghani~tan : Afgh.tn Rebellion
192S-1929.' OIOC UPVl0/1287.
114 \''~eeroy to Se<ret:al) ofSt21e for India, 21 Dec. 192R, ibid.
US CC ;'1."\VFP co Viceroy, 15 De~ 192R, thtt!.
116. Nawid, &liticiiS Rn~m , p 164.
1 16 FRO~TIER OF FAJTII
The ituation in Afghanistan Wll.) complicated when a
rebellion broke out in the north . I Iabibullah, also known Badu-
Saqao, wn a Robin I food char<u:ter who had started as a highwzy
robber from Kohi tan. ~nd quickly came to the fore of an upnsmg
T ~o that bcgnn as a prote t again t raxc and army conscnpnon.
I lahibullah quickly gained the upport of the l\lujaddidi ya of •
increa ing pre ure on mullas of the Akhund Ghaffilr-Had«b 1
line to join with him ;~nd the other rebels. oon after the confertDCt
~t I IJdd.t, l\lulla Chakn.nvar and the Akhunuda :>fTagao dec::lmd
their yrnp.uhies with the rebels and denounced ,\m;.nullah Khan
a ltlyir. Amanull.th abdicated and retreated to Kandahar, lea\rmg the
throne to hi!1 unde, Inayatullah, who was soon depo ed in fa\'our
I f.tbibull,th .117 In Jahlabad Ali Ahmad, the former go\ emor of K2bru
~t;lkcd his own d.um to the throne supported by the U tad ofHaddi
nod the l latrat of Charbagh. 111 The authority of the K:tbul anum:
was completely fra(.tured, and the Tribal Areas response \'aried frm::
w.ltl'hful silence on the parr of the 1\lohmand:. to boory-motn-.urd
participation by the Afridis. 11 9
In efforts to consolidate authority, the three competitors to tb:
throne .1ppcaled to Mghan 'ulama and mullas. J\manullah
tried to regroup in Kand.thar, entertaining ajirga of mu/las at
residence there.110 I Ie ent ~tulia Guldin to \Vana to d.i tribute
prodamation and uy to encourage :.upport there.121 Ali Ahmed •
Kandahar widely adverri ed that he had secured the support
loyalty of the Chaknawar Mulla, the Naqtb of Charbagh, and dx
U tad of lladda, and wrongly cLUmed that he a1 .., had the ~
of I laji Turang-.r..ai. tu I bbibullah, ~truggling to e rabli h himself
Knbul, dedared that he would reinstate allowances to all mzdks
trib.tl mnlth (pre umably on both c:ide::. of the border), prC\iouSh
117. lhi<l..pp. 164-7J.
118. CC NWFP to VJ<croy, 28Jan. 1929, in 'Mghanistan: Afghan Rcbdlim
11'1. CC NWFP to Vimoy,30Jan. 1929, ibid.
120..MiniHcr at 1\ohul to Sccn:wy of State fOr fon:•gn A!Taits, 10 fdl.. 1 •
i.bid.
121. CC NWFP to Se~n:tarvof utt lor India, 24 Fc:b. l9l9, ibid.
122. ;\1mbtc:r at 1\a.bul to Scuc:tary of ute for Foreign Affaus. 14 Fdl.. 1 •
Ibid.
PATRO~S OF' 1'1 IE S.\IN I !i 117
offby Amanullah Khan.123 During rhi time, Nadir Khan, general
of the Afgtan army under Amanullah, wa in Delhi and rcfu ed
Annnullah's rq>e2tcd reque ... t:-. ro join him in Kandahar. 1.M In ~larch
1929, Nadir Khan independently sent an emi ary to the Tribal Area
organise upport among the ~tohmaml~. Khugiani , Shinwui
a:xJ a.fkUS A serting their influence o,·er the election of the new
a:ru.r, the eastern Pakhtun mullaJ arranged ajirga at lladda to dt 1 i
a fa\'ou.red candicbte for the throne. l\lulla Chaknawar, U r d thtb
llidda, Mulla Tagao, Badc;hah Gul and the I laji Turang-nt Jon~
\nth some 'u/ama from Pe haw.u were notable .mcndee at this
prga.U6
In April 1929 some 'ulama from the administered p.trt of the
'orrh-\V~t Frontier Province formed .1 deputation or w".fil to rc·
esublish support for Amanullah. 127 These 'u/umtl were memher~
of the Pe~hawar Khilafat Committee and h;td helped organise the
Ui/ajJJ 4nd hijral mobilisarions in the 1919·21 pcriod. 123 Bec.\U e of
their participation in those activities, member~ ofthe organi .uion had
W"Otktd with the Tribal Areas mullas before. The wt~jil ~et out for the
Tribal Areas to usc the influence of the members and their relations
th the frontier mullas to con:.ohdate support for Am mullah among
the tribes.m They did this within a circuit covering 1\tohmant.l and
Bljaur and stretching to the Afghan Ea tem Provtncc.., .1long which
stopping points andjirgOJ were arranged by regional mullm .It which
the 'ulam11 could argue their case before the lo\.al PakJltun tribe:. The
greatest succe.':. of the wafdwas \\ith the M1tai Mus.t Khcl De~pite
the chn's long-standing animo~ity co the llajl Turangzat over their
:acttptance of British allowances, the Mu~a Khcl defied warnings by
123 Mminc:r t !Ubul to Sc..:rewy of Stare: for Foreign .AfT'Jir,, 16 Feb. 1929,
ibid.
124 CC ';'\VFP to Viceroy, 28 Feb. 11J29, 1hitl.
125. MPD. 9 ~ l arch 1929.
126 1PD, 23 March 1929.
127 Abclur R:ahim PoJnlzai, lffghilnistan Mrw Q•tY•lm·r-Aman (RaW21pindi,
1929, reprint Pc:sluwu, 1996), p. 8.
l2S P~zai. Afghanistan Mtin, p. 9. 'flle pro\in~·•al Kh•lafa1 Commmc:cs an:
ciUcusscd in greater dcr.ul funher on 10 thi chapter.
129 P~w. AJ:hllnistan Mrin, pp. 24, 34.
liS FRO~J'JER OF 1-i\ITII PATRO '-:'i Or Tm: SAI!IITS 11 9

the Di trier Commi ioner Pe•hawar and declared thor u:ruulimom mnmir in Kabul and would alwar~ beau eful check on the British.
upport fllr ArnanuUah. 130 ~uendy, Zahir Shah's gove;nment wa carefitl never to try to
Soon fter, Am.tnuUah'-. general 'l.:adtr Khan came out With undermine the power of, or politically discredit the mullat.
own daim to the throne, ju t as f labJbullah was losing popclm:T
underaccu arion ofheavy-handedne:. and incrcasin concern
the Pakhtun .tbout hi Tajik background.m Nadir Khan sent lcrun
to the I laji Turang7.ai and Miyan arkanri, promi ing m'-.uds
their 'piouo; prayer ' for him. He flattered the Tribal Are2s m
ending his nephew to lend weight to an inter·dan settlement
arranged hy B~ld hah Gul.md J Iaji Turangza.i.m Amanullah' I'Ct'llr:
to power now ~eemed impossible. I laving failed in thcir efforts
reinstate him, but f:tcctl with an acceptable sub~tirute in Nadir
who had served .ts the Jgcnt of the amir to the Tribal Area for
many year' and promised to abolish Amanullah' ref~1nns, 8
Gul I, the I lJj1 Tur.tnglai and other Tribal Area., mullas came
in active support of him soon thereafter. In rerum for their ppr.
1\J.tdir Khan mamtained AmanuUah's sryle of patronage, making
of monty .tnd guns and conferring honours on the 1\JuUa Ch!llrntn\"ltt_
U.;t,ttl of rI add~•. \lty.m of Sarkanri, the ~on of the Badsluh
I larnpur, the I Iaji Turangui and Badshah Gul. '\ .... r Klun
began to make gain:. again t Habibullah supported b} 1\hugWu.
anti ~lohmand lllJhk.m, and claimed the throne at Kabul h) the
of1929.u..
~lilitary su ccs cs of 1919 and 1924 and AmanuUah' recogrli:ii:Xl
of the: Tribal Area mull.u as important allies of his tate awle
Tribal Area m ullas vi ible and powerful figures in the: T nbal Artz
the year that foUowc:d and gave them a -;trong Af~ bias.
patronage of the Tribal Areas mullas declined \\ith Nadir
de nh and the ucccs~ion of his son Zahtr Khan-kn0\\11 as ZC:!
':!hah after hi., coroniltion-in 1933. I lowever Amanullah's mgn
,ufficicntly est.tbli-;hed that the e figures could sway the fortune

110. CC NWl P to Viceroy, 20 Nov 1928. in 'Afghanisun:

IM,.llwn.' •
131 . !\IPD, 24 Aug. 1929.
132. ~IPD. 11 Aug. 1929.
133. !\JI>(), 2~ ~larch 1930.
134. ~ I PD, AuK.- Oct. 1929.

5 t!::.tlJm of the Hadda line Comparison of the t\\o ca es highlights the
CO"J~OLIDATING AlJfO~O:\IY
1923 1930
Togtthcr Deoband1 and Afghan engagement in the Tribal
ennchcd the I I.1dda Mulla'!> successors and the prominence of the
pimmmdi line through the period 1915-30 to give their cti\'lttc:s a
gre.tt deal more significance. Their const<tnt agenda to organise
activity within the borders of the Tribal Areas and remain a pm
community and inter-tribal relations was pursued with more rcsoura:s
and u great deal more colonial and press attention being paid to them.
Bur de pite the hyperbole of Amanullah's narionali tic dechratiom
and Dcobandi religious ideali arion regarding Pakhtun tribal
the mullar' programme of c;ecuring the tenns of their regt
autonomy \V'cl not one of blind resistance to political absorption
Briti h India. It wa a -.eries of inter-tribal diplomatic and militm:
manoeU\TCS aimed at pre ef\ing the conditions "ithin which their
authority WJ cstnbli hcd-balanccd power between different aiks
and prescf\-ation of governmental and c;ocial autonomy within
tribal region . The move a\\-ay from the ideology of British resisura
wa encouraged by chang~ in the climate within which the
addrc ed the e i ucs after 1921. British efforu to ensure their
milital) preparcdne s up to the border region renew-ed the milir2n
department' and political office's interests in e rabli hing the 1m
of the border tribe .
Thr Wt1ziristan and Khybtr rtsistancts
After the Third Anglo-Afghan War which highlighted the fi
in British troop mobili ations to the border region, the British
a renewed 'forward movement' into \Vaz.irisran and the Kh''hcr
CO:-:SOLIO.\Tl~G AUTOl'm.tr 1923·1930 121
1lis involved the construction of road and canmnnltnt and the
rr-csubli hment of the North-Waziri un Todti ~out and the
th-Waziristan Scours, and the consrru~.:tion ot a broad-gauge
nilway through the Khyber Pa~ . Both initianvt."S met with tribal
~ce but only the Khyber rc~i ranee wa actively taken up by the
~·important fact that the bare principle of anti·coloniali m did not
dcttnnine the mullas· actions.
In \Vaziristan, oibe:. staged strong oppo ition to con tnJction
and planning work for the new road and r.til , org.mi ing atta~kl>
on SUf\'e)' parties and condemning any clan th.u offered to provide
ilxruadarror labourers for the scheme . The mobilisation wa.~ strongly
5Upported by Amanullah's deputy to the region, Abdur R1:t1q, who
lud staved on after the conclusion of the Third Anglo Afghan W .tr.
Another Jamaar-i Mujahidin member, Maulana Bashir moved to
\Vaziristan during th.ts time and beg.m publishing a new paper called
Ghazah (Farsi for ghazvah or religious war), in 1920-1. 1 Abdur Raziq
encouraged the Ahmedzai Wazirs to re~i t Briti h encro;u:hmcnt,
securing large allowances for them from Amanullah's government.
Mghan aid to theAhmedza~ Walles wa eventually cut ofrin 1923 and
Amanulbh Khan recalled Abdur Rallq to Kabul, but,\ deputation of
30 ether 1"1UJahulin went ro WaZiristan 10 Mar~,.h 1923 and remained
Makin under MauJana Bashir\ direction to encourage and aid
nmrance to the British there. 2 Despite mujahidin support of the
mo\-emeot, onlv one relatively unknown mu/111 w.h direc.:rly involved
the mobilisation.
The Jamout-i Mujahidin tried to popu!Jri c sentiment agaimt
the Briti h for their campaign 1n Wamimn amnng other Tribal
Areas communirie:..J They did thh through rhe /// Mujahul the
1 Intel ~ence Brarn:h l\1crno on M.111l.uu B 1 hrr, 1925' rn '1\bul.m;~ Abdul
Rahl , Special Branch NWFP, 727/45
2. ~Wl'PIBD. 1 March 1923.
l Member of the Jamaat·i Mujahidin who went 10 Afghanimn helped to
set up the llt~hJJ-i Mathriqi rn the Eo~Mcrn l'ruvin,e. Editorial •t.lO .u the
or
lttthtul-i .\.tavmtji lent 2 great dt·al of uppc>n Ill the cdiwrs Ill Mujahid
as well as covering new of Tnhal Arcu mohilis;uion,. A report ol the
dcc:bnoon of wv ag-olinst the Bncr h hy llajr Ab.lur Rniq wu fi:-arurcd rn
one of the first iuues of the 1/I~IMd•r-.\fa,hrifJi; and in 1923, the Briti~h
122 1-'ROSTIER Of fAIIII
new-spaper of the Chamarkand colony which began to be pub~
in 1922 and continued to run print until 1940.4 The newsp.zpa
contained ummarie~ of relevant news from the Briti h, Indian
Afghan press, with editorials and commentary highlighting issues
pecific regional concern such as the lthilafot mO\:cment, Amanulbb
reforms and miliwy expendirure in the frontier. The
cmphasi ed that there was a unity to the Tribal Areas encapsnb•rrl
in the common condition and concern of it disparate ~ ~
warring communities.5 The land had however been \iobred and ·a::
to pieces' by road , rmlitary po t·, forts and camp which sepanted
people~ The ongoing militar)' campaign in Waz.iri tan demonstrred
the heavy h.mJeJnes~ of the ad mini tration and the editors ~
the Pakhruns tribes and the mullas that:
Mind that if the enemy succeeds even a little in Wami tan noothcrpbtt
the frontier will he ahle w m.tke any oppo ition to hi aggressions bea::se
road have long .1go been constructed tn tht dtr«tion of Ctukcb.In
Chttral, and the Khyber r;Ulw·.~y, Thai, Kurram and other grand
han been forti lied and defended .o that tht whole of }i:ghisrm: m
power of the cnerny.7
Fa1.al Ilahi and M lUlana Bashir translated report:. of apendit=:
and military budgch for the north-west frontier in the AI.Muja!r Ir
Agent at Kabul described the editorial sta.fi\ o\Crwhelming conccm ~
the condition m Wazin tan and their repeatc:d call for a c:cssrro
the Bnu h bomhanlmcnt of that area and tnte~nuon b) the a:mr
Chamark.an<h, Sarguu:sht-t-Mujilhul, p 95; lllchaJ- \f.uhrigi. n.d.
Ruiq's Dccl.uatton ot War', appcndu: Z tlm.li, Muj.:hid-i-'!lih.m. p.
4. Chamark:.lndt, Sarguuubt-i MujilbiJ, p. 95
5. This newspaper and the opinion sutcd there dC'Ydopcd as the lepq
the mm-cment of the Jamut·i l\Jujahidin, but also under thc pz~:ro:::;l"!
of an Imltan antclhgcnt ia that become 10\"0h-cd m pnnt jc"~U:Iti..:s::::
in Alghanistan. The launch of the AI Mujillti.llcd to the artkuh::ioc at
Ocoho~nth nationali~t and Afghan cultunl tnllucnccs by mdhichu!s
h.td chll.;cn to rcm.un m the Tribal Areas and am-ol\-cd in the rdigious
tnbal politics of the region. Chamuk.andi's references to,i/ \fujt:hiJ
that the OC\\ paper was produced for an external rtadcrship as wd1-it
surreptllloUSI} posted to di idc:nts in Hmdw11n and luJ a subscriber
m Afghanimn. Chamarlandt, ~·hi-• MujiUJid, p. 69.
6. AIMujahiJ, 19 J\pnl1923. ~WFPPA peoal Branch ~\\'FP, file 41
7. AIMujahiJ, 6 0 t. 1922. ~\VFPPA pccial Branch 1\\\'fll, file 42-
co--:sOLJDATI:-.:G \UfO:->O~IY 1923·19.30 123
was reported that the finance mini ttr had ubmined for a J~.lrcasc in
apendirure in the civil branch ofaJminimarion in the North-Wet
Frontier Province, bur demanded an increa. e of 3.5 rmllJon rupee~
ft \Vaziristan expen.;es to meet the requirements of different heads
there. In another article Ba hir liber.illy estimated the expcndirure
frontier campaigns as 30 million in addirion to half a million in
"dies and ammunition on \Vatiri tane:xpcditionsoverrhe previou
four years. The article highlighted that the Engli~h mini rric and
~ iuld derided the hlgh co t of the etmpaign, pointing our thar
the \\'aziril>tan resistance wa eroding public support for the newly
mivcd 'forw·ard policy'!
While the mullas of the l ladda line did expresc; moral solidarity
with the \ Vaziristan insurgency, promtnent members of the li nc who
>ere in \Vazirisran, including the new l\IuUa Powinc.Jah Fat! Din and
lulla Hamzullah, did not contribute muitarily to the rnobili ation.
The British ultimately e~.:ured tribal complicity with their project
through huge increase in allowance in \Vaziristan-from about
130,000 rupees in 1919 to almo t 280,000 by 1925, in addition to
rbich 1.9 million rupee:. were being paid out under the J:hassad11r
schtme.' De:.pire the continuing calls to arms from the mujahiJin,
Wazir border raids and anacks on m1lirary posts in the Tribal Area~
had almost entirely cea ed by 1925 nod the remaining pm.kcts
of resistance were wiped our in acrhu campaigns. 10 The mujahidin
tinued to try to 'supply mformation about border problems and
' and 'discloc;e the plan:. of the enemies ... for the ero~ion of
tndcpendence of the border tribes', 11 ro rhe mullas of the lladda
Malla line in Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, Tirah, Dir and Swat but
the htter did not mobili e m upport of rhe Wazk tribe .
The tailure of the network to rake up the Wazirisran i sue on
idco!ogiC2l grounds can only be under tood if mulla action and tribal
actiOn are accepted as being mutually affirming in the Tribal Areas.
AlMU.J'lhiJ, 23 Marcll1923 NWWJ>A SpeCial Bmm:h 1\:WI'P, file 410.
Warren, Th~ Ft~qirDjlpi. p. 56
lbid., PP· 57-9, see aho II ugh B01ttie, Tlv lmpnial FrGntitr: Tril>t Stalt in
fJ4urut.an (Routledge, 2001), pp. 207-8.
11 Report onAIM~<jahiJ, 28 Aug. 1923. NWFPPA Spco.Jal Branch :-.IWFP,
file 410.
124 fRO=--TIER 01-' F.\ITII
Bccau e the I ladda line adherent tribes, and ultimately all me
in Waziri ton, did not ee the utility in opposing the scheme once
monetary benefit accrued to them, they did not oppose the scha:z.
Tribes in the northern Tribal Areas certainly had no take m the
and their mu/l,zs grounded by the tribal basi for their part11QD;:ztJO~
remained aloof from the scheme. The ~.:oncum:nt mO\-c:ment an
Kh)hc:r O\Cr an alrno t identic..U railway seheme was ho\\"e\"C'
up hy member of the Hadda Mulla line. These mullas
involvl!d on the principle ofequttable apportionmcm ofallowanas
rribelt in the region, not the blind principle of oppo ition to'
pcnctrat ion'. The terms of their involvement in the resi ranee did
ultimately oppo~e British acce s through the region. They aa:qm~
the inevitability of this and were mollified by achieving the ptojca.
When the plan for a new broad gauge r.ulway through the Klnbe:
into Afghanistan was presented in 1921, there wa immedinh'
opposition raised to the project b} the Mridi clan .u A number
clan men launched an appeal before Mulla SJ)')id Aklw a king
to fore tall the p;overnmcnr plans because the Kulo Khds Afridis.
virtue of proximity to the road, provided kJJ,wJJars to protect
Khvber Pa .1nd earned profits and ~cured contracts for the
\\ltrout sharing them with other clans who claimed equal ancc:s::i
trib.U proprietary right over the road. u These other clans, spccifuL
the Ak. Khel, Kamb:a.r Khd, K:a.rnalai and Sepah Afridis.
together at a)lrga ofabout 600 people at Bagh, and formall)~annro~
the authority of the .Mulla Sanid Akbar to puni h those int
to participate in con trucnon of the raihvay. 14 Accordingl),
Sayyid Akbu publicly denounced the allowance holders and
clan) like the '/ :tkk.a Khcl who supported the project in anti
of compcn-.Jtton ,;\lulla Chaknawar ga\"e several Hluthas sathl!:t'r
12. ~ lcmo
from Colonel Humphry • Britbh ~lini ter at Kabul, 1911
IJPS/11/180.
13. Pcuuu'l 30 Do.:c.. 1910, submitted to PA Khyber b~;rrgaJof~
K:unal:u, !), ·p:ah and Ab Khcl Afridi). There had been opposttJOD
S( hem in the past a.s well. ~lulla ~1ahmud Akhunzada and Mulh
Akhar mrted a campaign to prevent MndJ cnh:nmcnt in the trib2! k:rics
1915 and 1916. OIOC UP~ 11 180.
14. K.PD, 18Junc 1921.
CO!\SOLIDATl!':G AUTOKO~IY 1923-1930 125
rtferrcing to the 'iniquity of those working on the Khyber railwa)' in
SUIT' rt.''
Mil.- Say id Akbar reiterated the mujahidin :S warnings ofviolation
J
and d.L!:lWlbermeot of the Tribal Area and began to isolate group
dut were friendly to the Briti h government and had participated
m colonial r<nd-building o;chemes and provided l.:hllSSildars. 16 IIi
efforts quickly produced deo;irable result for the affronted clan -the
political office sanctioned increa cd a1Jo,vancc and contract for
consauccion labour to the previou tr cxduded group . Under this
policy, undertaken to o;ecure the 'goodwill and cooperation of the
Afridis during construction, and good beha\"iour .lftcr the line had
been completed', there was a total inc rca c in allowances of 84,000
rupees. This included spcc•al allowances ofberwc:cn 6,000 and 9,000
rupees :ach to the Kambar Khel, Kamala•, 5,pah, Aka Khel and
Mal.ikd n Khel, and 17,000 rupees in pcrsonal/ungi allmor.1nces to the
ma1ih f these clansY
Mulla Sanid Akbar stopped speaking out again t the railway
once m t of the Mridis were in receipt of government allowances
demonstrating rus commitment tO the re~i t.lnCC \V'.l secondary to
his commitment to the communities he erved. In return, the Afridi
cb.ns did not object when he declared him .elf ha,flh,th ofTirah and
the supreme religious authority there On the other hand, Mulla
~d also retained his religious posiuon, h1 involvement in regional
arbitrations, his connections to the Afghan court and hi relationship
with the Jamaat-J Mujahidin and other rcgion;ll 111111/as even after
capitulating on the Khyber railway re:,i)tance. 11 Leadership of the
"fuah resi:.tance had been a uccCli ful enterprise for him .1nd onJy
heightened Afridi commitment to him and his regional reputation.
Despite the great focu,. by the Brithh p;overnmcnt and by the
JUtionalisr pre s in India on tribal mulla led oppoc;ition to roads and
nilw:ays in the Tribal Areas, the rhetoric: of reliiSt:lncc populari~ed by
15 KPD, 18 June 1921.
1 otc by the PA Khyber, 31 Oct. 1920' 10 "Corrc: pondcn'c on con tnJction
of a railway hne through Khyber'. NWl· PPA Politk.tl Agent Khyber, ftlc
215/32.
17 tncmcnt ofTriba.l Allowancet, 1931'.
I l\\\'FPPD, 1923-1927.
 126 FRO~TIER OF J.' ,\ITH
the Jamut-i ~lujahidin \vas perhaps ju!>t that Cc:~ainly the janwl
Mujahidin and the mullas were in no position to pm-ent settlcmcn:s
with the Briti h owing to the limitation on all other form ofeaJIDO!ti:
activity, much though they may have hoped that uch rapprcnchmcn3
would not occur. Jn the case of the Khvber raihva,, the Mulh
Akbar':. prime objedi\·e was to prevent'a enleme~t between the
Khcl and the British without a corre ponding ettlement offer to the
le er clan in order to maintain parity between clan gnnq>S- Once
thi was accompli~hed he did not pur!>ue a coul"le of rdi~ ex
nution.llistically motivated anti-colonial resistance any further.
Tlu valorisation ofAjab Khan Afridi
In a case which allowed the mullas to take up an issue on ideolcgiar
grounds without nccdmg to correlate it to tribal concern , the
of the Tladda line, led by llaji Turangzai, champ•oncd the ause
an outlaw whom the Briti~h wanted to extradite for punishment.llx
mullas used the ca e ro impress upon colonial repmcntath"tS
they were the only authorities in the region who could force am
to account, and that their judgements and medtations had to be
accorded respect rather than trying to enforce collective rcspo
on tribe through threat!> of punishment and promi es of pm
In April1923 Ajab Khan of the BostJ Khel clan of the Afridi ~
of Tirah entered the administered district of Kohar and broke
the hou e of Major Archibald Ellis with a small group ofaroruxijilia::S.
The group murdered Mrs Ellis and abducted the couple' eightttt-
ycar·old daughter ~1oUy. They then rerumed to Tirah with M
held to r;m om. Warning had already gone out from the polincr.:
agencie to the Afridi and Orakzai tnbes, stating that any tnbe
gave the 'outlaws' shelter or safe passage would be hdd ~
the crime itself. lienee Ajab Khan did not rerum to hi \~
went to the Mulht Mahmud Akhunzada forshelter. 1' ~1ulhM
wrote to the politic-al office that Ajab Khan was with him md thn b:
could, for the price of 15,000 rupees, c;erve as mediator between
Khan Afridi and the British.JO
19. ()(. h.ohat to CC PC$hawa.r, 19 April 1923 1n ·~tunkr of irs Ellis
ab..luu on of her daughter, M1 ~ Ellis" OJOC UPS 1C.. 1062
20. 1-:"<tr.lct from offie~alrcpon of Legishtn"t: ~bh· deb&~ 9Juh-1923,
'
CO:\ SOLIDATJ:--:G AllTO:-;(}\fY 1'123· 1930 127
Ajab Khan \vaS not unknown to the polnic-.t.l office. I le and his
group had been respon ible for 2 raid on a police line at Kohat in
February of th~t year and had made ofT with 46 go\'emment rifles-a
\'lluable prize-and a tribal levy had beer er t into J\jab Khan'
'ilb.~ in Tirah at the direction of the De pun C.omrni ioner Kohat
to recover the rifles. In the period between J.ebnu.ry and April the
Political Agent Khyber had been exerting pres ure on the Tirah and
Afiidi clans to pay a penalty for their tribe man's misdemeanour, and
a cbte had been decided to con\'cne ajirga of tribe and go\cmmcnt
to &ode what compenc;ation the re pon ible tribe would pay for
Ajab Khan's tranSgression. 21
A small deputation was despatched to the Mull;t M.thmud
Akhunzada comprised of the A ·sistant Politit:al Otfacer Kurram,
Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan, Khan Bahadur Gulbu Khan ;\nd a British
friend of the Ellis family, Mrs Starr. The movement of the group was
&cilit2ted by Abdul Haq, the on of the Mulla Karbogha, who oflcred
a mean of intercession with the Mulla Mahmud Akhunzada, and
was 'the real c;afeguard of the party through independent territory'.»
When the group reached his house, Mulla Akhunzada put fonvard
Ajab Khan's demands-the relea~e of the village men c-aptured in the
British raid on Ajab's village in February. After c;ecuring Kuh Kh•m's
commitment that this would happen, MuUa Akhun1.;1da had Molly
Ellis brought to his houc;e and handed her O\'cr to the Briti h party.
Arbitration performed by 111UI/as between antagoni tic partie
>"aS not unusual. It was, however, unu~ual for the arbitration to be
solicited and paid for by the Government of India Normally, the
Political Agent would bring pre sure to be.\f on loc.u tribes until
an 'outbw" had been handed over. I lowevcr the Jelk~.\cy of thJs
particular situation necessitated the immediate relca~e of Molly
Ellis, at whatever cost to established pohcy. Moreover, the fact that
Ajah Khan was not actually in tribal territory but under the mulln's
protec;tion meant that negotiations through the tribes would be
a lengthy process. In the position of arbitrator, Mulla Akhunzada
was able to negotiate between Ajab Khan and the BritJsh as though
21 Ibid.
22. Irs Starr'.s Rcpon', abid.
 128 1-'RO:-lTIER OF 1-'AITJI
they were two equal parti • su~ting that the release o
was condttional on meeting Ajab Khan' demand. l\tOfCO\-cr, M
1\lahmud maintained 1\jab's freedom and autonom) of the
tribe , den) ing that there was a tribal 'rc ponSlbilit)' to hand him
for puni hmcnt.
Other rcgion.tl mul!.u took up Ajab 1-J .ll\' case :and 1
~lahmud' representation of the tribe a tree of obliganon
the Briti h, turning Ajab Khan into the }mbol of Tnbal
autonom) .ulll rcsi tance to the Briti'>h. ~lulla Chakruwar
re punsibility for p.trt ofAjab Khan's p.l ·age a~:ro .. t' Tnbal
.tfter the negotiJtions were over and hid J\jab Kh 's accom
D.wd Shah \ t ull.t Ch<lknawar and H aji Turan~v.ai nillicd
tribes, enwur•twng .tnd coercing them to get \hclter nd protecuoc
fi>r '\jab Kh.ul and his Jccomplices in local village .n B) Octoba
Ajah k.han was t.tken to Chamarkand where he rc ided for
tirnt with the mtyahidw. Thill period at Chamarkand marked
Khan Afridi's tran~formation into 'Ghazt Ajab Khan of Yaghist.:
I lc wrote cvcr.tl lctrers from Chamarkand, relatin his ide f
c\ent to the Politkal Agent Khyber, Khan Bahadur Kuli Khm
others im·ol\·ed in frontier dminisrrarion, and to the gm~
of Great Britain {through the Chtef Commi-.,ioner 1\"\\'FP
Khan's letters all repeated the c;ame basK point: that hi abduco
~lolly Elli had been in tigatcd by his outrage over the Brin
on hi village in pursuit of the government rifle earlier in the
f lc maintnined that his \\-"llS not a criminal act, but an act of cfu
retJli:uion again t the gO\·emment transgre-,ion and insult t
vallage in 'independent' territory.25 Ajab Khan berated Kuli K1u.n
~Iughal Baz Khan f{lr their 'treachery' m helping the British.
23. ~1PD, 20 Feb. 1920.
24. The valun .111un of Ajab Khan w.o.' dire~ tl) facilitated b) the rm:;:c::::;1
mujahidm :u Charnarkand. Aj;,~b 1\.han was ~nted the ntk: at
presi<lcnc. of the Anjum.u.-i Kh•·lar- K.ahah lil.tbistan. O'hc ~~~
had ofacn referred to their organi~atlOn as the Anjuman-i lo.ltudnn-s
.luring the thiltrfot ynrs. Thl> 'organisation' \\~ mcn:l~ another txr
agenda of the muJnhiJin and the p.ttticipant corre1ponded aactlv
remaht<d nf the Jam t 1 \ lujahidin itsclf.)
25. Aj.ahKhanAfnJituCC.. '\VFP,l0C~ . 1923,in'R, .lr· thAfifj;u6::
-l'nnteJ Cnrrespon ler~ , 1921-1924'. OIOC L JX, I 1049
CO;\SOLJDATI~G AUTOSO~IY 191!\ 1930 129
the paniotic blood boil in every patriotac Afghan and elt:rc pccting
luslim', and reiterated that hi adion and their' would ha\·e great
IWiorul consequence for the P...khrun and for Briti h lndia.16
The ChiefComrruc;sioner 1\"\VFP authorised immediate retaliation
~ :\jab Khan, and the Political Ag~:nt Kh) her organised an
Afiidi l~r to enforce puni hment on the gang member . The
l:sh.farenrered Ajab Khan's village of Jowak.i and burned down the
houses of Aj:J> Khan and hi supporters. The Jowak.i villagers had
to bear the burden of c.xpenc;e of fccdinK the Afridi lashl:trr.2 '
The ~0\emment also fought back again~t the mu/1111' rejc"tion of
uibal obligation to the British and ne\\ commitment to the British
~~:mment were solicited from the Adam Khel and Kh\·bcr Afridi
and the Orakzais. The text of the trcatie re~:onfirrncJ that
Ajab Khan, Shahzada, Sultan Mir, Cui Akh.u and ll.1idar Shith, who
:ue cnemte of our government, are our own enemies. The ahmc-namcJ
persons and their relation-. sh.ill hereafter never c:ntc:r the territory of any
ofour tribes, the tribe con,emed ~hall he bound to arre~t them OAnd lund
them m·er co the govcmmenr.11
The delicacy of the siruation was umlcmood by the: politkal office.
hub Mahmud had negotiated an agreement that maintained Ajab
1\hm's freedom, but this was now being repudi.ued hy the Briti~h.
In order to gh-e \'alidity to their criminali~ation and pcr,ecution of
Ajab Khan Afridi, the new treaties wtth the tribe~ were negotiated
b) two other mu//as-Muhammad Abdul I bq who had originally
conducted the British party into the Tribal Areas, and Sah1bzada
Abdul Hamid who happened to be the brother of Mulla Mahmud
Akhun7.ada. An effort was being made to undermine the position
ukm by the Mulla Mahmud, Mulla Chaknawar and I Iaji Turangzai
by soliciting an aJternanve rclagiou' po,ition. I Iowcver the weight of
numbers and pas ion was on the stdc of the mullm supporttng Ajab
Ajm Khan Mridi to Khan 8ahJdur Kul1 Khan, i\1'0 Kurram, n.d., 1b1d
11 CC :\'WFP to Foreign and Polltlc;~.l Dep.mmcnl, 19 June 1923. OIOC
1../PSJ 10/1062.
2S. 'Agrtc.rnent executed by (a) Alndis and Onkn.i mhc at Shinawari un 13
lay 1923' 11 CC NWFP to Fore1gn .and Poht1,'al Department, 29 June
1923, in ·~h.rdcr of ~1 1"' Ellis and a~u~uon of her daughter, .\11 Elli '.
 130 FRO='TIER OF FAITH
Khan. The tribe that agreed to c..xtradi te Ajab Khan and had p
~ssadurs to pur ue the outlaw-; received scathing crltiasm
~Julia Sanid Akbar, who called for a reprisal against the \;oht
the indepcnden(e' of the Tribal Areas.~
The plit between the allowance-holders and upporters ofB
policy on the one hand, and the Haji Turangz.ai. Mulh .._.,.,._.......
and 1\tulla l\lahmud and their adherent on the other, did
to a major confrontation between the mullas and the tribes
Ajab Khan wa moved in great "ecrecy, allowing the mbes to~
ignorant of hi:. whereabout . \lor were the British able to
.tnd pro ec:ute Ajab Khan and undermlne the position dw tilt
mullm had taken. In February 1924 the British exerted prc:ssure
AmanuiLth ""han to usc his influence in the Tribal Areas to fi
Ajah Khan·~ extradition. Amanullah Khan conducted negoti1
with Ajab Khan and his accomplices through Badshah Gul and H9
Turangzai. It was finally decided that Ajab Khan would surrcoda
for his crime, but only to the Mghan authorities. Bad bah
and I [uji Tur.1ng7~ti took responsibility for conveyin[! the 'ou
and their familie to Jalalabad where they would live under
government supcrvi ion.:IO The mu/las were paid 1,000 rupees try
amir in recognition of their services.31
The case of Ajab Khan Afridi became a rall)ing point for the
of the Akhund Ghaffur-1 Iaddal\lullalineon two counts. Thc fim
that ~tulia Mahmud' mediation had affirmed the ~nC) of
while the econd wa that the use of the arbitration method ~~:C
parity between the two parties-the representative:. ofM' Ellis
of Ajah KhJn Afridi. The British would never have been b
the ncgcHiating table had the matter not involved a young
girl. An Indian political officer had been kidnapped in Kurrun
monrh earlier and a British Political Agent murdered in the Khttc:
in 1921 and neither incident had brought the colonial authori
to negotiate with the perpetrators of these act!. in the Tribal Arus.
The ensith·ity of the situation in the light of ~lolly's a~ and
mor-.1l threat po cd by her captivity by 'barbarous .. Pathan
29. KPD. 23 June: 1923.
30. KPD, 12Jan. 1924 to 9 l'eb. 1924.
31. KPD, 16 Feb. 1924.
CO~SOLIDATI~G \UTO::\O~IY 1923- 1930 131
meant dut her immediate release had to be cwrcd reg-.udless of
lbe politio.l co ..t. \\'hether Ajab Khan had realised thi and planned
lbe C\"enb rhat followed is improbable. Yet he and the Trih I Arc.:-as
IJ!:l!Uzs legitimised his act as a moraUv and politi~-.Uly motivated one.
The people involved on Ajab Khan' ~ide trongly cmpha: d th .
ttSpCCt that had been accorded to both MoUy EUi and Mrs 5rarr.
It was u.->erted th1t Ajab Khan had acted \\ithin the moral code of
bospiral.ity to his 'guest' as defined by paMtunWIJii.'Jl Mulla Mahmud
preswted ~lrs Starr 'vith a gold necklace a he left hi hou e, as a
tnd.itional' gesture of re.,pect.JJ I lence Ajab KJ1an's 'crirnin;uity' was
ti a noble act, weU within the bounds of dcc.:cncy. Harbouring
him became a political act of re istance to the British ~1nd past .tnd
bter instanc~ of oudaws being harboured with tribes and clans in
the region were glamori ed (although none were ever so popul.tr or
ootorious as Ajab Khan)." Many of the e ca cs were c;cttled without
atradition of the criminal and compensation for crime!> was deducted
cfuectly from the balance of allowance payable to the clans, o while
rtWltu appeared succe:>sful in their declaration of and attempt
to reinforce tribal autonomy of action through the protection of
• vs, it was the Briti~h who forced through their verltion of tribJJ
responsibility which inherently compromised that autonomy, and
they ceruinly never negotiated through a mulla to gain acce to the
rcpon again.3S
Tht Mohmand blockadt 1926-7
Haji TurangzaJ managed to ~ecure Afghan allowance~ for select
lohmand clans after their support to Amanullah in the Khost
12. Tht •Jrgend' of Ajab Khan Afrid• that per 1 h w thi• tby rmpha~i es that
MoUv Ellis was never treated improperly. RAther it i• claimrtlthatlihe long
'rc~bcrc~d' her Pakhrun captors wHh "ffc:cuun lor the trc.ltmcnt ;u.:wrdc:d
hrr. Ajab Khan Afridi\ M>n, Naik Muh.1mm~d Gh.vitu.1y, da1mcd that
Mrs Sw-r had reNtncd to the Khyber many )C:;tl'\ lo~tcr to v1~it her 'old
friends'. Interview, Naik Muhammad Ch:lliluay, 10 Aug. 2002.
l3. Ma w-r's Report.
lc 'NWFP Polirial Movement: Muj.ahidin of Chamarlund' "'DC 919.
lS 'Afghaninan tran ·&onuer raid 1922 1910', OIOC l/PS 10/1020;
'Fronoer transgro •ions, 1923- 25', OIOC l.,IJlS/10/1061
 132 FRO~'TIER OF f.i\lTil
rcodh :m \Vhen he took these to the Halimzai, Oawezai. 1usa Khd
and Sati i\Iohmand , he got a commitment from those maflb d:2!
a <l condition of receiving this honour from the amir th~
never accept Bririo;h allow·.tnces again. I Iowcver the new Khyber 2nd
W1.tirbtan projcl't had led to a dramatic incn::ue in Bnu h monccm
support in T ribaJ Area and it soon became apparent to the Mohmmis
that they had a chance at more secure and generou uppon from the
Briri h politic~tl ofll~e than from Afghani tan. Those dans dosesl
the Briti~h base in 'ih.tb<pdar-the Halimzai, ~lusa Khcl. Utiil21lZl:
and Dawczai 1\lohm.tnd,, aU of whom had been tripped of their ole
allowance aftc.:r their .ts,istance to Am.mulbh in 1919-apptoacheC
the Dcput) Commh,ioner in Peshawar with commitmmts
khassctdar troop:. .tnd renewed pledges of loyalt)·.36 The DC's offia
accepted the l\ lohmands' offer and approved allow·ances of more tb2:l
15,000 rupee:. for the J lalimzai, 12,000 for the \-lusa Khel, ahnos:
2,000 for the Utmanzai .tnd 3,500 for the Dawcu.i.37 \\'hm H..9
Turangz;ti recehed new~ of trus, he immed•ately rallied a
to bring the m,zlikJ to .tecounr for having broken their O'-ths. 1be
lmhkar wa-> manned by I Iaji'o; own shaikhs and Safi and .Mit2i M
Khell\Iohrnand clan who had not accepted new allowances from
the political ofllce. It entered the Dawezai, Utmanzai, Halimzai a:i
Musa KheJ vill.tgcs and burned down and looted the houses of t!:c
errant malikJ.3"~ In t)pical style, the lashlwr then di~persed.
Haji Turang-t.:ti'~ anack was c;een as audacious and prO\'OClU\"e.a:::C
.l dJrectchallcngc to the Briti h authorities. The ChJefCommissiooc:r.
'"\VFP, was unwilling to allow it to go unchU!e~ and
determined that ~ommunitie supporting Briti h inrertStS in the
region had to he defended. }le approved rctaliat ll'\ measures
the clan that h.td joined in the Haji's attack and .tti and Miw l
Khcl dano;mcn cttled in Briti,h territory were ro mdc:d up and·
Their release W<h ubjcct to pa}ment of a tine of 2,000 rupees bf
J6. 'Repon of the recent a~uvnic:s of the Haji Turangu.i in ~lohnund~
16 Apnl 1927. n. tn I Olliccr Fronncr Con tabuluy :}ubq2dar ~
DOFC.S), 211111.
37. · tatt:m ·nt ofTnbaJ Allowances, 1931'.
38. 'Rcpon of rc~ent atuvuic:s ofHaji Turangu~ .'
39. Ibid.
CO:" OLIDATI~G AU'IO~OM'I' 1923·1930 133
die clans. In Iohm and, Haji Turangzai wa UO\\ illing or unable to
down from the stand he haJ taken hec.tu c of the pcnaltie hi
supporter~ would have to pay. I le announced to the S.tll and Mit.ti
1usa Khd that he would ~et out with another lmhkar ro punish tho c
puues that had insrigared the go\crnmcnr rcpri als.<IO J Ie w·.t a\\ arc
It this point that the Briri h re:.pon e would be trongcr but tried
diffuse thi through the Faqir of Alingar \\ho ent a lerter ro the
rial officer at Shabqadar claiming that the: Haji's only moth'C in
aamg a~nst the allowance· holdmg tribes was in defence of hi own
booour.
Attempting to )teer the i ue clear ofconfrontation with the Bnti h.
the Haji emphasised that rhi' wa~ a ncccs ary C<tmpaign of umr-hil
t~Un~j. but the Faqir of Ahng.tr believed that the I l.tji TurJngzai
lhould u e this occasion as .tn opp<lrtunity ro caU for ajihtld ag.tin)t
the Briti hand rally wider support.41 The llaji T urang-l.li maintained
t u was an internal concern over the broken oath and oppo it ion
posed tO rhe I laji's mic;sion in Janu.ll'y, rather than the fact of payment
~mment allowance and rc i ted the Faqir' ugge tion .~l In
effort to force the Daweui, Utmanzai and I Ia.limzai to C".Jpitul.tte
without the British bccomtng dirc~tly involved, rhc J laji exerted a
ch pres5ur' as he po sibly could unJer the pre~criprions of amr-
hi/ maruf and ordered all mullm to !>top rchgious services on behalf
of the oath-breakers and their supporting clans:41 Then he lient the
ns of Babra Mulla, the Faqir of AJingar anJ his own son., to give
IICWS of the mi sion among the Baizai, Khwaizai and Safi Mohm;tnd~
l!ld organise a new lmhkar 3,000 mc:.n volumcered and tim army
lm)mpanied Haji T urang-1~'li to G.•nd.1h to open talks with the \ lal1k
Anmir of the Halim7.ai clan.'"
The Haji's de ire to avoid military eSt"lllation led him to in~truct
the iaJhhrr not to attack, even when orne men at the Gandab village
~ed fire on the lashl:ar and killed one of the I L~i's shaikhs. lie
coercing M:ilik Anmir into momJ and not milnary submission.
MPD, 2 Apnl 1927.
41 MPD, 29 Jan. 1927.
4l MPD, Feb.-March 1927.
43. Mohmand Report. DC Pc:sh:awar, 20Apnl1927. DOFCS 211111.
44 Report of rrc.cnt awvinc:s off l:aj1 TunangtaL'
134 I RO;>;TJER Of' 1-'AITJI
Backed up of course by hh fonnidable army, I l.tj \ I
the lialinll.ai would prefer he would henccfort~. t nothing to
with them and would l~vc the .Mulla of Qasai to p«fonn ~~~.,...,...
fun-.:tion on behalf of the clan.45 Faced with two altemttn
~o-ategorically reject I iaji T urangza.i's authority, ha\ e his \ilhge
down and a dangerou:. enemy for ever after, or to humblt himself
~uffcr the lc c.:~ pensive :.hame ofcapitulation, Malik Annur 2CQcptl:d
that he had done wrong by breaking an oath and identified a house •
hi:. viUJge th:n could be burned down as pen.Uty. Seeing the rcbtin:lT
stronger and better armed J Ialimzai's example, the Ta.rakui
apologised lc>r their o.tth·breaking and asked the Haji' forgi~
Tn return, no doubt relieved that he had maintaanc:d ht prestige Dd
not been toned into bartle with the British, l IaJt at<tb announa:d
that the dan) who had accepted allowances could keep them thcv
had already paid the pnce for having broken their oath .
This would have been the end of the matter and llaji TllCli.Ilgz:D
would have ucceeded in holding on to his position had the C\'Cn ncx
led to a Briti h inquiry Jbout the status of the Tribal Areas mullaJ
the threat po~ed by the Haji'~ relation hip with the frontier tribes.
Kuli Kh:m, the A a:.tant Political Officer Kurram \\-ho had helped 111
the recovery of Molly Ellis, was appointed officer on pecU1 dun
report on ~nd help control the "ituation in l\Iohmand.46 In his repr.
Kuli Khan warned of the ,.,erious con equence of the confron
het\H:cn ~talik Anmir and Haji Turangzai:
The event of the Ia t ten dav' ha\-e con\inced me tlut the influence
mu/Jas h.t~ developed from ~ religious ro an authorituian one. 1bcv
cocrle any .Mohmand [a though] a ruler rather than a mul/a.••infl:;;ma
and lear of the mullar had inlrea,ed l"'n,iderahh· [and the c:hns]
h«n ic:cling the authorit) and fear of the mul~s. It i therefore
important that the mull.u hould not be supported in 211) tt
ngain t allowam:e· holders. 41
45. Ibid.
46. CC l'IWl P to Forea~n Sc'-ret.uy, Government of lndiJ., li Aprill •
I>OFCS IIJ. 5 B.
47. Report of 1-Jl tn Bahadur Kuh Klun, officer on special dul),l9 April I T
1'\WI'PPA DCOP file 212 ofl927
CO'>:SOLIDAT!;o.;G AUTO:o.;O~IY 192J· l 'IJtl 135
Kuli Khan also pointed out that it wa not all Tribal Area mul/as,
specifically mullas who were followers of the 1laji Turang-Lai who
thtc:ltenc:d the government's interest • The sort of wrnpliancc these
r.:dlas demanded from their communities gave the mullas too mu h
control and compromi~d colonial authority. Kuli Khan ad\i cd that
in receipt of allowance be a ked to make a commitment that
they would not join in or assi t any /mhk.1r led by a mullt.I or join
many campaign of amr-bil marufbeeJ.u e it allowed the mullas to
accumulate and exercise power} The allowance-holding clan were
asked to depoc;it 25,000 rupees each with the political oHker at
~adar, a sum that would go forfeit if any clan w.t found to be
participating tn the mullas' dorOJ.
l laving narrowly escaped a major m1utary confrontation, the Haji
Turangz.:u did not respond to the colonial demands of the allowance·
bold.ing tribes. But he could not prevent the less predictable and more
confrontational Faqir of Alingar from demanding a lo ~.u retaliation
~n$t the criminal outlawing of reugiou authority. It wa rumoured
a:nong the Faqir's supporters that he had had vision that convinced
him of the necessity to attack the Frontier Comrabulary post; and
:u laughed about among his detractors that he had gone mad
l!ld believed that he had an army ofinvi ible gho ts followtng him. 49
Despite internal dic;sent Faqir rai ed a lashkdr to .m.Kk Shabqadar.
fuji Turangzal, despite his best effort:. to dis uade the Faqir, was
forced under the pressure of hh fratem.U commitment and hi
personal stake in the issue to join the Faqir's lmhkar with 600 afi
ccn.so
n C; DC Peshawar announced that the movement of the lashkar
would h.. halted by aerial bombing, Olnd any Mohmand clan
a!lowing the Faqir's lashkar to pa s through its territory would be
considered complicir in the mobilisation and would not be spared
the same crearment.51 The Faqir's mobilisation immediately clarified
the implications of the Mohmand allowances. These dans could
N • Shabqadar Fort, 13 May 1927, abid.
Ml D 27 !\by 1927.
SO. MPD, 4 june 1927
51 DC Peshawar tu Secrer;uy CC \lWFP, 9 June: 1927 DCOP file 212,
1927.
 136 J.'RO:"-'TIER OJ.' FAITJJ
not remain neutral in the face of mulla-lcd mobilisations
they \\~rc required to hold an inner line on behalf of the coJOCJZI
admini tration b) the provi~ion of kmmadars and intelligence
pa iviry and in.tction in the face of offen~he mobili tions ·rm·on;~h
the ndrnini:.tcrcd border were deemed as puni hable as com
and partidpation. The ~lohmand alloY.".Ul\:e-holders formed a bmicr
between the lashl.:ar and the admiru~tcred di trier . upponed
pro\;ision and arm from the British, they held thi line against the
lmhl:m, preventing it progre:.s and cutting off supplies to the
beyond th.tr had supported the mobilisation.51
I Iaji Tur.tngz.li tried to .mange a ~ettlemcnt between the
allowance-holding or \tssurcd' Mohmands anll the upper
in order to hre<tk the blockade. I [e wrote letters ro some of che
I Jalimzai malih ~tsking them to attend a j~rga Jlong with all otba
'elders and notables' nmong the 1\Iohmand, Stunwari. Utmmkhd.
Sail, Mamund, Sal.tr7ai .1nd Charmung -;c:Ltton , at hi home
Ghazi.tb.l<l in June 1927. I lc noted that he was doing the Halimzais
u crvice by inviting them to Ghaziabad becau . .e of the great cost
inconvenience of the ahemative, the Halimuis ho ting Bad hllh (}.;;
and hio; large retinue. 53 ln return he demanded immedUte attendm«
by the llnlim1.ai-'come oon so a deci ion can be made. The
ummoncd from all sections arc coming to<Lay.'s.t \\'hen the
clan failed to attend, Haji Turmgzai and the Mulla Chak:ruw:u
pcrfomed Joras among local dans, both those dire~.tly in\'Ol\'cd m the
blodade and neutral pMtie , to call for rcpri,aJ again t the I
k.hcl and I l.uim1.ai55 and Haji Turangui convened aji~ of60
from the ~lit.ti Mu~a KheJ area and a!;ked them to impose SC\'m
puni hrncnt on the errant dans. 56 Trying to employ other tactics. H
Tul"angni and l\lulla Chaknawa.r \Yrote repeatedly to the Hakim
J .ual.tbad and tin ally gatncd permisc;ion to offer a financial con
52. lhad.
53. llaja Turangz;~i to Malik Inaprulhh Khan ~lohmand (fJ alimni), 1
1345 (1 7 June 1927), ibad.
54. lhid
55. Pohta< 11 Otli,c Mohmand to CC NWFP, 17 Dec. 19li. l11 1
Situau~n Rc:pon 1927. ~'\VfllP\ Tribal Re<.c:.rch CcU 37/3 FRP
56. ~Wl·PPD, 21 Jan. 1928.
CO!I:SOLIO:\Tl:-.:C AUT0:\0~1\' 1923 · 1930 137
from the Mghan amirate to the :\lu a Khel to undermine thcirsuport
or the BritishF
~blockade was taking a tremendou~ toll on the l\tu~ Khcl and
me Halimzai clam as they with tood nipcr .macks, everely curtailed
Utcdom of movemenr in the Tribal Area , per onal in ecurity,
rdigious and -;ociaJ condemnation and pres ure from the Afghan
murate. But the greater threat po ed by the Briti h combined with
arttommendation from Kuli Khan that the Commi~ ioncr increa e
lllowances to the Halimzai as a rew.ltd for thetr commitment led the
'il:s to reject the mullas' appeals.S'I The mu/I.IJ .md their /.uhk11r were
fMctd to disperse which they evenru.tlly did bc~.1uo;e the supporting
ttibes could no longer wtchsrand the shomgc of fi>od and other
~ities created by the blockade.
The failed mobilisation of the I Iaji Tumngz;ti and the Faqir of
Alingar and the political office's respon e now fc>rccd Mohm.md
tdigious policies to centre on the question of Briti!>h allowance:.,
dimdy pitting the mullas against tribes at"cepttng colom.u 'upport.
Scllsequent to the blockade, I laji Turang-LJi .tnd Mulb Ch.1knawar
regularly entered Gandab and burned hou<.e~ of the dtsloyal ma/ilu
such con...istent and violent attacks that a Gandab villager bitterly
ted 'the I Iaji Turangzai \\l:lS fighting his entireji/:tm/ again&t Malik
Anmir.'60 The politics of the colonial incentive sy<.tem to the tribe!>
bd Jon~ made it apparent to the mullas tn Mohmand that their
tion was only guaranteed in the absence of Briti~h control in the
rtg10n. \Vith the dramatic increac;e in British allowance:. to clans
Oat had prC\oiou ly been outside the net <tfter 1920, the mullas were
deep~· threatened but unable to rc:.i t. It wa:. nor until the st;\rt of
the nationali t movement in the NWFP after 1930, which will be
discusseJ in chapter 6, that they would rake ,\concerted sr.md against
lbc «nrral government, their antagonism encouraged by nattonalis~
the admini:.tered NWFP.
S7 DC ;.."WFP to CC N\VFP, 14 Feb. 1928, an 'Mohnund Satuation Reports
1921. ~:WFPPA Tribal Rescan.h Cell 37/3 FRP
lhlimui ~1ohmand ma!tJ:.s w DC Pe1 hawar, 20 June 1927 NWFPPA
OCOP fik 212, 1927.
S9 Nott APA Kula Khan,June 1927, ibid.
lntctVicw Ghl.dam Muhammad Dan, Gandab, 13 Aug. 2002.
 138 FRO:-.<TIER Of-' J.'AITII
Containing the i\,fa/,lkmrd states
Swat' politic had been a pivot for regaonal religiou orgarusatt
since the time of the ,\khund ot s\~at. Tha political centnli
was reinfon:cd when the Khan of Dar, 'awab Aurangub Khan
who e fathu h td been bnefh· ousted b\ llmra Khan an 1 -
rnan:hcd on Swat and annexed the northern territories of
Khcl tribe an w.lt in 1908 .~' The young .Mi;mgul w-ere inapm
ot organising opposation to Dar and rurned to mu/las of the Ha&b
i\lulla line- the artor Faqar, along with the Cud ~lulla, ancb.ki
Mull.l .tnd the old J.m Sahab Doda in Dir and BJJaur The
org.mi ed the only cffectave defence agaanst the ~a ab of Du s
int·urllaons and theu succes:.es made them the strongc. t authon
in Swat at the time. Sand,tk.i Mulla received a gift of 20,000 rupees
for has rnalitary nnd diplomatic services from the clans of"'"' 1'2t a
few year~ l.ucr. ~ 1
Opposition to Dir grew, nurtured b) the Sandaki Mulla and
hh favoured t.'nndidate for the throne of Swat, Sa\} 1d J bar
de ccnd.tnt of AkbM Shah. By 1914 Sa}'}id Jabbar <;b.. ' con
hcg.u1 to extend down towards Saidu and the Babuz:aa ar J · thre:um
the .\lianguls' control to the extent that they joined w u the '
of Dir in oppo ition to Sa.nid Jabbar Shah and the SanJaki Mul!2..
With the continued c.fforts of the Sartor Faqir and d then
.unveJ I Iaji Turangz;u, the regaon began to poWisc around the
war -Oir ten ion . The ~ l ulla Chaknawar, the Sabra ~lulb. :\
J n lhd hah ofhlampur, the Gujjar Mulla, Makhrani MUlla, thc,P::
'lthab of Dod.1 and, most important, the ShahZ;Jda ofRdwlkot
wa:. pir of the ""'.twab of Du, JOined in the oppo-irion to the r
and Dir
The Sh.1huda of Rehankot's engagement in the dispute on the
~ide of the S.1ndalo Mull.t m 1915 demonstrated that the pin
fmternif) of the I Iadda Mulla's line overrode loya.lties of p2tro:~u;:~
61. Thi histul) was dik.\1 cd briefly in chapter 2. Set KJu, Tbt SmJ tf:
p.J2.
62. lf'Cos Who, /9/ol,l'Wl'PPD, 17 April1915.
63. Klun, '/'& StoryojSfiXJt, pp. 3~.
64. NWFPPO 1'115~
CQ'\c;O LIDATI~G AUTO:"O~tY 192.1· 1910 139
md property. In desperation :"iawab Aurang-t.cb of Dar em hi
fn-ourlte wife ro dissuade the hahzada from joining Sa} id Jabbar
's faction, then threatened to bum the hou es and umfiscare the
rropertyof'any mul/a, 1haiA:h or tali!/ who acted llhrain t him.65 Yet the
Sluhz.ach maint2lned his allegiance and wem on to \vam members of
me Dir JC\ies to leave the ~a\vab' Cf\ice, or ri k excommunication
from thdr home villages.
B) 1916 the tharu of the mal.l Ute of Khar, Jar, Jandol and
·2W~ were involved in the di pure, with Kh;lr rendering crucial
s:m~c help ro the Nawab of Dir, and the Kh.ms ofJar, Jandol and
3Mgai o;idmg with the Sandaki Mulla 7 In 1917 the rurnour began
spread that Sayyid Abdul Jabbar Shah was secretly a Q.1diyani-a
fuslim sect considered heretic-al by many orthodox group . This
picion led the Sandaki Mulla to gnadgingly denounce S.1yyid Abdul
J3bbar Shah and accept the 1\tianguls' claim to tht wat throne and
their alliance with Dir. An unea y mace wa. rcat.hed, but this peace
ended abruptly when ~Iiangul Shirin Bad hah was murdered at Dar's
'~;.~tic n in 1918 and the Nawab of Dar renewed hi claim to the
Jcfi bank of Swat..s
"'.an<h.lo 1\tulla, together with the younger l\liangul , declared
he would avenge the ruler's death, renewing hi commitment
the Mianguls and his oppo inon to Oar. The wat tri~ led
the andaki .Mulla engaged the Nawab of Oar' forces in open
bonilities and other clans in the region indudmg the Mohmand ,
bmunds and Salarzai and the state of Khar, Jandol and Nawegaj
k up arm:. on behalf of their favoured party. As tension!. pread
:a:nong the communities !'Crved b) the mullas of the I !adda line, I laji
Slhib Turangzai and the young Jan Sahtb Ooda attempted to open
~ between the warring group . Jlaji Turungzai convened a
.Pga between the pro·Dir Sabrlai and M.lmunds .tnd the anti Oir
f hmand factions at the house of rhe Jhbr;t M ulla Sahib to d1scuss
6S ~·WFPPD. 11 Sept 1915.
r-.'\VFPPD. 16 Occ 1915.
&7 ~'\VFPPD, 1915-6.
NWFPPD 13July 1918.
~WFPPD 7 Sept. 1918.
140 FRO:-;TIER Of' f'AITII
a scttlcment.70 In recognition of their role a intcrmediancs and thar
nbiliry to drhe n ettlcmcnt, ~:l\\ab Aurangzcb of Dir mcd to
O\'er the e mullm b) otTcnn~ them allo\\·,mces71 and sent a p ..
mullm loyal to him to tl) ro connnce the B~bra ~fulb to suppr.
him. 71 But the mullus opposed the ~awab' heavy tundedn a! the
c.xpcn c of mallcr dan) and and led laJhi:tm in 2nacks agamst
Nawab' :mny.73
In 1924 the Khan of Khar, supported by the new ruler of Dir
Shnhjahan 1\.han, med to annex the territories of the Khan off'\ 1m
in Bapur. • In ~wat, \l1angul hirin's son and u cessor, l\1
Abdul Wudud, w.ts trymg to consolidate hb p<> ition and began
draw the upper Swat Kohistan tribe , who had previou l) had a tu
amnesty, into his t<LX net. Mulla Sandaki ·tatted a mo\-ement ~
the direct t.txarion of the Painda Khel by the 1\lJanguls. Hi \'Ocifj
denunciation oft he \1iangul's policy led htm robe expelled fromuppa
Sw.u. In Bajaur, I l.1ji Turangzai called for ajih.zdagalnst the Klun
Khar and mobilised a Mohmand lashlwr to help the Khan ofN
rc. pond to Khar\. threatening po rure. Bad~hah Cui led this
w attack .1nd annex the Khar fort in 1926, followin~ "'hich Hi;
Turang-1..ai ecured hi ad\antage by rallying another lashhzrto
boundary demaH.atJon by the Khan of Khar in fa,our of the Klu:!
Nawegai: 6 llajt Sahib Turangza.t declared the Khan of Khat a
or heretic to empha 1 e his oppo irion to the Khan' leadership.-\
hi ho tility to the Khan of Khar'<> ambition wa dearl) not~·-­
or ideological. In the mid~t of rallying lashhm to counter the
70. ~WI PPD. 5Jan. 1918.
71. ~Wl'PPD, 16 Feb. 1918.
72. Th1 JI'Kil compn i of th \lulla Sahib ~larJ..hani, Gul, son of&ha
ofDu 11nd the 1ar Sh:ukh ah1b -..;\VFPPD, 14Jan. 1919
il. In the late ummcr of 1918, the llaji Turangu. J Babra 1
/mhJ,,rllg:un t D.r. In 1920 Babra ~ l ulla, DooaJan 5 , Ha 1T
and P11khli l\ lauh i l"alled for Jihad again~t Khat and Jar 10 h2d era
:lllianle. NWI'PP[) J6-41, 1918; 10 April1920.
74. In 1924, I laJI Turannzai encouraged the Khan of Naw~gaJ to takr
against th Kh:tn otiVlar B \R, 1924-5
75. ~\VFPPD, l'i \ pnl 1925
7h. NWFPPD, 4 july. 2 Sept. 1926.
n. NWfPPD, ,\larch 1916,10~1arch 1917.
C0,50LIDATI:\G AlJTO~O\IY 192)·1930 141
ad\"ances. Haji T uranguj made a conciiJ:uory gc turc tow·.u d him,
min~ he would him~elf "ecure an allowance frorn Kabul fi1r 1\.har if
the Khan ceased to seek support from the Briti h.n
With the increasing complexity of relation between mullas. tates
a:ld tribe~, the alliance:. ari ing lo. t con i tency. The andaki ~Julia
rttre:ued to Dir where he cntcrt;d ir to negotiations v.ith the ~awab
Dir. encouraging him to atta~.k w u .7'1 In hi dTort to force the
awab of Dir's upport tor tht Pamda Khcl of Swat, the Mulla
SmWci willingly arranged a ~ecret meeting between the N.twab of
Dir and the Khan of Khar to try to ~olkir the latter' upporr for
an invasion of wat. 1\Jeanwhile, althou~h the J laji Tur.lllg-1~1i
and Sandaki ~lulla had dedarcd them~clves bitterly ho tile to the
mngul regime, the Mulla Mahmud Akhun1.td.t olicited the help
f ~liangul Abdul Wudud of 5\\,\t ro re~olve intcrn.tl problem~ in
Orak:zai.11 Ten:.ions and conthch between cbns .tnd ~tates aero s
Wakand continued unavoidably over the next lCiltUl)', .tnd along
side the mullas remained deeply inmJ,ed in the flucruaring petty
politics that they engendered 1 he one comr.tnt t:tltor hchind
religious involvement in the :\1alabnd ~r.uc politics wa in the
rual effon:. by mul/as to prevent the O\'er .IClUtnulation of power
by anyone ruler, whether the ~awab of D1r, the Khan ofKhar or the
hangul of Swat. The mullm brought together individu tllv weak and
d:spanrt groups-the Safi, and Kandahari cl.lns .tnd tht. Khans ofjar
and N;megai-who were mdepcndenrl" incapable of takmg on the
m':lb ofDir, his accomplice the Kh.tn of Kh.tr, or the M1anguls, but
ith support and organisation were able to defend thc.1r own interests
and resi t ex-pansionism by the ambitious nalcrs ofi!K"'JI states.
Bad hah Cui I summarised the danger of :.uch .10 .tccumulation
power as it affected the mul/m in a speech to the Charmungis in
Ba'aur, aying 'if the Khan of Kh.u 1-{et!i pos~ess1on of Kmkai [in
The Khan immcdiarely communit'Atetl thi, prn~ls.1lt<> the P \ r.lJb.kand
and rrquC5t~ an incrc.l~e in his allnwmu· from the: Britl'h an order to
nuke htm bctrrr able to counter the: m 1dmus ilctivilic:s of llaj• TurJnguj
m Bapur. 1\'\VFPPD, 17 Nov. 1927.
79 t-.'WFJ>PD. 16 ~1ay 1925.
1\'\VFJ>PD, 21 Au~. 1926.
1\'\\'FJ>PD, 15 Jan. 1927.
142 FRO!':TIER m· 1-·AITII
Bajaur) he will next -.mack Nawe~ and openly espouse the
the government, ruming out the mullar from Bajaur'.fl H1
W2 not mi pla~.:ed. The Political Agem Malakand met secrcth
the Khan ofKhar, the Khan ofJandol and Miangul of wat in 1926
di w their regional po itions. The Political Agent indicated dw
would be wiUing to allocate the Khan ofjandol up to 100,000 rupees
to help him ·c~t<lblish him~elf in Bajaur, to counter the post
the mullas. Curtailing the power of any one ruler presen'Cd the
tribe with fewer resource and hence maintained their patron:tge
the. mullm and the inter-group political space within which the
opcmted and from which they derived a function and authont).
Mulltl MahmudA/.:hzmzado and the Shias o[Oral:.ni
The politit:al ollicc's increasing willingness to intervene in the T
Areas to counter religious influence made the mullas'two ambmo
to prc,ervc regional autonomy and promote their authorin-
es entially conflicting ends. Tremedous social and poluical te
were created by their programmes of omr hi/ ma'ruf-a>nflic
gave the ~.:ommis~ioncr of Peshawar opporturucic to inter.~
rcg10nal affair<;. This ort of,ociaJ tension was created \lihen theM
;'\hhmud Akhun;rAtda, in an effort to assert h1s Sunni Naqshbancfn-n-
f\lupddidiyya ideology and his supporting clans' territorial am'biti~
attacked a competing pin family and its supportin~ clans. The
f•lJ>ids of Oraloai were a Shia famil} claiming descent from
Prophet and the e tablished pm of the Shia chn~ in Orab.ai.
of which were ettled in a tract of land extending from the
of 1\ohat to Kurram In 1923 Mullah Mahmud Akhu~ led a
ll11hkur con J!ltmg of Sunm Orakzai and the men of one Shi2
the ~ lan1 Khel Oralcr••u, to evict the Kab.ya fJ_Y)ids from OrU:zn
Most ot the extended toyyid line moved to Kohat to take refuge
muritb there."'
82. A1 paraphnucd m ~WFPPD, 15 Sept. 1928.
83. NWFPPD. 24 Aprill926.
84. ,\ Jcmo on fighting in Tinh between the Kahya S.n..do and the~
uprortcd by 1\lulla l\lahmud Akhunl;l<h, 6 Aug 1923, in 1W F
Ttrah Onk.7.ai'. OlOC UPS 10/1096.
CO,SOLIDATI:-.iG AUTO!"O~tY 192l·19JO 143
Between 1926-7, 'SOme Sh.a clan led by the Bar t\luhammad
Khel debated methods of bnn mg the sayyids hack into the Tnbal
Am.s. The approval and support of the Dtstrict Commi ioncr
Kohat was sought, and while the latter did not resolve the cri i , he
Crcd :\lulla Mahmud large urn of money to win hi approval of a
mum of the Kalaya rayyich.15 Unable to go ba~k on hi original tand.
lulla :\lahrnud refused. Finally in 1927 the Bar ~luharnmad Khcl,
emboldened by the British promi c of suppon fi>r the Shill Orakai
community and having won the ~l.tni Khcl clan over to their ide,
decided to bring the sayyids back to Orala.ai on their own by housing
a f.tmily of sayyich within each of the1r village .16 Thi move enraged
tull2 :\lahmud who immediately mobili~ed a lashkar ttgain t the Bar
Muhammad Khel." Hts move met with great support from Timh
Afridis and Sunru Orak.zai, who were promi~ed shares of the land of
the Shia!. and he managed to raise an Afridi and Or.tkz~ti lwhkar of
20,000 to punish the Shia dans.tM Tht ttme the conflict was clearly
di\idcd along sectarian line:.. I Jundred) were ktllcd on both ide$ in
tbc fi~hting that ensued and the confrunmtion ended in the evicrion
21mo t all the Shia clans from Or.w.ai.
The conflict was immediately highlighted in the pre a
Orthodoxy's challenge to the herettc ',19 .1nd the mark of 'frontier
bubarism'.90 Public condemnation of the audacity of the frontier
1, both in India and at home, for,ed immediate attention to the
· and strong criticism by the Ch1ef Commissioner in Pec:hawar.
their own defence, the 18 Oralo:u unn1 dan~, MuUa l\lahmud
l!ld other c:upporting mullas tnvolvcd Ill the expedition ~ubmitted
a petition explaining that the eviction of the sayyids of Kala\-·.t was
necessitated by their commis ion of grave crime~ in the area
such as me kidnapping of Sunni women. The petitioner~ went on
say that the absolute depravity of the sayyids was demonstrated
• :\VFPPD, 2 Oc;t. 1926
CC :-.,'\VFP to Foreign Sccn:ury Gnvcrnmc:nt of I ndio~, 10 M.~rch 1927,
ibid.
1\"\VFPPD, 20 Aug. 1927.
Telegram to Foreign department, 28 Aug. 1927, in 'NW 1-mnticr: 'firah
Orah.al'.
Daily Tdq;r~1ph, 4 Apnl 1929,
~ronucr barbansm, Sh 2 :\1u hma' woes', l!lf.tlurtan 'limtJ, 2 Sept. 1927.
 144 fRO:\ IIER m· FAITIJ
hy their 'exces e again t their own personal disciplcs."'fl But the
commi ioner N\VFP and di trict commt sioner in Koh2t tw:l
p:uien e for their explanation that it wa a matter of intenul
rnor.~l concern and not n pohu~al i' ue. The) san tioned supply
arms and ammunition to th C,hta dan~ to aid their retaliation
~lulh ~l.thrnud and the ~unm Orakzai.91
1\ lull a~ lahrnud looked to hi' tr.Aditional alliance with Afi hanistrJ
and other mullas of the region for support but the threat o direct
Briti h inrcrvention .1 a result of :\1uUa \lahrnud's actions dici
rrong condemnation from these: quarter~, The Co\cmor of)~
and Arnir 1\rn,llluiiJh cnt him letters w-arning him that ifhe did
;11low the <51ll.ts to rc:.cttle, the British government mi ht gamsoo
<lnd toruhl) reset ric the Orakz.ti trnct. 'This would be a great
both Multa MahrnuJ and the King' it wa~ mted. 9l llaji.TW'llll6
an u~cd Mul1,1 l\1.1hmud of wantonly and 'unjustifiabl) • atta king
co·rcligl()ni!tl . I lc .tdded that the action had cau ed 'gta\'C ofTener
in Afghani~t.111'. 94 This pres~ure and criticism from horh the
gliVcrnrnent .md the I laji Turnng-L.<ti demonstrated that M
\1 thmud's effort:. to secure regional predominance were themseh-ts
d(.grading the condition on which the Tribal Areas auronom\
maintained.
By June 1929, after two year:. of intermittent f ghting. the
clan h.td manageti to t.tke back some land. The Cl1dCoouru
1\:\VFP uggcsted that thi~ was an opportune Moncnt to suppon the
Shia position, and the colonial government hould publid) comm:t
support of the Sh1a dan-.. granting them allowance ro rai~ IC\'tCS
e tabli h po t 111 ':>h1.1 Oralv..ti along the lines of the Afridi IJJ(.rmt:u:r.
) tern.'IS Thi J.nnouncernent \\a!> met with great concern b) M
f'. bhmud .tnd otn Afridi and Orakzai jirga w;h convened in PeShnl
91, Orala.•u's Pctltaon, 10 July 1927. in '''\V Frontier: Tirah Onkni
92 '""· hv P,\ Kh~-bcr on Memorandum on the Afrida Smanon bv CC
'\VII~ 19 Juh ·1930, in 'Road~ m Kh.lJUri and Afnds unrest, ]~.Ji},·
OIOC I P~ 12J3131.
91. ~\\'1 PPD 10 De~. 1927.
94, MVJ'PPD, 4 l'eb. 1928.
95. Sec eornpsled corrcspondcn~ between DC. k.olut, CC ~\VF'Pand ~
Dcpartmcm, 1929, in ';'1:\V Frontier: Tir•h Orakui'.
CO...,SOLIO\TI~C ,\ijTO:o-;o~n 1923- 1930 145
1929. The jirga agreed that land held before 11.)27 \\Ollld he
rcrumed to the Shias, and thejirga would commit it elf to proted
rhc Shi2 clans on the condition that the B ti h did not estahli h levy
or ~t .,pecial allowance to th C,h11 Or.tkzai, and \multi take
arms and :lll'munition i ued and l.ln~d Jhassatlari ppointrnent
lmdt among rhe Shias.
We, the Afridi :and Sunni On.kz:ai, h:a\t heard the Government term ...
On the basis of thes.. terms we mlkc peace with the other party ( hia
itrah). M:ahmud Akhunuda, who remained joinal "ith u • 2lso accept
this settlement. The h1a~ wiU be re torcd to their land !rom where the)
tlitre turned out md thev wall be rc~torcd 10 the me pmition :h (they
OCCUp!Cd] before '\u~ht 1927 • [Finally) we reque 1 )OUr honour th.tt
as soon as the Sh1as are rc~otored to the land , [the) government should
\ithdro~w sb troop~ and con~otabul.tl) within the ndrnini tr.uave hordc:r
and d ~ Stua!>, as before, like other Tirah tribes rna) be (on,idercd
indqxndent -r
1\lulla Mahmud had as,erted the :-.uperiority of his own religious
' tion over that of the Kalaya sayyids, channelling inter-tribal
competition and territorial ambttion into a war over doctrine. But
once the Britio;h became in\'olved this became a milit.uily indefen~ible
project and had the effect of ultimately trcngthening and reinfordng
the hia clan . Arms, ammunition .md allowanc' continued to be
td to the Shia Orakzai clans and cventuallv Orakzai \V.ls made
the ep...rate tribal agency of Tirah, conflrmmg the territorial
boldings and regional pre~encc of the Sh1.t tribes.
Communities and their mullm organised along tribal tines
rhrough the 1920 as they were mutually lm:ked within the regional-
ethnographic paradigm of the Tribal Are.ts. Agendas were popularised
and lcshkars rallied through prgm, and mobilisottlons seemingly
elm-en by ideological concern., were Hrmly oriented by trib.tl politics
'rrilnl Di putc in Tirah', 29 June 1929, linus (London), 1bid.
9i Mull:a ~bhmud\ equal ~ay 1n the final ~rttlcmcm• w.l\ dcrnorl\lratcd an the
JUln in Peshawar, :arwhach the Sunna OrJkz.u rcfu~d tncomnut them elves
to the agreement bctorc ,pc.tlung darc~tlv to the J\lulla, .md e~tJbla•hcd h1~
z::thonty o cr the moAner in the text of the cmnmiuncnt 5igned hy tht <>unm
Africfis 2nd Onla..:ai Sec 'Tr:an~latrnn of Sl!(lled ~tatcrncnt ttl the Chief
Commi ncr '1.'\VFP, 29 ~br~h 1930',m N\V l'mnticr: 'Iirah Oralvas'.
146 FRO;>.;Tn'R 01-' f..AITJI
and me regional balance of power. The OJXrations of the pirimrmJi
network of the Akhund GhaiTur-Hadda Mulla line were con\"olutai
by the complexity ofintcrn.U alliance y tern and enmiu~. but mn
still evidently in effect as mullas communic-.ued 'vith each cthc:
to critid<:e or afl1rm one anomer's action :.ind maintain a unified
stance. But along-.ide the recent history of the retreat of aam
Mghan 10voh-ement 10 the region and Briri h effons to politiallv
sideline mullas over the \Votziristan garri onll, the Khyber railway, the
Mohmand alJowanc;e and ~ lalakand politi • the case of OrakzzJ
and Mulla M.lhmud' complete defeat illuminated the serious ~
to religious authority. The new British political forward policy
intended to actively counter me autonomy of religious leaders in me
region, threatening the status, freedom and efTectivene~ of mu!ln
negotiators, milit<U')' commanders, moral dictators or proponents
a political agenda But, although this British policy was rclendc:ssrr
pursued, it did not have the effect of permanently erodinz the
position of the Tribal Areas mullas. The nationali t movement~
in the admini tcred di)tricts of the NWFP and politiClll parties in the
administered districb loudly decried Briti h treatment of the 1rtc
tribes' while offering mullas 10 the Tribal Areas their moral suppr..
and transitions towards mdependence opened up new po'~ibilines fur
the engagement of religious leadership of meTribal Areas.
6
COr FRONT! G THE NATIO T
1930-1950
The centre:. of Muslim political thought, Delhi, Lahore and
5maranpur, had been at a great distance when the movement of
c:hc Jamaat-i Mujahidin began in 1915 and the mujahidin were the
pnmary articulators of its principles in the Tribal Areas. But .u
political activity gained momentum in the North-We .t Frontier
~· administered districts, the influence of lnd1an Mu lim
political di~course o n the Tribal Areas was redoubled a activi t in
Peshawar, Hazara, Bannu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan began to
k to engage the Tribal Areas and ib communi tie~> 10 their politics
the lnsis of a shared agenda of anti-colonialism. I lowcver they
appttlcd to the tribes as accomplices not as equal participants in an
ganisational arena which was confined in principle to the arena of
pmicipatory legislative politics.
Mminisln-ed districts politics and the Afridi
:abilisation of1930
lbejamiyarul Ulama-yi Hind QUI I) organisation of the Deobandis
a pohrical lobby group that sought to popularise key issues
l::lOng the Muslims of India in order to preserve the authonty of
the 'ulama over them. 1 The Jamiyatul Ulama-yi Sarhad 01JS), the
NWFP provincial wing of thi organisation, was established in
l 1be fmr of rhe.e i sues taken ur in the NWFP was the mobili7.ation a~nst
the Suda Act-centnl government legJ lature o;etting a minimum age for
~hich encroached on the authority of the 'ulaf1141 to manage
cnditJOna.l bw. T ran btion of article 'A judgement of the MajliJ·i /,1/xJ.ffuz-
' I'UZ1mll-r 1hariyal, A/ja"'ral (Ocoband), Nov. 1929, in 'Harul again t the
·daAcr'. :'I.'WFPPA DCOP, fale 288.
148 f'RO:'\TIF.R OF ~~\ITII
1927. The party of the Khuda1 Kh1dmatgars, Pakhrun nanomlis:J
deeply intlucnccJ b) Gandhi's theol) of peaceful non-coopcra
and led by Kll.ln Abdul Chaffar Khan, w;a establi hed as the
"1WFP bram.h of the All lndi.t NatJonal Congrc in 1930. Both
the JUS and tht l\.huda1 Kh1dmatgar pohu' were onl) rel!:' •
withm the pr<)\ 111Cill border,, as they were primarily concerned
with provincial legi lative and electoral i ue that did not apply
in the non·enfranchi ed Tribal Area' But the mall size o the
arena of puhlk pnlitk-al a~o.tivity in the ;\ WFP united punes
individual , even tho c: with radic.UI} dlltm.nt poluical \iews
me thoJ .
Gh.ttl:tr Khan h.~t.l collaborated with I Iaji Turangzai to ~
Azad Isl.utll.t mmbrwu .1~ alternatives to Briti~h mi ionan sdtoots
m Utmanz.u, B.umu and Kohat before the 1 bji mO\"Cd ro the
. mllitancy'.6 Although he a cribcd more gl.tmour to the wndition of
Tribal Areas in 1914. Ghaffiu Khan had :tho pa.rtidpated d
the early years of Maulana Mahmudul I la an' tthrik. ~
and living tc>r a tunc:. With the Babra Alu/111 anJ tiling boil ai me
hand of llaji Turangzai. J lowever he di agreed with the T
Areas mull.u' militilnc.:v and their charismatic :~uthorin and distanced
him.,clf from their .'nethod . Conneaions bcMe;n the Khud;:
Kh1dmatg.u .md the Trib.U Areas were maintained throudt the
1920s br the Khllatat Committees -organi ation set up in Eh:
'\J\VfP administered dbtricb in 1919 20 in aid of the khilaf.:t
then the hijmt movements, and whtch remained in c:cistencc in a
stare of \'irtual autonomy after the decline of the khilafat 010\'mlttl
in 1920.3 .Member of the committees maintained connections
the Jamaat-i 1\ lujahidin and Tribal Area:. mullas through the 1
while also maintaining tic to the national headquarta of the AINC
2. Kh:~n Alxful Ghalf.ar Klun, \lm ZmJ<~gi Jlur jadtltJjtW(Lahixe.
pp. 1-100.
3. )..Jcmbcrs of the C<lmmmc:(.. mamtame..l l<lOSe ideolog.al ocs
\11 Jndi:~ Nauonal Cc-ngrt:l \ ( \lZ'JC], and 50mctima alling ~
'Con 'ftsS wn11nittl"C$, but ll<llOK 1.1. the} (hmt Without act'OWlt2hilitv
\1\;C. 1'hl"$C cornmlltces had organised Large rallies in Haura and
and called for tcs1gnaunn !rom militan pmt J
and lilr a bci)~'OU of Bnush good. Haz: ·
1920', OIOC UP!-ill0/92'1; and Qln-.~. P.r11 I
195-200.
CO:-:FRO:'\Tir\G I m: ~ATIO:'\ 1930· 11150 149
md the pro\incial Khuda1 1\.~ •Jmatp;ars.• When JUS wa e tabli he< I,
drew on the extson . Khtlal t Committees lor it'> membcrsh•p and
bdership leading the org.m• ltlon to also inherit the ~onncnion
bcrwecn N\VFP khilafot activists, the AI~C and the TribaiJ\n.w.t .s
Both the Khudai Khidmatgar; and the JU were fow cd on
xhie\ing pruvinaal lcvd participation in govcrnm'-nt, nppwa hing
their org:mi ational goah in the 1\'\VFP from \\ithin the confines
the political geography of colonial India. For GhatTar Khan, the
p:ilitical con_<.truct w·as circum ribed at the admini trntivc border
because the tribes \\Cre not "apahlc of partidpation a thC) had
no intere't in economics, indu try, agriculture ur eduC"ation' and
trtre immersed 'in cu tom .md rintal and occupied in the realm of
lhe free tribes, the first pre idcnt of the JU also cmph.1 i ed the
Deed to keep the tribe "cpar.He from the adminbtcrcd l"Wl• J> in
ordtr d1at the latter be able to progrc at their own pace in pe.tce and
security: The J1j 's first goal wa to C:rl-ate a legislathc council and
demand native representation in provinci.tl go\·ernment on the arne
lints as other prO\'lnce in India.
Neither theJU nor the Khuda1 l-..h1dmatgm conceived .tmethod
that could incorporate the region th.tt wa~ outside governed India,
so they excluded its population from their organisation. But links
between the mul/a.r, the Khudai Khidmatgars and JUS <tllowed
a politiCll affiliation benvcen the two regions to emerge. Political
concerns were being wJdely broadcast imo the Tribal Areas from the
admini rcred districts through the Kh1lafat Committees. A y.roup
old J:hilufot acti\ists with connectiOn) to the AINC and the JUS,
allin~ it elf the Peshawar Congrt .. Committee:, was distributing
pllllphlet in Wa.ZJri ran .tnd ~ lohmand condemning the Sarda
Aa of 1927 and calling for tribal action against the govcrnmcnt.8
4 !PD. May 1925.
S Youth nd Student Movcnwnt,, Darul Ulum Dcohancl, 1921-1937'.
1'-.'\VFPPA pcci.U Brandl "'WFP
Gluffar 1\.han, \1m ZmJ.1 t, p. I 59.
buM Anwar Shah, Khutha, p. W.
Memorandum on unrcs1 an \Vujn tan, CC NWFP, ll t.la~· I'JJO, an
1'rib21 Dtsrurbanccs 1930-31: Pc:5hawar and di trkt ituatn;n·. OIOC
LIPS/1213125.
150 FRO~ riF.R OF FAITII
An infilrmer daimed that the 'Khilafat and Congrcs Commmec:s
Bannu' were a tively tC)ing to mobili e the ~lahsud and were
l<X-.&1 m111/as to organi ejirgai to discu the altion ofthegmunma::!
with the tribes.' The c connection -;bowed their potential in 1
"hen imulranoou cri~ a\.ro :. the Tribal Areas and P...,.,,....,..,..
brought the trihe , led by the mullai, and the 1'1:\VFP political parncs
into acrivc upport of one another.
It had been decided some years earlier that a.llow'llnces patd m the
Khyber to Sunni dam were not to be mcreascd to conciliate those
oflcndcd .lt coloni;tl patronage of the Sh1a dan ., irrespecth'C of...
Afridi pre ure and growing discontent Moreover, allowances
one cl.m, the Adam Khcl Mridis, were stopped altQRCther.• The
discontent .It the cap on aUo"vances was e.'<acerbated \\hen it beame
app;lrcnt th;Lt the government was not going to di arm the
Orakni .md had granted new allowances to the~e clan' and appointed
a Pohtical Agent to ovel"ec their management. Conrurrcnd) "W tb
this, a member uf the Malikdin Khel Mridi tribe, Khu hal
decided ro orvani e a contingent along the Lines that GtWfar
org•tni~cd hh Khudat Khidmatgars in the admini tered da trias. He
de ribcd h• ge ture a one of support to the Khudai Khidmatgm
the aJmini tered di triers, in the hopes that the alliance would
both ide!S liberation:
Our peace cannot bC' made separate from that of lnd1a for the
tight took pla.. c Olicr the rdi¢on of the Muslims and Hindus oflnd:1.
2nyone could bring about our pace m that no tyranny "ill be nude 01e
the rd1gion 11nd lnd~a, and if there be uJm then JOU should be - eel ayyid Kabir, the son and mundofthe nowdccea!,ed Mull.t Sayyid
that there wtll be no rca~e ...The J:hilaj'jt part) is read) for the
rhe) arc: waiting for a~ turc &om your ~ide. 11
500 Afridi attended a jirga wearing red sa. he and the Poli
Ag~nr reported that Khushal's men had been o~erved ~
9 , lbad,
10. Forcagn and Poliu~.-al Dcpartmc:nt to Government oflndU, 19 A
and Report of Mugtw Bu Khan, APO Khl--bcr, 13 July 1930. in'
Khajun and Alnda unrc .t 193Q-31' OIOC LiP 1l 3131.
II. Khu hal Khan ~bhkdm Khel Mridi to Congre Comnutttt
2'J Jul} 1930, in 'Corwe AcmitiQ in Tran -border areas of 1:'1.'\\'FP'
1'\VI'PP,\, Tribal Rcscan.:.h CcU
CO;>.:FRO:"TING rm: NATIOS lYl0- 1950 151
md CUI}ing out drills in the Mohmand area .u Report l"llrne of
250 new recruits to Khushal Khan's contingent from the Shinwari
reas north-west of Mohmand. 13 In MohmanJ I lnji Turangzai,
lulla Sahib Babra, ~tulia Chaknawar and the Faqir of Alingar who
wtrC 'till furious about thelr marginaliS;~tion over the allow':ln e issue
independently been in touch with th Peshawnr Congre Pilrt)
duough the person of Abdur R.auf, a '-:ow hera based memher ofthe
}lmiyaruJ Ularna-yi Sarhad with Khuda.a Kh1dmatgar connections.
Abdul Rauf warned the Haji of the terribk 1mplkation of the Sarda
larion. 14
In early 1930, several people were killed 10 o~n incident of police
firing on a peacefuJ demonstration 10 <lt~s•l Khwani ba1Aar in
Peshawar. Dozens of Congress nnd JUS activists were being arre~red
b peaceful non-cooperation.• As ~cntimcnt!, began to run high,
cembers of the JUS and the Peshawar Congre ·s Committee .t~ked
die H.1ji to mobilise the tribes with the guar.1nree of a strong re ponc;e
a:Jd support from the administered distrkt:. if he chose this time to
lead an attack on the administered district Y• Two B.mnu-b;t ed
acavists, Abdul Jalil and Fazal ~d1r, connected to the l.hi/,!fot und
jUS groups an Peshawar, were trytng to mobilise support for the same
agenda in \Vaziristan. 17 They heldjirga$ to thi end in some villagtli
Nonh-Wazirisran. Much of the sympathy they received wa rooted
tribal concerns over the British project and allowance distribution
lbcre.u
On 12 May 1930 a IDihknrofSOO Afridi men, led by ~ayYid Alrnar
ll 1\VFPIBD, 30 April 1931,9 July 1931.
1l r-.WFPIBD, 9 July 1931.
U MPD, 26 April 1930; 'Li&t of Leading Mullas on the NWFP, 1937',
r-.WFPPA DCOP, 1439/51.
15 Jamiyatul Uhma Afghan, DJ Su,.J yi Sorhod D,1 Ul.lmn ·o Qurhani
lPc:shawa.r, 1931).
16. MPD, 3 May 1930.
17. Me < C H. Gidney DC Bannu to Secreury CC N\VFP 30 Aug 1930, tn
'W r tan Afghan, Soviet and Congrc Activities, 1930·1932'. OlOC
LIP$J12/3122.
.MnlJvi Muhanlmad Guldin ro ~adir Khan King Afghlnimn, 26 July
1930, 1bid.
152 ~RO:-.;Tti::R 01' FAt nt
Akhar, upported hy Khu~haJ Khan' anny. advanced to the
plain.•• The lashkar grew w 4,000 men as it advanced towards Bm
on the border between the Tribal Areas and administered dis
south·wcst o.- Pc. hav.··.u. 20 A soon a the full forces \\tte thtrcd a
Bara, the CC "\ \\ I'P authori~cd the di~pcr-:ion of the lashh:r
aerial h<~mlang. The pi tne followed the retreating arm) for put
the W.l)' hack into the Khajuri plain ofTirah, dropping bombs dx
reconnoitring group , and managed to disperse the /ashh:rcntirdv: A
wt.tl uf 604 Afridi ca ualtie~ were reported in the air trikes.22
1\lc.tnwhik the Mnhmand mullar had independently organistd a
sm,tlllmhkm of ~.tlis and some Mohmands from the Afghan side
the border .1nd st.ICtcd m.trching toward:~ habqadar. In pin:d iw
lhnnu based .u:tJvisb, Mulla Shah Badan and ~Jaulvi l\luhamrn24
Guldm of North W:mrist;ln m;tnaged to motivate a few di nteeted
tribesmen an \V;mnstan and collected a lashk11r of 100 \\'azirs. Tbr
DC Pc~hawotr took preemptive measures again t the Mohnunds
l.tlled lor .tcri;ll .macks tO disper-;e the :\lohmand mullas before lhev
rn.tnJgcd w consolidate their 111Shkar.14 Close w·.ltch ·was kept o
Waliri ran mul/as and warnings were is ued to their host tribes bv
Re itlcnt Wa:tiri~tan .:rs
Be~au e of the immediate and forceful action by the polttial
upported by tl1t Rmal Air Force, the lashkars aero 'the TrilW Ait2s
were di pcrsed I lowc\er rather than easing the -iruation, t
began to escalate. On June 26 it wa reported that the
Khcl had fclunded a Khilafat Committee of their own, haded
1\.lulla Cui Bad h th Kambar Khel. The committee c-1isted 200
from ~lalikdin Khcl and Kambar Khel and the k.h cr
19, \',cerci\ to S«rcaarv of Smc for India, 13 \lav <~l'ld 1- \In 19 ,
d•nurban~cs Afnd; Country 193Q-3J'. OIOC LIP" l2'3J31.
20. Afritli Rcpon, 3 June 1930, ibid.
21. llutl.
22. Nut~ on \fridi im·;..,•on of Peshawar D•smct. ~WFPPA
:-.1\-\ FP 706144
l.l. ~lc·mo Cl. '\WFP, 13 .\lay 1930, 7ribal D..-rurinnca 1930-1
lJP!'i/12/J 125
24. \'it'croy I lome Dept to Sc-. of St2tc for Indw. 1~ ~11) 1930. 7
1), 01rb.Anu. MohmanJ, 193Q-3l' OIOC I..:PS 12 3116
25. GiJnc} to Cl. NWFP, 30 Aug. 1930
CO!'FROi'TI:-;G II IE :\ ,\TIO!'\ 19.30· 1!ISO 153
t a call for a new l.nhkar to rall). The khilafot part arrhed at a
.. of tnllliks 2nd government ami tried to di pcrse at to prc\'Cnt
a scnlcment.26 The Khibfat Committee lashli:ar grew to 1,600 men
both Afridi clans and unni dan in Orak7:ai.17 The Kh)bcr
m Tlt2h mullas rumed to the ~lalakand and \Vaziri tan mul/01 for
amstancc, pointing to the terrible violence uf tht Briti h bombing
me Khajuri plains. Haji Turang-L.:li, Mulla CJ aknawar. raqir of
I and :\lulla Sabra immediately tarted rallying upport for the
Afiidi mobilio;acion, publici-.ing it a J two pronged efl~>rt, both in
rmliation against the bombing of the 1\.hJ)\Iri plain and the violation
me Tribal Areas, and as a gc:.rurc of a~si~t.tncc tn the people of
Peshawar.l!
In late June the Mohmand mullas independently led .l lmhkar
down to the Shabqadar border. ' Abdul J.tlil 01nd Fazal ~tlir led an
m:promptu attack with their \Vazir triiDJl retinue on a polile st,uion
Bannu 2nd then retreated to thctr host tribe whc.rc they raised
a /ashlar of 300 men. In South Wazaristan, the. Shc.w.t .l\luiiJ
and the Bad~hah Khan Shakiwal organ1~cd well armed Wazirs
rttuming from supporting the victoriou~ "blar Sh 1h to his throne
Mghanistan. They succeeded in raJlymg lmhkan of 1,400 men
ttd set out for Bannu, VJ<l Kurram. 1 In North \V.tziri tan, l\hulvi
Guldin continued to rally the Wazar, M.th~ud .tnd Bhutant dan~
ltound him. An Mridi lashkilr almo. t twice the '"c of the May
UsHer and thus numbering about 7,000 men, began to gather in
Klujuri and to march on Peshawar. Thas time the leader emphasised
solidaritv with Muslim India but outlined a more particular obje<.Live:
the dcs~ction of the government's capacity to .lttal·k hy air. A
~ent informer returned from Bagh where he had attended a
7 pga of A.fridi:. discussing the proposed mobilisation and reported:
26. Afndi Reporu, 26-28 June 1930 in •Tribal dt turb.tnces Afridi country'.
l1 Mridi Repon~. 28-30 June 1930, 1bid.
Mohmand S.ruanon Rcpon , June 1930, 1n Tribal dtsrurb.tnccs in
Mahhnd t93Q-31' OlOC, UPS/1213124.
'B Ibid.
Gidney to CC 1\'WFP 30 Au~ 1930.
Assillant PA Wazin u.n to R.umak, 15 Aug. 19JO, 111 'Ot11cc: of the
Resident Waziri tan' ~DC 618.
 154 FRO:-;Tn:R OF 1-"t\ITII
The leaders of the Congrc:s in the jirxa .•.ga\'C kcnues m "iUch
said that the Go\·cmmem had passed a law that C\"tl) \\'OOWl
her marriage wo tl J b examined by doctors and also tlut any IIWl
tudicd the Qutn Shtnfin mosques or ga\c a calJ to pr2ya
to pa} a tax of 40 I'IJ1""' a )cat. The) added that gO\"tmiDC:Ilt tud
many small children in lndta. Tht irga decided that the Afridi
houltl mack Pemawar and the Orakzai /ashhrr hould atadt K
order to desrroy the Kohat a.irb ~ and a.arc:rafu.»
At first rhe army attempted to check the progr of tht
lmhkar by 'hclling, but had little success. The lmhhzr brought
telegraph poles and r;tided some villages tn rou/t to the admini.sttrcd
districts. Finally atr strikes were called in again, whi h on e
dispersed the /mhknr.'' The Mohmand lashkar in .Malabnd nude
less progress, .md was dispersed just as qutckly through air trikes.
and the Wazirist;tn contingent appeared to have dispersed befort
re;tched the border or could threaten it.~ Yet in both .Mohmand
Wa1irist;1n the mullni continued to take advantage of high emonocs
over recent events and direct minor attacks on Briti h posts
intere:.ts until the end of the year. ~
The Afridi:. involved in the mobilisation decided the tcnm of
settlement to be presented to the Political Agent would indDde
demand for the cancellation of the Sarda Acr. the rdeasc of
political pri oners in the NWFP; and a renegotiation of the Afiidj-
govemment compact. Of co~e the BntJc;h authorities were DOt
inclined to negotiate at all and by December plans \\'Crc in phtt
32. ratancnt by Muhammad Azam Khan son of Khan &hadur \
Muhammad Khan of Hangu, 23 PC!,hawu, 23 Aug. 1930. m 7
da turb~n cs in Afridi counuy, 1930-31'.
33. "Rc:v~ew of event , Afrid1 anaclt on PC!-hawar", Pi11nrrr (London) 2S
1930, 1huJ.
34. Foreign 01nd Political Department to Government of IPd.- 19 A _1
in 'Roo~d•10 Khajuri and Afrid.i unrest 1930-31' OIOC l..PS/12/Jbl
35. An ana k •n•tiated bv Mauhi Abdul )alii's supportcn n Wazirtstm
of parucular IJ(Tllfiu~cc as a aptain of the Indian army was killed m
confrontation Sce rc:porr of the incident with the Ho~thi IJtrl -.
Aug. 1930', 10 ·wu ristan:l L\1G"s Tribal Pol.iC} '. OIOC UPS.l2J31Sl
36. R~rt on rc:"c:nt Afridi;i'&a 10 Ma~dan, 16 Aug. 1930.. ;\'WFPPA
Branch tile 707/44.
CO~FRO~TI:-.:G TJH: ~AI"IO:-; 1930· 1950 155
the permanent occupation of the. Kh.aJuri plain.~ 7 The uibes were
no po-ition to ~ic;t a "ettlemc:nt f,JH!n internal di en ion, the
l2C losse o;ustained in the campaign and the apparent 'betrayal' by
the Congress Party when there wa no mobili :ltion in Pe hawar in
s;;ppon of the Tribal Areas adva.n\:e. The Pt>litka.l Agent Khyber
~Jj bed allowances to clan on trict contlitaon of peace, and
the guuantee that the original tribal 'r-.lbblt:·rousers', particularly
Khushal Khan. would be marginali1ed. During the garrisoning of
the Khajuri plains there was a re Cl>tablbhment of reran of relation
~"ttn the go'"-ernment and the Afridis :A.nd aUow.mce were re urncd
a!though under the threat of repeated military a~·tion if the Afridi!>
should mobilise again)."
The 1930 mobilisations marked the I.trgest regional movement
smct the Anglo-Mghan war of 1919. As with any Tribal Areas
mobili arion against the Briti h the chanw; of a decisive 'ucce;ss
;ere virtually nonexistent, but the o;c.Ue of the confront.ttion and
the sale of the British response required had demon tratcd the real
dmgtr a concerted organised eflort aero s the tribal region could
pose to the administered dis met . The~e e\"ents had injected a greater
a-edibility into the threat posed by the mu/lm bccau!".e it appe.ucd that
the ttntre of 'di~concent' was no longer the independent territories
or Afghanistan-rather it seemed the in~piration for mobiJi,ation
cauld come from within India by the activirie of the:. Congress Party
asmtcd by an unscrupulous campaign of lies <tnd cxagger.uion to
C%lite rdig1ous fanaticism.'l' Hence it was decided that uny sort of
mobilisation, whether overtly militaristic or a meeting to discuss
opposition; whether directed at the British or at 'otssurcd' duns, would
be treated as an offensive movement and dealt with tn the severest
lll2nner.40
l7 Foreign and Political Department to Government of lmli.a, 12 Dec. 1930,
m'I"riba.l o, turb2nces Afridi 193Q-31'.
R. R. Maconachic, 'Afghana tan, Annual Repon. 1930', 7 Jan. 1931. OlOC
IJPSJJ8/A 213.
l BAR 1930-l.
AJri4i 'F'~'" b paitha"' ohl ; 1/md lily"""'· I'WI I)PA Spc:mJ Br.mch file
710144
156 I'RO~ fii:·:R OF fA I Ttl
Afridi rc cntrncnt of the go,cmmem mea.-ure persi ted and
cl.tn ought new allic: in the admini~rered di trier to support
()(, ition. In 1936 ~lohammcd Ali Jinnah, prc~idcnt of the All I
~Iu lim Lcal,'1.1C party ,.,.hkh ~ought to unite. tht ~lu lim o I
1 a inglc political group. tra\'clled to tht ,,.,rth-West FCOC':lCI'
Pmvin~:c. lie \\,t ghen p<:rmi-.sion to travel to L ndt Kotal " here a
dcptlt tion of Afridi m.1/iks met him to dt'>~:u~ the Br t · tX--c\1
of Kh:lJUri in the aftc:nnath uf~1ulla ~lahmud'!> anti fllO\
tn Orakz1i .uul the Afridi rnobili,atton to the bord . . Pcsluwn
rq~.~rdtn~ inac;htngly v1olent colonial mea~urc in the region. Th
is:;uc W.l\ taken up h} Jinnah, who agreed to 'upport the dlllm to
demiliraris.uion of the Khajuri phtins on the premi~e that the T
Are.1~ was .1 culrurall}, org-antsarionally and geographicall) sqma::
~pale.l' Jinn;th's vi~it marked the appropri.aion of the case of
Trib;tl Arc;ts Pakhtuns by the Muslim League from the Co
Party, as an tssue primarily relating to the ~luslim!'t oflndu. At
annual scs!!ion of the Muc;lim League in 1938, a re olution \\"25
condemning the 'forced subjugation of the independent tnb21 bel:
1l1ls cssion of the All lnd1a ~luslim Lc:tgue is firml) of the
thJt the time now has come tor the Briti'h go\'c:mment to rc:ooos:di::
it Frontier Policy ...ba~c:d on the unh-c:l'illy re...~iscd principle
elf determination. It funhcr condemn the: polk) and actmncs
Congrrs in the ~"WFP b) which they ha\1: ~1\'en indiauons dw
tnbal arc:as should become pan of adm~tercd territol) .~
League upport grew ~Jowly in the Tribal Areas. supported
a growing unti- l i indu ~entiment. At Chamar~nd, Mulwnmld
Ba hir had given the Tribal Areas the name 'Ahrarisu.n', decbr:in6
olldaril) with the ambitions of a group called the Ahrars pro
Sunni onhodoxy through lndia.• 1 Another pro-~luslim
group, the Khak.,ars, were reported to have <.ent their rtprcsent2tl\"CS
to meet with the tribes through old Khilafat Committee members
inform them of the threat llindu nationalism po'ed to the l\1
41. Shah, !;thnitity, /ria"' and Nlllto,alism, p. 9
42. Res<>luMn XJJJ, All India ~tu~tim League 26th Patn2. Ike. 1
)1\,
In Shantuddm PtrrJJo~, f(;,.,/,uionsofP.U:ist<l" 1\ hi.l9i0
43. ,1/Mujahid, 25 April1933.
CO:-\FRO:"TI"'C Tm: :" \TIO:" 1'130 1950 157
lnda.~ In Tirah Khuo;haaJ Khan ~b.likdin Khel, who had comt•
prominence during the Afridi mobiliS<~tion of 1930 a taunch
:mss Patty :.upporter, wrote a letter C.'<pressing hi disappointment
the Congr~~ and hi.; ympathy for the Khaksar and Ahrars,
propounding the unitkation of the i\lu lim nation nf India
against Hindu 'inju.,tice~'. 45 In .Mohmand the ~lulla of Spinwarn
begm to peak out again:.t the Congrt.'S gO\crnrncnt ar Pc hawar.~
Bld bah Gul I, who had hitherto been reported a rccciving shukrana
Ghaffar Khan, called ajirg11 informing ~lohm.tnd tribe th.u
Gtuffar Khan's daughter had married a llindu and th.tt .til support
dlould be denied him. lie further warned of the thrc.u of .1 po ihle
H:ndu raj over India, which would he far worse th.m the current
Bnti hone."' By 1942 the governor NWI P noted that deeply ;tnti-
Con~ess entiments began to dominate 1n tht Trihal Area) flunk.,
the mullas of the region:'
ceking l»Upport for their loc:.tl concerns of tribal hal.mce .tnd the
tribution of privileges in the autonom<>u' zone, the rrihe:. sought
t:lJCS within the emerging sphere of pruvincial lc:gisl.uivc politics.
nderlaid by a mutual recogmtton of tribal ,1nd administered
trict scparatene.,s, Congre s, JUS and evcntu.&l l\ lu lim League
l!4mCts with the Tribal Areas insptred by the cri:.h 111 tht KhaJuri
phin brought the region 1nto the high drama of cornmurul and
rtprestntative politics which would some years huer lead to the
creation of nvo separate independent qatc:. of India .tnd P.tkhtan.
Anddcsrite the long-standing, if tangential, Tribal Areas connection
the AJNC, the crisis brought the mullm and the tnbcs m touch
hMu lim nationalism as it wa~ bcin~ rcprc~cntcd bv the Muslnn
league and Jinnah.
~ 'KlW:su Acth1nes At,a·:unst Arva S:uyagarha in 'J'nh.tl Territory', Mdnp
Lahore) 6 ~1:tv 1939.
Khushul Kha~ Malikdm KJ1tl ofTimh to BJtld1ah S.th1h and Arb.tb Kh~n
Kluknrs 1940 (?),in 'Khabar l\lovcmcnt in Trih.1l J'trriwn' NWFPPA,
SpecW Branch.
MPD, 30 ~tay 1939.
47 MPD, 12 .\lay 1942.
Gto:ge Cunningham, note 5 ~lay 1942, 1n 'Prnp:agantl;~ through mullahs',
OIOC. 'Cunnin~ham Paper '.
 158 FRO;-.oTJHR OF Fo\1111 CO~FRO~TI~G TilE ~ \TJO:-.; 1930 1950 159

Th~ Faqiroflpi tbe ~s of the Khan of Khar for tcnirorial violation .n Cn1ciillv
dlt fwlctions of the Tribal Areas mullos as nrbitrntors, polni~
Und~r the now entrenched British poliC) of dispropomom::
retlltation, cvcral campaigns were led againf>t the frontier tribes
spokesmw and convenors of the rcligiou congregation persi ted.
beau e the Britic;h govemm~nt was no longer "illing to tolerate
and their mu//,u in the 1930s. A military column " despatcbcd
~-tion by a mulla again t an as urcd dan, the mullas' influcnlCS
m North-\Va1.iri ran to direaly puni:.h a rribal misdemeanour
1931 •o In 1932, when the Faqir of. \lingar and B•dsh:lh Guhnd
wue ast as decidedly ho tile and the ferodty of the go\-emment
rt to undermine them through m1litary campaigns absoluu:ly and
l\1uU1 Chaknaw.tr\ )OUng son, Ghulam ~abi Ch knawan, co
um-oclbly turned any mulla voicing orne sort <1f di ontcnt with
;\ lashk11r of 500 upper l\1ohmands and Safis to puni h the Bn
Brilish policy or with allies of the Briti h in the Trihal Area into a
;tllowance· holder:. for rcfu~ing passage to,, party of upper 1oh.nunds
coofirmed enemy of the tate.
through Gandab to Peshawar, they were treated as 'ho tiles'. 1lx
This was the situation within which !\lim1 Ali nf lpi claimed
ChtefCommi'isioner NWFP was .tuthorised by the Government
gomtunent and public anention. ~ 1ir1a Ali had rc~:cived hts rcligiou.;
the Ind~;t to 'is!.ue warning of"such punitive action a the go\"alliDCC!
lnining from a variety of local 'ource bel(>rc he c.·arnc into contact
may sec fir to order", and on the expiry of the warning bomb dx
other villages without further reference to, and previou , sancu
•ilh the Naqib Sahib ofCharbagh (him elf of the Akhund Ghaffur-
fuddal\tulla line) and later with l.hila.fotht in Indi.t. lie returned to
When the Fuqir of Alingar held a grandjirga of Malakand tribes
the Tribal Areas to senle at Ipi in the Tcx:hi valley .tnd wa i{l;nored
pronounced them all free of their obligations to the ~ovmunent
relatively innocuous untill936. Public pa ion were running high
1934, his 'invading' lashhlr was bombed by the Roul Air Fcmx.
rhe administered districts a ptople followed the L'a c of a I lindu
Brithh policv hcL.lme o stringent on the matter that w"en it appearcrl
who had converted to Islam under ob urc cir~um tancc and
that ~ hostile Mohmand lash/tar w:lS g-athering lt the in tiga ·
mmied a Pakhtun in Bannu. The girl'.; family act.u ed her hu band
Bad hah Gut J and 'doing damage' to the Gandab road in 1935.
ahduction and forced conversion. The girl rcfuc;ed to return to her
what appeared to be a elf·defeating move, the RAF was ailed m
putnts, but the marriage was unlawftJl incc he wa a minor and
drop bombs close to the road to disperse the lo.~shlar and prt"'"tt:
not legally encer into a marriage of her own .u:cmd. Unable to
doing further damage.51
e\idence of either abduction or legal con~ent to rnarri.tge, the
In pite of the stringent government re:.pon~e to mulla actmtv,
mullm of the T rihal Areas could move in small groups which
ruled that the girl would live with a third party until she reached
could not be tracked and bombed. Aerial bombings were earned
the age of majority, at which time she could decide her fate for
in order to fri~htcn 01nd di~perse gatherings which could potm
bcrsdf. The decision wa heard by the :\1u .lim community of Bannu
~eat anger as a government dcoston in fitvour of the l !indu
grow larger and more threatening. They could do little to rcstnct
COmmunhy over the Mu.,Jim one.5-4 The Faqir held .tjirga to call the
mu/!.1 on his traditional Joros-his periodic traveL. amo~ the
~tion of the tribes of Daur to the government's interference in
to hear ca~e .., give reward and apply puni-;hmenr · uch as h.,,..,; ••,
rd:gion-a meeting chat was followed by 'some hooliganism on the
ra.d'and the Daur blocking passage through the area.ss J lc appealed
4~ Wamn, 1'/u Fagirqlpt, p. 1G4.
~0 '1\\W: flo .ttlc '\Jovcment in :.lohrnand Country·. ~larch 1932, m 0 5l Khan Khar to PA Dir Swar Bajaur, 31 July 19H, in NDCI, 'Malakand
\tohmand <",Jtuat1on, 193(}-32'. tuation 1919-60'
51. BAR 1934-S S.C Swnrnansed from AJan Wam:.n's lf~n;mlfllrr: Tbt l·iliJtr ojlpt anJ tht /nJtun
52. ,\lohmand Cummumquc, 17 Au~. 1935, in Peshawar Archnu, M Army, pp. 8()-6.
t\ cncy Record '. SS BAR 1936-7.
 160 1-'RO:'\TIER Of f'I\ITII
for and found S)1npathi ers among other mul/as of the T nbal Aras
including the llaji Tumngui and his 'on , the Faqir of Alingu,
Ghulam :'\ab1 Chaknawari. 56 The Chamarkand mujahidm came
in support of the Faqir'sjihad .tnd nunouh went around dut F
llahi, their pre:.idcnr, had gone ro \Naziristan to li\'C and ftght
rhe FaqirF The F.tqir al o managed to forge an alliance w1th Faz4
Dan, the on of hi old ad\'er;ary the .Mulb Po,,indah.
,\ftcrsomc effort the Faqir rallied a foUowing amon~ the Ton
\Vazir ofTochi, who e mllliks had recenth entered into an agrccmea
with the Britic.h for the garric;oning of the Kh.u son region of
Waziristan. In November 1936, as a British militarv column
-
to eros~ Khaa~nr.t, the raqir attacked with a lmhlar of 2,000 mm.
and with the advanr.tge of nagged and mountainous terrain fi
the army ro retreat News of the larhJ:ar's succc~ brought anotbe:r
1,200 Mahsud and Afghan -~ide Wazir men to join rhe Faqu,
wa~ now credited with miraculous powers. Go\'emment pressur-e
the malilu of tribes to turn over the Faqir and to forbid him
or any sort of a ~htance did not deter him or dimini h support
him. In April 1937, when the wor:.t of the winter had passed.
To~.:hi valley .md the r:'aqir's la1hkar, now numbering4,000mcn,
subjected to aerial bombardment. The army began to mo\'e in on the
ground from sc\eral different directions and the I.Jshkar \\':lS ~
to disperse. R.uds into administered territory by artered
of the Faqir\ <.upporter~ increased dramaticaUy but the recion
kept under wn t.lnt urvcillance and they \\CCC not allowed to
together again.
Like many other mohili arions in the Tribal .A.ras, the F:
mo\emcnt grew through hi:. military tactic-al leadmhlp. tb
ignificant reward otlcrcd to the participanb other than the hcspi::a!:::y
of hi~ !.mg~.r}h,m 1 and the poils from raid~ into ~
territory. Ahn \Varrcn C'.lutions again t reading too deep!) into
rhetoric of oppo~Jtion to the kafir and protection ofT lam in lnda.
arguing that his great popularity was partly Ton Khd tribal inttreS!
56. lntenic:w Ghubm N.tba Clukn.twari, 8 Feb. 2002.
57. 'Repon on Chamarlond Colony 1936, i Dec. 1939 . Politial
~lohmand rc:cvrd • me 46.
58. Prodamauons of the I'aqiroflpt m :\DCI'Wa.zinstan 01ssidcn:s
CO:'\FRO:\TI~C TilE :-.;ATIO;>; 1910·1950 161
nra"tntin""
r·· ~
!!Ovemment
o n.-·netration into the Khaisor.l and prcsen·ing
r·-
the autonomy of the Tochi vallcy.s9 Bur thi:, explanauon doc not
account for the panicipation of Afghan Wazirs who carne frorn 111:ro s
the border and the Shabt Khel !\ lall'.uds, who did not hare Tori
Khd concern over Kh.11-ora It wa~ more probably the attraction of
tugct practice againc;t the 1ndian umr and the promi c of booty from
ums-border raid!> that drew in many participant . ~Iilimry enC'ounrer
wUh the Briti ·h \V2.) both profitable and relatively risk-free the
tended to snipe rather than entering into darcct combat, and
puncipant could melt so quickly and quietly a\"''llY from the ene of
encounter and make their way back h\1mc through a network of
!!eS. But despite what the Faqir m.ty have ,.. anted, hi men were
•te and unwilling to make a concerted stand ag.tin t the lmli.tn
mny to force religious· politk.tl concc :.ions for l ndia or prevent
penetration of Khai ora.
The Faqir oflpa'sjih,,d highlighted the problem:. withe tabli hed
TnC:tl Areas policy of exerting control through the treaty system
dw defined che tribe as a collecti\'c, and when that failed to u e
acrUl campaigns to subjugate ansubordinate parties. Member of the
Tori Khel and panicipanc Mah~ud tribc:.rnen were clearly acting in
defiance of commitment:. made by their maliks to guarantee pa s.tgc:
to the army through the region in rerum for increased .tllowances,
and Afghan-side tribesmen were violating the Anglo Afghan treaty.
B t because, 1n the absence of personal documentation or intelligence
rm.1tion, identity was only linked ro the tribe, individu.tl action
;nide the unanimity of the tribe was an anonymous .tct and
bcnce uncontrollable. \.1oreovcr if insurgent organisation remained
gucnilla-sryle and .,cattered, the RAF could do little to l'ontrol it.
The gO\•emment furore about the fanaticism of the W .tZir...md their
J/a ma ked a greater unea:.ine ~ and fear: that the Tnbal Areas
policy could only partly cont.tin and regulate human action. Anyone
ahte to act outside the stnct sy~tcrn of collective property, aLtJOn and
pline co Jld inflict senous damage on government interests a
t compounded by the fact that the government could only
operate through the treaty ) tcm in the Tribal Areas. Whtle the Tori
Khel acquiesced in paying a fine for their clansmen':. p.trts in the
162 FRO:-:TIER OF rAI I'll
Faqir's upri ing, British pre ure to force thr Tori Khd to apo:t
the Faqir and h;tnd him over failed entirely despite the threat cia
blockade, a punitive aerial bombardment and the u pen ion ofTon
Khel khanadan, and government in:tbility to corner and exuaa hie
1n itself made him a more notable and exciting figure.60
When the violence of government action again t the Faqir m!
participant in hi mo\'cment in 1937 had proved to be of on.'T
limited effectivene , thi had at first increa5ed the Faqir' populatL~
generating storic about hb magical powers in dod2in:: bulkts
and evading C".tpture among hi supporting tribcs.61 The nwj
at Chamarkand printed a special edition of the AI Mujahid to a;.
attention to he••vy bombardments in Wuiristan; Faqirand ~lohmmi
mullas tailed for retribution for the casualties cau ed by Briti h Wl2l
campaigns through the Tribal Areas.IM His movement ,v:~_, lauded
as the mark of Pakhtun bravery, and Briti h tactics condc:mno:!
as demonstrative of governmental exec~ , by nationalist in dx
admmistered dbtric:ts. Over the ne.'t few years the Faqir ra.llicd an
occasionalltuh/uzr, encouraged his supporters to continue canyin!!:OC!
raids in the administered district:., and even conferred with an Ialim
envoy about the po ibilitie for foreign suppon.64 But air ~':>'!lS
to dispel':'e his laJhkarJ, political office pay-out to the tribe£. amonz
whom he lived, ,tnd the n.Hionalist parties' policy of upport for the
government during d1e ccond World War made hi effortS rW.m~
insignificant. J lis capmry to mobili~e the Wazirs did not become of
great political con cquence again until the region became a put
P~kistan in 1947.
Tht War and the nf'W politics ofpartition
The org.mi-.ation of Tribal Areas religiou poliri changed
dramatically in the 1930 . Mulla Sabra had died in 1927 and the
60. BAR 1937-8.
61 Warren, FaqirDj"lpi. p. 129.
62 ClD tep<ln 7 [)~ • 1939, in PA 'Chamarbnd Colony 1936'; tn:tn'ltll'
Ghuhm Nab1 Ch l..n:awari, Pcsluwar, 3 Feb. 2002.
63 See ~tuhamm .i -.;awu Khan Mahsud, Fmmti &j Aur Gb:iri:m.::"!:OI
11./-•..:~lltUln (\Va11rist.tn, 2000).
64 Warren. fiz~ir of/pi, pp. 249-66.
CO="FRO:'\"TI='C 1111:-: NATIO~ 1'-130·1950 163
IUdshah of Mampur in 1928, Mulla Ch:tknawar died in 1930,
hill ~lahmud Akhunzada 10 1931, the llaji Turang1.ai in 1937,
and th.. andak.i ~lulla in 1939 The I laja Turang-t:ai's three on .md
the F-11J' of Ahngar alone were left 1n \1ohmand; in Khyber .md
Tl!lh the: l\lul.Ll Say1d Akbar'~> ucce!. on. rook his line forward; in
\Vaz.irlscan the Faqir oflpi and the new Mulla Powindah Fazal Din
i::herited the influence of the Lala Pir of Kho t and the old ~tulia
Powi .:..h ..nd contended with the rise of a new mulla within the
lmc 1 Shewa Mulla. Internal politic like the conflict:s between the
law. t Khar and the Khan of Naw(.'gai and between the Naw':lb
of Dir wd Khan of Jandol per'i ted; ten-.ions between Briti h
a!!owance-holders and clans without privilege continued; and mullas
continued to oversee internal truce and settlement:..bS But the new
Bntish policy ofdisproportionate rc pon e appeared to dis uade the e
}'OUilger and les experienced mullm from mobilising even their own
pcrsoiU.I retinue~. Badshah Gul prcoc<:upied himself with building up
usenal, constructing a suat, and ~onsolidating influence among
rhe Mohmands and Shmwaris in view of the opposition po ed by the
Kh2n of Khar and the assured clans. The Faqir of Alingar withdrew
mto his own scheme to build a fort at his ba)e in Gari Ca. ht.66 The
faqiroflpi tried to rally support :tcross the region with the help of his
1u the Naqib of Charbagh, but British warnings to the Wazirs kept
them from allowing hjm to mobilise again."
Politics of the Mgh:tn court continued to be popul.trised by
.trent actors in the Tribal Areas, the most signific:tnt instance of
being an attempted revolution against Nadir Shah in 1933 by
the l.ewanai Faqir, a man purporting to be an agent of the ex-Arnir
Amanulbh Khan. But the amirate had become far more restrained
rts patronage ofTribal Areas mullas as Zahir hah (who succeeded
N~u Shah in 1933) was more involved in negotiatmg import transit
6S Mohmand PolauC21 Record~ 1939-1942.
~'\VFPID, Ma.rch-April1938.
~'\VFPID, J\la> 1938-De~ 1939
A IIUhl:m ··"'d gathereJ an \lonh Wazirisran, upponed im:idc:ntollly by rhe
faqu of Ipi, but was rcpuhcd b) rwo wmparues of Af~han regula!', who
recm~ ·ppon from the Royal Air Force. Rcpon PA Kh)bcr, 15 O.:t
1933 m IOLC. Kh<»t Ri mg ••
164 FRO~'TIER Of<' J.'AITII
terms with the British government and reauitin~ and trairu
armed forces than maintaining the informal ea tern PJ.khtun anm
tnate,ey forwn olidating the regime.'~ A~ thdrurilityhad dimilllist:d,
mu/las of Baj.mr, the Khyber and ~laJakand no longer rcttl\ul
sort of allowance: from Kabul that the) had been granted
Amanullah's tenure. B.td h.th Gul and the Faqir of Alingar
ac~:u ed of olidting Afghan c;upport again~t the Briti h occ~:ioc
of the Kh.tjuri pl.1in and con truction of a road throu h to n ... LILI....
m J\1ohmand .70 And it appeared that the I lakim·i Ab of]
mamr.tuled connections with the T ribJ.l Area d/ar to secure
routes in the region But the government .u 1\.abul maintained
rhe .tmounts paid ro these personalitie~ were nommal.
Most important of all w.ts the sudden tum-around of the B
admini•.tr.Hton tow.trds the mullaJ. The Governor I"\VFP
the war, George Cunningham, instructed Kuli Kh n, no'" Politia!
Agent Khvher, to convince mullru of the Tnbal Areas and me
'u/ama of N\VFP to speak out ag-ainst the Bobheviks, and then
69. 'llti~\\a the upiniun of F'ra~r-Tyt.lcr, ~linbrcr 10 Afglwiliun.
1n a .k$patc.:h h> the Foreign Ollke, 1 October 193o and thm
in C'\Cn the mo t alannisr BrittSh report from this penod to
contnl), sec 'Afghan lntcrfcrc:n~c: m Bnmh Tnbes in Hi
upnsing in uppon of Amanullah in 1939 was dTc..""th-d) put
as i tancc: from the Bntt h. A mul/a ailing himsdf the Slwni Pir
r.all) a ,\lllluud ltJJhlar to bnng Amanullah 1\lun b.lcl mto pl\'U
Powmdah uunchly oppoKd this rebellaon as well. but unlike the
umcs, his support wns not central to purttng 11 down, m '\\
a.ttVIItcs ol the: hami Pir and Baghd.ldt Pir', 193 -:\9'. In 1944 a
of the i'Aclran trihe an the Sou the~ Province was put d®11 dirccdv
regular Alglun anny and the: surrender of the leader nc:gotUttd bv the\
,.\Jimstc:r him5elf. ~lmhtcr K1bul, 29 July 19+4, in '1\.hou Risings 0
IJP 112/J176, 3255.3207.
70. Rc:pou nf F:ttjir Ahngar\ ,;,it to the Hak.tm·i Ala J.tWUud, In
Bureau Peshawar h> Go\cmmcnt of N\VFP. 2 Dec. 1935: memo ~
Sc~tet:ll)' to Govcrnmc:nt of NWFP, 17 Au~. 1935, in 'Afridi dckgl
Jal:a!Jbad 1935'. OIOC. l 'PS 1213147
71. 11u~ ll aktrn~i Ala krd Ghulam Nabt Ch.Wwari to we his influcD;'c
prt\'tllt Kamali llahm7.aJ atta..:k. on •\Jjo;han C'lf2\'ln to CX2Ct thdr
Baillhah Gul upfX>n~ this. BWihJh Gul cv~un~.- J to send 1
malth to Jalalabad to collcc:t .thanhaor 'c:xpcru.. · \lPD 1939
CO:"FRO;o.;TI:'\G 1' 1fP. :'\\110:-.: 1930·1950 165
Germans. Italians, and Japanese a enemies of lsl11m.7l While no
British officer nude direct contal..l with the mullas, the .utitude of
6e government softened toward the l.attcr a they \}tti kl} pro\cd
c:fftctiv~ and reliable propagandi t again t the Axi Powers. By the
cod~ r the \Var $<>me mullaJ, including J\lulla Powindah Fnzal Dm
o:l1 ... hc:wa ~lulla, had c.:ome out w ay thar in rhe e"cnt of the
\\ar wc:.ng to India they hould tight on the ide of the Briri h.
of the Germans and their hutparaJI or idol-worshipping allies the
}ap211~ who might re:.trict the pradice of lc;Jarn.73 Rumours about
B4dshah Gul's relations with the Afghan regime were reg.mleJ with
bdulgence and barely followed up. 7~
Meanwhile support for the frontier Congre Party, the Khudai
Khidmatgars, was beginning to fragment an the adrnini tcred di trich.
The secuLu stance of Ghaffar Khan disp.traging the involvement
of religion in government and ~od.u leadcr~hip was opening the
~ up to criticism. The i\Iuslim nationaJi,t AJI India .Mu lim
League party led by Muhammad Ali Jinn.th began to come to the
fo:e in the politics of the proVInce. The Ahr.us, who were deeply
concerned with maintaining a Sunni orthodox adeological unity and
p4!mlountcy in Muslim India, and the ~lu,Jim c:epar.ni t Khaksan.
1fae also popularising Muslim League relagiou!! nation.tli m within
lhcdtttorate. An NWFP Congre s ministry which had been elected
1937 resigned and was replaced by governor' rule during Congre~:.
tions in 1939. Ghaffar Khan's accu~ations that the government
tl)ing actively to undermine CongrCl.~ ~upport through the
r\VFP had strong foundation in the very po~atavc sentiments of
figures like George Cunningham, and larer Olaf Caroc, towards
the: luslim League over the rebellious Congress. From rhi~ point
OQ the Muslim League gained a strong foothold in the province,
f0p1.W.ri ing a separatist agenda for the creauon of a state of Pakistan
72 George Cunningham, 'Propaganda', April 1941, in 'Corrcsponden'e with
d-.c 1 temal affairs department regarding propaganda through mullah I, ere.'.
OIOC Cunningham P:apcrs.
il Gcor~ Cunningham, note: 5 May 1942, ibid.
74 Mgban interference With British tnhe~-B.1J hah Gut, 1935-40' OIOC
UPS/1213209.
75 George Cunningham, diarie 1943-6. OIOC Cunningham P.1pcrs. AJ,o
let Shah's summary of thi , Ethnwty. Ma·11 a,J Nat1onalirm, pp. 224-cS.
166 ~·RO''TIER or I'AITII
for the~~ u lirn uflndia, de$pite deep dhi ion between its mcmbcn
In 1943, a League mini rry took power. A mO\e of no-confidencd:d
byGhaflar Kh.m narrowly displaced the ~1u lim League in 1945,
while Ghaffitr Kh.m daimcd a majority in the election of 19 , t!x
Con~c~ mini try \V.l bitterly contested b~ Le tgucrs \\hO b;mcheC
.tuvil di ohcdience mmcrncnt ag-.Umt it
In 1945 the new Ptr of Mankl Sh·uif, \\hose father's pos:ttr=i
and now hi own \\ere do ely tied to th • .~o\liangul rcgune m
became de ply iO\olved in ~tu lim Lc.tgue organisation from
ba e in '\ow hera in the adminiqercd di trict of the NWFP He
brought many of hi muri.ls inro the League as politial
and suppuncn••.llld cncour.tgcd ~l1angul Abdul \Vudud to su~
Jinnah's cmnpaign .ts well:" The Pir\ mo)t ~ignificant o~
of Tribal Arc,ts politiL\tl .1Ctiviry in support of the Lc~e \<ZS
rally Shinw;tri and 1\l ull.tgori tribesmen to tagc 11 demonSUIUIC
agamst Nehru when the !mer toured the Tribal Areas in 19 - B
1947 the P1r of 7tkon Sharif in Bannu h;.~d also demonstnttd
jmpathy for r_ague dem.tnds and populari ed them in Wazinstn
Thcl-e advocate .1 ured the tribes 'on behalf of Paki tan' du:I
government would maintain allowances and that Pakisnn
'no de ire whato;ocvcr to interfere, in any way, "ith the aaditiooi
independence of the Tribal Areas.' 19
In June 1947 the central committee of the Con~ Pan"
conceded to a pl.tn for partitiM of the ubcontinent at ind~
-and dio;tribution of Indian territoric.. between two sua:cs:-or
of India nnJ Paki ran to be decided by prO\indal refettnd:lrn-
doing ~1 it deeply diS2ppointed Ghaffar Kh ' Khudai Khidriutgo
who had hitherto supported the central Cc ngres line on a
India. Ghaffar Khan launched a mover ent fOr the indusi ri •
7fl. The Wah of Swat contnbuted generou ly to the League fund a::d
Pakt tan fund. Sc~ Yusufi. rrmifr.ni Ajghtm, p. J20. Sec also \\
Shah wht> di~C\1 scs tht· extent of the Pir's invoh emem mpi'O\'UIOll ~
1.... ~1e org.ani 11110n in hh study, TIN Afrullm Lmgut in tht NWFP
1992).
7· Sr t ment by AP,\ Kh)hcr, quoted 10 <;ha~, MUJirm Lngut. p 119
78 Lt rue Laden DiSCu s C1\il Liberti.. I . Wlan 7imn, 21 Fcb.lW
79. Press release b) )lnruh, 29 Juh 1947. in·~ ol :aro:mu:DOdl:iOC
tribes in ~e\\ lnd1a'. OIOC l PS 12 3280.
COSFRO~TI~G TliF. !':ATIO;<.; 1930-1950 167
third option in the referendum: the creation of an indepcndeut tate
of Pashrum tan compri..ed of the admini tcred district and tribal
regwns of the ~'\VFP.10
Beneath these politic. of rcpre,entJtlon nod nation, the po,itiun
of tht tribes was largely ambh-alcnt Ohf Caroc met the Afridi and
Shinwaris in March 1947 in an attempt to g-.lUge local response tu
me independence and partition plan. He reported that:
On no :acco...nt were they prepared to deal with the :uhisol:) committee
of the pres..:nr Con3tituent A emhly which they rehr.~rdeJ as a purely
Hindu bod) ~either were they prepared to deal with any scp;~rnte bod)
which might seek to approach them un he half of the l\lu lim l..t2gUe. On
this point they wished it to he undmtooJ that rhc) rcb'llrdC'd the Mu lim
League as mainly repre entative of Mo !em [sil) India only, and if they
~-anteJ to join up with any cxdu)ivcly ~1oslem org.mhatlllll the) were
much closer to Afghani~tan. 11
No possibility being offered by any of the partie appealed entirely
to the Tribal Areas communi tic or their mullas. The Faqir of Ipi
assured the League of his support for Pakimn,82 <waved po sibly by
the self-proclaimed League supporters among the \-lah ud rrihe .11
But some months later he sent a letter to various tnbcs 1n W.tziri t.tn,
suggesting that the 'unity of Islam' was perhaps not as imponant
as the unity of the tribes of the frontier province. 8 ~ l'vliangul Abdul
Wudud and the Pir of Manki Sharifs championship of the P;tkistan
ISSUe wa limited in its coercive power in the Tribal Areas owing to
the deep re .enrment of man} trtbcs and kh<tnates towards the Swat
regune. The ~awab of Amb, who was himself bitterly hosule to
the ~Hangul. \\-TOte in detail to Jinnah, warning him that while he
himself supported the League and Pakhtan, the tribe and mullas of
See Erland Jansson, lnd,,, P''*"''"' or PalhtuniJIIln (Sweden, 19R1),
pp. 206 15
Report by 0. K Caroc, Pc~haw.tr, IS M:m:h 1947, in '(lilcbtion of
ICCOmn'locUtJon oftri~ in New lndi.1'
Anonymous Report on Tri~ of the NWJ.1>, April 1947. J•muh Papers
Cheraftcr ]P) I, 1.
See her B.ulsluh Kh.tn \.l lh ud to \.I \ Jmnah, 21 ~J:ar~h 1947. JP I, 1.
faqli of lp1's em:ular, Abu ubmun to I \. An~m. July 1947, c:ncloloure.
JP 1\'.
168 FltO;..;TmR OF FAI flf
the frontier were deeply dhided among themselves. He pointed c
that the upport of the young Pir of~bnk.i for the .Muslim I.ngoe
was itself alien.uing mher partie tn rhe Tribal Area from theM
League\ LilU'' owing tc> old Pir of ~lank.i' 'rivalry and enmit)' •
the l IadJa l\fulla and hi~ follower .
Confu ton ternrncd from the lack of clarity amund the opnom
bctn~ pre entcd in the Tribal Areas. An Afridi ft'la
confirmation that the rreatic which for so long had undcrpinncd
the relation of the tribe wirh the Government of India were to 1x
cancelled and that the Khyber Pas:. and the toll Lollected on 1t were
to rc\·ert dire~tly to the Afridi) once again. A long debate ensued
official circle:. attempting to clarify the applic:·.uion of the Cabinet
Mission plan for dclolonis.ltton and partition of the sub·ronnncm
to the Tribal An;.ts, a Jehatc that continued into the final dJ, r
empire <tnd never Lame to any meaningful condu~ion .14 Tunc be22::
to run out .1nd the long-~randing Tribal Area:. relationship wi±
Afgh;tnic;ran tlid nor throw up u feasible plan for ccc 'on to 1\Jbal.
nor was there .tny re;tl propo,.tl for admini tr.tti'<c and mti~
re-drafting of the Tribal Areas treaty-based relation hip "ith the
.tdministered di~rrict:.. As August 1947 approached, adminisua:o:s
left the region parcelled with rhe N\VFP and ih fate hcaune ~
to that of the provinc;c as .1 whole.
Contest~ over poliuc.LI legitimacy in the provincial I~
ultimately determined the fate of the pro\ince. The question ot
whether the N\VfP w.1~ to be included in India or in Pili tm was ldl
to be dccid~.d tn 1 referendum. But bcL-ause ChJtJar Khut' proposed
bur impra~;tical independent Pakhruni,ran was never included in the
referendum, he and h1 Khudai Khidmatgar co plerely bo)
it and a land lide OUJOOl) vote went to the :\'\\'FP' inclusion
Pakiqan. I Jcnce tht .tdmini~rered and non .admtnistertd districD
and agencies of the "\1\VFP were traMferrcd to the -rate ofPakis!o
through the referendum of 1947.
..
85 'a•~ b ofAmb to ~1. A.jmnah, JAug. 1947,JP 1\'.
86 0. "· C:uoe, memo on bcanng of Cabinet dcl~uon~s ratcmcnt oc 1i
Areas anJ the Frontier Surcs 1946, in '<l!Jcstaon of ACCOIIlrDClldrio
Tnhcs'.
CO~FRO~TJ;..;C Ttn: ~ATIOr-; 1930·1950 1b9
Dramatic chough the communali r and nationali t politi of
tion had ~en, there wa an ah .c;nc;t ofany real polirkal crC'.ltivity
and pragmaci-.m on the pan ot the f\tu~lim League anJ C()ngrc
tmruds the Tribal Areas Chafltr Khan, at the eleventh hour,
ted that he wanted an mtegranon of the trib.U and cttled
regums to compri~e an independent Pakhrunhtan but ccn.tinly did
present a formula either for the rcali Jtion and protection of uch :a
:e,or for the integr:ation ofir part . ro.roreover, he quickly dropped
idea (under extreme political pre ure) once in Paki~tan. The
tams of the relarion~hip between the Tribal Area~ and the tcccssor
rcguncs to the British \\ere a limited as the colonial relation hip had
ys been with its north·we:.tcm frontier Clearly thi rclation~hip,
the nationalist polirics of India a~ a whole, was constr.tincd within
the administrative template that underlay the transfer of power .lnd
p:utition plan . But the maintenance of the Tribal Are,t int.lCt
the period of independence w-as al o a conceptual inheritance.
The de"' .rting colonial admini rr.uion encouraged forttfkuion
t t ... Communist threat, pa ing on to the nation the imperial
gmpolit that had originally made the north-west into a frontier. 17
Kcshmir and the first lnclo- Pakirtan War
Nothing demonstrated so well the continuities from the coloni.u
to the national period in the North West Frontier as Jinnah'!>
aypointmcnt of George Cunningham, Governor NWFP 1936 47,
first go"emor of the NWFP in P;tk.ist,\n; Nehru's appointment of
.lountbatten a.s the first Governor General ofindependent India; and
the assistance and advice Mountbatren and Cunningh;tm offered to
cwugc che political and so,tal frictions generated by dec.:olonisation
ll::d partition. And pcrhap nothing demon:.trated the enormity of
the break graphically as the communalist massacres of Muslims,
Hindus and Sikhs, rhe invasion of Kashmir by Tribal Areas Pakhtuns
October 1947, and rhe start of the fir!>t Indo-Pakistan war. 88
ltnuM by Catoe and ~tountbattcn, 1946-97, 1bid.
George Cunningham to Lord ~1ountbattcn, 9 ~lay 1948, :.~.nd ~tountb.mcn'
rtSponSC, 29 ~la) 1948. OIOC Cunnin~lwn Papers.
 170 FRONTH:R OF 1-'AITB
'e" began to falter into the: prO\im:c of m~cs of
b\ Stkh:. throughout the Punpb The Go\c:rnor ~'\\'FP reported
new~ of rc:t.di.Hory nttadu on Sikh~ and I lindu in dte pto\incc •
September, .md it W<b dear that the civil .md military armed 6 m
together were in ulikienr to control the !\ituation.19 On 22 Scptanbc!
,\ Mahsud lmhl:ar, o ten ibly inspired by communal sentimc::s,
:mackc:d a convo) of Sikh and Gurkhas being a'llCUllttd
Wana.90 With the ch.mgc of government and politicaJ personnel
the region news Wll cant but report reached the Gm'ttnOr's onu
rhat B.tdh hah Gul li w.1 rall) ing for a jihad. ~I any other tribes
of wanting to mobili e in oppo~icion to the }Iindus and ikhs,
in the admm1.,tcred di trict of Hazara, talk wa of'an im'aSlon
Kashmir'. 11 On 22 Q, tobcr, ~orne thousands of~ lah ud ,l\ lohnunds
and Afridis moved into K;tshmir to liberate it from the llindus. 0!
the mullm of tht JI.tdd.t line, it is only certain chat Bad bah Gul ll
led a lmhkar ot l\lohmand-; through Peshawar into Kashmir. alE::z
along the w.l) for volunteers to c;upply tood, clothes and money
tho-e at the banlefront.93
While: detail~ of the Pakhrun mobilisation into Kashmir a
ob,cured by l.tck ofdetail about leadership and moti\"ation, a precr.det:
of moral alliance between the tribe:; and the ~lu~lim nati~
across the border had heen cstahlished. What wa~ entird\ \\ithoar
precedent w,ts that lhe government in the N\VrP was no; indincC.
or in a po~ition, to prevent the incursions bc)ond attempt at ~
di~su;~sion .~ Paki~tani government re ource were uetched
breaking and even food wa carce in the ad mini terc:d prminc:e. l1xse
89. Cunningh:tm tojmnah, Sand 15 pt. 19-47,tbid.
90. Cunningham reponed that tl- rc. w 1 'no question that the
communal as the bodtes oi our ~tu lam srouu were ailowtd
unsouhed b) the laJhl:ilr.' I lowe\ cr there were tr:t) att.u:b on other
troop , indlklmg ~1u lam , being C\~l'Uatcd out of Wazmsun om
next month. It 1 fatr to esumatc that the mntmmon 11l2) ~-e been
communal, hut w~ more closely related to po~ t ten ion between the
1nd th~· triho in Waziri t.tn. Cunningham to Jmnah, 1 Oct. 1947, iblci
91 CJnningham tnjmnah, 15 Oct. 19-47, abid.
91 C.. 1nningham to :\lounrbanen, 9 \l..a 194S, ibid
93. lntcnicw• Bad hah Gulli, Fa1..i.l Shu Bld hah, inJa\-m, H.. r71
pp. 383-8.
94. Cunningham tu ~lounthatten, 9 ~b) 1948.
COi'\FRQ:-.;TI~G Tllf. ~ATION 1930 19SO 171
arcumstances were clearly provoking the tribes, who e rnmcrncnt
, for the Mt time in over a cenfUI), unrc tricte(J to the eat,
md who \\ere ~ouffering as much, if not more, from the hnrt tge of
gnm.tS The tiCS{ entrant into Kal>hrnir were joined by mnre and
oore tribes, including the ~ langal , the migratory Powind.th , and
\\azirs. At the height of the fighting, tribesmen partk1pant in the
momnent together numbered around 20,000.96 They were: met and
orccd by Kashmiris and, b) man) account.;,, b) troop of the
• establi hed Pakistan army. though out of uniform. 91
h was unlikely th:u Pili rani 'nation:lli m' was o material and
pdling a rcali[)· on October 22, ju t over two month llftcr the
cration of Pakistan, that it provoked the tribal mobilisation imo
Kashmir. Opporrunity, brav·ado, and possibly hunger, hored up
by mmive moral and material upport once they were in prob.tbly
more to do with the im-a ion. The Bad hah Gull and II, \\ho
up till thi time appeared .1mbi\".dcnt about their commitment
Paki mn, moved to Pe haw·ar and joined the Frontier Provin'e
1oslim League. Badshah Cui I wa reported as touring villages in
administered districts in an attempt ro brio~ the. frJgmented
MJSlim nationalist group~ together into the central ~lw.lim League
party." What was of note is that the Kashmir phad lt!!elf generated
rual agreement on the nat1onal part1c1pation of the tribe:. which
had not ha\·e previously existed.
Q\-er the course of the 1947 8 Indo Pakistan war, with many
l:'ibc.smen ab ent from the Tnbal Are.1s and fighting in Ka:.hmir,
gm-emor of the 1\rwFP m111agcd to convene jirgm With almo t
the tribes and ranfy new treaty-based ~c:ttlement:; between them
the Paki tan go\"emment on the coloni.u model. The Pakist.ln
~ent, like the Briti)h before it, accorded allowance:!! to IIMiiJ.s
permit them to shore up their own po~itions internally and enforce
settlement in the face of report!! tlut there was great di~content
ng many of the young Mridi men over the internal distnbution of
~ces!9 All rribes of the region, other than those ofWniristan
~m tojinnah, 2 Feb. 1941!. OJOC Cunnangham Papers.
Brun Cloughlcy, A Hutory oftht p,,~iJtwn Arr ·y (Kuachi, 1999}, p. 19.
~·, P.zliJto,Army, p. 19.
'Bldshah Gul I, II and Ill'. NWFPP \, Spc"al Branch.
Canningham tojinnah, 17 Feb. 194q OIOC Cunmngham Papcl"'.
172 FROSTIER OF F,\JTII
who will be di \:U sed in greater detail below, "unanimous~)
their loyalty' to the gmemment in rerum for allowances t
clo t• to 1,000,000 rupees a year.'
In April 1948 Jinn:lh thanked the tribes tOr their mobiliu
into Ka hmir a~ a cru~iaJ contribution to the cr~tion of P
and proclaimed that the withdrawal of all re~ army prescnoe
gJ.rriron from the region, the pro\'ision of allowan-.cs and com
regionJ.l aut<lnorny wa.; the ~tate's reward to the tribes for their bdf.
.tnd a~kc:d them to now ~tand down from their militant actm
This policy, which Jinnah described ao; de igned to 'rclllO\"C
~u~pidon in the brotherhood of Islam, of which the tribes and tbc
Paki~tan government were both member:.', w.ts e. scntiall) a policy
desagncd w nor aggraV',tte the very difficult drcum't nccs on tbc
bordcr. 111 B)' September India had moved much better cquipprd
army regm1cnts into Kashmir to counter the insurgency and secutr
the valle\'. It was a strongly held belief th.u the Indians were lr)1
undermane the P.tkistani po ition on the Kashmir border b
money fO insurgents an Waziristan. The Afghan government tud
demon trated ho~tilit) to Pakistan. Brittsh ofllciaJ till in P
apprai ed the ituation confronting the government:
h would be extremch· dtfficult to deal vmh ~rous tn"bal uoublc
che fime now :wailable "o" more than C\"Cr sc•.:uricy must depend
policinl control of che tribu The trioomen would ruwc learned
their operations in Ka hmir chat a large g311g of SC'\ual hundreds
break through a chm !me of troops, "pend a d~) or cwo lootmg,
gee llWll) agam with ampuniry... There might "ell be trouble \\'lth them
the) fi,und chemsct~cs hungry• and cold when the) got co their homes.
A a back· up, the pilor.. of the Pakistan Air Force \\Cte ins~
to f:unili,tri e them clve!> \\ith the 18 aircraft rationed t RQipa:'
100. Cunnmgharn toJinnah, :-:ov.-Dec. 1947, ibid.
101. J•nnah to .1 j~rga of all mdependent tri~. quoted in ~lulumnud
SAbir, Q.ti./·, A :Am aur S ,h.J -y1 S;~rh.IJ (Peshawar, n.d ), p. 297
102. 'Announ~emcnt b} Ceo~~ Cunrungham Governor of the ~~\\'FP
Wazm~can Tnbes', annexure, C.B Duke, Deputy Hr;gh CommiSS21XIt!
Peshawar, to Bumcn, Depury Htgh Commissioner for Ul\ t
De,. 1947, 10 ·o, rurbances, Tribal \ret~. 1947. OIOC LIPS!l2132Sl
103. Duke to Burnen, 29 Oct\ 1947, ibid.
CO:>;FRO:-:TI:-:C TifF. i'JATIOS 1930· 1950 17:1
Pcsfuwar and ~liram bah, L'"llp~ble of'clo e uppon ofground troops
and for desrructi"-e action again t \illagcs'. 104
The Pak.htan admini trat' n also opened talks with the rulers of
lhc frontier <;tate of Dtr, Sw t, Chitrul, and Arnh ''ho exercised
control oYer con.,iderable population and land • and \\hose internal
politics threatened the peace and security of the region. ·nte authority
the rulers of Swat, Chmal and \mb was being ~hallenged hy an
~isarion called the 'Frontaer tate ~lu lim League' which began to
organise in their territorie demandang rcpr~c:ntative and coount hie
:anment. To forestall their denund , the nalers uf Chit raJ, Amb
and Swat all acceded to Paki tan immediately, handing mer control
all exrernal affairs in rerum for ratifi\:ation of their .mthoritv. The
N:awab ofDtr at first refused to accede on the b.tsi that he w~uld be
required to give up control of foreign relation!. and cxtc:rn.tl dcfcn\:c,
libaties which he had enjoyed under the British. Later, nu doubt
under great pre:.sure from Jinnah's government, he .telc:dcd but began
to any out a massive programme of aggr.tndisc:rnem of per onal
political power and of land, in communk.ltion with and upf"',,edly
>ith support from Kabul. In 1949 he threatened to march on Chatral
u'bere the old l\Iehtar had died and been succeeded hi> son whn wa:.
~dcd as a weaker ruler. 1os
Tens'ons with India had to some extent been contained by 1949
ulks ..r Karachi and indications were th~tt a referendum would be
bdd to dec1de the fate of Ka hmtr Nehru had sugge ted that such
a'-.lidation ought to be sought ro confirm the Mah;mtja\ .tcccs,aon,
znd when both countries had jointly approached the United Nations
Sccurit) Council c;ecking arbitration of the dispute in 1948, that
body recommended a plebiscite.""' A UN Commh~ion lor India
l:ld Pakistan was appointed to broker a cease fire between the two
COUnuies and moderate the accepmnt:c of a t:case·fire line.
Under the~e conditions, the administration of the frontier c.une
be of great immediate national importJnce. Concerned about
rntn21iscd from the Pakistan [)csp21dles, Ollkc: of the High
Comn1 1oner for the United Ktngdom, Pc\hllwar, Ma~ Srpt. 1949, in
'Fronrier Sc:ucs 1949-50'. OJOC I)PS/12/3284
Cloug"tl • , Pai.JJtan Army, p. 21.
 174 fRO:>.'TIER OF J.',\ITII
maintaining loyalty to Paki tan 2Jld wary of Indian infiltrano
in urgency in the tate , the Paki:.tan go\emment so~ht to
the region by ' upponing' rulers of the &rates. Whether or not tbm
wa truth to it, the Mu lim League central p.ut) leadership denied
any connection with the Frontter State...:\ lu,lim League. and rutilOil5
pread thar thi 01pni ation wa:. acruall} the Khu<hi Kh~
in di gui c, fomenting revolution and insurgency on behalf of India.
The Paki:.tan ~ovcmmcnt appointed a Political Agent to Cmtm
help control the siruation-es,entially to c;trengthen the posino
the f\ lcht.tr ;tnd stabili5e the balance of power, at least so long me
k.ashmir i~suc W.\S not rcc;olved, and the threat of Indian sum
on the frontier remained. Swat and Otr man.tged their intcm1l
.tffitirs .llld reported to the political agent Malakand on i 'ues reb
m frontier defence.
The British lli~h Commissioner po ted at Peshawar suggtsttd
what he believed to be the policy of the government towards dx
Tribal Areas, an understanding supported by the new truct\m
relation~ between the government at Karachi and the frontier smes:
l do not believe it i:. the polic} of the Paki~tan government to puSh a!-nd
too fa 1 with the introduc!ion into the'e extremely backw:lrd sum
m()(lem dern<xr:tt '- an:.titutions. The prime mini ter, \\no rmms
the portfolio or Statt. and Fronoer RegiOn", is well aware of the \UV br
cahbrc of th J, al \lu lim League p 1litician and he is not likth
unduly prt\:ipitate in c.xchanging the pre$Cnt comparatWd) bcnc:Nbt
regime of the hcredit.uy rules for a speciow. democracy.
Thi situation altered ~hghtl) and gradually between l9.0and 197
when the tate ofD1r, Swat and Chitral were gndwlly transfo:mcd
from independent kingdoms under the Political Agent i\lilibnd
adrnini tercel eli tricb, the states of Amb and Phulra were abolisho:!
entirely and <~eparate .1gencie~ ofl\1ohmand and Bajaur were aea:.
to gain better control over what had been the Malakand AgellC).Ikl
except for these modifications, the conditions created by the co1onW
political dcpo1rrrnent were re-enforced by the Paki~tan 1:0\~
The ocial egregation of the T nbal Areas population from the
107. Palhl•~<l [) faith, J 1 ~lay 1949.
108. Jb ••J..!! S..pt 1949.
CO:\FRO~T I:o-;G Tm: N \1'10!' 19]0 1'150 175
ad:nini rered di'tricts was maintained and control applied by mean
an :illowance sysrem. \Vhen the moment finall) l"llme, religious
and polincal identitication aero the border (in hoth dirc,tion ),
:md the exuberance of ,elf-government ultimately meant \'CJ')' little
for the trucrure of relation between the Paki rani nation and the
regJOn outSide the adrnini<.trati\·e border. For the Paki tani , f.u more
so than C\-er had been the ca c for the Briti h, the fmntier hc:ld the
potential ro threaten the very integrity of the tate n the battle over
!Ushmir continued.
Tlx Palthtunislan mO'Utmml
The resources and charm of Mina Alt Khan, Faqir of lpi, were
sa"trdy depleted after 1937, but he continued to Jive at his hasc with
a retinue ofover 300 men, mostly Shabi Khel Mahsuds, but including
some absconders from the administered dJstricto;. I lc organi~ed stray
incidents of ~niping and raids on army ba~cs through the period
of the war, and in 1946 apparently encour.lgcd clements among
habi Khel Mahsuds to kidnap the Pot.rical Agent of South-
Wawisran, Major J.O.S. Donald.' 'Bur •t was not nU after 1947
that he or~ni<;ed sufficiencly to demand the ~erious .mention of the
:-ernment ro the easr once again.
The one region that remained ambivalent during Cunningham's
r=nsutcmcm of the tribal allo\vances wa Waziristan. Cunningham
noted ('artier in the year that the Faqtr of I pi was preparing for
Something really big'. 110 This came together early in 1948 when the
Faq;r pulled a lashkar together and attacked and then occupied the
Dana Khcllhauadar post in the Tochi valley in June 1948. 111 Later
t same month, the national English daily, Dawn, published a
·p2ge report that the Faqir was receiving payments from the
fahsud, Firangi &;, p. 228. Retaliatory ;lir ~cnkc~ to punl\h the Mnhsuds
:Lrter Donald was released received n lut of men11on in the administered
cfutricu where the Muslim League and Congre'\ were closely competing
for the Po~lchrun vote. Sec Pa~hotam Mehra, l'ht North Wtsl Fronlitr
Drarna(Karachi, 2001), pp 66-8.
11 Cunningham toJinnah, 15 O<t 1947
111 Pdistn Dtlfhllch, 23 June 1948, UKJ IC Karat· hi, in 'Allivitic:.. of the
faqu oflpi' OIOC UPS/1213241
176 FRO~TIER OF' FAITII
Indian government, di burscd throu~h the Indian emlms) at
as an incentive for him to ~tan an ino;urrection again t the Pakistrl
government. 112 I li torians and contemporary obsencrs qucsnoo:d
the veracity of the claim supported only by a letter, o rensibly iiom
the Faqir to the Indian prime minister, amJ b) rumours about tb:
movement of the F.1qir's emiN.ry, Awal I lu ~n. What is ba'ood
doubt is that the ho tilities with the new India and the ''Ulnmbili:
of the newly- cpar..ttcd Paki tan made the F qir' moblliunon
his po:.~ible solkitations of help from other govcmmcn
threatening.
In mo t wa)'~ the Faqir\ actions were unexcepriorul. He
targeted the D.ma Khel po:.t, a clo:.e and de ir:tble wgct, 11 the
height of his movcmcn£ in 1937 and sniper attacks on BritiSh amrr
troops withdraw1 ng from the region were a commonpb'-'t throuiboc
1947. Moreover as the tribal mobilisation began it appeared to be
premised on the question of allowances. I lo\H~ver the Kashmir
had demonstrated how relevant mobili arion in the Trib:tl An:ts
were to the new and vulnerable Palo~tan' geographical integntt A
ignificant report from rhe Brin~h H1gh Commi iun indicated Stat::
the problem~ inherent in Pe,ha\var Intelligence Bureau inf~
gathering tactics a they 'accepted all ~torie ~cnt back "irlloc
discrimination (in fact the more highly coloured they wue the men
likely was the informant's pay to be increased).'113 And thcte is tt!t
doubt that such <."llremongering \'laS at work on the frontier &!
despite thi warning, the Faqir's act was cen, undmcood and dci!
with a nothing hort ofa political, anti-Pakistan insurgent 100\'CIJCl!..
After some political pre ure to eject the Faqir and his /ashl;r. cb:
Pakistan Air Force was sent in to deal with the iruation. Bombcn
went in de troy the village of parricipmt s~ abi Khd tahsuds
to dic;pcr.e the !.uhkar from it occupation of the !hassl1f/arpost.
the Faqir wa!> decried ut a national level a!. a tr:titor and a poE
112. 'lri-:llchru Axt to Elimin2tc P.&ki tan. Faqir's cmiSW) armttd
lcncrs: Jnd.an Pn:mu:r promtscs assi nncc in umc', Ilnrr: (
June 194R.
113. G. F. Squire to Foreign Office and L.KlK Pcsh2wu, 31 A
'Afghan-Paki tan Ot putc'. OIOC UPS U. 1827.
CO~FRO:-.'TINC TIIF. ~ATIO~ 19.10·1950 177
nt. Accusations of ecc ioni m again t the Faqir gathered
force when the Mghan pre began to ex pre }mp.uhy tor the ) ';~qi r
and concern over the aerial action of the Pakistan army and to call
fat the freedom of 'Pakhrunistan', thus e:.tablishing a motive which
cp to thi point it \'laS not at all dear the Faqir held. From hcing
• another incident ofTribal Areas mobilisation, the Faqir oflpi's
00\'tmcnt beC2Jlle a national cri i .
Early Pakistani-Mghan relation , unavoidably read thmu h
the pnsm of British documentation on the subject, were deeply
tmttrtain. 11.. Internally the young Zah1r hah was b.rgcly under the
i:lluence of his ambitiou uncle and thc.n hi cou in, Muhammad
Ihoud, who served as prime mini tcr from 1953-63 and later
~'trthrew the constitutional monan.hy to come back a the fir~t prime
muuster of the republic in 1973. 1li preoccupation with the e.htern
Pakhrun regions has been argued to have been rooted in concern
fC Pakhtun political dominance in Afghani tan. E ternally the
Afgfwts were suddenly fa.ced with an independent ·~1u lim nation'
successor to the hi rorically contentiou) Pakhtun border region,
chanenging the Mghan po ition on ethnic ground~ and the long-
bcld Mgha.n perception of the amiratc a the sole bastion for free
lsbm.U6 Before partition the Afghans had urgently sought and
teem-ed confirmation chat transit f.'lcilities from the port at Karachi
through to the borden. of Afghanistan would be maintained and on
114 Afghan political afTaj" from 1930 to 1970 have nor been the ~ubjcct of any
sound historical stud,r. The )eata between Amanullah's overthrow .and the
'Smr R('V()Iution' of1978 need hobrly ancntion, not least to uncover the
i:::cma1 politiCS that ~rrounded the tens tons wah Paki tan.
115 t2n Azjz. 'Lcadel'5hip Dtlc:mmas-ChaiJcnges and Rc ponscs', m Gran1
fm and John Merriam (ed .), Afgh.m RrsiJtanu thr Politia o/ Su,-,.'lt'ill
(Boulckr, CO, 1987), pp. 59-62.
11 The Paki tan and Afghan pre: traded jtbc~ over each country'~ form of
government A Pakistan Rad1o commentary on the autocracy of Zahtr
!lab's regul' and the bck of pcr$tmal poLncal uberty in that country
rtCCJ\'Cd a reply in an editorial in the /JI,Ih that maladminimation was
endemic tn Pakistan, a country whi~h had left admini tration in the hand
of'Bntish officers, and failed to en un: the a\'ailability of cloth and food to
ozens. Editorial in /r/11/J, 28 ~~ ar~h 1948, m 'Afghan-Pa.ki,tan Relation,,
I • OIOC UPS/12/1826.
 178 FRO:'\'TII::R OF FAITH
thi ba i ncc.:eprcJ Paki tan's inheritance of the Dunnd ~
oon 2fter independence they bc.--gan to query the persistence of the
Durund Line on the ground that the m~t rec.:ent treat) bctwttn
the Briti h gO\crnment in India and ~hani tan, that of 1921, tud
admitted an Afghan t:lk.e in the border tribe .u
The first ch;lllcngc from the Afghans came soon after 14 A
1947 when, following u~ual pmctice, Palo tan :.ide tribesmen attcndc:d
the annualj.trh.m at Kabul, where Zahir Shah and hi prime mirus-.cr
~poke out .w;ainst Palustani actions in the Triball\rea . The statc-:nm
1\..abul R~adio hcgan to run a series of commentaries 1."riticising the
attJOns of the Pak.htani state. In September 1947 At~hanist2n
the sole member stotre of the UN to oppose Paki5tani membership
of the world body on the basis that Pakhrun political aspirations
favour of independence (as represented by Ghaffar Khan) had not
been addressed. Liter that year Zahir Shah sent hi pecW em
'l.aj1hullah Khan to Kamch• to negotiate a treaty '~ith the Pakistt:l
government ·1 rade terms were readily agreed, but the g<>''CtllillCJU
under tandahlv refu ed an Afghan request to grant complete autonmm
to tht 1\Jorth We.,t Frontier Province and re-name it Afghmia or
Pathar.• tln on the grounds that these matters were the affair of the
Con tinnional A embly and not the Foreign \1m• oy. 119 ln 1arcb
1949 a Knbul Radio commentary on the PaLstanJ air action
the Faqir of I pi was .ent to all foreign mi' ions in Paki wa b) the
Afghan emha ~y .a a pre..s note. De:.pite the suggestions of supper.
for Tribal Arens 'independence', Afghani tan'~ bcllicociry SUI.~QU~
to the Paki rani government a fresh competition O\'er ownership
the Tribal Area :
117. · upplyofDocumcnt to Paki ran Government'. OIOC UPS/1211 - occurrence--such rrangressions over the v~\gue and unmarked border
118. llu rc·mterpn:r.uion of the Treaty of 1921 rnd the abrogmoo ot
prc:vaou trt"atic:s anJ ~emen~· as meaning the uuure of the
Lane agreement signed in 1894, and pointed out that one of the an.ncxu:t:s
l<l the treaty da tinguished the re~idcn~ of the Tribal Areas from
:a<lrninistc:rc:d tla~tm.t in a n:fc:n:ncc to the sha.n:d mterot of the
and the: Brau hint~ border tribe Sec: Bnri'h Legari<ln KAbUl to 5ccm:rf
of State: for Foreign \ft;u"', 19 JulJ 1947. In IOLC 'lnfomul
Pmpo als'. OJOC l P~ 12/1811.
119. Summ.uy of C\'Cnt annac:d to ·~ lc:morandum b) t!-<
for Commonwt:>alth Relation , April 1949, in 'A· ..
Dasputc'.
CO~FRO~TI:\G TilE Nr\1'10:-1 1910·1950 179
According to reliable report received here thc: p,,kj tan Air Force ha
once again bombarded the independent Tnbal Are2 killang hundreds of
innocent and undefended Afghan men, women and children. Radao Kabul
added thu wt~ strongly express our harn:J ofand regret thi unl:lw:ulact of
~sion and human cruell). It i~ very rcgrc:nahle tlut these r.ud~ were
carried out at the ~e moment that Faqir oflpi ent a peale mi aon to
Pakistan ...The Afghan wherever they may be wiU ne\'tr abandon their
10\-e oflibcrty...Afghaniqan is bound to these inno~.:ent and andependcnt
Afghans by numerous tic ofblood, r.tce, religion, culrure and Wlguage.
We wish them peace and prosperil)·.•. Afgh:mi tan's polic.:-y is to pre.en·e
pc2ceful relations with all countrie , e pcd.tlly ~vath our n~ighboun. o
it is our duty to advLe Pakistan to take lc sons from p.ht ha tory and not
repeat the mistakes made by the British. 130
Tribal attendance at jasham m Afghanisr.an, hyperbole and
machismo by the Afghan ruler at public event~. and passionate
warmth towards the Pakhtun fraternity in the Pakhrun -~ontrolled
Mghan national press were aspects of Atghan rolitical culture
which related co internal is ues rather than nccessarUr indicating
c:xpansiorust design. However Zahir Shah and Muhammad Daoud's
questioning of the legitimacy of the Palu~t:.tm o;tate and ih rel.aions
with its Pakhtun population at .an mternational diplomatic level
sugge ted that Afghanistan sought to rcvi e its regional po"itio.n
alongside Pakic;tan. This was proved the ca~e when the Afghan Amtr
called the nation-wide loyajirga-a urnmons which had historically
been reserved for only the mo r crucial momenb of national c;elf-
definition-to djscuss future Afghan policy toward~ Pakistan.m In
June 1949 the Pakistan Air Force dropped bomb on a ho tile !tUhkar
on the Afghan side of the border. Aga•n this was not an entirely new
had occurred during the Britbh period as well, whether accidental or
120. UKHC !Urachi to Commonwealth Rclauun• Otr.cc and li.M.
Amba~~ador, !<2bul, 11 March 1949, abid.
121. ~linistc:r at Kabul to forcagn Offilc:, 5 April I<.14<.1, in IOLC, 'M~hani t.tn-
Paki ran Da pute'. \manulbh Khan haJ ~allul the: Lova)iry,a tn 1923 to
uy to pu h throu~h hi new con mutton N~tltr Sh"h had culcd. a L:<>ya
Juga on hj, usumption of the: amar.uc: 111 1930, and lthar Shahs. pnme
minister had called a Loy~ Jarga in 1941 to asccrtaan ~ nauon ro Jtton on
the War.
 180 f'RONTI£R OF FAITH CO:'\FRONTING THE 1'\ATIO!' 1930- 1950 1St

on purpose. But the Afghan government .ugued that Mghan \ib Propaganda promoting the creation of an independent me of
had been p~rp~sefull) .targeted. In July 1949 the Afghan parliamcl. Pakhtunistan comprised entirely of territories in Pakistan and not
headed by Zalm Shahs uncle Shah Mahmud,w formallyre!IOUI).lC mcorporating the Afghan Pakhrun regions was circulated in London
~he Durand Line and officially claimed the territories to the n.<tci and Washington by the Afghan information ministry in 1951 and
lt. 121 then again in 1960. 127 But while the Afghan government still refu ed
Pakistan sought assurances that Britain would support it on ex to ratify the Durand Line between the two countries, the large:.t
basis of its Commonwealth status in the event of an Afghan J:od direct confrontation between the two states was a five- month clo~ure
across a1 guarantee was not dicital.
· · I:! oi the border from the Pakistan sade following a mob attack on the
. the border· While a lOrm r

Foreagn Office agreed to exert pressure on the Afghan~ Pakist2n embassy at Kabul in 1955.
as necessal}. to prevent an attack from Afghanistan, and pro~i~ The Afghan government was, in the end, unwilling to take the
documentataon to support the maintenance of the Durand Line inC! issue to the point of direct military confrontation, but this did not
preclude once again extending support to the region's mullas to
event of Afghanistan referring the issue to the United Nations'.t:' S!
1ecure their loyalties. Financial and mor".U support was extended to
the end . of the year• 1>a kistan wt'thdrew many of the transit facili!l(! ...
provtded filr Aftgh" · · u;
rhe Faqir of lpi to assist him in 'setting up' the Waziristan Br<lnch
. . .. nastan am ports through the port at Karachi. of the Pakhturustan National Assembly' . 12 A similar organisation
Pakistana A.figha' • •· re 1ataons
· os ci11ated over the next deade. Th' was encouraged in the Khyber region among the Afridis, and Kabul
t\vo governments were reconciled due to mediation by the Ameri.:sn
· · by y·tce President Nixon to J(mchi· 1J;o'. I Radio broadcast a declaration of independence on their behalf ~
government v _ ' a pcrso n aJ VlSlt Haja Turangui and his descendant:> were depicted as heroes and a:.
t h en n.abul and th . .·
. • e apparent openness of Pakistan to the possibili:: champions of Pakhrun ethnic unity,' tO Ilaji Turangz.ai's c;econd on,
f
o a regaonal co n f.e d eranon . consisting of Iran AJigbanisWJ lfli'J Badshah Gul II, admitted that he was approached by the Mghans
Paki
Feroz Kh N
' Stan SUD"o-e 5 t •d b th

· an oon 10 the 1950s. rn When Muhammad Ali Jk1snl

'
e . Y e governments oflskander M.ina, and ~ and offered land and money in Afghanistan to join the 'Pathanistan'
movement and Badshah Gul III moved across to Afghan Kohistan
government pro d
des· d pose and then instituted the One-Unit schct::~ with his family.m In 1960 a lashkarof15,000 men crossed the horder
· agne to balance the E p · iOiif
ro\"nce fW ast akistan majority by merging the from the Afghan side, and the presence of a contingent of the regular
P • so est Paki · . 11:.1.,1
once again . stan mto a smgle province in 1955, theiU5""'. , Afghan army close to the point of the incursion suggested Kabul's
issue was p:rcdctved a threat on their border and the Pakhtunir.J# approval, if not complicity, in the movemcnt.m The object was
· revtve .
127. Pakhruni tan propaganda litc:r.~rure wa~ publi hed and d•nributed hy the:
Afghan Information Ministry. 5« Rahman Pazhwak. p,Jk.htunill•zn, tht
122 Shah \hhmud I d . n~l KbJ4tr PtWtU th~ FOOJS of tht Ntw Stalt of Pakhtunis/.111 (London, n.d ),
/.ahir Shah's c ru.e as pnme minister until 1953wbenM~":. and Rahman Pazhwak, Pt1MtumJit1n, A Ntw Stolt m Cmtral A1ia (l .ondon,
bnet ac.:counr uofutht~ tool~ ~ver. See Edwards, Btfo" Talihan, PP· 61-J IJ
·~ po ttJcal hi 1960)
123 p rc ' Relca.,c Afghan· story.. ~" 128. Warren, Faqir ofIpi, p. 263
'Activtr1 c~ of Am J , 15~ Embassy, Washington', 22 Aug. 1 of tht Ntw St.~It oj
·
124. Mcmora~dum b
April 1949 ·s ~
m;; ·
IOC LIPS/12/1830. ".IP
Secretary of Stare for Commonwealth Reb ,
129 Pazhwak, Palthtunistan, tlx Khy/t.·r Jl.w ar lht Fo<ul
Pa1htunutan, pp. 123-6.
1 130. Pazhwak, Pok.htunistan. tht Khyhtr Pau, PP· 52-3.
UNO, Ma;ch ~~~f, of Documents to Pakistan in E\'ent of Rctdtn-'f
111. Javc:d, HaJI Twrongz.1i, pp. 383 R. J
125. M•Liran. A ttachc to· Afghani , ,, !)' 132. Srcd Abdul Qyddus, AjihoniJtan and Pilk.ist.m: A G~Pr;btu.JI Stu .v
1949, m 'Dtar St2n summaries of mtdligtnct. r -
· ba Razvi•c~Th
126. l\1UJta of~ltlitary
A .
Attach''
c.
OIOC UP '"'·1852
. 1P . -
(Lahore, 1982), p. 116.
' ' ron/IUJ ofPakistan (KMaclai, 1971), pp.l5b-t
182 FRO~ fiER OJ.' f"AITH
rumoured to he an attack on the long-rime enemy of the mu//as ofthe
Akhund GhafTur-ll:tdda~lulla line: the Khan ofl\lur. Theft-~~-----~
prin• the Palci tan anny bombed di idenr in Bajaur,
wa rumoured that L:llw-ai, the one-time ~t of Haji Turat1o"'"l.;3l
power and now the inheruance of hi on • 'vas t~ctcd despite the
Bad hah Gul ' ubsequent denial ofinvolvcmenr in the P4khtuntSUn
movement.
The Faqir of lpi' biographers de cribcd him as ha\'Utg been
motiv-.ucd by orthodox religious principle which were betrayed b\-
thc wc~tern·~ry·lc administration Clitablishcd in Paki tan.S,.. Afi
prop<tgotnd.t suggested that the mullas merely ga\'C \'Oice to
essential conflict between Pakhrun tribal culrure and the Paki.suni.
Punjab cenrrcc.l n.llion state. Political administr.uors belie~o-ed du•
the opposition posed hy the region's mullas was dirc~d) intended
undermine the .mthorit) of the srate.S 1 Between these a um
there emerged a per~istenr truth-that, as durmg the colonial period.
the cl.tim' put fimvard by religious Leaders were not for union
Afghanhtan, hut for greater regional autonomy and recogniuon
133 ~nldu , Ajghanislan t~nJ Palistan, p. 82.
134 \\'arrm's cudy of 1he l'aqir oflpt end~ in 1947 and he suggests
lim 1he mnbihsauoru of the Faqir after this ume wue prim:uily
1-ty hi objection 10 the Western style of 12w in Paliliran. M:ahsud'
irmbrly c:ntl ",th 1he creation of Pilisun, but without anJ attca:.pr
address the 6CCC 'onhr ffiO\'t:mcnc bunched b) the Faq11 m 194
135. Sec 1he cudy of Noor ,\lohamm:ad \Vana Mulb by Akh.u • Ahmed
pent man) years as an otliccr of chc: Pa.kist.in polinalscnice m the T
Areas. The \Van:a ,\lulb refi.t~d co accept the: 'officW' announc:anec
the rdrgtou holtd.ty of Eid b) the ~rare one ~ur and iruisccd dw be
cdchnued 11 ,lay later, on the day decided by him. POlitial p2
1hc cc:n1ral opposi1ion pa~ fUrther ~-on firmed the mullt:t'resourtts
milt. n, triCouragmg him 10 declare ham!>elf'baa ,f \\'aDJ.
ol chc. \\-,u1a \Julia' actJvio~ arc rakc:n from Ak.b Ll' S \hmcd"1
of th( 1\lulh ""oor t.luhammad, as an example ot rru. r .:: I
tnbal iOCie!) an h1~ boQk Rtmlantt anJ {;Qn/TD/m P.dillar: (CamlbriC~
l991),pp. 49-54. Although Ahmed arguot that 'mums and
lobe un.lcr:.wod in terms of che genealogical charter which excludes
from an) inhercnl righc t."<cept by c:xtem2l assocurion', and :attributts
ulnmate irrclevan\"e ro their ronmburion co mba! ot:ga!US2taon. the
of1hc: Wana Mulla demon•ttates the conunuin~ rdel':lilCCofthe
tttb:tl organt~tion, an th1s cue m defiance of federal authonty.
CO=-: FRO~Tl=-'G Ttn: :-;,\TIOS 1'Jl0·19~0 183
their own po,irions as leaden. among rhe tribe . Although the Faqir
obli:;ngly outlined his ambition:. for the creation of an independent
Pakhtun 'tate of which he would be the head in an intt:f\icw granted
to an American journalist in 1950, this w.1 compri ed oldy of an
autonomous \Vaziristan; and the Bad•hah Gul never demon trated
a sec~sionist impulse at all.u• Pakhtuni tan wa~ an obje tive ascribed
to !he Faqir ,of Ipi and Haji Turangz.1.i's three son by Afghan and
Indian propaganda and alarmi t reports in the Pakist.lni pre' . In
essence the Faqir's ambitions appear to have been to the sole right of
representation of the\Vazirs both to the Pakhtun government 0111d to
the Mghan stare.
An autonomous nationalfronlitr
The Tribal Areas had emerged out ofa colonial geography ofimperial
containment. An accepted terrestrial not inn of wh.n constituted the
Indian subcontinent underpinned it~ crc.uinn and lb o~ccommodation
into the tate of Pakistan. 1 As the centr.tl Mu ..lim Lc.1gue party
struggled to deal with the Indo-Pakhun w.u, Afghan belligerence,
the Faqir's movement .tnd general frontier management, the friendly
contact initiated by the Muslim League rowanh the Tribal Areas
was not sustained. In Peshawar Bad)hah Gul I parted way with rhe
Frontier Province Muslim League, saytng thott hi effort to forge a
political unity were not apprwated 111 the face of a battle over political
legitimacy across the country. Meanwhile the Khudat Khidmatgars,
who were most naturally placed to consolidate a P.1k.tstani Pakhtun
political po irion, were facing a witch-hunt and .\Ccus.ttions of national
betraval follo\ving Mghanistan's champiomhip of the P.tkhtunistan
mov;ment, and never ended up extending the remit of their politic-al
influence into the Tribal Arc.1s.
136. Chri~tophcr lUnd, tntcrvu:wwith the: F~qirofl pi, 1950, quu1ed in Warren,
Fatl'roflpt, p. 263. • . . .
137. Gyan Pralush defines thas a rhe 'nalionalt 1 cnnltnermnr an the oncnta!J\t
problcmanc', ''Vnting Pos1 Orlc:nualt 1 I listnneJ of 1h~ I nard World:
Penpcuives from In.iian I II 1onography' 111 Vmayak C h uun\:dt (cd.),
A1apptnt, Sub.Jittrn StuJrn .mJ tiN PoJf(o/IJnwl (l..ontion, 2000), p. 170.
138. Ja~~d. Hap TuranKZJ1i. p. ~89. Ja\ed quotes an tntcrvu:w 1hat he conducted
himself with Bad hah Gul l in 1951.
184 FRO 'TIER OF FAITH CO:":FRONTINC THE NATIOI'i !•HO· IY SO 185

The British colonial and Pakistani nationalist narrati\~ bee of eduation, business opportunities or jobs and claiming domicile
equ~lly confined the Tribal Areas within the firm grip of an etenu:o in the administered districts in order to claim identity cMd nnd
tauc culture. In the NWFP political 'moderrutV' was born as clx pa.>sports \\ithout having to seek the expr~s approval of the Political
:\gent." 1 So although many within the Tribal Are~ may have desired
conj~i?cd twin of the pre-modem, tribal pe~pb of the ~~~»"
the c;ocial, civic and instirutiooal amenitie:. a\..ulable in ndmini)tered
admm1 tereJ areas. Jamiyatul Ulama, the Khudai Kludmatgm ~
dbrricts, the strategic and cultural argument for separ.uion of the
the Mu.lim League alike used ideas of political moderni~·· sooll
region became part of the discourse of the Pakistani nation.
advancc_me_nt and progress to promote their compeun11; ,!Jj::ll
to pr~v.mcinl government--a progress that was neatly define? I:l
oppn:.stson to the tribe and the backward but noble Pakhtuns o: c;x
no~·administereJ highlands. Hence the relationship between ~ie
Tnbal Areas .lnd the administered districts was one of accornrhit~
rather than of shared politics and groups on both sides continued 1
reaffirm tl~e terms ofTribal Areas separateness well after 1947. Tn~Jl
Areas nwltks, maintained by the payment of subsidies by the Palo'1~
1

g overnment• pro1n'ssed to provt'de FWassadars

LL and protect the rt•.iJ'
and warned other mem b ers o f the1r . tnbes
. that .mcorpor:tU·on 111N
P.\kismn would mean paYing · exor ttant taxes and a Joss of pc r.;(lrJl
b' ·
liberty
. . ·
1 ~'~Su · ·11 '
ccesstve ms tary and elected governments, · Jbl
insngare
polltll~al conservatism· military b d th fnfj-btru'(l;CC
devci<>J>mcnt cd .• 1 rava o; e expense o t d ~lcl
. . • ucatton, aw enforcement and legislation; an J J
m the mtractability of the tribes, maintained systems of ,,po
control through political agents Pakhtun . . th TribJI 11.ft"'
and ·11 . d . . · wnters m e -~ L1
c It ~ ad.m~nsstered Pakistan glorified poUtical autonomY .uT~
u ur sstmctncss of tribal Pakhruns maintaining that the ~..
A rca~ w.ts the Ia d f • . ~ l' 141 , Muuffar Syal, Ghulam Nab1 Ch.tknawari, 1\h med Yu uf, ancl ObaJclur
_ .J • n o an independent Islam uncomprOJ1l:..-
muucrnsrr
. . • ' wcste rnssatton
· . and urbanisation I«> Rahman all drew attention ro the: fact that many Y'lung men, mcludang
1 ft th T 'bal Areas in sear,h of edu~•uon and emplo)1ncnt,
D~:. sdent voices from
the pub!' .
the T 'hal Ar .
n eas, servants o
f the <~
.
r•:' cJ th set
em ves, e e n
and whether or not they rerumed to the n a
T 'b I A <> .t mainuincd
rns, m
cvidcn . sc were undl· ce mt'ble. SpoKesmen
._ on all sideS ' ~ homes in admmistered parr~ of Afghani<tan or P01kistan D1 cnr on the
. ~e to the contrary that hundreds of o Pakh(llfl' i rue of Tribal Areas separation de..crvc a far more cornprchcn\lvc v.ntl
msgraung from the Tribal Ar y ung uJ'tl # thoughtful analysis than is po iblc here. Unfortunately '~.c~c are very
eas to Peshawar and Kab 1 • few substantial writings which explore the efforts <>r need ol I nb~l Areu
·I' ·.. ly and tnhally·lmnc~tcd
139. Nurul hlam Mian d . . /'I~,U" men and women to overcome t h e ~tate, rc l~lv 11 , , ..

H((momir Su rcw ~ttennon to this sentiment in hi• r~-t tion of the re .on. See Abubalw' Siddlque' 'Pami.M: I,mt' Nrtt:llt?t
1956) rvry of th~ Tnbol Ar~as Adjoininv0 Wtsl PaliJtllll l ~·)1 Jul 2oof. 'War on T error highlights dc:vtlopmcnl need' Ill
FATA' Tk ~rida 'T,nts (Lahore), 29 )Jn 2004; ~uul 'LeK"~ 1 r~~me
• p. 3 . 111
140. Some: imponant e: -Jjl~ F Faa h~ ouwved i?s utiliry', TM Frid•lJ 1inm, 2 July 2004 for aomc of the
r.ur W.a~ · · .,~mp1esofsuchliteratureareGulAwbKhlll~ "JIIo
...mstan • ankh (B · . .lit~ ll"",d only pubhcly voiced constdcratiuns of the 1' ue.
Sh.ljaray (Pe~ha . an) nu, 1969); Meera Jan Syal, D1 PtP'l'y-d'J
. war, 1988 . Ah ullab vt.__ 1"1.• • j}
n.d.) and Allah B ksh y • san 1'-Llllll, Pakht11t1 ~ril
a usufi, Yw'!ftai Afghan (Kanchi, t960l·
 EPJI.OGUF. 187

the H~dda Mulla at Hadda Sharif now housed a tate-nan matlraSil.l

F~~es of religious law w·ere .,ct up at rate una,er nics, to bnng
tradinonal education into line with the pra~.:tkc of \\'estern
edu~tion. ~I any more traditionally inclined rcligiou holm left to
seck m truction in Quran and b<ldith tudie at in titution in lmha
EPILOGUE P~ WI, Ca.iro and Damascu,,3 and in their place the unh·crsit\~
ISLAMISTS AND THE UTILITY OF tral~~d rel.tgious leadership began to de\'dop a thclllogically derh~
AUTONOMOUS SPACE: FROM THE ~m.on to counter the politic:. of the incre-.1 ingly left-leaning Afghan
AFGHAN JIHAD TO AL-QAEDA mtc~gents1a. \Vhile these universiry-trJ.ined theologian , the rno t
promment of whom were Burhanuddin Rabhani :~nd Gulbuddan
Hekmatyar, appealed co a de-tribalic:ed middle cl.t :&lro cthni
Jn 1973 Zahir Shah's constiruf Une~. they were also being drawn mro a w idcr, glob.1l rcligiou ideology
n;Hion• [ , .• rl· . wnal monarchy was overthro\\on and a through connections with the ~Ju.,Jim Brotherhood in Caim ,and the
1 1" 1' 1mcnt was est3 bli h d Th
by rhc ' more d s e · e parliament was domuu·ed Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan.~
Muh;tmrnad ~~~o~~atc facti~~ of the communist PDPA party"1th ln Pakistan madrasas and marjidJ were drawing 'u/omn, mul!.ls anJ
In Paki.. tan '. . ' t~~ amtr 5 cousin, at its head as prime mini;ta.
1 ctvt1-mJlitary . rudents into national and provincial organi_.uions hy promoting the
P,trliamcnt in • . est~ blish ment had colluded to diSJillSI tdea of a national religious curriculum and the p.lrJmOUIIh)' of Sunni
1958
tare policic!i A ' amJd public suspicion towards poUtic1an>d orthodoxy while religious parties were pres ing fi>r the enfi>rccment
· · mong other ent
Paki t.u1 (1958- ) . .
· A b p J - cf
erpnses, yu Khan, as resiUCI>~ of sharia-based law. Religiously motivated bur untrained 'I !ami t ••
Potkismn' Bengal· ' ~s~tuted. draconian measures to control E.tll
69 1
led by the formidable Abu! Ala MauduJi and hi Jamant-i I lami, and
and the hre..,l .. _ 1 mafJOnty. Hts policies contributed to the o,iJ \li!' th~ scholars of Pakistan's Islam, the 'uMn111, parted Wll.) a poluial
..~Utway o E t Pakis d
Banglade h in
197
1.' Thas . ·
t~ mto the independent ~u:e allies, but each continued to affect rhe prugrcssion of P<lk.istan's
of 1973 wa wri tt e consntunon of the Republic of Pll;isttl hlami~ation.
and namuw 1 l· en, superseding the constitutions of 1956 ard 1962 The 'ulama of Pakistan, dominated by evcral Dcohandi ,• were
n s am as the li .
lcgi !arion Zul£i . re gton of the state and the b:~.''' foe working to strengthen the interior domain of I lam-the maJroJm
a \'Ole ba e Ill s,·~:~~ :hu.tto and his Pakistan People's Pany d and masjitb-and to guard the interpretation of religion jcalou I) .
opposed bv a co-L . unJab, formed a government in J,~ They demanded that religious comment.uor hould ha\e recci\ed
• .u.Ition oppo · . f
t hc)ami}atu] Ulama- . Isl stno~ o the National Awarni Part) Dl
..1

and Raluchi~tiln. }'1 am which together dominated the ~'\\'f? 2. Edward!., Cm~alogus, p. 196
3. Olivier Roy, 'Modem Polinc.U Culture and 'J'r ul!tie~nal Rcss ranee', an Bo
Religion was b . Huldt and Erland Jnn on (ed .), Tht '/'ragt.l; of•IJghanutan (London,
ami Pakic:t In b emg steadily regularised in both Afg~
• etween 1963 d r. . 1988), pp. 106-1 2.
u rb.tni ;uion ilnd
.
an 1980. The press, pattY po11U:S.
government s . . . ._.J. 4. Tahsr Amm, 'Afghan Rc.1~tance: Pat, Present and rurure', ,111an Su~
murgm:tlbed tr·td' . usp1oon 10 Afighanistan inctta;un:•~ (CMomia, 1984), pp. 375 7.
• J nona) rcli . . . _J
5 \luhammad Qasim Zaman, Th~ U/.m111 ,, ( numporarv lll<~m. CuJttHham
, •
pcnod from 19 gwus leaders during the consotutlDil"'
63
lCntrc of rclJg· to. 1978. The state attempted to control the Joal .{Ch.angt (PrincelOn, 2002), pp. 102-10
- aous mstruction, so much so that the old br!Jh r/. '\~mel), Shabb1r Ahmed u~mani, N.ucrns.l.!m Ghorgha htl\1, Sycd
~luhammad Yusuf Banori, Ahmed Ah l.ahon and ,\htnh:anlul llpq
1 ~t hja).
\- ) - .-
.\ al, Stat~ ofMariW/ RJJi.e (Lah ore, 1999), cluptCf 5. lhami.
 188 FRONTIER OF F'AJTH EPILOGUE 189

nor only a cour;c of religious study, but the particular dan-uzi:Jmci In an attempt to shore up pubUc support for the regime, T araki was
Deoband.ln addjrion to the Deoband-modelled madras.a.r~uhllibol removed bnhe Politburo and replaced by hi:. deputy Jlatlzullah Am in.
in the urban cemrcs of Karachi, Lahore, GujranwalaandMulun,m:h When~ proved equally incapable of controlling the situation, the
Institutions were also estabHshed in the administered distriruoib So,iet army entered and occupied Afghanistan in January 1980 to
N\VFP and Baluchistan. The madrasru of NWFP and B.aludiliu:l prop up the weak and unpopular government. Am in wa c.xecuted and
began to induct and rrajn hundreds of exiled Afghan iJard ~ rq>laced bv Babrak KannaL Kannal's government in tiruted a mas~ivc
l\ laududi's Jamaat-i l slami rallied furiously to the support of Af;b dtpopularlon carnprugn along the eastern border, to eliminate the
lslamist!. escaping persecution by Muhammad Daoud's govttnmett cover of human habitation that the suddenly converging and quickly
between 1973 and 1978. <bpersing lashkar formation relied on. This marked t~e tran ter ~f
The year 1978 9, corresponding to the millennium year 1399 Ill the majority of the Afghan eastern Pakhtun populatton and ~~tt­
the hlamic calendar, marked the beginning of a new poliril21 en Soviet organisation to Pakistan, and its consolidation under poltttcal
acrolis the region. In Afghanistan Soviet-inspired officers of r:t management of the Afghan Islamisb in Peshawar. .
Afghan national army deemed Muhammad Daoud unequal to meet In Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was removed from, ~wcr tn .a
the country's needs although his regime was suspicious and heal)' military coup by General Zia u1 I Iaq and later executed. Zta ul I laq s
h,tnded towards possible opponents of the state. His government was hlamist bent led him to increase government support for (and control
overthrown in what was termed the Saur Revolution, to be rep!a."ttt oQ madrasas to impose a mandatory zokat tax, implement some
by a pro ~oviet mWtary regime and the country was renamed t!x aspects oflsl:uruc criminal law and increase the number of 'ulllma on
Dem<~c.:rattc RcpubHc ofAfghanistan (DRA). A newgovemrnentllll ~e parliamentary advisory body, the 'Council of hlar~ic Jdcology'.'
el>tabhshed under Nur Muhammad Taraki but his Marxist-inspired Zia's regime was well disposed to act as patron of the reststance group~.
e~onomic and social decrees made it deep!~ unpopular. Wid~~ PoUtica! organisation of the resistance in Pakistan too~ place under
Ctl)·bao;ed political demonstrations took place and were put doa':l S(ven primary leaders and their political parties: Gulbuddin I lckmaty~
on I~· through Soviet military assistance. In the eastem Pakhtun ~ and the Hizb-i lslami; Burhanuddin Rabbani and the J.unaat t hlamt,
regJons.• deep resentment against land reforms, laws for women's Yunis Khalis and the Hizb-i Islami-yi Khalis; Abdal Rab S~yaf.a.n~
protecn_on ~nd the systematic undermining of traditional rtti~ the Ettehad-i Jslamj; Sebghatullah MujaddiddJ a~~ thcJc.bh 1 Ntpt .'
~oader tn:.~tgated a calculated tribal response beginning in rhe P~ ~1illi; Sayyid Ahmed Gailaru and the Mahaz i Millr lslamJ; and Mull:
unar reg~on and spreadmg across Nuristan and Badlkslun .ilh
Talihan, pp. 65-71, 132-7 for an.upss·' · of t 1te ea~ rer11 Pakhtun mouv.tuon'"
''o_latcd tnbal risings occurring in Paktia and Ningralur as d.
Td_nbaJ .1ashkars formed and attacked military targets to great ~. ~
mobslhing
~1 . . . lemented hctwc:c:n 1977-7. ,, 1t ·,~ ·•mportanr
t perstng q · kl d · • ,, CY..t of tho.c measures were smp ' f> k' , I Lamie t>rsncsples.
Ute Y an untraceably into the surrounding popub~ th z· u1 H was not the author ul a s~un'
to nore at sa aq • · I!ion 1n pnncipk·:. of
The constitution of 1973 rooted_ the wuntry' 1cg• 1• . bod
' ~~thq;~niyya Madrasa in Akora Khattak alone gradu1red at la>1 jil
1 I f I lamk Idcnlogy d~ .sn .1<1Vl~m y
shari'a and formulated the Co~net 0 s nt whkh declared the Ahmcdi
fo' ~~ ;~n s~dent!. between 1945-78. See 'Dam/ Ulum Hi19'j4~i]Yi utlcl
.....n faua-u, /Jrvh ·
I Ia - J
• . -A. 1..:~S
'J& amston --an mcomplere Jjsr of Afghan !1'---
to pulsament. The conrrover..aJ amendmc
.
commumty a non- us 1m m
M t·
.
inonn: communtty was .\l <c:
., d h m•dvcs
II d in 1974
nnn·l\lu~hm
'
Gil~qa~.Y)-a, /1/ Haq (Abdul Haq Number, 1993), pp. 658-81. ~!
10 · ·
although Iegss1auon rcqusnng · · Ahmedis m e..: 1are
d h
1 t
z a ul llatt'• regime.
Rl'siJ~nr:,r;::,~~~~S~Iution Unnuling (London, 2005); Atrun. IIJJ- m order to get tdentit}' d~'Uments was la~ e Sl y ·a' Onhna;"c: ol~tua.lly
1

8. See report in Dawn, March-() . . '{)ril:1lliofl!t Zaman notes that Zia's enforcement o t c ~anthat or the 'uM,J, bv
Anta Sovie J h , . ct. 1979; Davtd B. Edward>. ,,_ l't'>tncted the power of shari'a court~. an~ ther~ ~pugnan c to the sh.lri';'
for a clo, t ' a~ • m ~arr and Merriam (eds.),.AJihan !Uslftll".tt,PP-;M! \'l" tiog 'final authoriry to determsne que 1100'
0
r
89
e constderatJon of the initial resistance; and ~ 'if. in the high courts. Tht Ulama in CnttmfOr<Iry /1/.lm, P· •
190 FRO:o-:TJER 01-· fAITH
Nahi ~luhamrnadi and the} lark:u-i lnqilah·i I !ami. "These resistm:t
II •hers "ho came fO be knO\\n as the 'A(~han l\h~ahidin' and tbcu
pohti al grou1 begun to organise the dhplaced Af~han populauon
Pe haw.tr .tnJ to support the pontaneoU£ tribal and rural mobilisatJom
again t the Afghan hron!mmcnt and the ann) .10
Refugt..'C pouring into Paki ran from At"Rhanisran entered mto the
Trib.tl Area first. De pitc Pakist.mi government effort to~
this di plal:cd population in refugee camp awa't fr:>m the border,!
out of the 278 Refugee Tented Village~ in the ''\VFP rc:mained in me
Tribal Area~. prinuril) in the Bajaur, Kurram and \lorth-\Vaziris
Agcncic~. 11 The Tribal Areas residents aligned them dve with the
rcsistanc;c mobilisation and m the first months of 1979 Mohmand.
Afndi, Wazir and Yusuliai dans met in a jirga and called for an
ass;tult on K.tbul to remove the Soviets. 1 /..«shli:arJ in support of the
Afgh<tn P.tkhtuns formed in the Pakistan Tnbal Are.., an' attacked
m1lit<li'Y columns, official convoys and any accesc;ible DR.\ target.
While Paki<;tan was a wtlling host to refugees and ar ti-.:0\ e1
Mujahidin ba ed in Pe~hawar, domestic concerns meant that the
govunmcnt could not encourage an} direc.t offensive organi ation m
adminhtcred territory so Afghan Mujahidin and Paki tani patronS
of the re(i t.mcc lighters looked to the Tribal Areas a a crucill
area for rcconnai ance. Arms were ~ecreted in the Tribal .Art2S
b) the rc!ooi tance parties to arm fighters cro ing into Af~harustto
and upport the ongoing rdstance inside the councry. Mujahi
\\ould 'a a rule' conduct campaigns in the Afghan border pfO\inccs
where they could ea~ily receive reinforcemenb from the Pakisu:l
ide of the border and retreat back across it if they needed to. The
normal lack of clear di~tinction between the Tribal Areas md the
ea tern Afghnn regions was ex-acerbated as the region became the
forn~.trd point of the Afghan jihad and the first point from which
the re~istuncc could take a stand. 1 Such mtegrarion of the Tn'b11
10. Am1n, 'Afghan Rc: 1 tlllce', p. 380.
11. N~ncy Dupree. 'OcmOt{T'OlphJc Reponing on Afghan Refugees m P
M ,t rn .\.,,J/hAr ,,,. ~~~ /, 1 (Cambridge, 1988), p. S-46.
12. Da\1d ChtfTcll, \f. han .ran in Tunnoil', /nttmlltifiMI Affirm (Londaa.
1%0 pp 1c;-J6.
13. '3 MIG') of \lglun A1r Force downed: ~lujahidin's claim', n.n...., 12 Mn
1979
EPILOGtn: 191
Areas anto the Afghan front was mo 1 uHnplerc in the Kunar-
Mohm..a.nd-Bajaur region where the Mujahidin artillery ofTen i\e
was l<X-ated in Mohmand on the Paki tan ide of the bt)rdc:r.
supponing ;\lujahidin ambu~he and raid on the Afghan idc. 1•
In re ponse, the DRA began to subj(ct Bajaur, ~lohmand, ~orth­
Waziri,tan, Khyber and Kurram on rhe Paki tan ide of the border
to the arne aenal bombardment u ed to tlu h guerrilla fighters
our of the ea.;tem Afghan prO\·inces, IS de pitc objcc tion lodged by
Pakistan at the UN .1
As the war and the depopulation of the e.t rern Afghan province
continued, refugees continued to pour in and to et tic on the Pak.i rani
'de of the border. By August 1980, 90,000 Atgh.tn were reported to
be entering Pakistan each month. 17 A 'working yrnhio is' bcg.tn to
emerge bet\\een Pakistani tribe:.men :1nd tho c refugees who settled
in the Tribal Areas. Refugees grazed livc:.tock on wheat stubble and
offered their services at the time ofharve t.ln return for tolerating the
refuge~. Pakistani tnbesmen 'got labour and fertiliser .tnd could claim
to be upholding Pakhrunwali ho pitality.'11 Ju t ,\ Afghan refugee
beg2.n to settle into the Pakhrun tribal ub istenre farming economy,
eqlW.ly the Pakhrun tribe men were inducted into the Afghan
economy of re~istance. Pakistan - ide: tribesmen were encouraged
by Mujahid.in leaders to farm the highly lucr<ttive poppy crop. The
poppy crop doubled from 1982 3 and by 198R up to 200 heroin
reftnc:rie!> had been set up in rht Khyber .tlonc. 19 Darra Adamkhel
!xr.Aar in the Khyber became the central tran action point for the
sale of Rus tan weapon) capntred by the mujahidin and the trade of
Chine e and American arrnc; coming in as intcrn.uion<tl us~i,t<tnce
to the Afghan jihad. 20 The volume of arms and ammunition being
14. Lcbcy Gr2u and ~1khael Grc:s , Tht SM•t··t·lljgh•m War (Kan a , 2002),
p. 62.
15. 'Booby·mpped toy kill many Afghan ch1ldrcn', /),n ·n, 5 Aug. 1980.
16. 'Pakistan letter to UN \fvh:m Alt.u:k..~',J),Iu•n, R Nn\' 19HO.
17. 'Booby-trapped to}' loll m:any Mghan chllJrcn', /),1 ·n, 'i Aug. 1980.
1 Andre Singer, 'Ahmed on the Afghan Rdi.lgt·c:~·. RAIN (London, 1980),
PP 1-2.
19. lknmul Haq, 'Pak-Afghan Drug Trade an IIi tnrk1l Pcn.pc~m't'', llu.m
Sll7WJ(Califorrua, 1996), p. 95<1.
20 Amin, 'Afghan Rt"Si$tan~o.c:', p. l90.
 192 fRO~TJt:R OF FAI'I H
tmded in Darra supplied the Afghan re istance,and prmed uffiacm
to also arm a number ofgroup from Karachi to K.t hmir.ll
By 198-1 the. \ luphidin ~ained strength and were able to take iw:k
positions on the. Afgh.m .;ide of the border. The offensive roO\~
back into Afghani t.tn and .Mujahidin returned to Paki tan onl) wnh
the wounded or for upplies. ~lany refugees on the Pakistan side
of the border hcgan to travel ~easonally to farm their bnd in 'iitt
areas of Afgh.mistan. 22 A number of road and pa throut,-.b the
region were widened and meraUed at a r.uc: of development whicb
wa~ uneqtutlcd in the Tribal Area~ hundred·year histOt). It
during this period th;tt cvtdence of friction between the Tribal Areas
residents and the Afghan 1\h~ahidin and refugee began to appear. In
South Waziristan IMmphlet~ were distributed calling for the remo•'lll
of Afghan refugee who were said to be threatening the ecurityofthe
Tribal Are;ts .tfter the j.llldola bridge \\"JS destroyed in a ORA attack.
These unri \luphidin entimcnts were encouraged by the K2hW
regime, whllh ho ted a 'I ligh Jirgah of Frontier Tribes' in 19 -.
T ensiom between the rc,ident of the Tribal Arc.l (and those of the
adminbtercd di rrict ), the \fghan refugee:. and ~lujahidin re.nuincd
through to the end of the Sovtet occupation in 1988.~ But despite
increasingly negative propaganda about the refugees. rather dun
threatening the statu!> of the Tribal Areas, the Nghan w:u enhancai
local economic <h:tivity and created an inflow of wealth that reduced
the previou:. reliance on government allowance: .
The tate·condonl'd, incrcll!>ing independence of the Trib2l
Areas wa reflected in account" of mJZJraJas pro\ iding simultaneous
military and religiou training through the recion and cngagin~ loc:l!
Paki tan- ide Pakhrun in the indu tn and ideology of the Af~
jihad.25 A camp called ·~taaskar adda' wa:. e tabli hed in me
21. Arm tradang in the Tnhal Area• wa confined in a n1l'TOW supply
demand intt-raction up 1111 the t.an of the AfghanJihad. Sec chapter 3 fi a
di u sion ol Trihal Areas anns tradmg during the ~riod ofBntish ruk..
22. Dupree, 'Demognph•c Reponing', p. 84B.
23. !hid.. p. 864
24 .\1min G. \\'dnbaum, 'P.tltistan and Afghamsu.n: · c ·~ Rcb:icc-
hip',l'lllan Surt'ry (C:ahfornia. 1991), pp. 503-5.
25. ~lanam Abou l'..atuh and Olivier Roy. lslamut N~ 1« 4i
PalUJan Conn«tum (London, 2004), p. 27.
EPILOGUE 193
Kurram agency, run by Abal Rab Sayyaf and the Etrehac.l·i I lami.
heikh Jamiur Rahman of Kun.tr c tabli hcd the camp I Iuuifa Bin
Yamaan in Bajaur and wa~ reputed to h.we establi:.hcd 250 more:
tr.IUfrasas through the Tribal Are,\ and to have controlled the Naw.l
Pass between Mohmand and Afghan Kunar.26 After 1986 m.tny
Arab '1 Iami t ' arrived to partidp.ne in the jih.ui, etting up C'.unp
m the border region ncar Khost. 'They \\C:.re there for their own
reason , and largely unim;ted,l7 but their offers of assi tan'e were
not refused. The~ actor adhered to a vi ion of a unified, borderlc:s!:
lu lim ummuh, which could be acated through militant mean
and contributed their effort and per onal wealth to the Afghan
1ujahi<lin's resistance cfTort.2 The Arab lslamists numbered
in the thousands, but were org;tni,cd by a core group of Arab~,
mduding Abdullah Azzarn, a Pale tini:tn, nod O<oarna Bin L.tdcn,
the audi di~'ident.l' Connedion hc:twec:n Arab and Paki tnni
Islami t brou~ht Arab mtlitant organi atinn and an ideolog) of
global unification of Mu lim to Po~ki tani m11droias, both in the
admini tc:red di:.tricts and in the: Tribal Area .
Within Pakistan religiou partie trongly supported the war,
despite their growing ho~tility to Zta ul I luq's military rc:gime.10
26. Arif Jamal, 'Reqan', Thr Ntt « (K.1radu), II July 200·t This ~mdal (and
highly poliucally charged) ibsue •II so rc~ciVc~ lmcf attention m the li>llnwing
notcwonhy accounts: Seyyed V11li Reu N,,,r, •The Rise of Sunni ~l1iltancy
in Pal ran: The Changing Rule uf I bnmm and the Ul:una in S1X:1C:t) and
Poliua', Mrxkrn A11an Stud1es (Camhridgr, 2000), p. 150; llu ain ll~qqani,
Paw/an BlltD«n Mos9ue nn.l Md1111,. (Wa hingron, 2005), pp. 185-90;
and Fmlenc Grare, Polttir.J//s/am in tht lndmn Subtontinmt (Delhi, 2001 ),
p. 89. h remain however th;u the rolt', l01.'2tion, enrolment, ,urrirulum,
and miliuot patticip.mon of these madnuaJ i deemrd pro~cn through
a handful of journal• uc account • 11us 15 uc demands comprchc:miv •
schob.rlv anent1on.
27 ,\, pom;ed out by O;avid l~w'ard , GrntnlrJgUS, p. 18.
28. Bany Rubm and Jud1th Cnlp Ruhm, AntJ·AmlriMI/ Tlrrorism tmd tht
MUM/e f'AII (New York. 2002).
29 Zahlh and Roy, IJ/amul NrttJXJrh, pp. 14-7.
30 See Sc)ytd Wal1 Reza N asr on the Jamut a I l.lm1 ~ml !Ia ull latJ, 'I lAmie
Opposstiontothel lamicState:TheJamaat·d lami,l9?7 P.l',lnternalwnal
jourm:/ ofMUIJ/t f'Au Studw (Camhndge, 1CJ<J3). The J.arniptullJbma·)i
hl.un also bcamt- hmule to Zaa'• regsmc, )Tt maintamc:d a vested mtt-rc t
an the: ongoing jihad.
194 FRO:-.;TJER OF 1-'AITH
Deeply im-csted now in the Paki rani nation and it progress, the
'ulama, dominJtcd by Deobandi , described their interest in the wu
a be in~ the defence ofPakhtan's borders and Paki ran's Islam. 11be
Jamiprul Ulama partkularly rallied support for the jihad through
the intlucm:e of its member 'ulama and their m;u/rasas.32 Pilisuni
Deob.mdi supportan..., the jihad bcl{.m to e tabli h their own lwcs
Wana .1nd ~lira.li m r\orth and South-\Vaziristan.33
Both the Pakistana and the Arab-led I !ami ts contributed most ci
their support to the jihud through the Mujahidin leaders. Of these,
two an p.micular organised resistance among the eastern Pakhruns:
f\f.tulva Yunas Khalis, u graduate of I Iaqqaniyya Madra a who
closely lanked to the Pakistani Islamists, ... and Maulvi AtxW Rab
Sayaf who spoke fluent Arabic and was a favourite in the 'e)CS oftbc
wealthy Arabli'. 15 Yunis Khalis' I lizb-i lslami particularly appealed to
eastern Pakhrun tribes, hierarchies and customs, and enli ted man)
of the eastern Pakhrun mullaJ around Kandahar as commanders,
including !\hulva Jalaluddin Haqqani, Maulvi Nizamuddin Haqqani.
Mulla lbr.tham and 1\lul.la Abdur Rahman of Zadran, Haji AM.Jl
~dcr nnd Mulla :\lalang of Kandahar, among others.J6 AbdaliUh
J\ 1f formed the locus of has Ettehad-i l slami around the Af~
rdu ee camp in Pakic;ran, drawing volunteers through the resources
at hi di posal rather than through tribal tie,., Sufi nef\\ orks or derial
authority. Other than the e per;onalities, lesser ~lujahidin le:uiers
such ,1 ~lauh-i llu sain of the afi tribe in Pech esrablhhed himsdf
ar a base in Bajaur, and Bad~hah Gul I, who organised a socien
of Pakhrun voluntccn. tor the Mghan jihad, called Ttbril:-i jun
llllab,31 livcd amon~ the Pakhtuns to channel Arab funds to refugees
31. 1\bdul QJiyyum llaqqam ob$cn."t:d debates bet-ween Abdul Haq and the
m14jahidm, both \f (han and Pa.km.mi, detailed in hi$ ";mess account.
Sahh.uav /J.J AN Ha9 (Akora K.hanak, 1990), p. 290.
32. ;\b.lul llaq'J ~latlrasa H.tqqaniyva hosted muJal:tJrn as dC\-otecs and
honoured guest • Suhb.1tay ha Ah.l-i Haq, pp. 358-406.
33. Jamal, 'Rc am'.
J4. llaqqam, s,,IJ/t,uoJy, p. 216.
.lS. Edward • Cmralogin, p. 266.
.16. ;\ gathcn:J from ,;gncncs on mujahiJin ra,tics in Alt Jalali and Lcsttr
Grau, AJ&h.m Cumllt H'clifart(London. 2001), pp. 168, 213.
37. llaqt(lnt, SJh!Mtay, P· 214.
EPll.OGm: 195
mvolved in the jilJad effort. The e personalities were the primary
links bem-een the Arab-led and Paki tani I !ami t and the eastern
Pakhrum of Mghanist-an, and the linlu through which 0 ama Bin
Laden brought in engineers and hea\'y machinery to help huild road
and depots through the frontier terrirory into Afghani tan to help the
their efforts.
When the Soviet troop:. began to leave Afghani ran in 1988, rhe
administrative landscape of the Pakhrun region wa left rclativc.ly
wu.ffected. Pakistan maintained the validity of the Durand Line,
and of the sta.te of non-admam:.tration of the Pakhtuns buAcring
1ts north-western frontier. But demographically, e~onomk-ally :and
socially, everything had changed. The Atgh.m jihad had pro,oked
the movement and non-genealogically derived rc cttlement of
people, acro s tribe and clan lines, in the P.1ki:.t.m Trib;\1 Artas. Ju ~ t
as the social insularity of the region was disrupted, the Tribal Areas
economy of subsistence farming, local arm tmc.ling and allowances
Wli transformed in a matter of years into a ma:.sivc export indu try of
heroin md weapons. Tribal Areas re·idenr:. were connected, palpably
and current.ly, to the Mghan economy, population und politics while
the policy of c;ocial and political containment and economic control
of the Tribal Areas by the Pakistani government wa abandoned
for strategic reasons. Wealth increa ed dramatically in the region,
although there is lltt.le doubt that this remained in the hand~ ofa few,
rather than being shared across the population.
After the Soviet withdrawal, a government of former Mujahidin
took power in Kabul. Year of bitter in·fighung between them
foUowed unti.l the Taliban, a group of eastern Pakhnan mullas,
\"eterans of the Mghan jihad, aU having received some mac/raJa
training, were provoked by the insecurity and lawlessness of po t-
&niet Mghanastan to assume control and ~et it right themsclve .
They began their campaign an 1994 and by 1997 had taken control
oi22 of Afghan1stan's provinces. The Taliban mullm had almost aU
participated in the anti-Soviet resi tancc, either as cornrnanders in
their own right or as young men growing up in the refugee camps in
Paki tan. But they maintained their provincial affiliation both during
and after the jihad. Their locu of organi· ation during the jihad had
been around the eastern province of Kandahar, and they returned
 196 ~RO:-.'TIER OF FAITH
a lo~"lll mullas to their home village in the rune r~on after the
m tct withdrawal, albeit grcady .;rrengthened through expericntt
and tockpilcs uf we.1pon .
~tulia Omar, who wa~ to organi'e and lead the Talibm.
him elf the village mu/!.1 of Smge ar 1n Kandahar, and \'ll supporud
by friend from hi home. town of Uruzgan: ~lulla Giu.us. M
l\Iuhammad R.tbbani, and Mulla Hassan ..u The TaJib:m laden
org-ani~ed wtder uppon through other local mull11s in the ~eo
Pakhtun region , most of whom had also been mujahidin comm:mdm.
Among these were l\lulla J',;aqib of Kandahar who, it wa ugges-.cd.
h.td been encouraged by the intelligence wing of the Paki tan armv.
the lSI, w hand over rontrol to the Taliban in 1994; l\1ulla Afzal
Nuristan, who h.H.I established an 'Islamic state' in the region a wlr
.ts 1984, N and surrendered authonry to the TaJiban in 1996;<1l and
Mulla Nnsmll.th Mamoor ofShahikot, who played a crucial roleasa
comm.tnder in the T;uiban conquest of Afghanistan.•• In addition
organising .t regional strucrure of Pakhrun control, the Talib:m used
their control to fi>rmalic;e Af~hanistan's position as ho t to A~lcd
J~;lami~t who had come to the Pakhrun regions dunng theji!xul. oow
led by 0 ma Bin Lnden who had succeeded ~luhammad. 1hcse
I lami~t had et up c-.unps dedicated to traimng milnanrs for a
again t the United State ,•2 and a headqarters for their intet'lUiio:W
organisation, Al ~ed.t. 4 ' Under the Taliban the e connections
Afghani tan were enhanced by trong pen.onal commitment surhzs
marrio& c Oct\\cen Afghan women and Ar.ili men.'"
The mullas of the Tali ban regime and it Arab-led supporters
had all along maintained tie' with rc:ligiou parties and t1gures an
Pak.i tnn, particularly tho.e in the Pakistani Pakhrun region b
addition, the 3 million Afghan refugees still in Paki t~. man) of
whom were depend.tnt of Afghan men who rerumed to work
'B. Ahmed Ra3hid, 'F.11th.m: Militantlrlsm, Oil onJ Fu,ulunmtaliim 11: (ftJnJ
Aua (New l l.wcn, 2001), pp. 23-5.
.l9. Ro~. Globalised Islam, p. 284
40. Rashi<l, Talihnn, pp. 28-9.
41. ~I 11)"11S Khan, ' Profile of:'\ek .\loh.unmad", D.n;!t, 19 June 2004
42. Zahab and Roy, lslamut Sttworh, pp. 57-63.
·11. tb.d .• J'Jl· 12-8.
41 Khan, 'Profile ot :-.:ck Mohammad'.
1-:Pn ocm: 197
Afghanic;tan, reinforced a trans-border Pakhrun solidarity which
was increasingly being articulated by P.tkhtun nationali t grou1 in
Baluchistan and the ;-..'\VFP.45 Hen c when the Tnlthan he n to
take control. connection to Pakistani madrauzs, military patron and
a wider Pakhrun identity immeJ ttd) "-ame into play. The Taliban
mullils were ,upp<>rted by the 1 I tor trategic reason , and by the
Dera I mail Khan-ba~ed Pa!J tam rdJgiou party Jamtyatul Ulama-
)i Islam UUJ) for ideological and personal one , a man) C)f the JUI
ulalllll and the Taliban had rudied together in p,,kj tani Dcobandi
madrasJS in the 1980 . It has been :tl"lllr.Hcly pointed out by politiC'.tl
commentators that these supporter enwuragcd the Taliban'
consolidation of post-Soviet Afghani t.m, gripped by ethnic tension,
hi..hway banditry, rural drug Cttltivation, ;\lld \iolent competition
between the Mujahidin successor!..~
But the Taliban had their own intere ts in P.Lki ~t.m ,h well,
demon trating these when they refu cd to ratify the Durand Line.•7
Taliban officials attended a tribal jirga in Mohmand at which they
elicited Pakistan-side Mohmand comrnirrnent to the con tnJdion
of a road aero s the disputed \lohmand border and into the
PaJUo;rani side, by the Tali ban regtme. Dn • b.tron~. traders, umber
merchants, mugglers and arms dealer under the T.tliban regime in
Afghani ·tan targeted the P.tki rani market, u'ing the Trib.U Areas
as the conduit for goods into and out of their coumry. The T.tliban
saw themsdve a fulfilling a religiou ide.tl .md modelled their
go\-cmment as a baltic and replic:lble ~y tern of I Iamie org.tnisJtion,
in\iting madrasa 5Ndent anJ religiou ide.tlist from Paki'>t.tn (and
the world) to particip.ltc in their spiriru.tl-milimry programme for the
reorganisation ofMghani'>tan. The Arab· led militant~ in Afgh.mistan
also cultivated their connections in Paki t.u1 to pull in jih.1di recntits
for the Taliban, some from the Tribal Are.t., but m.tny other~ from a~
far away as Karachi. C1
45. Titu , ll~nOIIl" tht Baltl(h, pp. 67()-.'10. ,
46. Ahmed Rashid, 'Paki~tan aud the Talihan', Tl•r M111011 (l ,.thurc) 5 April
1998.
47, Rashid, T11flbnn, p. 187.
4 'Ttliba.n -illowed to c-on truct road
111 Paki t:lni terntol) ', Frrmtitr H111,
lSAug.tm.
49. 7Ah2b and Roy, /JamUl Nrtworh, I'P· 57-(IS.
 198 FRO!I:TII::R Of FAITII
Together the Taliban and the Arab-led militant presented a
sodal·politi~o.-al model tor Paki ran's 'ulama llami,t , h:l\ing made
Atghani tan a place: where the directive~ of the 'ulama and the
\\Crc p;u:unount.50 Thi model was touted by the]UI as an inspuanoo
for leghlati\'c reform before the larger Pakistani public and parliamem.
and it encouraged vigilante Taliban-style movement in the Pakis
Tribal Arc.ts including one led b) Maulana Sufi ~luhammad \\
drew thousands of .tdherent:. in 1994, and had to be put down
the army •• The T<lliban also drew young madra1.1 students from the
Tribal Arc.ts into their ranks as fighters and commanders. In 1
4,000 NWFP students, many of whom were from the Tribal A1tt§.
migmcd t() Ktbul m volunteer their military service~ to the Talilwt
Among the Pakistani Tribal Areas volunteers to the Taliban was Nck
Muhamnud of W;tna who had studied at the ~ ladrasa Jamia O.uu!
Uloom Wazinstan. 1
P;lkhtun centric and eastern mulla-led organi arion in Afghmisun
once ag.tin drew the Tribal Areas, irresistibly into Af~ni tan
politic now dominated by the Taliban-led ideologic.u and miliwv
sy tem. By the turn of the century, many madras.u and leaders m
the Tribal Area:. publicly demonstrated strong linb to the Talibzn
regime, and pri\-atc:ly maintained connection with the Arab-led
I lami)t in Afghani tan de pite the fact that there \1.'2' nm' rron;r
inrcrnational attention on and condemnation of the T aliban for their
cx~o.cs cs again:.t women and their destrucnon of ancient Buddhist
. tatue in the Bami~'2n pro,;nce, and of the Anb-led lsbmisn
tilr their in\'olvement in attacks on American intere:.t around the
woriJ
\huiJnl Sufi ~luhammad of Swat, the militant anti Ioder
ot the gmup Tchnk a Nafaz-i Shariat-i ~luhammad., ..o
SO. In an addrc to tudcnh and \i~1ting 'lliatM al Darul lflum H:aq<pr..l!)"J.
~luulana S.amiul llaq ~aid that 'Mghanistan's human ngh model
exemplary in the world'. 'Palcistan in search of new oprions for Afg
pr:t(c', Tht Mw/,, (Lahore), 9 ~larch 1998.
51. IU hid, 'liJ/rh.m, pp. 193-4.
52. 'Pak mdcnt rcinfi>rdng Taliban'~ ranks', 1« Fnmhn- Post (Peslmt-2: 11
,\ug. 19'18.
53. 'Prnfile of~ek t-lohammad', Dil'WI'I, 19 June 200·t Also arnottt; thc:sc .ut
~laulana Abdul Kluhq of\Vana.
EPILOGUE 199
puticipated in the Afghan jihad, ~taun hly upponcd the Talaban,
allin<? for Pakistani diplomatic uppon to the new regime.:s. I le in\'ited
the Arab-led I lamists in Afghani tan to the PalO tJru Tribal Atc-J
and offered them both moral uppon nnd personal hor-pitality and
protection. Nek ~luhammad, who e ervice.s to the Taliban brought
him into contact with Arab-led 1 !ami t in the country, retumed to
Wana as a commander with a high profile and wealth having recehcd
substantial gifts of money and militJJ')' aid from them. M,,,JraStlS in the
Tribal Areas were headed by loc.u relig~ou adherent to key Tali ban
figures like Jalaluddin Haqqani. In Waziri tan thi conne~tion \'I'J
particulary strong since many important elf·pmd:umed ,,Jhc:renb of
senior Taliban officials resided here. In addition to -..:ek ~luhamanad,
these ancluded Abdul Khaliq ofMadras;t GuhllJnul Ulum 10 Khaney
Khel North-Wazinstan5' and 'Khalaf:t' who establi-ihed the Khatifa
Madrasa near 1\liramshah, in North \Vazirist.ln.Sb
The. e independent financial, anilatary, diplomatic and ideological
relations between Tribal Areas religious altivist" and the Taliban and
Arab-led Islamists in Afghani tan corre:.ponded ro a new articulation
ofTribal Areas independence from the government to the c.tst. Ulam.1
and mullaJ of Orakzai, Khyber .tnd "'onh and South Waziri tan,
as well as the administered tcrritoncs of I langlt, Bannu and Dera
l nwJ Khan, called for a rejection of the government-sponsored
justice system and a submis:.ion to rhe judicial authority of 'u/ama
and mullas.57 But because the religious directive were not specifically
anti-government, these articulations of autonomy were under rood
to be largely unobjectionable and un internal matter by the Pakhtun
COJ Mum ties of the tribal region.
I September 2001, the ambitions of the Arab-led lslamic;ts in
Af ·!lsnistan came to immediate anention when a carefully planned
attack on America was executed, and the resulting investigation
identified Osama Bin Laden as it!t primary inatiat<>r. The Taliban
rtfu~d to extradite Osama Bin Laden to the United States without
54 Rashid, Talrlt.ln, p. 194.
55. Ow.u Tohid, The W .tmor Tnbei', Ntfl»lint (Kar.tchi) Apnl 2004.
S6 'Milit nr den destro~·cd m l\taram hah', Davm, 16 .i\tar,h 2006.
57. Balnr Shah, The myth ofTahb~niS2tion of Paki tan', lmtitutt of StrlllfKic
Stu.i~; lslatrU~Io.ul Onlrnt Arihtw.
200 rRO:"TIER OF FAITH
proof of hi involvement del'opite pressure from world ~rnmenu
and a deputation of enior political, religiou and militru) o
from Paki mn. In Pili tan the humbt upheld thi refusal the
correct and ncce ary re pono;e to Americ-.m pres urc, and began
mobili c Pak.i rani recruits to reinforce the Taliban in antiap2
of an Amcric:tn attack on Af_~hani tan. The militant put) l..ashbr
T.tyyaba, do ch lmked with the Tehrik-i ~ifaz.-i hui1t
l\.luhammadi (TN ~1), reported the movement of 'thouS10ds
Pakt~t.tnt Pakhtun volunteers into Bajaur under the uper.i • n ri
l\.Lmlan.t 5uti 1\luhammad, where they organised in preparation
jotmng wtth and reinforcing the Taliban militias.58 In Khyber Afridi
tribesmen demonstrated .tg<tinst the American ultimannn, hou
!ilogans in support of Osama Bin Laden. l By the end of October
the TNSM reported that over 30,000 Pakistaru acth·i ts had bctn
sent to Afgh.mtstan through Dir and Bajaur. Of these, 10,000 were
P.tkistan side Pakhtun tnbesmen, who::.e mobilio:ation had been
directly ~olicitcd in an appeal from Mulla Omar.60
After the failure of demand~ to the TaJiban that they hand m-er
0· am.t Bm Laden and other Al-~cda members ro the United
'5tate , U) I d forces bombarded Afghanistan with a \"iew t0 'flushin;;
o t' tht. .\rab-bi Isl.uni~ts. The e Islamisr' immediately retreated
into the topographic and habitariooaJ land..capc of the Pakh
borderland. Month., ofbombardment, ate !lite trackin::. ground uoop
deploJmcnt and intelligence gathering failed to bring the Islamists
h.llld, and it began to he reported that the lslami ts had crossed
the Paki tan- ide Tribal Areas where they had taken refuge
the Paki uni Pakhrun tribe . The first major movement of Arab-led
1 !ami t frutn Afghanistan was into outh-\V.uiri..u.n where rM
were said to ho1vc u<:ed their connections to immediardy marT) local
women und to c tilblish their belonging and di~appear among the
locill populations. These foreign lslamist , rumoured to number
to 600 .tt lhc time, lived locally as Pakhruns, dre"'"~· speaking and
58. "Thous;and of vnluntc:en bound for Afghani ran', rcpottc:d m the
wc:h ltc of the MujahiJ(m Lmhl.ar-l-Taiha, 30 O.:t. 2001. tu
ar~havC'd in the Srpttmkr 11 W~b Archiw MINER I'A pro;rtt.
59. 'falabw take to the mounta.ans', o,/in~ Arw Timn, 6 ()((.2001.
60. "I ~S~I supporters hr:~d for Aighwi,ran', D~n. 28 Ou. 2001.
f.PII OGUI" 201
mO\ing indhtinguishably among the loC'.ll population. From thi
location 'some of them did farming and others jihad.'*'
Link.-. between the Arab-led blami t amlthc TribaJ Area , "'hi\ h
twi once relied on Sufi ~luhammad and other mediators like him in
the Tribal Areas, had engendered social, e unmnk and ideologicnl
connection which accomm<XLucd the Arab-led I larni t into the
dan-based village communities. Oistingui hing the new entrant
from among the tribal de cendant wa made dttli ult by the Pakhrun
cultural principle of accordin~ equal irnporton~e and protection to
family, clan and guests. \ Vhen the Paki rani gm ~rnrncnt, prompted by
me United State:., demanded the e.xtr.tditlOil ofthClic lt)rcign I lamisb
from tribal lands, they were met with ho-,tility .tnd resistance, which
cscalated almost immediately into a full- c.tlc milit.ll')' confronr.ttion.
Much of the resistance to the Paki~r.mi government w.ts motivated
and led by a number of loc.tl religious lc.tdcr:. .tnd vctcr.tn~ of the
Afghanjihadcalling for the protection ofrhc region from uhjugation
by the federal go\"emmcnt and the army. In \Vazirisr.tn, where tics
to me Afghanistan-based lslami)t were trongc:.t, well known
activ ts including ~ek Muhammad, ~1.tulana Abdul Khaliq, ~laulvi
AiJz :\1auh.i Abbas, Sharif Khan und Nur J,Jarn ctllcd lor lcx:al
prottttion to the foreign hlamt r and Shaht...tlb Pahalwan, the
contemporary succes or to the 1\tulla Powindah, decried military
operations launched in pur uit of the I lami t in the Tribal Areas.l>l
The organisation and succe s of the Muttahida Majlis-i J\m;U (the
MMA), a coalition of religious partie led hy the Jamiy.ttul Ularna-
)1 Islam, in tht. l\'vVFP in the clc tion of 2003, added weight to
mesc: demand . 1\laulana Fazlur R1hm.tn, pre:.ident of the Jarniy.trul
Ulama and secretary-general of the l\11\lA, tonk a tmng po:.ttion on
defending Tribal Areas autonomy and ~.tnltity, oppming AmeriC'Jn
mtercst and condemning Pakistani milit.try action .timed at killing
or extraditing foreign hlamist:. from the reginn."3
TribaJ Areas resistance to Pakistan government <Uld US pressure to
extradite fugitives was not only a con pir.lcy between P.llo,t.tni 'u/nmll-
61 Tohid,11ae Wamor Traheb'.
62 IUhimulbh Yusuf1..t1 and Saalah ,\lah uJ, 'Fighung uhsadcs a jarga seck.'
truec', '"Tk Nrt:», 22 M ar~h 2004; 'Wana tnla ruled w hand O\'ef 216
wanted men', 7"/x Nf'Wj, 20 Scptcmhcr 200·4.
63 'Wana operation to harm count')~ Fa1J', D.nzn, 17 cptl'mhtr 2004
 202 FRO!'\IIER OF F.o\JTU F. PI LOGUE 203

I bmi t ;1nd Tribal Areas mullaJ. Non-rcligiou figures suppomd
and reiterated the rand being taken b) the mullas as in tht case
a tonner Tribal Areas senator from Khyber who expressed s
critici m of pre ure from a political part) to encourage the hand-o\"Cr
of I lamist~. aying that 'the heads of political parties ought to :n-oid
interfering' in the afrairs of the T ribaJ Are-J.S.EA Tribal Areas residcn:s
complained at the v1olations of the military action and presstUC
the tribes:• As the PakJstan government's military campai~ to
out elusive AI C4teda members in South-Waziristan continued
tt!. )txth year, a sudden overnight air strike on a madruJil in 8 ·
in October 2006 which killed 82 people, many of them bo} under
the age of 15, provoked criticism across the country.66 Resistancr t
the new government policy of intervention in the region was
morality, di pen~ation of jusrice and moral policing to be negotiated
berwttn the tribe and their mullas.69
The disjunctl.l!e created by the e.xtraordinary event and de tructiun
of the Mghan war disallow., the drawing of dire(. t parallcb hcf\\ecn
the authority and initiative:. of the early f\\cnrieth century mullas
and the religious politics of the Trib.ll Areas rtxhy. llowevcr the
terrain of the Tribal Are:b remains out ·ide ystcm of national
participation and the protection nc~orded to the individual by tate.
The rovemmenr pursue a policy of conciliation toward privileged
ditcs who continually re-enforce a ditTercntiated ct of cultural and
politi~al codes and reject urban liberal critiquet. of criminality and
' disenfranchisement among the communitiCli on culntral ground . It
IS in this emi.ronment that power still accrues to religious leaders a!t

posed more obliquely as in Khyber where the Tamache 1\lulb issued moderators of the north -west frontier's 'tribalism'.
ajatwtl condemning a government-sponsored polio campaign, 52)
that the polio drops were being administered as part of an Amenan
conspiracy.b
The years of the Mghan jihad and the Taliban had once aga:n
entrenched a culrure of autonomous activuv and moth':ttion
the Tribal Areas, and brought new wahhabi influences to bear oo
religion and society. Under the e influences, locaJ mulkzs asserted
a newly narrowed and increasingly rigid set of llamic codes
a brutalitv that edip~ed even the early days of the amr l:il
initiative Criminal transgressors were publicly executed and their
boclie left on dic:play as an example to others. Resident "~warned
to obey religious injunction aga.mst music and \ideo, non-rdig
fe rivity und alcohol, and to grow beards-a direcri,·e reinforced
the de truction of video and music shops and a radio st.arion,
the forced do!iurc of barbers' shops. As government informers and
journalists were routinely c-aptured and e.xecuted, it became elm
th.u the vigilantes were also warning the government to le:m~ public

64. 'Panics warned ag;un t meddling in oibal affairs', Tht NN:S, 4 April
65. Rahimullah \ u~ufUJ, 'No end in ~ighr', Nn.wlmt, April 2006.
66 'BJjaur dt.td were all mllitant1> S.t)'S Mu~harraf, Dm::,, 31 Oct.
'NWJ'P A~ embly condemns Bajaur operatio~·. D.n;;,, 31 0 2006.
67 '\nta polm campaign launched in Landi Koral', DIZf&ll, 2 mba 69. hura pbns peace nmpa~gn : new m1htal) com~anc.Jrr .1ppointeJ for
68 l1h1d H u ain, 'Terror in t.liram•hah', Nro.1l1111, Apnl20 Waurutan', D111:Jn, 6 !'ov. 2006.
 GI.O AR\' 205

f!x:rxah; gbaz.ah war (Urdu; Far i)

Khozi w·.trrior
ghtt (cooking) oil
t,ara Engli hman (white person)
lxuiith S2)ings anributcd to the prophet
GLOSSARY /xJjiz-i Quran one who ha memori cd the Q!tran
haj ~Iu lim pil •rimagc to ~lecrn
hijrat migration to escape
ttkhuml. har.rat, Sujl,foqir titles denoting distinction rcligiou pctsCl':ttrion
within the Sufi tr.tdition hujra an area for entertaining guest
akhuu"'J.•at strength hul.u m.ll government
alim Muslim rcligiou. scholar (pl. 'ulama) ilaqa-yi ghair Tribal Areas (lit. unrel.ncd region)
amil ruler within the Muslim tradition imum; imamalt religious leader-,, term often u~ed
amir-hadshah ruler with temporal and for one th<lt lc;tds the pr.tycrs in the
religious authority mo que; the f(mn.tl ofllce of imam i
lllllf'•bi/ lliiiT/1Wll 71llhi prevention of vice and promotion now only held in rhe Shia tradition.
anal mrmki,. of virtue. f1Zijilah revoha rion
II'Z.at/ free ukh reform
h.til pledge at the hand of a fllibatf Union
spiritual teacher or pir }agir Estate
huz.urg: hm;urgan elder; pl. elders )OmtZQ/ gathering or congregation
crort unit of measurement equal ro Jamhuri; ja mhuriyyat democratil:; dernncr.t~.:y
ten million jihad struggle in the ~.~.tu c of religion
dahslullgardi terrorism Jtrga tribal council
dak mail qafJa retinue
darasgilhJ chools lajir non-belie' er
Jarbar court l.balifo (raliph) highe r tcrnpor.tl authoriry
dargah Sufi shrine in the mu lim world
(l.lm/ harh place of war or per;ccution &lifo deputy; reprcscnt~Hivc
d.ulurb,m.li coronation (lit. turban t)ing) l:handan family. 11 ed also f(>r 'tribe' or 'clan'
tlom preaching mission !haua.lars inform.tllevy lmops
forangi white men VJud mukhtar elf governing
fiztwll authoritative comment by Vmtba crn1on
a religious scholar klh one hundred thou and
fitqir ascetic langarJ:hun.z alm hou c
jirm.m royal pronouncements laJhlar a.rrncd rerinuc
ghairctl honour byajirga large regional tribal cuuncil
206 GLOSSARY Cl OSsARY 207

m41dra1.1 ~luc;lim chool of religiou learning rais governor

Majlis 1 Shur,z \fghan state council (lit. mhmirumul silk handkerchief
gathering of notable ) rifqa-yijihad companion injtha.J
marlm:. centre rinzj cu tom
mali!.: head of the dan or tribe unit, whose Slldar pre ident
authority is o ren(ibly confinned Slldar-i mudarris principal of a mmlras.z
through male con.-emu in the eLm. llljj.ula nashin heir to the pir's title
marl<az centre uryyiJ. sbailth and miyan de'cendcnt of the Prophet l\1uhammad
mmjid mo~que shaikh deputy
mtwlvi; maulana title taken by a religiou •cholar (a/. lhajarah genealogy
nuhmandari hospitality shari'.z hlamic law
mil/at religious community Jharif (the) pure
muhajir,· muhajirin one who performs hij"rat; pl. Jhaakh branch
muhlamim head administrator iharq cast
mujahid; mujahidtn one who wages jthad; pl. lilsi/4 a Sufi order
mull country umnah saymgs or actions attributed
mulla generic term to refer ro the to the Prophet
leader of prayer~ at the masjitl ubli'gh propagation of religion hy prc.~ehing
muriJ devotee of a pir 14jdid elucid<Hion
m llf laufi highest religious authority of ttJ!ih student
Mghan state, an official po-itioo uriqa method
mullahi.la united tllJhaddud violence
muu•djih cash award paid by amir as tmirah biography
mark of recognition. tigah rruce
naih-us sa/t.mate chief minister of state under lthril movement
the Mghan amir 'ulamu Mu lim religinu vcholar (~ing. alim)
ni:uzmnameh constitution wW repre~ent:uive/lawycr
p.zh,zri mountainous/mountain d\\elling fJaZ religious ~crmon
pakhtunwuli unwritten Pakhtun tribal code fJJtljJ deputation
of community living r.:vqf estates granted by the king as
pit spiritual guide, in the ufi tradition a religious endowment
pirimuridi the relationship between f ·,a state
teacher and murid as dic;ciple rebel
qabila; qahail tnbe; tribes charity
qaum nation; used also for 'tribe' m)">tical (Sufi) chant
qaumiy.zt nationalism
qazi judge

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Archive of Pakistan, 1993 2001. Abdur Rahman Khan, Amlf, 16, 17,
Zaman, J\Iuhamrnad Q1sim, 'Commentarie , Print and P.urom_ 18, 20. 30. 36, 44, 45, 556, 61,
'Hadith' and l\ladrJ ;h 10 ~1odern South .\sta', Bulletin cf t!x 101
SthtJol 1 Orttnlttl1md Ajrrran Studits, 62, 1 {1999 , pp. 60- 1. Abdur lUhman of Zadran, l\luUa,
- - • Th~ l.Jit11na m Conttmporary Islam, Custodians of Ch:m~ 194
Princeton Univer.;lt) Pres , 2002. Abdur IU.ziq, Ha.ji, 99, 105, 110,
113, 121
:\fghan Warb, First and Second,
7-8, 11-12; Third {1919), 102·
107, 109-110, 120-121
Afghanisran, 8, 16, 17, 19, 21, 29,
30,45,48,54,61, 70, 74, 77, 78,
82, 87-89, 92, 93, 98, 99, 101-
104, 107, 109. 110, 112, 114,
116, 124, 132, 144, 153, 155,
167, 177, 178-183, 186, 188,
189, 190, 192, 195-198, 201;
1\merican attack on, 200; Arab
kd lsbmi)rs in, 199; authonry
of rhc 'u/amn in, 108, Bnush·
imposed segregation of the
Tribal Areas from, 18; contain
the power of 'ulal'fUI in, ll1 ;
gO\<tmmc:nt of, 100, 110; killing
of Briri h occup)'ing force in, 7;
map of (1889), 11; mea urcs to
cont:tin, 12; J'Vfujaddt.lt)')'a iil~ila
in, 38, nation3.list ~cto~ in, 1,
2; n.monalist Afghanistan, 100;
Pakhrun politic:ll dominam:c
in, 177; religious authorities in,
113; role of religiou~ leadmhip,
4, ~paration of the 'Briti,h-~ide
tribe' from, 14, Sovtct presence
in, 3; So\iet wuhdrawal from, 3;
sy rcms of Sufi rcliSJous practice
in, 32; Tribal Area~ relationship
with,l68
Afghanistan· Khyber Agency border,
106
Afridis, 10, 12, 22, 26, 79, 96, 113,
114, 116, 124, 125, 129, 143,
145, 150, 153, 154, 155, 167,
168, 170,181
Ahmed of R2.i Barcilly, Sayytd, 38,
39,42,91,92,93
Ahmed, A.kbu S., 25, 63, 66, 182
Ahmcdzai Waurs, 105, 108, 121
Ahrars, 156, 157, 165
air attacb/strikes/action/aerial bom·
bardmcnt, 152, 153, 154, 160,
162,178,179,191,200,202
Ajab Khan, 76, 126, 127, 128, 129,
130, 131
 232 •~o~:x 233

Akbar Shah, Sanid (ofSw:u}, 38 arms manufa'"ture and trade. Afl!'han Wars; Durand [,.ill('; Dcra l ma•l Khan, 8, 9, 12, 13. 24,
Akbar, ~lulla Sa~)'id, 61, 78, 96, 191 192 !J:sbian 26. 147, 197, 199
112, 124, 125, 126, 130 Asma t, 54, 92, 93, 9 , 99 Bruce. Colonel, 76 Ou, 12, 23, 47, 48, 54, 74, 0, 86,
Akhund GhufTur-lladda l\lulla Atkar, \1 tlla, 41 Buncr, 39, 41, 42, 54, 92. 93, 95, 93, 98, 104, 105, 106, 123. 138.
line, 48, 50, 52, 55, 57, 59, 66, Azzam, Abdulb.h. 193 101, 104 139, 140. 141 , 159. 163. 173,
102, 112, 113. 115. 116, 130, B~~s.42,46,47 174,200
146, 159, 182 8 Durand Line:, 14, 20, 21, 30, 48,
1\khunuda, l\luUa Abubaku, 41, c 93,101,106,107,109,111,178,
52 Sabra, Mulli S.Jub). 41, 49, 53, 5-' 180. 181, 195, 197
Akhun7~'lda, Mulb l\tahmud, 76, 66, 70, 79,80,83,96, 104,1 Catoe. ow: 165. 167 Durand, .Mortimer, 16, 20
78, 96, 112, 126, 127, 129, 141, 153 Chaklhrra, 46, 47, 86, 122
142, 163 Badshah Gull. 118, 141 , 157, 1 Cluknawar, ~lulla, 48, 53, 59, 62, E
AI Mtyahid, 121, 122, 162 171,183, 194 67,68, 70, 72, 78, 79,80,82,96,
AI Qtcd.t, 4, I 96, 200, 202 Badshah Gul li, 170, 181 97, 106,110,112- 118,124,128. Ell., t"Jrnily and M olly Ellis kidnap,
al Afghani,J.mtaluddin, 89, 103 Badshah Gul lll , 181 129, 130. 136, 137. 138, 151, 76, 127, 128,131,134
Aling.tr, F.tqir of, 74, 79, 131, 135, Bagh, 78, 102, 124, 153 153, 158, 163 Frteh.td i I lami, 189, 19], 194
137, 151, 158, 160,163, 164 Bajaur, l, 12, 15, 16, 17, 23, 34,41 Clumarkand, 71, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97,
Alllndi.tl\lu•lirn Lc.tgue, 156, 157, 46,47,50,54, 72,i4,75,~ 98, 99. 103, 122, 128, 156, 160, F
165, lti6, 167, 168, 169, 171, 80, 92, 96, 104, 105. ll 7, 123. 162
173. 174, 183, 184 138, 140, 141, 142, 164, 1-4. Chamarkandi, Abdul Karim, 45,99 F.tqlro&b:ad, 115
All lnd1a Nauonal (ongrc•s 182, 190, 191, 193, 194, Chubagh ,39, 48,49, 116,159,163 Fa1.lur ltthman, Maubna, 201
(Congre Party), 90, 148, 151, 202 Chishrin-a..32, 36 feud\ in tribal ocict}, 73-78
ISS. 156, 157, 165, 166 Balakot. 39 crurn.L'·12 15, 16, 11. 23, 45, 46, Fronuc:r Cnmc: Regulation, 24
allowances to wbc • 24, 102, 124 Baluchbtan, 11, 12. 16, 93, 1 47, 106 122,173,174
Amanullah Kh:tr ' }1 th, Amir, 3, 188,197 Congress Party, su All India G
88, 102, 103, 104, 106, 110, 112, Baluch,, 7 National Congress
115,116,117,121,130,163 Bannu, 9, 13, 24, 147, 14 , 1· Cunnin~tum. George, 164, 165, Gaibm, S.tyvtd Ahmed, 189
l\ mb,167, 173, 174 151, 152, 153. 159, 166, 199 169 Gandab,68, 72,112,133, 137,158
ArncriC'll, 199 Bark:atul12h, ~lo~ul..na, 95 Canon, George. 23 Gandamak, Treaty of, 14, 19, 101
American: arms, 191; anacl< on Ba~hir, Maubna, 99, 103, 121, 112 GhaOar KJlan, KhJn Abdul, 148,
Afghani tan, 200; con piracy, Bedman1, HaJ• S.:h b, 41,43 D 149, 150, 157, 165, 166, 168,
202; govemmcnt, 180; imcre,~. Bhuno, Zulfiqu Ah. 1 , 1 169, 178
198,201 Bin Laden, Q..am;a. 193, 19-.. 1 Daoud, Muhammad, 177, 179, 186, Gha1.ni, 41 , 43,93
Amm, llalilullah, 189 199,200 188 Gomal Pm, 8, 22, 26, 109
Anrmr, Mo~lik, 72, 133, 134, 137 Birmal, 18-19 Darui Ulum Dc:oband, 55, 58, 88, Guv.1r Mulh, 80, 86, 138
ant1 \mcril:Ul rc:~i,tancc:, 4 Bokhara, 7, 26 89, 90, 100
anti-Amc:m"'llnl 111, 5 Briric:h Fronrier dc:lenccs, 11-14 '" lhut, 159 II
Arab 'I larnist ', 193 also Durand Line ~d.SJ,58,89,95, 100,188
.r\r.tng•. 86 Briti,h: O«UJntion, i, 107, 1 Den Ghazi Khan, 7, 9, 12 Habibullah, Amir, 17, 20, 97, 101,
164; re'i~rance, 120 sn1Zlst:JJ 102
 234 I~DEX
Hadd:a l\lulla ltne, 47, 50, 52, 60,
67, 123. 124, n 147, 149, 1"0, 153, 154. 15"
II;Hida ~11111.1 ~ajmw.idin, 42, 43,
44,~4.56,60
I ladda ~tulia, 2, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48,4Y,50,52,53,54,55,59,60,
61, 67, 81, 84, 91, 96, 110, 168,
187
I ladtl.1 Sharif. 41, 45, 187
I J tddJ, 41, 45, 49, 53, 78, 80, 81,
115, 116, 117; group, 79, 81;
line, 81, 84, <JS, 121, 123, 124,
126, 139, 170
ll.lfit Ji, w
I l.1liz SJhih, 115
I l111imui, 68, 72, 80, 132, 133, 134,
136, 1.17
l L~t}tl~ni, Jal.lluddin, 194, 199
I larkat i lnq&lab·i lsl.uni, 190
!Ia an,l\laul.1na ~lJhrnu<lul, 53, 89,
96,99,148
ll a~,9. 13,24,5S, 147,170
llazrat Ji, 36
I fazrat , 39, 48, 60
llckmatyar. Culbuddm, 187, 189
llmt, 8, 38, 39
heroin, 195; rdineric:s, 191
llinJu Kush, 10, 12, 20, 21,30
llmJus, 150, 16'), 170
lltiitny ofA,j'ghanistnn, 19
I lizh·• llami, 189, 194
IIJzh·• l lami·)i Kl121is, 189
lmJ.adullah, I bji, 53
lndJOI, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 19,
20,21,22.23,24,30,31,32,55,
70, 71,81.~6.88,89,90,91,92,
93, 98, 99, 101, 107, 108, 109,
115, 120, 125, 127, 129, H
156, 157. 15 • 159, 160. 1 •
165, 166, 167, 168, 169, li2.
173,174,176,17 ,187
Indian nationali t , 108, 109
Ipi, Faqir of. sn Muu Ali
Faqir oflp
hlampur, ~hr .m.,d Jan Bads!u!l
of, m Jan Bad h.lh, lir "' :id,
ofhlarnpur
J mail, Shah, 39, 55
J Kamh- Lt Khel, 124, 125, 152
Jabbar Shah, ayyid, 79, 13 , 139
Jacobabad, 7
jaJalabad, 7, 12, 14, 15. 20, 3 Kmokb,39
43, 65, 78, 80, 105, 110, I ll.
114, 115, 116, 130, 136, 144
164
Jamut·i I~lami, 187, 1 , 1
Jamut·i ~lujahidin, 92, 93, 94, •
96, 97, 9S, 100. 103, 10", 109
110, 121, 125, 126, 147, 1
Jamiyarul Ub.m:t·)i Hind (JUH;
147
Jamiyarul Ub.ma ") I 1 Khalis, taulvi Yunis, 189, 194
Jamiprul Ularna-\1 ad (JUS
147, 151
Jan BacL.hah, Mir ay)'id. ~
hlampur, 52, 61, 13
Jandol,86, 139,142,163,192
Jc:bh-a Nijat-i Milli. 1 9
jc:hangir, 28, 34
jih.IJs, 4, 5, 37, 41. 49, 79,
90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 9 ' 103, 1
108, llO, 133. 137, 1 • 1
161, 170, 171, 190, 191-1
199,201,202
t :-.;
jinnah. Mohammed Ali. 156, 157,
165,166,167,169,172,173
Kabul. 7, 1.2, 15. 17, 19, 20, 36, 38,
39, 42. 4 • 50, 53, 65, 93, 100,
102, 105, 111, 114, 116, 118.
119, 121, 141, 164, 168, 173,
176, 178, 179, 180, 181. 184,
190, 192,195,198
KW.t, 7, 10, 11, 93
Kmy ""P ·. 142. 143, 145
Kmd:t ..r, 7, 9, 12, 21, 36, 38, 65,
93, 114, 116, 117, 194, 195. 196
Kanna.l, Babrak. 189
Knlunir, 7, 10, 23, 92, 93, 169, 170,
171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,
192
Klsuri, ~tuhammad Ali, 71, 95, 99
Khaisol'll, 160, 161
Kmjuri, 152. 153, 155, 156, 157,
164
~. 156, 157, 165
Khalil, M ulla, 4 1, l 04
Khm, Oost ~luhammad, 7, 15, 35,
37,39, 42
Khan, Khu hal. 150, 151, 152, 155
Khan, ~asrullah, 101, 102
~. Wali ~tutwnmad, 41
Klur,l39, 140, 141, 142, 159, 163,
182
Kb.ttuk, Khushal Khan, 28
~ Vi.kfot: activistS, 149; Comminec ,
109, 117, 148, 149, 150, 152,
153,156; group, 151; mo\erncnt,
109,122, 148;~. ISO, 153
m:x 235
1\host, 17, 18, 20, 21, 41, 44, 52,
So, 57, 10, 78, 97, 1 n. 114, us.
131, 163, 191
Khudai Khidmatgars,148, 149, 150,
loS, 166, 168, 174. 183, 184
Kh)bcr Paklttunkhwa, 1, 4
Khyber Pa , 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. 22,
106, 10'1, 121, 124, 168
K.h)ixr, 1, 6, 8, 13, 14, 16, 20, 22,
24, 26, 36, 50, 101. 113, 120,
122-130 l.l2, 146, 150, 152,
153. 155, 163, 164, 181, 191,
199,200,102
Kohat, 9, 13, 24, 93, 126, 127, 142,
143, 144, 147, 148, 154
f...oh1 tan, 38, 41, 116, 140, 181
Kotah i\lulla (I hzrar San1d i\laruf
Bcv),41, 42,50
Kuki Khcl, 124, 126
Kuli Khan, Khan Bahadur, 127,
128, 134, 135, 137, 164
Kunar, 15, 20, 46, t8, 61, 105, 188,
191, 193
Kurrarn, 1, 6, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 21,
22, 23, 2-4, 106, 122, 127, 130,
134, 142, 153, 190, 191, 193
L
Labrai, 53, 59, 68, 182
Lala Pir, 78, 79, 97, 113, 163
Lalpura, 15, 16, 17, 20, 68, 100,
106
L.llldi Kotal, 106, 156
Lan downc, Lord, 19
Ll hkar·i Tayyaba, 200
laihkan, 37, 61, 66, 80, 82, 83, 84,
85, 86, 100, 106, 11 3, 114, 115,
118, 129, 132, 133, 136, 137,
140, 142, 143, 145, 151, 152,
236 1:\DF.X •~rn:x 237

153, 154, 158. 160. 161 , 162.
170, 175, 176, 179. 181, 188,
189, 190
LewnnaJ Faqir, 16l
M polirica.l cxploratOI)
Madm, \hulana llu ain Ahmad,
90,91,94,95,99
111cl.frtlllll, 33, .15, 52, 55, 58, 59, 62,
81, 88, 148, 187, 188, 189, 192,
1'.11, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199,
202
M.thaz i ~t.ll. hhuni, 189
~lahrnudulll.t~.tn, Maulana, 53, 89,
'.10,92,96,99, 148
J\Jahsud( ), 10, 11, 16, 17, 22, 70,
96, 108, 11 3, 11 ~. 150, 153, 160,
161, 167, 170, 175,176
.\1alak2nd, 6, 23, 24, 30, 46, 47, 51,
138, 141, 142, 146, 153, 154,
158, 164, 174
~1angab, 11 3,1 14, 171
~lanki Sharif, 41, 43, 44, 47, 50, 56,
81, 166. 167
~lansoor, ,.\ tulia;... ruJa}-, 196
l\laruJ Bey, llauat S.An1d, Kouh
~Julia, 41
masjidJ, 53, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74,
81, 85. 112, 187
~laududt, 1\bul Ala, 187
~htuhrt, 'h 1h1ad:t, 52, 59
M•angul of Sw.n, 12, 47, 81, 138,
139, 140, 141 , 142, 166, 167;
Aht!ulllan.m, 43; \lxlul Khahq,
41, 58; Abdul Wudud, 38, 47,
81, 140, 1·H, 166, 167;Jaham-eb,
34, 59, <;hmn Bad~hah, 139, 140
,\lignuon of 1920, 10&- 110
!\ lilltary: action,
aid, 199; ambiuons,
diplomatic scnicc:s, 138,
ele~ted go,·emments, 1 ,
political depanments. 10;
9; and political Strength.
and rchgiou 1.:ontrol, 115.
religious training, 192;
reprcscntati\-e authorit), 1 •
and r.cttlement 5\U\'t:} 1 106, 107, 114-118, 123. 131,
armed force , 170, ass uncr.
36, 113, 188; ba~e~. 92; brando.
184; budget , 122; C'liJllfW6
122, 159, 202; ~o-apahilitics,
115; centre~, 93; column, 1
160, 190; commandcn, 4, 1
compact, 100; confrontanoc.
135, 181, 201; connccnon. 21
cooperation, 15; roup. 1
encounter, 161; escalanon. 1
c:xpendnure, 122; force.
frontier, 101: prrisorung. U
hintcrl.tnd, 112; indcpcnd.cno:.
44; manocu\TeS,
mobili>iaoon, 12, Sl, 90;
200; operations, 107, 201.
commercial commitments. 1
organi'>ation, 2, 3, ~ 0, , 93,11
patton•, 197; polk), 12;
and camp1-, 106, 122,123;
86; prepared~. 120;
188, 193; n:lauon~. 199,
lOS; o;enice--, 198; trat
summons, 113; system,
tactical leadeohip, 160;
188; ties, 100; "in,g, 96
Mina Ali Khan. Faqir of !pi, 153,
15 • 161, 163, 167, 175, 177,
17 '179. 181,182,1 3
Mifzn, Maulana .Muhammad, 91
99
iohmand (district and people), 1,
12, 15, 16, 17, 36, 41, 44, 46,
4i, 50, 51. 53.- 4, 5S, 61, 66, 68,
i4, 75. 76, 7~. 79, so, 84, 92, 93,
9o, 97, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105,
132-137, 139, 140, 146, 149,
151-154, 157, 158, 162, 163,
164, 170, 1?0, 191, 193, 197
I ghals 28, 34, 128
luhammadi, Mull'l 'llab•. 190
Mujaddiddi, Sebghatullah, 189
lujaddidiyya, .«t Naq hbandiyya-
Mujaddidiyya
bjahidin, 189-197
ru!Lu.passim, ap. chapters 2 and 3
tuu Khd, 7S, 79, 83, 117, 132,
133, 136, 137
lusli.m League, set All lnJia
Muslim Lelaguc
llltahid2 Majlis-i Amal, 201
Nldir Khan (Nad.tr St.'lh), 105, 109,
110,113, 117. no, 153, 163
uddin, Had<h 1\lulla, su
Hadda Mutla 1'\ajmuddin
lqib,Mulla, 196
JqShbandiyya-~1ujaddidiyya, 32,
38.52,55,60,64, 142
NriomJ A w.uni Party, 186
nrcgai. 139, 142
chru, ]:l"'ahulal. 90, 166, 169,
173
Nck ~1uhammad, 198, 199, 201
Nmgnlur, 53, 54, 186
0
Ohaidullah Sandhi, 58. 90, 91, 92,
98,99
Omar, ~Julia, 196,200
Orakzai, 11, 17, 27, 46, SO, 129,
141, 142, 14~. 144, 145, 146,
150, 153, 154, 156, 199
p
Pakhtunistan idea and movement,
168, 174-176, 178, 180-183
Paki•r.trl 165- 202
pan-! !Jmi rn, !l\1, 90, 103
Partition and ~ummunal mas acres,
166, 169-175
Peshaw-u, 7,8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 22-25,
29,34,36,37,42,45,58, 70, 71,
92, 93, 117, 118. 132, 135, 142,
143, 144, 147, 149, 150-158,
170, 171, 17.3, 174, 176, 183,
184, 189, 190
Phuln, 174
P1r Saba, 38, 47, 81
pinmun.lr chapters 2 and 3
Powindah J'azal Din, MuUa, 163,
165
Powindth( ~). 26, 171
Powindah, \1u1JJ, 51, 56, 70, 78, 79,
123,160, 164n,201
Punjab, 7, 13, 26, 170, 182, 186;
annc:."<ation of, 9; frontier S)'lttem,
24; government, 23, 24; western,
8
 238 1:-\DEX 1:-:0J::.X 239

Q Shahj:than Khan, 14<() 141, 142, 159, 166, 167, 173, Wali UUah, hah, 32, 39, 40, 52, 53,
Sher Ah 1\hn, 8 1i4. 198 55,60,88,89,91
~deri})~. 32,36,37,43,53, 60 Shia, 11,22,65, 142.143, 144, 14. Wana Mulla, 1\oor ~1ohammad
~diyani, 79, 139 150, 156, 19 T 182n
Shinwui(s), 12, 16, 46, 50, ·4, 74 Wana, 17, 22, 106, 107, lOS, 116,
R 75, 115, 117, 136. 151, 163, 166, T~.3. 195,196,197,198,200, 170,194, 198, 199
167 202 Waziri tan, 1, 6, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24,
Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 187, 189 Sboaib, Akhund ~luhammad, 36, Taraki, Nur Mohammed, 188, 189 44, 47, so. 51, 78, 92, 93, 96,
lUJ Ba.rctlly, Sayyid Ahmed of su 37,51 tr.ltrahs, 32 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 113,
Ahmed of Rat BarciUy, Sanid Shor Bazaar, 39 Tehrik-i '1\ifaz-i Shanat-i 114,120, 121, 122, 123, 124,
milways, 12, 13, 19, 45, 121, 124, Shuja, Shllh, 41 ~luhammadi, 198, 200 132, 146, 149, 151, 152, 153,
125 Sikh(s), 7, 37, 39, 90, 169, 170 Tirah, 27, 41 44, 47, 50, 5 1, 54, 78, 154, 158, 160, 162, 163, 166,
refugees (since 1970s) 190 3 Singh, Ranjit, 8, 92n 92, 102, 106, 123, 125, 126, 127, 167, 171, 172, 175, 18 1, 183,
RchankcH, Shnhzada(s) of, 48, 51, Sirhindi, Sheikh Ahmed, 32 143, 145, 152, 153, 157, 163 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 199,
112, 138 Soviet(s), 190; anti-So\1Ct jalwi Tochi villcy and pa~ , 11, 22, 160, 200,201,202
roath, 8, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 73, 4; anti-Soviet Mujaludm. 190; 161.175 Wazir;, 10, 11, 17, 29, 97, 106,114,
107, 1211 122, 124, 125, 159, anti-Soviet orgams.ttJon. 1 9; Tochi-Khosr border, 21 152, 153, 160, 161, 162, 163,
164, 184, 192, 195, 197 anti-Soviet re istance, 195, Tori Khel. 160-162 171, 183
Ru ~•a, 8 :trmy, 189; invasion, 31; miliW) tnbal social ·rructure, chapter 3 World War, Fir~t. 7 1, 90, 110
Ru 'i.tn: advance , 101; expansion, assist:tnce, 188; post- ~Jet Turangui, Hajl S:thib (Fazal World War, Second, 162
6; weapon\, 191 Afghanistan, 195, 197; presence Wllhid), 44, 51-54, 57, 58, 59,
Ru, ian,, 21 in Afghanistan. 3; pro-s.mct 60,61,66,68, iO, 72, 74, 75, 76, Y
military regime, 1SS; occupaooo i8-S6, 94-98, 103-106, 11 2-
s in 1988, 192; trOOps. 19-. 118, 126, 128-141, 144, 148, Yaghi,tan, 29, 30, 74, 92, 93, 95, 96,
withdrawal from .V~ 151, 153, 160, 163, 181-183 97, 122, 128
Saadulhh Khan, Sartor F:tqir, 41, 3, 195, 196. ..t-inspim! Turis, 15, 22 Yaqub Khan 14
46,47,49,51,61,98, 138 officers, 188 T~·.99 Yusuflai(&), 9, 10, 12, 34, 37, 69, 74,
atdu Shan(, 43 Sufi Muhammad. Maubna. 1 75, 76, 190
Sa du, 37, 38, 138 200 u
Stifur Rahman, MauJana, 58, 90 Sufism chapter 2; su alsD ~:&"' z
Sandaki, MuUa, 53, 54, 79, 95, 96, of ltachm a11J lznn, "-' Uruted ~arion~. 189, 193
138, 140, Hl Naqsbbandiyya-)1ujaddtd•n"~• USA. 196,199,200,201 Zahir Khan/Shah, Amir 118, 119,
Sana, Mujaddid AJf, 32, 38, 52 O!deriyya 163, 177, 178, 179,180, 186
Sarda Act, 147, 149, 151, 154 Suhr:twardi, 32, 36 w Zia ull laq, General, 189,193
Sarbnn, M1y.1n, 104, 11 8 Swat, 1, 12, 16, 23, 34, 36, 3i, 3..,.
S.trtor Faqar, su Saadullllh Khan, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 4i . 4 "'-ahhabis, 39
Sartor Faqir 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 59. 63. 64, 69. Wahid, Faul, stt Turangui, I Iaji
llhlf, AbJ.U Rab, 189, 194 74, 79, 80, 81, 86, 93, 9 • 104. Sahib
habtpd.tr, 61, 79, 93, 104, 106, 105, 106, 123, 13 • 139, 1
132, 133, 135, 152, 153
FRONTffiROF
A H istory of Religious Mobilisation in the p.Me••
Tribal Areas c. 1890-1950
ana Haroon
fronll'r of f11ttiJ a<~mtnes the hmory of I l.lm-apeciallr m. aflacll
mullaJ, or Musl1m dcrtu m the Nonh-Wc11 Frondet (DDW
Kh) bcr l'akhrunkhw.l). A l.ugd~ autonomous zoac scradclll• . .
boundal) ofl'<~klst.an and Afghamsun,thc rnb.IAiellwaseiC.U 'd
me
,l\ <I str<ltrglc.. buffer 7.01lC for Brm h lndl.a, ;~nd ...kina ......,
allowed lout mu/Lz to .usumc roln of t~mcndous..,._. At. Palldall
m 194 .. , the I nb.al Arc<~ nuint.amc:d ItS st.mu .-• ~ ......
and for the next fifty )""C.lrs the mu/Lu suppo,..a U1Dell IDCibl'w._,
In CX( h.ange ror prot«.tiOil of their VC'\ted lntereiDlft . . . . . ,.,......
( onse<tucnth, the honucr h.u b«ome rhc blmcrlud ol ~
contr.adlttor) pltm/J m ~upport of Pashrun ahald-. ud-colonlal
n.auonalhm, P.aktsunl tcrritori.alum. rd1glous rmnllua, Aflhu
anu Sov1ct resmanc:e, and .anu Amenunism. Coi1lldrriaa chil cenllaly
l Uld 10 bc the current hideout of Osama bm Laden, mae coulda'r be
:a better ume for .a ourc.cbook dcmllng the iaukada of die
P.aknun-Afglumst.an borderland~ t<Xh) :and the tu..mo. oldie_,.,
.md their allies

aJU tbroon tompktrd hn 81\ at hie l.:nl\~nny ia 1991; aM her PlaD ia

2004 wath the dqunment of South A1aan Ha tory M che SdloaiGIOrillal
.1nd Afrun S1udao, l nl\'n It~ of London he held the pe11 . . . . . . . .
pot d<Kror;al fcl~~lup .at the lnnnutc of Hmoricallhn ld '-lGM-05
.and UUYtt a1 Z.J\-cd l:nh-cnnv In l)uhll for IOniC,_... Ia ......... • . .
'Al>rk on lhc 1 nhll Arus .1n.1 ius-. rkcd on dx rile aad .__k " 1M
oflkobandtlshm rnthc nutlr.z ofnonh -.'C:St , . . . , _ Sila_. '•1•
Pakt ·'" U12()()C) me tus been rocan.hmg;and -rililll• ..........,.
nmctccnth <cnturv rcformt tlh ughr and n now . . . . . . . . die I_._
of 8u ncu Adm n u.anon 18.'\ K.1rxh1 a aa le ' • - Pu ( r Ia dw
l)cpanmcnt ofSouaJI)ucmn