Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by
counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered
his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as
such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the
counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal
or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP
issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in
this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of
Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI
of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which
read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil
action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in
the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that
he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San
Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos,
Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed
out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the
civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of
Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy
of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement
in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary
of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs
against appellant..
 VIRGINIA VILLAFLORES, A. C. No. 7504
Complainant,

- versus - November 23, 2007

ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS,

Respondent
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RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by complainant Virginia Villaflores against respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, charging

the latter with Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.

Complainant Virginia Villaflores is the defendant in Civil Case No. 1218-BG entitled, Spouses Sanchez represented by Judith

Medina vs. Spouses Villaflores, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33.

Receiving an unfavorable judgment, complainant sought the help of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) to appeal her case to

the Court of Appeals. The PAO filed for her a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.

On 1 September 2004, complainant received a copy of a Notice[2] from the Court of Appeals requiring her to file her appellants

brief within 45 days from receipt thereof.

Immediately thereafter, complainant approached respondent, who had previously handled her sons case, to file on her behalf

the required appellants brief. Since respondent agreed to handle the appeal, complainant handed to respondent on 8 September

2004 the amount of P10,000.00 as partial payment of the latters acceptance fee of P20,000.00, together with the entire records of the

case. The following day, on 9 September 2004, complainant paid the balance of respondents acceptance fee in the amount

of P10,000.00. These payments were duly receipted and acknowledged[3] by the respondent.

On 21 September 2004, an Employment Contract[4] was executed between complainant and respondent whereby the former

formally engaged the latters professional services. Upon the execution of said contract, complainant again paid the respondent the

amount of P2,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses.[5]

On 14 January 2005, complainant received a copy of a Resolution[6] dated 6 January 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals

dismissing her appeal for failure to file her appellants brief within the reglementary period. Thus, on 17 January 2005, complainant

went to respondents office but failed to see respondent.

After several unsuccessful attempts to talk to the respondent, complainant went to Manila on 18 January 2005 to seek help

from another lawyer who agreed to handle the case for her. On 19 January 2005, complainant went back to the respondents office to

retrieve the records of her case. Respondent allegedly refused to talk to her.

Aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent.

In her Answer,[7] respondent admitted her issuance of the acknowledgment receipts for the aggregate amount of P22,000.00,

the execution of the Employment Contract between her and complainant, and the issuance by the Court of Appeals of the Notice to

File Appellants Brief and Resolution dated 6 January 2005. She, however, denied all other allegations imputed against her. Respondent

argued that the non-filing of the appellants brief could be attributed to the fault of the complainant who failed to inform her of the

exact date of receipt of the Notice to File Appellants Brief from which she could reckon the 45-day period to file the same. Complainant

allegedly agreed to return to respondent once she had ascertained the actual date of receipt of said Notice, but she never

did. Complainant supposedly also agreed that in the event she could not give the exact date of receipt of the Notice, respondent would

just wait for a new Order or Resolution from the Court of Appeals before she would file the appropriate pleading.Respondent further

contended that she had, in fact, already made preliminary study and initial research of complainants case.
 Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, OrtigasCenter, Pasig City, on 17 June 2005.

On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his Report and Recommendation, [8] finding

respondent liable for gross negligence and recommending the imposition upon her of the penalty of one year suspension, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be declared guilty of gross negligence
in failing to file the required appellants brief for which act she should be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year. Also, it is recommended that the respondent be ordered to return the amount of P22,000.00
that she received from the complainant.

Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution[9] No. XVII-2006-584 dated 15 December 2006, approving with

modification the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents gross negligence in failing to file the required appellants brief, Atty. Sinamar E.
Limos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with Warning that a repetition of similar
conduct will be dealt with more severely and ORDERED TO RETURN the amount of P22,000.00 she received from
complainant.

The core issue in this administrative case is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants

case as would warrant disciplinary action.

After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and the

recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and, thus, sustain the same. Respondents conduct in failing to file the appellants brief

for complainant before the Court of Appeals falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their

clients cause.

The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained.[10] To establish the professional relation, it is sufficient

that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession. [11]

It must be noted that as early as 8 September 2004, respondent already agreed to take on complainants case, receiving from

the latter partial payment of her acceptance fee and the entire records of complainants case. The very next day, 9 September 2004,

complainant paid the balance of respondents acceptance fee. Respondent admitted her receipt of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee for the

legal services she is to render to complainant and P2,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses she is to incur in handling the case, and

the subsequent execution of the employment contract between her and complainant. Hence, it can be said that as early as 8 September

2004, respondents rendition of legal services to complainant had commenced, and from then on, she should start protecting the

complainants interests. The employment contract between respondent and complainant already existed as of 8 September 2004,

although it was only reduced into writing on 21 September 2004. In short, respondents acceptance of the payment for her professional

fees and miscellaneous expenses, together with the records of the case, effectively bars her from disclaiming the existence of an

attorney-client relationship between her and complainant.

No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause

of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.[12] Among the

fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination,

that is, until the case becomes final and executory.

As ruled in Rabanal v. Tugade[13]:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion
to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
 legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much
is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.

Respondents defense that complainant failed to inform her of the exact date when to reckon the 45 days within which to file

the appellants brief does not inspire belief or, at the very least, justify such failure. If anything, it only shows respondents cavalier

attitude towards her clients cause.

A case in point is Canoy v. Ortiz,[14] where the Court ruled that the lawyers failure to file the position paper was per se a

violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code. There, the Court ruled that the lawyer could not shift the blame to his client for failing to follow

up his case because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client of the status of cases.

Respondent cannot justify her failure to help complainant by stating that after receipt of part of the acceptance fee, she did

not hear anymore from complainant. The persistence displayed by the complainant in prosecuting this complaint belies her lack of

enthusiasm in fighting for her rights, as alleged by respondent.

This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high

standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his

full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Certainly, a

member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from the

perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.[15]

A lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and he should provide a quality of service

at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his clients

counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the

character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor, and

his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently.[16]

Respondent has obviously failed to measure up to the foregoing standards.

It may be true that the complainant shares the responsibility for the lack of communication between her and respondent, her

counsel. Respondent, however, should not have depended entirely on the information her client gave or at the time the latter wished

to give it. Respondent, being the counsel, more than her client, should appreciate the importance of complying with the reglementary

period for the filing of pleadings and know the best means to acquire the information sought. Had she made the necessary inquiries,

respondent would have known the reckoning date for the period to file appellants brief with the Court of Appeals. As a lawyer

representing the cause of her client, she should have taken more control over her clients case.

Respondents dismal failure to comply with her undertaking is likewise evident from the fact that up until 19 January 2005,

when complainant retrieved the entire records of her case, and more than four months from the time her services were engaged by

complainant, respondent still had not prepared the appellants brief.

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states:

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

In this case, by reason of respondents negligence, the complainant suffered actual loss. Complainant faced the risk of losing

entirely her right to appeal and had to engage the services of another lawyer to protect such a right.
 This Court will not countenance respondents failure to observe the reglementary period to file the appellants brief. Counsels

are sworn to protect the interests of their clients and in the process, should be knowlegeable about the rules of procedure to avoid

prejudicing the interests of their clients or worse, compromising the integrity of the courts. Ignorance of the procedural rules on their

part is tantamount to inexcusable negligence.[17] However, the matter before us does not even call for counsels knowledge of procedural

rules, but merely her managerial skills in keeping track of deadlines for filing necessary pleadings, having difficulty with which, she

could have always opted to timely withdraw from the case in order not to prejudice further her clients interest.

The failure of respondent to file the appellants brief for complainant within the reglementary period constitutes gross

negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon,[18] this Court held:

An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del
Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the
duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration
of justice. (People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the interest of complainant, respondent indeed

violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special

privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its

expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or

omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.

In People v. Cawili,[19] we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary period is an offense that

entails disciplinary action. People v. Villar, Jr.[20] characterized a lawyers failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable

neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held that the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client,

but also to the court. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon[22] reiterated Ford v. Daitol[23] and In re: Santiago F. Marcos[24] in

holding that an attorneys failure to file a brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence.

In cases involving a lawyers failure to file a brief or other pleadings before an appellate court, we did not hesitate to suspend

the erring member of the Bar from the practice of law for three months,[25] six months,[26] or even disbarment in severely aggravated

cases.[27]

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS is hereby SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will

be dealt with more severely. Furthermore, respondent is hereby ORDERED to return the amount of Twenty-Two Thousand Pesos

(P22,000.00), which she received from complainant Virginia Villaflores.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be

furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7021

MELVIN D. SMALL

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DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Melvin D. Small (complainant) against Atty. Jerry Banares[1] (respondent) for failure to
render legal services and to return the money received for his legal services.

The Facts

On 30 August 2001, complainant engaged the services of respondent in connection with several complaints to be filed
against one Lyneth Amar (Amar). Complainant paid respondent P20,000 as acceptance fee.[2]

On 4 September 2001, complainant gave respondent P60,000 as filing fees for the cases against Amar.[3] Respondent then wrote a

demand letter for Amar and talked to Amaron the phone. Respondent also informed complainant that he would be preparing the

documents for the cases. Complainant consistently communicated with respondent regarding the status of the cases. But respondent

repeatedly told complainant to wait as respondent was still preparing the documents.

On 5 January 2002, complainant required respondent to present all the documents respondent had prepared for the cases

against Amar. Respondent was not able to present any document. This prompted complainant to demand for a full refund of the fees

he had paid respondent.[4] Complainant even hired the services of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo to recover the money from respondent. But

respondent failed to return the money. Hence, complainant filed a case for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) against respondent.

On 15 October 2004, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit his answer to the

complaint. Respondent did not file an answer despite receipt of the order.

On 21 January 2005, IBP Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes (IBP Commissioner Reyes) notified the parties to appear

before him for a mandatory conference on 3 March 2005. Only complainant appeared at the conference. As there was no proof that

respondent received the notice, IBP Commissioner Reyes reset the mandatory conference to 30 March 2005 and, later, to 14 April

2005. Respondent was warned that, if he fails to appear at the conference, the case will be considered submitted for resolution.

On the 14 April 2005 conference, only complainant appeared despite respondents receipt of the notice. The Commission on Bar

Discipline considered the case submitted for resolution.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

On 14 July 2005, IBP Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation (Report) with the finding that respondent failed

to render any legal service to complainant despite having been paid for his services. The Report considered complainants evidence

sufficient to find respondent guilty of violating Canons 16,[5] 18,[6] and 19[7] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). IBP

Commissioner Reyes recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years and

that respondent be ordered to return complainants P80,000.

In a Resolution dated 12 November 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report. The IBP Board of Governors

forwarded the instant case to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[8] of the Rules of Court.

The Courts Ruling

We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The Code provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.[9] The Code states that a lawyer shall keep the

client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. [10]

The records show that after receiving P80,000 respondent was never heard from again. Respondent failed to give complainant an

update on the status of the cases. Moreover, it appears that respondent failed to file the appropriate cases against Amar. Respondents

failure to communicate with complainant was an unjustified denial of complainants right to be fully informed of the status of the

cases. When respondent agreed to be complainants counsel, respondent undertook to take all the necessary steps to safeguard

complainants interests.[11] By his inaction, respondent disregarded his duties as a lawyer.

The Code also mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys of his client that may come into his

possession.[12] Furthermore, a lawyer shall account for all money received from the client and shall deliver the funds of the client upon

demand.[13]

In Meneses v. Macalino,[14] the Court ruled that:

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.Consequently, if the lawyer does not use
the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.[15]

Respondent specifically received P80,000 for his legal services and the filing fees for the cases against Amar. Since respondent failed

to render any legal service to complainant and he failed to file a case against Amar, respondent should have promptly accounted for

and returned the money to complainant. But even after demand, respondent did not return the money. Respondents failure to return

the money to complainant upon demand is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity. [16]

Moreover, respondents misconduct is aggravated by his failure to file an answer to the complaint and his refusal to appear at the

mandatory conference. The IBP rescheduled the mandatory conference twice to give respondent a chance to answer the

complaint. Still, respondent failed to appear, exhibiting his lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. [17]

The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the attorney. In

this case, respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the Bar.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Jerry Banares GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 18 and Rules 16.01, 16.03, and 18.04 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility.Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two years effective upon

finality of this Decision. We ORDER respondent to RETURN, within 30 days from notice of this decision, complainants P80,000, with

interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this decision until full payment. We DIRECT respondent to submit to the

Court proof of payment within fifteen days from payment of the full amount.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney.

Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and

guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101374 July 30, 1993

FORTUNE LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., respondent.

Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision of public respondent Court of Appeals, dated February 7,
1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21046; and its resolution dated August 12, 1991.1

The antecedent facts, briefly stated, as follows:

In Civil Case No. 85-29991, entitled "Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Fortune Life and General Insurance Company, Inc.," the
Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment dated November 21, 1985, in favor of the plaintiff, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court orders the defendant (Fortune Life) to:

1. Pay plaintiff (Delsan) the amount of P1,952,302.00 with double the ceiling as that prescribed by the Monetary
Board after thirty (30) days from submission of proof of loss to defendant;

2. Pay plaintiff (Delsan) the sum of P50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;

3. Pay plaintiff (Delsan) the amount of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

4. The cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 2

On December 11, 1985, private respondent Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. filed a motion for execution pending appeal. It invoked as
"good reason" petitioner's alleged fraud and deceit in not informing the former of the latter's change in corporate name. Its motion
was supported by a bond which states, in relevant portion:

"NOW THEREFORE, we DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC, as Principal and FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND
INSURANCE CO. INC., a corporation duly organized and existing under the (sic) virtue of the laws of the Philippines
with principal office at 7th Floor, Victoria Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, Philippines, as Surety, hereby jointly
and severally bind ourselves in the sum of PESOS, FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) only, Philippine
Currency in favor of the appellant in the event the case judgment in the case is reversed by the Appellate Court. 3

The motion was opposed by petitioner. While the motion was pending, or on December 20, 1985, petitioner filed its notice of appeal.

On January 2, 1986, the trial court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was
denied. The Sheriff garnished its bank deposit and levied upon its properties. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. The trial Court's order granting the writ of execution pending appeal was set aside on the ground that, inter alia, the
alleged "good reason" of private respondent was sufficient to justify the issuance of said writ. This Court affirmed the action of the
Court of Appeals in G.R. No. L-75461.

On August 16, 1986, petitioner filed before the trial court an application for damages against the bond and private respondent. This
was opposed by private respondent, citing Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. — Where the judgment executed is reversed totally or partially on
appeal, the trial court, on motion, after the case is remanded to it, may issue such orders of restitutions as equity
and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

On 11, 1988, the trial court issued an order which, in part, reads:

Factual background of the case which gave rise to this application for damages, show that a decision was rendered
by the Court against the herein defendant, and on December 20, 1985, the latter filed its Notice of appeal; a motion
for execution pending appeal, was filed by the plaintiff and on December 11, 1985, the plaintiff offered to post a
bond in support of its motion for execution pending appeal, conditioned "to answer for any damages which the
defendant may suffer by reason of the execution . . ."; that on the basis of the said offer, the Court granted execution
pending appeal in its Order of January 2, 1986, fixing the amount of the bond at P500,000.00; on March 31, 1986
the plaintiff filed a surety bond which, however, is different in tenor and condition from what the plaintiff offered.
The Court, laboring under the terms of plaintiff's motion, issued a writ of execution pending appeal. The said variance
 in the conditions between the bond offered to be file and that which was actually filed remains unexplained, in fact
they discovered said variance only after this application was filed. The Court needs to receive evidence to enable it
resolve the issue whether or not, such bond filed should answer for any damages sustained, and if in the affirmative,
the extent of such damages. The resolution of the said application for damages at this stage will facilitate the
conclusion of the entire case for all parties, in that any appeal will comprehend in a single instance the incident at
bar along with the main case, which also will be economical in money and in time for the parties and the courts as
well.

The Court therefore resolves to receive evidence against the plaintiff and the First Integrated Bonding, Co., Inc., on
the application for damages.4

The trial court then proceeded to receive petitioners evidence, having issued an order on December 18, 1989, ruling that private
respondent had waived its right to cross-examine petitioner's witness. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied on February 6, 1990.

On March 5, 1990, private respondent filed another motion for reconsideration assailing the trial court's jurisdiction in issuing the
orders dated August 11, 1988, December 18, 1989 and February 6, 1990. It prayed that records of the case be elevated immediately
to the appellate court pursuant to the notice of appeal which was filed by petitioner.

On May 15, 1990, the trial court denied private respondent's motion, based on the following:

Submitted for the Court's resolution, is a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 5, 1990 filed by plaintiff alleging
that appeal having been perfected, this Court has already lost jurisdiction to entertain defendant's Application for
Damages filed on August 16, 1986, so that all orders of this Court relative to said application, more particularly the
orders dated August 11, 1988, December 18, 1989 and February 6, 1990 should be set aside as null and void.

Defendant, in its Comment/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration on March 26, 1990, argues that the rule that
once the appeal is perfected the Trial Court loses its jurisdiction only comprehends matters subject of the appeal and
not those purely collateral or supplemental, and lying outside the issues framed in the appeal. Defendant also invokes
the rule that damages enforceable against a bond, supporting a provisional relief dissolved because improvidently
issued, must be proved before judgment in the main case becomes final, or the same will be barred.

The Court agrees with the defendant's statement on what the rule is in (sic) respect to proceedings to claim
damages on a bond. More appropriately since the records of the case are still with the Court and have not been
elevated to the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court has already ruled with finality on the impropriety of the levy of execution pending appeal on
defendant's properties. This Court as far back as its order of September 9, 1988 had already declared that the
resolution of the said application for damages will facilitate the conclusion of the entire case for all parties — any
appeal will encompass the main case as well as the present incident to pave the way for a single decision of all
litigated issues. The former counsel and all the parties have even agreed to this procedure for reasons above stated.
This is in accord with law and jurisdiction, not to mention sound procedural policy.5

Thereafter, private respondent filed a portion for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before public respondent Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the August 11, 1988, December 18, 1989, February 6, 1990 and May 15, 1990 orders of the trial court to prohibit
the trial court from conducting further proceedings; and to compel the trial court to forward the records of the case to the appellate
court since it has lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the appeal of petitioner.

On February 7, 1991, respondent court ruled in favor of private respondent. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are hereby granted, and the orders of August 11, 1988, December 18, 1989,
February 16 (sic), 1990 and May 15, 1990 are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent court is ordered to
desist from further proceedings in Civil Case No, 85-29991, and ordered to elevate immediately to this Court the
records of the said case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

For lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration was denied in its resolution dated August 12, 1991.7

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

The sole issue raised herein is: upon perfection of petitioner's appeal of the trial court's decision, does said court retain jurisdiction to
hear the application for damages against the bond that was posted in support of private respondent's motion for execution pending
appeal?

Petitioner insists that even upon perfection of its appeal from the decision on the merits, the trial court retains jurisdiction to hear its
application for damages. The general rule is, petitioner states, once the appeal from a trial court judgment has been perfected said
court loses jurisdiction over the case. By way of exception, it retains jurisdiction, inter alia, to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. Under the facts of this case, upon
perfection of the appeal to respondent court, the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the case only insofar as the subject matter of the
appeal is concerned but not the right of petitioner to recover damages against the bond. The cause of action in the first is the occurrence
of the risk insured under the marine policy whereas in the second, it is the breach of the condition in the bond, to wit: "to answer for
any damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of the execution." Granting arguendo that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the claim for damages, private respondent is estopped by laches from raising the same.

The decision and resolution of respondent court, which petitioner asks this Court to set aside, deserve our affirmance.

There is no controversy that the appeal of petitioner has been perfected. As a necessary consequence thereof, the trial court was
divested of jurisdiction over the case.8 Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court mentions three (3) instances when the trial court is
allowed to exercise "residual" jurisdiction after the perfection of the appeal, namely: (1) to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; (2) to approve compromises offered
by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court; and (3) to permit the prosecution of pauper's
appeals. Petitioner relies on the first instance as basis for its stand that the trial court has the authority to hear its application for
damages. Its reliance thereon is misplaced. Although the application for damages is beyond the scope of the matter to be litigated by
the appeal, there is no "protection and preservation" of its "rights" to speak of. Respondent court was emphatic in its disquisition on
this subject matter:

The private respondent's application for damages being heard by the respondent court may not be considered an
exception to Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The provision speaks of "protection and presentation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal." The action for damages, in fact, and in
actuality, however, is an act of vindication, is punitive in nature and not an act to protect and preserve, but to punish
and make one party, the petitioner, to pay damages for having availed of a writ of execution pending
appeal. . . .9

xxx xxx xxx

It is, moreover, clear that the pursuit of damages against the bond posted by the petitioner in this case, is a futile
undertaking for by its express language, approved by the respondent court, the bond may only be answerable in
damages where two conditions concur: one, that judgment has, in fact, been rendered on appeal, and second, that
the judgment appealed from has been reversed on appeal. The very proceedings before the respondent court, now
sought to be struck down, are the very reason preventing the realization of these conditions. 10

Thus, the trial court had no more jurisdiction to issue the disputed orders inasmuch as the case had already come under the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of respondent court.

Nor are we inclined to sanction the application of the doctrine of estoppel by laches to the prejudice of private respondent. This doctrine
is an equitable principle applied to promote but never to defeat justice. 11 It should be noted private respondent opposed petitioner's
application for damages by citing Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and, in effect, questioning the trial court's jurisdiction thereon.
Additionally, private respondent set up the defense of lack of jurisdiction, in its motion for reconsideration dated March 5, 1990. There
was no unreasonable delay by private respondent in assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court. Adherence to our exceptional ruling
in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy 12 and other cases is unwarranted. Instead, we uphold the fundamental rule that a court of justice could only validly act
upon a cause of action or subject matter of a case over which it has jurisdiction and said jurisdiction is one conferred by law, and
cannot be acquired through, or waived by any act or omission of the parties. 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1991 and its resolution dated
August 12, 1991 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 528 October 11, 1967

ANGEL ALBANO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the Philippine
Bar. In a letter dated June 20, 1962 addressed to this Court, complainant alleged that during the Japanese occupation his mother,
Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized,
respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another
lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees. It was then alleged
that during the hearing they were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that they as well as their co-
plaintiffs in the case promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-¹/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages. A
copy of such document was attached to the letter. The more serious charge was that the signature therein appearing, purportedly that
of the complainant, and the writing after the name of his mother were not made by them. It was further stated that the Honorable
Delfin B. Flores, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, submitted the document in question to the National Bureau
of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as NBI) together with samples of his genuine signature. A copy of the finding of the NBI was
attached, the conclusion being that the questioned signature "is NOT in the hand of the person whose sample signatures were received."

Complainant stated that being a poor man, he could hardly pay for the services of a lawyer to assist him in the disbarment proceedings.
He added the information that respondent Coloma "is a very influential woman in the province of Ilocos Norte" as she was then a
member of the provincial board. The prayer was for the "kind and generous help regarding this matter in order that Atty. Perpetua
Coloma may be made to stand before the bar of justice and disbarred from the practice of her profession as a lawyer."

In a resolution dated July 20, 1962, this Court required respondent Perpetua Coloma to answer the complaint. The answer came in
September 4, 1962. There was a specific denial of the allegation that the complainant was "a victim of injustice," respondent alleging
that the same was "untrue, unfounded and imaginary." While admitting that her services were contracted by complainant and his
mother and their co-plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 4147, she stated that there was a contingent fee of one-third (¹/3) of whatever land
and damages could be obtained for the plaintiffs. She denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of such civil
case as the record would show that she filed "more than twenty (20) papers and pleadings, went to trial for several days and with the
assistance of her sister, Atty. Oliva D. Coloma, obtained a favorable judgment in the Court of First Instance for the petitioner and his
co-plaintiffs and filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals a thirty-five (35) page brief, finished after careful, conscientious and
exhaustive study and preparation." She attached a copy of the favorable decision rendered by Judge Simeon Ramos of November 10,
1948;1 the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 13, 1950, confirming the above favorable decision, which was
penned by the then Justice Gutierrez David;2 and the dismissal of a petition for certiorari to review such decision in the resolution of
this Court of January 10, 1951.3 Then came a reference to a decision by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10563-R, the complainant
as one of the plaintiffs having appealed from an order of the lower court, sustaining her lien upon the judgment as well as "her share
of one-third (¹/3) of the lands adjudicated" which according to the lower court however would require that the proper action be filed.
In the opinion of the Court of Appeals penned by Justice Sanchez, now a member of this Court, an evaluation of her service was made
thus:

"Appellee served as plaintiffs' counsel for a period of about seven years. The record shows that she was diligent in her work. That she
had rendered valuable services cannot be doubted. In fact, the final decision favorable to plaintiffs is almost wholly the result of her
efforts. Literally, she gambled on the success or failure of the litigation. She was a member of the Bar since 1940. Gauged by the
familiar rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney, . . ., we feel, as
did the trial court, that appellee is entitled to one-third of all the lands and damages recoverable by plaintiffs under the judgment of
the Court below."

She likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she served "faithfully,
efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity." Her dismissal then, according to her, "was made without cause
and without the consent of herein respondent and only on June 18, 1951, when the undersigned had already won the case for them in
the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals." In view of the failure of the new lawyers retained to be at times available in
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and as pleadings by opposing counsel were still sent to her and out of loyalty to her former
clients she continued "to render professional legal services to complainant and his mother." Then came the allegation "that after the
case was won in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, complainant and his co-plaintiffs stopped seeing the undersigned and even
disowned their contract with her in the trial of [her] petition to record attorney's lien which was granted by the trial court and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals." Copies of the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, were submitted together with the
answer.4 She characterized as "false and unjust" the averment of complainant "that the latter and his mother did not sign Annex 'A'
because they really signed the instrument in the presence of attesting witnesses who testified to and confirmed the signing of the
same, which fact (of signing) was found and confirmed by the trial court after and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, . . . ."

Then came the denial of the allegation of complainant that due to the seriousness of the charge, Judge Delfin B. Flores submitted the
alleged falsified document to the NBI for examination, the truth being that it was complainant who did so. She likewise "specifically
denies the authenticity and veracity of the alleged findings of the National Bureau of Investigation on Annex 'A' because the signatures
therein are genuine and have been found to be so by the trial and appellate courts after hearing the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses and comparing the signatures in Annex 'A' with signatures admitted to be genuine by the complainant as well as upon the
affirmation of complainant's sister and a co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4147." She then referred to a rule which she considered well-
settled in this jurisdiction that a question of whether or not a given document is genuine falls within the general knowledge and
competence of a judge who may inquire into its authenticity, the testimony of instrumental witnesses sufficing, without the court being
bound even by real experts. Nor could she agree that the complainant was a poor man and could hardly afford the services of a lawyer
because thru her efforts, he and his co-plaintiffs were richer "by about P100,000.00 (P85,000.00 in realty and P15,000.00 in cash as
damages) by winning Civil Case No. 4147 for them" notwithstanding, which ingratitude had been her reward. Respondent also denied
the insinuation that she was using her influence as a board member. She stated that from 1944 to 1951, when she rendered her
services for complainant, she was in private life, not having been elected to the provincial board until 1959.
She concluded by saying that "during her practice of law for more than twenty (20) years [she] has strictly adhered to the ethics of
the profession and has always been guided by the principles of justice, fairness and respect for individual rights and that as a public
official, [she] has never used her influence to corrupt public servants or ordinary citizens, and all the people of Ilocos Norte well know
that complainant has no sense of justice, no integrity to preserve, no honor to treasure and no future to build. On the other hand, the
people of said province have faithfully supported [her] in her aspirations, first as councilor and then as board member with
overwhelming majorities. Said support speaks of vindication and means full faith and credit to [her] integrity, ability and honesty."
She further submitted as affirmative defenses the cause of action being barred by (1) prior judgment and (2) by the statute of
limitations. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against her.

The matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated
September 7, 1962. On September 12, 1967, the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General was submitted. He asked "that
this case be dismissed." We grant such a plea.

In his report, the Solicitor General noted that in the investigation conducted on his behalf by the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte, "only
the complainant appeared."5 No evidence was introduced by him other than the NBI report on the alleged falsified signatures. He
manifested that all his evidence could be found in the records of Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte.6 Respondent on her part, according to the Solicitor General, "merely filed a manifestation to the effect that the contract for
attorney's fees in question had already been declared genuine and authentic by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, the Court
of Appeals, and this Honorable Court, in their respective decisions, copies of which were attached to her answer; that said Contract
was signed by petitioner and the instrumental witnesses thereto in her presence; and that she was submitting the case on the annexes
to her answer and the transcript of the trial of the proceedings on the recording of her attorney's lien in Civil Case No. 4147. . . ."7

The facts as found by the Solicitor General in so far as the services of respondent as counsel for the complainant and his mother were
concerned reveal the utmost diligence and conscientiousness on her part. What she said in her answer was sustained in all respects.

The express finding was then made by the Solicitor General that the question of the genuineness and due execution to pay respondent
her attorney's fees "had already been litigated by the parties in the course of the proceedings for the recording and enforcement of
the attorney's lien of respondent in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte; that the plaintiffs in said case
(one of whom is the complainant in this case) denied the genuineness and due execution of said agreement Exh. 'A'; that they had full
opportunity to present evidence in support of their said contention; that after hearing, the trial court found said document to be genuine
(pp. 43-48, rec.); and that on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said court likewise found said document genuine . . ." 8

On this point an extended excerpt from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the opinion being penned as noted by Justice Sanchez,
was quoted. Thus:

1. Exhibit A, the written contract of professional services, shows that appellee, as plaintiffs' attorney, is entitled to one-third
of all the lands and damages which may be awarded plaintiffs; otherwise, if the case is lost, then appellee is not entitled to
compensation.

That Exhibit A was duly executed is a proven fact. A witness to that document, namely, Sergio Manuel, testified that the cross
after the name of Delfina Aquino was placed by her and that the signature of Angel Albano, one of the plaintiffs, is the genuine
signature of the said Angel Albano. It is true that on the witness stand Delfina Aquino denied that she placed a cross after the
typewritten words "Delfina Aquino" in Exhibit A, and that Angel Albano likewise denied his signature therein. Suffice it to say
that this negative testimony will not prevail over the positive testimony of appellee and her witness aforesaid. People vs.
Bueno, 41 Phil. 447, 452; People vs. Ferrer, 44 O.G., No. 1, pp. 112, 115.

Further, appellee's evidence on this point is not limited merely to Exhibit A. The record shows that previous thereto, there
was a verbal agreement regarding said attorney's fee's. On this point, appellee finds corroboration in the testimony of Rosario
Lagasca, a blood relation of plaintiff and Silvina Guillermo.

Plaintiffs' evidence that in 1955 appellee undertook to take up the case of plaintiffs for a stipulated contingent fee of P2,000.00
does not merit serious consideration. It does not seem probable that appellee would take the case on a win-or-lose basis, i.e.,
for the sum of P2,000.00 in case the litigation is won and nothing in case of loss, because at that time P2,000.00 was worth
only a few gantas of rice. No lawyer in his right mind would accept such a miserable fee.

The following testimony of Felicidad Albano, one of the plaintiffs, given in an obviously unguarded moment, stripped plaintiffs
naked of the pretense that there was no such contract for one-third share as fees:

"Q — Did you not authorize your brother, Angel Albano, or your mother, to give one-third (1/3) of all the
properties and damages?

"A — We authorized them." Tr., p. 8, Galapon.

The court below, therefore, is correct in declaring that, after weighing and considering the evidence of both parties, Exhibit A
is genuine. (pp. 61- 62, rec.)9

The Solicitor General thus concluded that the finding of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and of the Court of Appeals that the
questioned document "is genuine, is now res judicata and bars complainant Angel Albano (one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147)
from raising said question anew in these disbarment proceedings. As repeatedly held, the fundamental principle of res judicata applied
to all cases and proceedings, in whatever form they may be (Brillantes vs. Castro, L-9223, June 30, 1956, 99 Phil. 497; 60 C.J.S. 31,
267), and a party can not escape the bar of a judgment against him in a new suit on the same cause of action by varying the form of
his action or adopting a different method of presenting his cage (Wensel v. Surigao Consolidated Mining Inc., 57 O.G. 6958; Vda. de
Padilla vs. Paterno, G.R. No. L-8748, Dec. 26, 1961; 50 C. J., S. 98)."10

It was noted further that there was no oral testimony as to the alleged falsification, except the report of the NBI, lacking in persuasive
force in that it failed to state the reason or basis for its conclusion. The observation of the Solicitor General here made is both pertinent
and relevant: "The mere conclusion in the aforesaid NBI report that the signature of complainant Angel Albano on the document Exh.
A was not written in the same hand that wrote the genuine specimens of his signature, without any reason or reasons supporting it,
is, therefore, of little or no value in evidence and consequently, it cannot support the present charge of falsification against respondent,
apart from the fact that, as already stated, it is inadmissible on the ground of estoppel by judgment." 11 On the reasonableness of the
contingent fee collected by respondent, the Solicitor General adopted the same view found in the decision of the Court of Appeals,
already referred to being part of respondent's answer, that such indeed was the case.
The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant and his co-
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their
agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for
them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and genuineness of
their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, . . . ."12

He was of the opinion then that even if for purposes of said case the findings in judicial cases could not be considered binding "it is
safe to conclude, from a review of the evidence in said court proceedings taken together with the evidence before us in this case, that
respondent may be exonerated herein."13 With such a conclusion of the Solicitor General, this Court, to repeat, is in full agreement.

Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely
of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled
to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if
after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an
eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services
to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.

There is this additional point to consider. As Cardozo aptly observed: "Reputation [in the legal profession] is a plant of tender growth,
and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."14 This Court, certainly is not averse to having such a risk minimized. Where, as in this
case, the good name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard of the truth, an action prompted by base
ingratitude, the severest censure is called for.

Certainly, this is not to say that if a case were presented showing nonfeasance or malfeasance on the part of a lawyer, appropriate
disciplinary action would not be taken. This is not such a case however. Respondent, as has been so clearly shown, was in no wise
culpable; there is no occasion for the corrective power of this Court coming into play.

WHEREFORE, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member of the Philippine Bar, is hereby dismissed.
 [G.R. No. 106194. January 28, 1997]

SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF
NORBERTO J. QUISUMBING, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, annulling certain orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 in Civil Case No. 10513, entitled Norberto J. Quisumbing v. Philippine National Bank, to wit:

(1) Order, dated March 30, 1990, granting petitioner Santiago Land Development Corporation's motion for intervention and
order admitting its answer in intervention;

(2) Order, dated March 21, 1991, denying private respondent Quisumbing's motion to quash or disallow interrogatories and

(3) Order, dated July 30, 1991, denying Quisumbing's motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Norberto J. Quisumbing brought an action against the Philippine National Bank to enforce an alleged right to redeem certain real
properties foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank. Quisumbing brought the suit as assignee of the mortgagor, Komatsu Industries
(Phils.), Incorporated.

On November 21, 1989, with notice of the pending civil action,[1] petitioner Santiago Land Development Corporation purchased
from PNB one of the properties subject of the litigation, situated along Pasong Tamo Extension in Makati, for P90 Million.[2]

On December 11, 1989, petitioner SLDC filed a motion to intervene, with its answer in intervention attached, alleging that it was
the transferee pendente lite of the property and that any adverse ruling or decision which might be rendered against PNB would
necessarily affect it (petitioner).[3] In its attached answer, SLDC, aside from adopting the answer filed by PNB, raised as affirmative
defenses the trial court's lack of jurisdiction based on the alleged failure of plaintiff Quisumbing to pay the docket fee and Quisumbing's
alleged lack of cause of action against the PNB due to the invalidity of the deed of assignment to him.[4]

On February 7, 1990, Quisumbing opposed SLDC's motion for intervention. He argued that SLDC's interest in the subject property
was a mere contingency or expectancy, which was dependent on any judgment which might be rendered for or against PNB as
transferor. He further argued that the allowance of SLDC's motion would only make the proceedings complicated, expensive and
interminable.[5]

On March 30, 1990, the lower court issued an order granting petitioner's motion for intervention and admitting its answer in
intervention. The court also directed the substitution of heirs in view of Norberto J. Quisumbing's demise and submitted for resolution
PNB's motion to dismiss.[6]

Petitioner SLDC, as intervenor, then served interrogatories upon private respondents and moved for the production, inspection
and copying of certain documents.[7] SLDC wanted to know whether there were documents to show that a consideration had been paid
for the assignment of the right of redemption; if so, whether payment was made in cash or by check; and, if it was by check, in what
banks the checking accounts were kept and whether the checks were still in its custody or possession.

Private respondents filed a motion to quash or disallow the interrogatories, which petitioner opposed. Subsequently, private
respondents filed a reply to which petitioner SLDC responded by filing a rejoinder.[8]

On March 21, 1991, the trial court denied private respondents' motion to quash or disallow interrogatories and instead granted
petitioner SLDC's motion for the production, inspection and copying of certain documents. [9] Private respondents moved for a
reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the lower court in its order of July 30, 1991. Private respondents therefore filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision, now the subject of this review, setting aside the orders
dated March 30, 1990, March 21, 1991, and July 30, 1991 of the trial court.

In its petition before the Court, SLDC contends that the Court of Appeals erred thus:

[1] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION AND/OR WAS PATENTLY
IN ERROR IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND RULING UPON THE FIRST ISSUE RAISED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CA-G.R. SP
NO. 25826 WHEN THIS ISSUE WAS NOT EVEN RAISED BY THEM BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.

[2] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION AND/OR WAS PATENTLY IN
ERROR IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION RAISED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 25826 SINCE THEY
DID NOT RAISE ANY JURISDICTIONAL ERROR THEREIN BUT ONLY RAISED QUESTIONS AS TO PROCEDURAL ORDERS ISSUED
BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE RIGHTFUL EXERCISE OF ITS JURISDICTION AND DISCRETION.

[3] EVEN IF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS AUTHORIZED TO PASS UPON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION RAISED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 25826, IT ERRED IN BARRING THE TRIAL COURT, IN THE SOUND EXERCISE OF ITS SOUND
DISCRETION, FROM ALLOWING PETITIONER TO INTERVENE IN ONE OF THE CLASSIC OR RECOGNIZED INSTANCES OF
INTERVENTION IN THE CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION 2 OF RULE 12 OF THE RULES OF COURT DESPITE COMPLIANCE WITH
THE STANDARDS FOR INTERVENTION PRESCRIBED THEREIN.

[4] THE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED PETITIONER OF THE RIGHT TO GENUINELY OR EFFECTIVELY DEFEND ITSELF IN THE
CIVIL ACTION DESPITE ITS HAVING ACQUIRED A REAL AND SUBSTANTIVE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CIVIL
ACTION.

[5] PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES IN THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES
OF COURT AND THEY WERE THEREFORE BARRED FROM RAISING THEIR OBJECTIONS TO THE INTERROGATORIES.

[6] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO QUASH PETITIONER'S
INTERROGATORIES.[10]

Petitioner's contentions are without merit.

Petitioner's first contention is without basis in fact. The fact is that the issue regarding the propriety of petitioner's motion for
intervention was raised by private respondents before the trial court in their opposition to said motion. [11] Moreover, petitioner SLDC
is estopped from questioning the appellate court's ruling on this issue since petitioner did not object to its consideration by the court
in its comment on the petition filed in that court.[12]
 Nor is it true that private respondents' petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals did not raise a jurisdictional question. The
petition specifically charged the RTC with gravely abusing its discretion in issuing its questioned orders, in granting petitioner's motion
for intervention and in denying private respondents' motion to quash or disallow interrogatories. Clearly, the Court of Appeals correctly
took cognizance of the issue regarding the propriety of petitioner SLDC's motion for intervention.

This brings us to the main question raised in the third and fourth assignments of errors, namely, whether petitioner, as
transferee pendente lite of the property in litigation has a right to intervene.

Rule 12, 2 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Intervention. A person may, before or during a trial be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he
has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof.

The question is whether this provision applies to petitioner in view of Rule 3, 20 governing transfers of interest pendente lite such
as was alleged in the trial court by petitioner. This provision reads:

Sec. 20. Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless
the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original
party.

In applying the rule on transfer of interest pendente lite (Rule 3, 20) rather than the rule on intervention (Rule 12, 2), the Court
of Appeals stated:

While it may be that respondent SLDC has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation, its interest as transferee pendente
lite is different from that of an intervenor. Section 2 of Rule 12 refers to all other persons or entities whose legal interests stand to be
affected by a litigation, but it does not cover a transferee pendente lite because such transferee is already specifically governed by
Section 20 of Rule 3. Otherwise, Section 20 of Rule 3 on transferees pendente lite would be rendered ineffectual and useless. Since it
specifically covers transferees pendente lite, any such transferee cannot just disregard said provision and instead, opt to participate
as an intervenor when it is more convenient for it to do so. Indeed, there has never been a rule, authority or decision holding that a
transferee pendente lite has the option to avail of either Rule 3, Section 20 or Rule 12, Section 2.

. . . It has been consistently held that a transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as its predecessor-in-interest,
that is, the original defendant. . . . However, should the transferee pendente lite choose to participate in the proceedings, it can only
do so as a substituted defendant or as a joint party-defendant. The transferee pendente lite is a proper but not an indispensable party
as it would in any event be bound by the judgment against his predecessor-in-interest. This would be true even if respondent SLDC is
not formally included as a party-defendant through an amendment of the complaint. As such the transferee pendente lite is bound by
the proceedings already had in the case before the property was transferred to it (Jocson vs. CA, 183 SCRA 589, citing Fetalino
vs. Sanz, 44 Phil. 691; Associacion de Agricultores de Talisay Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294)

Petitioner asserts that Rule 12, 2 and Rule 3, 20 can be applied interchangeably and that the Court of Appeals is in error in its
insistence on the application of Rule 3, 20 solely.Petitioner thus overlooks a substantial difference in the nature and consequences of
the two rules. The purpose of Rule 12, 2 on intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party to protect his interest
and the court incidentally to settle all conflicting claims.[13] On the other hand, the purpose of Rule 3, 20 is to provide for the substitution
of the transferee pendente lite precisely because he is not a stranger but a successor-in-interest of the transferor, who is a party to
the action. As such, a transferee's title to the property is subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation and is in no better
position than the vendor in whose shoes he now stands.[14] As held in Fetalino v. Sanz:[15]

As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in
the case before the property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have
been bound by the judgment against his predecessor.

How then can it legally be possible for a transferee pendente lite to still intervene when, for all intents and purposes, the law
already considers him joined or substituted in the pending action, commencing at the exact moment when the transfer of interest is
perfected between the original party-transferor and the transferee pendente lite? And this even if the transferee is not formally joined
as a party in the action. On the other hand, one who intervenes has a choice not to intervene and thus not to be concluded by any
judgment that may be rendered between the original parties to the action.

Because the transferee pendente lite simply takes the place of the transferor, he is barred from presenting a new or different
claim. The appellate court therefore properly refused to pass upon petitioner's attempt to inquire into the consideration paid for the
assignment of the right of redemption to the late Norberto J. Quisumbing, as well as petitioner's claim that the transfer of interest to
Quisumbing was made in violation of Art. 1491(5) of the Civil Code, prohibiting attorneys from acquiring property or interest which is
the object of the litigation in which they take part as such. This matter was never alleged by PNB in its answer to Quisumbing's
complaint.

Since petitioner is a transferee pendente lite with notice of the pending litigation between Quisumbing and PNB, petitioner stands
exactly in the shoes of defendant PNB and is bound by any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against PNB. [16] Under
Rule 3, 20, the action may be continued against PNB, the original defendant. In the alternative although it was not essential that the
transferee be substituted and the latter insist on such substitution the trial court could have directed that petitioner be either substituted
as party-defendant or joined with defendant PNB.[17]

But petitioner could not be allowed to intervene for the reason already stated that the conditions under which one may be allowed
to intervene are significantly far different from the conditions under which a transferee pendente lite is substituted in place of the
original party. For the fact is that an intervenor can withdraw and refuse to be bound by any decision that may be rendered in the case
but the fortunes of a transferee pendente lite, although not formally impleaded as a party, are bound up with those of his transferor.

With respect to the fifth and sixth assignments of errors, suffice it to say that because petitioner did not have a right to intervene,
it did not have the right to file interrogatories or seek the production of documents by private respondents, either.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 106194. August 7, 1997]

SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF
NORBERTO J. QUISUMBING, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner has filed a motion for reconsideration to which private respondents, heirs of Norberto J. Quisumbing, have filed an
opposition. Petitioner has in turn filed a reply. Petitioner maintains that, as purchaser pendente lite of the land in litigation in Civil Case
No. 10513 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, entitled Norberto J. Quisumbing v. Philippine National Bank, petitioner has a right to
intervene under Rule 12, 2.

First. Petitioner points out that Sen. Vicente J. Franciscos book on the Rules of Court (Vol. 1, page 719), which the Court cited in
its decision, in turn cites Moores Federal Practice (Vol. 2, page 2307) which actually supports petitioners right to intervene. Petitioner
states:

9. Prof. Moore, in his above-cited treatise, cites among others a case decided by the Supreme Court of California for the proposition
that intervention of a purchaser pendente lite is recognized by the U.S. courts. (Ibid., Chapter 24.03, page 19, note 49; See, e.g.,
Dutcher v. Haines City Estate, 26 F. 2d 669 [CCA Fla., 1928]; State ex rel. Thelen v. District Court for Toole County, 17 P. 2d 57, 93
Mont. 149 [S.C. Mont., 1932]; Bily v. Board of Property Assessment Appeals & Review, 44 A. 2d 250, 353 Pa. 49 [S.C. Penn., 1945];
Miracle House Corp. v. Haige et al., 96 So. 2d 417 [S.C. Fla., 1957]).

The Court cited Sen. Franciscos work on the Rules of Court only for the proposition, not disputed by petitioner, that the purpose
of Rule 12, 2 on intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party to protect his interest and the court to settle in the
process all conflicting claims. Since petitioner is not a stranger in the action between Quisumbing and the PNB, petitioner in fact having
stepped into the shoes of PNB in a manner of speaking, it follows that it cannot claim any further right to intervene in the action.

Nor do we find the cases said to be cited in Moores Federal Practice supportive of petitioners right to intervene in this case. The
first three cases (Dutcher v. Haines City Estate, 26 F.ed 669 (CCA Fla., 1928); State ex rel. Thelen v. District Court, 17 P.2d 57, 93
Mont. 149 (S.C. Mont., 1932) and Bily v. Board of Property Assessment Appeals and Review, 44 A.2d 250, 353 Pa. 49 (S.C. Penn.
1945)) involve purchasers pendente lite in execution or sheriffs sales, not in voluntary transactions. The difference is important. In
voluntary sales or transactions, the vendor can be expected to defend his title because of his warranty to the vendee. No such obligation
is owed by the owner whose land is sold at execution sale. In fact the buyer at such sales takes the property subject to the superior
right of other parties. Thus, in Dutcher v. Haines City Estates, supra, in the action brought by Dutcher against the Haines City Estates
to claim a lien on certain lands, it was held that a bank, which subsequently obtained a judgment against the Haines City Estates for
a sum of money and bought the lands being claimed by Dutcher, was entitled to intervene. It was held that the title of the bank is
superior to any lien asserted by appellants [Dutchers and company]. ...It is immaterial that the title was acquired by the
purchaser pendente lite, as it is valid and cannot be affected by the pending litigation.

In State ex rel. Thelen v. District Court, supra, Ke-Sun Oil Co. brought a suit to quiet title against Sunburst Oil & Refining, Oil
Well Supply and Ferdig Oil Co. Oil Well Supply, which had a lien on a property belonging to Ferdig Oil, foreclosed the lien and the
property was sold to J.N. Thelen. It was held that J.N. Thelen should have been allowed by the lower court to intervene in order to
have his rights adjudicated. (17 P.2d at 59)

And in Bily v. Board of Property Assessment Appeals, supra, it was held that in an appeal brought by property owners to protest
an assessment, a party who foreclosed a mortgage on one of the properties and purchased the property at sheriffs sale has a right to
intervene. It was held that the right of intervention should be accorded to any one having title to property which is the subject of
litigation, provided that his rights will be substantially affected by the direct legal operation and effect of the decision, and provided
also that it is reasonably necessary for him to safeguard an interest of his own which no other party on record is interested in protecting.
(44 A.2d at 251)

As the purchaser in those cases did not acquire the property from their owners but adverse to them, he could expect no party in
the pending suit to safeguard his interest. Hence the necessity of allowing his intervention. In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner
himself considers the defenses raised by PNB, its predecessor in interest, to be formidable and all that it desires in seeking to intervene
is to fortify even more such defenses (Reply to Opposition. p. 4). Petitioner is thus unlike the heirs in Dizon v. Romero, 26 SCRA 452
(1968) or the purchaser pendente lite at a sheriffs sale in Bily v. Board of Property Assessment who had to be allowed to intervene
because it was reasonably necessary for him to safeguard an interest of his own which no other party on record is interested in
protecting. (44 A.2d at 251) It is simply petitioners perfectionism or meticulousness that makes it want to intervene to further improve
the defenses of the original party (here, PNB). But otherwise there is no reasonable necessity for its intervention.

On the other hand the last case cited in Moores Federal Practice, Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, supra, while involving a vendee
who sought to intervene in a case in which said vendee had an interest by virtue of a contract of sale made in its favor by one of the
vendors, does not involve a purchaser pendente lite so as to be considered on all fours with the case at bar. He was a purchaser but
not pendente lite. Hence the ruling in that case cannot be invoked by petitioner.

Second. Petitioner contends that, unless its right to intervene is upheld, a stranger to the action would have a better right contrary
to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Petitioner is not really denied protection. It is represented in the action
by its predecessor in interest whose defenses petitioner itself considers to be formidable. As private respondents point out, it is not
really the case that petitioner is denied a hearing. It is not. As already stated, since petitioner is a transferee pendente lite with notice
of the pending litigation between Quisumbing and PNB, petitioner stands exactly in the shoes of defendant PNB and is bound by any
judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against PNB.Under Rule 3, 20, the action may be continued against PNB, the original
defendant. In the alternative - although it was not essential that the transferee be substituted and the latter insist on such substitution
- the trial court could have directed that petitioner be either substituted as party-defendant or joined with defendant PNB.

Third. Petitioner points out:

20. On a separate matter, this Honorable Court stated in its decision that:

[T]he appellate court therefore properly refused to pass upon petitioners attempt to inquire into the consideration paid for the
assignment of the right of redemption to the late Norberto J. Quisumbing, as well as petitioners claim that the transfer of interest to
Quisumbing was made in violation of Art. 1491(5) of the Civil Code, prohibiting attorneys from acquiring property or interest which is
the object of the litigation in which they take part as such. This matter was never alleged by PNB in its answer to Quisumbings
complaint.
Petitioner most respectfully wishes to point out that the foregoing statement as to PNBs supposed failure to raise the defense that
the transfer of interest to Quisumbing was made in violation of Art. 1491(5) of the Civil Code, is not correct.

Indeed, PNB raised this defense. Attached hereto as Annex A is PNBs answer with counterclaim in Civil Case No. 10513 wherein PNB
expressly raised the nullity under Art. 1491(5) of the supposed assignment to Atty. Quisumbing (Annex A at page 3, par. [e], among
its various defenses. Hence, it is most respectfully asked that manifestation this be NOTED to prevent any party from unreasonably
capitalizing on the erroneous statement of fact.

The Court regrets the error. The underscored portion should not have been made. However, correction of the error does not call
for the modification of the decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59378 February 11, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NELIA NICANDRO y VELARMA, accused-appellant.

PLANA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, convicting the accused Nelia Nicandro y
Velarma of violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (1), (m), and (o) Article I, of Republic Act 6425, as amended
(Dangerous Drugs Act), upon an information which reads:

That on or about November 6, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having been authorized
by law to sell deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and knowingly sell or offer for sale four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a
piece of newspaper, one (1) roach marijuana cigarette and marijuana seeds and ashes contained in a white plastic
bag, which are prohibited drugs.

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

Not long before November 6,1981, the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police Station No. 5, Western Police District,
Metropolitan Police Force, Manila, received complaints from concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of prohibited
drugs by one alias 'Nel' in the Commodore Pension House at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila (p. 4, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981).
lt was also informed that the use of prohibited drugs in said place was rampant (pp. 3, 18-19, tsn, Ibid).

Responding to said complaints and reports, Cpl. Salvador Guitan and Pfc. Romeo Joves of the Drug Enforcement Unit
of said Police Station No. 5 placed the Commodore Pension House and its surroundings under surveillance for about
a week (pp. 4-5, tsn, Ibid.). After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the
confidential informant acting as the buyer of marijuana was organized. (pp. 5-6, 29-30, tsn, Ibid.).

At about 9:00 p.m. on November 6, 1981, the police team formed to carry out the entrapment plan was alerted of
the presence of the drug pusher, alias 'Nel', at room 301 of the Commodore Pension House, selling marijuana to drug
users (pp. 6, 32-33, tsn, Ibid.). Immediately Cpl. Salvador Guitan, Pat. Proceso Federes, Pat. Aurora Gomez and Pfc.
Romeo Joves proceeded to the said Commodore Pension House and met the female confidential informant at the
corner of Arquiza Street and M.H. del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila (pp. 6, 23, 33, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; pp. 15-16, tsn.
Dec. 9, 1981). Pfc. Joves gave the informant two (2) P5.00 bills, marked Exhibits "D" and "E", with his initial thereon,
marked Exhibits "D-1", and "E-1" (Exhs. "D", "D-1" "E" and "E-1", pp. 3-4, Folio of Exhs.; pp. 6, 8, 35, tsn, Dec. 8,
1981; p. 16, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). They instructed her to follow them to the Commodore Pension House (p. 33, tsn,
Dec. 8, 1981).

Following later, the informant went to room 301 of the Commodore Pension House (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17,
tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Upon a given signal she knocked on the door of the room. Appellant Nelia Nicandro y Velarma,
alias 'Nel', opened the door (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8. 1981). The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette and
gave appellant the two (2) marked P 5.00 bills (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Thereupon, the
appellant delivered to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette (pp. 7, 25, tsn; Dec. 8,1981; p. 8, tsn, Dec.
9, 1981).

Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed appellant (p. 7, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Pat.
Gomez frisked appellant and got from the right front pocket of her pants the two (2), marked P5.00 bills (Exhs. "D"
& " E ") and from the left pocket of her pants marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper (pp. 8-9,
12, 34, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; pp. 9-10, 17-19, tsn. Dec. 9, 1981). Appellant tried to escape by entering her rented room
301 but was immediately (pp. 8-9, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981).

xxx xxx xxx

Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted
having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from
her pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing (pp. 12-13, tan; Dec. 8, 1981. ... (People's Brief, pp. 3-
6, 8.)

To support the charges, the prosecution relied principally on Pat. Joves, who testified that he saw the accused sell marijuana cigarettes
to the unnamed police informant, which allegedly the accused verbally admitted when she was under custodial investigation. Pat. Joves
declared:

Q Where were you when the informant handed the two P5.00 bills to the accused?
A We were hidden within the vicinity of Room 301 sir.
Q After your confidential informant have handed the two P5.00 bills to the accused, what
happened next?
A The accused in turn handed one small plastic bag containing suspected marijuana leaves. I beg
to correct sir. I think it was four sticks of marijuana cigarettes sir. It is not a plastic bag sir.
Q What did you do when you saw the accused hand over to the confidential informant the four
sticks of cigarettes containing marijuana?
A When we saw the accused handed the four sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes to our
confidential informant, and after a pre-a rranged signal was given by the confidential informant
 that the accused had already sold her the marijuana cigarettes, we immediately nabbed said
suspect and at the same time we Identified ourselves as police officers. (TSN, Dec. 8, 1981, p.
7.)
xxx xxx xxx
Q You also conducted the investigation of this accused and confiscation of the articles of the
crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you conduct the investigation?
A The first thing I did was I informed the accused of her constitutional rights.
Q What next?
A Then I questioned her about the marijuana cigarettes and leaves that were confiscated and
also the marked money and she verbally admitted that she sold the four sticks of suspected
marijuana cigarettes and possession and ownership of the other marijuana leaves which was
confiscated from her possession.
Q Did you place that in writing?
A The accused refused to place her statement in writing, sir. (Ibid., pp. 12-13.)
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS EXAMINATION
Q And who were your companions in apprehending the accused?
A I was with Police Cpl. Salvador Guitan, Pat. Federis and Policewoman Aurora Gomez, sir.
Q When you posted yourselves and other companions at the third floor of Commodore Pensione
House, were there any other persons present in the premises, Pat. Joves?
A There were other persons passing by or walking in the place from where we were posted sir.
Q In fact, there were several or many persons in that place because there is a lodging house Pat.
Joves when you posted yourselves there? There were several persons present there?
A There are several persons present but they are just passing by or walking towards their rooms,
sir.
Q And you want this Court to believe that in spite of the presence of these people walking and
passing to the place where you made the apprehension, you want this Court to believe that the
accuse was then selling the alleged marijuana sticks?
WITNESS:
Please repeat the questions?
ATTY. CARINGAL:
Q You want the Court to believe that the accused was selling the prohibited drug in public
because according to you there were several persons present then?
A There were several persons passing by sir at that place.
Q You testified a while ago Pat. Joves that you have seen the accused handing a plastic bag to
your confidential informant. How big is that plastic bag.?
A It was not a plastic bag, sir but four sticks of marijuana cigarettes, sir.
Q Do you want to impress this Honorable Court that the accused was selling this marijuana
cigarette in the open?
A The accused sold marijuana cigarettes also in a way that she will not be noticed by other
persons sir.
Q How were you able to say that the things handed by the accused to your confidential informant
were four sticks of marijuana cigarettes when you have just said that the transactions was done
secretly?
A She was handing the marijuana cigarette secretly, sir.
Q How were you able to say and how were you able to determine that the things handed to your
confidential informant were four sticks of marijuana cigarettes?
A We saw and observed that the accused handed sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes and we
also have a prearranged signal from the confidential informant that the marijuana was already
sold by the accused, sir. (Ibid., pp. 23-25.)

Policewoman Aurora Gomez also testified but her testimony was limited to events subsequent to the alleged sale of marijuana
cigarettes. She did not witness the sale. (TSN, Dec. 9, 1981, pp. 17-18, 21.) Neither did Cpl. Guitan or Pat. Federis.

After trial, the trial court convicted the accused as aforesaid and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.00.

In the instant appeal, defendant-appellant has assigned the following errors:

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE II
IN RELATION TO SECTION 2(e), (1), (f) and (o), ARTICLE 1, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED BY P.D. NO. 44 AND
FURTHER AMENDED BY P.D. NO. 1675.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ALL POLICE OF
OFFICERS WHICH ARE HEARSAY.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION PETITION OF ACCUSED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED MORE PARTICULARLY THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND TO
CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESS AGAINST HER HAS BEEN VIOLATED.

Numerous factors combine to make the appeal meritorious.

The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is at best uncertain whether any prosecution witness really saw the alleged
sale of marijuana cigarettes. Patrolman Joves allegedly was an eyewitness. He testified that he saw the appellant sell marijuana
cigarettes to the police informant, as the transaction took place openly just outside room 301, in the presence of several persons
"passing by or walking in the place". But when his attention was called to the improbability that an illegal merchandise would openly
be sold, he qualified his story by saying that appellant handed the marijuana cigarettes to appellant "secretly".

Pat. Joves was not certain as to what he saw. At first, he said that after the police informant had paid appellant, the latter handed to
the former "one small plastic bag containing suspected marijuana leaves." Then he corrected himself by saying: "I think it was four
sticks of marijuana cigarettes sir. It is not a plastic bag sir."
It is probable that Pat. Joves really did not see either the alleged delivery of the marijuana cigarettes or the supposed payment therefor.
After all, according to him, the transaction was effected "secretly". On the other hand, if the sale was made within the view of Pat.
Joves and his companions, there would have been no need for them to wait for a signal from the police informant to indicate that the
transaction had been completed, before closing in and arresting appellant.

With the testimony of Pat. Joves seriously placed in doubt, there is not much left of the prosecution evidence. Note that the police
informant was not presented as a witness, prompting the accused to invoke with reason the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. [Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5(e).]

In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied partly on her alleged oral admission declaraciones custodial investigation, as testified
to by Pat. Joves. This reliance is assailed as violative of Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution which reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The above provision is an expanded version of the guarantee against self-incrimination, formally incorporating the doctrine in the
landmark American case of Miranda vs. Arizona—

... Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow, but briefly stated, it is this: the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior
to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes
to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents
to be questioned. [384 U.S. 436, 444-445. Incidentally, the Miranda doctrine rests on just one broad guarantee in
the U.S. Constitution, i.e., that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
(Fifth Amendment.)]

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be
presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which
the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not
do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People VS. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other
words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator
to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial
of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed" implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant
personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where
the subject is unlettered.

Thus, in the cited case of People vs. Ramos, this Court said:

In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not adequately educated to
understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is
not enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and
then taking his statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him The
records do not reveal that these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that
appellant has been represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill
of Rights which states that 'any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence,' We
hold that the verbal admissions of appellant during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence against him.
(pp. 321-322.)

Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary;
it must be made knowingly and intelligently (People vs. Caguioa, supra), which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what
is being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether
the person interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is Idle to talk of
waiver of rights.

Going to the instant case, Pat. Joves testified that he conducted the custodial investigation of appellant. As to the manner of
investigation, he tersely testified:

Q How did you conduct the investigation?

A The first thing I did was I informed the accused of her constitutional rights.

Q What next?

A Then I questioned her about the marijuana cigarettes and leaves that were confiscated and also
the marked money and she verbally admitted that she sold the four sticks of suspected marijuana
cigarettes and possession and ownership of the other marijuana leaves which was confiscated from
her possession. (TSN, December 8, 1981, pp. 12-13.)
According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional rights when she was under custodial investigation. What specific
rights he mentioned to appellant, he did not say. Neither did he state the manner in which the appellant was advised of her
constitutional rights so as to make her understand them. This is particularly significant in the instant case because appellant is illiterate
and cannot be expected to be able to grasp the significance of her right to silence and to counsel upon merely hearing an abstract
statement thereof.

As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so
it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such
affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. As broadly
stated in the Miranda case and quoted with approval by the then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in People vs. Caguioa, supra, —

... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
investigation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination (95 SCRA 2,9. Emphasis supplied.)

The reason is not difficult to see. A constitutional guarantee should be liberally construed with a view to promoting its object.

... Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would
abrogate them.

xxx xxx xxx

In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his
rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not
show that any warnings have been given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing
and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record. ... (Miranda case, 384 U.S. 436, 491, 498-499.)

Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the accused during custodial investigation was
inadmissible, although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, for the reason that the prosecution
failed to show that those rights were explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was sufficiently manifested and
intelligently understood" by the accuse.

Similarly, in People vs. Caguioa, the Court sustained the rejection by the trial court of the extrajudicial admission made by the accused
during custodial investigation, there being no showing by the prosecution that there was sufficient compliance with the constitutional
duty to inform the accused of his rights to silence and to counsel, without which there could be no intelligent waiver of said rights. In
said case, the accused —a native of Samar— was interrogated in Tagalog. The prosecution did not show that the accused's acquaintance
with Tagalog was such that he could fully understand the questions posed to him.

All considered, we hold that the guilt of appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside, and the appellant is hereby acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 231989, September 04, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the
September 24, 2013 Decision2 of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2010-1073 and
2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), committed as follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous
drugs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total
weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the substance recovered from his possession is a dangerous drug.

Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 3
On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also indicted for illegal sale of shabu, committed as
follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
without being authorized by law to sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell and/or offer for sale, and give
away to a PDEA Agent acting as poseur-buyer One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine
hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug, in consideration of Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) consisting of one piece five hundred peso bill, with Serial No.
FZ386932, which was previously marked and recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation.

Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.4

In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty.5 They were detained in the city jail during the joint trial of the cases.6

The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, IO1 Nestle Carin, IO2 Vincent Orcales, and Police Senior
Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both accused, Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense.

Version of the Prosecution

Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional Office X of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited
drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather
for a buy-bust operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting
officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-buyer, respectively. The team prepared a P500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with
its serial number entered in the PDEA blotter), the Coordination Form for the nearest police station, and other related documents.

Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about 15 minutes before 10:00 p.m. and arrived in the target area at 10:00
p.m., more or less. IO1 Carin and the CI alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan
and the other team members disembarked a few meters after and positioned themselves in the area to observe. IO1 Carin and the CI
turned at the comer and stopped in front of a house. The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. " Gorres came out
and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as
a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out,
he handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin.
In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.

After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan, which was the pre-arranged signal. The latter,
with the rest of the team members, immediately rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were standing near
the door. They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and informed
Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their arrest for selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put their hands on their
heads and to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on
both.

When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his pocket. IOl Orellan ordered him to pull it out.
Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it
contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was seized.

IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IOl
Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets.
Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness
the inventory-taking.

The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession of the seized items. Upon
arrival, they "booked" the two accused and prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence and
for the drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory
Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public official and the
representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were
taken.
The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1
Orellan was in possession of the sachets of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic Chemist,
and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas7personally received the letter-requests and the two pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. PSI Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory
tests on them. Based on her examination, only Lim was found positive for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry
Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With respect to the two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive
ofshabu after a chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-
228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the cellophane containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave
them to the evidence custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office during the inquest.

Version of the Defense

Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. Lim was sleeping
in the bedroom, while Gorres was watching the television. When the latter heard that somebody jumped over their gate, he stood up
to verify. Before he could reach the door, however, it was already forced opened by the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian
clothing. They entered the house, pointed their firearms at him, instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and
handcuffed him. They inquired on where the shabu was, but he invoked his innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of "Romy,"
he answered that he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there and kicked the door open. Lim was then surprised as a
gun was pointed at his head. He questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet. The men let him and Gorres
sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA Regional Office and the crime
laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel, ownership of the two sachets
of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest.
Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the case. Both Lim and Gorres acknowledged
that they did not have any quarrel with the PDEA agents and that neither do they have grudges against them or vice-versa.

Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita, Pasil, Kauswagan the night when the arrests
were made. The following day, she returned home and noticed that the door was opened and its lock was destroyed. She took pictures
of the damage and offered the same as exhibits for the defense, which the court admitted as part of her testimony.

RTC Ruling

After trial, the RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient
evidence linking him as a conspirator. The fallo of the September 24, 2013 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:

1. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1073, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A.
9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve [12] years and one [1] day to thirteen [13]
years, and to pay Fine in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of Fine;

2. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay the Fine in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00].

3. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ELDIE GORRES y NAVE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Warden of the BJMP having custody of ELDIE GORRES y Nave, is hereby
directed to immediately release him from detention unless he is being charged of other crimes which will justify his continued
incarceration.8
With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of evidence favors the positive testimony of
IO1 Orellan over the feeble and uncorroborated denial of Lim. As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was able to establish
the identity of the buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller, and the delivery of the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed
as simple, straightforward and without any hesitation or prevarication as she detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust transaction
that occurred. Between the two conflicting versions that are poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence
and no reason to disbelieve in the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment preceding and pervading the arrest of
Lim. On the chain of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA operatives were able to preserve the
integrity and probative value of the seized items.

In so far as Gorres is concerned, the RTC opined that the evidence presented were not strong enough to support the claim that there
was conspiracy between him and Lim because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what the box contained. It also noted Chemistry
Report No. DTCRIM 196 & 197-2010, which indicated that Gorres was "NEGATIVE" of the presence of any illicit drug based on his
urine sample.

CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the trial court that the prosecution adequately established
all the elements of illegal sale of a dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented during the trial showed that a valid buy-bust
operation was conducted. Likewise, all the elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug was proven. Lim resorted to denial and
could not present any proof or justification that he was fully authorized by law to possess the same. The CA was unconvinced with his
contention that the prosecution failed to prove the identity and integrity of the seized prohibited drugs. For the appellate court, it was
able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were not compromised. The witnesses for the
prosecution were able to testify on every link in the chain of custody, establishing the crucial link in the chain from the time the seized
items were first discovered until they were brought for examination and offered in evidence in court. Anent Lim's defense of denial and
frame-up, the CA did not appreciate the same due to lack of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by an
improper motive. Instead. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was applied.

Before Us, both Lim and the People manifested that they would no longer file a Supplemental Brief, taking into account the thorough
and substantial discussions of the issues in their respective appeal briefs before the CA.9 Essentially, Lim maintains that the case
records are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.

Our Ruling

The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165.10 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements the law, defines chain of custody as-
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course
of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.11
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into
evidence.12 To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational
basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be.13 In other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution
must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims
it to be.14 Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when
the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent
foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has
either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.15 This was adopted in Mallillin v. People,16 where this
Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized items should be established:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.17
Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court. 18

Seizure and marking of the illegal

drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the
investigating officer

Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] 19
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
mandates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.20
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially incorporated the
saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a phyical inventory
of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator Grace Poe admitted that "while
Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent
planting of evidence, the application of said section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing
drug addiction and also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts." 21 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the rule on witnesses
during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are not always available in all comers of the Philippines,
especially in more remote areas. For another, there were instances where elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the
punishable acts apprehended. "22 In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is also very
limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were apprehended." 23

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in drug-related cases due to the
varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so
that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation."24 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he
noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and international syndicates.
The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers
makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe
for the proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.
xxxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in 2002 where the safety of
the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the preservation
of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of
seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where the seized drugs as
well as the persons who are required to be present during the inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.
It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be conducted either in the
place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures
to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized
illegal drugs to be properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as
long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances
wherein there are no media people or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not
automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected official also is sometimes impossible
especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.25
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of arrest may be excused in
instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are
threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to mount a
counter-assault.26 The present case is not one of those.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter.
IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic
sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.27 To
ensure that they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by Lim to IO1 Carin and the one that he recovered from
his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.28

Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items.29 In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.

The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:30

The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must
initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated
procedure must be adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note
that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in
their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence
to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or
alteration of evidence.31
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug
seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s
acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official
within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting
officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-
drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence
of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.32
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos33requires:

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a
justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under
Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were
unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given
the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to
contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non- compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that
police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities
of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements
beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As
such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that
they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were
reasonable.34
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late
at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house.35 IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was
made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no available media representative and barangay
officials despite their effort to contact them.36 He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to
their operation as they. might leak the confidential information.37 We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there
was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law.

The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-bust team to secure the presence of a barangay
official during the operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO:

xxxx

Q x x x Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay official to witness the operation?
A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation, Sir.

Q Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our information.38
The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a representative from the Department the arresting
officer, IO1 Orellan, stated in his Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media, the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses failed to show that they tried to contact a DOJ representative.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an earnest effort to coordinate with and secure
presence of the required witnesses. They also failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives
in Lim's house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten (10) members, and the two accused were the only persons in
the house.

It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended,
and its IRR may be excused as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved applies
not just on arrest and/or seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation but also on those lawfully made in air or sea port,
detention cell or national penitentiary, checkpoint, moving vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or those by virtue of a
consented search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident to a lawful arrest, or application of plain view doctrine where time is
of the essence and the arrest and/or seizure is/are not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant;
hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and
Regulations directs:
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of coordination for operating units
other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86 (a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be presented.39
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been practiced in most cases elevated before Us.
Thus, in order to weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases,
the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or explanation
therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated
items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must
not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in
order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a
commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section
5,40
Rule 112, Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which
affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2010-1073
and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause.
Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte, for
immediate implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision
the action he has taken.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, as well as to the Head/Chief of the National
Prosecution Service, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's Office, the Philippine National Police, the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance.
Likewise, the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this Decision to all trial courts, including the
Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JENNIFER GA-A Y CORONADO, Accused,

AQUILA "PAYAT" ADOBAR, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is an Appeal1 filed pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated July 31, 2015 (assailed Decision)
of the Court of Appeals, Twenty-Second (22nd) Division (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01192-MIN. The assailed Decision affirmed in
toto the Judgment3 dated July 25, 2013 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 (trial court), in Criminal
Case (CC) No. 2011-485, which found accused-appellant Aquila4 "Payat" Adobar (Adobar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." 6

The accusatory portion of the Information7 filed on June 1, 2011 against Adobar reads:

That on or about May 9, 2011[,] at about 11:00 in the morning, more or less, at 32ndStreet, Ramonal Village, [Barangay] Camaman-
an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law to sell, trade, dispense and give away any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and illegally sell,
trade, dispense and give away to another one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, to
PDEA Agent Naomie Siglos, who acted as poseur-buyer, which after a confirmatory test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory, said
sachet is found positive of the presence of 0.03 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly known as
shabu, in consideration of Five Hundred pesos (Php500.00) with Serial No. MR443620 which is recorded as marked money in a buy
bust operation.

Contrary to and in Violation of Section 5 Article II of R.A. 9165.8

Adobar's co-accused, Jennifer Ga-a y Coronado (Ga-a), was charged on May 12, 2011 in two (2) other separate Informations for
violation of Sections 119 and 1510, respectively, both of Article II of RA 9165. On September 27, 2011, she pleaded not guilty11 to both
offenses charged and trial as against her commenced.

Meanwhile, Adobar remained at large until he was apprehended via an alias warrant of arrest12 on February 13, 2012.13 Upon his
arraignment on April 2, 2012, Adobar entered a plea of "not guilty."14

As the cases against both accused arose out of the same incident, the parties adopted in the present case (Criminal Case No. 2011-
485) the testimonies of the witnesses already called to the stand in Criminal Case Nos. 2011-422 to 423 prior to Adobar's arrest.
Thereafter, joint trial on the three (3) cases continued as to the remaining witnesses for both prosecution and defense. 15

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution:

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Agents 1) IO1 Naomie Siglos (IO1
Siglos); 2) IO3 Alex Tablate (IO3 Tablate); 3) IO1 Nestle Carin (IO1 Carin); 4) Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Erma Salvacion - Sampaga
(PCI Sampaga); and 5) Punong Barangay Dometilo Acenas, Jr. (Punong Barangay Acenas).16

The prosecution dispensed with the testimony of PCI Sampaga, the forensic chemist,17 after the defense stipulated on certain matters.18

The prosecution made the following narration of facts:

On May 9, 2011, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, a team of PDEA Regional Office X agents, Cagayan de Oro City (collectively,
buy-bust team), organized a buy-bust operation against Adobar and his live-in partner based on information from a Confidential
Informant (CI), who came to said office that morning, and from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) National Drug Information
System watchlist of drug personalities which included Adobar.19 In the meeting, assignments were made as follows: IO1 Siglos as
poseur-buyer, IO3 Tablate as apprehending and investigating officer and the rest of the agents as back-up. IO1 Siglos was given a
buy-bust money of one (1) piece of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) bill. 20

After the briefing, the buy-bust team proceeded to the residence of Adobar at 32nd St., Ramonal Village, Camaman-an, Cagayan de
Oro City in two (2) unmarked service vehicles.21 Upon arrival, at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, they parked the vehicles about
20 to 30 meters away from Adobar's residence. IO1 Siglos and the CI alighted and walked towards Adobar's house, outside of which
a man, identified by the CI as Adobar, was standing.

The CI introduced IO1 Siglos to Adobar as a friend who was interested to buy shabu (subject drugs). Adobar asked IO1 Siglos how
much worth of shabu she wanted to buy and the latter answered P500.00, while handing the buy-bust money to Adobar. Upon receipt
of the money, Adobar excused himself to get the "item" inside the house. In less than a minute,22 Adobar came back and handed to
IO1 Siglos one heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.23 After examining the
sachet, IO1 Siglos rubbed the back of her head, signaling her colleagues to respond to the scene.

Upon seeing the signal, IO3 Tablate, who earlier positioned himself about ten (10) meters away from the group of IO1 Siglos 24 and
who witnessed the exchange between IO1 Siglos and Adobar,25 alerted the rest of the team.26 The team responded and rushed towards
Adobar, with IO3 Tablate shouting "dapa, dapa[,] PDEA!"27 Adobar ran inside his house and locked the front door behind him.28 The
buy-bust team forced open the door, cleared the ground floor then proceeded to the second floor where they found a small window
through which they suspected Adobar to have escaped.29 The buy-bust money was not recovered.

In another room on the same floor,30 IO3 Tablate found Ga-a. Near her were seventeen (17) pieces of transparent sachets containing
suspected shabu together with other drug paraphernalia on top of a table.31 Upon inquiry, Ga-a introduced herself as Mecaella, the
live-in partner of Adobar, and claimed that the shabu on the table were from Adobar.32

Meanwhile, IO1 Siglos held custody of the subject drugs seized from Adobar until the same was turned over to IO3 Tablate for marking
by the latter.

After "clearing" Adobar's house, IO3 Tablate called for Camaman-an Punong Barangay Acenas, media representative Rondie Cabrejas
of Magnum Radyo33 (media representative) and an unidentified representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).34 Thereafter, the
sachets of suspected shabu, including the subject drugs, were marked 35 with IO3 Tablate's initials, "AMT."36 After the marking, IO3
Tablate proceeded with the inventory of the seized items (including the subject drugs) on the table where the seventeen (17) sachets
were found,37 and prepared the Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs (Inventory)38 in the presence of Ga-
a.39 Photographs40 of the seized drugs, the room where they were found and the accomplishment of the Inventory were then taken.41 It
appears from the prosecution's submissions that among the three (3) witnesses summoned, only Punong Barangay Acenas and the
media representative arrived at Adobar's house and witnessed42 and signed the Inventory.43

The buy-bust team and Ga-a proceeded to the PDEA RO-10, with IO3 Tablate in possession of all seized items, including the subject
drugs.44 Upon arrival, IO3 Tablate prepared a request for the examination of the seized items with the Regional Crime Laboratory Office
10 (crime lab)45 and personally delivered said items thereto.46

Version of the Defense

The defense called to the stand accused-appellant Adobar and accused Ga-a who narrated the following pertinent facts:

In the morning of May 9, 2011, Ga-a was alone cooking her lunch inside the house of Adobar where she was a tenant when she heard
a loud pounding on the door.47 Suddenly, about ten (10) armed persons entered the house. After introducing themselves as PDEA
agents,48 they proceeded to search the house49 and destroyed Ga-a's belongings50 while looking for a certain "Payat."51 Ga-a was
likewise bodily searched by a woman.52 She was then invited to go to the PDEA office and as they were about to leave, the agents
called for a barangay official.53 Ga-a claimed that the evidence presented by the prosecution were "planted" by the PDEA agents. 54

Adobar, on the other hand, testified that on May 9, 2011, he went to Opol at 5:00 o'clock in the morning to buy fish for vending. 55 He
then took the same to Abellanosa St., Cagayan de Oro City where he stayed until he went home at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
when the fish were sold out.56 When he arrived at his house, he noticed that the door was destroyed and the belongings inside were
disarranged.57 He was likewise informed by the neighbors that Ga-a was arrested by PDEA agents58 but he did not think to report the
incident to the police as he was unschooled.59 On February 12, 2012, he was arrested while selling fish under the bridge in Abellanosa
St.60

The Ruling of the trial court

In the Judgment dated July 25, 2013, the trial court found Adobar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and imposed
upon him the penalty of Life Imprisonment with a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

In a two-paragraph discussion, the trial court held that under the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Adobar. As
between his and the prosecution's conflicting versions of facts, the latter's was more believable. No discussion was made on the
compliance by the PDEA team with the required procedures under relevant laws, rules and regulations particularly, Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165, albeit such was raised as an issue by the defense.61
On the other hand, the trial court acquitted accused Ga-a in both Criminal Case Nos. 2011-422 and 2011-423, holding that the PDEA
agents had no probable cause to search and arrest her. Moreover, the urine sample taken from Ga-a and the results of the chemical
examination made thereon showing the same positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride are inadmissible in evidence, being fruits
of the poisonous tree.62

The fallo of the trial court Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 2011-422 and 2011-423, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, JENNIFER C. GAA is hereby ACQUITTED of the offenses charged. The Warden of the BJMP having
custody of JENNIFER C. GAA is hereby directed to immediately release her from detention unless she is accused of other
crimes which will justify her continued incarceration.

2. In Criminal Case No. 2011-485, accused AQUILO ADOBAR a.k.a. "Payat" is GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the offense defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 as charged in the Information, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay the Fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos [P500,000.00], without subsidiary penalty in case of non-payment of fine.

Let the penalty imposed on accused Adobar be a lesson and an example to all who have the criminal propensity, inclination and
proclivity to commit the same forbidden act that crime does not pay, and that the pecuniary gain and benefit, as well as the perverse
psychological well being which one can derive from selling or manufacturing or trading drugs, or other illegal substance, or from using,
or possessing, or just committing any other acts penalized under Republic Act 9165, cannot compensate for the penalty which one will
suffer if ever he is prosecuted and penalized to the full extent of the law.

SO ORDERED.63 (Emphasis in the original)

Adobar appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal.64 He filed his Brief65 dated January 3, 2014, while the People, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Brief66 dated April 28, 2014. In a Resolution67 dated June 18, 2014, the CA considered Adobar to
have waived his right to file a Reply Brief.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the trial court Judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 25,2013 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.68
The CA held that the prosecution adequately proved all the elements of the crime. It held that the prosecution sufficiently established
all the links in the chain of custody as to remove doubt on the integrity of the subject drugs.

Anent the alleged failure of the PDEA agents to comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 as the media and DOJ representatives,
respectively, were not presented to testify on the Inventory which they supposedly witnessed, the CA held that this lapse did not
render the subject drugs seized inadmissible because the prosecution had duly shown that its integrity and evidentiary value were
preserved. According to the CA, substantial adherence - not strict adherence - to the requirements of Section 21 suffices and the same
was satisfied by the PDEA agents.

Hence, this recourse.

In lieu of filing supplemental briefs, Adobar and the People filed separate Manifestations dated July 4, 201669 and June 16,
2016,70 respectively, foregoing their right to file supplemental briefs as they have exhausted their arguments in their
respective Briefs filed before the CA.
 Issue

The main question thrown to the Court for resolution is whether or not accused-appellant Adobar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of sale of illegal drugs as defined and punished under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.

The Court's Ruling

The Appeal has merit.

Adobar is charged with selling 0.03 gram of dangerous illegal drugs, in particular, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride colloquially known
as shabu. At the outset, RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002, being the law in place at
the time of the commission of the offense and being more favorable to the accused than its successor, RA 10640, 71 shall apply in this
case.

Section 3(ii), Article I of RA 9165 defines "selling" as any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration. In the context of a buy-bust operation, its elements are 1) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and 2) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction
or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.72

Anent the latter element, proof beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime
whose core is the confiscated illicit drug.73 It is important that the State establish with moral certainty the integrity and identity of the
illicit drugs sold as the same as those examined in the laboratory and subsequently presented in court as evidence. 74 This rigorous
requirement, known under RA 9165 as the chain of custody,75 performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed.76

In turn, Section 21 of RA 9165 is a critical means to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody77by providing for the procedures
to be followed in the seizure, custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia.
Section 21 of RA 9165 provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted
to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner,
shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing
within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous
drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed
forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours; (Emphasis supplied and italics in the original)
Filling in the details as to where the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items should be made is Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 (IRR) which reads:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; xxx (Emphasis supplied)

The same likewise provides for a saving clause in case of noncompliance with the requirements of RA 9165 and the IRR, thus:
xxx Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under Justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing is echoed in Section 2(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, to wit:
a. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of dangerous drugs or controlled chemical or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment shall immediately, after the seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of:

(i) the person from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel;

(ii) a representative from the media;

(iii) a representative from the Department of Justice; and,

(iv) any elected public official;

who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory report covering the drugs/equipment and who shall be given a copy thereof;
Provided that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of seizure without
warrant; Provided further that non-compliance with these requirement under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team xxx.
In sum, the applicable law mandates the following to be observed as regards the time, witnesses and proof of inventory in the
custody of seized dangerous illegal drugs:

1. The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after seizure or confiscation;
 2. The physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of:
a. the accused or his representative or counsel;

b. a representative from the media;

c. a representative from the DOJ; and

d. any elected public official.

3. The conduct of the physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the:
a. place where the search warrant is served; or

b. at the nearest police station; or

c. nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of

warrantless seizure.

In People v. Dela Cruz,78 it was explained that compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21 ensures the
integrity of confiscated drugs and related paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second,
the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident
allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the personls alleged to have been in
possession of or peddling them.

Compliance with the requirements forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner. Non
compliance, on the other hand, is tantamount to failure in establishing the identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, thus, engendering the acquittal of an accused.79

However, the law allows such non-compliance in exceptional cases where the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of
justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.80 In these exceptional cases, the seizures and custody over the confiscated
items shall not be rendered void and invalid.

Against the foregoing legal backdrop, the Court had exhaustively studied the records and is of the considered view that the integrity
and identity of the corpus delicti are compromised.

The buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, particularly as to the presence of the three (3)
witnesses immediately after seizure and confiscation of the illegal drugs.

In no uncertain words, Section 21 requires the apprehending team to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph [the seized illegal drugs] in the presence of the accused xxx or his representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof."

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs must be at
the place of apprehension and/or seizure. If this is not practicable, it may be done as soon as the apprehending team reaches the
nearest police station or nearest office.81

In all of these cases, the photographing and inventory are required to be done in the presence of any elected public official and
a representative from the media and the DOJ who shall be required to sign an inventory and given copies thereof. By the
same intent of the law behind the mandate that the initial custody requirements be done "immediately after seizure and confiscation,"
the aforesaid witnesses must already be physically present at the time of apprehension and seizure - a requirement that can easily be
complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its very nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the
buy-bust team had enough time and opportunity to bring with them these witnesses.

In other words, while the physical inventory and photographing is allowed to be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure," this does not dispense with the
requirement of having the DOJ and media representative and the elected public official to be physically present at the time of and
at or near the place of apprehension and seizure so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing
of the seized drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."82

The reason is simple, it is at the time of arrest or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" that the presence of the three (3)
witnesses is most needed. It is their presence at that point that would insulate against the police practice of planting
evidence.83 In People v. Mendoza,84 the Court ruled:
xxx Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. xxx 85 (Italics in the original)
In the present case, none of these three (3) witnesses under Section 21 were present at the time the subject drugs
were allegedly confiscated from Adobar. Upon the other hand, only two (2) of the three (3) were summoned by the
team and were actually present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items.

The testimony of Punong Barangay Acenas, which was, in fact, offered by the prosecution for the sole purpose of proving that he was
present during the inventory and that he signed the inventory receipt,86supports the conclusion that he arrived only after the subject
drugs were already confiscated, thus:

[ATTORNEY ECHANO:]

Q But, you will admit that [when] the PDEA went inside the house, you were not present?

A When I arrived at the area, all the agents were already in the second floor of the house.
 Q When did you receive the call from the PDEA agents?

A Immediately after the arrest [of Ga-a] and seizure.

Q How many minutes did it take you before you arrived?

A About 15 minutes from our residence, Sir.

Xxxx

[TRIAL COURT:]

Q In other words, Captain Acenas, when you arrived there, the accused [Ga-a] was already arrested?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q The items were already on top of the aparador?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Was the Inventory already prepared ready for your signature or the Inventory was prepared when you were there already?

A When I arrived, they started the Inventory, Your Honor.87 (Emphasis supplied)

To recall the prosecution's narrative, Ga-a was arrested after the buy-bust was made against Adobar, i.e., after the subject drugs
were taken from him by IO1 Siglos. Clearly, Punong Barangay Acenas was summoned only sometime after the attempted arrest of
Adobar and the alleged confiscation of the subject drugs from his person. According to Punong Barangay Acenas, he arrived at the
scene about fifteen (15) minutes from such call, when the agents were already settled on the second floor of Adobar's home, ready
for inventory. This is confirmed by IO3 Tablate who testified that he phoned in the witnesses only after "clearing" the alleged crime
scene, thus:

[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]

Xxxx

Q What did you do with the drugs on the table?

A After clearing, before I actually made the markings[,] we called up the barangay captain or one of the members of
the team, the barangay captain, member from the media and also the representative from the DOJ and upon
their arrival it was the time when I actually made the markings to the evidence.

Xxxx

Q And then what else after marking, labelling the sachets of shabu and the paraphernalia, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A After the inventory was signed by the witnesses, upon arrival of (sic) the office after the booking I also prepared a
request for the crime lab and then I myself was the one who delivered the evidence to the crime lab.88 (Emphasis supplied)

Notably, while IO3 Tablate testified that all three (3) insulating witnesses came, observed and signed the inventory, this testimony is
contradicted by the records which reveal that only the signatures of Punong Barangay Acenas and the media representative actually
appear on the inventory document.89 In this regard it should also be noted that only Punong Barangay Acenas was presented in court
to testify.

Other than the above quoted testimony of IO3 Tablate, no sign of the presence of the DOJ representative appears on record. In fact,
the Affidavit90 dated May 10, 2011 of IO3 Tablate belies the presence of a DOJ Representative even during the inventory, thus:
I, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER-3 ALEX M. TABLATE, xxx do hereby depose and say:

xxxx

That during the inventory of the seized items/evidence recovered, which I, IO-3 TABLATE myself conducted in the very table itself
where said items were found in plain view in the 2nd floor of the house of the suspects, the same were witnessed by the Barangay
Captain himself of Brgy. Camaman-an and by a representative from the media through Magnum Radio.91 (Additional
emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, the three (3) insulating witnesses must be present at the time of seizure of the drugs such that they must be at or near
the intended place of arrest so they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized items "immediately after
seizure and confiscation." These witnesses must sign the inventory and be given copies thereof. In the present case, from the
evidence of the prosecution itself, none of the witnesses were present during the seizure and confiscation of the subject
drugs. Moreover, only two (2) of them - the punong barangay and the media representative - witnessed the photographing and
signed the inventory.

On this note, considering that at the point of seizure, i.e., the first link in the "chain of custody," irregularities were already attendant,
it becomes futile to prove the the rest of the links in the chain. Simply put, since "planting" of the drugs was already made possible at
the point of seizure because of the absence of all three (3) insulating witnesses, proving the chain after such point merely proves the
chain of custody of planted drugs.

Adobar's flight serves as a waiver of his right to be present during the initial custody requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, but does
not excuse compliance by the buy-bust team with the presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses therein.

Apart from the three (3) insulating witnesses, Section 21 requires that the physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs
by the apprehending team immediately after confiscation and seizure be likewise made in the presence of, "the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel."9

The question arises: what if the person from whom the drugs were seized escaped? This obtains in the present case. From the
prosecution's narration, Adobar successfully evaded arrest despite the efforts of the buybust team to apprehend him.93 He remained
at large until his subsequent apprehension on February 13, 2012 via an alias warrant of arrest.

If the story of the prosecution is to be believed, the escape of accused Adobar serves as a waiver of his right to be present during the
physical inventory and photographing of the drugs allegedly seized from him. The prosecution cannot be burdened by the accused's
escape provided that reasonable efforts were made to apprehend him, as what appears in the present case. The buy-bust team
cannot be reasonably expected to secure the presence of the accused's representative or counsel at the time of confiscation and during
the buy-bust operation, considering the clandestine nature of such operations. In the same vein, after such escape, it should be difficult,
if not impossible, for the buy-bust team to find a counsel or representative for the accused before the initial custody requirements
which Section 21 mandates to be performed "immediately after" the confiscation.

As such, the prosecution is excused from complying with the requirement of Section 21 as to the presence of the accused during the
initial custody requirements, i.e., physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs. However, it is not excused as to the
presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses, i.e., the DOJ and media representative and elected public official. The buy-bust team
must still secure the presence of these insulating witnesses, and the prosecution must still prove such presence, not only during the
inventory and photographing but likewise at the time of and at or near the intended place of confiscation and seizure of the subject
drugs.

In the same vein, the buy-bust team need not secure the presence of the accused during the marking of the seized drugs as his escape
serves as a waiver of his right to witness the same. As will be extensively discussed below, although Section 21 is silent as to the
matter of marking of seized drugs, jurisprudence94 teaches that consistency with the chain of custody rule requires the same to be
done in the presence of the accused.

The prosecution failed to trigger the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165. Its noncompliance with Section 21 cannot be excused;
the identity of the corpus delicti is not established.

To be sure, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 is required as a rule.95 The exception to this rule is found
in the saving clause under Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of RA 916596 which requires the following: (1) the existence of justifiable
grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team.97

If these two (2) requisites are present and the saving clause is successfully triggered, the confiscated items shall not be rendered void
and invalid. This allows the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti despite failure of the apprehending team to
physically inventory and photograph the drugs at the place of arrest and/or to have the DOJ and media representative and elected
public official witness the same.

On the first element, it has been emphasized that the prosecution must first recognize any lapses on the part of the apprehending
officers and thereafter explain the cited justifiable grounds.98 Moreover, the justifiable explanation given must be credible.99 Breaches
of the procedure contained in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised.100

Hence, to successfully trigger the saving clause, the prosecution must satisfy its two-pronged requirement: first,
acknowledge and credibly justify the non-compliance, and second, show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item were properly preserved. The Court held in Valencia v. People:101
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal
to the prosecution's case, the prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance with the procedures must
be justified by the State's agents themselves. The arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the
procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the
reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not
be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience.102
In this case, the prosecution did not acknowledge the lapses, much less offer a credible and justifiable ground for the failure of the
buy-bust team to comply with Section 21. No explanation was advanced as to why none of the insulating witnesses was present at
the time of seizure and confiscation of the subject illegal drugs. Neither do the records show any justification as to why no DOJ
representative was secured to witness the photographing and physical inventory of the seized drugs. Worse, the prosecution did not
even concede such lapses. The affidavit of IO3 Tablate shows the indifference of the prosecution on its failure to comply with Section
21, thus:
That IO-1 SIGLOS turned over to me, IO-3 TABLATE the one (1) piece of heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white crystalline
substance also suspected to be shabu, which was the subject of the buybust earlier transacted.

That during the inventory of the seized items/evidence recovered, which I, IO-3 TABLATE myself conducted in the very table itself
where said items were found in plain view in the 2nd floor of the house of the suspects, the same were witnessed by the Barangay
Captain himself of Brgy. Camaman-an and by a representative from the media through Magnum Radio.

That at the PDEA Regional Office-10, the arrested female suspect formally identified herself as Jennifer C. Ga-a, 22 years old,
single and a resident of Ramonal Village, Brgy. Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City while the other suspect who was able to elude
arrest despite earnest effort to apprehend him was formally identified as Aquilo Adobar, 48 years old, married and a resident of the
same barangay. The latter suspect is a targetlisted personality as per PDEA National Drugs Information System (NDIS).103 (Emphasis
in the original)
Hence, considering the prosecution neither acknowledged nor explained its noncompliance with Section 21, the first prong was not
satisfied, thus leading to the inevitable conclusion that the saving clause was not triggered. Accordingly, there is no point anymore in
determining if the second prong had been satisfied - i.e., proving the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs.

To be sure, from the records, outside the non-compliance with Section 21, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs
are heavily tainted. The second prong, even if the Court allows proof of such despite failure to prove the first prong, seems difficult if
not impossible to establish in light of the serious irregularities in the transfer of custody of the seized illegal drugs.

Proving the second prong of the saving clause - the integrity of the seized illegal drugs - despite non-compliance with Section 21
requires establishing the four links in the chain of custody: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 104

In the present case, there was failure to mark the seized illegal drugs immediately after confiscation due to the palpable gap between
the confiscation of the drugs to its subsequent marking which the prosecution utterly failed to explain.

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items after they have been
seized. In People v. Beran,105 the Court held that while the matter of marking of the seized illegal drugs in warrantless seizures is not
expressly specified in Section 21, consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that such marking should be done (1)
in the presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain
of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items-to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and
are eventually the ones offered in evidence-should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of
protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on
allegations of robbery or theft. xxx106 (Emphasis in the original)
It is vital that the seized contrabands are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings
as reference. The Court has held:
Crucial in proving [the] chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they
are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The
marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time
they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating[,] switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.

Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately
mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties, the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution.107 (Additional emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, a considerable period of time intervened between the confiscation of the subject drugs and its subsequent marking
- which was unaccounted for by the prosecution. This gaping hiatus is brought about by the failure of the poseur buyer, IO1 Siglos, to
credibly account for her whereabouts and the handling of the subject drugs from the time she confiscated the same from Adobar to
the time she turned it over to IO3 Tablate for marking. The marked inconsistencies in her testimonies taken on April 23, 2012 and
November 6, 2012 fail the test of credibility.

On April 23, 2012, IO1 Siglos testified that when her colleagues responded to the scene, she inspected the area with them and then,
without much delay, followed IO3 Tablate upstairs for the marking, thus:

[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]

Xxxx

Q And then after you made that pre-arranged signal of rubbing your back head, what happened?

A After a few minutes[,] the back up team rushed up.

Q What happened next?

 A And then when they arrived we checked the area and then after we checked the area I followed them and then
I went up stairs to give the buy-bust evidence to the arresting officer, Sir.

Xxxx

Q You said that after you touched your head the arresting officer arrived, and then Tablate went upstairs?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How many minutes after Tablate went upstairs, how many minutes you followed Tablate?

A About 3-4 minutes, Sir.108 (Emphasis supplied)

This is in contrast to her testimony on November 6, 2012 where she stated under oath that when the back-up team arrived, she
proceeded to the team's service vehicle, about 10-15 meters away, and therein waited for a considerable time while the back-up
team chased after Adobar and searched the premises. She only went back to the house and handed the subject drugs to IO3 Tablate
when it was time for the physical inventory, thus:

[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]

Xxxx

Q After you rubbed the back part of your head, what happened next?

A I noticed that the operatives rushed up to the area, Sir.

Xxxx

Q So[,] when the operatives arrived, what did Aquillo (sic) Adobar do?

A He went upstairs, Sir.

Q He run?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And he was chased by the operatives?

A Yes, Sir.

Xxxx

Q What did you do?

A I went outside going to our service vehicle, Sir.

 Q How far was the service vehicle parked from the house?

A More or less 10-15 meters, Sir.

Xxxx

Q Why you did not go with them when they chased the accused?

A Because my tasked (sic) is only a [poseur] buyer, Sir.

Q You said that the accused handed to you the sachet of shabu, what did you do with it?

A I handed to the arresting officer, IO3 Tablate during the inventory, Sir.

Q But you said you went to the vehicle?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You waited there?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And then, when did your team conduct an inventory?

A After the searched (sic), Sir.

Q So[,] after you went to the vehicle, you went back to the house?

A Yes, Sir.109 (Emphasis supplied)

The significance of this contradiction in IO1 Siglos' testimony cannot be overemphasized. Being the first custodian in the chain and
having held onto the then unmarked seized drugs for a considerable lapse of time, IO1 Siglos must clearly and convincingly account
for her handling and care of the subject drugs before turning them over to IO3 Tablate for marking. In this, she failed, thus,
effectively creating an obvious but unexplained break in the chain. Hence, assuming that the illegal drugs which went into the chain
are actually the same drugs seized from Adobar's person, i.e., assuming the same were not planted at the point of seizure, there
remains that great possibility of switching while the same were in IO1 Siglos' custody.

The foregoing conflicting narrations, seemingly trivial when viewed in isolation, cast very serious doubts on the veracity of the
prosecution's overall narrative when juxtaposed against the procedural lapses of the buybust team and its abject failure to justify
said lapses.

Courts must be extra vigilant in trying drugs cases.

Unfortunately, the CA and the trial court glossed over these obvious irregularities which attended the present buy-bust operation and
the resulting confiscation of the subject drugs.

The CA, while seemingly recognizing the lapses in observing Section 21,110 simply dismissed the same "because it was shown by the
prosecution that the integrity and evidentiary value of the specimens were properly preserved by the buy-bust team."111 In other
words, the CA excused the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with Section 21 on the basis of the second prong of the saving
clause (that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject drugs are established) but ignoring altogether the first prong
(absence of justifiable reasons for the procedural lapses). The CA justifies its decision to excuse this nonobservance of Section
21 by ruling that only substantial adherence thereto is required.112

This position taken by the CA is mistaken. To reiterate, the procedure enshrined in Section 21 is a matter of substantive law and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.113Substantive law requires strict observance of these procedural
safeguards.114 Courts, in resolving drugs cases must keep in mind this mandate and the peculiar nature of buy-bust operations being
susceptible to police abuse as discussed by the Court, thus:
xxx a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to
police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that by the
very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease
with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. xxx115 (Italics in the original)
For this, the Court has instructed lower courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drugs cases "lest an innocent person be made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses."116 The presumption that regular duty was performed by the arresting officers
simply cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence granted to the accused by the Constitution. It is thus incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove that the accused is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt.117

At this point, it is well to emphasize that this case involves a meager 0.03 gram of shabu. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny,
consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs as they
can be readily planted and tampered with.118 Consistent with this, in People v. Segundo119 involving the same amount of drugs as the
case at hand (0.03 gram), the Court emphasized the extra caution that law enforcers must observe in preserving the integrity of
small amounts of seized drugs, thus:
To sum, "[l]aw enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of seized
dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia." Thus, "[t]his is especially true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous
drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused."

Although the miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs is solely by itself not a reason for acquittal, this instance accentuates the
importance of conformity to Section 21 that the law enforcers in this case miserably failed to do so. If initially there were already
significant lapses on the marking, inventory, and photographing of the alleged seized items, a doubt on the integrity of the corpus
delicti concomittantly exists. xxx120 (Emphasis supplied)
Adobar's defense of denial is concededly weak and uncorroborated. This weakness, however, does not add strength to the prosecution's
case as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the
conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution. 121

Based on the foregoing and following the Court's precedents as discussed above, the Court is constrained to reverse Adobar's
conviction.

The prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime due to the serious lapses in observing Section 21 of RA 9165 and the
concomitant failure to trigger the saving clause. Anent the latter point, the prosecution utterly failed to acknowledge and credibly
justify its procedural lapses and was unable to prove the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. Adobar's innocence, as
presumed and protected by the Constitution, must stand in light of the reasonable doubt on his guilt.

To conclude, the Court issues anew a reminder: The prosecution arm of the government has the duty to prove, beyond reasonable
doubt, each and every element of the crime charged. In illegal drugs cases, this includes proving faithful compliance with Section 21
of RA 9165, being fundamental to establishing the element of corpus delicti. In the course of proving such compliance before the
trial courts, prosecutors must have the initiative to not only acknowledge, but also justify, any perceived deviations from
the procedural requirements of Section 21.122

As no less than the liberty of an accused is at stake, appellate courts, this Court included, must, in turn, sift the records
to determine if, indeed, the apprehending team observed Section 21 and if not, if the same is justified under the
circumstances. This, regardless if issues thereon were ever raised or threshed out in the lower court/s, consistent with the doctrine
that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review and the appellate court must correct errors in the appealed
judgment whether they are assigned or not.123 If, from such full examination of the records, there appears unjustified failure to comply
with Section 21, it becomes the appellate court's bounded duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.124

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 31, 2015 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01192-MIN
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Aquila "Payat" Adobar is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, for immediate implementation. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, the action he has taken.
Copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for his information.

SO ORDERED.

HONORIO BERNARDO,Petitioner, G.R. No. 183357

- versus - March 15, 2010

HEIRS OF EUSEBIO VILLEGAS,

Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to assail the validity of the Decision [1] dated 21 April
2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal in Civil Case No. R-
00-035.

This controversy stemmed from a Complaint dated 14 November 2000 for accion publiciana filed by respondent Heirs

of Eusebio Villegas against petitioner Honorio Bernardo, Romeo Gaza (Gaza) and Monina Francisco (Francisco). Respondents had

earlier filed an ejectment case against the trio, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-065 with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binangonan,

Rizal, which case was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for having been filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period for

filing a forcible entry case.[2]

Respondents alleged in the Complaint that their father, Eusebio Villegas, is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46891 with an area of 18,369 square meters and situated in Barangay Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal; that

petitioner, by stealth and in the guise of merely grazing his cattle, surreptitiously entered into possession of a portion of respondents

land; that petitioner conspired and confederated with Gaza and Francisco by illegally constructing their own houses on the subject

land; that the issue of possession was brought to the barangay for conciliation but no settlement was reached by the parties; and that

petitioner, Gaza and Francisco had forcibly, unlawfully and unjustly possessed and continue to possess the subject property and had

refused to vacate the same.

In his Answer, petitioner denied taking possession of any portion of the property of respondents. He argued that the cause of action is

barred by the judgment in the ejectmentcase. He claimed that he had been in possession of his land since the early 1950s.[3] As he

did before the MTC, petitioner also alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.

Gaza alleged that he has been occupying an abandoned river bed adjacent to the property allegedly owned by

respondents. [4]
Gaza averred that he entered into a written agreement with petitioner, who claimed to own the land and allowed him

to build a nipa hut thereon.[5]

An ocular inspection was conducted by the trial court judge. On 5 March 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents

and ordered petitioner, Gaza and Francisco to vacate the subject land covered by TCT No. 46891 and to pay jointly and severally

respondents the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost of suit.[6]

The trial court held that the suit, being an accion publiciana, falls within its jurisdiction. It found that the houses of petitioner

and Gaza were inside the titled property of respondents. Its findings were based on the testimony of one of the

respondents, Estelito Villegas; the relocation plan prepared by Engineer Rico J. Rasay; and the Technical Report on Verification Survey

submitted by Engineer Robert C. Pangyarihan, petitioners own witness.[7] The trial court noted that petitioner failed to present any title

or tax declaration to prove ownership or possessory right.[8]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

In his appeal, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and argued that in their complaint, the

respondents failed to state the assessed value of the property in dispute. The appellate court ruled that petitioner is estopped from

raising the issue of jurisdiction because he failed to file a motion to dismiss on such ground and, instead, actively participated in the

proceedings before the trial court.

With respect to the argument that being indispensable parties, all of the heirs of Eusebio Villegas should have been impleaded as

parties, the appellate court disagreed and invoked Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any one of the co-owners may

bring an action for ejectment. The appellate court construed said provision to cover all kinds of actions for recovery of possession. [9]

The appellate court sustained the trial courts finding that the portions of the land occupied by petitioner and Gaza are owned by

respondents. The appellate court likewise ruled that respondents could not be guilty of laches considering that Estelito Villegas, upon

seeing for the first time in 1996 that petitioner was already building his house on the premises, verbally asked him to discontinue the

construction.[10]

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition.
Petitioner insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action for failure of respondents to allege the

assessed value of the property involved in their complaint. Petitioner belies the ruling of the appellate court that he failed to raise

objections before the trial court. Petitioner reiterates that he raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction as early as in his Answer filed

before the trial court. Moreover, he argues that even if he did not raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction, the trial court should have

dismissed the complaint motu proprio. Petitioner disputes the application to him of the doctrine

of estoppel by laches in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. [11]

Petitioner avers that unlike in Tijam, he raised the issue of jurisdiction, not only in

his answer, but also in his appeal. [12]

Respondents defend the ruling of the Court of Appeals and maintain that petitioner is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the

trial court.[13]

The issue presented before this Court is simple: Whether or not estoppel bars petitioner from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction.

Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the plenary action of accion publiciana must be brought before the regional trial

courts. With the modifications introduced by Republic Act No. 7691 [14] in 1994, the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts was limited

to real actions where the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00, and P50,000.00 where the action is filed in Metro Manila, thus:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Under the law as modified, jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property.

A reading of the complaint shows that respondents failed to state the assessed value of the disputed land. The averments read:

xxxx

3. EUSEBIO VILLEGAS, deceased father of hte plaintiffs, is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Pag-asa (formerly Barangay Tayuman), Binangonan, Rizalwith a land area of 18,369 square
meters. The same is covered by and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46891 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Rizal. x x x.
4. Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of EUSEBIO VILLEGAS and succeeded to the subject parcel of land by virtue
of their inheritance rights as compulsory heirs of said deceased EusebioVillegas and upon his death, immediately
took over and were enjoying the peaceful possession of the said parcel of land and exercising said rights of possession
and ownership thereof;
5. That sometime in 1996, defendant Honorio Bernardo, by stealth and in guise of merely grazing his cattle,
without the consent of the plaintiffs, surreptitiously entered into the possession of a portion of the subject parcel of
land. Employing threats and intimidations, he claimed later that the area he illegally occupied is purportedly not part
and parcel of the land owned by the plaintiffs predecessor, Eusebio Villegas, and forcibly fenced and built his house
on the portion of land he illegally occupied;
6. Not being content with his own forcible and unlawful invasion, usurpation and incursion into the plaintiffs
parcel of land, and in furtherance of his desire to forcibly exclude the plaintiffs of their lawful and for possession of
the subject portion of plaintiffs parcel of land, defendant Bernardo, conspired and confederated with defendants
Romeo Gaza and MoninaFrancisco by surreptitiously and illegally constructing their own houses on the subject parcel
of land through stealth and intimidation;
7. That the issue of the possession of the subject parcel of land was brought under the Barangay Justice
System in 1996 for conciliation but, no settlement was reached by the parties.Copies of the Certifications issued by
the Barangay for that matter is hereto attached and marked as Annex B;
8. That the defendants have forcibly, unlawfully, and unjustly dispossessed and still continues to forcibly,
unlawfully, and unjustly dispossesses the plaintiffs of their lawful rights of possession and ownership on a portion of
the subject property since 1966 up to the present;
9. Because of the unjust refusal of the defendants to vacate the premises, plaintiffs were constrained to
engage the services of counsel to protect their interest on the property for an agreed attorneys fee of P50,000.00,
and have incurred litigation expenses[;]
10. By reason of the unlawful and forcible invasion by the defendants of the property of the plaintiffs which
was accompanied by threats and intimidation, the plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer anxiety and sleepless
nights for which the defendants should be made to indemnify by way of moral damages in the amount of at least
P100,000.00;
11. To serve as an example to others who might be minded to commit similar wanton and unlawful acts,
defendants should be held answerable for exemplary damages of not less than P50,000.00.[15]

This fact was noted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision but it proceeded to rule in this wise:

Records show that at the time plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint below, R.A. No. 7691 which amended
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was already in effect. However, the complaint failed to allege the assessed value of the
real property involved. Although appellant indeed raised the issue of jurisdiction in his answer, he had not filed a
 motion to dismiss on this ground nor reiterated the matter thereafter but actively participated in the proceedings
after the denial of his demurrer to evidence anchored on the failure of the plaintiffs to identify in their complaint all
the heirs of the registered owner and supposed lack of technical description of the property in the certificate of
title. Indeed, appellant is now estopped to question the trial courts jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature
of the case having actively pursued throughout the trial, by filing various pleadings and presenting all relevant
documentary and testimonial evidence, his theory that the portion occupied by him is not covered by the torrens title
of Eusebio Villegas.[16]

We agree.

As already shown, nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. There is no

showing on the face of the complaint that the RTChas jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint

of the assessed value of the property, it cannot readily be determined which of the two trial courts had original and exclusive jurisdiction

over the case.[17]

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. [18] Lack of jurisdiction is one of

those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence

on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. [19]
The reason is that

jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on

the action.[20]

However, estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One

cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against

one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party

submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when

adverse.[21]

In Tijam, the Court held that it is iniquitous and unfair to void the trial courts decision for lack of jurisdiction considering that

it was raised only after fifteen (15) years of tedious litigation, thus:

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the
court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its
part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced
on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness
of this is not only patent but revolting.[22]

The principle of justice and equity as espoused in Tijam should be applied in this case. The MTC dismissed the ejectment case

upon its ruling that the case is for accionpubliciana. It did not assert jurisdiction over the case even if it could have done so based on

the assessed value of the property subject of the accion publiciana. And there was no showing, indeed, not even an allegation, that

the MTC was not aware of its jurisdictional authority over an accion publiciana involving property in the amount stated in the

law.Moreover, petitioner did not bring up the issue of jurisdictional amount that would have led the MTC to proceed with the trial of

the case. Petitioner obviously considered the dismissal to be in his favor. When, as a result of such dismissal, respondents brought the

case as accion publiciana before the RTC, petitioner never brought up the issue of jurisdictional amount. What petitioner mentioned in

his Answer before the RTC was the generally phrased allegation that the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter

and the nature of the action in the above-entitled case.[23]

This general assertion, which lacks any basis, is not sufficient. Clearly, petitioner failed to point out the omission of the assessed value

in the complaint. Petitioner actively participated during the trial by adducing evidence and filing numerous pleadings, none of which

mentioned any defect in the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was only on appeal before the Court of Appeals, after he obtained an adverse

judgment in the trial court, that petitioner, for the first time, came up with the argument that the decision is void because there was

no allegation in the complaint about the value of the property.

Clearly, petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.

We note that the decisions of the RTC and of the Court of Appeals discussed extensively the merits of the case, which has been pending

for nearly ten (10) years. It was handled by two (2) judges and its records had to be reconstituted after the fire that gutted the

courthouse.[24] If we were to accede to petitioners prayer, all the effort, time and expenses of parties who participated in the litigation

would be wasted. Quite obviously, petitioner wants a repetition of the process hoping for the possibility of a reversal of the decision. The

Court will not countenance such practice.

Significantly, the Technical Report on Verification Survey[25] by Engineer Robert C. Pangyarihan, which was attached to and

formed part of the records, contained a tax declaration[26] indicating that the subject property has an assessed value of P110,220.00. It

is basic that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued

by the proper government agency.[27] Under Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC in fact has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

action.

Taking into consideration the decision of the MTC proclaiming that the case is one for accion publiciana and the assessed value of the

property as evidenced by the case records, jurisdiction pertains, rightfully so, with the RTC. Perforce, the petition should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 April 2008, affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court

of Binangonan, Rizal dated 5 March 2007, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

AUGUSTUS GONZALES andSPOUSES NESTOR G.R. No. 167398

VICTOR andMA. LOURDES RODRIGUEZ,
August 9, 2011
Petitioners,-versus-

QUIRICO PE,

Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution[2] dated

February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Twentieth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, entitled Quirico Pe v. Honorable Judge

Rene Hortillo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, Augustus Gonzales and Spouses
Engr. Nestor Victor and Dr. Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez, which granted the petition of respondent Quirico Pe. The CA Decision reversed and

set aside the Order[3] dated September 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 31, which dismissed

respondent's appeal for non-payment of docket and other lawful fees, and directing the issuance of the writ of execution for the

implementation of its Decision[4] dated June 28, 2002 in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent. The CA Decision also

directed the RTC to assess the appellate docket fees to be paid by the respondent, if it has not done so, and allow him to pay such

fees and give due course to his appeal.

The antecedents are as follows:

Respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of construction materials, and had been transacting business with

petitioner Spouses Nestor Victor Rodriguez and Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

awarded two contracts in favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez for the following projects, namely, construction of Lanot-Banga Road

(Kalibo Highway) km. 39 + 200 to km. 40 + 275 Section IV (Aklan side) and concreting of Laua-an Pandan Road (Tibial-Culasi Section),

Province of Antique. In 1998, respondent agreed to supply cement for the construction projects of petitioner Spouses

Rodriguez. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez availed of the DPWHs pre-payment program for cement requirement regarding the Lanot-Banga

Road, Kalibo Highway project (Kalibo project), wherein the DPWH would give an advance payment even before project completion

upon his presentment, among others, of an official receipt for the amount advanced. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez gave Land Bank of

the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 6563066 to respondent, which was signed by co-petitioners (his wife Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez and his

business partner Augustus Gonzales), but leaving the amount and date in blank. The blank LBP check was delivered to respondent to

guarantee the payment of 15,698 bags of Portland cement valued at P1,507,008.00, covered by Official Receipt No. 1175,[5] issued by

respondent (as owner of Antique Commercial), in favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez (as owner of Greenland Builders).However, a

year later, respondent filled up blank LBP Check No. 6563066, by placing P2,062,000.00 and June 30, 1999, corresponding to the

amount and date.

On December 9, 1999, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint[6] for Declaration of Payment, Cancellation of Documents and
Damages against respondent with the RTC, Branch 31, Iloilo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 25945. The amended complaint alleged
that they entrusted blank LBP Check No. 6563066 to respondent so as to facilitate the approval of the pre-payment application of
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez with the DPWH. They stated that the blank LBP check would serve as collateral to guarantee the payment
for 15,698 bags to be used for the Kalibo project, amounting to P1,507,008.00, and that after payment of the said amount, respondent
would return the LBP check. According to them, after having paid respondent the amount of P2,306,500.00, which is P139,160.00
more than the amount of P2,167,340.00 (representing the value for 23,360 bags of cement taken for the Kalibo project), they were
cleared of any liability.

On January 6, 2000, respondent filed an Answer to Amended Complaint,[7] averring that he had so far delivered 40,360 bags
of cement to petitioners who remitted P2,306,500.00, thereby leaving an outstanding amount of P2,062,000.00. He countered that
when petitioners stopped the bank-to-bank online payments to him, he filled up the amount of P2,062,000.00 and made the LBP check
payable on June 30, 1999. The LBP check was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). By way of compulsory
counterclaim, he sought recovery of the balance of P2,062,000.00, with interest at 24% from January 29, 1999 until fully paid as
actual damages.

In the Pre-trial Order[8] dated January 28, 2000, the trial court determined the following to be the delimited issues, to wit:

(1) whether plaintiffs [herein petitioners] liability to defendant [herein respondent] for 15,698 bags priced
at P1,507,008.00 subject of the earlier-mentioned pre-payment program and covered by the blank LBP Check No.
6563066 has already been paid, hence, plaintiffs are no longer liable to the defendant for this amount;

(2) whether this LBP Check No. 6563066 should not be returned by defendant to plaintiffs, or failing in
which, should now be declared as cancelled, null and void;

(3) whether plaintiffs have completely paid to the defendant the price of the cement used for the Kalibo
project which specifically is the amount of 23,360 bags of cement valued in the total amount of P2,167,340.00;

(4) whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages and attorneys fees; and

(5) whether this case be dismissed and with the dismissal of the complaint to proceed with the
counterclaim.[9]
 In a Decision dated June 28, 2002, the trial court, applying Section 14[10] of the Negotiable Instruments Law, found that

respondents subsequent filling up of LBP Check No. 6563066 in the amount of P2,062,000.00 was not made strictly in accordance with

the authority given to him by petitioner Nestor Rodriguez, and that since one year had already lapsed, the same was not done within

a reasonable time. As to the 23,360 bags of cement for the Kalibo project, valued at P2,167,340.00 which was subject of previous

transactions, the trial court ruled that the same had been fully paid and considered a settled issue. Consequently, the RTC rendered

judgment in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, as follows:

1. Declaring plaintiffs' obligation to the defendant for the cement supplied for the Kalibo (Lanot-Banga) Road
Construction Project in the amount of P2,167,340.00 as already and fully paid, hence, plaintiffs are no longer liable
to the defendant;

2. Declaring Land Bank Check No. 6563066 dated June 30, 1999 for P2,062,000.00 as null and void and without
any legal effect;

3. Ordering defendant to pay each plaintiff the sums of P100,000.00 as actual damages; P500,000.00 as moral
damages; P200,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee; P50,000.00 as
miscellaneous actual and necessary litigation expenses; and

4. To pay the costs.

Defendant's counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[11]

After receipt of a copy of the said RTC Decision on July 26, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2002.

In an Order[12] dated August 5, 2002, the trial court gave due course to respondent's appeal, and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to

transmit the entire records of the case to the CA.

On August 26, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of

Execution,[13] stating that respondents appeal should be dismissed as the same was not perfected due to non-payment of docket and

other lawful fees as required under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Claiming that since the respondents appeal was not

perfected and, as a consequence, the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 became final and executory, petitioners sought the issuance

of a writ of execution for the implementation of the said RTC Decision. To buttress their motion, petitioners also appended a

Certification[14] dated August 19, 2002, issued by the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC, Iloilo City,

certifying that no appeal fees in the case had been paid and received by the OCC.

In the Order dated September 23, 2002, the trial court dismissed respondent's appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of

execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.

On October 2, 2002, the Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo issued the Writ of Execution[15] directing the

execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.

On October 7, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction

and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order,[16] seeking to set aside the RTC Order dated September 23, 2002 (which dismissed his

appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), and to enjoin the

implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2002.

In a Resolution[17] dated October 9, 2002, the CA granted the respondents prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and, in the

Resolution[18] dated August 20, 2003, approved the respondents injunction bond and directed the Division Clerk of Court to issue the

writ of preliminary injunction.

 On August 20, 2003, the Division Clerk of Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, [19] thereby enjoining the

implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2002.

On June 23, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed order and writ of execution of the Regional Trial Court
must be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE. The trial court is hereby ordered to assess the appellate docket fees, if it has
not done so, and allow the petitioner to pay such fees and give due course to the petitioner's appeal. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21] on August 24, 2004, which, however, was denied by the CA in a

Resolution[22] dated February 23, 2005.

Hence, petitioner filed this present petition raising the sole issue that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT AND ALLOWING
RESPONDENT TO BELATEDLY PAY THE REQUIRED APPELLATE DOCKET AND OTHER LEGAL FEES.

Petitioners allege that since respondent failed to pay the docket and other legal fees at the time he filed the Notice of Appeal, his

appeal was deemed not perfected in contemplation of the law. Thus, petitioners pray that the CA decision be set aside and a new one

be rendered dismissing the respondents appeal and ordering the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.

On the other hand, respondent, citing Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, maintains that his appeal has been perfected by the

mere filing of the notice of appeal. Respondent theorizes that with the perfection of his appeal, the trial court is now divested of

jurisdiction to dismiss his appeal and, therefore, only the CA has jurisdiction to determine and rule on the propriety of his appeal. He

raises the defense that his failure to pay the required docket and other legal fees was because the RTC Branch Clerk of Court did not

make an assessment of the appeal fees to be paid when he filed the notice of appeal.

The petition is meritorious.

In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in

the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC (the court which rendered the judgment

or final order appealed from) and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.Section 3 thereof states that the appeal shall be taken

within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is

the payment of the required appeal fees within the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule. Thus,

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay
to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record or the record on appeal.

In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the CA cited Yambao v. Court of Appeals[23] as justification for giving due course to

respondents petition and ordering the belated payment of docket and other legal fees. In Yambao, the CA dismissed therein petitioners

appeal from the RTC decision for failure to pay the full amount of the required docket fee. Upon elevation of the case, the Court,

however, ordered the CA to give due course to their appeal, and ruled that their subsequent payment of the P20.00 deficiency, even

before the CA had passed upon their motion for reconsideration, was indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply with the

Rules.

The ruling in Yambao is not applicable to the present case as herein respondent never made any payment of the docket and other

lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so, simultaneous with his filing of the Notice of Appeal. Although respondent was able to file a

timely Notice of Appeal, however, he failed to pay the docket and other legal fees, claiming that the Branch Clerk of Court did not

issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the part of the respondent rendered his appeal with the CA to be dismissible and,

therefore, the RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002, to be final and executory.
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo,[24] as with other subsequent cases[25] of the same ruling, the Court explained that the procedural

requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed

period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary

appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full

amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final

order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere

technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an

appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter

of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an

appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket

and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the

docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction

over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

Respondents claim that his non-payment of docket and other lawful fees should be treated as mistake and excusable negligence,

attributable to the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, is too superficial to warrant consideration. This is clearly negligence of respondent's

counsel, which is not excusable. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not

have guarded against.[26] Respondent's counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period for filing the same without,

however, paying the appellate docket fees. He simply ignored the basic procedure of taking an appeal by filing a notice of appeal,

coupled with the payment of the full amount of docket and other lawful fees. Respondents counsel should keep abreast of procedural

laws and his ignorance of the procedural requirements shall bind the respondent. In National Power Corporation v. Laohoo,[27] we ruled

that therein counsels failure to file the appeal in due time does not amount to excusable negligence. The non-perfection of the appeal

on time is not a mere technicality. Besides, to grant therein petitioners plea for the relaxation of the rules on technicality would disturb

a well-entrenched ruling that could make uncertain when a judgment attains finality, leaving the same to depend upon the

resourcefulness of a party in concocting implausible excuses to justify an unwarranted departure from the time-honored policy of the

law that the period for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.

The CA took cognizance over the case, based on the wrong premise that when the RTC issued the Order dated August 5,

2002 giving due course to respondents Notice of Appeal and directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the

case to the CA, it ipso facto lost jurisdiction over the case. Section 9,[28] Rule 41 of the Rules explains that the court of origin loses

jurisdiction over the case only upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time by the appellant and the expiration of the time to

appeal of the other parties. Withal, prior to the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, the RTC may issue orders for

the protection and preservation of the rights of the prevailing party, as in this case, the issuance of the writ of execution because the

respondents appeal was not perfected.

Moreover, Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules states that the CA may dismiss an appeal taken from the RTC on the ground of

non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the 15-day reglementary period:

SEC 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the
appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time,
or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. (As amended by A.M. No.
00-2-10-SC, May 1, 2000.)

Since respondents appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, it was as if no appeal was actually

taken. Therefore, the RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents lodged before it, such as the petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of Execution, filed on August 26, 2002, which sought to set aside its

Order dated August 5, 2002 that gave due course to respondents Notice of Appeal, and directed the issuance of a writ of

execution. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the prudent thing that the CA should have done was to dismiss the respondents appeal

for failure to pay the appeal fees, and declare that the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 has now become final and executory.
 As an incidental matter on the propriety of petitioners petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules, respondent

raises the argument that since the subject of the present petition is the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the CA (in favor of

the respondent enjoining the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, which is interlocutory in

nature, petitioners petition should be denied for being the wrong remedy. In other words, respondent advances the theory that since

the assailed CA Decision dated June 23, 2004 partakes of an interlocutory order, i.e., enjoining the finality of the RTC Decision dated

June 28, 2002, petitioners should have availed of the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45.

Respondents argument is unfounded. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 45 provides that decisions, final orders

or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to Us by

filing a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[29]Therefore,

petitioners filing of the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper and adequate remedy to challenge the

Decision dated June 24, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the CA.

To recapitulate, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and

failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[30] The rules require that from the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order

denying ones motion for reconsideration, an appellant may take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC and

paying the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, within the 15-day reglementary period for the

perfection of an appeal. Otherwise, the appellant's appeal is not perfected, and the CA may dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-

payment of docket and other lawful fees. As a consequence, the assailed RTC decision shall become final and executory and, therefore,

the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of execution.

Since the CA erroneously took cognizance over the case, its Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23,

2005 should be overturned, and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on August 20, 2003 should likewise be lifted. Thus, the RTC

Decision dated June 28, 2002 is reinstated and, as the said decision having become final and executory, the case is remanded for its

prompt execution.

While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the

constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises

jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal.After a decision is declared final and

executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period,

the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case. [31]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the

Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction, issued by the Court

of Appeals on August 20, 2003, is LIFTED.

The Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Iloilo City is REINSTATED and, in view of its finality,

the case is REMANDED for its prompt execution.

SO ORDERED.
 ROSITO BAGUNU, G.R. No. 186487
Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

- versus - PERALTA,*

BERSAMIN,** and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO &

ROSENDA ACERIT,

Respondents.
August 15, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration[1] filed by Rosito Bagunu (petitioner) to reverse our April 13,

2009 Resolution [2]

which denied his petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177

The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents)

against the petitioners free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject

land), pending before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional

Office).

The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In

1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.

On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent[3] over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands

Management Bureau).[4] On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner,[5] who substituted for

Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of

Atty. Binags pending free patent application.[6]

The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands survey, [7] and the free patent applications

uniformly identified the subject land as Lot322. The deeds covering the second and

third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land.[8]

On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioners free patent application. The respondents

asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979,

executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.[9]

The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal investigation. The DENR

Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates the area in dispute including the area purchased by [the

respondents].[10]

On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application

since this lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:

1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;

2. [The petitioners free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D, as included in Lot
No. 258;

3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties] respective technical
description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.[11]

The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office

denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling.

Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner

acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot322.[12]

On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed[13] the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the differences in the

boundaries stated in the parties respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in

fact, distinct from that claimed by the respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective deeds of sale, the

Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale

in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.[14] The petitioner appealed to

the Court of Appeals (CA).

COURT OF APPEALS RULING

 The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since

questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the

DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality.[15] The petitioner assails this

ruling before the Court.

Civil Case No. 751

In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint

for reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan,

Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC). Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly

identified the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322, instead

of Lot 258.[16]

On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the pendency of the land

protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss.[17]

After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing

a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention captioned the respondents causes of action as one for

Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and Damages.[18] The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim over Lot 322 is a cloud on their

title and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse possession of

Lot 322 from the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy,

ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring his possession from Lot 258.[19] The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as owners

of Lot 322.

After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution on the respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC

to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling.[20] In their prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to:

1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of action xxx for
reformation of contracts be granted;

2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to exclude Lot 322
xxx.
3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.]

THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarys jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims

of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258

(and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and

determined claims of ownership over a real property matters beyond the DENRs competence to determine.

The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right

over Lot 322 does not involve the specialized technical expertise of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves interpretation of

contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within the competence

of the courts.

The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to the evidence. The

petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag

identified in his free patent application; that the area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself

(Atty. Binag), tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was

sold to him; and that his present possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its ocular

investigation.
 The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents claim of ownership over Lot 322, based on Atty.

Binags testimony during the hearing on the respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed

interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner

adds that as early as 1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty. Binags free patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed

their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims

that the respondents inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership.

Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents favor by claiming that the respondents presented

no sufficient evidence to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title.

In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA

Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his arguments to the issue of

jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

THE RULING

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45

The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged error of the DENR and the CA in identifying the parcel of

land that the petitioner bought an error that adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the subject land. In his motion

for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently took a cue from our April 13, 2009Resolution, denying his petition, since his present

motion limitedly argues against the DENRs jurisdiction and the CAs application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the

present case, the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity of these lots involves the

task of delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others.

While there are instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not

even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions.[21] On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of

the Director of Lands[22] on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts, [23] and

even on this Court, when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine our discussions to

the petitioners twin legal issues.

The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive
jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain

The petitioner insists that under the law[24] actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for reformation of

contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since

these actions are already pending before the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the

petitioners free patent application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.

In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties written agreement reflects their true

intention.[25] In the present case, this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and third sale. On the other

hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to recover its

full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership, but also the identity of the real property he

seeks to recover.[26]
 While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve controversies

involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the present case, neither party has asserted private ownership

over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the

DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioners

act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public

land[27] whose management and disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4,

Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 292[28] reads:

Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall:

xxx

(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and,
in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy
and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;

xxx

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve
as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with
appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)

Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,[29] the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has the duty, among others,

to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141)[30] by having direct executive

control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the

public domain.

As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents against the petitioners

free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot

claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the

administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other

hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicants entitlement (or

lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional Office still has to determine the respondents entitlement to the issuance

of a free patent[31] in their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own application.) Thus, it is the

DENR which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to

intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands,[32] unless grave abuse of

discretion exists.

After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction

on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction,[33] such as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts

involving the same property. Note that the contracts refer to the same property, identified as Lot 322, - which the DENR Regional

Office, DENR Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-

judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its

jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction[34]

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil
Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this
function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised
by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their
particular expertise.[35]

The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public
lands

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a

better right over Lot 322) does not require the specialized technical expertise of the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves

interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within the

competence of regular courts.

 We disagree.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is

within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of

sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine

technical and intricate matters of fact[36]

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to cases
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within
the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.[37]

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below.
It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed
out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily
served.[38] (Emphases added.)

The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts area of competence and,

concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of

ownership given the public character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192,[39] the disposition

and management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR

Secretary.[40]

While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not divest regular

courts of jurisdiction over possessoryactions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and

occupations),[41] the respondents complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession whether de jure or de

facto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of

ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on the respondents reivindicatory action pending final

determination by the DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents entitlement to a free patent, following the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and his consequent

directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretarys exercise of sound administrative discretion. In

the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,[42] which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of

Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of

the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior

judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the

primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 HEIRS OF CESAR MARASIGAN namely: Luz G.R. No. 156078
Regina, Cesar Jr., Benito, Santiago, Renato,
Jose, Geraldo, Orlando, Peter, Paul, Mauricio,
Rommel, Michael, Gabriel, and Maria Luz, all Present:
surnamed Marasigan,

Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

- versus - NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Apolonio, Lilia, Octavio, Jr., Horacio,

Benito Jr., and Marissa, all surnamed
Marasigan, and the Court of Appeals,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

March 14, 2008

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, with petitioners praying for the reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2002 and its Resolution[2] dated 13 November 2002 denying the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order, in CA- G.R. SP No. 67529. Petitioners
are asking this Court to (a) give due course to their petition; and (b) reverse and set aside, and thus, declare null and void the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67529. However, petitioners are asking for the following reliefs in their Memorandum: (a)
the dismissal of the complaint for partition of the estate of the late Alicia Marasigan, docketed as Special Civil Action No. P-77-97, filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur; (b) annulment or rescission of the public auction sale of petitioners
1/7th undivided share in the estate of Alicia Marasigan, and direct Apolonio Marasigan to restore the same to petitioners; or (c) in the
alternative, allowance of the physical partition of the entire 496 hectares of Hacienda Sta. Rita.

Central to the instant Petition is the estate of Alicia Marasigan (Alicia).

Alicia was survived by her siblings: Cesar, Apolonio, Lilia, and Benito; Marissa, a sister-in-law; and the children of her brothers
who predeceased her: Francisco, Horacio,and Octavio. She died intestate and without issue on 21 January 1995.

On 17 December 1997, a Complaint for Judicial Partition of the Estate of Alicia Marasigan was filed before the RTC by several of her
heirs and private respondents herein, namely, Apolonio, Lilia, Octavio, Jr., Horacio, Benito, Jr., and Marissa, against Cesar, docketed
as Special Civil Action No. P-77-97.

According to private respondents, Alicia owned in common with her siblings 13 parcels of land called Hacienda Sta. Rita in Pili
and Minalabac, Camarines Sur, with an aggregate area of 4,960,963 square meters or 496 hectares, and more particularly described
as follows:

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 626

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 516-B of the Subdivision Survey Plan Csd-05-001020, situated at Sagurong, Pili,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE., by PNR; on the SE., by Bgy. Road; on the SW., by Lot 2870; and on the NW.,
by Lot 512, containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWELVE (8,712) SQUARE METERS, more or
less, declared under A.R.P. No. 014 166 and assessed at P12, 860.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 627

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 4237, Cad-291, Pili Cadastre, Plan Cen-05-000006, situated at Saguron, Pili,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the N., by Irr. ditch beyond Lot 445; on the E., by Lots 517 and 518; on the S., by
Creek, Lot 468, 467; and on the W., by Lot 2948 and Mun. of Minalabac, containing an area of EIGHT HUNDRED
SIXTY ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE (861,163) SQUARE METERS, more or less, declared under
A.R.P. No. 016 268 and assessed at P539,020.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 628

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 2870 Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre Plan Swo-05000607, situated at Sagurong, Pili,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the N., by Binasagan River; on the E., by Lots 512 and 516; on the S., by Barangay
Road; and on the W., by Lot 469, containing an area of THIRTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY TWO (13,462)
SQUARE METERS, mote or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 014 130 and assessed at P15,180.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 629

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 517-B of the Subdivision Survey Plan Csd-05-001020, situated at Sagurong, Pili,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE., by PNR; on the SE., by Lot 519; on the SW., by Lots 2025 and 2942; and on
the NW., by Brgy. Road, containing an area of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE (13,765) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 014 167 and assessed at P20,310.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 652

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 4207-B of the subdivision survey Plan Csd-05-011349-D, situated at Sagurong
(San Jose), Pili, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE., by Lot 4207-C, Lot 6157; on the SE., by Irr. ditch, Lot 2942;
and on the NW., by Lot 4298 (3051-B), containing an area of FIFTY FOUR (54) SQUARE METERS, mote or less,
declared under A.R.P. No. 014 384 and assessed at P40.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 653

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 4207-A of the subdivision survey Plan Csd-05-011349-D, situated at Sagurong
(San Jose), Pili, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE., by Lot 4205 (I0T 443-A Csd-05-001019); on the SE., and SW.,
by Irr. ditch (Lot 2942); on the W., by Lot 4207-C Lot 6157; and on the NW., by Lot 4208 (Lot 3051-B, Csd-05-
001019), containing an area of TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN (27,33) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 014 383 and assessed at P20,150.00.

A.R.P. NO. 014 385

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 4207-C Lot 6157 of the subdivision survey Plan Csd-05-001019, situated at
Sagurong (San Jose), Pili, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE., by Lot 4207-A Lot 6155; on the SE., by Lot 4207-A
Lot 6155; on the SW., by Lot 4207-B Lot 6156 and Irr, ditch; and on the NW., by Lot 4208 (3051-B), containing an
 area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE (361) SQUARE METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 014 385 and
assessed at P270.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 654

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 443-A of the subdivision survey Plan Csd-05-001019, situated at Sagurong (San
Jose), Pili, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE., by Lots 474, 4019, 4018, 4027, creek; on the SE., by Hrs. of Benito
Marasigan; and on the NW., by Lot 443-B, Ireneo Llorin; containing an area of TWO HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT (244,858) SQUARE METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 014
382 and assessed at P195,400.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 655

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 2942-A of the subdivision survey Plan Csd-05-010854-D, situated at Sagurong
(San Jose/San Agustin), Pili, Camarines Sur, bounded on the N., by Creek; on the NE., by Lot 3049; on the SE., by
Creek; and on the W., by Lots 3184, 3183, 2942-13, 3183, 3060 and 3177; containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED
SIXTY SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY TWO (466,622) SQUARE METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P.
No. 014 386 and assessed at P287,160.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 656

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 2 Plan Cen-05-000007, situated at San Jose, Pili, Camarines Sur, bounded on
the N., by Lots 509 and 508, Binasagan River; on the E., by Lots 523, 521 and 520; on the S., by Lot 522; and on
the W., by Phil. Natl. Railways; containing an area of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWELVE
(105,212) SQUARE METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 016 939 and assessed at P524,220.00.

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 657

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 1, Plan Cen-05-000007, situated at San Jose, Pili, Camarines Sur, bounded on
the N., by Lots 525, 526, 527; on the E., by Lots 528-A, 529, 530, 531, 532 and Natl. Road; on the S., by Lots 533
and 522 pt.; and on the W., by Lots 521, 523; containing an area of FIFTY SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO
(56,652) SQUARE METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 016 993 and assessed at P292,090.00

TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 16841

A parcel of land denominated as Lots 1 and 2, Plan II-10759, situated at Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur,
bounded on the N., by Lots 3061, 3059, 4119, 3178, 3185, 3186, 3187, 3188, Borabodan Creek, 4350, 4401; and
on the W., by Lots 4380, 3030, 3057. 3286, 3053, 3056; containing an area of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIFTY NINE (2,922,059) SQUARE METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 014
0372 and assessed at P888,200.00.

TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 16842

A parcel of land denominated as Lot 443-A of Plan Psu-62335, situated at Manapao, Minalaban, Camarines Sur (San
Jose, Pili, Cam. Sur); bounded on the NE., by Shannon Richmond and Eugenio Dato; on the E., by Eugenio Dato; on
the S., by Eugenio Dato and Creek; and on the SW and NW., by Shannon Richmond; containing an area of TWO
HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIX (240,706) SQUARE METERS, more or less, declared under A.R.P.
No. 014 245 and assessed at P146,830.00.[3]

Alicia left behind her 2/21 shares in the afore-described 13 parcels of land.

In answer to the private respondents Complaint, Cesar enumerated Alicias several other properties and assets which he also wanted
included in the action for partition, to wit:

1. 1/8 share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10947 located at Poblacion, San Juan, Batangas,
containing an area of 4,827 square meters, more or less;

2. 1/8 share in the parcel of land with improvements thereon (cockpit arena) located in Poblacion, San Juan,
Batangas covered by TCT No. 0-3255;

3. A parcel of commercial land under property Index No. 024-21-001-25-005 situated in Poblacion, San Juan
Batangas containing an area of 540 square meters, more or less;

4. A parcel of land situated in Yabo, Sipocot, Camarines Sur containing an area of 2,000 hectares and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 7546;

5. A parcel of land located at Brgy. Yabo, Sipocot, Camarines Sur with an area of 21,000 square meters, more
or less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 6622;
 6. A parcel of land located at Brgy. Yabo, Sipocot, Camarines Sur with an area of 2,6750 hectares under Tax
Declaration No. 5352;

7. A parcel of land located at Barrio Yabo, Sipocot, Camarines Sur with an area of 2,3750 hectares and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 3653, and

8. Shares of Stock in Bolbok Rural Bank, Inc., a family owned rural bank consisting of 3,230 shares at P100.00
per share.[4]

Cesars request for inclusion was contested by private respondents on the ground that the properties he enumerated had already been
previously partitioned and distributed to the appropriate parties.[5]

On 4 February 2000, the RTC decided in favor of private respondents and issued an Order of Partition of the Estate of Alicia Marasigan,
decreeing that:

As regards to [sic] the real properties located in Hacienda Sta. Rita in the municipalities of Pili and Minilabac,
Camarines Sur as described in par. 3 of the complaint, the actual area representing the 2/21 pro-indiviso share
having been determined consisting of 422,422.65 sq. meters, more or less (Exhibit 0-2) therefore, the share of
each heir of the late Alicia Marasigan is 1/7 or equivalent to 67,496.09 square meters each (Exh. 0-3).

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered.

1. Ordering the partition of the estate of Alicia Marasigan in Hacienda Sta. Rita located in the
municipalities of Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur consisting of 422,422.65 sq. meters among her
surviving brothers and sisters namely: APOLONIO, LILIA, BENITO and CESAR, all surnamed
MARASIGAN who will inherit per capita and her nephews and nieces who are the children of deceased
brothers the children of Francisco Marasigan and children of Horacio Marasigan who will inherit per
stirpes and Octavio Marasigan, Jr., who will inherit by right of representation of his deceased father,
Octavio Marasigan, Sr.

2. Declaring the partition of the San Juan, Batangas properties made by the heirs of Alicia Marasigan as
contained in the minutes of the Board Meeting of the Rural Bank of Bolbok valid and binding among
them.

3. Ordering the partition of the real properties located in San Juan, Batangas as shown and reflected in
Exhibits 1 to 10 inclusive presented by defendant, in the same sharing and proportion as provided in
paragraph one above-cited in this dispositive portion.

4. No pronouncement as to costs.[6]

As the parties could not agree on how they shall physically partition among themselves Alicias estate, private respondents filed a
Motion to Appoint Commissioners[7] following the procedure outlined in Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, citing,
among other bases for their motion:

That unfortunately, the parties could not agree to make the partition among themselves which should have been
submitted for the confirmation of the Honorable Court more so because no physical division could be had on the 2/21
pro-indiviso shares of the decedent [Alicia] due to different locations, contours and conditions;

The RTC granted the Motion and appointed Myrna V. Badiong, Assistant Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur, as Chairman
of the Board of Commissioners.[8] Private respondents nominated Sandie B. Dacara as the second commissioner. Cesar failed to
nominate a third commissioner despite due notice. Upon lapse of the period given, only two commissioners were appointed.

On 26 October 2000, the two Commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of Hacienda Sta. Rita, together with the Local
Assessment Operations Officer IV of the Provincial Assessors Office, the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman,
and the Marasigans caretaker. However, Cesar contended that he did not receive any notice from the Commissioners to attend the
ocular inspection and he was, thus, not present on said occasion.

The Commissioners Report[9] was released on 17 November 2000 stating the following findings and recommendations:

The undersigned Commissioners admit the 472,472.65 (47.2472.65) square meters representing the 2/21 pro-
indiviso share of the deceased Alicia Marasigan and the 1/7 share of each of the heirs of Alicia N. Marasigan equivalent
to 67,496.09 square meters or 6.7496.09 hectares determined by Geodetic Engineer Roberto R. Revilla in his
Compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated November 18, 1998.

Considering that the physical division of the 2/21 pro-indiviso share of the decedent, Alicia Marasigan cannot be done
because of the different locations and conditions of the properties, undersigned Commissioners hereby recommend
 that the heirs may assign their 1/7 share to one of the parties willing to buy the same (Sec. 5, Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court) provided he pays to the heir[s] willing to assign his/her 1/7 share such amounts the Commissioners have
recommended and duly approved by the Honorable Court.

In consideration of such findings and after a careful and thorough deliberations by the undersigned on the subject
matter, considering the subject properties classification and actual predominant use, desirability and demand and
together with the benefits that may be derived therefrom by the landowners, we have decided to recommend as it
is hereby recommended that the price of the 1/7 share of each of the heir[s] is P700,000.00 per hectare, thus:

P700,000.00 x 6.7496.09 hectares = P4,724,726.30 or in words:

FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY SIX AND 30/100 PESOS FOR
THE 1/7 SHARE (6.7496.09 HECTARES) OF EACH OF THE HEIRS.[10]

Cesar opposed the foregoing findings and prayed for the disapproval of the Commissioners Report. In his Comment/Opposition to the
Commissioners Report, he maintained that:

He does not expect that he would be forced, to buy his co-owners share or to sell his share instead. Had he known
that it would be the recourse he would have appealed the judgment [with petitioners referring to the RTC Order of
Partition]. But the findings of facts in the Decision as well [as] dispositive do not show that any valid grounds for
exception to partition is even present in the instant case.[11]

Cesar alleged that the estate is not indivisible just because of the different locations and conditions of the parcels of land constituting
the same. Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court can only be availed of if the partition or division of the real properties involved would
be prejudicial to the interest of any of the parties. He asserted that despite the segregation of his share, the remaining parcels of land
would still be serviceable for the planting of rice, corn, and sugarcane, thus evidencing that no prejudice would be caused to the
interests of his co-heirs.
Countering Cesars arguments, private respondents contended that physical division is impossible because Alicias estate is equivalent
to 2/21 shares in Hacienda Sta. Rita, which is composed of 13 parcels under different titles and tax declarations, situated in
different barangays and municipalities, and covers an area of 496 hectares.
After a serious consideration of the matters raised by the parties, the RTC issued an Order dated 22 June 2001 approving in toto the
recommendations embodied in the Commissioners Report, particularly, the recommendation that the property be assigned to one of
the heirs at P700,000.00 per hectare or a total amount of P4,724,726.00,[12]after finding the same to be in accordance with the Rules
of Court and the New Civil Code. Pertinent portions of the Order are reproduced below:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commissioners Report dated November 17, 2000 is hereby approved
in toto, more specifically its recommendation to assign the property to any one of the heirs interested at the price
of P700,000.00 per hectare or in the total amount of P4,724,726.00 per share.

Regarding the properties of deceased Alicia Marasigan located at San Juan, Batangas, the herein Commissioners,
Mrs. Myrna V. Badiong and Engr. Sandie B. Dacara are hereby directed to proceed with utmost dispatch to San Juan,
Batangas and inspect said properties (Exhibits 1 to 10 inclusive) and thereafter to submit a Supplemental Report as
to its partition or other disposition with notice to all parties and their counsels all at the expense of the estate, within
a period of thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.

Dissatisfied, Cesar filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.[14]

In the meantime, Cesar died on 25 October 2001. He was substituted by his heirs and herein petitioners, namely, Luz Regina, Cesar,
Jr., Benito, Santiago, Renato, Jose, Geraldo, Orlando, Peter, Paul, Mauricio, Rommel, Michael, Gabriel, and Maria Luz, all surnamed
Marasigan.

Upon the denial by the RTC of Cesars Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners elevated their case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 67529.[15] They claimed that the
RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the Commissioners Report
although the facts would clearly indicate the following:

(a) The procedure taken by the Commissioners violated the procedure for partition provided in Section 4, Rule 69
of the 1997 Rules of Procedure because there was no notice sent to them for the viewing and examination
of the properties of the estate; neither were they heard as to their preference in the portion of the estate,
thus depriving them of due process;

(b) The ground used by the Commissioners resulting in their recommendation to assign the property is not one of
those grounds provided under the Rules

(c) Article 492 of the New Civil Code is inapplicable

(d) Assignment of the real properties to one of the parties will not end the co-ownership.
Moreover, petitioners accused the RTC of committing grave abuse of discretion in solely relying on the testimony of Apolonio to the
effect that physical division is impractical because, while other portions of the land are suitable for agriculture, the others are not,
citing the different contours of the land and unavailability of water supply in some parts.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in a Decision[16] promulgated on 31 July 2002, and
ruled that the RTC acted within its authority in issuing the Order of 22 June 2001. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to
discharge the burden of proving that the proceedings before the Board of Commissioners were unfair and prejudicial. It likewise found
that the petitioners were not denied due process considering that they were afforded the opportunity to be heard during the hearing
for approval of the Commissioners Report on 18 January 2001. According to the appellate court, whether or not the physical division
of the estate will cause prejudice to the interests of the parties is an issue addressed to the discretion of the Commissioners. It further
held that it would be absurd to believe that the prejudice referred to in Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court does not embrace
physical impossibility and impracticality. It concurred in the finding of the RTC that:

It is not difficult to believe that a physical partition/division of the 2/21 pro-indiviso shares of the decedent Alicia
Marasigan contained in and spread throughout thirteen (13) parcels of the Hacienda Sta. Rita with a total area of
946 (sic) hectares would be quite impossible if totally impractical. The said parcels are of different measurements in
terms of areas and shapes located in different barrages of the Municipalities of Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur.[17]

The Court of Appeals also noted that whether or not the RTC correctly applied Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court and Article 492
of the New Civil Code, would involve an error of judgment, which cannot be reviewed on certiorari. Finally, the Court of Appeals found
unmeritorious petitioners argument that the assignment of the estate to one of the parties does not end the co-ownership, considering
that it questions the 4 February 2000[18] Decision of the RTC which had already become final and executory.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19] of the foregoing Decision but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 13 November 2002. Still aggrieved, petitioners filed on 31 December 2002 this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 156078.

Pending resolution of the instant Petition by this Court, the RTC granted private respondents Urgent Motion for Execution on 26
December 2002. The RTC ordered the sale of petitioners 1/7 pro-indiviso share in Alicias estate upon the urgent motion of private
respondents dated 27 September 2002 for the partial execution of the judgment of the Court approving the Commissioners report
pending certiorari.[20]

Petitioners share in Alicias estate was sold in a public auction on 26 February 2003.[21] Based on the Commissioners Report
on the Auction Sale, there were two bidders, Apolonio Marasigan and Amado Lazaro. Apolonio, with a bid of P701,000.00 per hectare,
won over Amado Lazaro, whose bid was P700,000.00 per hectare. Petitioners 1/7 share as Cesars heirs in Alicias estate was sold in
the public auction for P3,777,689.00.
This amount is lower than the P4,724,726.30 price of the 1/7 share in Alicias estate as earlier determined by the Commissioners due
allegedly to the acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of a portion of Hacienda Sta. Rita located in Minilabac,
Camarines Sur which was placed under Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, with 100.00 hectares
thereof compulsorily acquired.

On 24 March 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Declare Failure of Bidding and to Annul Public Auction Sale.
On 5 May 2003, however, the RTC released an Omnibus Order[22] ruling, among other things, that the objection of petitioners as to the
difference of the value of their 1/7 share as determined by the Commissioners vis--vis the winning bid was no longer an issue since
Apolonio Marasigan indicated his willingness to pay for the deficiency.
Following the public auction and sale of their 1/7 share in the property,[23] petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal[24] with the RTC on 26
May 2003 indicating that they were appealing the 5 May 2003 Omnibus Order of the RTC [25] to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, or
on 9 June 2003, petitioners filed a Record on Appeal[26] pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, praying that it be approved
and transmitted to the Court of Appeals.[27]

On 2 July 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal on the ground that the proper remedy is
not appeal, but certiorari. Petitioners then filed on 27 August 2003 another Petition before the Court of Appeals
for Certiorari and Mandamus,[28] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78912, praying that the RTC be directed to approve their Notice of Appeal
and Record on Appeal, and to forward the same to the appellate court.

In a Resolution[29] dated 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 78912 outright on the ground that the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition was signed by only Cesar Marasigan, Jr., without any accompanying
document to prove his authority to sign on behalf of the other petitioners. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[30] dated 12 July 2004.[31]

Cesar G. Marasigan, Jr., in a Petition for Certiorari filed with this Court on 4 September 2004 and docketed as G.R. No. 164970, prayed
for the reversal and setting aside of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 10 October 2003 dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 78912, and
Resolution dated 12 July 2004 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. This Court, however, issued a Resolution on 13 October
2004 denying the petition for failure of the petitioner to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. The same has
become final and executory.

Going back to the Petition at bar, petitioners raise before this Court the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT THEREFORE DETERMINED BY
THE SUPREME COURT IN FINDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR DUE NOTICE TO THE PARTIES TO ATTEND
THE VIEWING AND EXAMINATION OF THE REAL ESTATE SUBJECT OF PARTITION WHEN THE
COMMISSIONERS HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PARTITION THE PROPERTY AND SUCH NOTICE UNDER SECTION
4 OF RULE 69 IS INDISPENSABLE ONLY WHEN THEIR DECISION IS TO PARTITION.
 II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW PARTICULARLY WITH
ARTICLES 494 AND 495 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND SECTIONS 5 RULE 69 OF THE RULES.

III. THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY AND IMPRACTICALITY
IF EMBRACED IN PREJUDICE REFERRED IN SECTION 5, RULE 69 OF THE RULES SHALL MAKE SAID RULE
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE RULE MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
THAT ITS RULES SHALL NOT INCREASE, DECREASE OR MODIFY SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.[32]

In their Memorandum, however, petitioners submitted for resolution the following issues.

I. RESPONDENTS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PARTITION BECAUSE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE CONSISTS OF UNDIVIDED SHARES WHICH CANNOT BE PARTITIONED.

II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PARTITION UNDIVIDED OR UNIDENTIFIED LAND
AND HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER 496 HECTARES OF UNDIVIDED LAND WHICH SHOULD BE THE
PROPER SUBJECT OF PARTITION.

III. THE JUDGMENT OF PARTITION AND ALL SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO,
INCLUDING THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE OF PETITIONERS SHARES WHICH HAD NOT RENDERED THIS PETITION
MOOT.

IV. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION, AS
DISCUSSED, CAN BE IGNORED, THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW ARE TAINTED WITH SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES
THAT CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE SUPERVISORY POWERS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

V. CERTIORARI AS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION UNDER RULE 65 AND APPEAL BY CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45,
BOTH OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, WERE EMPLOYED AS PROPER REMEDIES IN THIS CASE.[33]

This Court significantly notes that the first three issues,[34] alleging lack of jurisdiction and cause of action, are raised by petitioners for
the first time in their Memorandum. No amount of interpretation or argumentation can place them within the scope of the assignment
of errors they raised in their Petition.

The parties were duly informed by the Court in its Resolution dated 17 September 2003 that no new issues may be raised
by a party in his/its Memorandum and the issues raised in his/its pleadings but not included in the Memorandum shall
be deemed waived or abandoned. The raising of additional issues in a memorandum before the Supreme Court is irregular, because
said memorandum is supposed to be in support merely of the position taken by the party concerned in his petition, and the raising of
new issues amounts to the filing of a petition beyond the reglementary period.[35] The purpose of this rule is to provide all parties to a
case a fair opportunity to be heard. No new points of law, theories, issues or arguments may be raised by a party in the Memorandum
for the reason that to permit these would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[36]

Petitioners failed to heed the Courts prohibition on the raising of new issues in the Memorandum.

Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that:

SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has not jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim.

First, it bears to point out that Cesar, petitioners predecessor, did not file any motion to dismiss, and his answer before the RTC did
not bear the defenses/objections of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action on these grounds; consequently, these must be considered
waived. The exception that the court may still dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, although the same is not
pleaded, but is apparent in the pleadings or evidence on record, does not find application to the present Petition. Second, petitioners
arguments[37] on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the case more appropriately pertain to venue, rather than jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and are, moreover, not apparent from the pleadings and evidence on record. Third, the property subject of partition is
only the 47.2 hectare pro-indiviso area representing the estate of Alicia. It does not include the entire 496 hectares of land comprising
Hacienda Sta. Rita.

Even petitioners argument that non-payment of appropriate docket fees by private respondents deprived the RTC of jurisdiction to
partition the entire Hacienda Sta. Rita[38]deserves scant consideration. In National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[39] the Court
ruled:

x x x while the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising
such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only
objects to the courts jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.
Irrefragably, petitioners raised the issues of jurisdiction for lack of payment of appropriate docket fees and lack of cause of action
belatedly in their Memorandum before this Court. Cesar and petitioners were noticeably mum about these in the proceedings before. In
fact, Cesar actively participated in the proceedings conducted before the RTC by seeking affirmative reliefs therefrom, such as the
inclusion of more properties in the partition. Hence, petitioners are already estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC on this
ground.

It is conceded that this Court adheres to the policy that where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may de done at any time.[40] While it is the general rule that neither waiver nor
estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, the Court may rule otherwise under meritorious and exceptional
circumstances. One such exception is Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[41] which finds application in this case. This Court held in Tijam that
after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court."

This Court further notes that while petitioners filed their last pleading in this case, their Memorandum, on 26 December 2003, they
failed to mention therein that the Court of Appeals had already dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 78912.[42] To recall, CA-G.R. No. 78912 is a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus involving the RTC Order dated 2 July 2003, which denied petitioners Notice of Appeal. Petitioners
intended to appeal the RTC Omnibus Order dated 5 May 2003 sustaining the public auction and sale of petitioners share in Alicias
estate. Petitioners failure to provide this Court with information on the developments in CA-G.R. SP No. 78912 is not only in violation
of the rules on non-forum shopping, but is also grossly misleading, because they are raising in their Memorandum in the present case
the same issues concerning the public auction and sale of their share in Alicias estate. The purpose of the rule against forum shopping
is to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice.

Forum shopping occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he
feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict. In our jurisdiction, it has taken the form of filing multiple
petitions or complaints involving the same issues before two or more tribunals or agencies in the hope that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition. There is also forum shopping when, because of an adverse
decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The rationale
against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different
fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts. Thus, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency
among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration
of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims
to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions
upon the same issue.[43]

Petitioners have indeed managed to muddle the issues in the instant case by raising issues for the first time in their Memorandum, as
well as including issues that were already pending before another tribunal and have eventually been decided with finality, for which
reason petitioners are herein admonished by this Court.

The Court, nonetheless, manages to strip the issues in this Petition down to the singular issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming in toto the RTC Order adopting the Commissioners recommendation on the manner of partition of the estate of Alicia
Marasigan.

After an exhaustive study of the merits of the case and the pleadings submitted by the parties, this Court is convinced that the Court
of Appeals did not err in affirming the Order of the RTC which approved the Commissioners recommendations as to the manner of
implementing the Order of Partition of Alicias estate. There is no reason to reverse the Court of Appeals dismissal of petitioners Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition and ruling that the RTC acted well-within its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Order. Nowhere is it shown
that the RTC committed such patent, gross and prejudicial errors of law or fact, or a capricious disregard of settled law and
jurisprudence, as to amount to a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on its part, in adopting and confirming the
recommendations submitted by the Commissioners, and which would have warranted the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

This petition originated from an original action for partition. It is governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, and can be availed of under
the following circumstances:

Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the partition of real
estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property.

In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, the trial court, after determining that a co-
ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial court promulgates a decision
confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed
commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be.[44]

The delineations of these two phases have already been thoroughly discussed by this Court in several cases where it explained:

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter
case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
 conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed
or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby.

The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by
the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.[45]

Trouble arose in the instant petition in the second phase.

Petitioners postulate that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that notice to the heirs regarding the examination and viewing of the
estate is no longer necessary given the circumstances. They aver that, in effect, the Court of Appeals was saying that such notice is
only necessary when the Commissioners actually distribute the properties, but is not mandatory when the Commissioners recommend
the assignment of the properties to any of the heirs. Petitioners contend that this is prejudicial to their right to due process since they
are deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the valuation of their share in the estate.

Petitioners opposition is anchored on Section 4 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 4. Oath and duties of commissioners. Before making such partition, the commissioners shall take and
subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court
with the other proceedings in the case. In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and examine
the real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and examination, and shall hear the
parties as to their preference in the portion of the property to be set apart to them and the comparative
value thereof, and shall set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and
equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the different parts thereof.

Petitioners insist that the above provision is explicit and does not allow any qualification, contending that it does not require that the
lack of notice must first be proven to have caused prejudice to the interest of a party before the latter may object to the Commissioners
viewing and examination of the real properties on the basis thereof. They maintain that they were prejudiced by the mere lack of
notice.
We, on the other hand, find that the scales of justice have remained equal throughout the proceedings before the RTC and
the Commissioners. This Court, in the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, is duty-bound to ensure
that due process is afforded to all the parties to a case.

As the Court of Appeals declared, due process is not a mantra, the mere invocation of which shall warrant a reversal of a
decision. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[46] the
Court held that as long as parties to a case were given the opportunity to defend their interest in due course, they cannot be said to
have been denied due process of the law. Neither do the records show any indicia that the preference of petitioners for the physical
subdivision of the property was not taken into consideration by the Commissioners.
Petitioners persistent assertion that their rights were prejudiced by the lack of notice is not enough. Blacks Law Dictionary defines the
word prejudice as damage or detriment to ones legal rights or claims. Prejudice means injury or damage.[47] No competent proof was
adduced by petitioners to prove their allegation. Mere allegations cannot be the basis of a finding of prejudice. He who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[48]

It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the rules of procedure is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding.[49] The ultimate purpose of the rules of procedure is to attain, not defeat, substantial
justice.[50]

Records reveal that the parties were given sufficient opportunity to raise their concerns. From the time the action for partition
was filed by private respondents, all the parties, including the late Cesar, petitioners predecessor, were given a fair opportunity to be
heard. Since the parties were unable to agree on how the properties shall be divided, Commissioners were appointed by the Court
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

Section 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. - If the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to
make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion
of the property as the court shall direct.

While the lack of notice to Cesar of the viewing and examination by the Commissioners of the real properties comprising Alicias estate
is a procedural infirmity, it did not violate any of his substantive rights nor did it deprive him of due process. It is a matter of record,
and petitioners cannot deny, that Cesar was able to file his Comment/Opposition to the Commissioners Report. And after the RTC
adopted and confirmed the Commissioners recommendations in its Order dated 22 June 2001, Cesar was able to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order. He had sufficient opportunity to present before the RTC whatever objections or oppositions he may
have had to the Commissioners Report, including the valuation of his share in Alicias estate.

Petitioners also allege that the ruling of the Court of Appeals -- that physical impossibility and impracticality are embraced by the word
prejudice, referred to in Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court -- violates the constitutional limitation on the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court, according to which, the Rules of Court shall not increase, decrease or modify substantive rights.
 According to petitioners, Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners. - When it is made to appear to the
commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of
the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the
other parties such amounts as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the interested parties asks that the
property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real
estate at public sale under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine.

should be read in conjunction with Articles 494 and 495 of the New Civil which provide for the following substantive rights:

Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten
years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical
division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would render unserviceable for the use for which it is intended.
But the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article 498.

Article 498 of the New Civil Code, referred to by Article 495 of the same Code, states:

Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of
them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.

Evidently, the afore-quoted Civil Code provisions and the Rules of Court must be interpreted so as to give effect to the very purpose
thereof, which is to put to an end to co-ownership in a manner most beneficial and fair to all the co-owners.

As to whether a particular property may be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties is a question of fact. To
answer it, the court must take into consideration the type, condition, location, and use of the subject property. In appropriate cases
such as the one at bar, the court may delegate the determination of the same to the Commissioners.

The Commissioners found, after a viewing and examination of Alicias estate, that the same cannot be divided without causing prejudice
to the interests of the parties. This finding is further supported by the testimony of Apolonio Marasigan that the estate cannot be
divided into smaller portions, since only certain portions of the land are suitable to agriculture, while others are not, due to the contours
of the land and unavailability of water supply.

The impracticality of physically dividing Alicias estate becomes more apparent, considering that Hacienda Sta. Rita is composed
of parcels and snippets of land located in two different municipalities, Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur. The actual area representing
Alicias 2/21 pro-indiviso shares in Hacienda Sta. Rita is 422,422.65 square meters, more or less. Each of Alicias heirs is entitled to 1/7
share in her estate equivalent to 67,496.09 square meters or roughly seven hectares.[51] Cesar and his heirs are entitled only to his
1/7 share in the yet unidentified, unsegregated 2/21 pro-indiviso shares of Alicia in each of the 13 parcels of land that comprises
Hacienda Sta. Rita. Dividing the parcels of land even further, each portion allotted to Alicias heirs, with a significantly reduced land
area and widely scattered in two municipalities, would irrefragably diminish the value and use of each portion, as compared to keeping
the entire estate intact.

The correctness of the finding of the RTC and the Commissioners that dividing Alicias estate would be prejudicial to the parties
cannot be passed upon by the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. Factual questions are not within the province of a petition
for certiorari. There is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. As to whether the court a
quo decided the question wrongly is immaterial in a petition for certiorari. It is a legal presumption that findings of fact of a trial court
carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better
position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses.[52]

The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certioraricannot be legally used for any other purpose.[53] At most, the petition pertains to an error
of judgment, and not of jurisdiction, for clearly under Section 5 of Rule 69, the question of whether a partys interest shall be prejudiced
by the division of the real property is left to the determination and discretion of the Commissioners.
Hence, it is totally unnecessary for this Court to address the issue raised by petitioners concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court for having been issued beyond the constitutional limitation on the rule-making power of this
Court. Basic is the principle that a constitutional issue may only be passed upon if essential to the decision of a case or controversy.[54] A
purported constitutional issue raised by petitioners may only be resolved if essential to the decision of a case and controversy. Even if
all the requisites for judicial review are present, this Court will not entertain a constitutional question unless it is the very lis mota[55] of
the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of a statute or general law. The present
problem of partition by co-heirs/co-owners can be resolved without elevating their case to one of constitutionality.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court can only presume that the proceedings in Special Civil Action No. P-77-97 before
the RTC, including the recommendation made by the Commissioners, were fairly and regularly conducted, meaning that both the RTC
and the appointed Commissioners had carefully reviewed, studied, and weighed the claims of all the parties.
Petitioners argument that the assignment of the property will not terminate the co-ownership is specious, considering that partition,
in general, is the separation, division, and ASSIGNMENT of a thing held in common by those to whom it may belong. [56]

Inasmuch as the parties continued to manifest their desire to terminate their co-ownership, but the co-heirs/co-owners could not agree
on which properties would be allotted to each of them, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC did
not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the Commissioners recommendation
that the co-heirs/co-owners assign their shares to one of them in exchange for proper compensation.

This Court has consistently held that one of the purposes for which courts are organized is to put an end to controversy in the
determination of the respective rights of the contending parties. With the full knowledge that courts are not infallible, the litigants
submit their respective claims for judgment, and they have a right at some time or another to have final judgment on which they can
rely over a final disposition of the issue or issues submitted, and to know that there is an end to the litigation; [57] otherwise, there
would be no end to legal processes.[58]

Finally, petitioners raise before this Court the issue that the public auction sale of their shares is null and void; at the same time they
allege deficiency in the bid price for their 1/7share in Alicias estate vis--vis the valuation of the same by the Commissioners. [59] This
Court is already barred from ruling on the validity of the public auction sale. This Courts ruling dated 13 October 2004 in G.R. No.
164970 denying their petition for certiorari lays to rest petitioners questioning of the Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing their
appeal therein of the issue of the validity of the public sale of their share in Alicias estate. Such decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may have been.[60]

Indeed, while it is understandable for petitioners to protect their rights to their portions of the estate, the correlative rights of the other
co-owners/co-heirs must also be taken into consideration to balance the scales of justice. And, by finding the course of action, within
the boundaries of law and jurisprudence, that is most beneficial and equitable for all of the parties, the courts duty has been
satisfactorily fulfilled.

Thus, contrary to petitioners averments, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting and confirming the recommendations of the
Commissioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision
dated 31 July 2002 of the Court of Appeals in docket no. CA-G.R. SP No. 67529 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 162322
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:

March 14, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial courts
in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas[2] in LRC Case No. N-98-20,
LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporations (Corporation) application for original registration
of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
assailed CA Decision before filing this Petition for Review.
 The Facts

On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas
an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total
assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an
area of more or less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. [3]

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997. [4] On 7 August 1997, it issued a
second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.[5]

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still with the RTC.[6]

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan, because the
assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.[7]

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default[8] and commenced with the reception of evidence.[9] Among the documents
presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax Declarations,[10] a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,[11] and a Certification
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable zone.[12] Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent
Corporation.[13]

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the proceedings before the
lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the lower court on appeal.[15] The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latters registrable title
over the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.[16]

Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following arguments in support of
its appeal:

I.

THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

II.

THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.[17]

The Courts Ruling

We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings in order to determine if the
property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

I
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former
raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.[18] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. [19] It cannot be
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. [20]Consequently,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.[21]

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part
in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated
by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court
and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court,
did the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches
had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,[24] we
cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose
factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.

The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic filed its
Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the RTC.[25] At that point, petitioner could not have
questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were
transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner
immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to
the instant appeal.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[27] In this case, petitioner
Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to
assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
 II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the period for setting the date
and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.

First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because the RTC set the date
and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property Registration Decree.[28]

We disagree.

The Property Registration Decree provides:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five
days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.

In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of the
application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the
Order.[30] While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction
of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner Republic therein contended that there was failure to comply with
the jurisdictional requirements for original registration, because there were 125 days between the Order setting the date of the initial
hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial
hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application.Thus, we held:

x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land
court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party
cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the
trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which
the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements
of the law.[32]

Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its application for registration on
account of events beyond its control.

Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997, [33] within the 90-day
period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second Order was issued
more than five days from the filing of the application, again contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration Decree.[34]

Petitioner is incorrect.

The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the filing of the application for
registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period
was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule
that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. [35] It cannot be contingent upon the action or
inaction of the court.

This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that the law deliberately meant
the provision to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.[36] However, the records of this case do not show such blatant
disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for
registration,[37] except that it had to issue a second Order because the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided
by law.

Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale annexed to respondents
application for original registration was ₱160,000,[39] the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended,[40] the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the
value of which should not exceed ₱100,000.

We are not persuaded.

The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
which provides:

Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and
determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition,
or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00),
such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are
more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis
supplied.)

Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no controversy
or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed ₱100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent Corporations application for registration
on 8 January 1998.[41]

However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case does not exceed ₱100,000.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section
34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three
ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third,
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.[42]

In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit
executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the second method, because this
method finds application only where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the
property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims the property.

The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by respondent
Corporation together with its application for registration. From the records, we find that the assessed value of the property
is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property.[43]Based on these Tax Declarations, it is
evident that the total value of the land in question does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction
under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower court erred in granting
respondent Corporations application for original registration in the absence of sufficient proof that the property in question was alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.

The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State.[44] The applicant for land registration
has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land
sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government.[45] We held in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be
registered.[46] The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released
the land in question as alienable and disposable.[47]

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO[48] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records.[49]

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its application.[50] Clearly, this falls short of
the requirements for original registration.

We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the property in question
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents
a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original registration should be
granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question is alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the
government, the application should be denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial
Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.

SO ORDERED.