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b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence
Bill of Rights
I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND CONTRACT
CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT
DOMAIN AND TAXATION
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even
required to be conferred by the Constitution, are the police,
eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of
Rights, notably the due process, equal protection and non-
impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of
these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to
protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the
State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do
to the individual.
A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive
Civil Procedural Due Process
In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the
case of Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca:
a. Court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant
c. Judgement rendered according to law.
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard
(requirement on notice and hearing)
Criminal Due Process
In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in
Vera v. People:
a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against,
and what charge he must answer.
that is not tainted by falsity, and after the defendant was
heard.
If the prosecution produces the conviction
based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the
accused of due process. Thus false
testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless
of the time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to law
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction
Administrative Due Process
In administrative proceedings, the elements were
laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. CIR as the "seven
cardinal primary rights" in justiciable cases before
administrative tribunals:
a. There must be a hearing, where a party may
present evidence in support of his case.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented by a party.
c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case
correctly, its decision must be supported by evidence.
d. The evidence supporting the decision must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
e. The evidence must have been presented at the
hearing or at least contained in the record and known to
the parties affected.
f. The tribunal must rely on its own independent
consideration of evidence, and not rely on the
recommendation of a subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and the law in
such a way that the parties can know the issues involved
and the reasons for the decision.
Substantive Due Process
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the
police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in
violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,
challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to
rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked
authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the
IAC. Hence this petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final
judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the
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constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass
upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of
these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male
and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary
permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work
or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We
do not see, however, how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply
to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily
circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps
so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited,
it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The measures
struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him
elementary fair play.
(4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall
"be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The
phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and
the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. VV.
B. Due Process and Police Power
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid.
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates
on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy crisis. It
excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck),
DPL (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist
Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, Transportation,
issued memo. providing penalties for viol. of the LOI,
namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of
registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the
validity of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory
and a denial of due process. The resps. denied the
petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit amounted
to a request for advisory opinion.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick
and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of
the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They,
therefore, have standing to challenge the validity of the LOI.
(2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. It
has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity for
evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As
underlying the questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy
conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a
problem.
(3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the
petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the
LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not
include others does not render it invalid. The govt is not
required to adhere to a policy of "all or none."
(4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does
not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to
that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires. VV.
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)
Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering Massage
Services Valid.
F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-fold
purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to collect a fee for
operating massage clinics separately from those operating
barber ships and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might
probably arise from the construction of separate rooms.
HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances
based on general welfare clause. VV.
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in
Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the
Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the
operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h alls in that
mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI
upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the
petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of
nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented
from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted,
granted municipalities the power to regulate the
establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs
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and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was
amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the
power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the
operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law
remained the same so that the power granted to
municipalities remains that of regulation, not
prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting
mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of
nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates
the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337)
speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment,
and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances,
circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari
granted. VV.
C. Due Process and Eminent Domain
The taking by the State of private property in an
expropriation proceeding must be: (1)
for public use, (2) with just compensation, and (3) upon
observance of due process.
Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be take
for public use without just compensation.
Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest of
national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital
industries and, upon payment of just compensation,
transfer to public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the government.
1. Taking either for public use or public
purpose.
Public Use
Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It is not
confined merely to use by the public at large (e.g. roads). It
is enough that it serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a
large group of people short of the public in general
(e.g. expropriating property for the relocation of squatters).
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the
expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and
Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to
10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA
to take immediate possession of the property. The charter
of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation
proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports
complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands,
filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that
(1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was
covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation
would impair the obligation of contracts.
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the like.
The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has
been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.
It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. The petititioners have not shown
that the area being developed is land reform area and that
the affected persons have been given emancipation patents
and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has
never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police
power and likewise eminent domain. VV.
Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority
filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land
in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the
expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among
those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners'
lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the
constitutionality of PD 1224.
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the
purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since
it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use"
requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing
conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public
use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general
welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands
in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few
landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots?
Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to
be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the
area of the land and not the number of people who stood to
be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested
with broad discretion to designate the property. The
property owner may not interpose objections merely
because in their judgment some other property would have
been more suitable. The provisions on just compensation
found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions
which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay
(1987) for being encroachments on judicial
prerogatives. VV.
2. Just compensation must be judicially
determined
Just Compensation
Just compensation is the fair and reasonable
equivalent of the loss sustained by the owner of the property
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due to the taking; it is the fair market value of the property
measured at the time of the taking, no matter how long ago
it was taken (e.g. the time of the taking was in the
1920's, the time of payment was in the 1960's, in the
Ministerio and Amigable cases, supra), and using the
conversion rates at the time of taking (because according
to those cases, Art. 1250 of the Civil Code applied only to
contractual obligations).
EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the
owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA
expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the
trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development
Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition
for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation
should be the fair and current market value declared by the
owner or the market value determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower.
HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under
PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have
the power to determine the just compensation for the
property, following the decree, its task would be relegated
to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared
either by the owner or the assessor. Just compensation
means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be
considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis
for the just compensation were made long before the
declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper.
To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents
which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory. VV.
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known
as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila,
both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees
issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The
petitioners contend that the decrees violate their
constitutional right to due process and equal protection
since by their mere passage their properties were
automatically expropriated and they were immediately
deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without
being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The
government on the other hand contends that the power of
eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the
legislature or the President through his law-making powers
exercises this power, the public use and public necessity of
the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation
become political in nature and the courts must respect the
decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures
adopted and the powers given to the NHA. The Tambunting
subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and
directly expropriated by decree without the slightest
semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The
expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit
before the taking is required. There is not provision for any
interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are
the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the
expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by
the decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly
declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are
declared unconstitutional.
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly
overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. LTA that the
power of Congress to designate the particular property to be
taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be
duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether
in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely
affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now
rules that such singling out of properties does not foreclose
judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by
legislative act transgresses the due process and equal
protection and just compensation guarantees of the
Constitution. VV.
3. Due process must be observed
De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be
ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project,
originally called for the expropriation of properties along
Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry
of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension
pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of
the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on
Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the
original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh
save the government P2 million. The government filed
expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando
Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.
HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is
arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. The
Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost
factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a
choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality
strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and
Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic
impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue.
While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice
between people, on one hand, and progress and
development, on the other, it is to be remembered that
progress and development are carried out for the benefit of
the people. VV.
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Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990)
F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several
properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which
the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the
extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities.
De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from
proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied
by the lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the
lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De
Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case
was remanded to the lower court.
No further action was taken despite the SC decision
until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same
properties for the same purpose. The lower court denied
tthe motion. Appeal.
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt
on the subject becomes the law of the case between the
parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take
private properties for public use upon payment of just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the
laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by
the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the
land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or
by legislation.
When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based
on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision
of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social
impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this
extension to be arbitrary had disappeared.
Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the
legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its
own independent assessment of the circumstances then
pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the
expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by
enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case.
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP
340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the
subsequent legislative fiat. Charo.
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, Napocor's lines have to pass the lands
belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations
for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor
was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple
easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by
its transmissin lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the
power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden
upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of
title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of
right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature
and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the
limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the land
(that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the
lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents
of ts ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should
neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.
Just equiivalent has always been understood to be the just
and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character
at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for
determining just cmpensation. Charo.
D. Equal Protection
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measure that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.
1. Economic equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall
include the commitment to create economic opportunities
based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection
to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
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It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitle to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making process
affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its
just share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth.
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon
recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,
or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Id., Sec. 2. xxx
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in
its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
There are areas of economic activity which can be
limited to Filipinos. The Constitution itself acknowledges
this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII,
Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art. XII, Sec. 10),
to name a few.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC
upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the retail
trade. For the protection of the law can be observed by the
national interest.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)
But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away
for the simple reason that they cannot be deprived of a
common means of livelihood, especially when they are
admitted to the country as immigrants.
In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86 SCRA 270
(1978), the SC invalidated a city ordinance imposing a P500
permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
occupation. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity
of taxation, and deprived aliens of the right to earn a
common livelihood.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the
employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless
they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in
Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI
declaring the ordinance null and void.
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate
of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in
situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule
on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for
granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the
arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the
ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal
protection of the laws. VV.
In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979), Sec. 169 of the
NIRC requiring manufacturers of skimmed milk (non-fat) to
put on its label the warning that the milk is harmful for
infants, was struck down as unconstitutional on the ground
that it did not require the same labeling in the case of filled
milk (coco-fat added)
At that time of the decision thought, the law was
already inoperative.
Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
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F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and
sale of filled milk products. They brought an action in the CFI
for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169 of
the Tax Code. This provision required that "all condensed
skimmed milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part
has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
immediate containers with the words: This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of
age.
HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA
344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and
not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against
respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not against
manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them the
equal protection of the laws. VV.
2. Political equality
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained
solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates to public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC
upheld the validity of sec. 4 of Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying
retired elective local officials who have received retirement
benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the
term. It does not violate equal protection, for it gives
younger blood the opportunity to run the local government.
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any retired
elective provincial, city ot municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks
to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired." Petitioner,
Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for prohibition to enjoin
enforcement of the law on the ground that it was contrary
to the equal protection and due process guarantee of the
Constitution.
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the application of the
provision. No petition seeking his disqualification has been
filed against him. His petition is a mere request for advisory
opinion. Nevertheless, because of public interest, the
question should be resolved. The purpose of the law is to
allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments
and therefore, not invalid. The retired employee in effect
declares himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work. VV.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the
disqualification of candidates convicted or simply charged
with national security offenses was struck down as
unconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence
and thus ultimately the equal political protection.
Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and member of the
bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., as taxpayer and voter, sued
for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of
which provides for the disqualification as candidate of any
person convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion or
similar offenses.
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged
with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from being candidates
for local elective positions. They have no personal or
substantial interest at stake and therefore no locus standi.
Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the statute does
not involve disbursement of public funds. VV.
3. Social equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measure that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.
.
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE
A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law. Any evidence
Constitutional Law II
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section, shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
1. Requirements for Search Warrants
Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)
F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda, the
Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, a SW was issued to
search the store and premises of the petitioner, accused of
violating the Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs and other
articles were seized and retained in the possession of the
Anti-Usury Board.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW
were complied with.
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his application,
swore that "he made his own personal investigation and
ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a
license, charging usurious rates." The witness he presentted
testified before the judge and swore that he knew that YEE
was lending without a license because he personally
investigated the victims who secured loans from the
petitioner. Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder,
they could be held liable for perjury. The existence of
probable cause has been determined by the justice of the
peace before issuing the warrant complained of, as shown in
the warrant itself. Charo.
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)
F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure
the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the
resp. judge, & the restoration of certain documents alleged
to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury
Board.
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained
from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW,
commanding any officer of the law "to search the person,
house or store of the petitioner for certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents & other papers relating to her activities
as userer."
On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a
captain of the PC, went to the office of the petitioner, and
after showing the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, &
w/o the presence of the petitioner, who was ill and confined
at that time, proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two
packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing
several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate criminal
cases were filed against petitioner. Petitioner demanded
the return of the documents seized. Bu motion, pet.
challenged the legality of the SW and the devolution of the
documents demanded. By resolution, the resp. judge of CFI
denied the petitioner's motion for the reason that though
the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the
petitioner.
The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are
sought, together w/ the SW, to be nullified in these
proceedings.
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
declared a popular right and for a SW to be valid, (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or another; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
& (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place
to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
In the instant case, the existence of probable cause
was determined not by the judge himself but by the
applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the
affidavit made by agent Almeda. It does not appear that he
examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the prop. to be seized to be
sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is
sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the prop.
seized were not delivered to the court w/c issued the
warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over
to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up
cases against petitioner. Considering that at the time the
warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the
petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued
primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis.
IS THERE A WAIVER? No express waiver.
IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.
To constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must
appear first that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; (3) that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
It is true that the petitioner did not object to the
legality of the search when it was made. She could not have
objected bec. she was sick & was not present when the
warrant was served upon Salas. Certainly, the constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except by the
person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her behalf. The failure on the
part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object
to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an
implied waiver of the consti. right. It is but a submission to
the authority of the law. The delay in making the demand
for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result
im implied. waiver. RAM.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom
Constitutional Law II
F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC,
the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum were
search and printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and other
literature seized on the ground that they were used in the
commission of the crime of subversion. Petitioners brought
and action to annul the warrants and compel the return of
the things seized.
HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit. Probable
cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. When addressed to a
newspaper publisher or editor, the application for a
warrant must contain a specification stating with
particularity the alleged subversive materials he has
published or intending to publish. Broad statement in the
application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirement of probable cause. Another factor that
makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. In Stanford
v. State of Texas, the US SC declared this type of warrant
void. VV.
Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)
F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the
seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing
the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the
Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters,
mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video
machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the
warrant but his motion was denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere
conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of
probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to
include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is objectionable. VV.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971)
F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through Rev. Examiner
de Leon filed an application for a SW against Bache & Co. and
its pres., Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the
NIRC. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a hearing, the
deposition of de Leon and his witness, Logronio, was taken
by the Dep. Clerk of Court. The deposition was later read to
the judge who asked the witness to take an oath as to the
truth of his statements. The judge then signed the SW and
accordingly issued the same.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW
were complied with.
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The judge did not have the
opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents
and to propound initial and follow-up questions which his
judicial mind, on account of his training, was in the best
position to conceive. This is important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-importatnt question of w/n there was
probable cause. Charo.
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990)
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. Dimagmaliw,
supported by a "Deposition of Witness," executed by P/Lt.
Angeles, issued a search warrant for the search and seizure
of arms, ammunitions and explosives in the premises of the
PUP which were supposed to be in possession of Dr.
Prudente. In enforcing the warrant, 3 fragmentation
grenades were found in the bathroom of the office of Dr.
Prudente.
ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid.
RULING: NO.
(1) The warant was not issued on the basis of personal
knowledge of the applicant and his witness. The probable
cause required under the Constitution for the issuance of a
search warrant must be in connection with one specific
offense, and the judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavit submitted. However, in the case
at bar, Dimagmaliw merely stated in his application that his
knowledge was based "on gathered infrmation from verified
sources." The same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles.
Moreover, the judge did not examine Angeles in the
form of searching questions and answers. What appears on
the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no.
(2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched, the SC ruled that the
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
Here, the SW described the place as PUP, with its address
and specifically mentioned the offices of the "Dept. of
Military Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the
Office of the President at the 2nd floor and the other rooms
in that floor." This is deemed sufficient.
(3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was
issued for one specific offense. The warrrant was issued for
violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses. While
there was failure to state the particular provision of the law
violated, the warrant itself qualified the description of the
Constitutional Law II
offense as "illegal possession of firearms, etc." This suffices
to cure the defect.
The fact that the word "etc." was added to refer to
ammunitions and explosives did not violate the rule on single
offense, for notwithstanding that possession of firearms,
explosives and ammunitions are punished in different
sections of the PD, they are treated as belonging to a single
specie. An exception to the rule that a warant shall be issued
for a single offense is when existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses. Charo.
Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp.
judge was invalid. They also question the extrajudicial
confession taken from them without according them the
right to assistance of a counsel. The articles seized by virtue
of the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as
evidence for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act.
RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states
that it is in connection with "the violation of RA 6425," it is
clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable
cause to believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his
possession and control, marijuana dried stalks which are
suject of the offense stated above." Although the specific
section of the law is not stated, there is no question at all
that the specific offense alleged to have been committed
as basis for determining probable cause is alleged.
Furthermore, the SW specifically described the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, the
same are deemed inadmissible against them. In People V.
Galit, the Court declared that: " At the time the person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence
of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the wiaver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence."
These requirements were even made stricter under
the 1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of a
person under custodial investigation cannot be waived
except when made in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Charo.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, 171 SCRA
348 (1989)
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve
as the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of
dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign
exchange.
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be
authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973
Constitition.
RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of the
PASTF under its enabling law, sees nothing that will reveal a
legislative intendement to confer upon the body, quasi-
judicial responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by PD
1883. Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n probable
cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper
court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to
a judicial recourse, and to recommend action of appropriate
authorities.
The Court agrees that PASTF exercises, or was meant
to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it
cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to
determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of
arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is
naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his
office "is to see to it that justice if done and not necessarily
to secure the conviction of the accused," he stands
invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To
permit him to issue warrrants and indeed, warrants of arrest,
is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he
is neither. This makes to our mind and to that extent, PD
1636 as amended by PD 2002, unconstitutional.
The "responsible officer" referred to under the
Cosntitution is one not only possessing the necessary skills
and competence but more significantly, the neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a
judicial officer.
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO
1022, POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of
the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having verified that
she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. He
further ordered the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalias, being used or intended to be used as the
means of commiting illegal recruitment. This order was
enforced on 26 January 1988. Petitioner filed this suit for
prohibition.
Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue
warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. 38 of
the Labor Code?
Constitutional Law II
HELD: NO.
The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now
embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are the dying vestiges
of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. Under Art. III,
Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no other,
who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception
is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,
whom the President of the Commissioner of Immigration
may order arrested, following a final order of deportation,
for the purpose of deportation. The Sec. of Labor , not being
a judge. may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent, we declare Art. 38, par. C of
the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
a. Existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as
would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime
have been committed and that the documents or things
sought to be searched and seized are in the possession of the
person against whom the warrant is sought. Without
probable cause, there can be no valid search warrant.
In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967), 42
search warrants were issued for alleged violation of Central
Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, and the
Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the warrants on the
ground that it was impossible for the judge to have found
probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have
been violated by the petitioner. How could he even know
what particular provision of each law had been violated? If
he did not know this, how could it be determined if the
person against whom the warrant was issued was probably
guilty thereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which
violated the sanctity of domicile and privacy of
communications. To establish the requirement of probable
cause, the rule is: One crime, one warrant.
b. As determined by a judge
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a
warrant; the offensive and much abused phrase "and other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973
Constitution has been removed
c. After personally examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witness.
The examination conducted by the judge takes the
form of searching questions.
The requirement that the judge must personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses means that the
actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else,
like the clerk of court.
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37
SCRA 823 (1971). In this case, when the BIR agent and his
witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing, the
judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk
to examine and take the testimony of the witnesses in his
chambers. After he was through with the hearing, he went
back to his chambers and finding that the examination was
finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they
affirmed what they what they testified to, after which he
issued the search warrant in question.
d. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts
that they are testifying to.
The determination of the reasonableness of the
judicial warrant must be based on the affidavit of one who
has personal knowledge of the facts to which he
testifies. The testimony cannot be based on mere
belief. Neither can it be based on a report. Otherwise, the
warrant is void.
Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984),
reiterating the 1937 case of Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the
testimony based on a military report that the newspaper We
Forum was used for subversive were held to be not a
personal knowledge and so was inadmissible.
Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985), the
testimony based on investigation reports that certain items
in the Philippine Times were subversive were held to be not
personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant issued was
not valid.
e. The search warrant must describe particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Failure to state with particularity the place to be
searched and items to be seized makes the warrant used for
fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void.
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description which read
"subversive documents, leaflets, papers to promote the
objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a
Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not
to be particular descriptions, thus making the warrant a
general warrant.
In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed
copies and dummies of Philippine Times, subversive
documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,
banners, and typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again
invalidated for the description was not at all particular or
specific, thus making the warrants general warrants.
When it comes to printed matters, the offensive
material need not be set out in full. It is enough if it specifies
the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction to
seize "subversive materials" is not valid because the
determination of whether a material is subversive or not is
Constitutional Law II
not for the police officer to decide; no unfettered discretion
must be granted to him.
The matter is different if goods were searched and
seized because of their intrinsic quality (as when they are
stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searched for the
ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is
sought). In the latter case, a more detailed description of
the physical features of the item is required to avoid
delegating the appreciation of ideas, and thus threaten free
expression.
2. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles
The reason is the person may escape easily if a
warrant has to be applied for the mean time. In the Tariff
and Customs Code, customs agents are specifically
authorized to search and seize vehicles even without a
warrant.
Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on
the purpose (e.g. apprehend a suspected criminal) and the
circumstances (e.g. probable cause that the criminal is inside
the car). There is no question that when a child has been
reported kidnapped in a community, the police can stop all
cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them.
(b) When search is an an incident to a valid arrest.
Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.-
- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. (Rules of Court.)
A person arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything that proves the commission of the
offense. It follows that the search can only be made within
the area of control of the arrested person, and within the
time of the arrest.
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985);
Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were arrested at the
intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30
a.m., having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. At
12:00 noon, Roque's apartment located 2 blocks away, was
searched and some documents seized. The SC at first held
that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void
for failing to describe with particularity the things to be
seized, because it was an incident of a valid arrest.
But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC
granted the motion for reconsideration and held that just
because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the
search was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be
"incidental" to the arrest, that is, not separated by time or
place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental
searches is looked into, one can see that this situation is not
one involving a valid incidental search.
The law allows the arresting officer to search a person
validly arrested (by frisking him for instance) because (a) a
weapon held by the arrested person may be turned against
his captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the crime, if
the arrested officer has to first apply for a search warrant
from a judge.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30
minutes after the arrest, there is no longer any danger that
the captured may turn against the captor; and if the
documents in the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search
would no longer be justified since there is no way for Roque
to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents,
having been arrested already.
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985)
F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with
Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group.
Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the
CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984.
At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and
428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were
seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search
warrant for rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of the
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion were
filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco
with illegal possession of subversive materials. Milagros
asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it
was illegally obtained. The search warrant described the
things to be seized as "Documents, papers and other records
of the CPP, NPA and NDF, xxx".
HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to describe
with particularity the things to be seized. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are and what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive. There is absent a definite guideline
as to what items might lawfully be seized, thus giving the
officers discretion regarding what articles they should seize.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant. But the seizure
of the articles could be justified as an incident of a valid
arrest. It is a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place of premises where the arrest was made can also be
searched without a search warrant.
(c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching
party
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on
5/10/84. The petitioner's house was searched 2 days later
but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt
Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they
Constitutional Law II
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against
the petitioner.
RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby
declared null and void and accordingly set aside.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken
by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the
ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of
the complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit
executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.
By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was
question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only
"to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the
same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed
and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have
asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been
completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did
not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to
the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's
deposition in writing and attach them to the record,
together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able
to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it
if it will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata
v. Bayona.)
The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW
on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally
known to him. His application, standing alone, was
insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It
was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by
their own personal info., to establish the applicant's claims.
Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take
the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant
himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their
depositions.
A study of the deposition taken from witnesess
Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
"intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a
mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits,
except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the resp. judge.
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp.
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to
the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window,
or whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why
his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were
really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses,
considering that these acts were against the law. These
would have been judicious questions but they were
injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the
witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was
issued forthwith.
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED
WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY
SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS
CONFORMITY IN WRITING.
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure
exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced
the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty
against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search
they were conducting.
Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow that bec. an
offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala
prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply bec. they are prohibited. A SW is
still necessary.
Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should have, before
coming to the SC, filed a motion to quash the search warrant
by the resp. judge. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
consitutional issues raised." RAM.
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)
F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon
Bagatsng, policemen seized and confiscated from dealers,
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic, and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in
public. Among the publications seized and later burned
was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by
plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was dismissed by
the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with
SC, invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure.
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
HELD: YES.
It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only
through a judicial warrant , otherwise, they become
unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of
Staff (133 SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the orders of
the RTC authorizing the serach of the premises WE Forum
and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by reason
of a defective warrant. There is a greater reason in this case
to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence
of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case
involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos,
a political case, because speech is speech, whether political
or "obscene".
The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a
search warrant from the judge , if in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that
the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a
clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action. The judge must
Constitutional Law II
determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the
judge's sound discretion. If probable cause exist, a search
warrant will issue.
(d) Stop and Frisk
Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the
INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the Intelligence
Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along
Magallanes, St., Davao City. While they were w/in the
premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be
acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. They then
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live
ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was brought to the
police station for further investigation. He was prosecuted
for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RTC
of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty, and trial on
the merits, a decision was rendered finding petitioner
guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in
toto.
Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of
w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure,
the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.
The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R 136 of
ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof
of a commission of an offense, w/o a SW.
HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest w/o
a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private
person, among others, when in his presence the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense, or when an offense has in
fact, just been committed, & he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed
it.
At the time the peace officers identified themselves
and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee,
they did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing, the offense. They just suspected that he was
hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what
its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an
arrest w/o a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant
& seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by
an arrest, foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c
has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa.
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure (S & S)
conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
thereof in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed,
the latter is more reasonable considering that, unlike in the
former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there
was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after
they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
As the Sol-Gen said:
"The assailed S & S may still be
justified as akin to a 'stop and frisk'
situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of suspicious
individuals or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officers
seeks to obtain more info. ... The US SC
held in Terry v. Ohio that "a police officer
may in appropriate circumstances & in an
appropriate manner approach a person for
the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behaviour even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest." In
such a situation, it is reasonable for an
officer rather than simply to shrug his
shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to
stop a suspicious individual briefly in order
to determine his identity or maintaing the
status quo while obtaining more info."
PETITION DENIED. RAM.
(e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily
and intelligently.
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the
person consented or did not object to the search, for it many
happen that he did so only out of respect for the
authorities. The waiver must be expressly made.
People v. De lara
F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation
was conducted by the police, as a consequence of which,
accused was arrested. The accused already pocketed the
marked money and handed two foils to the police when he
sensed the presence of police operatives. He tried to
retrieve the two foils but he was prevented from doing
so. He tried to escape by running inside his house. The
police pursued him and were able to subdue him. The
accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his
house. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic
bag containing prohibited drugs. The team, together with
the accused, proceeded to WPD headquarters for
Constitutional Law II
investigation. During the investigation, accused was
apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have the assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked
to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending
arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his arrest and
the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null
and void. He also contends that he was not assisted by
counsel during custodial investigation, where he was forced
to sign the photocopy of the marked money, the Receipt of
Property Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the
seizure of the plastic bag were valid.
RULING: YES. The accused was caught in flagrante as a
result of a buy-bust operation. There was no need for a
warrant. The policemen were not only authorized but were
also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even
without a warrant. The policemen’s entry into the house of
the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of
a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The
arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure
of the plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside
the house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted
upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity
where the arrest was made.
ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused
during the investigation were admissible in evidence.
RULING: NO. There was no showing that accused was then
assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into
writing. (The rejection of these evidence would not affect
the conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of
other evidence establishing his guilt.) Bam.
People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994)
F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the
height of the coup d'etat staged in December,
1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in
two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and
for attempted homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was
acquitted of attempted homicide.
Surveillance was undertaken by the military along
EDSA because of intelligence reports about a
coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in
gunfire killing one member of the team. A searching team
raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and
confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of
C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov"
bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a
door. The team arrested appellant. They were then made to
sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and
ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search
warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was
found guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged
before us in this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure
in this case.
Ruling: YES
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided
the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search
warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the
door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling
the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office
is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory
or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives
and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale
of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-
powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or
even colorably explained. In addition, there was general
chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and
intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel
forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein
were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our
considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of
the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There
was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for
and secure a search warrant from the courts. Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.
There are two separate statutes penalizing different
offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code
treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide,
arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of
firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the course
of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and
punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession
of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.
Subject to the presence of the requisite elements in
each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in
furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate
prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135
of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in
this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense
Constitutional Law II
punished by a special law while the second is a felony
punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant
elements.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death
penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the
time the offense charged in this case was committed under
the governance of that law, the imposition of the death
penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently,
appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out
by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation
in connection therewith.
3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target
zonings."
Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the
mission of conducting security operations w/in its area or
responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political dev't of the NCR. As part
of its duty to maitain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM.
Petitioners aver that, bec. of the institution of said
checkpoints, the Valenzuela residents are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning
the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court
order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when
Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood
by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to
speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented
before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine
checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of
petitioners' rights against unlawful search and seizure of
other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by
those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
w/c are reasonable are not forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benfit of
the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as
measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the
interest of public security.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search w/c is, however,
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that
all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
cost of occasional inconveninece, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990)
F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. inj. to prohibit
the military and police officers represented by public
respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or
"saturation drives" in MM.
The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal
age, bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers and leaders in
their respective communities.
Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings"
or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are
hiding. Petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a
common pattern of human rights abuses.
Respondents stress 2 points. First, the resps. have
legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And, second,
they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a
deliberate disregard for human rights, are total lies.
Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Const.:"The Pres.
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed."
They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. shall be the
Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. xxx
HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some
violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the
alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of
residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
personal verification." However, the remedy is not to stop
all police actions, including the essential and legitimate
ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence
visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots
or violent demonstration if they do not move in sufficient
numbers. A show of force is sometimes necesary as long as
the rights of the people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners
would limit all police actions to one on one confrontation
where search warrants and warrants of arrest against
specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign
if the military and the police decide to sit down in their
offices bec. all concerted drives where a show of force is
present are totally prohibited.
Constitutional Law II
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition
brought through a TP's suit. Where not one victim
complains, and not one violator is properly charged, the
problem is not initially for the SC. It is basically one for the
executive departments and for the trial courts.
Under the circumstances of this TP's suit, there is no
erring soldier or policeman whom we can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained
through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be
given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners'
charges and a hard look by admin. officials at the policy
implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also
warranted.
In the meantime, and in the face of a prima facie
showing that some abuses were probably committed and
could be committed during future police actions, we have to
temporarily restrain the alleged baning on walls, the kicking
in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas
for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences
even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and other
alleged acts w/c are shocking to the conscience.
4. Wire Tapping
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to
withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against
Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This
demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone
extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear
the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was
subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon
receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent,
complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of
the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a
private conversation would constitute an unlawful
interception of communication between 2 parties using a
telephone line.
HELD: NO
An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices
enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone
line. This section refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. The tel.
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It
just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes
must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in
the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal
statute must be construed as not including an extension tel.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows
that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through
punishment, persons suchj as government authorities or
representatives of organized groups from installing devices
in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate,
blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel.
users. Consequently, the mere act of listening , in order to
be punishable must stricly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature.
5. What may be seized
Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal property to be seized.-- A
search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
the following personal property:
(a) Subject matter of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits
of the offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as a means of
committing an offense. (Rules of Court.)
6. Exclusionary Rule
Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this
(privacy of communication and correspondence) or the
preceding section (unreasonable searches and
seizures) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an
illegal search is to ask for the suppression of the things seized
and the evidence illegally taken.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any
evidence obtained in violation of secs. 2 and 3 (1) of Art. III
for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding". The evidence is
absolutely useless. This has not always been the case.
In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC, following
the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally
obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise
admissible under the rules of evidence. In such case, the
evidence admitted, without prejudice to any criminal, civil or
administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. In
other words, the admissibility of the evidence is not effected
by the illegality of the means by which it was acquired.
It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following the U.S.
case of Maop v. Ohio 1969, when the exclusionary rule was
first adopted in the Philippines, the SC noting that the total
suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of
ensuring the constitutional right which it seeks to
preserve. The Court noted, the insufficiency of the other
remedies (e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment,
resistance), especially in the Philippines where violations
Constitutional Law II
were committed by those in power and were thus equipped
with the pardoning power to water down the gravity of the
other penalties imposed to violators of those constitutional
rights.
The victim may or may not get back the thing seized,
depending on whether it is contraband or not. It the thing is
contraband, it would not be returned, and only its
suppression can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the
party can ask for its return, even if no criminal prosecution
has yet been filed, as in the Stonehill case.
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
F: Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp.
prosecutors), several judges (resp. judges) issued a total of
42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the
corporations of w/c they were officers, directed to any peace
officer, to search the perons named and/ or the premises of
their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize
several personal prop. as the "subject of the offense; stolen
or embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense" as violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws
(TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants
are null & void, said petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig.
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus &
injunction. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar
as the papers, documents, and things seized from the
officers of the corporations; but the injunction was
maintained as regards those found & seized in the
residences of petitioners.
ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the
offices of the corporations, w/n petitioners have cause of
action to assail the validity of the contested warrants.
(2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the
residences of petitioners, w/n the search warrants in
question and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof are valid.
(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said
documents, papers and things may be used in evidence
against petitioners.
HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail
the legality of the contested warrants and the seizure made
in pursuance thereof bec. said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied of by 3rd
parties.
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in connection
w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied w/. It
was stated that the natural and juridical persons has
committed a violation of CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No
specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof w/ respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of a probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of
our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed bec. they place
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of
the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights-- that the things to be seized
be particularly described-- as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. RAM.
7. Civil Action for Damages
A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to
Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the privilege
of the writ is suspended, the court can nevertheless
entertain an action not only against the task force but even
against the top ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to
recover damages for the illegal searches and seizures made
in a despotic manner. By so doing, one can indirectly inquire
into the validity of the suspension of the privilege.
8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor)
& husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened appellant's box, a peculiar order emitted
therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of
the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane
wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and
requested a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist of the
Narcotics Section of the NBI.
Thereafter, an information was filed against
appellant for violation of RA 6425.
Constitutional Law II
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the
imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his consti.
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and
privacy of communication and therefore argues that the
same should be held inadmissible in evidence.
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered
and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and w/o the intervention and participation of state
authorities.
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the state?
HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Consti. cannot be invoked against the State. This
constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by govt.
xxx (Villanueva v. Querubin.)
The contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the govt w/o the latter transgressing
appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures (S & S), the Court sees no cogent reason why the
same should not be admitted against him.
Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe
that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. The
arguments of appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or
the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar
readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted
an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. Records of
the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made the search/
inspection. Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on
the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure bef.
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of
Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. Merely to
observe and look at that w/c is plain sight is not
search. Having observed that w/c is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill
of Rights governs the relationship between the individual
and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. xxx" (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner
Bernas.)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful S & S
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the govt
and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and w/o the
intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable S & S cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
govt.
9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST, as distinguished
from SEARCH warrants, the judge may rely simply on
fiscal's certification as to probable cause
Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of arrest) with Rule
126, Sec. 4 (on search warrants.)
Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-
- (a) By the Regional Trial Court.-- Upon the filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant
for the arrest of the accused.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court.-- If the municipal
trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is
satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and
that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of complainant;
record.-- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known
to them and attach to the records their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed
in that the judge can rely on the certification of the fiscal that
the latter has conducted the preliminary investigation and
has found probable cause on the part of the accused. The
judge can issue the warrant on the basis of the information
filed by the fiscal and the certification of probable cause.
The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v. Abbas,
98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting that it has been practice long
settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on the
basis of the certificate.
Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he can always ask
the fiscal to submit the records of the preliminary
investigation, so he could determine for himself if, on the
basis of the affidavits, there exists probable cause. It he is
satisfied with the affidavits, he need not summon the
affiants.
Constitutional Law II
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary
investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery
filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale
harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining
Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the
records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his
finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as
charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the
records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal
of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde
failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the
accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal
Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause
existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge
Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he
has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be
required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative
duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was
ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge
to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after
conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that
the accused commited the crime charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE
INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER.
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on
the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine
whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must
have examined in writing and under oath the complainant
and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he
must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there
must be a need to place the accused under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not
obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating
judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is
necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information
immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused. Bam.
Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint for libel
against the petitioners, who were publisher and columnist of
the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in
Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 entitled "The Nervous
Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you will recall,
during the Aug. 29 coup attempt, the Pres. hid under her
bed, while the firing was going on-- perhaps the first
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, Beltran
moved to dismiss the complaint. The fiscal deniend his
motion after finding a prima facie case against the
petitioners and filed the case in court w/c thereafter issued
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. The petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the word
"determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Consti. to issue warrants to "other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law," has
apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Consti. now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation. What the Consti. underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue
a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure,
otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed
before their courts.
xxx
10. When arrest may be made without a warrant
Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful.-- A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment of place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section.
7. (Rules of Court.)
Constitutional Law II
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases where
an arrest can be made either by the peace officer or a private
person without need of a warrant.
The key element in the first case is that the offense
was committed "in his presence". The key element in the
second case is that he has "personal knowledge".
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the
arrest made by the constabulary without a warrant of a
farmer on the basis of information that he was a subversive
was held unconstitutional, since there was no personal
knowledge of the offense itself.
The gun and subversive documents found by the
officer and admitted by the former to be his were likewise
held inadmissible because the admission violated the
Miranda rule.
a. Strict enforcement of rule
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar Masamlok, the
appellant was arrested while plowing his farm in Tiguman,
Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal
possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38
caliber revolver was found buried under his
house. Subversive documents were also seized from a place
near his house. Two arresting officers testified that the
appellant had readily admitted ownership of the gun and the
documents. The appellant was found guilty of the charge
and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and the gun
and documents were ordered confiscated.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting officer must
have personal knowledge that the crime has been
committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed,
in order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The offense must
also be committed in his presence or w/in his view. There is
no such personal knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest
of the appellant was illegal.
(2) Consequently, the incidental search and seizure
were likewise illegal and the firearm and document are
inadmissible in evidence.
(3) The prosecution argues that the appellant
admitted ownership of the gun and claims that it was he who
pointed to the place where the subversive documents were
hidden. However, as the appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights at that time, his admission is
inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).] It is true that 6 days
later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the
assistance of counsel, but it was then already too late.
(4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is
the testimony of Cesar M. and it is uncorroborated and
unreliable, the appellant should be acquitted, but the gun
and the subversive documents must be confiscated.
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989)
F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the
desk officer of Sub-Station I, namely, Michael Orbeta, who
informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling
marijuana at No. 8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila
and requested that said person be apprehended. Acting on
this phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta, a team of
policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from
the house located at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw
a tricycle with 3 persons on board, a driver and 2 passengers,
stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St. They also
saw a male person come out of the said house and approach
and talk to the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw
the male person go back to the house and a little later come
back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a
cigarette, a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the
tricycle driver in turn give something to the male person. Pat.
Pajilan together with his companions approached the male
person and the tricycle driver and after introducing
themselves as police officers, they asked the male person,
the tricycle driver and his 2 passengers to bring out the
contents of their pockets, which the male person, the driver
and the passengers of the tricycle did. The male person
brought out from his pockets 2 small plastic bags containing
suspected marijuana leaves. The tricycle driver brought out
from his right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana
cigarettes. Nothing illegal was found in the pockets of the 2
passengers of the tricycle.
The appellant contends that the police officers had
no personal knowledge that he was indeed handing
marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away
from the alleged sale transaction. The arrest therefore was
not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were
not complied with.
Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
Ruling: YES.
The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was
valid since it falls under the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)
of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of
the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only
authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the
drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The police
officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal
trade of the accused. The exact location where this trading
in drugs was taking place was given to them. The 'suspicious
stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be
marijuana after tests were conducted on them. The
attendant circumstances taking place before their eyes led
the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense
was actually being committed.
Constitutional Law II
b. Exceptions to strict enforcement
(1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef.
the Court. The Court finds that the persons detained have
not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty and that the circumstances
attending these cases do not warrant their release on HC.
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars. (a) and (b)
of Rule 113, ROC, as amended is justified when the person
arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested
has committed it.
The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC
have been filed had freshly committed or were actually
committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their
arrests, w/o warrant were clearly justified, and that they are,
further detained by virtue of valid informations filed against
them in court.
I produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received
confidential info. about a member of the NPA-Sparrow unit
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital
in Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was found that the wounded
person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM
soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM.
Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an
inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an
info. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/
Assault upon agents of persons in authority."
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused
in a crim. case, who has been released on bail.
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of
shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he arrested after the
commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after
the shooting incident. However, Dural was arrested for
being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that
he was committing an offense when arrested.
The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as
its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent
acts but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell
the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause bef. the issuance of
a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against govt forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)
Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now
serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial
court. Thus, the writ of HC is no longer available
II
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra,
w/o warrant is also justified.
In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos, a
former NPA, the Constantino house in Marikina Heights was
placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88, pursuant
to a search warrant , a search of the house was conducted at
5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the course of the search were
found several firearms, regular power supply, antennae,
speaker and subversive documents.
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) could not
ammunition, radio, etc. He was brought to CIS HQ for
investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a
written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff
member of the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member
of the International Dept. of the CPP.
At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra arrived at RC's
house. When arrested, he readily submitted to the military
agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that
he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong,"
referring to RC and other members of the rebel group. Also
found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper
containing the jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque, sister of
Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to the address on
8/13/88 and arrived at the place about 11 AM. After
identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking
permission to search the place, w/c was granted, the military
agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants
of the house and the barangay captain of the place.
The military found the place to be another safehouse
of the NUFC/ CPP. They found firearms, subversive
documents, ledgers, journals, vouchers, among
others. Amelia admitted ownership of the documents
seized.
Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for
inquest after w/c an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866
was filed. Another info. for viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act
was filed against Roque and also to Buenaobra.
A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court on behalf of
Roque and Buenaobra. At the hearing, Buenaobra
manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp
Crame, Q.C. Accordingly, the petition for HC on his behalf is
now moot and academic.
Constitutional Law II
III
Anonuevo v. Ramos.
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon
Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the
house of RC w/c was still under surveillance. The military
noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked,
the agents found them to be loaded guns. They were asked
to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms
and ammunitions but they could not produce any. Hence,
they were brought to PC HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," and
C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD 1866
was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On 8/24/88, a petition for HC was
filed bef. this Court.
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully
arrested bec. there was no previous warrant, is w/o
merit. The records show that they were carrying unlicensed
firearms and ammunitions in their person when
apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the info.
filed against them are null and void for want of prel. inv. The
filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been first conducted,
is sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC.
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions
of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did petitioners ask for prel. inv. after
the informations had been filed against them in court.
IV
Ocaya v. Aguirre.
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP Command, armed w/ a
search warrant, conducted a search of a house located at
Marikina Green Heights, believed to be occupied by Benito
Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search,
Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive
documents and several rounds of ammunitions for a .45 cal.
pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought
to the PC HQ for investigation, when O. could not produce
any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an
info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-
Pasig. Rivera was released from custody.
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of
these 2.
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her
arrest w/o warrant is justified. No. prel. inv. was conducted
bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to
waive the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, pursuant to
R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
V xxx
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and Roque
claim that the firearms, ammunitions and subversive
documents alleged to have been found in their possession,
when arrested, did not belong to them, but were planted by
the military to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any
evidence to support their claim. On the other hand, no evil
motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that
could cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the
petitioners falsely, has been shown.
As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of the
petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing
expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the
petitioners.
VI
Espiritu v. Lim.
Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of
PISTON. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of 11/23/88,
while he was sleeping in his home located at Sta. Mesa, Mla.,
he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of
persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to
talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When
he asked for the warrant, the men bodily lifted him and
placed him in their owner type jeepney. He demanded that
his sister be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not
accede to his request.
An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142, RPC (Inciting
to sedition) was filed against him.
In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-con at
the NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-media was heard urging
all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on
11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in
order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen his slip. He
was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and
sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa
magkagulo na."
Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in
accordance w/ the provisions of R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and
the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/
the competent court, he may not be released on HC.
VII
Nazareno v. Station Commander.
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo Bunye II
was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinglupa,
MM. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who
was arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon questioning,
Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the
killing of Bunye II. In view thereof, the officers, w/o warrant,
picked up Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ for
questioning.
Constitutional Law II
On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan,
Laguna, issued a resolution denying the petition for HC, it
appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
respondents by reason of an info. filed against him w/ the
RTC-Mkti., MM.
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o
warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), R 113, ROC, after he was
positively implicated by his co-accused; and after
investigation by the police.
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an
arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a
necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the
indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in
authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristic of a crime and that the same grounds exist to
beleive that the person sought to be detained participated
therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.)
VIII
In all the petitions here considered, criminal charges
have been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order,
or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of HC
will not be allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.)
On the Ilagan Doctrine.
As the Court sees it, re-examination or re-appraisal,
w/ a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is
not the answer. The answer and the better practice would
be, not to limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n
the court w/c issued the process, judgement or order of
commitment, or bef. whom the detained person is charged,
had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or
order or to take cognizance of the case, but rahter, as the
court itself stated in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for
HC, the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention-- "from the moment petitioner was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can
the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our
Constitution in fact has been satisfied."
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251
PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S DECISION
PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not rule that mere
suspicion that one is a CPP or NPA is a valid ground for his
arrest w/o warrant.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant is justified as
it can be said that, w/in the contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R
113, ROC, he was committing an offense, when arrested,
bec. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an
outlawed org., where membership is penalized, and for
subversion w/c, like rebellion is, under Garcia v. Padilla, a
continuing crime.
Dural did not cease to be, or become less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply bec. he was,
at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons
who, the day before his arrest, w/o warrant, had shot 2
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other
policemen, anywhere as agents or representative of an
organized govt. It is in this sense that subversion and
rebellion are anchored on an ideological base w/c compels
the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence
until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized
govt is attained.
His arrest was based on "probable cause."
Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2 conditions for a valid
arrest w/o warrant: (1) the person to be arrested has just
committed an offense and (2) the person arresting has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested is the one who committed the offense.
It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in
arrests w/o warrant must be based upon probable cause,
w/c means on actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded
on probable cause, coupled w/ good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Said confidential info. received by the arresting
officers, to the effect that an NPA was being treated for a
gunshot wound was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA
member was truly in said hospital. The actual facts
supported by circumstances are: (1) the day bef., or on
1/31/88, 2 CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong
Bo., Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural; (2) a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie
Javelon" was actually then being treated in said hospital for
for a gunshot wound; (3) "Ronnie Javelon" and his address
entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the
wounded man was in reality Dural.
Constitutional Law II
On good faith.-- The peace officers who arrested
Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith,
considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly
perform their official duties.
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info. charging him
w/ Double murder w/ assault against agents of persons in
authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. He was placed
under judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. Anonuevo, R..
Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests, w/o warrant, are also
justified. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued
by a court of law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms,
explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons. They
were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto w/c justified
their outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113,
ROC. A few days after their arrests, informations were filed
in court against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial
custody and disposition. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec.
he had chosen to remain in detention.
The reason which compelled the military agents to
make the arrests w/o warrant was the info. given to the
military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the other
by Benito Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for
their operations, w/ info. as to their exact location and the
names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following
circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), w/c confirmed the belief
of the military that the info. they had received was true and
the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain crimes: first, the search warrant was
duly issued to effect the search of the Constantino
safehouse; second, found in the safehouse was a person
named RC, who admitted that he was a ranking member of
the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed
firearms and communist equipment; third, at the time of
their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions, and/ or subversive documents, and they
admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in
the CPP/ NPA. And then shortyly after their arrests, they
were positively identified by their former comrades as CPP/
NPA members.
An arrest is in the nature of an administrative
measure. The power to arrest w/o warrant is w/o limitation
as long as the requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace
and order in our community.
"xxx The legality of the detention does not depend
upon the fact of the crime, but xxx upon the nature of the
deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be
inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the
moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of
suspending the liberty of the citizen." (US v. Sanchez.)
ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not for
subversive or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the
words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa
magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the arresting
officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons differ as to the validity of such
perception and regard the language as falling w/in free
speech guaranteed by the Consti. But, the authority of the
peace officers to make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time
the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, w/o
obviously becomes difficult at times, the court, has in this
case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for
purposes of the arrest (not conviction.)
Supervening events made this case moot and
academic. for E. had bef. arraignment asked the court a quo
for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Case
against E. has been provisionally dismissed and his bail
cancelled.
NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the killing of Bunye
II occured on 12/14/88, while Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant
was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later, teh arrest falls
under Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on 12/28/88 that the
police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably
one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest
had to be made promptly, even w/o a warrant (after the
police were alerted) and despite the lapse of 14 days to
prevent possible flight.
Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo
for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
These admissions strengthen the Court's perception
that truly the grounds upon w/c the arresting officers based
their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by probable cause,
i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/ Sec. 5, R
113, ROC. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is
not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the
offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were
predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence
of persons arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition
for HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
(2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784
F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust”
operation. The two marked ten-peso bill were retrieved
from him. He was asked to sign his name on the two marked
bills. The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from
the accused were submitted for examination. After finding
these positive for marijuana, a case was filed for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Law. Linsangan denied the
charge. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal,
one of the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial court
Constitutional Law II
erred in not holding that when the policemen required him
to initial the marked bills, they violated his constitutional
right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate
himself while under custodial investigation.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE
ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE
TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel
when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked
in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not
violated for his possession of the marked bills did not
constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act
of selling marijuana cigarettes. His conviction was not based
on the presence of his initials on the marked bills, but on the
fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the
policemen that they arrested him while he was actually
engaged in the selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of
the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to
their categorical declarations than to the appellant’s
denials. That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they are
presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular
manner. Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the
deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and
procedural technicalities to make it doubly so.
11. Immunity from arrest of members of
Congress
Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six (6)
years imprisonment (prision correcional), be privileged
from arrest while Congress is in session. xxx
B. Rights of Persons under custodial interrogation
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense, shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violations of this section, as well as compensation to
and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
According to Chief Justice Warren, when a defendant
is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through
menacing police interrogation procedures, where
compulsion is forcefully potential and his will is likely to be
subjugated, the officers must undertake to afford proper
safeguards by the reading of the "Miranda rights" at the
outset of the investigation to ensure that the statements
made are truly the product of free choice.
Any person under custodial or police investigation has
the right to be informed of the following rights:
1. Right to remain silent
a) To make him aware of it.
b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the
interrogating atmosphere
c) To show the individual that his interrogators are
prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to
invoke his right.
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain
silent, anything he says can and will be used against him.
a) To warn him of the consequences of waiving his
right to remain silent.
b) To make him aware that this is an adversary
system, and that the police are not acting in his interest.
3. Right to counsel before and during the interrogation
a) To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his
testimony, since the inherent pressures initially overcome by
the right to remain silent may again run unless coupled with
the right to counsel.
b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police.
4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel,
then one will be provided for him by the state.
a) To inform him that if he does not have counsel or
cannot afford one, he does not have to defend himself alone.
b) To inform him that his poverty is no reason why he
should lose his right to counsel.
(The reading of these rights is no less indispensable
even if the person arrested is a prominent Constitutional
lawyer. Although he may already know these rights, the
purpose is not so much to inform him, as to assure him that
his interrogators are willing to respect his rights amidst the
pressure of custodial investigation.)
The reading of these rights is required during
"custodial investigation".
A police investigation consists of 2 stages:
Constitutional Law II
1) "General exploratory investigation" - when the
investigation consists merely of general questions to find out
who might be the culprit, but without being directed at
anyone's guilt in particular. At this stage, the Miranda rule is
not yet applicable; otherwise, people who could otherwise
explain their innocence would be arrested.
2) "Custodial investigation" - when the investigation
now focuses on the guilt of a person such that he is no longer
allowed to leave the premise. It is at this stage that the
Miranda ruling is necessary, since the purpose of the
interrogation is to evince evidence that can be used to
prosecute the person.
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees X running
with a stained knife away from an apparently dead man, he
can rung after X and having grabbed him, ask him for an
explanation as to what he saw without reading his Miranda
rights. But once A arrests X and starts interrogating him in
the police precinct, then his rights must now be read, for
there can only be one purpose to the questioning, and that
is to elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him.
Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial
Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988); 61 Phil. LJ 409
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF
PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS.
Since the introduction of the American accusatorial
system of criminal procedure in the Phils., the rule has been
that involuntary confessions are inadmissible in evidence
against the accused.
The question is on whom the burden of proof is
placed. The early rule placed the burden of proving that the
confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible in
evidence, on the prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619.) It was
held that a confession not shown to have been voluntarily
given could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings,
even for the first time on appeal in the SC.
Act No. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. code of
1916, w/c placed the burden of proof on the accused to
show that his confession was involuntary. Under the new
rule, it was sufficient that the confession was given under
conditions w/c accredit prima facie its admissibility.
In 1953, a further change took place when the SC held
in Peo. v. de los Santos that "A confession, to be repudiated,
must not only be proved to have been obtained by force and
violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects
the confession when, by force or violence or intimidation,
the accused is compelled against his will to tell a falsehood,
not even when such force and violence he is compelled to
tell the truth. In the later case of Peo. v. Villanueva, the
Court stated "the admissibility of that kind of evidence
depends not on the supposed illegal manner in w/c it is
obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or admission
contained therein.
The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence
does not affect its admissibility (Moncado v. People's Court.)
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND
SEIZURE CASES
The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in
search and seizure cases (Stonehill v. Diokno) worked a
parallel in the law of confession. W/o expressly overruling
its decision in de los Santos and Villanueva, the Court, in Peo.
v. Urro, went back to the former rule that involuntary or
coerced confessions, regardless of their truth, are null and
void. xxx Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman
methods to secure confessions. xxx
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an "unconstitutional
coercion will render inadmissible even the most
unquestionably true inculpatory statements." xxx This is
not bec. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the
methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle
in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -- a system in
w/c the State must establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge
against an accused out of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v.
Richmond, J. Frankfurter.)
THE MIRANDA RULE
The prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the def. unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken to custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. xxx
II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS
MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain warnings to be
given by police interrogators bef. a person in custody may be
interrogated, w/c have been adopted by the Phil. SC:
1. The person in custody must be informed in clear
and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain
silent. The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege not to
be compelled to incriminate himself, to overcome the
inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere, and to
assure the individual that his interrogators are prepared to
recognize his privilege, should he choose to exercise it.
2. The person in custody must be warned that
anything he will say can and wilol be used against him. This
warning is intended to make him aware not only of the
privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it.
3. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody
interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will
of one merely made aware of his privilege by his
interrogators, it is indispensable that he has the assistance
of counsel.
THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION
Constitutional Law II
At what stage of the police interrogation must the
warnings be given? The Consti. does not state at what stage
of the interrogation process they must be made. but in
Miranda, the court specified that it is only at the custodial
phase of the interrogation that its ruling applied. As the
Court indicated in Escobedo v. Illinois, it is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a
process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was arrested, w/o a
warrant, for vagrancy. He was taken to police precint no. 2
in Mla. The next day, he was included in a police line-up of
5 detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a
complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the
accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the
complainant, while the latter was interrogated. The accused
was then charged w/ robbery. The accused moved to
dismiss the case against him on the ground that he had been
denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up. His
motion was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of
an interrogation, when the police officer starts to ask
questions designed to elicit info. and/ or confessions or
admissions from the accused. As the police line-up in this
case was not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner was
not entitled to counsel xxx.
III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS.
It is important to distinguish bet. the waiver of rights
and the waiver of warnings. The first can be made provided
that the waiver is "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" but
the second cannot. As the warnings are the means of
insuring that the suspect is apprised of his rights so that any
subsequent waiver of his rights can be "voluntary, knowing
and intelligent," it is obvious that there can be no valid
waiver of the warnings. A waiver of rights will not be
presumed.
1. With respect to confessions obtained bef. Jan. 17,
1973, the rule that the suspect must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel
does not apply. such confessions, even though presented in
evidence in a trial after the effectivity of the 1973 Consti.,
are admissible, provided they are voluntary, using the
traditional test of voluntariness.
2. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. 17,
1973, but before March 20, 1985, when the decision of Peo.
v. Galit was handed down, the rule is that the voluntariness
of a waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel must be
determined on a case-to-case basis, taking into account the
circumstances under w/c the waiver was made.
3. With regard to confessions obtained after March
20, 1985 but before Feb. 2, 1987, when the present Consti.
took effect, the rule is that a waiver of the rights to remain
silent and to the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must be
made w/ the assistance of counsel.
4. With regard to confessions given after Feb. 2, 1987,
the present Consti. requires that the waiver to be valid, must
be in writing and w/ the assistance of counsel.
IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him, the Consti. says. No distinction is made bet.
confession or admission. Although the previous Consti.
spoke of confessions only, I have argued that it was not so
limited but that it also embraced uncounselled
statements. For "if a statement made wore in fact
exculpatory, it could ... never be used by the prosecution, in
fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the
defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial
or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under
interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication."
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding"
conveys the idea that the rule excluding evidence illegally
obtained is absolute. No similar phraseology is used in the
exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. Does this
mean there can be instances, where uncounselled
statements may nevertheless be admissible in evidence,
albeit, for a limited purpose?
In Harris v. US, it was held that although a confession
obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda rule was
inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in chief the
confessor's guilt, it may nevertheless be presented in
evidence to impeach his credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a
prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what he had sold
to a police officer was baking powder, as part of the scheme
to defraud the purchaser xxx The shield provided by
Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by
way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation w/ prior
inconsistent utterance
In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public
safety" exception to the Miranda rule. xxx. "There is public
safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings
be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in
evidence." It held that the warnings were not themselves
Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to
insure the right against self-incrimination. The Court noted
the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely, that the
giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering
questions and this might lead in turn to fewer convictions. It
then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of
warnings might deter suspects from answering questions
than are necessary to avert an immediate threat to public
Constitutional Law II
safety. When answers are not actually coerced, this social
cost outweights the need for Miranda safeguards. In such
exigent circumstances, police officers must not be made to
choose bet. giving the warnings at the risk that public safety
will be endangered and withholding the warnings at the risk
that probative evidence will be excluded.
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262
F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. The victim,
Pagdalian was found dead, sustaining stab wounds. When
the policemen inquired about the circumstances of the
incident, they were informed that the deceased was with
two companions, on the previous night. The accused was
apprehended. In the vehicle where the accused boarded, on
his way to the Police Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted that
he killed Pagdalian because he was abusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was
admissible in evidence.
HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra-judicial
confession of the accused in evidence, violated his
Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to
have a counsel of his choice, while already in police
custody. Since the extra-judicial confession was the only
basis for the conviction of the accused, the trial coust’s
judgment was reversed. Bam.
People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566
F: After he and his wife were individually hogtied
and their house ransacked, Atty. Garay was found
dead with 3 gunshot wounds . For his death and the
loss of their things on the occasion thereof, Bandula,
Sidigo, Dionanao, and Ejan were charged in court for
robbery with homicide. On the basis of the
extrajudicial confessions (EJC) allegedly made by
Bandula and Dionanao during their custodial
investigation which the court found to "have all the
qualities and have complied with all the requirements
of an admissible confession, it appearing from the
confession that acussed were informed of their rights
under the law regarding custodial investigation and
were duly represented by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it
disregarded the defenses interposed by the accused
and convicted Bandula. The 3 other accused were
acquitted for "insufficiency of evidence".
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Bandula
conformed with the constitutional requisites for its
validity, hence admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO
From the records, it can be gleaned that when
accused Bandula and Dionanao were investigated
immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel
present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the
custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao, and
2 weeks later with respect to Bandula. And counsel
who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty.
Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused and
who is not an independent counsel. On top of this,
there are telltale signs that violence was used against
the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of
of Sec. 12, Art III of the 1987 Constitution which
protects the rights of the accused during custodial
investigation. Suzette.
1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed
before January 17, 1973
2. Not applicable to res gestae statements
People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things done") is an
exception to the rule against Hearsay evidence. Res gestae is
based on the belief that because certain statements are
made naturally, spontaneously and without deliberation
during the course of an event, they leave little room for
misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon hearing by
someone else( i.e. by the witness who will later repeat the
statement to the court) and thus the courts believe that such
statements carry a high degree of credibility. Evidence which
can be admitted into evidence as Res gestae fall into three
headings:
Words or phrases which either form part of, or explain a
physical act,
Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to belie
concoction, and
Statements which are evidence as to someone's state of
mind.
3. Not applicable to statements given in administrative
investigations
People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
It should at once be apparent that there are
two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the
section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of
a person not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935
Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, and
2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e.,
the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the
commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much
more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these
rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right
Constitutional Law II
against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section
17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a person
in custodial interrogation, which have been made more
explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article
III.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned
in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded
to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself." It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not
a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer
any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to
which has a tendency to incriminate him for some
crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put
to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does
not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-
executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly,
or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate
time.
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also
treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights. These
rights apply to persons "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes
these rights different from that embodied in the first
sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying
in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under
investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision
described as an "earthquake in the world of law
enforcement."
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right,
2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him; and
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Miranda rights
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those
rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement.
But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self- incriminating statement
without full warnings of constitutional rights."
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of
accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by
custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of
Testimony
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a
crime and subsequently charged with its commission in
court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying
or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the
public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after
having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by
the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to
force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in
violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever
result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to
cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a
specific question which tends to incriminate him for
Constitutional Law II
some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that
Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood,
prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared
to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person
under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were
of no relevance to the inquiry.
4. Custodial Phase of Investigation
Police Lineups
Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988
Police line-up not part of custodial inquest
F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. The
following day, he was included in a police line-up and was
identified as one of the suspects in a robbery case. He was
later charged with robbery and charged. He moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the conduct of the line-
up, without the assistance of counsel, was unconstitutional.
HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial
inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage,
to counsel. VV.
US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967)
People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1
F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with
several companions including Ongue who vaguely
recognized the assailant, describing the latter as a
"mestizo." Two days later, Ongue was invited by the police
to identify the suspect in a police line- up. Hatton was
pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Hatton alleges that at the
time that he was made to stand in the police line-up, he was
not assisted by counsel. Hence, his identification therein by
Ongue is inadmissble.
RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police station
for indentification, technically, he was not yet under
custodial investigation. Thus, the right to counsel does not
yet apply.
However, there is every reason to doubt the regularity
of the identification of the suspect by the witness. During the
proceedings in the police station, Ongue identified
Hatton not because he was certain that Hatton was really
the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the
station and because he was pointed by the police as the
suspect. This cannot be considered as positive identification
of the accused by the witness.
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights
No valid waiver.
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is
voluntary, knowing and intelligent
F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in
the CFI of Bulacan. The prosecution presented Corporal
Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who identified a
statement of the accused during a police interrogation and
his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent and to
counsel. When Roca was questioned on the incriminating
answers in the statement, the defense objected, contending
that Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of
counsel. Respondent Judge sustained the objection on the
ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived.
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation
may be waived provided the waiver is made intelligently and
voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences. In
this case, the statement made only a perfunctory opening
question, after informing the suspect that he was under
investigation, that he had a right to counsel and that
anything he said could be used for or against him and after
asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he
answered "yes." The statement was in Tagalog which the
defendant, a native of Samar, had not been shown to be fully
acquainted with. The date of execution of the statement
before the municipal court was not indicated. The separate
statement signed by the defendant stating he was made to
read the opening statement containing the Miranda
warnings and that they were explained to him all the more
engenders doubt as to whether the defendant was properly
informed of his right.
People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980)
Public trial; waiver of right to counsel
F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14, 1976,
they attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another prisoner.
Afterwards, they surrendered to the prison guard, saying
"surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later,
they gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the killing.
They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty. They took
the witness stand and affirmed their confessions. Tampus
was sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion temporal.
Trial took place at the Penitentiary. On review, it was
contended that Tampus was denied the right to a public trial
and to counsel.
HELD: The record does not show that the public was actually
excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the
accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial there.
Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived. In another
Constitutional Law II
case where Avila was also a defendant, the SC directed that,
for security reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National
Penitentiary. The accused was warned in Tagalog that he had
a right to remain silent and to counsel but despite this, he
was willing to answer questions of the police. There is no
doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The truth is
that shortly after the killing, Tampus and Avila admitted their
guilt. That spontaneous statement, elicited without
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same
time was a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of that
statement given freely on the spur of the moment without
any urging or suggestion, the two waived their right to
remain silent and to counsel.
People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986)
No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence
F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old
woman and sentence to death. His conviction was based
solely on his extrajudicial confession which he disowned in
court. The confession was given to the police and subscribed
before the clerk of court and contains a waiver.
HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question whether
there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his right to
counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to be sure, but
the question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver only "for
the moment." As worded, the question suggested a
tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed permanent
foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there was any
waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a
lawyer but not that one could be provided for him for free.
VV.
Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a
written confession showing that he was apprised of his right
not only by the police but also by the fiscal, but that he
waived these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent and thus admissible.
b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, 1987)
It is not enough that the confession is voluntary,
knowing and intelligent. The waiver must be made in the
presence of counsel. Waiver of the right to counsel must be
made with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied from
March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987.
In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the SC,
reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538
(1983), ruled that no custodial investigation should be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, and that
although the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver
should not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel.
In the Galit case, however, the adoption of the
Morales obiter was also an obiter. The confession in this
case was traditionally involuntary, and so the SC did not
need the Morales obiter in order to disallow the confession.
Under the facts of the case, the accused Galit was
convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of his
confession, which was obtained through torture. The NBI
investigators covered Galit's face with a rag and then pushed
it into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after
they had broken his will that he signed the confession and
posed for pictures for re-enactment as directed by the
investigators.
People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985)
F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide by
the Circuit Criminal Court. The principal prosecution witness
testified that he heard the defendant and his wife, who was
the mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the morning
after the crime. He said the defendant wanted to leave their
house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling
Nene." The prosecution also presented the extrajudicial
confession of the defendant.
HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible
because it was obtained through torture. The NBI
investigators covered the defendant's face with a rag and
then pushed in into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was
only after they had broken his will that the defendant signed
the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as
directed by the investigators. The defendant is from Samar
and there is no showing that he understood Tagalog. It was
two weeks after he executed the salaysay that his relatives
were permitted to visit him. His statement does not contain
any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. These constitute
gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case of Morales
v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in custodial
investigations: No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
of anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
this, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule,
however, was laid to rest by the SC in People v. Sison, 142
SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v. Galit,
which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the
Justices except one who took no part, the Court was out to
rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Enrile, and
embraced its ruling.
In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its
charge of subversion against Asis by means of her confession
given in the hospital, in which she admitted through a
Constitutional Law II
leading question, that she was a member of the NPA and
that she was wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld the
trial court's decision excluding the confession on the ground
that the waiver of the Miranda rights was made without the
assistance of counsel.
People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986)
F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At the trial,
the Fiscal offered as evidence an extrajudicial confession
given by her in the hospital. In that confession, she admitted,
through a leading question that she was a member of the
NPA. The trial court excluded the confession on the ground
that the waiver of Miranda rights was made without the
assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends that the
ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that the right to counsel
may be waived only with the assistance of counsel, was only
a dictum.
HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en
banc and concurred in by all Justices except one who took no
part, the SC put to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in
Morales v. Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile.
People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)
In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986), Nabaluna
et. al. were convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis,
among others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in
1977. The confessions and the special counsel before whom
the confessions were signed prove that the Miranda
warnings were given, but these were not made in the
presence of counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession,
ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect,
especially since in this case the trial court decision was
already rendered before the SC pronouncement.
People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987)
F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of a
confession and circumstantial evidence which the trial court
found substantial to establish guilt.
HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel was
made without the assistance of a counsel. The SC has held in
Morales v. Ponce Enrile, People v. Galit and People v. Sison
(1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any statement
obtained in violation of this procedure shall be inadmissible
in evidence. VV.
c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987)
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in
the presence of counsel
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be
made (1) in writing, and (2) in the presence of counsel.
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on the
prosecution
The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of
the Miranda warning devolves upon the one seeking to
present the confession, that is, on the prosecution. This rule
applies whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule.
In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC noted
that the stereotype "advice" appearing in practically all
extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a legal form. Investigators
automatically type it together with "opo" as the answer, or
ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their
handwriting. Its tired punctilious, fixed and artificially
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness
or even understanding on the part of the accused.
Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by
one entitled to that protection, the presumption is always
against the waiver. Thus, the prosecution must prove with
strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused
willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession, and
knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not
interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of
that confession.
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986)
F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with
homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. de
Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the
appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on
the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the
husband of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two
of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo
Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as
the mastermind. The confessions were taken while the two
were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen
and after two weeks of detention.
HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights
appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which
are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or
model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding
on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous,
Constitutional Law II
free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived
by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is
always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution
must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the
accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession
and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not
interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of
that confession. That proof is missing in this case.
7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to
counsel, but not the right to be given "Miranda warnings"
The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are
the effectuations of the Miranda rights, can be waived.
What cannot be waived are:
1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For
how can one waive what one does not know?)
2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of the
right to remain silent or to counsel.
8. Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary
rule reads: (any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible "for any purpose in
any proceeding."
There are two exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. One, to impeach the credibility of the accused. Two,
public safety.
Impeach the credibility
The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not
totally without use. While it is not admissible to prove the
guilt of the accused, it may be used against him to impeach
his credibility by showing that he is lying in court, so ruled
the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
In this case, Harris was arrested for twice selling
heroin to an undercover police agent. He confessed to the
crime during the police interrogation, but the confession was
uncounselled, and so it was held as inadmissible in
evidence. But when Harris took the witness stand, he
testified that what he sold was baking powder in order to
defraud the police agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to
introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he was
lying.
In justifying the admission of the testimony, Justice
Burger said that it is one thing to say that the government
cannot make an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully
obtained, and quite another to say that the defendant can
turn the illegal method by which the evidence in the
possession of the government was obtained to his own
advantage, providing himself with a shield against perjury
and the contradiction of his untruths.
The reason, continued the Court is that the shield
provided by the Miranda rights cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
Public Safety
Public Safety may justify the police in taking
confessions without prior warning. Thus ruled the U.S.
Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626
(1984).
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
In the case, the Court excused the giving of the
Miranda warning because the public safety required that the
weapon had to be located before it could be used by the
accused against those in the supermarket.
The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while the
police may be justified in forcing the assailant to say where
the weapon is located, he is not justified to present this in
evidence in the subsequent criminal prosecution.
C. Right to bail
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
1. When right may be invoked
The right to bail is available from the very moment of
arrest (which may be before or after the filing of formal
charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final
judgement (which means after appeal).
No charge need be filed formally before one can file
for bail, so long as one is under arrest. So ruled the SC in
Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945).
Constitutional Law II
The case was unique in that after the war, the People's
Court Act amended Art. 125 of the RPC to allow for a longer
time to detain persons because of the impossibility of filing
charges within the reglementary period due to the number
of indictees.
Bail and Habeas Corpus
In the case of bail, there is an implicit recognition that
the arrest and detention, are valid, or that even if they were
initially illegal, such illegality was cured by the subsequent
filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail is that one
be released temporarily from such valid detention, and this
can be made anytime after arrest.
In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely that the
arrest and detention are illegal, so that the prayer is to be
released permanently from such illegal detention. When the
privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention
remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to the victim
is not available. Under the 1987 Constitution, though the
effect of the suspension has been considerably lessened to
the need to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest,
otherwise the detainee is to be released.
The Constitution now provides, overruling Morales v.
Enrile, that the suspension of the privilege of the writ does
not carry with it the suspension of the right to bail. Habeas
Corpus refers to illegal detention, while bail refers to legal
detention, or even detention that started as illegal but was
cured by the filing of a case in court.
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it is a matter of
discretion
Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by
reclusion perpetua.
It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of guilt
is strong. In such a case, according to People v. San Diego,
26 SCRA 522 (1966), the court's discretion to grant bail must
be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. Thus, the order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by the conclusion on whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong.
The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (b) the
evidence of guilt is strong.
With the abolition of the death penalty (III, 20), and
the automatic commutation of a death sentence to reclusion
perpetua, it is contended that when the 1987 Constitution
denies the right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, it is meant to apply only to those crimes which
were once punishable by death. For if it includeds even
those crimes which before and now are really punishable by
reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very spirit of the
Constitution.
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991)
3. Bail in courts-martial
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991)
4. Standards for fixing bail
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; guidelines.-- The
judge who issed the warrant or granted the application
shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily,
but not limited to the following guidelines:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty of the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and
(j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused
is under bond.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory be requiring a sum that is excessive,
otherwise, it becomes "a promise to the ear to be broken to
the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a
pauper's will" (Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De la Camara v.
Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971).
In this case, a bail of P1.195 million imposed against
Mayor Camara for charges of 12 murders and 12 frustrated
murder was found excessive.
The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing the
amount of bail in Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967),
later contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114.
1. Ability of the accused to give the bail.
2. Nature of the offense.
3. Penalty for the offense charged.
4. Character and reputation of the accused
5. Health of the accused.
6. Character and strength of the evidence.
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial.
8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested.
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases.
Constitutional Law II
Even when the accused has previously jumped bail,
still he cannot be denied bail. the remedy in this case is to
increase the amount of the bail (Siquiam v. Amparo).
5. Right to bail and right to travel abroad
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 (1986),
the SC disallowed a person released on bail to travel abroad
for a business trip. The Court gave 2 reasons why bail
operates only within the country.
One, the accused may be placed beyond the
jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, thus affecting one of
the conditions in the grant of bail, namely to have the
accused available whenever the court requires his presence.
Two, implicit in the bail is the agreement between the
State and the surety that the State will do nothing to make it
difficult for the surety to arrest the defendant upon order of
the court. If the court thus allows his to leave, then the State
loses its right to order the forfeiture of the bond because it
itself has breached its obligation to the surety.
The case leaves the question of allowing an accused
under bail to go abroad for humanitarian reasons open-
ended. This reason was not foreclosed by the Court, which
hinted that the accused could be allowed to leave if he had
"sufficient reason". What the Court found insufficient was
the business trip.
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986)
F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two
corporations, in one of which he was the president. The firms
were placed under a management committee by the SEC and
petitioner was placed "on hold" by the Commission of
Immigration. Petitioner was charged with estafa. He later
asked for permission to leave the country for business
reasons, but his request was denied by the courts. He filed a
petition for certiorari but his petition was also dismissed for
lack of merit. He appealed to the SC.
HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. 1 upon the
accused to make himself available whenever the court
requires his presence, operates as a valid restriction on his
right to travel. The constitutional right to travel is not
absolute, but is subject to lawful orders of the court. VV.
6. Waiver of the Right to Bail
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
D. Rights during trial
Art. III, Sec. 14. (1) No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
1. Presumption of innocence
In People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 69 (1971), the SC noted
that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is a
necessary corollary of the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), a law
disqualifying candidates charged with national security
offences was struck down as unconstitutional, for violating
the presumption against innocence.
In Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1980), a judge
who allowed the accused to present his evidence ahead of
the prosecution, over the objection of the prosecution, after
the acused admitted the killing but invoked self-defense,
was reversed by the SC on the ground that this change in the
order of trial violated the constitutional presumption of
innocence which places the burden proof on the
prosecution.
This ruling was modified by Rule 119, sec. 3 (e) of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which now reverses the
order of trial when the defendant admits the act but invokes
a justifying or exempting circumstance.
People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 739
F: De Guzman, Castro and Catap were charged
with murder for the killing of an unidentified person
on Nov. 16, 1994. Only De Guzman and Castro were
arrested and both pleaded not guilty. They were
convicted by the court mainly on the basis of the
testimony of Adelia Angeles. She positively identified
the 2 accused as the persons who were with Catap
who maltreated an unidentified person whom they
had tied to an ipil-ipil tree and upon seeing her, she
Constitutional Law II
testified that they untied the man and brought him
towards the direction of the Pasig river which was
only 3 houses away. This was further strengthened
by the extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused
Castro to Police Corporal Dominador Cunanan that it
was Catap who killed the victim and that he and de
Guzman acted only as look-outs.
Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of
innocenec of the accused has been overcome.
HELD: YES
Though there is no direct evidence to link the
3 accused to the killing of the unknown victim, the
circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec. 4,
Rule 133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce conviction
beyond resonable doubt.
With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police Cpl.
Cunanan, there is no evidence that Cunanan had any motive
to falsely testify against accused. While it is true that
accused's EJC was made without the advice and assistance
of counsel, hence inadmissible as evidence, it could be
treated as a verbal admission of the accused established
through the testimonies of persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v Molas
218 SCRA 473). Moreover in Peo v Alvarez, the court ruled
that an extrajudicial confession is admissible against a co-
accused when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to show
the probability of the participation of said co-accused in the
crime committed.
2. Right to be heard personally or by counsel
Adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty (Art. III, Sec. 11.) No matter
how educated one may be, he may not know how to
establsih his innocence for the simple reason that he does
not know the rules of evidence said the SC in People v.
Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952).
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952)
F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of
First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention
because he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of
Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said
Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." Accused, unaided
by counsel, pleaded guilty and said that he was instructed by
Mr. Ocampo to do so.
Accused was convicted of a capital offense.
Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no
evidence appears to have been presented by either party,
the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from
the facts pleaded in the information.
Ruling: Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified
plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it
was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render
such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a
capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty
as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years,
without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the
true facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from
the beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court,
Rule 112, section 3 (now Rule 116, Sec. 6), that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must
be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
before being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the
aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by
the trial court.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by
our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that
all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing
unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right
to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court
to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one
de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to
the evidence of the prosecution (on the ground that the
prosecution failed to tender a case) and this motion is denied
-- could the defense still present its own evidence?
In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949), the SC ruled
in the affirmative, contending that the right of the accused
to present his evidence is a constitutional right which cannot
be defeated by the dismissal of the motion of demurrer.
Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be
heard (Rule 119, Sec. 15.)
Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949)
Constitutional Law II
F: Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was
accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested
its case, counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused. After hearing the arguments for and
against the motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs
sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon
counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the
accused. The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of
evidence by the defense, contending that the present
procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in
criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had
presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation
and after said motion had been denied, and citing as
authority the case of United States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil.,
279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the opposition
of the provincial fiscal and, without allowing the accused to
present evidence in their defense, convicted all of them and
sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven years of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.
Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present
evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution
Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence.
1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-
petitioner to present proofs in his defense after the denial of
his motion for dismissal was a palpable error which resulted
in denying to the said accused the due process of law
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in the
Constitution, it being provided in Article II, section 1 (17), of
the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf. There is no law nor "procedural
practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the
right to be heard before being sentenced.
Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal
cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has
rested terminates the case then and there. But if the motion
for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the
evidence for the defense before entering judgment
regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its
right to present evidence in the event its motion for
dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the constitutional
right of the accused to be heard in his defense before
sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the accused has
no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to
present it, the court has no alternative but to decide the case
upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone.
2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of
habeas corpus lies in a case like the present.
We have already shown that there is no law or
precedent which could be invoked to place in doubt the right
of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his
defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly
and clearly guarantee to him that right. Such constitutional
right is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of
government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the
accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the
contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough, and the
court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction
to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without
hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus
pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
Although the sentence against the petitioner is void
for the reasons hereinabove stated, he may be held under
the custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail
until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. The
process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may stand
should be resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by
the trial court's denial of his constitutional right to be heard.
Up to the point when the prosecution rested, the
proceedings were valid and should be resumed from there.
People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973)
Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal
F: After prosecution presented its witnesses, the
defense moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. The judge granted the motion.
Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an acquittal of the
accused?
Ruling: YES
A dismissal ordered after the termination of the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has the
force and effect of an acquittal. Since there is a failure to
prove the guilt of the accused, the case must be
dismissed, and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon
motion or with the express consent of the defendant, in
exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal.
Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence.-- After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the
case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont its
own intitiative after givint the prosecution an opportunity
to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with
proper leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the
accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave
of court, he waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution. (Rules of Court.)
3. Right to free legal assistance
Constitutional Law II
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991)
F: On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo
Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989, addressed
to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant
Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to
withdraw the appeal due to his poverty.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the
basic privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are
the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a
preliminary examination. President Mckinley made the first
a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the
Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to
have assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today said
right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for, as Judge
Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most important to
the person accused of crime."
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that
it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented
that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney,
it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one
de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him
a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon
the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues,
even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign
a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an
intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar,
where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his
appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for
the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the
withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must
assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the
duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and
perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less
in life must have more in law." Justice should never be
limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone,
whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced
and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor
one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of
court of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty
imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that
never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for
a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go
scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a
counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said
counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective
briefs, upon submission of which the case would be deemed
submitted for decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that
the accused- appellant was charged with the crime of rape
in a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio,
duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M.
Alejandro of the province of Rizal, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in
the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against
her will.
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-
appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the Makati
CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty
to the offense charged.
xxx
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of
the crime of rape.
The theory of the defense at the trial level was
grounded on alibi. The accused claimed that at the time of
the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in
Romblon. This claim was corroborated by the accused's
brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's submission of the
voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he
was in Romblon.
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the
theory of the defense. The new theory presented by counsel
de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when accused-
appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984.
It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred
on 24 March 1984 and that, allegedly, it was the fourth time
accused had abused complainant. This allegation as well as
the fact that complainant failed to lock the door to the
bathroom could only have been due to the fact that there
was consent. The charge was filed, according to defense
counsel de oficio, only because the complainant's mother
caught them.
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had
been consent from the complainant, fails to generate doubt
as to the accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous
situation indeed to believe that one, so young and as yet
uninitiated to the ways of the world, would permit the
Constitutional Law II
occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle, a
brother of her very own mother. The Court notes the
sudden swift in the theory of the defense from one of total
denial of the incident in question, by way of alibi, to one of
participation, that is, with the alleged consent of the
complainant. This new version could only be attributed by
the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different from
the counsel in the trial court. Although the Solicitor General
has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an
afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get
himself acquitted, the Court deems it more likely that this
shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the
appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the
case. If the appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal,
had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly,
he would not have changed the theory of the defense for
such a shift can never speak well of the credibility of the
defense. Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which applies
equally in criminal cases, is that a party may not shift his
theory on appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more
conscientious, he would have known that the sudden shift
would be violative of aforementioned procedural rule and
detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant (his
client).
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to
be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their
clients' causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for
"public interest requires that an attorney exert his best
efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's
cause." Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole
system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. And a
lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court,
to the bar and to the public.
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws,
he is expected to take such reasonable precaution in the
discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional
guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to uphold the
law, a transgressor of its precepts.
The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the
circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither
diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility
owed to his client. The ethics of the profession require that
counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty
irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. Any
attempted presentation of a case without adequate
preparation distracts the administration of justice and
discredits the Bar.
4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation
The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely
intended to comply with the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. As noted in Vera v. People, procedural due process
requires that the accused must be informed why he is being
prosecuted and what charge he must meet.
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in the
City Court of Cebu. After one postponement due to
petitioner's failure to appear, the case was reset. Again,
petitioner failed to appear, despite notice to his bondsman.
The court then allowed the prosecution to present evidence
despite the fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. After
the offended party had testified and presented
documentary evidence, the court found petitioner guilty.
The CFI affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion and his decision is void. Because petitioner was
not arraigned, he was not informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. Arraignment is an indispensable
requirement in any criminal proceeding.
5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
(1) Speedy Trial
The right to a speedy trial means one that is free from
vexatious and oppressive delays. Its objective is to free the
innocent person from anxiety and expense of a court
litigation, or otherwise, to have his guilt determined within
the shortest possible time, compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatever legitimate defense the
accused may interpose.
While reasonable delay may be allowed as
determined on a case to case basis, an unreasonable delay
on the part of the prosecution to present its case, thereby
causing the threat of penal liability to remain hanging over
the head of the accused for an extended period of time,
violates the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
The remedy of the accused in this case is habeas
corpus if he has been restrained of his liberty, or certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case;
and dismissal based on the denial of the right to speedy trial
amounts to an acquittal.
So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247
(1970), a case involving the prosecution for damage to
property through reckless imprudence which had been
pending for 6 years, the last step taken being the start of the
cross-examination of the complaining witness, who did not
appear thereafter. The SC ordered the case dismissed with
prejudice, thus acquitting the accused.
(2) Public Trial
Constitutional Law II
A public trial does not require that the entire public
can witness the trial. It is enough if it is conducted at a place
where one's relatives and friends can be accommodated and
the public may know what is going on.
The right is not absolute. The court can order the
public out of the trial room in the interest of morality and
order.
In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970), the SC
dismissed the contention of one party that the trial was
conducted inside the chamber of the judge on the ground
that the objection came too late (the party only complained
after the 14th hearing) and that the place was agreed upon
by the parties for their mutual convenience (the judge's
room was air conditioned).
Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970)
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, one which thus far has remained unresolved, is
the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public
trial.
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the judge
violative of the right to a public trial?
Ruling: NO
The defendants in this case agreed that the hearings
be held in the chambers. On fourteen separate occasions
this was the case and there was no objection on their
part. There was no evidence to substantiate the claim that
any other person was excluded from the chambers. It is
thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city
court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy.
The trial must be public. It possesses that character
when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge
conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to
the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties
need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard
is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further
protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with
regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not
amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation
the importance of this right singled out its being a
deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why
such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process.
Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom
and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no
problem arises. It the usual course of events that individuals
desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well
recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of
the public where the evidence may be characterized as
"offensive to decency or public morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for
the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge,
it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial
was held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as
violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative.
There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It
is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
would reduce the number of those who could be present.
Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of
this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some
are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice
Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy
the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could
"have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter
with what offense he may be charged."
Then, too, reference may also be made to the
undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in
chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the
part of respondent policemen. xxx
(3) Impartial trial
One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral magistrate
who exercises cold impartiality.
In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), it was held that
a town mayor who was paid on the basis of the fine he
imposes for every conviction for violation of the drinking
laws, could not be an impartial judge. Under such a
situation, he would be interested in convicting those he tries
so he would earn more.
Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial
tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights and the strict rules of
evidence and procedure.
In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144
(1987), the SC held that a civilian cannot be tried by a military
court (in connection with the Light a Fire Movement) so long
as the civil courts are open and operating, even during
Martial Law.
6. Right to confront witness
The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to
test the credibility of the witness. The best means of
confrontation is the process of cross-examination.
7. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the
production of evidence in his behalf)
There are various means available to the parties to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense
of a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum: depositions and other modes of discovery;
perpetuation of testimonies.
8. Trial in Absentia
Although the right to be present is not explicit in the
provision, it is inferrable from the phrase "trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused"
Constitutional Law II
This right to be present may, however, be waived by
the accused. Rule 115, sec, 1(c), talks of 3 ways that the
waiver may take place: (a) express waiver pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification; (b) implied waiver when the accused without
any justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a particular date
of which he had notice; and (c) implied waiver when the
accused under custody who had been notified of the date of
trial escapes.
In cases in which there have been a waiver of the right
to be present, whether expressed or implied, the trial may
be held "in absentia". The requisites of a valid trial in
absentia are: (i) the accused has been arraigned; (ii) he was
duly notified of the hearing; and (iii) his failure to attend the
trial is unjustified.
There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the
accused has been arraigned, ruled the SC in Boria v.
Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), a case involving a charge for
slight physical injuries where the accused failed to appear
and so the trial court allowed the prosecution to present its
evidence even if the accused has not yet been
arraigned. Arraignment is crucial because it informs the
accued of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Conviction without arraignment violates due process
and ousts the court of its jurisdiction.
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra.
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner
of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. The
indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it
should come after arraignment. VV.
Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver
of the right to present evidence. Thus, if the accused fails to
attend trial (which presupposes arraignment), without any
justifiable cause, the prosecution can proceed with the
presentation of the evidence, and thereupon, the court may
consider the case submitted for decision. The court will
decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's
evidence. This does not violate the constitutional
presumption of innocence because it does not mean that the
judgment of the trial court will result in conviction.
So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163
(1986), which further ruled that trial in absentia applies even
to capital cases.
People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986)
Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases
F: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in
the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned, the case was
reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of
the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with
no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial
commenced but while it was in progress, the prisoner took
advantage of the first information filed and succeeded in
deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and
ordering his release. The respondent Judge, learning of the
trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's
re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution
moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia. The
respondent Judge denied the motion and suspended all
proceedings until the return of the accused. Hence, this
petition.
HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. Avanceña has
been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19 [now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of
the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in absentia. The
prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possible eventual conviction provided only
that (a) he has been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified
of the trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The
right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except
only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present
witnesses who will identify the accused. The defendant's
escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the
inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his
trial. VV.
Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973
Constitution to remedy a situation in which criminal
prosecution could not move because the accused has either
escaped or jumped bail.
In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978), the SC ruled
that trial in absentia does not justify the accused to jump
bail. Just because th Constitution allows trial in absentia
does not mean that the accused is now free to waive his right
to be present during the trial. If he does, he runds the risk
of having his bail bond forfeited.
Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for jumping
bail
F: For repeated failure of the accused Dario Gamayon to
appear, respondent Judge declared the bail bond forfeited
and required the bondsmen to produce the accused within
thirty days and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them. However, on motion of defense
counsel, who invoked the last sentence of Art. IV, section 19
[now Art. III, sec. 14(2)] on trial in absentia, respondent
Judge reconsidered his order. He argued that "if trial could
be conducted after the accused has been arraigned and
identified, the conclusion is inescapable that issuing an order
of forfeiture of the bail bond is premature." The prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari.
HELD: The innovation introduced by the present
Constitution goes no further than to enable a judge to
continue with the trial even if the accused is not present
Constitutional Law II
under the conditions therein specified. It does not give the
accused the right to jump bail. VV.
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)
In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present
evidence and confront witnesses
F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr., together with five others, was
charged with murder. After arraignment, during which he
pleaded not guilty, the case was set for hearing on Sept. 18,
1973 but he escaped. He was tried in absentia. The trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the case against his co-
accused but it held in abeyance the proceedings against him
in order to give him the chance to cross examine the
witnesses against him and present evidence. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped
from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the
trial? No. As we have consistently ruled, jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but
continues until the case is terminated. The lower court was
correct in proceeding with the reception of evidence but it
erred when is suspended the proceedings as to the
respondent. The court need not wait for the time until the
accused finally decides to appear. To allow this delay is to
render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia.
9. When presence of the accused is a DUTY
In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the SC held that
(a) the accused has the right to be present during trial; (b) if
he is in the custody of the law, presence in all stage is
likewise a duty during (i) arraignment, (ii) entering a plea,
and (iii) promulgation of judgment. This rule however has
been modified.
As things stand, the following are the rules:
1. Generally, the accused has the right to be present
at all stages the trial (from arraignment to rendition of
judgment).
2. If the accused is in the custody of the law, his
presence during the trial is a duty only if the court orders his
presence to enable the prosecution witnesses to identify
him. (People v. Salas, infra. reiterating Aquino v. Military
Commiission, infra. modifying People v. Avancena, infra.)
3. Although the accused is not in the custody of the
law (and more so if he is in the custody of the law), his
presence is required in the following cases:
a) Arraignment, regardless of the offense;
b) Entering a plea, regardless of whether the
plea is guilty or not guilty.
c) Promulgation of judgment, except that
when the judgment is for a light offense, he may be
represented by his counsel or a personal emissary.
a. Arraignment and plea, whether of
innocence or of guilt
Rule 116, Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-
-
xxx
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment
and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and
plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of record
shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
b. During trial, for identification
People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra.
HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may now
be waived except only at that stage where the
prosecution intends to present witnesses who will
identify the accused.
c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense,
in which case accused may appear by counsel, or a
representative (Rule 120, Sec. 6.)
E. Priviledge against self incrimination
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him. [Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)]
1. Scope of privilege: Compulsory Testimonial
self-incrimination
The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination
obtained compulsorily. It refers therefore to the use of the
mental process and the communicative faculties, and not to
a merely physical activity. If the act is physical or
mechanical, the accused can be compelled to allow or
perform the act, and the result can be used in evidence
against him.
Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample
of a substance taken from his body (U.S. v. Tan Teng. 23, Phil.
145 (1912)).
F: This defendant was charged with the crime of rape.
He was found guilty of the charge. He appeals the decision
on the ground that the lower court erred in admitting the
testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain
substance from the body of the accused while he was
Constitutional Law II
confined in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of
the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the
accused with reference to a venereal disease. It was
discovered that the rape victim was infected by venereal
disease so that the finding of venereal disease in the accused
was material to his conviction.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested
and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing
and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant
swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the
body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of
Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made
of the same. The result of the examination showed that the
defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has
gonorrhea may be used against him
Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to make any
admissions or answer any questions, and the mere fact that
an object found on his person was examined: seems no more
to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in
evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.
The substance was taken from the body of the
defendant without his objection, the examination was made
by competent medical authority and the result showed that
the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found
with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could
have been no question had the stolen property been taken
for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him.
So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood
stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the
commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no
objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same
as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen
property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from
the defendant, could not be used against him as evidence,
without violating the rule that a person shall not be required
to give testimony against himself.
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in
principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and
compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover
we are not considering how far a court would go in
compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is
exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order
goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the
Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a
witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his
will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in
discussing the question before us, said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not
only for his [physical control] in whatever form exercised,
then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself
up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and
defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything
that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential
articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is
not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . .
but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec. 2263.)
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine
Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners
before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting
unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the
commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
The doctrine contended for by appellant would
prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even,
for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application
of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be
permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the
court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted
under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the
accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for
his testimonial responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that
evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is not
testimony but his body his body itself.
The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine
from his mouth (U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)).
U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)
Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional
question that the accused was compelled to be a witness
against himself. The contention is that this was the result of
forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his
mouth. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an
accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit
himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and
other articles taken from the room of an accused in his
absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from
the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It
would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article,
substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime
could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling
confessions from prisoners implicating them in the
commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.)
The accused can be made to take off her garments
and shoes and be photographed. (People v. Otadura, 96 Phil
244 (1950)).
A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to
show her body for physical investigation to see if she is
Constitutional Law II
pregnant (Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)). Viewed
against present standards, however, it is possible that this
method of determining pregnancy would violate due
process as being too barbaric.
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
F: The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending
before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with
the crime of adultery. The court ordered the defendant
Emeteria Villaflor, to submit her body to the examination of
one or two competent doctors to determine if she was
pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on
the ground that such examination of her person was a
violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of
court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
she should permit the medical examination required by the
court.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her
body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is
pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force
shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the
rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be
decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination
by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be
taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient
any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection
to the physical examination being made by the family doctor
of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches the
ones found in the scene of the crime is allowed (People v.
Salas and People v. Sara).
However, making the accused take dictation to get a
specimen of her handwriting is not allowed, for this involves
the use of the mental process. [Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil.
485 (1937).]
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
F: In connection with this administrative case, said
respondent filed, six letters which, for purposes of
identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37.
He contends that said six letters are the complainant's, but
the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in
rebuttal.
Respondent required complainant to copy the
letters in her own handwriting in the presence of the
investigator. The complainant, refused invoking her right not
to incriminate herself. The investigator, upholding the
complainant, did not compel her to submit to the trial
required, thereby denying the respondent's petition.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to
make a copy of the letters in her own handwriting
Ruling: No. It would violate her right against self-
incrimination.
The constitution provides: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." It should be
noted that before it was attempted to require the
complainant to copy the six documents above-stated, she
had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator
authorized to receive statements under oath, and under said
oath she asserted that the documents in question had not
been written by her. Were she compelled to write and were
it proven by means of what she might write later that said
documents had really been written by her, it would be
impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The
purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby
the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other
case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be
sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in
the person himself, then he must be promised and assured
at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so
legally, or he should be asked, one for all, to furnish such
evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is of
the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision
under consideration may prove to be a real protection and
not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad
interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
In view of the foregoing consideration and holding, as
it is hereby held, that the complainant is perfectly entitled to
the privilege invoked by her, the respondent's petition is
denied.
Also requiring the accused to reenact the crime is not
allowed, for this also involves the mental process.
People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525
F: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the
lower court of murder for the death of Bagon. Olvis, the
alleged principal by inducement, was acquitted. The three
accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial
confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel
summoned by the NBI to handle appellants' case, and the
reenactment done by them of the circumstances
surrounding the killing.
RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. They
were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by the
NBI and not of appellants' own choice. He cannot therefore
Constitutional Law II
be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused when
he lent his presence at the confession proceedings.
But the accused were denied their right to counsel not
once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the crime.
Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and coerced
confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination.
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection
against testimonial compulsion but this has since been
extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired
under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant
to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and
recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of
compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.
People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73
F: After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by
the police. Upon the presentation of a search warrant, the
house of the accused was searched, and several prohibited
drugs were seized. They were charged with and convicted
of violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. They contended
that they had not been shown a search warrant. In
concluding that a search warrant had been presented to the
accused prior to the search, the trial court relied on a
document entitiled “Certificate of Re-conduct of Search”,
signed by the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in
evidence.
RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to
an implied admission that shabu, the marked money, and
shabu papaphernalia had been found by the police
authorities at the residence of the Go spouses and therefore,
subject to the control and custody of the accused (the
spouses) and necessarily in their possession. To this extent,
the “Certification” is a declaration against the interest and
tacit admission of the crime charged. The second paragraph
of the Certification is a self-incriminatory statment made at
a time when the spouses were not assisted by counsel and
under circumstances (in the course of or immediately after
the search of the residence and seizure of quantities of
shabu) which render intelligent waiver of their right against
self-incrimination open to serious doubt.
The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent
admission of the “Certification” to substantiate the fact that
a search warrant issued by a judge had been brought to the
attention of the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust
operation carried out at their residence and that in the
course thereof, no force or intimidation had been exercised
upon the spouses.
Notwithstanding such, the accused were convicted of
the crime charged against them.
2. In what proceedings available
The privilege is available in any proceedings, even
outside the court, for they may eventually lead to a criminal
prosecution.
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344
(1969), the SC held that the privilege against self-
incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which
possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, it was held
that a doctor who was being investigated by a medical board
for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found
guilty, could not be compelled to take the witness stand
without his consent.
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)
F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on
February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now
respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the
initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he
would present as his first witness herein petitioner-
appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice
charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel,
made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional
right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of
such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-
appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness,
unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order
from a competent authority.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on
August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be
well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from
compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
the complainant in said investigation without his consent
and against himself."
HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license as
a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The
constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according
to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and more in line with
the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual
even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens."
Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force to surrender to his detriment." So also with the
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to
Constitutional Law II
a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right
is the hallmark of our democracy." In the light of the above,
it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could
be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision
now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing
against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently
with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent.
In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the privilege was held to
extend to fact-finding investigation by an adhoc body.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given
immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self-
incrimination
F: The respondents led by General Fabian Ver and Major
General Prospero Olivas testified before the Agrava Board
looking into the killing of former Senator Benigno Aquino.
They were subsequently accused of murder in two cases for
the killing of Sen. Aquino and Rolando Galman. They were
charged as accessories in both. The prosecution offered in
evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before the Agrava
Board, but on the latter's objections, the Sandiganbayan
excluded the testimony. The private and public prosecutions
filed petitions for certiorari.
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the Agrava
Board were "under investigation for the commission of the
offense" within the meaning of Art. III, sec. 12. It is to be
noted that the framers of the Constitution did not adopt the
Miranda reference to "custodial investigation." The subject
matter dealt with and the questioning before the Agrava
Board indubitably evinced purposes other than merely
determining the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
assassination. The respondents were called to determine
their probable involvement in the crime. Yet they were not
informed or at the very least warned of their right to remain
silent and that any statement given by them may be used
against them. The first portion of Sec. 5 of PD 1886 denied
them the right to remain silent, and gave power to the Board
to punish refusal to testify. The SC said it is not satisfied that
when they testified they waived their constitutional right not
be compelled to be a witness against themselves, much less
their right to remain silent. The SC also said it cannot be
contended that the privilege against self- incrimination
applies only to criminal prosecutions. Art. III, sec. 17 of the
Const. provides that "No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself."
Compare People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989), supra.
3. "Use and Fruit Immunity" v. "Transactional Immunity"
When the State requires testimony to be made before
a board or body, it has to grant immunity by means of law to
the persons testifying, so as not to violate their right against
self-incriminatrion. This is the only way to reconcile two
conflicting values; public interest to get certain relevant
information, say, to legislation, that can only be supplied by
the testimony of certain persons and the highly primed
constitutional right not to make a person a witness against
himself.
Through an immunity statute, the state in effect
exchanges immunity for the testimony of a witness. The
problem concerns the extent of immunity that the State
must grant in order to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Transactional Immunity
In a transactional immunity, a person is given
immunity from prosecution of the crime in connection with
which he gave his testimony. The immunity is from the
prosecution, not merely from the use of the
testimony. Thus, even if the guilt of the person testifying can
be proven by independent means, he can not be prosecuted
anymore.
Use and Fruit Immunity
In a use and fruit immunity, a person is exempted
from the use of his testimony as well as the leads (fruits) that
the testimony opened up in a criminal prosecution arising
from what he testified on. The immunity in this case is from
the testimony given. Thus, if the state can procure evidence,
independent of the testimony and its fruits, it can prosecute
the person testifying nevertheless.
History in the United States
In Councilman v. Hitchcock (1892), the SC ruled that
the only way to respect the right against self-incrimination is
to give transactional immunity; anything less violates the
constitutional right.
Thus, Congress in 1893 passed the Compulsory
Testimony Act, providing for transactional immunity.
In 1964, the U.S. SC in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission of New York hinted that it was not really
necessary to give transactional immunity in order to protect
the right against self incrimination.
This gave the U.S. Congress the cue to revise the
Compulsory Testimony Act and provide for a "use and fruit
immunity".
With the validity of this limited immunity was raised,
the SC in Castigas v. U.S. and Zicarelli v. U.S. ruled that the
right is amply protected by the use and fruit immunity.
Constitutional Law II
In the Philippines
There is no fixed rule in the
Philippines. "Transactional immunity" can be found in the
following:
Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights
shall have the following powers and functions
xxx
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth
in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority.
Use and Fruit Immunity
On the other hand, "use and fruit immunity can be
found in P.D. 1886, which created the Agrava Fact Finding
Board, and which was the subject-matter of Galman v.
Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985).
In this case, Ver and other high-ranking AFP officials
were made to testify before the Agrava Board investigating
the double murder of Sen. Aquino and Galman. Under
P.D.1886, every person summoned by the Board has to
appear and testify on pain of being held in contempt.
Any testimony made, in turn, was exempted from being
"used" in a criminal prosecution. Despite this however, a
case was file against Ver in the Sandiganbayan, and one of
the evidence presented was the testimony he made before
the Board. When objected to, the Sandiganbayan sustained
the objection. And so the matter was raised to the SC on
certiorari.
The SC held that the testimony could not be used in a
subsequent proceeding. it hinted that were it not for the
provision in the decree conmpelling attendance and
testimony on pain of being held in contempt, the accused
could have invoked the right against self-incrimination. But
since the state needed the testimony, it gave them immunity
and so now, the State must honor its obligation and disallow
the use of the testimony in the criminal prosecution.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985), supra.
HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into
two: one, which grants "use immunity" and the other, which
grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The
distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" prohibits use
of a witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the
witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to
which his compelled testimony relates. PD 1886, sec. 5
grants merely immunity from use of any statement given
before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by
reason or on the basis thereof. VV
4. Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
The paradigmatic application of the exclusionary rule
is a traditionally coerced confession, and not so much on
uncounselled statement. A fortiori, testimony forced out of
a person cannot be used in evidence against that person.
5. Effect of denial of the privilege by court
When the privilege against self-incrimination is
violated outside of court, say, by the police, then the
testimony, as already noted, is not admissible under the
exclusionary rule.
When the privilege is violated by the court itself, that
is, by the judge, the court is ousted of its jurisdiction, all its
proceedings are null and void, and it is as if no judgment has
been rendered. A classic case is Chavez v. Court of Appeals,
34 SCRA 663 (1968).
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968)
F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his
original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of
this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed
from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which
resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional
right not to be compelled to testify against himself. There is
his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for
failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court
to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was
raising purely questions of law.
Accused Chavez was made to testify as a witness for
the prosecution without him being considered a state
witness inspite of objections by his counsel.
Roger Chavez was found guilty. The court had this
to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a
matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial
court branded him "a self- confessed culprit".
Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against self-
incrimination was violated
Ruling: YES
The right agianst self-incrimination is "not merely a
formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the
discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a
defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is
fundamental to our scheme of justice.
The constitutional proscription was established on
broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy
because it would place the witness against the strongest
Constitutional Law II
temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it
would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress
every species and degree of which the law abhors.
Therefore, the court may not extract from a
defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his
guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory
disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him
as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to
prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his
own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not
necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which
operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free
and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational
judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral
coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips
of the defendant."
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of
protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and
claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to
answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of
calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to
incriminate him.
xxx With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that
petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full
breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot
be said now that he has waived his right. He did not
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did
not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed
the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of
being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this
circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony
is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled
submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings
before a judge who possessed the power to put him under
contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he
escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his
testimony at least on direct examination would be taken
right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas
corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a conviction
where the consitutional rights of the accused were violated.
A court which denies the accused of his constitutional
rights is ousted of its jurisdiction. The judgment of
conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is
void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of
habeas corpus.
Notes on the case: In this case, the accused Chavez
was compelled by the judge with the threat of being held in
contempt to take the witness stand, in spite of his objection
that he had the right to remain silent and not to be a witness
against himself. And so he took the witness stand and was
convicted by qualified theft. He appealed but the lawyer
failed to file the appellant's brief and so the appeal was
dismissed, the judgment became final and executory, and he
served his sentence. Years later, Chavez went to the SC on
habeas corpus, contending that his convictioin was void
because it was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained
in the violation of his right against self- incrimination. The
SC granted the petition and released him.
Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case, is an
extraordinary post-conviction, mid-sentence, remedy. The
petition for habeas corpus is such that it inquires into all
questions of illegal detention. When the judge compelled
the accused to take the witness stand, he was ousted of his
jurisdiction and all subsequent proceedings became
void. Ultimately, the judgment of conviction and even the
sentence were likewise void, thus making the detention of
Chavez illegal, and thus actionable by habeas corpus.
The case also illustrates the difference between the
ordinary witness and the accused. A witness can be
conmpelled to take the stand; he can only object to the
questions as they come, invoking his right against self-
incrimination.
But in the case of the accused, he cannot even be
made to take the witness stand, for the only purpose of such
is to incriminate him.
Of course, the moment the accused agrees to take the
stand, he is deemed to have waived his right, and must now
thus submit himself to cross-examination.
E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by
military courts
Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146 SCRA 406 (1986)
F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a military
tribunal to try twelve accused persons, only one of whom is
in the military, for the offense devoid of any national security
or political complexion and committed long before the
proclamation of martial law,
The petitioners were charged with murder in
connection with the alleged killing of Yanson, a political
leader,during the November 11 elections.
The accused were arrested almost a year later, on
September 21, 1972 after martial law was proclaimed. It was
only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation" was
conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge Advocate
General Service. The petitioners were recommended for
prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering that
one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military
Constitutional Law II
personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General filed the
corresponding charge sheet, but he modified the crime
charged from "Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the
Revised Administrative Code" in Relation to Section 2692 of
the same Code and Presidential Decree No. 9, " Illegal
Possession of Firearms with Murder."
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National
Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch
of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) which in turn
assigned the same to respondent Military Commission No.
27.
Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. 27 is without
jurisdiction over the criminal case
Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction.
We apply the rule in Rolando A. de Guzman v. Hon.
Alejandro R. Leopando, et al, (G.R. No. 62798, December 22,
1983 and March 13, 1984) where the lone military personnel
was ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused before
a civil court. It is also clear from the records that the acts for
which Sgt. Animas was charged had nothing to do with the
performance of official duty.
The crime for which the petitioners were charged was
committed on November 10, 1971 long before the
proclamation of martial law. There was no question about
the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil
courts at the time. Now that it is already late 1986, and
martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully never more to
return, there is no more reason why a murder committed in
1971 should still be retained, at this time, by a military
tribunal.
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144
Military trial of civilians void even under Martial Law if the
civil courts are open
F: Petitioners were found guilty of subversion by the
respondent military commission and sentenced to death.
They filed a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the SC, questioning the jurisdiction of
the military tribunal.
HELD: In Aquino v. Military Commission (1975), the SC held
that "Martial law creates and exception to the general rules
of exclusive jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the
laws of war as well as those of a civil character, triable by
military tribunals.xxx" Due process, however demands that
in all criminal cases prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to, among others, a trial. As explained by Justice
Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Military
Commission supra: "Judicial power is vested by the
Constitution exclusively in the SC and insuch inferior courts
as are established by law. Judicial power exists only in the
courts which have the exlcusive power to hear and
determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or
property of a citizen." Since we are not an enemy occupied
territory and even on the premise that martial continues in
force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by
them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.
xxx
"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge
whose objectivity and independence are protected by
tenure and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial
tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially different
rules of evidence and procedure apply in military
trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the
possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by
the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the
counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command
and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military
laws, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the
danger. VV.
Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988)
F: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this
Court on October 1, 1986 to test the legality of the
continued detention of some 217 so-called "political
detainees arrested in the nine-year span of official martial
rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for common
crimes before various courts martial; if any of these
offenses had any political color, this had neither been
pleaded nor proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26
confirmed as military personnel.
Issue: Whether or not military courts have jurisdiction over
civilians
Ruling: No
As held in Olaguer: A military jurisdiction or tribunal
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period
of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and
functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body
relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the military tribunal concerned
The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes
appear to have been committed, and there are accusations
against herein petitioners for those offenses. Olaguer cannot
and does not operate to absolve the petitioners of these
charges, or establish that the same are baseless, so as to
entitle them to immediate release from detention. It is not
to be forgotten that the victims in offenses ascribed to the
petitioners have as much interest as the State has to
prosecute the alleged authors of the misdeeds. Justice will
be better served if the detention of such of the petitioners
as are not hereby ordered released or excepted, is continued
until their cases are transferred to the ordinary courts having
jurisdiction, and the necessary informations have been filed
against them therein, as has already been done in the case
of petitioners Imperial D. Usman and Samu Gumal. The
Constitutional Law II
State should be given a reasonable period of time to
accomplish this transfer, at which time the petitioners may
apply for bail for their temporary release.
The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates
questions to arise as to the availability of certain defenses to
the petitioners upon their prosecution before the civil
courts. It seems evident, however, that no breach of the
constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would
result from the retrial of the petitioners" cases, for the
simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts
martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first
jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous proceedings are
required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be
raised by the accused in the second prosecution.
G. Bills of attainder-- Legislative adjudication of guilt
Bill of Attainder
A "bill of attainder" is a law which substitutes the
legislative determination of guilt for a judicial
determination. Through a statute, the legislature finds
individuals or groups guilty, without the benefit of being
proven so in court.
A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill of attainder
proper (legislative imposition of the death penalty) and (ii)
bill of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty).
In People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972), the Anti-
Subversion Law (RA 1700) which declared the Communist
Party of the Philippines a clear and present danger to
Philippine security, and thus prohibited membership in such
organization, was contended to be a bill of attainder. The
SC, however, dismissed the contention, holding that
although the law mentions the CPP in particular, its purpose
is not to define a crime but only to lay a basis or to justify the
legislative determination that membership in such
organization is a crime because of the clear and present
danger to national security.
People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the
constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act, which outlaws
the Communist Party and other "subversive associations",
and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts affiliates himself, with, becomes or remains a
member," of the Party and of any other similar "subversive"
organization.
ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder.
HELD: NO
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bill of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will
be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Phils (CPP) of the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition against
membersip in the outlawed organization. The term "CPP" is
used solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act applies
not only to the CPP but to "any other organizatuiion having
the same purposes and their successors". Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of
attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would
suffice to secure their punishement. But the undeniable fact
is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined with the specific intent to further its basic
objectives.
H. Right to a speedy disposition of cases
Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases
complements the right to a speedy trial. After the case has
been submitted for decision, so that technically the trial
stage is terminated, the Constitution mandates that the
judicial, quasi- judicial or administrative body or tribunal
must decide the case consistent with the right of the accused
to a speedy disposition of his case.
To carry out this mandate, the Constitution in several
other places provides periods for deciding a case:
The Supreme Court has to decide cases within 24
months from the date of submission of the case for decision
which is the date of filing of the last pleading [Art. VIII, Sec.
15 (1).]
III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE
A. What acts cannot be criminalized
1. Mere beliefs and aspirations
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained
solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
2. Debts and civil obligations
Constitutional Law II
Art. III. Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
What the law prohibits is imprisonment for non-
payment of a contractual obligation.
When one is convicted of estafa and sent to prison,
the imprisonment is not for the non- payment of debt but
for the deceit or abuse of confidence employed by the
convict.
Thus, in Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 123 (1986), the
SC again upheld Batas Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) as not
unconsitutional for being violative of the rule against non-
imprisonment for debt. It is true that under this law deceit
is not necessary. It is, however, a valid exercise of the State
of its power to determine what acts constitute a crime.
What the Consitution further prohibits is
imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax, which is a tax
imposed on certain persons regardless of their property or
business. The prohibition does not apply to non-payment of
property taxes and taxes on privilege.
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes or
draws and issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of said check in full upon presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds xxx"
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of BP 22
on the following grounds: 1) It offends the
constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for
debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it
contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly
delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its
enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan
prohibited amendment of the bill on 3rd reading.
HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished in BP
22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment. It is not the non- payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property but as an
offense against public order. Recent statistics show
that one third of the entire money supply of the
country consists of currency in circulation. These
demand deposits in the banks constitute the funds
against which commercial papers are drawn. The
amount concerned justifies the legitimate concern of
the state in preserving the integrity of the banking
system.
3. Acts which when done were innocent
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of
attainder shall be enacted.
Ex Post Facto Law
An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to punish an
act which, when committed, was not yet a crime or was not
as heavily punished. It is a law that retroacts to the day of
the act so as to cause prejudice to the person performing the
act. Its unfairness consists in the fact that the person could
not have known the act was criminal, and thus could not
have avoided the crime. When a law is more favorable to
the accused, however, it is allowed to retroact.
In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428
F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Villegas
Kami Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized non-stock and
non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land,
and praying for the detremination of the validity of Sec. 8,
RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s and duties
thereunder. Petitioner claims that the challenged provision
constitutes an ex post facto law.
ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law.
HELD: NO
An ex post facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law which was innocent when done, and punishes such
an act;
2. Aggravates a crime , or makes it greater than it was,
when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. [Quoting Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil.
74 (1902)]
This constitutional prohibition refers only to criminal
laws which are given retroactive effect.
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of
any provisin of RA 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the
penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior
thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates
that its provisions shall apply to acts carried out prior to its
approval.
B. What punishments cannot be imposed
Constitutional Law II
1. Involuntary servitude
Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in any
form shall exist, except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been convicted.
2. Excessive fines
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Id., Sec. 12. xxx
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
Assuming that judgment has been rendered and the
accused has been convicted the Constitution now further
prescribes certain standards as to the punishment that can
be meted out. After all, due process prohibits barbaric and
disproportionate penalties.
The employment of physical, psychological or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions, shall be dealt with by law. [Art. III,
Sec. 19 (2).]
In 1935, the prohibition was against "cruel and
unusual" penalty, in 1973; it was against "cruel or unusual "
penalty; in 1987, the prohibition is against "cruel, degrading
or inhuman" punishment. The purpose in changing the
phraseology is to allow for experimentation, and not to fix
the concept of what is cruel to the standards of the present
civilization, or those of antiquity. This notion is supposed to
expand and grow, so that what today is considered as
acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as cruel
penalty.
Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends on its
form or whether it depends on its severity has been
ambivalently answered by the SC:
In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900 (1953) the SC ruled
that it was the form of punishment as fixed in antiquity
(pillory desembowelment, etc.) and not its severity, that
constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty under the 1935
Constitution. Thus a disproportionate penalty (10 years
imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is
only a matter of severity of an acceptable form of
punishment (imprisonment).
The SC spoke in a different way in People v. Borja 91
SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was sentenced and he served at the
national penitentiary for 20 years before the case came to
the SC. The Court said that Borja had been living in the
shadow of death. Although the sentence was initially valid,
it had become cruel by the lapse of time. And yet, this was
a form of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual.
People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989)
F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of a mayor
who killed three persons on suspicion that they were cattle
rustlers. They were found guilty of murder. Three appealed
to the SC which found them equally liable for the killing. The
penalty for murder under the RPC is reclusion temporal to
death. The question concerns the penalty to be imposed in
view of Art. III, sec. 19 which provides that "Neither shall the
death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua."
HELD: Art. III, section 19 does not change the periods of the
penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the RPC except insofar as it
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty adn reduces it
to reclusion perpetua. The range of medium and minimum
penalties remain the same. VV.
People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991)
F: A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC of Del
Carmen, Surigao del Norte, charging Remelito Lubreo along
with crime of Homicide in connection with the killing of
Mamerto Sanico. Judge Gorgolon of said court conducted
both the preliminary investigation and preliminary
examination. Thereafter, he forwarded the records of the
case to the Office of Provincial Fiscal. The fiscal conducted
his own PI and on the basis thereof, he filed an information
for murder not only against remelito but also against
Lucresio Lubreo. Trial Court find them guilty of the crime
charged.
ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of innocence in
favor of Lucrecio has been overturned by the prosecution
HELD: NO.
An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution and
Constitutional Law II
until such burden is sufficiently discharged , the accused
continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence. In the
instant case, the lower court convicted Lucrecio on the basis
of its conclusion that he was positively identified by
witnesses Nenita Monter and Epifanio Pangatungan as one
of the assailants, and that therefore, his defense of
alibi would not prosper. Unfortunately, the testimonies of
the abovementioned witnesses did not categorically stated
or proved that Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim.
Though Monter categorically stated in her direct
examination that she saw the accused Lucresio hacking the
victim, in the "re-enactmment", she however candidly
informed the court Lucresio was just standing by and she
could not remmenber as to who actually hacked the
victim. From her version, the participation of Lucrecio is at
one enveloped inserious doubt. It is worse in the case of
Pangatungan. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in
hacking as if they will come one after the other in hacking
his mind (sic) and the neck", he never elaborated as to what
"abetted in hacking " means. He could not even specify the
part of the body of Mamerto which was hit by Lucrecio.
There is evidently insufficient evidence to show the
actual participation of Lucresio in teh crime. There being no
evidence of conspiracy, he cannot be held for the acts of his
co- appellant.
4. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado and
other forms of detention and the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
Id., Sec. 19. xxx
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
5. Indefinite Imprisonments
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989), supra.
C. The protection against double jeopardy
Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.
Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7; People v.
Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968):
(1) Court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) A Complaint or Information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction;
(3) Arraignment and plea by the Accused;
(4) Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of the case
without the express consent, of the accused.
Subsequent prosecution is barred for the following:
(1) Same offense
(2) Attempt of the same offense
(3) Frustration of the same offense
(4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense (All
the elements of the 2nd constitute some of the elements
of the 1st offense)
(5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense
(All the elements of the 1st constitute some of the
elements of the 2nd offense)
Exceptions to no. 5:
(1) The graver offense developed die to "supervening
facts" arising from the same act or omission constituting the
former charged.
Thus, in Melo v. People, 85 Phils. 766 (1950), the SC
allowed the amnedment of the information from its original
cahrge of frustrated homicide, because after the filing of the
information, the victim died.
(2) The facts constituting the graver charge became
known or were discovered only after the filing of the former
complaint or information.
This overrules People v. Yorac, where the SC
disallowed the amendment of the information from slight
physical injuries to frustrated murder after the prosecution
subjected the victim to another medical examination and
found a wound, that it was the fault of the prosecution if
they had an incompetent medical examination.
(3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party.
Identity of offenses and identity of act
When an act gives rise to two or more offense which
are punished by the same authority, and an individual is
convicted, acquitted, or the case dismissed without his
consent, of one of these offense (Crime A), there is no
double jeopardy if he is charged of another offfense (Crime
B) flowing from the same act. Double jeopardy arises only
when he is again charged of that same offense (Crime
A). Thus, this is called double jeopardy by "identity of
offenses".
But when an act which give rise to two or more
offenses is punished by two different authorities (a law and
an ordinance), then if an individual is convicted, acquitted,
or the case dismissed without his consent, of any of these
Constitutional Law II
offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by law), even if
he is charged of another offense which is punished by the
other auhtority (Crime B by ordinance), there is double
jeopardy, because both offenses, one punished by a law and
the other punished by an ordinance, flowed from the same
act. Thus, this is called double jeopardy by "identity of act."
Sum: If only a law in involved, there is double
jeopardy only when there is an identity of offenses. But is a
law and an ordinance are involved, there is double jeopardy
when there is an identity of act.
Identity of Offenses:
If a married man maintains as concubine a married
woman not his wife, the man is guilty of both concubinage
and adultery. From the same act (cohabiting with the
married woman), two offenses arise. And yet he can be
prosecuted for both because, the two offenses coming from
the same authority, there is no identity of offenses.
Identity of Act:
People v. Relova, 48 SCRA 292 (1987), Relova was
prosecuted under an ordinance of Batangas City for the use
of wiring to tap electricity without permission from the local
authorities, but the case was dismissed because the crime
has prescribed. So the fiscal filed a case for theft of
electricity under the RPC. The SC ruled there was double
jeopardy already, and so the second case could no longer be
filed. For although the offenses were different, both flowed
from the same act. And in this case, the act was punished by
a law and an ordinance.
Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy
If the court has no jurisdiction, or was ousted of its
jurisdiction beccause it violated the right to due process of
the parties, the decision is null and void, the accused may
again be charged.
In People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985), the SC, held
that the move by the trial court of summarily dismissing a
criminal case for theft on the ground that it merely involved
a question of ownership deprived the prosecution of due
process by denying it the chance to introduce its
evidence. This ousted the court of its juridsiction.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986), the
SC declared the criminal prosecution of the 26 accused in the
Aquino-Galman double murder case a "mistrial" after the SC
commission found that the Sandiganbayan justices and the
Tanodbayan prosecutors had been summoned by the
President and instructed on how to conduct the trial. Due
process is a right not only of the accused but also of the
State. Once the court deprives either party, which in this
case is the State, of a fighting chance, then it is ousted from
its jurisdiction, and double jeopardy would not apply. Thus,
the accused were ordered retried.
1. Two situations contemplated
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht violation of
Ordinance No. 1 series of 1974 of Batangas City prohibiting
the installation of electric wiring devices without authority
from the city government. He admitted installing the electric
wiring devices found by the police in order to decrease the
readings of electric current. The case was however dismissed
on the ground that the offense had prescribed. Fourteen
days later, the City Fiscal filed another case for theft against
him. The court also dismissed this case on the ground of
double jeopardy. The prosecution appealed contending the
offense was different.
HELD: The contention has no merit. The first sentence of Art.
III, sec. 21 states the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where
the second prosecution is for an offense that is different
from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both may be based from the same facts. The
second sentence provides an exception: that the protection
against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under the national statute
such as the RPC provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of acts. VV.
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154 SCRA 175
(1987)
F: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan,
was accused of violating Sec.7, in relation to Sec. 11 RA 3060
and Art. 201(3) of the RPC, in two separate informations filed
with the City Court of Manila. Upon arraignment, accused
Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other
accused, Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he is still at
large. Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in
the 2 cases on the ground that said informations did not
charge an offense. Motion denied. Later, he again moved
to quash the information in one of the Criminal case on the
ground of duble jeopardy, as there was according to him,
also pending aginst him another criminal case, where the
informatin allegedly contain the same allegations as the
information in the first criminal case. Court granted the
motion.
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
HELD: NO
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double
jeopardy, 3 requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for teh same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit
Constitutional Law II
the same or a frustration thereof. All these requisites do not
exist in this case,
The 2 informations with which the accused was
charged , do not make only one offense, contrary to private
repondent's allegation. In other words, the offense defined
in Sec. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion
pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion
Pictures does not include or is not included inthe
offense defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC punishing the
exhibition of indecent and immoral motin pictures.
The elements of the 2 offenses are different. The
gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public
exhibition of any motion pictures which has not been
previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion
Pictures. The motion picture may be indecent or immoral
but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its
public showing constitutes a crimnal offense. On the other
hand, the offense punished in Art 201(3) of the RPC is the
public showing os indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or
shows, not just motion pictures.
The nature of both offenses also differs. The crime
punished in RA 3060 is malum prohibitum in wh criminal
intent need not ber proved because it is presumed, while the
offense punished in Art. 201(3) of the RPC is malum in se,
which criminal intent is an indispensable
ingredient. Suzette.
2. Rules of Court provisions
Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former conviction of acquittal;
double jeopardy.-- When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of
compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense in the former complaint of
information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be
a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former
complaint or information under any of the following
instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening
facts arising from the same act or omission consituting the
former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became
known or were discovered only after the filing of the
former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused
satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement, he
shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction
for the graver offense.
Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950)
F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI, Rizal with
frustrated homicide , for having allegedly inflicted upon
Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several
serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring
medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and
incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the
same period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am, accused
pleaded not guilty to the offense chargde. At 10:15 am of
the same day, Obillo died from his wounds. An amended
information was filed charging accused with consummated
homicide. Accused filed a motion to quash the amended
information alleging double jeopardy. Motion denied.
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
HELD: NO
Double jeopardy means that when a person is
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense. The phrase "the same
offense" has always been construed to mean not only that
the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one
alleged in the first information, but also that the two
offenses are identical. There is identity between the two
offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
other.
This rule of identity however does not apply,
however, when the second offense was not in existence at
the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason
that in such case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inesistent. Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the
accused dies, the charge for homicide against the same
accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily
include or to be necessarily included in another offense, for
the purpose of detremining the existence of double
jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence during the
pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the
second offense was then inexistent, no jeopardy could
attach therefor during the first prosecution, and
consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot
constitute a second jeopardy. Suzette.
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637
(1983)
F: This is a petition to review the order of the City Court
of Manila Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide
thru reckless imprudence filed against Gapay, in a criminal
Constitutional Law II
case on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent
court held that the accused having been previously tried and
convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place
the accused in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted
thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru
reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of
the same injuries.
HELD: YES
Well settled is the rule that one who has been charged
with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or
identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than
the former. However as held in the MELO case, the rule of
identity does not apply when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of teh first prosecution , for the reason
that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was
inexistent.
The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the
information was filed , and the accused was arraigned 2 days
after or on October 20, 1972 . When the information for
homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on
October 24, 1972, the accused was already in doubly
jeopardy. Suzette.
People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight physical
injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party
being Lam
Hock who, according to the medical cerificate issued by Dr.
Rogelio Zulueta, was confined since April 8 1968 up to the
present time for head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial
Hspital. Accused pleaded guilty on April 16, 1968 resulting
in his being penalized to suffer 10 days for arresto
menor. On April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an
information charging the same defendant with frustrated
murder arising from the same act against the aforesaid
victim Lam Hock for upon further diagnosis, the healing
period for the injuries caused to accused was found to be
longer. A motion to quash was filed by the accused on the
ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/N the defendant, who had already been convicted
of slight physical injuries for injuries inflicted on Lam Hock ,
and had served sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew
for frustrated murder for the same act committed against
the same person
HELD: NO.
In order not to violate the constitutional prohibition
on double jeopardy, there is the indispensable requirement
of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible changing the character of the
crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing
previously constituting a new and distinct offense.
In this case, there is no supervening fact which
occurred to justify the non-existence of double
jeopardy. The wound causing the delay in the healing of the
injuries caused to the victim was already in existence at the
time of the first examination of the doctor. Said delay was
caused by the very superficial and inconclusive examination
then made resulting to a later finding of fracture. Suzette.
Barlongay: When defense of double jeopardy available.-
- (1) Dismissal based on isufficiency of
evidence; (2) dismissal bec. of denial of accused's right to
speedy trial; (3) accused is discharged to be a state witness.
When defense of double jeopardy not available.-- When
the case is dismissed other than on the merits upon motion
of the accused personally, or through counsel, such dismissal
is regarded as w/ express consent of the accused, who is
therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea double
jeopardy.
Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959
F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in violation of a
city ordinance. Later he was charged again in another
criminal case in the same court with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Yap moved to quash the latter
information. Meanwhile, petitioner was acquitted in the first
case.
ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy.
RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as
distinguished from Constitutional or Political Law - the
offenses with which petitioner was charged constitute,
strictly different offenses, although, under certain
conditions, one offense may include the other, and
accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of
double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other.
Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second
information were not established by the evidence,
petitioner could be convicted in the first case of the very
same violation of municipal ordinance charged in the first
case, unless he pleaded double jeopardy. Charo.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43
F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify the
proceedings on the trial of the Aquino-Galman duble murder
case alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting
mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and
the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of
law. The SC dismissed. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged. Respondents submitted that in view of the SB
decision, the case has become moot and
Constitutional Law II
academic. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
the SC ruling. The SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to
look into petitioners' allegations.
RULING: The report of the Commission revealed that Pres.
Marcos used the overwhelming resources of the
Government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and
make a mockery of the judicial process in this case. The
unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the accused after the
rigged trial would accomplish the two principal objectives of
satisfying the public clamor for the suspected killers to be
charged in court and of giviing them, through their acquittal,
the legal shield of double jepardy.
However, double jeopardy does not attach where a
criminal trial was a sham. A dictated, coerced and scripted
verdict of acquittal such as in this case is a void judgment. In
legal contemplation, it is no judgment. It neither binds nor
bars anyone. The criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents completely
disqualified them and voided ab initio the SB verdict. DJ
cannot be invoked where the prosecution, which represents
the sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due process.
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249
F: The information filed by the fiscal alleged that
through violence and intimidation, Obsania had carnal
knowledge of one Erlinda Dollente against the latter's will.
Later, the fiscal amended the complaint to allege therein
that the offense was committed with lewd designs. The
accused after pleading not guilty moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground that the first information was fatally
defective for failing to allege "lewd desiigns," and that the
amended information did not cure the jurisdictional
infirmity. The motion of the defense was sustained by the
judge. Hence this appeal by the fiscal.
RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege "lewd
designs" in the first information does not affect the
sufficiency in substance of the information, for unchaste
motives are deemed inherent in the very act of rape itself. In
any case, the lower court erred in dismissing the case by
failing to distinguish between the concept of jurisdiction and
insufficiency in substance of an indictment.
As to the question of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must have been obtained to invoke the
constitutional protection against it:
(1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
The only remaining and decisive issue in this case
seems to be as to whether or not the case was dismissed
without the prior consent of the accused.
The SC ruled that as a general rule, when the case is
dismissed, other than on the merits, upon motion of the
accused, such dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express
consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to
have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is
estopped from claiming such defense on appeal by the
Government or in another indictment for the same offense.
The exception to this is where the dismissal is sought
by the accused on the ground that they were denied their
right to a speedy trial and that the government failed to
prosecute; in which case double jeopardy will set in. The case
of herein accused falls under the general rule.
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, the President may, for a period not exceeding 60
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus...
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within 3 days, otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec.
18.)
A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ directed to the
person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the detainee at a designated time and place, and to
show cause why he should continue to be detained.
The "privilege of the writ" is the right to have the
immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation
of physical liberty.
What is suspended is the privilege of the writ, and not
the writ itself. The writ will always issue as a matter of
course. But when the privilege of the writ is suspended, all
the detaining office needs to do when he receives the writ of
habeas corpus is to show to the court that the detainee is
being detained for an offense covered by the suspension,
and the court cannot inquire any further to find out if the
detention is legal. Under the Conmstitution, this is so only
for 3 days. After 3 days, the Court can now require the
detaining officer to produce the body of the detainees and
show cause why he should not be released.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ applied
only to crimes related to invasion or rebellion. An extensive
discussion was made under the Commander-in- Chief clause
of the President, supra. This rest of the section will be
confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all other offenses.
In general as already noted above, the privilege of the
writ is an extraordinary remedy to question the illegality of
Constitutional Law II
the arrest or detention, or any other restraint to
liberty. When all else is lost, it is the last recourse to get
someone out of his illegal detention.
1. Functions of the writ
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)
Habeas corpus is available not only for those who are
in actual detention but even for those whose liberty is
merely restrained. Thus, in Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233
(1986), the SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who,
though temporarily released, could not travel outside Metro
Manila, could not change his residence, could not be
interviewed by media, and had to report to the military.
2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, supra, habeas corpus
was the remedy of one whose confinement was the result of
a void judgnment of conviction arrived at after the judge
violated due process by compelling him to take the stand
and testify against himself.
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 633 (1986), supra.
In Gumabon v. Director of Prison, 37 SCRA 420 (1971),
some persons who were charged with the complex crime of
rebellion with homicide, rape, or other common crimes, did
not appeal their conviction and so were sentenced
accordingly. The other accused, however, appealed their
conviction, resulting in a new ruling in People v. Hernandez
to the effect that there can be no complex crim of rebellion
with homicide, rape, etc., for these common crimes are
absorbed by rebellion. As a result, while those who
appealed were now free, those who did not remained in
jail. The SC ruled that those who conrtinued to languish in
jail could avail of habeas corpus to question the legality of
their continued detention pursuant to the ruling in People v.
Hernandez.
3. Suspension of the privilege
Art. VII, Sec. 18.
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488 (1971)
E. Affirmative rights
1. Free access to the courts
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctionsfor violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, victims of
tortures
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievance.
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely
by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
xxx
A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees
Free Market Place of Ideas
1. For the discovery of political truth
When men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-- that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
the truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616. (1919)
The theory behind freedom of expression is the
principle that ours is a democratic society, and so the only
way to rule ultimately is by, means of public opinion, which
is possible only when everyone can speak their minds out
and compete in the free market place of ideas.
2. For self government
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984), supra
HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure, the
premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" were
Constitutional Law II
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioner's freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is patenly
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
3. For individual protection
B. Prior Restraints
Thus any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to the Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutionality, giving the government a heavy burden to
show justification for the imposition of such restraint. (New
York v. United States (1971); also in New York Times v.
Pentagon and Bantam Books v. Publication of Pentagon
Papers).
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Subsequent Punishment
And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the
greater interest of promoting free public opinion. The most
significant expression is the law on libel.
We consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to debate on public issues
being uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials. The falsity
of some of the factual statements and alleged defamations
do not qualify the role. And just as factual error afforded no
warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free,
the same is true of injury to official reputation. (New York
Times v. Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
The interest of society and good government
demands a full discussion of public affairs. Whether the law
is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper
comment. Public policy, welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection
for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result
has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v. Bustos, 731
(1918).]
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code, any defamatory
statement is presumed to be malicious (malice-in-law),
when the defense proves that the communication is
privileged, such a presumption of malice does not arise
because of the greater public interest involved.
If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in
parliamentary freedom of speech), the prosecution cannot
even prove malice-in-fact.
If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged
(Art. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair and true reporting
of an official proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the
burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact,
which the defense can overcome by proving the truth of the
defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials
may or may not constitute a crime, so long as related to the
conduct of his office) and good motive.
C. Content-Based Restrictions
1. Test of validity of content-based restrictions
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard imitation,
the Philippine Supreme Court, have evolved certain tests to
regulate the contents of speech.
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative body
has determined generally, in the exercise of its discretion,
that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of a
substantive evil that they may be punished, the question
whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited
class is likely, in and itself, to bring the substantive evils, is
not open to consideration. In such cases, the general
provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied to
the specific utterance if its natural and probable effect was
to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925).]
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. When the
legislature has decided that one who advocates a certain
conduct is guilty of a crime, the court cannot intrude. As it
evolved, this test was supposed to apply when there is a
statute, in contrast to the clear and present danger rule
which applies when the speech is not prohibited by statute.
Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. [Schenck v. United States,
249 US 47 (1919).]
The emphasis of the test is the nature of the
circumstances under which it is uttered. The speech itself
may not be dangerous. As Holmes said: "Many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded movie house.
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity
of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such an
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
Constitutional Law II
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge
Learned Hand.]
This test was meant to supplant the clear and present
danger. They both emphasize the circumstances of the
speech, but this latter test consider the weighing of values.
Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees
of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation,
except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite
or produce such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).]
The test emphasizes the very words
uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b) What is the likely
result of such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present
danger test for being top dependent on the
circumstances. Speaker may, when tested show no
incitement but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition.
Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake
the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances
and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of
rights. [American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US
383 cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
The test applied when two legitimate values not
involving national secuirty crimes compete. Involves an
appoint of the competing interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec)
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it is a
question of balancing the freedom of expression of the
producer and the right to privacy of Enrile.
(not in VV's revised outline)
Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the clear-
and-present danger test is over- simplified judgement unless
it takes into account also a number of other factors: (1) the
relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the
value of the occasion for speech or political activity, (2) the
availability of more moderate controls than those the State
has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent with which
the speech is launched. (Freund, quoted in Dennis v. United
States in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
2. Applications of tests in various contexts
a. Freedom of expression and national security
Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316
(1984)
F: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. On
different dates in July 1980, they were summoned by
military authorities for interrogation regarding their work,
feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even private
lives. In addition, one of them was charged with libel by a
General who sought to recover P10 million in damages. They
brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from
questioning them and from filing libel suits on matters that
had been the subject of inquiry by the NIB.
HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. Be that
as it may, it is not idle to note that, while ordinarily, an
invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is
not illegal or constitutionally objectionable, under certain
circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily
assume a different appearance as when it comes from a
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military
officers and the designate interrogation site is a military
camp.
b. Freedom of expression and criticism of official
conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice"
Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-354 and 361-
362
Freedom of expression and libel
Freedom of speech versus right to reputation. Libel is
the most common form of subsequent
punishment. Although one cannot be prevented from
saying something before he actually says it, one can be held
liable for what one has said if it causes damage to the rights
of others.
Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
(1988)
F: The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for
libel against the petitioners, who were the publisher and
columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following
statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The
Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you
recall, during the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid
under her bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the
first Commander-in-Chief to do so." Beltran did not submit a
counter affidavit and instead, moved to dismiss the
complaint. The fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition
for certiorari.
HELD: xxx
(3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran
that he could not be held liable for libel bec. of the privileged
character of the publication, the Court reiterates that it is
not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the
trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the
parties. As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the
libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on the
press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule
on the point. VV.
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)
Constitutional Law II
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed
outright unless made in bad faith
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-Smuggling
Action Center denouncing abuses allegedly committed by
ASAC agents against petitioner's clients. Petitioner said the
agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her
necklace and bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70.
But the agents were exonerated so petitioner filed criminal
charges of robbery. Petitioner found prosecutors
unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for damages against
the agents. Later, the Bulletin Today published a news item
based on petitioner's letter to ASAC. This became the basis
of an action for libel brought against petitioner and his
clients. Petitioner moved to quash the case but his motion
was denied.
HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive
law, the charge is defective. The letter constitutes privileged
communication. It was sent by petitioner in his capacity as
lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. He
could also invke his civic duty as a private individual to
expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was
addressed to the official who had authority over them and
could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an index of
good faith, the letter was sent privately, directly to the
addressee without any funfare nor publicity. As for the news
report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an
ordinary citizen without known ties to newspaper, could
have by himself caused the publication. It does not appear
either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. At
any rate, the news item is a true and fair report of a judicial
proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or
remarks. VV.
Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986)
F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the
publication in the Feb. 23, 1981 issue of Newsweek of the
article "An Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of
Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed them as
exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the article was not libelous
since it did not single any particular individual. The trial court
denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed. Thus, this appeal
to the SC.
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been
directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every
individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so
that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he
can bring the action separately if need be. The disputed
portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola.
The news report merely stated that the victim had been
arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the
area by Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as it
does to an official act is within the realm of privileged and is
protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and press. VV.
Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear in
the Visayas" did not specify any individual, it cannot be
libelous. An article must be sufficiently, specific or at least
sweeping as to apply to all members of a group, in order to
be deemed libelous.
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently
published and mistaken for another man who was a sanitary
inspector and fooled the authorities about the Babuyan
Islands, claiming of murders there, so they could go and he
could be rescued. An erratum was published by the This
Week magazine. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez,
however, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages,
since the error in in this case could have been checked
consideringing that this was a weekly magazine and not a
daily.
Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955)
Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to
enable them to courageously and effectively perform their
important role in our democracy. In the preparation of
stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race to
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a
point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in
the choice of words.
.
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982)
F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a
telegram which he sent to the Secretary of Public Works
requesting investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of the
Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe
that she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices xxx." He
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his
communication was privileged, but his motion was denied.
He filed another motion which was also denied. Thus, this
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the SC.
HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by
forty years a similar decision of the US Supreme Court to the
effect that a libel prosecution must survive the test of
whether or not the offending publication is within the
guarantees of free speech and free press. However, Justice
Malcolm in US v. Bustos was careful to point out that
qualified privilege and this is one instance may be "lost by
proof of malice." What casts doubt on the good faith of
petitioner is his conduct, vis-à-vis private respondent. The
tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of
conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt
could reasonably be entertained as the bona fides of
Constitutional Law II
petitioner. The prosecution should be given a chance to
prove malice.
c. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy
Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)
F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on a
book written by Rodriguez. xxx Nelly Amane who was a
half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie on the ground
that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and family
life, including scenes about his mother, Maria Soto vda. de
Gonzales, and a certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl
friend. Subsequently, Nelly Amante, together w/ her sister
and mother, agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit, use and
develope the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of
producing the pictures," in consideration of
P20,000. Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed to pay the
balance agreed upon, he was sued. Judgement was
rendered against him by the trial court, w/c was affirmed by
the CA. Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he
was forced to enter into the agreement only to avoid
financial loss caused by delay in the showing of the movie
and the relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in
the life of M. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Being a
public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a
person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's
privacy to disseminate public information does not extend
to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no
matter how a public figure he or she may be. In the case at
bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present
the true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that
he included a little romance in the film bec. w/o it, it would
be a drab story of torture and brutality.
Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however,
w/o limitations. In the particular circumstances presented
and considering the obligations assumed by petitioner under
the agreement, the validity of such agreement will have to
be upheld particular bec. the limits of freedom of expression
are reached when expression touches upon matters of
private concern. [In the agreement signed by him, petitioner
admitted that in the picture produced, he had "exploited the
life story of Moises Padilla for pecuniary gain, and other
profit motives, and (had) encroached upon the privacy of
Moises Padilla's immediate family, and (had) in fact
included, in the PICTURE's case, persons portraying some of
MOISES PADILLA's kin..."]
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29, 1988
F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in
the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from producing
the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the
EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his
right to privacy. Petitioners contended that the movie would
not involve his private life not that of his family. But the trial
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered
petitioners to desist from making the movie making
reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action for
certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom
to produce motion pictures and to exhibit them. What is
involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise
of speech and of expression by petitioners. Because of the
preferred character of speech and of expression, a weighty
presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint.
The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that the
movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no
"clear and present danger." The subject matter of the movie
does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. The
intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a
truthful historical account. He is, after all, a public figure.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant
case between freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement
that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no
showing of a reckless disregard of truth.
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day
revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the
use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer,
sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any
mention of his and his family's name. The SC lifted the
injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it
amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by
the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by
ecclesiatical officials.
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because
his name is part of history and this cannot be changed or
altered; thus his name can be used so long as only his public
life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla
was also a public figure, the movie dealth with both the
public and private lives of Moises Padilla.
d. Freedom of expression and administration of justice
(contempt of court)
In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17. 1990
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989)
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957)
A contempt imposed by the court on the party who
sent a letter to the Presidential Action Committee
complaining about the delay in the disposition of the
agrarian case, was lifted by the SC. It held that although such
a letter should have been sent to the SC and not the PAC, it
was nevertheless a valid exercise of speech which did not
significantly destroy, the orderly administration of justice.
People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939)
Constitutional Law II
A person can be held liable for making comments on
a pending case (sub judice) which have the tendency to
impair or obstruct the orderly administration of
justistice. But if the case is not pending, such comment is a
valid exercise of the freedom of expression.
e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-burning case
Flag burning when done to express dissent is protected
speech.
F: Respondent Johnson participated in a political
demonstration where he burned an American flag while
protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or
threatened with injury, although several witnesses were
seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was
convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of
a Texas statute which (1) prohibited the desecration of,
among other things, a state or national flag, and (2) defined
desecration as the physical mistreatment of such objects in
a way which the actor knows will seriously offend one or
more persons likely to observe or discover the act. A state
court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas reversed, holding that the desecration statute as
applied violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech
under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment, because
the statute (1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes
as it related to breaches of the peace, and (2) was not
adequately supported by the state's purported interest in
preserving a symbol of unity.
ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is
unconstitutional
HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.
Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First
Amendment under the particular circumstances because (1)
Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to implicate the First Amendment, given
that this flag burning was the culmination of a political
demonstration and that the state conceded that the
protester's conduct was expressive; (2) the state's interest in
preventing breaches of the peace was not implicated on the
record in this case, since (a) no disturbance of the peace
actually occurred or threatened to occur because of the flag
burning, (b) it cannot be presumed that an audience which
takes serious offense at a particular expression is necessarily
likely to disturb the peace, and (c) the flag burning does not
fall within the small class of "fighting words" that are likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby
cause a breach of the peace; and (3) the state's asserted
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity does not justify the conviction, since (a) the
attempted restriction on expression is content-based, and
thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny, given that the flag
desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the physical
integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but only against
impairments that would cause serious offenses to others
and is aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended by
the ideas expressed by the prohibited activity, and (b)
although the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging
proper treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own view
of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it
and by criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as
a means of political protest.
f. Movies Censorship
While prior restraint is the general rule, censorship in
the movies is tolerated because by the nature of the
medium, it has a greater impact on the audience and
produces instant reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike
newspapers which are read by people separated by walls.
Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)
F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa
Patalim which the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were
made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner
brought an action, claiming violation of their freedom of
expression.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for
the communication of ideas and the expression of the
artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the
classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule
and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is
against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest. The Board committed an abuse of
discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail
before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without
deletion. However there is not enough votes to consider the
abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were
reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women
erotically dancing naked and kissing and caressing each
other like lesbians. VV.
Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa
Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part and
to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are within the
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that
censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior
restraint. The only case whe the Board of Censors can order
a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil against national security or public morals or
other public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only
classify.
But a different standard must be followed in television
because of the pervasive and intrusive influence of the
medium on people who watch its programs without having
to pay anything.
Constitutional Law II
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along
is not necessarily obscenity, the test being whether, using
contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal
us to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this
score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board
for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining
a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules
that the abuse was grave.
Tests of obscenity:
(1) Whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable law.
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. (Miller v.
California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419.)
g. Radio Broadcast
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647, the SC
held that radio broadcast also enjoys the protection of the
freedom of expression. If closed down, the owners enjoy the
rights to due process according to the standards set in Ang
Tibay v. CIR.
But radio deserves greater regulation than
newspapers because it could invade the privacy of everyone
for no fee, and it is such that one is likely to listen to what is
being said.
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA 647
(1985)
F: The petitioners filed this action to compel respondent
government officials to allow the reopening of Radio Station
DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly having been used
to incite the people to sedition. The petitioner contended
that it was denied due process because no hearing was held
and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for
the closure. However, before the Court could promulgate its
decision the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw its action
on the ground that it had sold the radio station to Manuel
Pastrana and that the National Telecommunications
Commission had expressed its willingness to grant the
requisite license.
HELD: The case has been moot and academic. However, for
the guidance of the inferior courts and administrative
bodies, the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The
cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings
as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before a
broadcast station may be closed; 2) All forms of
communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print
media. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast
media have a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Filipinos; 3) The government has a right to be protected
against broadcasts which incite listeners to violently
overthrow it; and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
h. Freedom of Information
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to, official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Access of official records (the docket book) for any
lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases for a report
on the peace and order situation of the municipality) is
guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the
custodian of the records.
Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. [US v. O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968), adopted in
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)]
1. Regulation of political campaign
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)
F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass
media which were prevented from selling and donating
space or air time for political advertisements under RA 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the
constitutional right to freedom of expression.
RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by
the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation f
media of communication and information. The fundamental
purposes of such power are to ensure "equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform
and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media
Constitutional Law II
facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns
and forums among candidates."
Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and
of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The
limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection
with the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio
and television time that the resources of the financially
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate,
assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it prohibits
the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or
private, and limits their location or publication to authorized
posting areas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
fundamental right of free speech. There is no public interest
substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction
involved in this case. The posting of decals amd stickers in
mobile places does not endanger any substantial
government or public interest. Under the clear and present
danger rule, not only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be
so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by
the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedoom of an
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on
his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may
be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees
to have it placed on his private vehichle, the expression
becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and
not of anybody else.
Morever, The restriction is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in
this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the
Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due proocess of law.
2. Freedom of Assembly
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580)
A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office
of the Mayor at least, five working days before the day of the
rally.
But no permit from the mayor is required in case the
rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a
private property (provide with consent of the owner), and
(iii) campuses of state universities (which are left to
university authorities)
The application must be in writing and must include:
(1) names of the organizers and leaders, (2) date and time,
place and street, (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street,
(5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must also have a
statement of the duties of the rallyists.
The written application is filed with the Office of the
Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. If the Mayor
refuses to accept the application, then it is enough for filing
purposes if a copy is posted in the premises.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the
application. If he does not act, it is deemed granted.
But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and
present danger" to public peace, order, health, etc., and he
has proof of this, he should not deny the application right
away. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant
can be heard. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no
danger exists, then he can deny the application.
The applicant can then go to any court other than the
Supreme Court for the review of the decision of denial of the
mayor. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition. If
the judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any case if the
applicant is satisfied with the decision, the judgment
becomes final and executory immediately, and no appeal
can be taken by the local authorities anymore.
But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant,
then he has 48 hours from receipt to appeal to the SC.
During the rally, the police must be limited to
maintaining peace and order and so must stay away by 100
meters from the rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with
their names visibly written. They can carry no firearm except
a nighstick, but they are allowed protective devices.
If they anticipate trouble, the police must call the
attention of the leader of the rallyists. When trouble
actually erupts, the police must not disperse the crowd right
away but first give a warning. If violence persists, they must
give a second warning. If still violence continues, only then
can they fight back.
If a rally does not have a permit, the police can
disperse the crowd, but they cannot use violence. Penalty is
imposed only on the leaders and organizers.
Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the
members of their duty under the law, (b) to police their own
rank, and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in
maintaining peace and order.
Notes: The freedom to use public places to peaceably
assemble is best expressed thus: "Wherever the title or
steets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of time
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
Constitutional Law II
thought betwee citizens, and discussing public questions."
(Justice Roberts. Hague v. CIO)
Although under a "permit system", before one can use
a public place, one must first obtain prior permit from the
proper authorities, the principle has always been that one
has the right to a permit, subject only to reasonable
regulation. The validity of the permit system has been
upheld by the Court, provided, (a) it is concered only with
the time, place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not
vest on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in
choosing the groups which could use the public place and
discriminate others.
As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71,
the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority to the Mayor
to issue permits for parades should be construed to be
limited to the time, place, and manner of the parades
socially to secure public order, convenience and
welfare. Thus, denying the Nacionalista Party a permit to
hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions
raised by the recent national election were still high and a
rally to protest election anomalies could only exacerbate the
matter, was overturned by the court.
Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71
F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Primicias, campaign manager of the Coalesced
Minority Parties, to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of
Manila to issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public
meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress of grievances. The Mayor denied the
application on the ground that passions still run high due to
the recent election, and a rally to protest election anomalies
might threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of
public order.
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit.
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the Mayor under
the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board pursuant to
its authority under the Revised Administrative Code which
pertains to the use of streets and public places, can be
construed only to mean the power to regulate, which means
and includes the power to control, govern, and to restrain
but cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or
"prohibit."
The Court quoted with approval the decision in the
American case Cox v. State of New Hampshire, " a statute
requiring persons using public streets for a parade or
procession to procure a special license therefor from the
local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of
the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press,
where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of
licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner
of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse license..."
But under the same ordinance, the SC, in Navarro v.
Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970), upheld the mayor's refusal to
grant permit to a group during weekdays, on a finding that
everytime there was an announced rally, stores closed and
business was gravely affected because of violent
incidents. It found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies
only during weekends to be reasonable.
Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement for
a Democratic Philippines (MDP), an association of students,
workers and peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor
of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. Respondent
Mayor denied the application to hold the rally on the date
and time specified by petitioners in view of the events that
transpired during the last demonstration held by them
which ended in the destruction of public and private
property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a score of other
persons and the closing down of schools, offices and many
stores. The Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken
Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be
held during weekends and earlier during the day so that it
may end before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on
the ground that the same constitutes a violation of their
right to freedom of assembly. Petitioner contended that the
right of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the
government for redress of grievances may be exercised
without the prior necessity of securing a permit from the
government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed
without the corresponding right to use public places for that
purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit
amounted to a violation of petitioner`s right to freedom of
assembly.
HELD: NO.
The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely
refused the permit sought by petitioner. He has expressed
willingness to grant the permit for the peaceful assembly
during certain days and time, and at a place when they
would not disrupt the normal activities of the community.
The respondent mayor possesses reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure
convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and
maintain public safety and order.
Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty
on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application
for a permit unconditionally. Experience in connection with
present assemblies and demonstrations have shown that
they pose a clear and imminent danger of public disorders,
Constitutional Law II
breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as
an aftermath of such assemblies, which, petitioner has
manifested, it has no means of preventing. Charo.
In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the majority
upheld the mayor's denial of permit to members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within the
town plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with
members of the Roman Catholic Church, whose tenets are
opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose church is
very near the klosk.
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)
F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the town plaza for
the purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that
the permit, if granted, may give rise to disturbance of the
religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic
Church which was said to be within hearing distance from
the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident
with members of the rival denomination.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), the
SC found no basis for the denial of permit to the Anti-Bases
Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to the street fronting
the U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that the use
of streets is free to all. It found the fear entertained by city
authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by
provocateurs to be unfounded, given the report of the NPD
that adequate security measures were provided by the
police.
The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance
of Manila prohibiting any rally within 200 meters from any
foreign embassy as a means of complying with the Geneva
Convention that requires the host country to protect the
premises and personnel of the embassy.
Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits
(now in BP 9801 (i) any group which applies must do so
within a sufficient time so the authority can have time to act:
(ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit, the
applicant can question the denial in the lower court, which
can try questions of fact and law, and (iii) appeal can be
made to the SC on an expedited procedure.
J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a
peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983 starting 2 p.m.
from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed this
petition because as of Oct. 20, there was yet no action on his
request to hold a rally.
HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public concern without censorship or punishment. There is
to be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits,
prosecution for damages, or contempt proceedings unless
there is a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent." There can be no legal
objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at
Luneta. Neither can there be objection to the use of the
streets up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute requiring
persons to secure a special license to use public streets for a
procession is not unconstitutional. The licensing of
authorities are strictly limited to the consideration of the
time, place and manner and the authorities are not invested
with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse a permit.
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985), the SC
upheld the power of the city authorities to close JP Laurel
Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area
restriction", in order to protect the President and his family,
based on the incident in the early 70s when the gates of the
palace were almost stormed. The rallyists in this case
purported to merely worship at St. Jude's.
In case a rally is held in a private place, no permit from
the mayor is required. However, the consent of the owner
of the place must be acquired.
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985)
F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who were
businessmen, students and employees, met on JP Laurel
Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass
at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang
grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts and, with clenched fists,
marched on the street and shouted anti-government
invectives. They were stopped from proceeding to the
chapel by the Presidential Security Command. They brought
an action for mandamus.
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers,
their fists clenched and chants of anti-government investives
support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose
was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti-
government demonstration close to the residence of the
President. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified.
The need to secure the safety of heads of states cannot be
overemphasized. The threat to their lives is constant and felt
throughout the world. The petitioners were not restrained
in their freedom of religion but only in the manner by which
they had attempted to translate the same into action.
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) and
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985), the SC upheld the right
to expression of students who held a rally in a private
university. But since they held it beyond the time granted in
a place other than the one allowed by the administration,
their suspension was condoned.
Constitutional Law II
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They
were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the
merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date,
the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled
time and held it in a different place from that indicated in
the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their
opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office
work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under
preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of
holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were
suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for
certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic
considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the
students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on
the constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional
rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the
setting aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them
for one year is out of proportion considering that the
vigorous presentation of views was expected. The
excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be taken
into consideration.
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)
F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They
were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 28,
1982.
HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in the course of
such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading
them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even
vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. They
would be ineffective if during the rally they speak in the
guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate,
even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full
credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account
the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers
to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The refusal of
the university to enroll the students is a highly
disproportionate penalty.
Notes: Note that while the permit system is not
allowed in the case of publication, it is allowed in the case of
assembly. In publication, censorship is presumptively
unconstitutional. There is very little possibility or
justification for the regulation of news. The remedy in this
case is prosecution or subsequent punishment.
But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is
needed by the very nature of the expression, when people
use streets, they may deprive other groups which want to
use the streets too. So as long as only the incidents of
speech are regulated, the measure is constitutionally
acceptable.
Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987)
F: While these cases were pending in the SC, the labor
unions involved intensified the pickets they had been
conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and
set up picket quarters, at times obstructing access to and
egress from the Court's premises. When required to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt of court,
their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident
would not be repeated.
HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations
to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way
or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances must
be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e. through
appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with the
respect due the courts as impartial administrators of justice.
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have the
causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The acts of
respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this
Court but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the
adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the
public sector
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not be abridged.
The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is
ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an economic
and labor right, the right to association in general is a civil-
political right.
Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public
employees cannot engage in collective bargaining and strike.
SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a
prayer for a writ of prel inj. against petitioners SSSEA,
alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged
an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS
building preventing non-striking employees from reporting
to work and SSS members from transacting business w/
SSS. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council ordered
the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do
so. The SSSEA went on strike bec. SSS failed to act on the
union's demands.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion was denied. The
restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted
into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners
appealed the case to the CA. The latter held that since the
Constitutional Law II
employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed
to strike.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to
strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like
workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt.
to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4,
Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise
of the Right of Govt. EEs to Self-Organization which took
effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms and
conditions of employment in the Govt, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and
controlled corporations with original charters, are governed
by law and employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes thereof.
The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt
Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1)
is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet.
workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ regard
to the right to strike?
Since the terms and conditions of govt.
employment are fixed by law, govt.
workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector
to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor
unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion of law. Relations bet.
private employers and their employees
rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other
labor and welfare legislation, the terms
and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective
bargaining. In govt employment,
however, it is the legislature and, where
properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of govt w/c fix the
terms and conditions of employment. And
this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations, not through CBA's
E. Academic Freedom
Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (1975)
F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused to
readmit petitioner, Garcia, in its M.A. program because they
felt that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not
always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class;" that it would be "to the best interest
(of the petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more
compatible with her orientation. Garcia assailled her
expulsion for being unreasonable; that the reasons given
therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear that her
conduct constituted a violation of the school's regulations
and grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by
mandamus to readmit petitioner.
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by
institutions of higher learning of the right to academic
freedom. The school decides for itself its aims and objectives
and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of the students.
The collective liberty of an organization is by no means
the same thing as the freedom of the individual members
within it. In considering the problems of academic freedom,
one must distinguish between autonomy of the university,
as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual
university teacher.
The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the
right of each university teacher to seek and express the truth
as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his
capacity as a private citizen. This status of the individual
teacher is as important as the status of the institution to
which he belongs and through which he disseminates
learning.
On other hand, the internal conditions for academic
freedom in a university are that the academic staff should
have de facto control of the following functions: (a)
admission and examination of students; (b) curricula for
courses of study; (c) appointment and tenure of office of
academic staff; and (d) allocation of income among the
different categories of expenditure. It is the business of a
university to proviide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a
university prevail - to determine for itself who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.
For the above reason, mandamus is not available for
the petitioner. There is no duty on the part of the School to
admit her to study since the School clearly has the discretion
to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of
space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and
component considerations. There are standards to meet and
policies to pursue. What a student possesses is a privilege
rather than a right.
UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the establishment of
the UPCB Highshool to serve, among others, "as a laboratory
and demonstration school for prospective teachers -
provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting." However,
the Dept of Professional Education in Baguio was never
organized. So, the BOR decided to phase out UPCBHS for
failing to attain the conditions for its creation. The UPCBHS
Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the University from
phasing out the UPCBHS.
Constitutional Law II
ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an
institution of higher learning such as the UP?
RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of academic freedom.
Private respondent invokes the right to quality education
and to free secondary education.
The rights invoked by private respondent may be
asserted only as against the Government through the
DECS. UP was created under its charter to provide advanced
tertiary education. An institute of higher learning cannot be
compelled to provide for secondary education.
It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher
learning enjoys academic freedom. UPCBHS was established
subject to a number of conditionalities. Failing on such
conditions, UP can order its abolition on academic
grounds. Charo.
UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993
F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and the
Tasaday representative filed a complaint for damages and
declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and
Zeus Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday
find and made a proposition in various conferences attended
by them that Elizalde merely fabricated the discovery of the
Tasadays.
UP intervened, aaserting its duty to protect the
respondents as faculty members for acts and utterances
made in the exercise of academic freedom. The lower court
denied UP's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. Hence this petition.
RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for
"judgment declaring the Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic
community, the lower court is cautioned that the same is
akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for
declaratory relief. The complaint was filed mainly to
vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor.
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the court to make
pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise.
To be sure, in resolving the complaint for damages, the court
may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls
within the field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind
that its proper role and function is the determination of legal
issues.
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
A. Non-Establishment Clause
The clause prohibits excessive government
entanglement with, endorsement or disapproval of religion
[Vicoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
(1974); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburg ACLU,
492 US 574 (1989).]
The clause prohibits the State from establishing a
religion. In assessing the validity of the law, the questions to
be asked are:
a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it
secular?
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion?
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive
entaglement between the State and religious matters in
religion?
The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the
State gives any manifest support to any one religion, even if
nothing is done against the individual.
It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions,
for there may be atheists who are not so favored.
1. Operation of sectarian schools
While the ownership, creation and management of
educational institutions must be in the hands of Filipinos or
60% Filipino-owned corporations, sectarian schools and
those run by religious groups and missions board are
exempted from these requirements, provided the
administration is in the hands of Filipinos, who could be
sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).]
2. Religious instruction in public schools
Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents
and it is at no cost to the State (although this is not entirely
possible, because the use of classrooms and electricity are
costs in the State), religious instruction in public elementary
and secondary schools during class hours, by one approved
by the authorities of the religion of the child or ward is
allowed. [Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be
integrated in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
3. Anti-evolution laws
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the SC
held that the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution
cannot be prohibited from public shools by parents whose
religions finds the theory offensive.
4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967), the SC
disallowed the conducting of an interdenominational prayer
before the start of classes in public schools as, violative of
the Non- Establishment clause.
Constitutional Law II
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967)
F: The respondent Board of Education upon the
recommendation of the State Board of Regents, directed
the School's District principal to cause the recitation in
public schools of a brief, denominationally neutral prayer.
Its observance on the part of the students was voluntary.
RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York, by using
its public school system to encourage the recitation of the
Regent's prayer has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent
with the Establishment Clause. The prayer was composed by
govt officials as part of a governmental program to further
religious beliefs. The constitutional prohibition against laws
respecting an establishment of religion means at least that it
is not part of the business of the government to compose
official prayers for any group to recite as part of a religious
program carried on by the govt.
The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit
laws respecting an establishment of religion and abridging
the free exercise thereof, although overlapping in certain
instances, forbids two diff kinds of governmental
encroachment upon religious freedom. The stablishment
clause, unlike the free exercise clause, does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion, whether or not those laws operate directly to
coerce non-observing individuals. It rests on the belief that a
union of govt and religion tends to destroy govt and to
degrade religion, and upon an awareness of the historical
fact that governmentally established religion and religious
persecutions go hand in hand.
In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), it likewise disallowed the reading of a passage from
the bible without comment in public schools as contrary to
the Non- Establishment clause.
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
The issue was whether the establishment clause was
violated by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the Board of
Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to statutory
authority requiring the reading without comment, at the
opening of each school day, of verses from the Bible and the
recitation of the Lord's prayer by the students in unison. The
students and parents may refuse to participate in the school
exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of the
curricular activities of students who are required by law to
attend school and held in school buildings under the
supervision and participation of teachers employed in those
schools.
RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated.
The establishment clause prohibits a state from
placing official support behind the tenets of one or all
orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees the
right of every person to freely choose his own course with
reference to religious training, teaching and observance,
free from any compulsion from the State.
The test in determining whether a legislative
enactment violates the Establishment clause which
withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief or
the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY
EFFECT of the enactment. If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope
of legislative power as circumscribed by the First
Amendment. To withstand the strictures of the
establishment clause, there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.
The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion
cannot be gainsaid. This is particularly so where the State's
recognition of the pervading religious character of the
exercise is evident from the rule's specific permission of the
alternative use of the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as
well as from a recent amendment permitting non-
attendance at the exercises, none of those factors being
consistent with the contention that the Bible is used either
as an instrument for non-religious moral inspiration or as a
reference for the teaching of secular subjects.
5. Tax exemption
Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx
(3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial
Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is modified to the extent now that
the property must be "actually, directly and exclusively"
used for religious purposes to be exempt.
If not for religious purposes, educational purposes.
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352
(1927)
F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, is the owner
and occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
On the south siide is a part of the church yard, the convent
and an adjacent lot used as vegetable garden. In the center
is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the
north side is an old cemetery and the base of what was once
a tower. The Prov. Board imposed a tax on the whole land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal.
RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of the land tax
mandated in the Constitution in favor of the religious
entities refers to the home of the priest who presides over
the church and who has to take care of himself in order to
Constitutional Law II
discharge his duties. It therefore must include not only the
land actually occupied by the church but also the adjacent
ground destined for the ordinary incidental uses of man.
Except in large cities where the density of the
population and the development of commerce require the
use of large tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden
belongs to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use is
limited to the necessities of the priest. Therefore, which
comes under the tax exemption.
As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery, while
it is no longer used as such, neither is it used for commercial
purposes and, accdg to the evidence, is now being used as a
lodging house by the people who participate in religious
festivities. The same constitutes an incidental use in religious
functions. It also comes within the exemption.
6. Public aid to religion
The payment or use of public money or property for
any religious institution or clergy is not allowed; except in
those cases provided in the Constitution: priests assigned in
the AFP, penal institution, government orphanage, or
leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)]
But in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937), the SC held
that the stamp printed by the government showing the map
of the Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress to be held in Manila did
not violate the Non-Establishment clause because its main
purpose, was to call the world's attention to Manila as the
site of an international congress, and whatever benefit it
gave the Catholic Church was only incidental.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937)
F: The petitioner, Mons. Aglipay, Head of the Phil. Ind.
Church, sought to restrain respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress. The Director issued
the stamps under the provisions of Act 4052 which
appropriates public funds for the cost of the plates and
printing of the stamps. Petitioner alleged that the issuance
of the stamps was done in violation of the Constitutional
provision that no public money or property shall be
appropriated for the use, benefit or support of any sect or
religion.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable.
RULING: NO. Act 4052 contemplated no religious purpose in
view. What it gave the Director of Posts was the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be advantageous to the
government.
The purpose in issuing the stamps was to advertise
the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country. The
officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance to give publicity to
the country and its people. The stamp contained a map of
the Philippines and the location of Manila, and an inscription
as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Crusade."
What was emphasized was not the event but Manila.
It was obvious that while the stamps may be said to
be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character,
the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic
Church was merely incidental and was not the aim and
purpose of the government.
In Ignacio v. Ela, supra, the dissenting opinion of
Justice Concepcion pointed out that the mayor disapproved
the application for a permit not so much because he was
afraid that breach of peace would ensue but because he
wrongly though the kiosk should be used for public purposes
only and not for religious purposes. When the Jehovah's
Witness members use the public squares, they are no
different from ordinary pedestrians or promenaders who
use the street: that they are performing religious acts is only
incidental. So long as the use of public property is only
incidentalally and temporarilly for religious purposes and so
long as the use is such as to be reasonably compatible with
the use to which other members of the community are
similarly entitled, then the non-establishment clause is not
violated. The tests then are (1) Is the use of the public
facility compatible with general use? (2) Is the resulting
benefit to the religious group only incidental.
B. Free Exercise Clause
1. Flag Salute
Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu, 219
SCRA 256 (1993)
Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the
flag.
F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were expelled
from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, since the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and by
Dept. Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS making
the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.
ISSUE: W/N school children who are members of a religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from
school (both private and public), for refusing, on account of
their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony
which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Phil.
National Anthem, saluting the Phil. flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge.
HELD: NO.
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotice pledge,
during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's
job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the
Constitutional Law II
conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut
their teeth on the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to
free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and
worship.
xxx
xxx Forcing a small religious group, through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates
their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of
country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
xxx
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation
on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a
grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, moral, health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the state has a right
and duty to prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety,
the expulsion of the pets. from the schools is not justified.
xxx
Although petitioners do not participate in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external
acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who
believe in exercising their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the ceremony to show their respect for the
right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. As there is no disruption, expulsion is
unwarranted.
However, if they should commit breaches of peace by
action that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons, the school authorities have the
power to discipline them.
Compare West V. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624
(1943)
F: The State Board required public school pupils to
salute the flag of the United States while reciting a pledge of
allegiance under penalty of expulsion entailing liability of
both pupil and parents to be proceeded against for unlawful
absence. Appellees, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
consider the flag as a graven image which they are forbidden
to salute under their religious beliefs. The State asserts the
power to condition access to public education.
ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid.
RULING: NO.
In connection with pledges, the flag salute is a form of
utterance. It requires an affirmation of a belief and an
attitude of mind. It is now a commonplace that censorship
or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by the
Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and
present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to
prevent and punish. Here the power of compulsion is
invoked without any allegation that remaining passive
during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger
that would justify an effort even to muffle expression.
To sustain the compulsory flag salute, we are required
to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right
to speak his mind left it open to public authorities to compel
him to utter what is not in his mind.
The Court applies the limitations of the Constitution
with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social
organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if
patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead
of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate
of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.
2. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P 386 (1957)
F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sale of
bibles and religious articles. The City Treasurer of Manila
informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of
general merchandise without securing the necessary license
and paying the requisite fee in violation of the City
ordinance. Plaintiff protested against this requirement as
constituting a restraint upon the exercise of religion. It
claimed that it is not engaged in business which necessitates
the securing of a license as it never made any profit from the
sale of its bibles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to petitioner
is unconstutional for being in restraint of petitioner's right
to free exercise of religion.
HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the privilege is
the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who
can tax the exercise of religious practice can make its
exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary
for its maintenance. It is true that the price asked for the
religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than
the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that
plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling
said "merchandise" for profit. The mark up can only be
treated as contributions by the faithfuls to the religious
cause. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff
society, for in so doing, it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as
its right to disseminate religious beliefs.
3. Exemtion from union shop
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
(1974)
F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the Elizalde
Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned from the respondent
labor union on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which
he is a member prohibits union membership. As the union
demanded his dismissal from employment pursuant to a
closed shop agreement, Victoriano brought this action for
injunction. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting from the
closed-shop contracts members of religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any labor
organization. The union appealed.
Constitutional Law II
HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of association.
It does not impair the obligation of contracts for not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligation
of the parties but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into such contracts. Neither
does the law constitute an establishment of religion. It has
been held that in order to withstand objections based on this
ground, the statute musr have a secular purpose and that
purpose must not directly advance or diminish the interest
of any religion. Congress acted merely to relieve persons of
the burden imposed by union security agreements.
4. Disqualification from local government office
Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)
F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed against him on the
basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code
providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or appointed
to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries from provincial funds, or
contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed the petition
on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly
repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code.
HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven justices
held that section 2175 is no longer operative. Justice
Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on
the exercise of the right to run for public office contrary to
Art. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that
section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. Five
justices held that section 2175 is constitutional.
VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)
Right to travel
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito Salonga
came to the SC by way of a mandamus proceeding to compel
the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In
the first case, Salonga v. Madella, the case became moot and
academic. The present petition is likewise moot and
academic. In the motion to dismiss filed by the Solicitor
General, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to
travel had been granted petitioner.
Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that this Court
may be faced again with the same situation, it is desirable
that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise
the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens
desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel
could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. The
freedom to travel is one of the most cherished. xxx
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760 (1989)
F: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the
Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to
enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. The case for petitioners is
founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the provisions
of the Constitution respecting one's liberty of abode and
right to travel. Respondents argue the primacy of the right
of the State to national security over individual rights.
RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. Essentially, the right involved is the right to
return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the
right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but
it is the Court's well considered view that the right to return
may be considered as a generally accepted principle of
international law, and under our Constitution, is part of the
law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
Intl. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e. against being
arbitrarily deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed
to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel. It must be treated as a matter
that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative
to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether
it must be granted or not.