Anda di halaman 1dari 2

Jaucian v.

Querol
October 5, 1918 | Street, J.
Title I. Obligations Chapter 3. Different Kinds of Obligations IV. Joint and Solidary Obligations B. Solidary
Obligations 3. Effects b. Solidary debtor in relation to: ii. solidary co-debtor

Doctrines: A creditor may sue any of the joint and several (solidarios) debtors or all of them simultaneously. The claims
instituted against one shall not be an obstacle for those that may be later presented against the others, as long as it does not
appear that the debt has been collected in full.
Case Summary: A surety signed a debt instrument binding herself "jointly and severally" with the debtor. The surety sued
for cancellation of the instrument, but it was ruled by the court as valid. When the surety died, the creditor filed a claim with
the estate, but was refused because the creditor did not exhaust his claim against the principal debtor. SC opined that decision
of the trial court denying appellant's petition and his motion for a new trial was correct and should be affirmed.

Facts:
1. Oct. 1908 - Lino Dayandante and Hermenegilda Rogero executed a private writing in which they acknowledged
themselves to be indebted to Roman Jaucian in the sum of P13,332.33.
2. Hermenegilda Rogero signed this document in the capacity of surety for Lino Dayandante; but in the instrument itself,
both debtors bound themselves jointly and severally to the creditor
3. Nothing in the terms shows that the relation between the two debtors was that of principal and surety.
4. November, 1909. Hermenegilda Rogero brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Albay against Jaucian, asking
that the document in question be cancelled as to her upon the ground that her signature was obtained by means of fraud.
5. Jaucian answered by way of cross-complaint and asked for judgment against the plaintiff for the amount due upon the
obligation, which appears to have matured at that time.
6. CFI found in favor of plaintiff
7. Pending appeal to SC, Hermenegilda Rogero died and was substituted by the administrator of her estate–Francisco Querol;
and a committee was appointed to pass upon claims against the estate.
8. SC reversed the trial court; held that the disputed claim was valid.
9. March 24, 1914, or about a year and a half after the filing of the report of the committee on claims against the Rogero
estate, Jaucian entered an appearance in the estate proceedings, and filed with the court a petition in which he averred the
execution of the document of October, 1908, by the deceased, the failure of her coobligor Dayandante, to pay any part of
the debt and the complete insolvency of Dayandante
10. Jaucian prayed the court to order Querol to pay him the principal and its interest.
11. April 13, 1914.CFI held that: "Hermenegilda Rogero having been simply surety for Lino Dayandante, the administrator
has a right to require that Roman Jaucian produce a judgment for his claim against Lino Dayandante, in order that the said
administrator may be subrogated to the rights of Jaucian against Dayandante. When this action shall have been taken
against Lino Dayandante and an execution returned 'no effects,' then the claim of Jaucian against the estate will be ordered
paid or any balance that may be due to him."
12. Acting upon the above suggestions, Jaucian brought an action against Dayandante and recovered a judgment against him.
Execution was issued but was returned by the sheriff wholly unsatisfied bec no property of the debtor was found
13. Jaucian filed another petition in the proceedings upon the estate of Hermenegilda Rogero, in which they averred, upon the
grounds last stated, that Dayandante was insolvent, and renewed the prayer of the original petition. It was contended that
the court, by, its order of April 13, 1914, had "admitted the claim" of Dayadante that he had no property left.
14. CFI refused to grant Jaucian's petition; rehearing denied
15. Jaucian contends that the trial judge erred (a) in refusing to give effect to the order made by the CFI, dated April 13, 1914;
and (b), in refusing to order the administrator to pay the appellant. The contention with regard to the order of April 13,
1914 is that no appeal from it having been taken, it became final.
Issue: WON Hermenegilda Rogero’s liability was that of principal, though she was only a surety for Lino Dayadante
Held:
1. Rogero, though surety for Lino Dayandante, was nevertheless bound jointly and severally with him in the obligation, the
following provisions of the Old Civil Code are here pertinent:
Art 1822: “By security a person binds himself to pay or perform for a third person in case the latter should fail to do so.
If the surety binds himself jointly with the principal debtor, the provisions of section fourth, chapter third, title first, of
this book shall be observed."
Art 1144: "A creditor may sue any of the joint and several (solidarios) debtors or all of them simultaneously. The claims
instituted against one shall not be an obstacle for those that may be later presented against the others, as long as it does
not appear that the debt has been collected in full."
2. Rogero was liable absolutely and unconditionally for the full amount of the obligation without any right to demand the
exhaustion of the property of the principal debtor previous to its payment. Her position so far as the creditor was concerned
was exactly the same as if she had been the principal debtor.
3. The absolute character of the claim and the duty of the committee to have allowed it in full as such against the estate of
Rogero had it been opportunely presented and found to be a valid claim is further established by section 698 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which provides:
"When two or more persons are indebted on a joint contract, or upon a judgment founded on a joint contract, and
either of them dies, his estate shall be liable therefor, and it shall be allowed by the committee as if the contract had
been with him alone or the judgment against him alone. But the estate shall have the right to recover contribution
from the other joint debtor."
4. Applying section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such absolute claims are barred if not presented to the committee
in time
5. Trial court decision denying appellant's petition and his motion for a new trial was correct and should be affirmed.
Disposition: Decision of the trial court denying appellant's petition and his motion for a new trial was correct and should be
affirmed.
Note/s:
Additional Issue: WON the order of April 13, 1914 is final and hence appealable – No.
- It was not a final order, and therefore it was not appealable; no rights were conferred. Whatever rights Jaucian might
have against the estate of Rogero were subject to the performance of a condition precedent, namely, that he should first
exhaust this remedy against Dayandante. Jaucian failed to show that he had exhausted his remedy against Dayandante
which is a complete bar to the granting of the petition
- The court made no order requiring the appellee to make any payment whatever, and that part of the opinion, upon which
the order was based, which contained statements of what the court intended to do when the petition should be renewed,
was not binding upon him or any other judge by whom he might be succeeded.

Anda mungkin juga menyukai