Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No.

213847, 18 August 2015

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile
filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that
before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden
of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be
excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted
of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances
– his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that
his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into
account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing. In its Comment,
the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense;
that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless
of the attendant circumstances.

ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?

HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the
judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a
good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the
primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also
to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon
his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.
N.B. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life
would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

[G.R. No. 185128. January 30, 2012.]

[Formerly UDK No. 13980]
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent

FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house
of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September
13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant
to petitioner.

Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they
were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. When they went upstairs, they met
petitioner's wife and informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search
the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front
of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay
tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.

His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was
able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. The result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information.
Petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1
Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal
sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant.

Petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is no longer within the
"permissible area" that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search
warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other
hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only
against government authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the
folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.

Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same
just because they were found inside the nipa hut. The OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner,
stating that, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in
violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is no probable cause to issue the search warrant because the police officer has no
personal knowledge of the commission of the offense?
2. WON the nipa hut is within the permissible area that may be searched
 3. WON the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply in
this case as the one who searched and found the evidence were the barangay tanod and not the
police officers?
4. WON the petitioner has the right to be presumed innocent?

HELD: Petitioner is ACQUITTED

1. THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things
to be seized. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. The judge, in
determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him
and not by a fixed and rigid formula. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination.
2. NO, the nipa hut is not within the permissible area that may be searched. It must be remembered
that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. The confiscated items, having been found
in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
3. The constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches does apply in this case. It was testified
to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance
of the barangay tanods. Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods
therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. The Local Government Code also contains a
provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. By
virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as
agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
4. YES, the petitioner has the right to be presumed innocent. It must be put into emphasis that this
present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for the illegal
possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is
found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly
constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is
under appellant's control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that
petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the
said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician
by profession. During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded
that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner. The prosecution must prove that the
petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control
and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa
hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.