CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS v ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE G.R. No.

187226
WESTGROVE / Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB
28 January 2015 REYES, J.
TOPICS IN SYLLABUS: Women Workers, Just Causes for Termination (Serious Misconduct in conjunction with Special
Laws/Rules)
SUMMARY:
Leus worked in St. Scho Westgrove as a non-teaching employee. One day, she and her boyfriend conceived a child out of
wedlock, but both were UNMARRIED. Still, it was enough for the school to dismiss her due to ‘disgraceful or immoral
conduct’ under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, seeing as St. Scho is a Catholic school, and the act is
anathema to Catholic doctrine. The Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA agreed with the school. The SC reversed, noting that the
interpretation of morality should be SECULAR, and given that there is nothing proscribing premarital relationships and
pregnancies of UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS (and that St. Scho never even presented evidence to substantiate their
arguments), there is no just cause for termination.

PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: Complaint for illegal dismissal with Labor Arbiter (dismissed) -> Appeal to NLRC
(affirmed) -> Rule 65 to CA (affirmed) -> Rule 45 (St. Martin’s-style, so view in context of GAD) to SC

FACTS:
 Leus was the Assistant to St. Scholastica's College's Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach
Directorate.
 Sometime in 2003, she and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock (BOTH of them were not married at
the time). When Sr. Quiambao, the Directress of the College, learned of this, she advised Leus to file her
resignation letter, but Leus refused.
 Sr. Quiambo then ordered Leus to show cause as to why she should not be dismissed for pre-marital sex leading
to pregnancy, given that such amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a
Catholic school. She anchors this on the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (hereafter The
Manual), which in Sec. 94(e) lists 'disgraceful or immoral conduct' as a ground for dismissal in addition to the
just causes for termination under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. She also pointed out that Leus' position was one
where she was looked up to by the students as a role model, aggravating the infarction.
 In their written exchanges, Leus, personally and through counsel, argued that pre-marital sex is not disgraceful
or immoral conduct, or serious misconduct, and that the argument that she would be a bad example to the
students and employees is merely speculative. Should she be dismissed, it would be a grave abuse of
management prerogative, especially as it was her first offense in her two years of service.
 The exchanges lasted for days, from May 28, 2003 to June 11, 2003. On June 11, Quiambao informed Leus of her
termination on the ground of disgraceful or immoral conduct/serious misconduct, citing the grounds she
discussed in their exchanges.
 This led to the filing of an illegal dismissal complaint with the NLRC, which was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter,
echoing the arguments of the school, particularly the citation of disgraceful or immoral conduct and serious
misconduct based on the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the Labor Code, again having in mind
that St. Scho was a Catholic school. The NLRC and CA affirmed this decision, hence this petition to the SC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 1992 Manual is applicable such that its provisions may be used as a ground for
termination.
2. Whether or not Leus was illegally dismissed for being an unmarried woman employee of a Catholic school
who engaged in pre-marital sex with an unmarried man, and for getting pregnant as a result of that
relationship.

HELD:
1. YES. First, estoppel has set in as the issue was never raised in the lower courts. Second, BP 232, the Education
Act of 1982, empowers the Department of Education (specifically, its Secretary) to promulgate rules and
regulations even for disciplinary procedures, here including termination.
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  PETITIONER: The Manual implements BP 232 (The Education Act of 1982). BP 232 did not provide for any
grounds for the termination of employment of teachers and non-teaching personnel of private schools. The
Manual, which provided for causes for termination, was invalid for widening the scope and coverage of BP 232.

 COURT: First, the petitioner is estopped from pursuing this argument as it was never raised in the lower courts.
To allow this argument on appeal in the Supreme Court would amount to trampling on the basic principles of
fair play, justice, and due process.

 Moreover, BP 232 vests the Secretary of Education with the authority to issue rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of BP 232. On a broader note, Sec. 57 of the same provides DepEd with the power to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM in accordance with the policy declared in BP 232. In addition, and more on point with
the case, Sec. 69 of the same law authorizes the Secretary of Education to prescribe and impose such
administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and appropriate in implementing the provision on gross
inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching personnel of private schools. These provisions also apply to
termination.

2. NO. Judging the situation from a secular morality, while the act is not ideal, it is not immoral from a secular
perspective as nothing proscribes it.
 PETITIONER: What she did, though improper, is not enough to constitute disgraceful or immoral conduct such
that she could be validly terminated.

 COURT: In determining valid cause for termination for disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Court considered:
o First, the matter shall be assessed from a strictly neutral and secular point of view, including the
interpretation of the said Sec. 94(e) of the Manual.
o Second, the rule on termination cases is that the burden of proof is on the employer to show the
existence of a just cause for termination. The evidence required is substantial evidence-- that relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds
equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Without such evidence, the dismissal is
considered not justified and therefore illegal.

 Procedurally, one can already see there was grave abuse of discretion in the findings of the Labor Arbiter (and
as affirmed by the NLRC and CA). The Labor Arbiter ruled on the basis that the pregnancy out of wedlock is per
se disgraceful and immoral since Leus was employed in a Catholic school. They merely assessed the fact of
pregnancy vis-a-vis the circumstances surrounding it. However, no evidence was presented at all to support this
conclusion. The fact of the pregnancy out of wedlock may not be enough to constitute disgraceful or immoral
conduct-- this conclusion must be proven throguh substantial evidence.

 Moreover, it cannot be said that the acts done constitute disgraceful or immoral conduct, or serious
misconduct. In Chua-Qua v Clave, the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of each
particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing (secular) norms of
conduct and applicable laws. This requires a look at: (1) the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct, and (2) the prevailing (again, secular) norms of conduct.

The secular perspective is necessary as to rely on religious beliefs would be to violate the establishment clause
of the Constitution. While government action may proscribe immorality through the criminalization of acts
such as concubinage, this is done with a secular mindset. The conduct is proscribed because it is detrimental or
dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society, and not
because it is proscribed by a religion. While a law may have deep roots in religion, for it to pass the religion
clauses, it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification.

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 Moreover, the secular perspective is necessary as we also consider the right to security of tenure, which is also
protected by the Constitution. A regular employee may not be dismissed unless for cause provided under the
Labor Code and other related laws, here the Manual.

 Applied here (and to the possibility of dismissal due to disgraceful or immoral conduct), the Court considers two
scenarios for an unmarried woman giving birth out of wedlock:
o If the father is unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct. While this is not ideal, nothing proscribes it, whether a penal provision or a (secular
and neutral) Constitutional policy.
o If the father is married to a woman other than the mother, there may be a cause for sanction against
either. The disgraceful and immoral conduct consists of having extramarital relations with a married
person, which contravenes our policy on the sanctity of marriage (especially as a special contract of
permanent union). This has been previously applied to administrative cases, such as those against
judicial employees and in the case of Santos v NLRC, facts congruent to the present case (except of
course, the teachers involved were married).

 It is not disputed that both Leus and her boyfriend are unmarried. The mere fact it led to childbirth did not
make it immoral conduct. Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in a Catholic school, and that her actions are
anathema to Catholic doctrine. However, this did not contravene SECULAR morality, which is the means of
interpreting the termination provision under the Manual.

 Neither could the school claim that the pregnancy caused grave scandal to the students. Not only was this not
supported by any evidence, but it should be noted that Leus was a non-teaching employee-- her interaction
with the students is limited. It is quite impossible that her pregnancy out of wedlock caused such as a grave
scandal so as to warrant her dismissal.

Neither could the school rely on management prerogative. While management certainly has the right and
power to discipline its workers, dismissal is another matter as JUST CAUSE is required. Here, there is no such
just cause. There is not even a single policy or rule in St. Scho that would warrant even disciplinary action.

 (However, while an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right, when
relations are strained between the parties, separation pay is granted instead.)

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