The Code Contains Six Canons

The Code contains six canons — one more than the 1989 Code — dealing with judicial independence,
integrity, impartiality, propriety, equality, and competence and diligence. According to the Supreme Court,
Its nuanced and often overlapping rules are meant to be respected by judges in both their public and
private lives.
The Code’s basic and guiding principle, as laid down in the high tribunal’s past decisions, is that a judge
not only must possess competence in the law but also have moral integrity. “Magistrates are measured
not only by their official acts, but also by their private morals, to the extent that these are externalized.”
Judges; bias and partiality must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held that the
truth about Judge Austria’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the verified
complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the
person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence
to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from being
speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on
mere opinion and surmises. The complainant also failed to adduce proof indicating the judge’s
predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I.
Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; impropriety. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Austria for impropriety for
posting her details as judge in Friendster and posting a picture with an indecent attire for the public’s
consumption. The Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, they do not shed off
their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and
duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty
of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public. Joining
Friendster per sedoes not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. However, Judge Austria
disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster
photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available for public
viewing. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judge; Time within which certain acts must be done; Exception. An administrative complaint was
filed against MCTC Judge Regencia. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the
efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the
disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants. In this case, the civil case was
already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary
Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last affidavit or position
paper within which a decision must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only
more than 2 years later. While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus,
should be regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges
and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their
businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge
Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case,
thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. Gershon N. Dulang
v. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841,
June 2, 2014.
Competencve and Diligence
Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that
the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits
and other countervailing evidence. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November
15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be
unfamiliar with the same. Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes
it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In
short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu
City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases. The OCA found that the court failed to
maintain a general docket book to keep track of the cases under it. Although the duty is vested with Mr. Teves as the
Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the members of her staff perform their duties.
The OCA also found that Mr. Teves repeatedly submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases
pending with their court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an efficient system of monitoring their cases.
Again, this is the primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct
an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that every
case is in proper order.
Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to comply with her duty
to provide an efficient court management system in her court which includes the preparation and use of docket
inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch
Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1) Dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis’ work history which reflects how she
performed her judicial functions. We find that there are several administrative cases already filed against her, with
most of these cases being decided against her. These cases show her inability to properly discharge her judicial
duties. Considering her past infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities she committed in this
present case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon.
Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr.
Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds. As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente, “an inhibition must be for just and valid
reason.” Complainant’s mere imputation that the case was decided by the magistrates of the Court with extreme bias
and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No.
9259. March 12, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the
fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Under the
1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission for decision
or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
The mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents
pending before the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the
norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction
against the defaulting magistrate. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same
court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC,
Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No.
RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases pending in his court.
Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and poor health, will not
absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for
good reasons, ask for an extension. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single
case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G.
Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the
prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as
suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending
on the following factors: (1) the number of cases not decided within the reglamentary period; (2) the presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances; (3) the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; (4) the health
and age of the judge; and (5) other analogous circumstances.
In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his more than 15
years in the service. The Court likewise took into consideration the fact that the respondent judge exerted earnest
efforts to fully comply with the Court’s directives as contained in the resolution. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC,
Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a justification for the delay. Respondent judge
claimed that the delay was the consequence of the three suspension orders issued against her as she was
suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six months. Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis
was repeatedly suspended in cases wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a member of the Bench. She
cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even
if she was allowed to avail of this excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she failed to
dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to said suspensions. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu
City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative matter was instituted against Judge
Grageda, based on the result of a judicial audit conducted after his retirement. According to the Supreme Court, for it
to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the
respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the
holding of a position or office in the government service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost
by the mere fact that the public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case.
In present case, Judge Grageda’s retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative
proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to
penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in the service. Accordingly, the complaint against retired
Judge Grageda was dismissed. Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March
1
SC dismisses judge for grave

misconduct
The Supreme Court (SC) has dismissed from the service a judge who
figured in the controversial 2013 elections of the Philippine Judges
Association (PJA) which resulted in the “Ma’am Arlene” controversy.
In a 32-page per curiam decision dated June 10, 2014, the SC ordered
the dismissal of Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 24 Judge Marino
Rubia of Binan, Laguna for gross violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
“Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby dismissed from the

service, with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment in any public office, including government-owned or –
controlled corporations,” the SC ruling said.
The SC also imposed a one-year suspension against Eileen Pecana,

Data Encoder of Binan, Laguna RTC for violations of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel.
It acted upon the administrative complaint filed by Emilie Sison-

Barias which has three cases concerning the estate of her late husband
pending before the sala of Rubia.
Barias filed the complaint before the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) on Nov. 11, 2010 where she accused Rubia of
conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law
and incompetence, and Pecana of gross misconduct.
In her complaint, Barias revealed that she had a dinner meeting with
the respondents in a restaurant in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City in
Taguig on March 3, 2010 where they have discussed her pending
cases.
During the meeting, Rubia allegedly asked her questions not related to
her pending cases, including her supposed involvement with another
man, her being connected with a leading airline in the country and the
hospital where she brought her husband when he suffered cardiac
arrest.
The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals (CA) Associate

Justice Samuel Gaerlan.
In his investigation report dated March 13, 2012, Gaerlan

recommended that the respondents Rubia and Pecana should not be
held administratively liable as he was convinced that the meeting of
complainant and respondents at Burgos Circle in Global City was
“just a chance encounter” and that Barias had failed to present
substantial evidence to prove her allegations.
Gaerlan also stressed the fact that it had taken Barias eight months
before she filed the administrative complaint.
However, the SC rejected the report of Gaerlan as they decided to hold

Rubia and Pecana administratively liable.
The SC En Banc gave more weight to Barias’ testimony and to her

narration of the dinner meeting which was supported by the exchange
of text messages between Barias and Pecana.
“Pecana’s actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for

Court Personnel when she admitted to meeting with complainant
several times, thus allowing herself to be placed in a position that
could cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel,” the SC
ruling said.
“Respondent Pecana’s actions constitute a clear violation of the

requirement that all court personnel uphold integrity and prudence in
all their actions,” it added.
As to the case of Rubia, the SC is convinced that he had committed
gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct by meeting a
litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel.
The SC also castigated Rubia because of his failure to admonish or

discipline Pecana after he was informed of the latter’s interactions
with a litigant.
“Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of

his office. By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to
admonish respondent Pecana for her admitted impropriety, respondent
Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct,” the SC ruling said.
As to the allegations of Barias against the orders of Rubia in her

pending cases, the SC ruled that the complainant “should resort to
appropriate judicial remedies.”
The SC’s ruling is immediately executory. PNA

A judge shall conduct the judge’s personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize
the risk of conflict with the obligations of judicial office.
Rule 3.1. Extrajudicial Activities in General.
Judges shall regulate their extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with their
judicial duties and to comply with all provisions of this Canon. However, a judge shall
not:
(A) participate in activities that will interfere with the proper performance of the judge’s
judicial duties;
(B) participate in activities that will lead to frequent disqualification of the judge;
(C) participate in activities that would reasonably appear to undermine the judge’s
independence, integrity, or impartiality;
(D) engage in conduct that would reasonably appear to be coercive; or
(E) make use of court premises, staff, stationery, equipment, or other resources, except
for incidental use for activities that concern the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice, or unless such additional use is permitted by law.
Comment:
(1) To the extent that time permits, and judicial independence and impartiality are not
compromised, judges are encouraged to engage in appropriate extrajudicial activities.
Judges are uniquely qualified to engage in extrajudicial activities that concern the law,
the legal system, and the administration of justice, such as by speaking, writing,
teaching, or participating in scholarly research projects. In addition, judges are permitted
and encouraged to engage in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic
extrajudicial activities not conducted for profit, even when the activities do not involve
the law. See Rule 3.7.
(2) Participation in both law-related and other extrajudicial activities helps integrate
judges into their communities, and furthers public understanding of and respect for
courts and the judicial system.
(3) Discriminatory actions and expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside
the judge’s official or judicial actions, are likely to appear to a reasonable person to call
into question the judge’s integrity and impartiality. Examples include jokes or other
remarks that demean individuals based upon their race, sex, gender identity or
expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or
socioeconomic status. For the same reason, a judge’s extrajudicial activities must not
be conducted in connection or affiliation with an organization that practices invidious
discrimination. See Rule 3.6.
(4) While engaged in permitted extrajudicial activities, judges must not coerce others or
take action that would reasonably be perceived as coercive.
(5) Paragraph (E) of this Rule is not intended to prohibit a judge’s occasional use of
office resources, such as a telephone, for personal purposes.
Rule 3.1 – Amended April 25, 2018, effective July 1, 2018
Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases.
(1) This Rule’s restrictions on judicial speech are essential to the maintenance of the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. A judge should be
mindful that comments of a judge regarding matters that are pending or
impending in any court can sometimes affect the outcome or impair the fairness
of proceedings in a matter. See Rule 1.2.
(2) Rule 2.2. Impartiality and Fairness.
(3) A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial
office fairly and impartially.
(4) Comment:
(5) (1) To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge must be objective
and open-minded.
(6) (2) Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and
personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without regard to
whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in question. This comment
is not intended to restrict the appropriate functions of the courts in statutory or
common law review.
(7) (3) When applying and interpreting the law, a judge sometimes may make good-
faith errors of fact or law. Errors of this kind do not violate this Rule.
(8) (4) It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters
heard fairly and impartially.
(9) Rule 2.3. Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment.
(10) (A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including
administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.
(11) (B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not
limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender identity or
expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation,
marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and shall not permit
court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge’s direction and control to
do so.
(12) (C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain
from manifesting bias or prejudice, or engaging in harassment, based upon
attributes including but not limited to race, sex, gender identity or expression,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital
status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, against parties, witnesses,
lawyers, or others.
(13) (D) The restrictions of paragraphs (B) and (C) do not preclude judges or
lawyers from making legitimate reference to the listed factors, or similar factors,
when they are relevant to an issue in a proceeding.
(14) Comment:
(15) (1) A judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the
fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.
(16) (2) Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not
limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping;
attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile
acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and
crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics. Even facial
expressions and body language can convey to parties and lawyers in the
proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice. A
judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or
biased.
(17) (3) Harassment, as referred to in paragraphs (B) and (C), is verbal or

physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward a person
on bases such as race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability,
age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political
affiliation.
(18) (4) Sexual harassment includes but is not limited to sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature that is unwelcome.
(19) (5) The Supreme Court’s Rules and Policies, e.g., the Rules of Judicial
Administration and the Unified Judicial System Policy on Non-Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, have continued force and effect.
(20) Rule 2.3 Amended March 28, 2017, effective immediately
(21) Rule 2.4. External Influences on Judicial Conduct.
(22) (A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.
(23) (B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other
interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.
(24) (C) A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression
that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.
(25) Comment:
(26) An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases according to

the law and facts, without regard to whether particular laws or litigants are
popular or unpopular with the public, the media, government officials, or the
judge’s friends or family. Confidence in the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision
making is perceived to be subject to inappropriate outside influences.
(27) Rule 2.5. Competence, Diligence and Cooperation.
(28) (A) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently
and diligently.
(29) (B) A judge shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the
administration of court business.
(30) Comment:
(31) (1) Competence in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to
perform a judge’s responsibilities of judicial office.
(32) (2) A judge should seek the necessary docket time, court staff, expertise,
and resources to discharge all adjudicative and administrative responsibilities.
(33) (3) Prompt disposition of the court’s business requires a judge to devote
adequate time to judicial duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious
in determining matters under submission, and to take reasonable measures to
ensure that court officials, litigants, and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to
that end. The obligation of this Rule includes, for example, the accurate, timely
and complete compliance with the requirements of Pa.R.J.A. No. 703 (Reports of
Judges) where applicable.
(34) (4) In disposing of matters promptly and efficiently, a judge must
demonstrate due regard for the rights of parties to be heard and to have issues
resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. A judge should monitor and
supervise cases in ways that reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable
delays, and unnecessary costs.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 February 4, 2015

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ]
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice
Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013
Resolution,2 referring the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado
P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Facts
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave
misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of
school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in
August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis
(Judge Tormis),then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Cebu City,
as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in
his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several
times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis
Mondragon Tormis (Francis),son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted addict."4 She
was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang
(Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided
to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis"5 (Lachica v. Tormis),
her mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a
cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case
then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted
therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her
mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the
amount of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,"docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then
pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Comment of Judge Paredes
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated
thatJudge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a
result of the investigations, he recommended sanctionsagainst Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis
used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v.
Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of
the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity
and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the
judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would
not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams werealso discussed during meetings of RTC
judges and in schools where remediallaw and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and
resolvedcases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in
discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the
legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge
Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, butshe resented his advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or
dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter
was not also brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local
authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug
addict and thatdrug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested thatFrancis
should be removed from the judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the
influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who
determines the persons to be appointed as court employees. JudgeTormis, however, allowed her
drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally
accepted a cash bail bond of 6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio onMarch 13, 2011.
He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5
of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent
matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely
followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following
business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk
of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official
receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in
the afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred thatthe discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge
Tormiscould not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the
performance of his judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do
with the filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to
continue her law studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and
judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of
her mother’s administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in the
marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her
mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge
Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her
brother, Francis, as a "drug addict."
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to
discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn
Garcia and was also written in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was
known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.
In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the
conflicting allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on
the evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive natureof the charges, a full-
blown investigation should be conducted by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the
administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report
and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.11
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy.
Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted.
Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of the parties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in
class where she was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of
delicadezabordering on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards
of behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could
not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the performance of his official duties
did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of whatwas just and fair not only in
the performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when he discussed the marriage
scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated; that
the administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge
Paredes was not the Executive Judge ofthe MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the
Guiguiocase; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before
accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption
judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did
not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of. In his Reply-Memorandum,13Judge
Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage
scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA
held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may comment
thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge
Tormis never intervened in the present case; that ifhe indeed made derogatory remarks against
Judge Tormis, she should havefiled a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the
ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the
Judiciary.14
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was
inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the
laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative
case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to
be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that "Judges,
like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary."16
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held administratively liable
for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the
exercise of his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions,
but also inhis other professional endeavors and everyday activities.
Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when the
latter discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still
being investigated. She cited, as basis for JudgeParedes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguiocase, Justice Diy
absolved him ofany liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient
evidence. She accepted Judge Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid
down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail bond.
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the
following: (1) a Fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out
with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.18
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to
duty and the rights of others.19
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against
Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be
considered as "misconduct." They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a
judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing.
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial Conduct provides: CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make
any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair
the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order
to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.21 The
rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that
it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; thatfacts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.23 Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the
marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not
yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2,
2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue
influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the
judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in
finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing
the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in
bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the
marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his
class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was
widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no
need for Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the wound,"25 as Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge
Tormisas a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify
propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence
and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. Heshould choose his words and exercise more
caution and control inexpressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered
petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to
always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.26
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code
and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes
demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal
circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then
being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge
Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4
of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to
freedomof expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary ofwhich he is a
part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should
have been more circumspect inhis language. Beinga judge, he is expected to act with greater
circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively
liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes
should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him asa judge not only in the performance of
his judicial duties, but in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of
the Code mandates:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. (Emphases
1âwphi1
supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not
be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of
Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge mustbe free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his salaand as
a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify
honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties
and in private life should be above suspicion.27
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case,Justice Diy correctly found
that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court findsmerit in the position of Judge
Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, ofthe cash bail bond, was in accordance with the
rules. Thus:
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave
misconduct when he personally received cash bailbond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge
Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section
14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on
Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule
also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge
receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that
Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot beheld administratively liable for his act
of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed
either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place
of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of
arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are
authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes
was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as anExecutive Judge since he was the
only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail
bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assignedto the court where the Guioguio case
was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the
bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be
present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity
reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by
sufficient evidence.28
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not
less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition
with warning.
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the
circumstances is admonition.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and
ADMONISHES him therefor.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016
WILFREDO F. TUVILLO, Complainant, v. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON, RESPONDENT.
A.M. NO. MTJ-10-1756
MELISSA J. TUVILLO A.K.A MICHELLE JIMENEZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE HENRY E.

LARON,Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a consolidation of two cases filed against Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City (MeTC). The first case arose from the complaint of Wilfredo Tuvillo
(Wilfredo) for immoral conduct, and the second case from the complaint of Melissa Tuvillo (Melissa) for
unexplained wealth and immorality.
Wilfredo and Melissa Tuvillo are husband and wife. Wilfredo works as a seaman and is out of the country
most of the time. Melissa is a businesswoman with several B.P. Blg. 22 cases filed against her in the MeTC
of Makati City. In her desire to have her cases resolved, she approached the respondent Judge Henry Laron
(Judge Laron). The respondent is married but his wife was in the United States at the time the events of this
case transpired. Due to their frequent interaction with each other, Melissa and Judge Laron became intimate
with each other and their relationship gave rise to these administrative cases.
The Complaint of
Wilfredo Tuvillo
On May 2, 2008, Wilfredo wrote a letter-complaint against Judge Laron to the Court Administrator for
immorality and unacceptable wrongdoing. He submitted a Complaint-Affidavit1 where he alleged, among
others, that his wife Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron for t resolution of the cases filed against her;
that, in turn, Judge Laron asked money from Melissa and forced her to produce it whenever he needed it;
that they lost all their savings and their two houses and lots because of Judge Laron's constant requests for
money from Melissa; that Judge Laron would physically hurt Melissa when she could not produce the money
he needed; and that Judge Laron "transgressed, intruded and besmirched the tranquility and sacredness of
our marital union and family unity" To support his complaint, Wilfredo attached Melissa's complaint-letter
and her affidavit where she admitted having illicit relations with Judge Laron.2 chanrobles law
Wilfredo also submitted the Joint Affidavit of his two sons3 wherein they alleged: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
6. That sometime in the year 2007, we were living in our house in Antipolo city; We were surprised that
certain Tito Henry Laron used to go to our house in Antipolo; He slept in our house twice or thrice a week
specially during weekends; Nagtaka kami mga magkakapatid bakit natutulog si Tito Henry Laron sa bahay
namin at sinusundo na kami at ang mama namin tuwing umaga minsan gamit ang kanyang sasakyan
minsan aming sasakyan ang ginagamit niya at sunduin kami sa school tuwing hapon.
This allegation was confirmed by their caretaker in her Affidavit4 stating that Judge Laron slept in the
Antipolo house during weekends, picked up Melissa and her children in the morning, and fetched them from
school in the afternoon using either his own or Melissa's car.
In his July 2, 2008 Comment,5 Judge Laron averred that he had already confessed his affair with Melissa to
his wife. In his December 18, 2008 Comment,6 he claimed that Melissa told him that she was a widow and
explained that his relationship with her was an intimate emotional and personal attachment that did not
involve any sexual liaison.
Wilfredo subsequently filed an adultery case against Melissa and Judge Laron before the City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati but it was later dismissed for lack of probable cause.7 Wilfredo's petition for review was also
dismissed by the Department of Justice8 for failure to comply with DOJ Circular No. 70 and for lack of
reversible error.9
chan rob leslaw
The Complaint of Melissa Tuvillo
This case was initiated by Melissa on May 14, 2008 when she wrote a letter to the Court Administrator
accusing Judge Leron of unexplained wealth and immorality. In her letter, she asked that Judge Laron be
investigated because based on his salary as a judge, he could not have acquired their P9 million house. She
also claimed that Judge Laron could not have afforded to buy several Lamarroza paintings, four Plasma
televisions, expensive furniture, a Nissan Patrol, and to send his three children to private schools. Her letter
also bore her admission that she was his mistress for three years.
In his July 21, 2008 Comment,10 Judge Laron explained how he was able to afford and own the properties
that Melissa claimed were beyond his means. He said that he and his wife sold their townhouse for P1.7M
and obtained a P3.2M loan from Land Bank to cover the P4.4M construction cost of his house.11 The Nissan
Patrol, a 2001 model, was allegedly bought for P1.15M with money borrowed from his father's retirement
proceeds.12 The Lamarroza paintings, accumulated through the years from 2004 to 200713 for a total value
of P410,000.00, were purchased at a low price because the artist was his wife's friend. The two (2) plasma
televisions, on the other hand, were gifts to them while the other two were purchased in 2000 and 2002. His
children's tuition fees were covered by educational plans14 and their furniture was part of his wife's
commission as a dealer in his relative's furniture shop.
In her July 31, 2008 Complaint-Affidavit,15 Melissa admitted that she had approached Judge Laron when she
needed help regarding the pending cases against her. Her liaisons with Judge Laron started in November
2005 in his office (doon una niya akong naangkin). She said that he slept in their house in Antipolo and was
in her Pasong Tamo condominium almost daily from August 2007 to January 2008. At that time, Melissa was
receiving a monthly allowance of US$2,000.00 from her husband while Judge Laron would ask money from
her every month and whenever he needed it. She cited several occasions when she gave him money. Judge
Laron would hurt her physically and threaten to tell her husband about their relationship every time she
would refuse to give him money. To meet Judge Laron's demand for money, she said that she sold her
house and lot in Taguig City and her two vehicles - a Pajero and a Honda CRV. Yet, only two of her four
pending cases were settled. She also mentioned an incident in Judge Laron's office in April 2008 when a
lawyer attempted to effect a reconciliation between her and Judge Laron.
Defense of Judge Laron
In his October 27, 2008 Comment,16 Judge Laron related that Melissa was introduced to him in November
2005 and that in December 2005, she informed him about her B.P. Blg. 22 cases. He refuted the alleged
sexual liaisons that happened in his chambers by attaching affidavits of his staff who swore that the door to
his chambers was necessarily open because the air conditioner that supplied the cold air to the staff room,
the telephones, the fax machine, the coffee maker, and the refrigerator were all in his chambers. He
likewise denied that he had asked Melissa for money or that she gave him money. He pointed out that
Melissa could have settled the cases against her by paying the complainants because she had the money.
The cases against her were violations of B.P. Blg. 22: two counts for P20,000.00, two counts for P19,377.00,
and two counts for P24,620.00. He also mentioned that the threats and harassment against him started
when he began avoiding her.
A member of the staff of Judge Laron, Ma. Anicia Razon, related in her affidavit that on April 16, 2008, a
woman went inside the chamber of Judge Laron and started shouting and berating the judge.17 A man, who
was then with her, pulled the woman away and brought her out of the room. She, however, continued her
outburst even when they were already along the corridor. Seven other staff members executed a joint
affidavit18 about the incident narrating that they ran to his chambers after they heard a woman shouting and
then saw the woman berating Judge Laron (minumura at inaalipusta) while the judge just remained quiet
(nanatiling tahimik). The woman's shouts were heard even in the courtroom. They recounted that the
woman told the judge: "IDEDEMANDA KITA!" to which the judge retorted: "Idedemanda ka rin ng misis ko."
Imelda Laron, the wife of Judge Tuvillo, also executed an affidavit where she recounted that sometime in
January 2008, she lifted their home phone and heard a conversation between her husband and another
person.19 She confronted her husband about what she overheard and they had a serious talk about Melissa.
She also stated that after that incident, "nasty text messages with threats from different cellphone numbers
were sent to me;" that their sons also received the same messages in their cell phones; and that her
relatives in the province, whose cellphone numbers were listed in her list of contacts, called her "about the
damaging text messages they received about my husband and the woman named Michelle."
The Office of the Court Administrator in its Report20 recommended the consolidation of the two complaints
as all the allegations in both were rooted on the alleged affair between Judge Laron and Melissa.21 After its
evaluation, the OCA recommended that Judge Laron be found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and
be fined P10,000.00, and that the case for unexplained wealth be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.
The Court's Ruling
Unexplained Wealth
The charge of unexplained wealth was disputed by Judge Laron who was able to explain the source of the
money he used to pay for the construction of his house and the purchase of his vehicle, televisions and
furniture. He also attached copies of the educational plans of his children. On the other hand, Melissa failed
to substantiate her claim that Judge Laron, by his salary, could not afford to buy those properties and send
his children to private schools. For said reason, the Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation that the
complaint for unexplained wealth against Judge Laron be dismissed.
Immorality
The charge of immorality, however, is a serious one covered by Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
The penalty therefor includes dismissal from the service. Section 8 of Rule 140 provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an
appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, members of the judiciary are essentially guided by Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of
Judicial Ethics in their acts. Canon 4, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Judge Laron's conduct of carrying on
an affair with a married woman is highly improper. Pertinently, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry 3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety.
A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not
only upon the bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety both
in his professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court.22 As
the judicial front-liners, judges must behave with propriety at all times as they are the intermediaries
between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. These most exacting
standards of decorum are demanded from the magistrates in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary.24 No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness
and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench.25 As the epitome of integrity and justice, a
cralawre d
judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion. For moral integrity is not only a virtue but a necessity in the judiciary.26 chan robles law
In these cases at bench, the conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this exacting standard. By carrying an affair
with a married woman, Judge Laron violated the trust reposed on his office and utterly failed to live up to
noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the members of the judiciary.27As the Court wrote in
Re: Letter of Judge Augustus Diaz,28 "a judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. He must
comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to
the performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
His character must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles
and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial
system."
In these cases, both Judge Laron and Melissa admitted the affair. In the case filed by Wilfredo, the July 2,
2008 Comment29 of Judge Laron reads:
1. Sometime in November 2005, Melissa Tuvillo was introduced to me. In December 2005, Melissa
approached me regarding problems about a vehicular accident she was involved in. She later
informed me about the bouncing checks filed against her. At that time, I had been married for more
than 17 years, and my wife was in the United States attending to her ailing father. Melissa was
likewise then without a husband and Mr. Tuvillo was out at sea. She was aware of my marital status
and that I have three sons. We were both mature lonely people whose marriages had
lessened sheen. She brought me a sense of soul connection, understanding and great
company. [Emphasis supplied]
2. On the week of the May 2007 elections, Melissa called and told me that her husband Wilfredo died
of illness in China. She even told me that the remains were cremated, that a padasal was held at
Brgy. Pitogo, Makati City, the place of her husband. After that, she frequently asked for my
presence and company, she even asked me to help her guide her four children, and we developed
an intimate personal attachment to each other. She showered me with the affection I felt
I needed, and I reciprocated. We however tried our best to be discreet and sensitive to
the sensibilities of those around us.
3. September of 2007 was a turning point. Imelda, my previously distant wife became ever present.
My wife was all over me, ever caring and loving. On November 2007, I started to distance myself
from Melissa.
4. Around the first week of January 2008, Imelda would later hear of the affair, she confronted me and
I soon had to choose between the mother of my three children, or Melissa, the woman who made
me feel needed and cared for. One look at my three sons made the choice plainly clear. I could not
abandon my family. I confessed to the affair, and vowed that I would immediately mend my
ways. I started to exercise more self-discipline, and became more aware of my responsibilities to
my family. I now persevere in keeping true to the straight and narrow path." [Emphases supplied]
The affidavit of Melissa, on the other hand, stated that:30 chan robles law
2. I have been maintaining an illicit relation with the said Judge above-named since November 2005 until
March 2008. Our relation is known among the personnel in the court's premises in Makati City.
3. To support my complaint are the various text messages and videos, ATM cards, bank checks which I am
willing to present in the proper forum. [Emphasis supplied]
The illicit affair must have been known to the staff of the court because in their joint affidavit recounting the
scene created by Melissa when she berated the judge in his office, none of them attempted to stop her
harangue which was highly disrespectful of the judge's status. Judge Laron's inaction on the face of Melissa's
verbal attack was a strong indication that they had a relationship which was more than official or
professional.
In finding Judge Laron guilty of immorality, the Court is guided by the ruling in Geroy v. Calderon31where it
was written:
The bottom line is that respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which
every member of the judiciary is expected to observe. Respondent is a married man, yet he engaged in a
romantic relationship with complainant. Granting arguendo that respondent's relationship with complainant
never went physical or intimate, still he cannot escape the charge of immorality, for his own admissions
show that his relationship with her was more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than
friendly.
As the Court held in Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr.;32 chanro bles law
[I]mmorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare. [Italics Supplied]
Immorality under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11,
2001 on the discipline of Justices and Judges, is a serious charge which carries any of the following
sanctions: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
The Court also finds Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is
another serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. The illicit relationship started
because Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron with respect to her pending B.P. Blg. 22 cases and,
apparently, he entertained the request for assistance. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
Rule 2.04.—A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency.
Judge Laron admitted that Melissa had informed him about the f@ B.P. Blg. 22 cases against-her one month
after she was introduced to him. One of those cases was before Judge Laron himself. The case was
dismissed upon agreement of the parties.33 Another case was pending before the sala of another judge
which was provisionally dismissed.34 The situation highly smacked of impropriety because Judge Laron, at
the very least, "aided" Melissa in a case pending before him and before another judge.
Another situation of impropriety was when Judge Laron asked money from Melissa who was a litigant in a
case pending before his court. This is also a serious charge under Section 8 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Wilfredo and Melissa alleged in their complaints that Judge Laron continuously demanded money from
Melissa which led to the sale of their houses and vehicles. Melissa claimed that: Judge Henry Laron was
asking an amount of money on a monthly basis. In addition, he is also asking me to purchased his
medicines (Teveten, Forecad. I even shoulder the expenses of his executive check-up (07-08 June 2007)
and also the normal visitation, to his doctor (Dr. Antonio Sibulo, St. Luke's Hospital) in which he kept all the
receipt. He was also asking for cell phone load, gasoline, and monthly groceries (Puregold). Judge Henry
Laron even ask for an allowance when he was sent to Canada (a total of 2,000 US dollars) for a study grant
last year.35 She further claimed that Judge Laron would physically hurt whenever she could not give him
money and this averment was corroborated by her sons who stated in their affidavit that "he is hurting
physically our mother because we saw once our mother having maraming paso, the result of the physical
punishment made by Tito Henry Laron."36Melissa also submitted a photocopy of a Bank of Philippine Islands
deposit slip US$200 deposited in the account of "Henry E. Laron."37 chanrobles law
All these conduct and behavior are contrary to the canons of judicial conduct and ethics. Judges are held to
higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and
confidence. Judges should uplift the honor of the judiciary rather than bring it to disrepute. Demanding
money from a party-litigant who has a pending case before him is an act that this Court condemns in the
strongest possible terms. In the words of Velez v. Flores,38 such act corrodes respect for the law and the
courts, committed as it was by one who was tasked administering the law and rendering justice.
Judge Laron's immorality and serious misconduct have repercussions not only on the judiciary but also on
the millions of overseas Filipino workers (OFW) like Wilfredo. While Wilfredo was working hard abroad to
earn for his family, Judge Laron was sleeping with his wife in his bed in his house and spending his hard-
earned dollars. What was even worse was the flaunting of the illicit relationship before his young boys (aged
13 and 14) who related it to him upon his return from abroad. This is the nightmare scenario of every OFW -
to be confronted upon their return with stories from their own children about the "other man or woman"
sleeping in their house while they were away enduring the bitter cold or searing heat, homesickness, culture
shock, and occasional inhumane treatment just to earn the dollars for the food, shelter, clothing, and
education of their family back home.
Under these circumstances, the Court finds itself unable to adopt the recommendation of the OCA that Judge
Laron be simply found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a public official and be fined P10,000.00. The OCA's
recommended dismissal of the charge of immorality is not warranted by the evidence on hand. Judge Laron
himself admitted his immorality and even prayed that he be forgiven and that no disciplinary action be taken
against him.39 To disregard Judge Laron's admission and grant his plea would mean a betrayal of the public
trust.
WHEREFORE, finding Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati
City, GUILTY of IMMORALITY and SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, the Court hereby metes him the maximum
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits. He is
likewise disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The charge of Unexplained Wealth is DISMISSED for insufficient evidence.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

November 7, 2017
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant

vs.
JUDGE CONRADO O. ALINEA, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, IBA, ZAMBALES, Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stemmed from a news
report in the June 19, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer1 regarding an entrapment operation
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against Respondent Judge Conrado O.
Alinea, Jr. (Judge Alinea) of the Municipal Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (MTC), for demanding and
receiving the amount of ₱15,000.00 from the plaintiffs in a land dispute case pending in the said
court.
The undisputed facts, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Raul A. Neria (Neria) and his uncle, Cesar Abadam (Abadam), were among the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 7852(subject case). The MTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, which ruling was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales (RTC) on appeal by the defendants therein.3 On
August 24, 2001, the RTC issued a Notice to Vacate,4 ordering the defendants to vacate the
premises subject of the case. However, defendants refused to do so,5 prompting the RTC to issue an
Order6 dated September 15, 2003 for the issuance of a Writ of Demolition (Writ). Thereafter, in
another Order7 dated October 6, 2003, the RTC remanded the subject case to the MTC for execution
of the Writ.
Judge Alinea issued an Order8 dated November 7, 2003, directing the sheriff to enforce the Writ. On
December 23, 2003, defendants filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Demolition,9 but this was
denied in a Resolution dated May 3, 2004.10 On Motion for Reconsideration11 by the defendants,
Judge Alinea, in an Order12 dated June 3, 2004, recalled the Writ and set the motion for hearing on
June 11, 2004. Immediately after the hearing on the said date, Neria and Abadam asked Judge
Alinea why he recalled the Writ. However, instead of giving any satisfactory answer, Judge Alinea
told them to give him ₱15,000.00 in exchange for a favorable resolution.13
Surprised by Judge Alinea's directive, Neria and Abadam filed on June 15, 2004 with the NBI a
complaint14 for Direct Bribery, and an entrapment operation was arranged. On June 17, 2004, Neria
and Jose Abadam, together with NBI agents and Simeon Soriaga of the television
program Magandang Gabi Bayan, proceeded to Iba, Zambales for the operation. Judge Alinea sent
a text message to Neria, directing them to proceed to Bon's Restaurant. Upon reaching the
restaurant, Neria and Jose Abadam handed over an envelope containing the marked money in the
amount of ₱15,000.00 to Judge Alinea. After Judge Alinea acknowledged receipt of the money and
placed them on the table, the NBI agents immediately arrested him and thereafter subjected him to
an ultraviolet light examination by the NBI forensic chemist. Per the NBI's Report15 dated June 21,
2004, Judge Alinea was tested positive for specks of fluorescent powder from the marked money.16
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information17 for Direct Bribery18 against Judge Alinea with the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27994, thus:
That on or about 17 June 2004 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Iba, Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused CONRADO ALINEA y OBISPO, a public officer, being then the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, taking advantage of his official position and with
grave abuse of authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS ([₱]15,000.00) but received only the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
[₱l0,000.00] consisting of Three (3) pieces [P]l,000 bills, six (6) pieces of [₱]500 bills and forty (40)
pieces [₱]l00 bills, dusted with fluorescent powder and invisible ink, from Raul A. Neria in exchange
for a favorable resolution that he will render in connection with Civil Case No. 785 entitled Heirs of
Agueda Giron, et al. vs. Heirs of Roque Edejer, et al. to the damage and prejudice of said private
complainant and the public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
Meanwhile, the OCA instituted the instant administrative matter against him for the same offense. In
its Resolution20 dated January 17, 2005, the Court ordered Judge Alinea to: (1) comment on the NBI
report dated June 21, 2004,21 the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan against him,22 and
the sinumpaang salaysay of Neria;23 and (2) show cause why he should not be suspended,
disbarred, or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar for Violation of Rule
1.01,24 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) within ten (10) days from notice.
In his Comment,25 Judge Alinea denied having demanded any amount of money from Neria and
having taken the marked money, and even accused Neria of attempting to bribe him. He alleged that
he refused to accept the said envelope and simply left it at the table before walking away. In its
Resolution26 dated June 20, 2005, this Court held in abeyance the administrative proceedings
pending resolution of the criminal case against Judge Alinea.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Decision27 dated January 25, 2010, finding Judge
Alinea guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Bribery, finding that the series of circumstances
established Judge Alinea's intent to extort money from Neria and Abadam in exchange for a ruling in
their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Conrado O. Alinea,

Jr. GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery, defined and penalized under the
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year, 1 month and 11 days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00).
The accused shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.28
On petition for review on certiorari,29 the Court's Third Division affirmed Judge Alinea's conviction in
its Resolutions dated July 19, 201030 and November 17, 2010,31 finding no reversible error on the part
of the Sandiganbayan in convicting him of the said offense. An Entry of Judgment was subsequently
issued on January 24, 2011.32 Thereafter, in its Resolution33 dated January 13, 2016, the Court
ordered the resumption of the administrative proceedings against him. However, Judge Alinea had
reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 on August 16, 2013,34 three (3) years before the
resumption of the said proceedings.
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In its Memorandum35 dated August 8, 2016, the OCA found Judge Alinea guilty of gross misconduct
for Violation of Republic Act No. 3019,36 (R.A. No. 3019) and Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as well as Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and recommended that he be disbarred, citing his
conviction by the Sandiganbayan for Direct Bribery, which was affirmed by the Court. It opined that
allowing Judge Alinea to continue serving as a judge after his conviction would unduly tarnish the
image of, and the people's confidence in, the judicial system, and would be an insult to the legal
profession. Moreover, it cited Section 2 7, Rule 13 8 of the Rules of Court in relation to A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC,37 which provides that administrative cases against a judge of a regular court based on
grounds which are identical to those for disciplinary action against a member of the bar, shall be also
considered as a disciplinary case against him as such member of the Bar, and that judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. However, the OCA anchored its finding
of gross misconduct on the violation of R.A. No. 3019 instead of Direct Bribery under the Revised
Penal Code despite Judge Alinea's conviction on the latter offense.
The OCA also took into account that Judge Alinea had already reached the compulsory retirement
age of 70, hence dismissal from the service would be impossible to impose. Thus, it recommended
the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court

that:
a) respondent Judge Conrado O. Alinea, Jr., Municipal Trial Court, Iba, Zambales, be found GUILTY
of gross misconduct for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019), the
Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under Rule 1.01, Canon I. In lieu of dismissal from the service, which
may no longer be imposed owing to his retirement, as penalty for his offense, all his retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, be FORFEITED, and with prejudice to reemployment in the
Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies including government-owned
and -controlled corporations; and,
b) respondent Judge Alinea be likewise DISBARRED and his name be STRICKEN from the roll of
attomeys.38
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious review of the records, the Court has no cogent reason to diverge from the findings
and recommendations of the OCA.
Direct Bribery involves, among others, the act of a public officer in accepting an offer or promise, or
receiving a gift, by himself or another, with a view to perform a crime or an unjust act, or commit an
omission, which is connected to his official duties.39 It is a crime involving moral turpitude, an act
which is "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals," and involves "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman,
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals,"40 and which renders any person
convicted of the said offense unfit to continue discharging his duties as a public official or a
lawyer.41 It is also among the serious charges enumerated in Section 8,42 Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, which may be punished by, among others, dismissal from the service and forfeiture of
benefits.43 Moreover, it is a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or
suspend a lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27,44 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In this matter, the OCA observed that the Sandiganbayan and the Court had held Judge Alinea guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery, finding that: (1) Judge Alinea demanded
₱15,000.00 from Neria in exchange for a favorable resolution of the latter's case; (2) while at Bon's
Restaurant in Iba, Zambales, Judge Alinea had indeed accepted the said amount from Neria, after
which the NBI agents arrested him; and (3) the NBI forensic chemist subjected Judge Alinea to an
ultraviolet light examination, which tested him positive for fluorescent specks from the money he
received from Neria. Hence, it concluded that the foregoing are more than sufficient evidence to find
Judge Alinea administratively liable for the said offense as a member of both the Bench and the Bar.
The Court agrees with the OCA. It cannot emphasize enough how bribery, whether direct or indirect,
can seriously affect the public's trust in every subdivision and agency of government, more so in the
judiciary. As the branch of government responsible for interpreting laws and settling controversies
brought to it by any person, it has the duty to observe fairness and neutrality in hearing the sides of
all the parties to a case,45 and make a resolution thereon based solely on the merits of the evidence
presented by the parties and the laws and jurisprudence applicable thereon.46
As gleaned above, the evidence had fully established Judge Alinea' s criminal intent to extort money
from Neria and Abadam, from demanding ₱l5,000.00 in exchange for a favorable decision, to
actually accepting the said amount when they met at Bon's Restaurant. Thus, Judge Alinea not only
gravely violated his duty to dispense justice solely in accordance with the merits of the case, but also
put the trust and confidence of the people in the judiciary and the rule of law into serious peril, hence
rendering him utterly unfit to continue dispensing his duties as a public official and a member of the
Bar.47
As for the imposable penalty, the Court agrees with the OCA that Judge Alinea should be disbarred
and the benefits he received as a judge be forfeited. It is important to stress anew that Direct
1âwphi 1
Bribery is not only a serious charge which would merit the dismissal from the service of a judge and
the forfeiture of his benefits, but also a crime involving moral turpitude which is a ground for the
disbarment of a lawyer.
In this regard, it is relevant to note that the Court has, in the past, dismissed erring judges from the
service and disbarred them in a single decision on the ground of conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude,48 and forfeited the benefits of other judges similarly situated, who had already retired
prior to the resolution of the administrative matters against them,49 all in accordance with Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in relation to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. In view of the seriousness of the
offense, and considering that Judge Alinea had already reached the compulsory retirement age of
70 on August 16, 2013, the Court hereby imposes the forfeiture of benefits as a former judge.
In addition, the Court hereby disbars him. In imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment, the Court
is also aware of its recent decision in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B. Yu.50 In the
said case, the Court dismissed Judge Eliza B. Yu from the service for gross insubordination, gross
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, oppression, and conduct
unbecoming of a judicial official in, among others: (1) resisting the implementation of the Court's
Administrative Order No. 19- 2011 in designating her to render night court duties; (2) refusing to
honor the appointment of court personnel; (3) issuing show-cause orders against fellow judges and
court personnel; and (4) sending e-mails, and Yahoo and Facebook messages, which contained
sexual innuendos to a fellow female judge. However, while the offenses charged against her were
also considered as violations of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, it was shown that she was not yet given an opportunity to explain
why she should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined as a member of the Bar. Thus, in its
decision dated November 22, 2016, the Court, in dismissing Judge Yu from the service, and as part
of due process, directed her, among others, to show cause in writing why she should not be
disbarred for her acts, and it was only after she submitted her written explanation, and after
judiciously studying the merits thereof, that the Court disbarred her in its Resolution dated March 14,
2017.
Here, on the other hand, the Court, in its January 17, 2005 Resolution, explicitly directed Judge
Alinea to show cause why he should not be suspended, disbarred, or otherwise disciplinarily
sanctioned as a member of the Bar for Violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, to which he
complied. Hence, he was undeniably accorded due process insofar as the disbarment matter against
him is concerned. Finally, considering that the offenses charged against him were also grounds to
disbar him, the supreme penalty of disbarment, as recommended by the OCA, should be, as it is
hereby, imposed against Judge Alinea, aside from forfeiture of all of his benefits, except his accrued
leave credits, as a former member of the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, Judge Conrado O. Alinea, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Iba, Zambales is
found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct for Direct Bribery under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. All of his
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, are hereby FORFEITED, and he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment, including to
one in any government-owned or government-controlled corporations. Moreover, he is
hereby DISBARRED pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, and his name is ordered STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately upon the date of his receipt of this Decision.
Judge Alinea is hereby DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his
disbarment has commenced, copy furnished to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has
entered his appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Judge Alinea's personal record
as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

The Code Contains Six Canons

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The Code Contains Six Canons

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The Code contains six canons — one more than the 1989 Code — dealing with judicial independence,

Competencve and Diligence

SC dismisses judge for grave

“Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby dismissed from the

The SC also imposed a one-year suspension against Eileen Pecana,

It acted upon the administrative complaint filed by Emilie Sison-

Barias filed the complaint before the Office of the Court

The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals (CA) Associate

In his investigation report dated March 13, 2012, Gaerlan

However, the SC rejected the report of Gaerlan as they decided to hold

The SC En Banc gave more weight to Barias’ testimony and to her

“Pecana’s actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for

“Respondent Pecana’s actions constitute a clear violation of the

The SC also castigated Rubia because of his failure to admonish or

“Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of

As to the allegations of Barias against the orders of Rubia in her

The SC’s ruling is immediately executory. PNA

Rule 3.1. Extrajudicial Activities in General.

(D) engage in conduct that would reasonably appear to be coercive; or

Rule 3.1 – Amended April 25, 2018, effective July 1, 2018

Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases.

(2) Rule 2.2. Impartiality and Fairness.

(17) (3) Harassment, as referred to in paragraphs (B) and (C), is verbal or

(20) Rule 2.3 Amended March 28, 2017, effective immediately

(21) Rule 2.4. External Influences on Judicial Conduct.

(26) An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases according to

(27) Rule 2.5. Competence, Diligence and Cooperation.

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 February 4, 2015

JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant,

Comment of Judge Paredes

Reply of the Complainant

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

The Court’s Ruling

Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing.

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016

WILFREDO F. TUVILLO, Complainant, v. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON, RESPONDENT.

A.M. NO. MTJ-10-1756

MELISSA J. TUVILLO A.K.A MICHELLE JIMENEZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE HENRY E.

The Complaint of Melissa Tuvillo

Defense of Judge Laron

The Court's Ruling

Serious charges include:

1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry 3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety.

As the Court held in Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr.;32 chanro bles law

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The charge of Unexplained Wealth is DISMISSED for insufficient evidence.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant

The undisputed facts, as borne by the records, are as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Conrado O. Alinea,

In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to an

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court

The Court's Ruling

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