Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation vs.

Paredes-Encinareal

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2102

Facts: Complainant instituted the action for unlawful detainer against Falame in the MTCC of Dipolog City.
On the MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the complainant, which promptly filed a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal. However, the MTCC did not resolve the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,
and instead elevated the records to the RTC in view of the Falames filing of their Notice of Appeal. Appeal
was assigned to respondent Judge was the Acting Presiding Judge. Complainant filed an Urgent Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, averring as grounds for dismissal the Falames failure to post the supersedeas bond, and
to deposit the monthly rental. According to the complainant, however, respondent Judge did not resolve
its Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal but instead issued the order, to stay execution of judgment pending
appeal. Complainant, undaunted, filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and Grant Immediately Judge issued
the order of November 8, 2005 whereby she denied the complainants Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
Eventually a Motion for Writ of Execution was filed with this court. The complainant insists that the order
of November 8, 2005 was null and void because respondent Judge had by then been relieved as the Acting
Presiding Judge of the issuing court. Respondent explained that she did not resolve the complainants
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal because the motion was addressed to and filed in the MTCC; that
belying the allegation of delay, she stressed that she gave to the Falames five days within which to
comment on the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal in view of the motion having been filed in the
MTCC.

Issue: Whether or not the Decision of the Judge was proper.

Ruling: This case presents the opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to always
adhere to the mandate of Section 19, supra, by issuing writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in
actions for ejectment whenever the defendants have failed to stay execution. They should not leave to
the appellate courts the action on the motions for execution because that action would be too late in the
context of Section 19. The trial and appellate judges should constantly be mindful of the summary nature
of the ejectments actions, and of the purpose underlying the mandate for immediate execution, which is
to prevent the plaintiffs from being further of their rightful possession. Otherwise, they stand liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
DEPED vs Casibang

G.R. No. 192268

Facts: The property in controversy is portion of Lot 115 covered by OCT No. O-627 registered under the
name of Cepeda, the respondent’s late father. In 1965, upon the request of the then Mayor Cepeda
allowed the construction and operation of a school. The school is operating under the control and
supervision of the petitioner DepEd. Despite Cepedas death, the herein respondents and other
descendants of Cepeda continued to tolerate the use and possession of the property by the school.5
Sometime between Oct. – Nov. 2000, the respondents entered and occupied a portion of the property.
Upon discovery of the said occupation, the teachers of the school brought the matter to the attention of
the barangay captain. The school officials demanded the respondents to vacate the property.
Respondents refused to vacate the property. DepEd filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages
against respondents before the MCTC of Solana-Enrile. The MCTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and
directed respondents to vacate the premises. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC.

Respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money against the DepEd.
Respondents averred that since their late father did not have any immediate need of the land in 1965, he
consented to the building of the temporary structure and allowed the conduct of classes in the premises
occupation is by mere tolerance, the property has always been occupied and used adversely, peacefully,
continuously and in the concept of owner for almost forty (40) years. It insisted that the respondents had
lost whatever right they had over the property through laches.

Issue: WON CA erred in affirming the Trials Court decision.

Ruling: CA is correct in affirming the Trials court decision. Case law teaches that those who occupy the
land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are
necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. In the
case of Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, states that acts merely tolerated are, those which by reason of
neighbourliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbour or another person to do on the
property. It was out of respect and courtesy to the then Mayor who was a distant relative that Cepeda
consented to the building of the school. The occupancy of the subject property by the DepEd to conduct
classes therein arose from what Professor Arturo Tolentino refers to as the sense of neighbourliness or
familiarity of Cepeda to the then Mayor that he allowed the said occupation and use of his property.
Therefore the right to recover is not barred by prescription or laches.
Fullido vs Grilli

G.R. No. 215014

Facts: Grilli, an Italian national, met Fullido in Bohol and courted her. In 1995, Grilli decided to build a
residential house where he and Fullido would to stay whenever he would be vacationing in the country.
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot in bohol, from her parents which was registered in her
name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30626. They constructed a house, which was funded by
Grilli. Upon completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there whenever Grilli was
on vacation in the Philippines twice a year.

Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, a memorandum of agreement, to define their
respective rights over the house and lot. The lease contract stipulated among others, that Grilli as the
lessee and that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot
without the written consent of Grilli. SPA allowed her to administer, manage and transfer the house and
lot on behalf of Fullido.

Their relationship turned sour after 16 years. They could not agree who should leave the common
property, and Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido demanding that she vacate the property. Grilli filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. MTC dismissed, Fullido
can’t be ejected because she was co-owner and respected the TPO. RTC reversed, Grilli had right to house
and lot. Since lease had not expired, Fullido had obligation to respect Grilli as lessee. TPO no bearing. CA
upheld RTC, as Fullido executed both the MOA and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession
and use of the house and lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli who had the
better right of physical possession. TPO no prejudice.

Issue: W/N CA erred in upholding RTC’s decision.

Ruling: In the case at bench, the lease contract and the MOA, from which Grilli purportedly drew his right
of possession, were found to be null and void for being unconstitutional. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all. Hence, as void contracts could not be the source of rights, Grilli had no
possessory right over the subject land. A person who does not have any right over a property from the
beginning cannot eject another person possessing the same. Consequently, Grilli’s complaint for unlawful
detainer must be dismissed for failure to prove his cause of action.
Rosario vs Alba

G.R. No. 199464

Facts: The subject properties originally formed part of a parcel of land belonging to the estate of the late
Urbano Rosario and Vicenta Zarate. By virtue of a Decision of the RTC which was rendered pursuant to a
Compromise Agreement executed among the heirs to the said estate, including Luz, the subject properties
were adjudged as shares of Luz. The respondent is the son and only surviving legal heir of Luz while the
petitioners are fellow heirs to the estate of Urbano and Vicenta.

The petitioners introduced residential dwellings and other improvements on the properties. After
Luz died, the respondent sent out written notices to vacate upon the. Because of the petitioners' refusal
to leave, the respondent instituted the action for ejectment. In their Answer, the petitioners claimed that
the subject properties were already sold by Luz to Rogelio and to Pablo Rosario, even before the execution
of the Compromise Agreement and was allegedly proved by duly notarized deeds of sale. The MTC
ordered the petitioners to remove the improvements they introduced in the subject properties and to
vacate the same and that petitioners' claim over subject properties cannot hold water as the parcels of
land subject matter of the deeds of sale were different from the inheritance of the respondent.

The petitioners appealed to the RTC, which set aside the decision of the MTC and ordered the dismissal
of the respondent's complaint on the grounds that the complaint cannot give rise to an unlawful detainer
action nor one for forcible entry since there was no allegation that entry was committed by means of
force, intimidation, strategy or stealth. RTC furthered that the respondent cannot avail of the summary
action of ejectment considering that the possession of the properties cannot be wrested from another
who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year. Thus, the MTC
should have dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. The respondent elevated his case to the CA
which reversed and set aside the RTC decision and reinstated the MTC judgment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s complaint is constitutive of any of the forms of cases for
ejectment.

Held: Court agrees with the RTC that the respondent’s complaint is not constitutive of any of the forms of
cases of ejectment. In Spouses Del Rosario v. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., the Court explained two forms
of ejectment, to wit, “Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action. In forcible
entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.” Premises
considered, the Court ruled that the complaint cannot be considered as one for forcible entry, even when
respondent averred that the petitioners' entry in the subject properties was made without the knowledge
and consent of the respondent or his predecessor-in-interest which may amount to an averment of the
employment of stealth, because there was no showing that the action was filed within one year from the
questioned entry. Neither can the Court consider the complaint as one for unlawful detainer.