Municipality of Jasaan v.

Gentallan

G.R. No. 154961, May 09, 2005

The Court held that as a permanent appointee to the position, she enjoys security of tenure. She
is likewise entitled to all benefits, rights and privileges attached to the position. She cannot be removed
or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process.

An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to

backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement.
This is only fair and just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is
considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time
of her reinstatement.

In the instant case, we note that there is no finding that malice or bad faith attended the illegal
dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by her superior officers. Thus, they cannot be held personally
accountable for her back salaries. The municipal government, therefore, should disburse funds to answer
for her claims resulting from dismissal.

Laganapan v. Asedillo

G.R. No. 28353, September 30, 1987

A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back
salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not
applicable in this instance. In Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals, for instance, the municipal mayor was held
liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was
arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner
of Civil Service to reinstate.

In Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police
corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable
cause and without any administrative investigation.

In Rama vs. Court of Appeals, the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly
and severally in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province
of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

257 SCRA 727

Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
 P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C. A.
No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands,
and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty
of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus
its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."

Mercado v. Manzano

G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may
be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should
apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should
interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

Marcos v. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness
as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Aquino v. COMELEC

248 SCRA 400

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should
be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives this Court held that the term
"residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

In Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), The Court held that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a
petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal
could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte
proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her
in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were
counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election.
He was repudiated by the electorate. . . What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected
position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing
the eligibility, requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated position.
Dela Torre v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1999

The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received
is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Anent the second
issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.
Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which already declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling
squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40(a), subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation.