Defense Concepts

Wasted Space:
How and Why the U.S. Must Prepare
to Fight a Clean War in Space
Howard Kleinberg

http://www.abc.net.au/

Who is the Prey?: The Challenges of the Predator Drone Program and High-Val-
ue Targeting
Sarah Catanzaro

Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and its Elusive
European Rapid Reaction Force
Alexander Justice Moore

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - AFRICOM: An Independent Review for

the Obama Administration
Daniel Lawner, Sarah Khederian

Taking the Offensive: The Utility & Limitations of Raiding

Adam Elkus
Founder & Chairman
Newton Howard

Executive Director
David E. A. Johnson

Board of Directors
Sharon Brown
April Foley
Lester S. Hyman
Sergey Kanareykin
Sue Kelly
Jerrold Post
Ammar Qusaibaty

Senior Fellows
Shlomo Argamon
Drew Bewick
John Callery
Robert M. Cassidy
James E. Davidson
Gideon Frieder Defense Concepts is published by the Center for
Norman D. Geddes Advanced Defense Studies (CADS), a global se-
Mathieu Guidère
Robert Lawrence
curity think tank headquartered in Washington,
Michael Litzelman DC. As a non-profit, non-governmental organiza-
Chris Mason tion, CADS empowers experts from government,
Anthony Shaffer military, academia and the private sector who are
committed to solving the security problems of
Fellows
Mishkat Al-Moumin today and examining the defense issues of tomor-
Sviatoslav Braynov row.
David Brown
Martin Dudziak
Edward Ghafari
Douglas M Hosmer
Chris Kammerman
James O'Neill
Steve Orrin
Stefan E. Schmidt
J. Michael Waller

Staff
Sarah Catanzaro
Elise Hogan
Daniel Lawner
Farley Mesko
Benjamin E. Power
Lindsay Vacek
Defense Concepts
Published by CADS Press

Editor in Chief
Newton Howard

Editorial Board
Sarah Catanzaro, Elise Hogan, David E.A. Johnson, Lindsay Vacek

Compiled by
Fellows, Researchers and Staff

Designed by
Sarah Catanzaro

Defense Concepts is made possible through donations from private foun-

dations and individuals. Please support this publication and other cen-
ter-wide activities by making a contribution at www.c4ads.org. Because
the Center for Advanced Defense Studies is a 501(c)(3) non-profit orga-
nization, most donations qualify for a federal, and often state, income-
tax charitable deduction.
Defense Concepts (ISSN 1932-3816) is published quarterly by CADS Press at the Center for
Advanced Defense Studies, Directorate of Research, at 10 G Street, NE, Suite 610, Washing-
ton, DC 20002 USA; info@c4ads.org; www.c4ads.org; + 1.202.289.3332. Volume V,
Edition 2, Spring 2010. Printed in U.S.A. To subscribe to Defense Concepts, visit
www.c4ads.org, write to info@c4ads.org, call +1.202.289.3332 or write to Defense Con-
cepts, Center for Advanced Defense Studies, 10 G Street, NE, Suite 610, Washington, DC
20002 USA.

The Center for Advanced Defense Studies does not adopt specific policy positions; opinions
expressed in Defense Concepts are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the opinions of the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, its fellows, researchers or staff.

Copyright © 2010 by Center for Advanced Defense Studies. All rights reserved.
 Table of Contents

SPRING 2010 VOLUME 5 EDITION 2

COVER STORY

Wasted Space:
How and Why the U.S. Must Prepare to Fight a Clean War in Space
by Howard Kleinberg

Letter from the Executive Director

Quick Takes

COMMENTARY

Innovating Citizen Engagement: The National Dialogue on the Quadrennial

Homeland Security Review by Drew Bewick

Retroactive Attribution: The Ripple Effect of the House Foreign Affairs

Committee’s Resolution on Armenian Genocide by Elise Hogan

The Golden Gun: Economic Warfare in the 21st Century by Andrew Baer

FEATURES

Who is the Prey: The Challenges of the Predator Drone Program and High-
Value Targeting by Sarah Catanzaro

Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and its Elusive
European Rapid Reaction Force by Alexander Justice Moore

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - AFRICOM: An Independent Review

for the Obama Administration by Daniel Lawner and Sarah Khederian

Taking the Offensive: The Utility and Limitations of Raiding by Adam Elkus
A Message from the Executive Director
People Centric Security
In our last message, we described the path towards a Comprehensive
Approach to security. This multi-disciplinary path bypassed the the obstacles
of persistent conflict through a more effective and efficient use of govern-
ment, international, enterprise and non-governmental organization assets to
provide more complete protection. The security and defense sector is reexam-
ining traditional roles in light of the challenges posed by continuous spectrum
of threats associated with persistent conflict. Our biggest challenges now
relate to the episodes where the military cannot be the principal steward.
Metrics for success for these phases are elusive, because the perception of
security of the target population and the global audience ultimately deter-
mines if a program or approach will be successful.
Experts, pundits, and practitioners of all sorts recognize the need to
enable cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and communication to em-
power both military and non-military partners. Too often, the search is for a
silver bullet - a new organization, information sharing software, or cool gear
- instead of a more complete understanding. At its root, cooperation, coordina-
tion, collaboration, and communication involve the interaction of people in a
physical space to achieve a higher cognitive capacity. Decisions in this
environment are not about data, they are about harmonizing how different
groups of people use the same data.
CADS has recently expanded its strategic and media footprint through a
new positioning and visibility strategy. The Center expanded its roster of
partners by welcoming Ambassador April Foley to our Board of Directors.
The Global Security Monitor highlighted unprecedented challenges in India,
Kyrgyzstan, and Lebanon before they became popular topics of discussion.
Our Understanding Clandestine Organizations Program (UCOP) has gener-
ated interest in adversary behavioral studies among government clients.
CADS sponsored both a Common Defense West conference in San Diego,
CA and an International Law Enforcement Conference on Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder in Palm Beach, FL. And this is only a short list that does not
include many other flourishing initiatives.
To ensure these programs and advances in interagency coordination and
interdisciplinary research continue to lead us towards a “people centric”
security, the Center relies upon public donations and grants. Please help us to
make Innovation for Peace a reality by donating at www.c4ads.org.

LTC David E.A. Johnson

Executive Director
 QUICK TAKES

Wasted Space: How and Why the U.S. Must Prepare for a Clean War in
Space
Howard Kleinberg
The challenge of space debris generated by active defenses is oftentimes
misunderstood and overstated. More importantly, the concerns regarding
space debris are far less ominous than threats to the very survival of the U.S.
as a nation. Because space is a pivotal arena for the U.S., we may to have to
defend it by force. With judicious design and utilization of future space-based
assets and weapons, U.S. space-based assets can be protected against ASATs
with a minimum of space debris generation.

Who is the Prey?: The Challenges of the Predator Drones Program and
High-Value Targeting
Sarah Catanzaro
In a volatile and perilous global setting, human capital is a terrorist
organization’s most valuable asset, differentiating terrorist groups that sur-
vive from those that struggle. Terrorist groups rely on important decision-
makers who establish policies and organizational structure, allocate resources,
and communicate strategic vision. When executed properly, a high-value
targeting approach can generate strategic effects; however, an assessment of
the relative utility of this program requires a discriminating look at purposes,
targets, and circumstances.

Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and its

Elusive European Rapid Reaction Force
Alexander Justice Moore
European Union attempts to develop a European Rapid Reaction Force
(ERRF) have resulted in little meaningful progress. The security regimes
literature recognizes two forms of state behavior: cooperation and competi-
tion. The existing definitions for these terms create a behavioral dichotomy:
cooperation entails mutual restraint from arms buildups and alliance-building
while competition equals unilateral action along these lines. To build a
successful joint force, EU member states must engage in cooperative
action—an unprecedented measure in the security realm. Tracing the
ERRF’s history, this article concludes that without external shocks prompt-
ing EU security anxiety, major advances in the force’s operational capability
are unlikely.
 QUICK TAKES

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - AFRICOM: An Independent Re-

view for the Obama Administration
Daniel Lawner and Sarah Khederian
On October 28, 2009, CADS held a conference, AFRICOM: An Independent
Review for the New Administration, in cooperation with Representative John
Tierney, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Chairman Tierney of-
fered the keynote address outlining ongoing issues for oversight of the U.S.
Africa Command. His comments were followed by a half-day of expert
remarks on the remaining challenges and opportunities for the Command in
the future. The day’s speakers delivered insightful and varied remarks to an
audience of African Embassy representatives, U.S. civilian government
personnel, U.S. military personnel, congressional staff, and representatives
from non-governmental organizations, think tanks and universities.

Taking the Offensive: The Limitations & Utility of Raiding

Adam Elkus
Raids executed by small units, special forces and counter-terrorist groups can
be astoundingly successful, defying the odds and all logic when a small
number of soldiers operating in difficult environments inflict striking defeats
that sharply alter the military situation and possibly even determine the
outcome of the conflict. However, military pundits continue to debate wheth-
er such unanticipated and potentially devastating military attacks should be
categorized as tactics (i.e. the concepts and practice for winning battles) or as
a significant element of grand strategy (i.e. the collection of policies that
comprise the state's effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and
economic tools together to advance the national interest).
Defense Concepts

COMMENTARY
http://twitter.com/qhsrdialogue

The DHS leveraged social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, blogs, and Ning com-
munities to advertise the National Dialogue.

The DHS offers civilians a chance to participate in policymak-

ing, the U.S. recognizes the Armenian genocide, and former
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson reveals an economic war-
fare scheme - each story highlights the role of individuals and
populations in shaping history.
Innovating Citizen Engagement: The National Dialogue on
the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
Drew Bewick

Retroactive Attribution: The Ripple Effect of the House For-

eign Affairs Committee’s Resolution on Armenian Genocide
Elise Hogan

The Golden Gun: Economic Warfare in the 21st Century

Andrew Baer
1 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

INNOVATING CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE

ON THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW
Drew Bewick
The Department of Homeland Security was recently nominated for a Citizen
Service Award - an award recognizing innovative citizen outreach efforts by gov-
ernment offices accorded by the U.S. General Services Administration - for its
work on the The National Dialogue on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Re-
view (QHSR). If you are interested in how social media and citizen engagement
can change national security policy, read on.
The first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report was
published in February 2010. To address the recommendations of the National Com-
mission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States articulated in the Implement-
ing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) conducted a comprehensive review of the entire home-
land security apparatus. The primary purpose of this examination was to develop a
strategic framework that could guide the activities of participants in homeland se-
curity toward the achievement of a common objective. The authors of the QHSR
offered specific recommendations on how to strengthen and mature the homeland
security enterprise. For example, they described mechanisms to enhance coordina-
tion and unity of effort across multiple homeland security partners and stakehold-
ers. The QHSR is not a resource prioritization document; rather, it offers an
optimistic homeland security concept for the U.S. based on a set of five key mis-
sion areas integrated across the vast homeland security landscape.i
For observers of U.S. national security, the completion of the inaugural QHSR
was a watershed event not just because it set forth a unified conception of home-
land security and pinpointed five key homeland security missions, but because it
identified the stakeholders responsible for homeland security and a description of
how the DHS designed the review.
First, the QHSR provides the framework for a
new Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE)ii and em-
phasizes that the five key mission areas are enter-
prise-wide, and not limited to the DHS alone.
Hundreds of thousands of people from across the
federal government, state, local, tribal, and territori-
al governments, the private sector, other NGOs,
and other societies are responsible for executing
these missions.iii Previous attempts to unify the
http://www.dhs.gov

homeland security community called for informa-

tion sharing and collaboration across boundaries.
However, these efforts did not go quite as far; they
did not adopt a wide enterprise-approach to home-
land security in comparison to this QHSR.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 2
Defense Concepts

Second, the QHSR was executed in a transparent, open and collaborative man-
ner using the latest Web 2.0 technologies to engage stakeholders and the public. In
colloquial language, this quadrennial review is not your father’s quadrennial re-
view. The QHSR was not designed in a smoke-filled room by select Senior Steer-
ing Groupsiv nor was it created using a top-down approach like the Pentagon’s
early Quadrennial Defense Reviews. Through a series of three web-based, public
Dialogues (the National Dialogue on the QHSR) driven by an iterative, online col-
laborative discussion forum hosted by the National Academy of Public Administra-
tion (NAPA), DHS collected the wisdom of U.S. citizens, as well as
operational-level expertise and specialized knowledge and incorporated it in the
review. Insights gained from this experience led DHS to continue the momentum
by launching a new collaborative forum to help expand its capacity for public en-
gagement.
The Dialogue was conducted in three phases between July 16 and October 4,
2009. More than 20,000 stakeholders from all 50 states and the District of Colum-
bia, and more than 1,000 cities participated in the conversation. The National Dia-
logue on the QHSR included three dialogues:

· Dialogue 1: An initial forum for the exchange of participant ideas on the goals
and objectives developed by DHS study groups across six topic areas.

· Dialogue 2: A deeper discussion on how best to prioritize and achieve the pro-
posed goals and objectives.

· Dialogue 3: A review of the final products of each study group with partici-
pant feedback and identification of next steps.

Over the course of these three Dialogues, stakeholders were asked to review,
rate, and discuss the concepts, ideas, and draft recommendations developed by the
six QHSR study groups. The valuable comments and ideas solicited were made
available to the study groups tasked with writing the QHSR for DHS.v Overall, the
extensive stakeholder feedback, along with insights from the DHS study group
members, interagency partners, and ordinary citizens informed the work of the
QHSR study groups in an unusually open and collaborative manner in the often
secretive homeland security and counter terrorism domain. The final report has
been delivered to Congress and can be viewed on the Department of Homeland
Security’s QHSR page.vi
By conducting their study in a manner so that the drafts were accessible to all
interested parties, without regard to their position or formal credentials, the Dia-
logue provided the opportunity for stakeholders and the public to review, rate, and
openly discuss the raw, unvetted materials initially developed by the QHSR Study

3 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Groups. This achievement cannot be easily overlooked. The National Dialogue

on the QHSR was one of the largest, most complex stakeholder consultation
efforts that the federal
government has ever
“...its triumph is a nod to the efficiency
undertaken.vii Rather
than set policy internal- and effectiveness of collaborative
ly in a top-down fash- technologies, a trend which the
ion, DHS completed the business community has already
QHSR in an innovative
and ccoordinated man-
embraced. Moreover, its success begs
ner that engaged tens of the question whether we are likely to
thousands of stakehold- see similar approaches become more
ers and harnessed their frequently used in the decision-making
ideas and comments in
the process. Perhaps the process within the U.S. security domain.”
QHSR can be regarded as
a sign of the time, but it
is also an example of how emerging technology can be used to invite and initi-
ate mass collaboration and enable citizen engagement to shape U.S. national
security policy.
The level of engagement, registered by the NAPA’s National Dialogue
Team, is quite impressive.viii Overall, more than 2,977 individuals registered to
participate in the Dialogues. These participants left 856 unique ideas, 3,174
comments, and 8,425 ratings. In keeping with the experience of other social
networking web sites, Dialogue participants spent an average of nearly 7
minutes on the site and contributed to the rapid improvement of its features. As
part of their outreach strategy, the National Dialogue Team used Twitter,
Facebook, and other social networking platforms to share information with
participants. Its triumph is a nod to the efficiency and effectiveness of
collaborative technologies, a trend which the business community has already
embraced. Moreover, its success begs the question whether we are likely to see
similar approaches become more frequently used in the decision-making
process within the U.S. security domain. Where can readers get the answer? As
odd as it may sound to long-time national security observers, you might want to
keep an eye on Twitter and Facebook for future announcements.

Drew Bewick has participated in 30 venture capital investments in technology

companies and has helped visionary social entrepreneurs launch profitable ven-
tures. He also served as Chief of Technology Tradecraft in the Defense Human
Intelligence Management Office of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 4
Defense Concepts

i Staff, 2010. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, Washington: Department of

Homeland Security http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ qhsr_report.pdf.
ii Ibid, ix. The term “enterprise” refers to the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of

Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners—as

well as individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical homeland security ca-
pabilities. The use of the term connotes a broad-based community with a common interest
in the public safety and well-being of America and American society that is composed of
multiple actors and stakeholders whose roles and responsibilities are distributed and shared
iii Ibid, ix
ivStaff, 1997. Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington: Office of the Secretary of De-
fense
v Staff, 2010. A National Dialogue for the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Wash-
ington: National Academy of Public Administration
http://www.homelandsecuritydialogue.org/
vi Staff, 2010. Quadrennial homeland Security Review, Washington: Department of Home-

land Security http://www.dhs.gov/qhsr

vii Citizen Service Award, "Dialogues on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review," Cit-
izen. Service Award Blog, entry posted February 22, 2010,
http://citizenserviceaward.wordpress.com/2010/02/ 22/dialogues-on-the-quadrennial-home-
land-security-review/
viii Ibid

5 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

HIGHLIGHTS
The Global Security Monitor (GSM) is CADS’s web resource that provides timely, in-
depth analysis of domestic and international developments. The GSM features a blog
where staff members and interns at the Center can share ideas and opinions on important
current events and policy issues. The GSM also includes briefs that focus on evolving
trends such as asymmetric threats, hybrid warfare, economic warfare, and energy security.
The Center supplements the GSM website with a bi-weekly newsletter delivered to a grow-
ing readership. The following two articles were selected as exceptional examples of the
editorial work presented in the GSM. To find out more about the GSM, visit
gsm.c4ads.org, and to subscribe to the bi-weekly newsletter, write to info@c4ads.org.

RETROACTIVE ATTRIBUTION: THE RIPPLE EFFECT OF THE HOUSE FOR-

EIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE’S RESOLUTION ON ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
Elise Hogan
In a 22 to 23 vote in late March 2010, the House Foreign Affairs Committee
passed a resolution condemning the 1915 mass killings of Armenians in Turkey as
genocide. In 2007, the Bush administration aggressively contested a similar bill to
prevent it from reaching the House. Officials voiced their anxiety about alienating
Turkey since Washington depended on its close Muslim ally for access to Northern
Iraq and regional efforts to isolate Iran. In two similar votes (1975, 1984) Congress
also deferred from using the term genocide. However, April 24, 2010 marked the
95th anniversary of the massacre and deportation of as many as 1.5 million ethnic
Armenians. Moreover, the dispute over the genocide label had set off what Dan
Eggen of The Washington Post called a “lobbying frenzy.” Finally, during his cam-
paign, President Obama unequivocally promised that he would recognize the mas-
sacre as a genocide. These pressures combined to provide Congress with the
impetus to acknowledge the Armenian genocide.
Nevertheless, the course of events preceding the announcement of the resolu-
tion was tarred by the usual political maneuvering. Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
ton stepped in at the last minute to sway the Committee against voting, but to no
avail. She warned Rep. Howard Berman, the Committee Chairman that both she
and Obama opposed any action by Congress. Clinton admonished the Committee
to forgo voting on the resolution since it could jeopardize relations between Tur-

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 6
 Defense Concepts

key and Armenia. However, this reasoning is somewhat dubious. In a CNN inter-
view, Fadi Hakura, Turkey Analyst at Chatham House, a London-based think tank,
suggested that the security interests of the U.S., and not the international communi-
ty, are the real motivator for the State Department’s intervention.
The response from Turkey has been quick and pointed. Turkey recalled Namik
Tan, its ambassador to the United States, for consultations following the resolution
and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu cautioned that “each interference by a
third party will make this normalization impossible,” thereby alerting the U.S. of
the effects its actions could have on diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia. Da-
vutoglu also mocked the seemingly arbitrary voting process and narrow margin of
victory by which the resolution was passed. He questioned whether history should
be treated in such an “unserious manner.” His criticism undermines the
Committee’s respect for the legacy of its allies
Those investigating this episode have faced hurdles in acquiring access to nec-
essary primary sources from the Ottoman archives, but 2008 marked a diplomatic
turning point between Turkey and Armenia when they created an impartial interna-
tional historical commission to examine available archival evidence. Much of the
debate is centered on what is and is not considered genocide, since several of the
deaths during this epoch were caused by displacement, war, and disease.
http://www.gwpda.org

A relic of the Armenian massacre at Erzingan. Such evidence of the casualties can be found
throughout Armenia.
Turkey acknowledges and commemorates the 1915 deaths of Armenian civil-
ians, but does not regard the casualties as genocide, which it defines as a planned
and deliberate systematic elimination of people. Rather, Turkey ascribes the esti-
mated 1.5 million deaths to the civil war and unrest that occurred in the wake of a
disintegrating Ottoman Empire.
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism diffused rapidly as a con-
sequence of the dynamic reign of Mustafa Atatürk and the advent of Kemalism,

7 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

whereby the nation seeks to establish a modern, democratic and secular nation-
state, guided by educational and scientific progress. Under Atatürk, Turkey was
quickly modernized according to the western European example. Education, lan-
guage, religion and penal codes were reformed during the first part of the twentieth
century. As a result, modern Turkey is a fiercely proud nation, and is consequently
framing the passing of this resolution as a deeply emotional affront on Turkish
identity and history. Davutoglu is correct; it is reductive and quite frankly, absurd,
that one vote, by a nation that was not even a participant in the incident, can seal
the pages of history.
Since the resolution was passed, Secretary Clinton expressed White House op-
position to the resolution by offering condolences to Davutoglu, thereby thawing
U.S.-Turkey tensions. The ambassador has since returned to Washington and Tur-
key sent representatives to the April Nuclear Summit in Washington, DC. Never-
theless, the timing and administrative fumbling surrounding the House resolution
marred the United States’ ties with Turkey. Moreover, the resolution cut off Turk-
ish-brokered peace talks between Syria and Israel and may have further strained
the already tenuous relationship between Turkey and Armenia. While Secretary
Clinton’s belated intervention and subsequent apology may have patched U.S.-Tur-
key relations for the time being, the ripple effects of the Armenian genocide reso-
lution are multi-dimensional and are yet to be fully realized.

THE GOLDEN GUN: ECONOMIC WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Andrew Baer
In his recently released memoirs On The Brink, former Treasury Secretary
Hank Paulson alleges that top Russian officials made overtures to their Chinese
counterparts suggesting that the nations coordinate to initiate economic warfare
against the United States in the Summer of 2008. Paulson claims that during the
2008 Summer Beijing Olympics Russian officials pressed China to dump its Fan-
nie Mae-Freddie Mac holdings, proposing “that together they might sell big
chunks of their GSE holdings to force the U.S. to use its emergency authorities to
prop up these companies.”
Central bank data confirms “While for several years scholars
that Russia sold all 65.6 billion have maintained that the role of
dollars worth of its Mae-Mac
holdings mid-2008. Although
the state has diminished with
China rejected Russia’s propos- regards to the threat environment,
al, the incident highlights the arguably, these kinds of non-military
potential for state-level, non- disruptions... may shift our focus
military disruptions to destabi-
lize the international system back to state-to-state conflict.”

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 8
 Defense Concepts

and reveals a potential blind-spot in the U.S. approach to national security.

While for several years scholars have maintained that the role of the state has
diminished with regards to the threat environment, arguably, these kinds of non-
military disruptions ( i.e. the use of international events as a diversionary tactic,
state cooperation in economic manipulation, etc.) may shift our focus back to state-
to-state conflict. And with the Department of Defense and U.S. Government so
fixated on countering guerilla insurgencies and christening irregular or asymmetric
warfare as the term du jour, Paulson’s experience should underscore the lingering
danger of state-to-state economic warfare.
With $13 trillion worth of debt, much of it owned by foreign entities, the Unit-
ed States is increasingly vulnerable to hostile coordinated economic maneuvering
by competing powers, such as Russia and China. China is the largest foreign U.S
debtor owning nearly 24% of the debt backed by foreign entities, totaling just un-
der 800 billion dollars. OPEC follows in fourth with 185 billion dollars, or 6 %,
and Russia, seventh, with nearly 118 billion dollars, or 4%. Political common
sense would ostensibly dictate that being indebted to your competition is folly.
Maybe Thomas Jefferson was on to something when he wrote the following:
“The system of banking [is] a blot left in all our Constitutions, which, if not covered,
will end in their destruction... I sincerely believe that banking institutions are more
dangerous than standing armies; and that the principle of spending money to be
paid by posterity... is but swindling futurity on a large scale.”

http://www.naturalnews.com/cartoons/old-new-warfare_600.jpg

9 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

COVER STORY

Howard Kleinberg analyzes the challenge of space debris http://www.nasa.gov

generated by active defenses and suggests technologies that

can protect U.S. assets while generating minimal amounts of
debris.

Wasted Space:
How and Why the U.S. Must Prepare
to Fight a Clean War in Space

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 10
 Defense Concepts

Introduction
Much anxiety has been engendered within the various space operations commu-
nities regarding combat operations in space. Several stakeholders fear that anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons will generate so much space debris that Earth’s Orbital
Space (EOS)i will become too ‘clogged up’ with lethally bullet-fast pieces of debris
to ever be usable again. With this in mind, critics argue that space warfare should be
prohibited.ii Unfortunately, the recent test of an anti-satellite weapon by China in
January of 2007 transformed the issue of space warfare and its attendant space
debris-generation challenge from the realm of the hypothetical to the real.iii With just
one test, space has been irrevocably altered from a free and open observation and
communications zone into a battlefield of the post-Cold War era. Thus, it behooves
the U.S. to contemplate how to counter such weapons (including their physical
destruction) through methods that render these armaments ineffective and keep U.S.
space systems secure. Concurrently, policymakers must consider solutions that
generate minimal amounts of long-term space debris.
Satellites have been used
“The key lesson of China’s 2007 ASAT as warfighting assets by the
test is that the physical destruction of a U.S. military since Opera-
tion Desert Storm in 1991.
satellite of even moderate size can result Indeed, their use in combat
in the generation of a massive amount of has only expanded in scope
space debris...” and extent and continues to
be a vital part of the ongo-
ing War on Terror, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.iv This new
battlefield, like all others before (and below) it, has strategic implications that are of
immeasurably great importance. Consequently, the issue of the residual wreckage
caused by any physical combat conducted therein should also be given proper
consideration. However, discussions of ‘pollution’ in space must place this issue in
its appropriate context within the overall, broader range of issues involving the
transformation of space into a strategic environment. Now is an opportune time to
revisit the debris inquiry and consider the options for minimizing debris resulting
from space combat operations and for removing debris.
The key lesson of China’s 2007 ASAT test is that the physical destruction of a
satellite of even moderate size can result in the generation of a massive amount of
space debris in addition to the loss of the satellite itself. Therefore, ASATs must be
stopped at all costs, not only to prevent the resulting space debris but also to secure
the increasingly vital space-based capabilities and all satellites within that orbital
zone. ASATs are here to stay, simply because there is no way to legislate their
removal, regardless of the effort put forth to try to prevent their proliferation. The
only reliable means to prevent their devastation of space in the foreseeable future is

11 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

to find and implement ways to thwart or destroy them, with as little collateral
damage to friendly assets and the space environment as possible.
This paper argues that not only is the challenge of space debris misunderstood
and oftentimes even overstated (if only by omission of certain key facts), but in
actuality, it is a far less important issue than threats to national security that may
even jeopardize the survival of the U.S. as a nation. Space is a vital arena for the
U.S.; it is a venue not only from which, but also in which, the U.S. can win or lose
future wars against other space-capable adversaries, both current and nascent. Thus,
space is a “terrain” that we may have to have to defend by force in both the physical
and electromagnetic contexts.
Fortunately, there are a number of methods and approaches, both passive and
active, that can be used to counter the ASAT threat. Moreover, relatively few of
them involve the use of force in space itself. Indeed, the earlier in the ASAT’s
launch cycle it can be thwarted, the better positioned the defenders will be.

“Not only is the challenge of space debris misunderstood

and oftentimes even overstated ... but in actuality, it is a far
less important issue than threats to national security that
may even jeopardize the survival of the U.S. as a nation.”

Next, the author of this paper argues that with the judicious design and utiliza-
tion of future space-based assets and weapons, U.S. space-based assets can be well
protected against ASATs. Notably, these weapons could also be used to provide the
U.S. with the single most effective possible missile defenses with minimal to no
hazardous space debris generated. Space-based kinetic-kill weapons can destroy
rockets in their boost phase in or just above the Earth’s atmosphere, regardless of
their payloads, whether they are nuclear warheads, satellites, or ASATs. No satel-
lites will be lost and no hazardous space debris will be generated if a boost-phase
missile-defense system is operational and functional. Additionally, there are a
number of other means by which satellites can be disabled without generating debris.
ASATs themselves must be stopped at all costs, since the damage they could
wreak, both in the short-term and longer-term, indubitably warrants their defeat and
destruction. Kinetic kills of satellites can be achieved, but only when the national
security of the U.S. is at sufficient risk. Under these circumstances, the destruction
of enemy space-based assets would abrogate concerns regarding the secondary
consequences of the space debris generated. However, there are less ‘dirty’ ways to
render a satellite nonoperational, such as directed energy and forcibly maneuvering
the satellite about, as well as blinding or shading it from the sun’s energy-providing
rays. Space debris hazards can be mitigated or eliminated entirely, even in the
eventuality of a kinetic kill, given the correct targeting and tactics. Kinetic kills are

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 12
 Defense Concepts

not the only means by which anti-satellite operations can be conducted; other
options exist than can disable the satellite without obliterating it.
Finally, in the longer run, the rising numbers of nations and organizations using
space mean that the problem of space pollution will inevitably worsen, possibly to
hazardous levels that prohibit access.
“Today, however, the bipolar EOS will eventually need to be
international system is gone, cleaned up, regardless of wartime or
replaced by an increasingly peacetime usage. To solve this long-
multipolar scenario of a growing term challenge, there are a number
of entirely viable, affordable, but as
number of actors with capabilities yet untried technologies available to
in space.” perform the space-cleanup task.

Background: The Importance of Space, and the Space Debris Problem

Space is a medium of vital interest to humanity in general and to the United
States specifically. The U.S. depends on space for its global military capabilities, as
well as for communications, commerce, science, navigation, weather forecasting,
and for a multitude of other military operations, such as intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (i.e. ISR).v Space access is not achieved without generating
negative secondary effects: the process of launching satellites into orbit around the
Earth inevitably leaves behind some ‘pollution’ in the form of space debris. This
space debris is comprised of the detritus of spent or exploded rocket boosters, and
expired or exploded satellite fuel tanks or batteries. Not all of this junk remains in
space; some of it falls back to Earth, where it usually burns up in the atmosphere.
But while some pieces will remain in orbit around the Earth for merely a few hours,
others may remain ‘up there’ for centuries to come.
Like all objects in orbit, debris obeys the laws of celestial mechanics, following
relatively fixed, predictable closed paths.vi These laws portend both good and bad
news about the predicament of space debris. The good news is that space debris
orbits the Earth in a largely predictable manner, making it easier to avoid. The bad
news is that because any object in orbit around the Earth travels at speeds of up to
several miles a second, collisions between objects traveling at such speeds could be
devastating.
While great military power can be projected with the use of space-based
capabilities, no satellite has ever been destroyed in combat. However, this is a
fortuitous coincidence, a result of both the brevity of the Space Age itself, and a
consequence of the ‘stable deterrence’ doctrine established by the U.S. and the
Soviet Union (the two dominant space-going protagonists of the Cold War era of
relative bipolar stability). During that era, each side placed reconnaissance satellites
in orbit over the other state’s territories to monitor and verify each other’s strategic

13 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

nuclear capabilities. They agreed not to attack these space-based verification assets
in order to avoid provoking a nuclear war.vii
Today, however, the bipolar international system is gone, replaced by an increas-
ingly multipolar scenario of a growing number of actors with capabilities in space.
This changing spacescape has resulted in a higher likelihood of physical combat
operations as evidenced by China’s recent testing of a direct-ascent anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapon. This threat is one that cannot be swept away by the stroke of a pen
or the wording of a treaty. On the contrary, it requires the development of physical
defenses. Daniel Davis summarizes this issue as follows:

Virtually every competent armed force possesses unmanned aerial systems,

and a growing number possess the ability to attack space-based platforms.
Therefore, we must create the ability within our force to both defend against
such attacks and to launch counterstrikes. Like it or not, space has been
added as a dimension of war. Our potential adversaries possess the ability
to shoot down, blind, deceive or outright destroy the space platforms upon
which we critically rely. If we don’t protect our satellites and improve our
ability to employ precision weapons against hostile enemy forces, we incur
an avoidable, unacceptable vulnerability.viii

Just How Severe Is the Space Debris Problem?

At first glance, space debris appears to be an imminent and looming problem.
The numbers alone are cause for alarm. There are an estimated 12,500 or so objects
in EOS that are 10cm or larger in diameter.ix Of these 12,500 objects, only about 700
are actually active, operational spacecraft.x This means that an overwhelming 94.4%
of man-made objects in space are junk. Another negative factor to consider is that,
like all man-made machinery, all satellites will eventually deteriorate; their orbital
maneuvering rocket-fuel will be depleted or their electronics or batteries will fail
from either the harsh environment of space or from sheer old age. Unlike a failed
aircraft, however, a dead satellite will not fall out of space immediately, but can
remain in orbit for years, centuries, or even millennia, depending upon its altitude
and other factors. In addition, an estimated 100,000 pieces of debris between 1cm
and 10cm in size are in orbit.xi As for the number of objects that are under 1cm, their
estimates “probably exceed tens of millions.”xii What makes this latter figure alarm-
ing is not only its sheer magnitude but also the fact that these fragments are
undetectable using current technologies. Finally, with an estimated 75 ongoing
space launches per year, the space debris problem will only become more hazardous
with time.xiii

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 14
 Defense Concepts

Fortunately, not all space debris remains in orbit permanently. In fact, certain
regions of Earth’s orbital space are actually self-cleansing, as is the case with debris
in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), the most frequently used zone of EOS. The Earth’s outer
atmosphere (mesosphere, thermosphere and exosphere)xiv extends out as far as
1,000km, exerting a small but measurable amount of aerodynamically induced
friction on objects in space.xv If not corrected or compensated for, this aerodynamic
drag will eventually bring an object into the Earth’s main atmosphere where the
combination of high air density and object velocity will incinerate the object. Thus,
space debris in LEO does not inherently pose a long-term risk to space-accessibility,
because that much-used volume of EOS is essentially self-cleaning. However, this
process can take months or even years to occur.xvi

“We are now in a different era in which space technology

has proliferated widely and will only continue to spread.”

Space Defenses and Space Debris in Context

ASATs, or Anti-Satellite weapons, were first developed in earnest by the Cold
War superpowers during the 1970s and 1980s. By the mutual consent of the U.S. and
Soviet Union an agreement not to deploy ASATs was reached in that era.xvii ASATs
grant their user the ability to carry out ‘strategic paralysis’ strikes against any
adversary that makes extensive use of space assets, whether for economic, civil or
military purposes. Indeed, the more that a target state uses space-based capabilities,
the more vulnerable it is to attacks on its space assets. This is a paradigm that
Chinese military thinkers have long discussed and applied in their recommendations
for targeting.xviii
ASATs are now more than ever a looming problem and threat that policymakers
must address. We are now in a different era in which space technology has prolifer-
ated widely and will only continue to spread. China’s 2007 ASAT test has reintro-
duced a threat to space and national security policy not seen since the darkest days
of the Cold War, when both the U.S. and Soviet Union tested ASAT weapons.xix
Disturbingly, China has stated its strategic interest in acquiring the capability to
attack U.S. satellites in order to bolster its own ability to fend off U.S. forces (for
example, in a possible future military takedown of Taiwan).xxTwo conditions aggra-
vate this seemingly forbidding challenge: first, the U.S. is highly dependent on space
assets for its military and economic security; and secondly, these assets are effective-
ly unprotected at the moment. There are currently no defenses available to directly

15 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

defend against physical weapons attacks on satellites. By contrast, rogue or

revisionist states with nascent space capabilities or even with ballistic missiles
and nuclear weapons can carry out attacks on satellites, and there is no possible
guarantee that they would never do so. China’s recent ASAT test proved that
space-based capabilities are spreading to actors besides the U.S. and Russia; if
China can conduct this sort of operation, other states are bound to obtain similar
capabilities. Worse, China has sold or disseminated other highly advanced
weapons technologies such as cruise missiles to third-party actors, including Iran.
Some of these technologies were then transferred by Iran to the Lebanese-Iranian
Hezbollah terrorist organization.xxi
This implies that in the
future, policymakers will be “This implies that in the future,
forced to choose between policymakers will be forced to
defending U.S. space assets,
which may generate space choose between defending U.S.
debris with all of its atten- space assets, which may generate
dant risk to current and fu- space debris with all of its attendant
ture space operations, or risk to current and future space
losing a war against an ag-
gressive state that resorts to operations, or losing a
war against an
ASATs to disable U.S. satel- aggressive state that resorts to ASATs
lites. Fortunately, it is un- to disable U.S. satellites.”
likely that policymakers
will have to accept the latter choice, for a number of compelling reasons. Even if
space objects were to slam into one another, space is immense. Thus, even in
LEO, debris can be routinely avoided. The already low risk-levels of collisions
between space debris and spacecraft (one incident in over 45 years of spaceflight)
would not be catastrophically increased by limited space weapons usage. In fact,
merely doubling the probability of a collision between debris and a satellite
would require doubling the mass of debris in orbit; doubling the amount of space
debris in a space-conflict would entail the destruction of a massive 2,000 tons
worth of spacecraft. Since even the largest spacecraft currently in orbit weighs
only on the order of 18 tons apiece,xxii the destruction of hundreds of spacecrafts
would be necessary just to double the odds of a space debris collision, to a risk
level which would still be quite low. This scenario would also require the
destruction of more sheer mass than is accessible to most adversaries, if only at
the present time.
However, there are cautionary notes that readers must consider when review-
ing this necessarily macrocosmic approach. Firstly, the doubling of orbital debris

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 16
Defense Concepts

mass assumes a uniform distribution over all of EOS. In fact, the debris from these
kills would scatter throughout a band around the original orbit of the destroyed
satellite. This phenomenon was exhibited after the Chinese ASAT test of 11 January
2007 destroyed an obsolescent weather satellite, thereby exposing a greater number
of satellites in a similar orbital band to potential collisions.xxiii Secondly, ASAT
operations would generate vastly increased absolute quantities of space debris. This
debris could exacerbate the already challenging task of controlling space traffic, of
managing and manipulating satellites’ orbits so that they are not struck by any of the
increased numbers of pieces of debris.
Third, it is not the mass per unit volume of space that counts, but rather, the
number, size, and orbits of discrete pieces that is of concern. It only takes one strike
from a debris object to destroy a satellite. Additionally, logic dictates that the smaller
the size of the fragments, the more numerous they may be. To make matters worse,
the smaller and more numerous the objects, the less likely we are to know where
they are.xxiv
The final caveat is that, given the bullet-like speeds of orbital debris, even very
small objects can inflict lethal damage to a satellite. While space wouldn’t necessar-
ily become unusable in the aftermath of even a high-intensity space war, subsequent
space traffic control and management operations would be vastly more difficult,
dangerous, and could result in the loss of one or more spacecraft, particularly in LEO,
where most of the targets and subsequent combat is likeliest to take place.

To Stop an ASAT, Follow its Kill Chain

As with so many practical problems, the earlier in its life-cycle a problem is
prevented, the less expensive or difficult the solution becomes. This notion also
holds true when defending against ASATs. Indeed, the best way to win a fight in
space is to avoid fighting there as much as possible. As with combat aircraft design
and operations, attacks on satellites can be avoided or their effects mitigated.
Alternatively, the probabilities of successful interception of ASAT attacks can be
increased by a variety of methods, known as susceptibility reduction and vulnerabil-
ity reduction. Susceptibility reduction involves reducing the ability of the ASAT to
detect and track its target. For instance, raising the altitude of the satellite makes it
harder for an ASAT to reach. Similarly, stealth in both the radar cross-section and
infrared signatures of a satellite could be reduced, making it more difficult for an
ASAT to detect and track down. Likewise, maneuvering a satellite out of its regular
orbital track would disrupt an ASAT’s limited detection and targeting capabilities.
Vulnerability reduction involves making the target harder to disable or destroy.
It includes design measures such as separation and redundancy of vital components
within the body of the satellite, armoring in the likeliest or most vulnerable areas of
debris impacts, damage suppression, and similar protections. However, while virtu-

17 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

ally all of these measures are utilized in both the design and operation of combat
aircraft, few are currently in use in contemporary spacecraft.xxv
Of particular interest in the quest for an ASAT-resistant satellite system
design is the distributed multiple-small-satellite-design architecture proposed by
DARPA’s F6 program, in which a number of small co-orbiting satellites would
function collectively as a single larger satellite. A loosely-grouped cluster of
small satellites has many advantages. Each satellite is smaller and has a lower
radar cross-section, making it much more difficult to detect and to hit. With
sufficient separation distances between the component satellites, debris generat-
ed from the physical destruction of one is unlikely to reach or damage the others.
Redundancy of functions among satellites in the group enables it to continue to
function even after one or more direct strikes by a KE ASAT. Finally, small
satellites can be replaced more quickly with other small satellites than a single
large satellite would.xxvi Redundancy either through the use of many platforms or
readily available replacements and launchers on the ground (the concept underly-
ing the Air Force’s concept of Operationally Responsive Space, or ORS)xxvii
would make it more difficult to cripple the U.S. military for extended periods.
The F6 concept is illustrated in Figure 1, below:

Figure 1 – Space-Based Small-Satellite Group Conceptxxviii

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 18
Defense Concepts

Other passive efforts could also prove useful, for example, transposing a satel-
lite to a higher altitude out of the ASAT’s range. ASATs can also be thwarted by
changing the satellite’s orbital path or by placing the target out of the ASAT’s reach.
Moreover, an ASAT can be defeated by active means, like destroying it on its launch
pad.
However, there are problems and limitations to all passive measures, both in the
present and in the future. ORS is still in its infancy, and might not stop a challenger
who has plenty of ASATs to spare, or simply deliberately creates orbiting clouds of
debris. In addition, F6 and like designs are still years away from deployment. While
the recommendation to armor satellites in critical locations is used in the Shuttle and
ISS, it is employed by few other platforms. Even if all the passive-defense options
were implemented in all future satellite designs and operations, they would do
nothing to protect the large array of large, non-stealthy, unarmored, high-value
satellites currently in orbit, which constitute the bulk of the U.S.’ space-based
capabilities and will continue to do so in the future. This means that U.S. space
capabilities are and will remain extremely vulnerable to attack, a precarious security
situation that is unlikely to be remedied for the many years or decades to come. If
the adversary’s space situational awareness and ASATs are effective and numerous
enough, and if its
targets are rela-
“Even if all the passive-defense options
tively few, large,
were implemented in all future satellite low-orbiting, and
designs and operations, they would do important, they
nothing to protect the large array of large, will be found and
non-stealthy, unarmored, high-value satellites destroyed. This
will hold true un-
...which constitute the bulk of the U.S.’ less other protec-
space-based capabilities...” tive measures are
taken.

Hypervelocity-Collision Pulverization: No Space Debris… Done Properly

All currently-operational U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) weapons use
hypervelocity, direct-impact “hit-to-kill” Kinetic-Energy (KE) weapon systems to
achieve the destruction of their targets. Hypervelocity is defined as a speed of Mach
5 (five times the speed of sound, or 3,800mph) or higher.xxix “The ‘hit-to-kill’
concept involves colliding with the incoming warhead, completely pulverizing it…
This collision ensures complete destruction of a warhead carrying weapons of mass
destruction — nuclear, biological or chemical — and the means of delivery, such as
mid-range and long-range ballistic missiles.”xxx The great advantage of this ap-

19 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

proach with respect to orbital debris generation is that these hypervelocity

impacts result in the “pulverization” of the interceptor and its ballistic missile
target into minute fragments and particulates.xxxi Also KWE missile defense
weapons typically intercept their targets outside the atmosphere, i.e., in space.
Hypervelocity collisions between ballistic missiles and kinetic-energy inter-
ceptors generate no long-term space debris. This fact was first verified in the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization’s (SDIO) Delta-180 experiment of
September 11, 1986, in which a direct collision occurred between the payload of
the Delta-180 space-launch vehicle and its second-stage booster rocket, at a
closing velocity of about 3km/sec. This was the first time such a hypervelocity
in-space collision had ever been carried out. The net result was the generation of
millions of tiny fragments, most of which burned up in the Earth’s atmosphere
in a matter of minutes, and all of which disappeared within a few days. Further-
more, the debris cloud scattered widely after the collision, thereby lowering its
density and the risk it posed as a debris-cloud.xxxii As Dr. Lowell Wood and
Ambassador Henry Cooper point out about both the Delta-180 and Brilliant
Pebblesxxxiii tests:

“…there have been no adverse consequences reported from any of these

major hypervelocity collision events, which generate literally millions of
sand-grain-sized pieces of space debris, by anyone at all…

“Typical Pebble intercept altitudes, at which the collision debris is gener-

ated, are 50-150 miles, where the residual atmosphere drags down
collision debris on time-scales of seconds to minutes -- and far lower
than those at which recent midcourse defense-testing collisions have
been made to occur. The residual air densities at the much higher
altitudes mistakenly guessed by the critics as pertinent to Pebbles of any
vintage are exponentially smaller, and the inversely proportional orbital
lifetimes of debris created at these altitudes thus are several orders-of-
magnitude larger than those relevant to Pebbles.”xxxiv

Hypervelocity hit-to-kill weapons would be designed along the lines of the

SDI-era proposed Brilliant Pebblesxxxv and now-operational Ground-Based Mid-
course Defense (GMD)xxxvi KE weapons. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate the
outer appearance and system architecture of the Brilliant Pebbles weapon system,
respectively, while Figure 4 shows the GMD intercepting and pulverizing its
missile warhead target.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 20
Defense Concepts

Figure 2 – Brilliant Pebbles Space-Based BMD Interceptorxxxvii

Figure 3 – Anatomy of a Future U.S. Space-Based Kinetic-Kill Vehiclexxxviii

21 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Figure 4 – GMD Intercept Imageryxxxix

Further evidence for the clean-kill potential of technology made to achieve

hypervelocity interceptions is that the GMD is designed to intercept ICBM
warheads in their midcourse phase, during which time they can reach altitudes of
1,000km or more.xl While this altitude is well up into long-duration-orbit EOS,
ICBM warhead interceptions present absolutely no long-term space debris haz-
ard due to the interceptor/target pulverization process.xli This is to be expected
given the combination of factors intrinsic to interceptions of this nature: the
suborbital speeds of both missile and interceptor; the closing velocities that come
from generally opposite directions resulting in tremendous closing speeds; the
small, densely-packaged masses of both interceptor and warhead; and important-
ly, the similar masses of the two items, all of which results in their mutual
annihilation.

Is Debris-Free Space Warfare Possible?

It is thus possible to protect our satellites in space from ASATs without
generating large amounts of long-term debris (none, in some cases), but only
when combat occurs in limited regions of space, and under limited conditions. In
addition, there are two ways to use weapons offensively in space relatively
cleanly. The first way is to use Directed Energy (DE), by focusing optical,
infrared, or radio frequency energy to disrupt or disable a target, without destroy-
ing it outright, thereby shattering it into multiple pieces of debris. The second

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 22
Defense Concepts

way is to use Kinetic Energy (KE) weapons against a target in space, but this
approach should only be used in limited circumstances.
Given the attributes and limitations of hypervelocity-impact kills of targets
in space, some recommendations and restrictions on the use of KE weapons need
to be made. First, both the interceptor and its target must both be relatively small
and compact or larger fragments might escape the pulverization process. Second,
the collision velocities must be as high as possible in order to deliver as much
energy to the target as possible, to pulverize as much of it as possible. Third, the
interception must occur in or close to the outer reaches of the Earth’s atmosphere
so that at least some aerodynamic drag (relative to their small masses) will be
present to drag these small fragments farther down into the atmosphere where
they will be incinerated. Lastly, the target should ideally be intercepted before it
reaches orbital velocity; otherwise, some of the resulting fragments could remain
in orbit for years to come. KE weapons will not result in clean satellite kills at all
altitudes of EOS, nor can KE ASATs guaranteeably be cleanly used outside this
zone, almost regardless of their collision velocities.xlii If the kill must be achieved,
the interception/collision velocity must be as high as possible, in order to
pulverize as much of both target and interceptor into fine particulates as possible.
Direct proof of both the efficacy and limitations of the clean-KE satellite-kill
approach, of ‘how it should be done,’ was evidenced in the 20 February, 2008
shoot-down of an out-of-control U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
satellite by the U.S. Navy using a specially-modified Standard SM-3 missile
defense interceptor launched from the AEGIS missile-defense cruiser USS Lake
Erie while sailing in the Pacific Ocean. In this shoot-down, the satellite was dead,
tumbling out of control in a decaying low Earth orbit, its electrical power systems
shut down, its solar power panels folded, and its hydrazine fuel frozen solid in its
tanks; the optimal small, densely-packed target for a clean KE kill in LEO.
Indeed, this was precisely the effect achieved, with no large long-term debris
resulting from the AEGIS KE intercept.xliiixliv

The “Shotgun” Approach; Even Worse

Co-orbiting ASATs are innately ‘messy’ satellite-killers, arguably more so
than KE-ASATs. First devised and tested by the former Soviet Union from the
1960s through the 1980s, this type of ASAT kills its target by first rising
gradually after its launch to achieve a parallel orbital path within a short distance
of the target satellite (i.e. ‘co-orbiting’ with it) then utilizing a blast-fragmenta-
tion-impelled “grenade”-type warhead to destroy the target.xlv Supposedly, this
method of attack generates ‘only’ a few hundred large pieces of debris.xlvi
However, this debris lingers for a very long time, even in LEO, as evidenced by

23 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

the fact that today, debris from these Soviet-era tests still poses an on-orbit
hazard. “Several Soviet ASAT tests did create thousands of detectable pieces of
junk that are still in orbit after 25 years… In total, 371 detectable pieces of
orbiting junk still survive today from various Soviet ASAT weapons tests.”xlvii
Worryingly, the Russians produced stockpiles of these IS-Axlviii and IS-MUxlix
co-orbiting ASATs during the Cold War. These stockpiles have not been dis-
posed of and may become a space-security threat in the future, either through
their reactivation into service by Russia, or via sales to other countries.l
Figure 5 – Soviet Co-Orbiting ASAT Attacking a Satelliteli

Directed Energy: the Cleanest-Killing U.S. Space Weapon Technology

Directed-energy (DE) weapons are another means of conducting ASAT
missions that do not produce any space debris if used judiciously. As its name
implies, DE involves the generation and focusing of either optical-frequency
(laser) or radio frequency (RF) energy onto a target. One of DE’s greatest
advantages is its direct, line-of-sight flight path. It can also arrive at an orbiting
target virtually instantaneously, since it travels at the speed of light, the maxi-
mum velocity possible in the universe.lii Indeed, noted space security specialist
Robert Butterworth agrees that the greater range and virtually instantaneous
reach of DE may make it the active space-defense weapon technology of choice,
particularly against short-flight time, direct-ascent ASATs.liii This type of use
would take advantage of both the instantaneous reach and greater range of DE
depending on its type and source location.
DE weapons also have the potential to be truly ‘clean-killing’ ASAT weap-
ons, even more so than KE weapons. DE weapons’ effects can be calibrated as
desired simply by varying the intensity, duration and location of the energy
directed onto the target. As a result, DE weapons possess the capability to blind,

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 24
Defense Concepts

disable, disrupt or destroy satellites. Different methods of DE deposition can be

used to achieve each effect. For instance, high-energy lasers, whether ground, air,
or space-based (see Figure 6) could be used to accomplish a range of controlled
effects, such as temporarily dazzling or permanently blinding sensitive optical or
Infra-Red (IR) sensors, overwhelming solar-electric semiconductor power-gener-
ation arrays, or melding down the exterior of a satellite. Similarly, the power and
energy deposition could be ratcheted up to burn through the insulation and outer
wall of the satellite, penetrate to the internal structure of the satellite, and destroy
or damage the innards (computers, gyros, etc.) of the satellite sufficiently to
lobotomize it without generating multiple large pieces of debris. As a final
alternative, the target could be shattered by imparting enough additional energy.
However, this latter effort would generate debris. In the optimal lethal-effect
scenario, a permanently-deactivated enemy satellite (or ASAT weapon, for that
matter) would continue along in its existing orbit, albeit as an inert hulk that
could be easily monitored and avoided.liv
Similarly, High-Powered Microwave (HPM) weapons could be used to
destroy targets in space. HPM weapons can disrupt or destroy a target by
generating sufficient amounts of electrical current to electrocute the electronic
micro-circuitry that satellites are dependent on to function.lv As with the less-
destructive usage of laser energy, judiciously applied HPM would also engender
a temporarily jammed satellite’s communication systems. At the other extreme
of potential effects, HPM could also be used to achieve a clean kill, leaving only
a drifting hulk in its wake. As Eileen Walling explains, “One advantage of
microwave weapons is that they do not physically destroy satellites and thereby
produce the debris that would harm other satellites.”lvi HPM DE is the preferred
method of killing a satellite without transforming it into a debris cloud.
DE is arguably the better space-weapon technology option, for a number of
reasons. First, it can be used to control, limit or increase the desired level and
duration of effects on a target, depending on the political or military situation as
well as the target itself. Second, as described above, the debris-generation
problem can be completely avoided if the satellite can be disabled but kept intact.
Third, the risks of escalation in a space-war, especially with a nuclear-armed
adversary, can be avoided if the effects of the target neutralization are temporary.
Fourth, the need to resort to ultimately counterproductive ground-strikes, or
worse, to nuclear weapons in retaliation for the loss of a “significant” number of
satelliteslvii is eliminated altogether. Possessing the capability to effectively,
flexibly, and cleanly defend our own space assets against physical attack would
allow us to avoid the lost-space-capability nightmare scenario altogether.
However, even DE is not a cure-all: satellites might be hardened against DE;
stealth, deception or evasion tactics may be used to circumvent targeting by DE

25 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

and KE weapons; the target may be in too high an orbit to be within range of DE
weapons. Nor is the risk of debris generation reduced to zero with the use of DE
weapons, since some pieces might be sliced or melted off the target, or the target
might explode outright (propellant tanks, batteries) with sufficient energy deposi-
tion.

Figure 6 – Proposed U.S. Design for a Chemically Fueled Space-Based

Laserlviii

‘Boosting’ High-Energy-Lasers with Space-Based Relay Mirrors

Space-Based Laser Relay Mirrors (SBLRMs) can extend the range and reach
of DE lasers, enabling instantaneous coverage of all of EOS with accurate,
pinpoint protective fire against ballistic missiles, boosting ASATs, and even
ASATs in higher-altitude orbits and trajectories, with only a relative handful of
DE lasers. SBLRMs are another technology developed and proven during the
SDI era as a means of extending the range and reach of laser weapons beyond
their physical direct-line-of-sight limitations. The goal was to place a constella-
tion of mirrors in orbit to provide the requisite sequence of reflection relay-points
from any laser platform to any required area of coverage at all times in the same
manner as that utilized in the GPS or IRIDIUM constellations. With a sufficient
number of mirrors in orbit, one laser source could instantly be used to engage a
number of targets anywhere around the world. In fact, the high-energy laser
emitter can be located anywhere in the world, from locations on the ground, in
the air, or up in space. In addition, any given mirror could relay the beams of any
number of sources, giving redundancy to the intended area of coverage if one or
more laser sources were lost.lix
Perhaps surprisingly, SBLRM technology is the most mature of all the
Directed-Energy Laser DEL systems stemming from the SDI program. An

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 26
Defense Concepts

SBLRM was flight-tested in the Relay Mirror Experiment (RME) of February

1990. In this experiment, a satellite bearing a specially-made mirror was orbited,
and successfully and accurately reflected an Earth-based laser’s light-beam back
down to the ground onto a nearby stationary ground target, all while the satellite
was orbiting overhead in LEO and traveling at some 4.5 miles a second.lx The
RME used adaptive optics to compensate for atmospheric distortions in the laser
beam and produced a reflected laser beam that arrived in essentially coherent
form on the ground target.lxi Further validation of the laser-relay-mirror method-
ology lies in its recent resurrection and successful testing in the form of the
Aerospace Relay Mirror System (ARMS) for tactical battlefield applications. In
a July 2006 test, two balloon-lofted mirrors were used to reflect a laser from a
ground-based emitter to a ground target, two miles away.lxii
Just as with space-based KE weapons, SBLRMs could be used to shoot down
missiles of any hostile purpose in their boost phase. SBLRMs could also extend
their DEL sources’ range much more than any KE weapon. They could even
‘bounce’ their beams to expand their reach around the world. Furthermore,
SBLRMs could even be used to increase the reach of their beam sources farther
up into EOS, again with the near-instantaneity that only DE weapons can provide.
Thus, they present a promising option.

Figure 7 – Space-Based Laser Relay Mirror Experiment of 1990lxiii

27 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

ASAT Operations via Blocking, Tumbling and Towing

There are several other methods of conducting debris-free ASAT operations.
Since virtually all satellites currently in orbit utilize solar-electric arrays to
generate electrical power, one method of non-destructively ‘killing’ a satellite
involves co-orbiting a sunshade that would be interposed between the target
satellite and the sun. This tactic would prevent solar energy from reaching the
targeted satellite’s solar arrays, cutting off its electricity. The satellite would be
deactivated once its batteries ran out.lxiv
Another way to ‘kill’ a satellite without generating space debris would be by
physically dislocating it by either tumbling or towing. Tumbling involves attach-
ing a parasite satellite to the target satellite, which then tumbles the target beyond
its ability to stabilize itself. Similarly, towing involves moving or towing the
target satellite from its orbit beyond its capability to recover from such a displace-
ment. In order to permanently eliminate the target satellite altogether without
turning it into hazardous orbital debris, it could be towed either to the point of
reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere or out of EOS altogether, though the former
is much easier to achieve.lxv

“If all else fails and an ASAT is unswervingly, undeniably

inbound towards a high-value satellite and no other form of
clean-killing defense can stop it, then the only alternative left
to protect that high-value satellite is to use an Anti-ASAT.”

KE Anti-ASATs: Last Resort, and Necessity

If all else fails and an ASAT is unswervingly, undeniably inbound towards a
high-value satellite and no other form of clean-killing defense can stop it, then
the only alternative left to protect that high-value satellite is to use an Anti-ASAT
(AASAT). Not only is there the potentially critical loss of the satellite and its
capabilities to contend with, but the resultant debris field could then pose an
enormous threat to all other operators in that band of EOS. This is all the more
likely, given that most satellites tend to be clustered in a relatively few zones of
high utility and usage, such as LEO and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO).
Assuming that the total number of pieces of debris is roughly proportional to the
total mass of the ASAT-plus-satellite collision, it behooves the defender to find
some way to stop the ASAT, regardless of the debris.lxvi If debris generation is
indeed inevitable, then the ASAT should be destroyed with as small an AASAT
as possible in order to minimize the total debris mass produced. To this end,

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 28
Defense Concepts

microsatellites could be employed to function as satellite bodyguards, as illustrated

in Figure 8 below. And to this end, and possibly for all of these reasons, both the
AFRL and DARPA are working on defensive counter-ASAT microsatellite
designs.lxvii

Figure 8 – Satellite Bodyguards Defending a High-Value Satellitelxviii

Yet More Ways to Defeat ASATs – Or Are There?

In addition to stealth, evading, maneuvering, hardening, distributed components,
and shooting them down, there are still other ways to stop ASATs from accomplish-
ing their mission. Alternative methods include striking their launchers, and electron-
ic attack/infiltration. The former would require detecting, locating and then
launching cruise or even ballistic missiles at the launch platform or vehicle (e.g., a
mobile launcher, such as was used by China). The Navy’s proposed Prompt Global
Strike System would use conventionally-armed Trident submarine-launched ballis-
tic missiles to destroy high-priority, mobile targets at long ranges and in very little
flight-time.lxix The latter option involves using highly sophisticated electronics in
combat aircraft, warships, or military facilities to electronically infiltrate or ‘hack
into’ the radars, command and control systems, or the guidance system of the ASAT
itself. Israeli Defence Force/Air Force combat aircraft used this method to thwart
Syrian air defense systems (including inbound surface-to-air missiles) protecting a
‘mystery’ nuclear facility that the IDF/AF subsequently destroyed.lxx
However, both of these approaches are perilous. Striking a ground target, even
a missile launcher, would constitute an act of war, especially if the strike occurred
deep inside another country’s territory. Adversely, a submarine-launched ballistic
missile could be interpreted (accidentally or deliberately) as a strategic nuclear strike,
initiating a miscalculation of intent and triggering a nuclear counterstrike. Even if it

29 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

didn’t provoke a nuclear response, the potential repercussions would be substantial.

How could the U.S. possibly explain to the international community that the
resulting pile of rubble far into the domain of, say, China, was in fact an ASAT about
to be launched? Nor would the owners of the pile of wreckage in question leave
incriminating evidence in the open for the world to inspect and confirm its guilt and
ultimately exonerate a U.S. act of war. There is also the risk that U.S. intelligence
entities could incorrectly identify the targeted launcher as an ASAT or other threat.
Indeed, such an effort would most likely backfire against the U.S. The ASAT-
defense-via-launcher-strike strategy would not tangibly enhance American security,
and cannot be counted on to provide the last line of defense against ASAT attacks.
Similarly, electronic attack or infiltration such as was purportedly carried out by
the IDF/AF requires that the attacking systems be in close proximity to the launcher,
ground-based space-tracking radars, or command and control facilities. This disposi-
tion would be extremely risky to the attacking systems and to their mission. Alterna-
tively, this type of mission might be possible by hacking into the ASAT system’s
ground-based network via the Internet. However, friendly hackers may not be able
to hack into the system at all. In any event, this method is fraught with risk, and
cannot be relied on to provide the last line of defense against ASAT attacks either.

Recent Federal Mandate for Space Defenses

The language that Congress added to the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Bill
(H.R. 1585) directs the Department of Defense to begin planning for space defenses.
Ironically enumerated as Section 911, the Space Protection Strategy requires the
DOD to map out strategy, forces, and doctrine for the development and deployment
of the capabilities needed to protect U.S. space-based capabilities, with planning
extending as far as 2025.lxxi The most salient portions of the Bill are as follows:

“It is the Sense of Congress that the United States should place greater
priority on the protection of national security space systems… The Secre-
tary of Defense, in conjunction with the Director of National Intelligence,
shall develop a strategy, to be known as the Space Protection Strategy, for
the development and fielding by the United States of the capabilities that are
necessary to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States… The
strategy required… shall include each of the following:

“An identification of the threats to, and the vulnerabilities of, the national
security space systems of the United States… A description of the capabili-
ties currently contained in the program of record of the Department of
Defense and the intelligence community that ensure freedom of action in
space…

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 30
Defense Concepts

“For each period covered by the strategy, a description of the capabilities that
are needed for the period, including-- the hardware, software, and other materi-
als or services to be developed or procured; the management and organization
al changes to be achieved; and concepts of operations, tactics, techniques,
and procedures to be employed.”lxxii

While this language doesn’t specifically call for weapons in space, it directs the
DOD for the first time to ensure that the U.S. military and intelligence communities
plan appropriately to ensure that they will have freedom of action in space. As this
analysis shows, that guarantee will require active defenses to defend U.S. space
assets while at the same time preventing or minimizing the creation of additional
long-term hazardous space debris.

Clearing Out the Space Debris Issue… Literally

Finally, the best long-term solution to the space debris problem is not achieved
by mitigating or waiting for the debris to disappear (no matter how ‘short’ a period
of time it may linger in orbit). Considering humanity’s ever-increasing operations
in space, it is inevitable that more space debris will be generated with time. Whether
the space debris problem will be worsened by space-combat operations is a question-
able but ultimately irrelevant point. The fact remains that the problem of space
debris is only going to worsen with time, no matter what is done to mitigate it.
Put simply, the space debris challenge demands an active space-debris removal
strategy, regardless of whether even a single satellite is ever intentionally destroyed
in combat. Several existing technologies are viable and affordable. They address the
debris problem on a permanent, ongoing and dynamically responsive basis. These
solutions can be broken up into two basic subsets: space tugs and space-applied lasers.
Space tugs could be used to remove the largest long-term space debris problem
items, the spent upper-stage booster rocket stages malingering in Medium Earth
Orbit (MEO) bands, where they may remain for millennia. Since these are large,
unitary objects (either integral or fragmented booster stages, or dead satellites) their
size and mass would require and justify the development of a space-based towing
vehicle, or tug, to either de-orbit or boost them into an orbit outside of EOS. These
tugs can be propelled by either nuclear or solar-electric energy. Sandia Laboratory
has proposed their IOSTAR design for sustained, cost-effective space debris remov-
al operations.lxxiii Skycorp Inc.’s Orbital Recovery System, also designated as
CX-OLEV, uses photo-voltaic-array-generated electricity to power Hall
thrusters.lxxiv
There is also a near-operational technology with which to remove smaller, more
numerous pieces of debris from LEO. Originally the result of a NASA study on
space debris removal, Project ORION proposed using High Energy (HE) Lasers,

31 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

whether ground- or space-based, to remove debris from LEO. HE lasers would

ablate the surfaces of small pieces of debris, creating a thrust which, if generated
on the fragment face pointing towards the direction of orbit at any given moment,
would provide a ‘retro-rocket’ thrust effect. This effect would slow the fragment
and lower its orbital altitude more quickly than would atmospheric drag alone.
Multiple illuminations of a fragment during successive overhead passes would
result in its re-entry and burn-up in the Earth’s atmosphere proper earlier than if
it was left to its own devices. A ground-based laser is recommended over a
space-based system, given the vastly greater costs involved with the latter.lxxvlxxvi
According to NASA estimates, not only are the DE laser’s power require-
ments entirely achievable, but the system itself would be remarkably effective.
Two systems, one nearer-term and the other a longer-term proposal, were as-
sessed. As Ivan Bekey explains:

“The nearer term system would be able to remove from orbit essentially
all of the 30,000 1-to-10-cm debris objects at or below about 800-km
altitude within three years, for an estimated total cost of $60 million-$80
million, including R&D and operations. The longer term system would
be able to remove essentially all of the 125,000 1-to-10-cm debris objects
at or below 1,500-km altitude within two years, for an estimated total
cost of $150 million-$180 million.”

The surprisingly low costs and tremendous levels of efficiency of such

systems are also listed in Table 1, below:

Table 1: Summary of ORION Costs and Capabilitieslxxvii

Near-term System Far-term System

Debris size, cm 1-10 1-10

Debris altitude, km <800 <1500

Number of objects de-orbited 30000 125,000

Technology Near existing Some development

Operating time, years 3 2

Cost, $M (as of 1997) 60-80 150-200

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 32
Defense Concepts

SBLRMs could also be used in combination with ORION-type GBLs to remove

smaller pieces of debris from orbit. SBLRMs would augment GBLs by increasing
the lasers’ total ‘dwell time’ on space debris. Increasing the ablation-effect time on
smaller pieces of space debris will cause them to de-orbit even sooner. This effect
would increase the rate at which LEO could be cleansed of debris compared with the
standalone effect of GBLs only. SBLRMs could also be used to extend the GBLs’
‘reach’ into higher earth orbits, serving to empty EOS of the multitudes of smaller
pieces of debris that would otherwise linger in EOS for millennia. Finally, this
multiplied illumination-time might actually enable the complete vaporization of the
smallest and most numerous pieces of debris from the higher orbital altitudes.

Figure 9 – Sandia/IOSTAR Nuclear-Powered Space-Tuglxxviii

Figure 10 – CX-OLEV Space Tug Docking with Satellitelxxix

33 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Neither Conventional nor Nuclear Deterrence will Prevent Space Combat

Both USSTRATCOM’s Gen. Cartwright and MDA’s Gen. Obering stated
in early 2007 speeches that the U.S. should be ready to respond to ASAT threats
by attacking launch sites before the ASATs can loft against their targets.lxxxlxxxi
Cartwright, in particular, advocated a nuclear response to a sufficiently crippling
ASAT attack.lxxxii His statements beg several questions: Is the U.S. truly willing
to strike targets deep inside Chinese territory to retaliate against lost satellites, or
even in response to a significant number of ASAT launches? How will that
protect our satellites or prevent space pollution if the damage has already been
done? If we do carry out such strikes, conventional or especially nuclear, how
will the Chinese react to this seemingly disproportionate response, and act of
war? Nuclear retaliation? An invasion of Taiwan? Clearly, deterrence will not
work here. Worst of all, we might be too blinded and crippled to be able respond
at all to a sufficiently extensive attack against U.S. space-based assets. Lt. Col.
Michael Baum described just such a scenario in his paper on space warfare,
entitled “Defiling the Altar – The Weaponization of Space.”lxxxiii
Such an offense-only counter-ASAT approach, particularly with a nuclear
threat, is fraught not only with errors, but with peril. How would we even “know”
for certain that anyone was going to attack our satellites? Certainly not with our
intelligence-gathering agencies that have failed to foresee everything from the
fall of the Iron Curtain to the coming of 9/11.lxxxiv How would we prove to an
already cynically anti-American world that the indecipherable, smoldering heaps
of wreckage on some launch-pad deep inside China were actually ASATs about
to be fired at U.S. satellites? Further, the Chinese would invariably hide or alter
any evidence of their own hostile space ambitions from the world, so as to feed
just such world cynicism, undermining the U.S.’ own efforts against it.
Additionally, would anyone outside the military really believe that a “Prompt
Global Strike” ICBM or SLBM hurtling in toward Chinese home territory was
not, in fact, a nuclear weapon?lxxxv Would the Chinese really sit idly by while
ICBM/SLBMs are hurtling inbound at them, even if they were somehow con-
vinced that the missile wasn’t carrying nuclear warheads? Further, are U.S.
policymakers really willing to threaten nuclear retaliation and risk killing mil-
lions on both sides to avoid losing our satellites? How will nuclear retaliation
salvage our lost space assets or thwart defeat in a theater conflict, which will be
much more likely after the destruction of these satellites?
Finally, the principle of mutually assured destruction does not hold if our
enemy lacks the dependency that we have on space, or does not possess any
space-based assets. For example, China’s implicit dependency on their space-
based capabilities is and will remain much less significant than our own, especial-
ly if the Chinese are truly intent on getting control of Taiwan. Direct-ascent

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 34
Defense Concepts

ASATs leave little time for any kind of measured response, such as knocking out
ground-control stations in order to stop them. Similarly, attacking ground sta-
tions might not stop an ASAT already on its way towards its target. Put simply,
there is no substitute for a space warfighting force that can provide an effective,
active, timely, direct defense of U.S. space-based assets.
Fortunately, there is increasing interest in some military circles in boost-
phase missile defenses as a means of defending against ASATs. MDA’s then-
Director, Gen. Obering said, “It’s not prudent to rely only on just one approach
to meet the threat of anti-satellite weapons… You can’t always go on the
assumption that you can do this offensively. You need some kind of defensive
capability as well.”lxxxvi The goal of a missile-defense-oriented approach to
ASAT defense would be to shoot down the missile launching the ASAT.lxxxvii
However, the absence of any mention of active space defenses in recent Congres-
sional testimony by the senior leaders of the U.S. government’s national security
space establishment is conspicuous.lxxxviii

When, not if, Push Comes to Shove…

Even the best passive space-defense technologies and tactics cannot entirely
prevent the generation of long-term space debris under all foreseeable circum-
stances. If the decision should be made to attack an adversary’s satellites using
KE interceptors, even the highest-closing-velocity-capable KE ASATs are going
to generate some debris when they obliterate much larger satellite targets.
Moreover, potential future adversaries will also become more space-capable.
China is the most exemplary such nation-state, but it is by no means alone. With
these new space-capable nations will come the greater likelihood that these
adversaries will also develop their own space-based warfighting capability,
including ISR, communications and even navigation satellite constellations,
similar to our own systems.lxxxix We must also take heed that debris generation
could very well be China’s (or any other adversary’s) long-term strategy. As Joel
Williamsen points out, the threat of secondary collisions resulting from the debris
clouds of a possible future series of Chinese ASAT tests could deliberately pose
a serious long-term hazard to all users of LEO space, thereby degrading or
eliminating its usefulness:

“This successful test… also raises the specter of a potential (and perhaps
intentional) secondary threat with broad consequences – the generation
of orbital debris as a threat to general satellite survivability. This second-
ary threat of widespread orbital debris, while undirected, would be far
more likely to disadvantage a nation such as the U.S., with its far heavier

35 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

dependence on a satellite-based infrastructure, than one such as China, and

could be an effective strategy for ‘leveling the playing field’ in future
conflicts.”xc

One day the U.S. will be forced to choose between losing a war to a space-
capable enemy, or defending against that enemy’s assaults on our own space assets
by destroying its ASATs and ‘poking out’ its ‘eyes in space,’ by disabling or
eliminating its space-based assets.xci Is the space debris ‘pollution’ problem really a
higher national security risk than the loss of thousands of American or allied troops,
and possibly the loss of an entire war? Will we be prepared to deal with the threat if
an enemy launches ASATs at our satellites? Do we simply stand by, or prepare to
destroy those ASATs before they can do even worse damage? If the only weapons
available are KE interceptors and the U.S. is facing defeat, what should U.S. space
security policy be? This is the question that U.S. policymakers are going to have to
confront and answer in the years to come.

“ Indeed, it behooves the U.S. to pursue these weapons and

tactics, since this pursuit can guarantee not only the security of
its satellites, but also the long-term usability of EOS,
particularly LEO, against the likelihood of hostile ASAT
operations.”
Conclusions
Within the next few years, U.S. policymakers will have to make an important
choice between losing a future major international conflict in space, with all the
attendant costs and risks to both U.S. and global stability and security, or winning
that conflict albeit generating some extra space debris in the process. U.S. space-
defense weapon constellations will secure the peace in Earth’s orbital space in the
same way that the U.S. Navy secures the world’s oceans, a presence that has not
spawned a “destabilizing” arms race at sea. A number of potential adversaries either
have or will obtain weapons with which to conduct combat operations in space.
China is but the most recent state to demonstrate such capabilities. Like Russia, the
other known space weapons producer, China has sold arms and weapons technolo-
gies to other states, including many that are antagonistic to the U.S. or its allies. As
a result, other space-threat actors will emerge in time.
The prospect of debris generated by space warfare is far less important than is
U.S. national space security overall. Stakeholders must cautiously analyze the types
of weapons and operational doctrines that could be fielded by the U.S. to achieve the
dual goals of space security and space debris mitigation. Indeed, it behooves the U.S.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 36
Defense Concepts

to pursue these weapons and tactics, since this pursuit can guarantee not only the
security of its satellites, but also the long-term usability of EOS, particularly LEO,
against the likelihood of hostile ASAT operations. Furthermore, there are plentiful
ideas for viable and affordable technologies and methods for cleaning up the space
environment. Maintenance of space will become necessary as its use grows in the
coming years, decades, and centuries. Even if many large pieces of long-term space
debris were generated at higher altitudes by a space conflict, the choice ultimately
remains a simple one: between ‘space-pollution’ and national defeat, between
security and naiveté, between our all-important self-defense, and our de facto
surrender to the first adversary that chooses to attack our space assets via this route.
These are the stark yet undisputable policy choices being faced by U.S. policymak-
ers today.
The technologies currently envisioned for U.S. space weapons would provide
the best means of achieving U.S. space security and continued national security in
the foreseeable future. These technologies would also minimize the risk of space
debris generation. If used intelligently and judiciously, both hypervelocity-collision
and directed-energy weapons will provide an effective and debris-minimizing
space-defense force. It is vital that we arm ourselves to deter and defend against
ASATs and other space-traversing threats as soon as possible. With luck, a strong
U.S. space-defense force will prevent a conflict from ever occurring in space.
Failing that, these forces will enforce the safety and security of space, hopefully with
a minimum of long-term orbital debris along the way.

Howard Kleinberg has a BASc in Electrical Engineering from the University of

Toronto and an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. He has ten
years of experience in the Canadian Space Industry and eleven years in the U.S.
telecommunications and defense sectors.
iEarth Orbital Space (EOS), a term defined by the author to define the volume of space
within which artificial satellites are placed in regular orbits around the earth, out to a
‘practical limit’ at Geosynchronous Earth Orbit, or GEO.
ii Leonard Weiss et al. 7 April 2005. Ensuring America’s Space Security, Federation of
American Scientists, Appendix E: Orbital Debris.
http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=297&contentId=311.
iii Covault, Craig. 17 January, 2007. Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon. Washington: Avia-

tion Week & Space Technology.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI
01177.xml
iv Dolman, Everett and Hays, Peter and Mueller, Karl. 10 March, 2006. Toward a U.S.

Grand Strategy in Space, Washington, DC: The George C. Marshall Institute.: 2-5,
http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/408.pdf.

37 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

v Rumsfeld, Donald H. (Chair). January 11, 2001. Report to the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington:
Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives.: 8-9,
http://space.au.af.mil/space_commission/executive_summary.pdf.
vi Lee, James G. et al August 2003. Air University Space Primer, (USAF Air Universi-

ty.: 8-1 – 8-22, http://space.au.af.mil/primer/.

vii Staff. 26 May, 1972. Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union

Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

(Washington: The Department of State of the United States of America.
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html.
viii Davis, Daniel L. (Major, U.S. Army). January 2008. Heavy & Agile – Nine Steps to

a More Agile Force, Armed Forces Journal.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/01/3208280.
ix There were approximately 11,000 pieces of orbital debris before the Chinese ASAT

test of 11 January 2007, which added about 1,500 objects over 10cm in size to the mix.
From Stansbery, Eugene. 29 April 2005. Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions.
NASA Orbital Debris Program Offic., http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html; and,
Staff, Battlefield Space,. August, 2007. Cape Town: Popular Mechanics.
http://www.popularmechanics.co.za/content/general/singlepage.asp?fid=991&pno=1.
x David, Leonard, Space Traffic Control. May 5, 2004. Space.com.
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/space_traffic_040505.html.
xi Ailor, William. Winter 2000. New Hazards for a New Age Los Angeles: The Aero-

space Corporation, Volume 1, Number 1.

http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2000/04.html.
xii Stansbery, Eugene29 April 2005. Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions. Hous-

ton: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office. http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html.

xiii Jorgensen, Kira and Johnson, Nicholas. 15 May 2007. Orbital Debris Education

Package. Houston: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, last accessed 15 May 2007:3.
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/EducationPackage.pdf.
xiv Phillips, Shaun. 1 December 2005. Earth’s Atmosphere. NASA MSFC Exploration.

http://liftoff.msfc.nasa.gov/academy/space/atmosphere.html.
xv Lee, James G., et al. August 2003. Air University Space Primer. U.S.AF Air Universi-

ty.: 8-22, http://space.au.af.mil/primer/.

xvi Stansbery, Eugene. 29 April 2005. Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions.

NASA Orbital Debris Program Offic. http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html

xvii Grego, Laura. May 30, 2006. Space Weapons Basics – A History of Anti-Satellite
Programs, Washington: Union of Concerned Scientists.
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/a-history-of-asat-programs.html.
xviii Wortzel, Larry M.. 15 October, 2003. China and the Battlefield in Space. Washing-

ton: The Heritage Foundation.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm346.cfm.
xix Covault, Craig. 17 January, 2007. Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon, (Washington:

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 38
Defense Concepts

Aviation Week & Space Technology.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI
01177.xml
xxWortzel, Larry M.. 15 October, 2003. China and the Battlefield in Space. Washington:
The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm346.cfm.
xxi Kueter, Jeff and Kleinberg, Howard. 3 May, 2007. The Cruise Missile Challenge: De-
signing a Defense Against Asymmetric Threats. Washington: The George C. Marshall Insti-
tute: 17. http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/522.pdf; and,
Fulghum, David and Barrie, Douglas. August 14, 2006. The Iranian Connection. Aviation
Week & SpaceTechnology: 20-22.
xxii Pike, John. 27 October 2006. Advanced Keyhole / Improved Crystal / “KH-12”.

GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/kh-12.htm
xxiiiStaff. March 28, 2007. Space Debris Left by Chinese Test Poses Near-Term Worries.
Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 13, No. 7; pg. 9-10
xxiv Staff. 1997. Protecting the Space Shuttle from Meteoroids and Orbital Debris. Washing-

ton, DC: National Research Council: 36

xxv Williamsen, Joel. December 10-11, 2007. Direct Ascent KE ASAT Satellite Vulnerabili-

ty: Applying Lessons Learned from NASA, Missile Defense, and Aircraft Survivability
Programs,” (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, Briefing to Space and Defense
Conference, Las Vegas, NV: 12, 20.
xxvi Foust, Jeff. 20 August, 2007. From One, Many. The Space Review.

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/937/1
xxvii Rupp, Sheila. 22 May 2007. Operationally Responsive Space, News - Kirtland Air

Force Base., http://www.kirtland.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123054292

xxviii
Brown, Owen C. 24 July, 2007. Industry Day Briefing – System F6 (Washington, DC:
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: 9. http://www.darpa.mil/tto/solicit/BAA07-
31/Dr._Owen_Brown's_Brief.pdf
xxixStaff, hypersonic. answers.com, 2007. http://www.answers.com/topic/hypersonic; It
must also be pointed out that the issue of Mach number disappears outside of the atmo-
sphere in which to measure the speed of sound, as space is airless.
xxx Staff. 2005-2006. GMD/EKV -- Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle/Ground-Based Midcourse

Defense System. Raytheon Missile Systems.

http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms01_05581
8.pdf
xxxi Parts of the target spacecraft that are farther from the point of impact would be broken
into larger fragments, however; the farther the part from the impact point, the lesser the im-
pact energy, and the greater the fragment size.
xxxii Chobotov, V.A. and Spencer, D.B. 16-19 April, 1990. A Review of Orbital Debris

Modeling at the Aerospace Corporation,. Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues and
Future Directions, Baltimore, MD, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,

39 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

NASA, and DOD. http://pdf.aiaa.org/preview/1990/PV1990_1356.pdf

xxxiii Brilliant Pebbles was high-tech kinetic kill machine composed of a constellation of

tiny rocket-powered devices that would independently detect, track, and neutralize in-
coming missiles. It was designed to operate in conjunction with the Brilliant Eyes sen-
sor system and would have detected and destroyed missiles without any external
guidance
xxxiv Wood, Lowell and Cooper, Henry F. 23 July, 2002. Hit-To-Kill Intercepts In Near-
Earth Space. The High Frontier, 2002 Strategic Policy Issue Briefs.
http://users.erols.com/hifront/2002_issue_briefs.html
xxxvPfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and Van Cleave, William R.. 2006. Independent Working

Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century –
2007 Report, (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.:41-58.
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWGreport.pdf
xxxviStaff. May, 2006. Fact Sheet – Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. Missile Defense

Agency. http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/gmd06.pdf
xxxvii Robert L., Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and William R. Van Cleave, Independent Working

Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century –
2007 Report, (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 2006, pg. 46),
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWGreport.pdf
xxxviii Cooper, Henry F. 1 October, 2002. Defending America from Offshore Missile At-

tack. Washington: The George C. Marshall Institute;24.

http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/119.pdf
xxxixStaff. 8 January, 2007. GMD Intercept Imagery (50K). Missile Defense Agency,

http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/images/ift9d.jpg,. Last accessed 8 January, 2007

xlRussia’s latest ICBM, the Topol-M, has a maximum altitude, or apogee, of 1,000 km.;

from Wade, Mark . Topol-M. 2007. Astronautix.com.

http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/topolm.htm
xli Staff. 2005-2006. GMD/EKV -- Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle/Ground-Based Mid-

course Defense System. Raytheon Missile Systems.

xlii Williamsen, Joel. Spring 2008. Satellite Vulnerability to Direct Ascent KE ASAT:

Applying Lessons Learned from NASA, Missile Defense, and Aircraft Survivability Pro-
grams. Wright-Patterson AFB: Aircraft Survivability Journal: 23-25.
http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/asnews/AS_Summer_2008.pdf
xliii Matthews, Jim. 20 February, 2008. U.S. Navy Shoots Down Satellite. Aviation Week

& Space Technology.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news
/ERIE02208.xml&headline=U.S.%20Navy%20Shoots%20Down%20Satellite
xliv Fulghum, David A. 24 March, 2008. Satellite Shootdown Surprised Planners, Aero-

space Daily and Defense Report.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news
/ASAT032408.xml&headline=Satellite%20Shootdown%20Suprised%20Planners

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 40
Defense Concepts

xlv Grego, Laura. May 30, 2006. Space Weapons Basics – A History of Anti-Satellite Pro-

grams. Union of Concerned Scientists.

http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/a-history-of-asat-programs.html.
xlvi Wade, Mark, IS-A. 30 March 2005. Astronautix.com.

http://www.astronautix.com/craft/isa.htm
xlvii
Staff. August 10, 1995. Congressional Record – Amendment No. 2402, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT 1996. U.S. Senate.
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/congress/1995/cr950810.htm
xlviii Wade, Mark. 2007. IS-A. Astronautix.com. http://www.astronautix.com/craft/isa.htm
xlixWade, Mark. 2007. IS-MU. Astronautix.com.
http://www.astronautix.com/craft/ismu.htm
l Ibid
li
Zak, Anatoly. 30 December, 2006. SPACECRAFT: Military: IS anti-satellite system.
Russianspaceweb.com. http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html
lii Beason, Doug. 2005. The E-Bomb – How Directed Energy Will Change the Way Future
Wars Will be Fought. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press: 9, 21-29
liiiButterworth, Robert. January 2008. Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs. Washington,

DC: The George C. Marshall Institute;2. http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/575.pdf.

livSinger, Jeremy. 2 March 2004. Air Force Document Envisions Variety of Anti-Satellite
Weapons. Space.com.
http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive04/weaponsarch_030104.html
lv Walling, Eileen M. 2001. High Powered Microwaves and Modern Warfare from William

C. Martel (editor), The Technological Arsenal – Emerging Defense Capabilities. Washing-

ton: Smithsonian University Press: 90-97, 102-103
lvi Ibid
lvii Gertz, Bill. 30 March, 2007. China Has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons.
Washington: The Washington Times. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070329-
114710-9929r.htm
lviiiStaff. 2 December, 2005. Space-Based Laser. Federation of American Scientists.

http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/sbl.htm
lixDouglas, Beason. 2005. The E-Bomb – How America’s New Directed Energy Weapons

will Change the Way Future Wars Will be Fought. Perseus Books Group: 165-169
lxIbid, pg. 164

lxi Ibid

lxiiStaff. 8 August, 2006. Boeing Demonstrates Aerospace Relay Mirror System.

Spacewar.com.
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Boeing_Demonstrates_Aerospace_Relay_Mirror_Syste
m_999.html
lxiiiStaff. 11 December, 2006. Relay Mirror Experiment. Ball Aerospace & Technologies

41 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Corp. Last accessed 11 December, 2006, pg. 2

lxiv Lewis, Jeffrey. 17 February 2006. Space Weapons in U.S. Defense Planning. Interna-

tional Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation.

http://www.inesap.org/bulletin23/art03.htm
lxv Ibid

lxvi Preferably, the interception will be carried out in such as away as to deflect the debris

out of the direction of the defended satellite

lxvii Beneski, Barron. 14 November, 2007. Orbital Awarded $29.5 Million Contract For AN-
GELS Satellite Program By Air Force Research Laboratory. Dulles, VA: Orbital Sciences
Corporation. http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/release.asp?prid=635; and,
Singer, Jeremy. 19 November, 2007. ANGELS’ Size, Mission To Increase. Space News: 4;
and
Singer, Jeremy. 3 December, 2007.DARPA Eyes using Tiny Satellite Clusters to Defend
Spacecraft. Space News: 14.
lxviiiZielinski, Robert H. (Lt Col., U.S.AF), and Worley, Robert M. II (Lt Col., U.S.AF),

and Black, Douglas S. (Maj., U.S.AF), and Henderson, Scott A. (Maj., U.S.AF), and John-
son, David C. (Maj., U.S.AF). August 1996. Star Tek—Exploiting the Final Frontier:
Counterspace Operations in 2025.Maxwell-Gunter AFB: Center for Strategy and Technolo-
gy, Air Force 2025 Study. http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/volume3/vol3ch09.pdf.
lxix Singer, Jeremy. 6 November, 2006. Pentagon Weighs Global Strike Options,

(Washington, DC: Space News.

http://www.space.com/spacenews/businessmonday_061106.html
lxx Fulghum, David A., and Barrie, Douglas(October 8, 2007. Off the Radar – Israel used

electronic attack in air strike against Syrian mystery target. Aviation Week & Space Tech-
nology.: 28-29.
lxxi Staff. 6 December, 2007. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008

(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate), Section 911 - Space Protec-
tion Strategy. Washington, DC: The United States Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/F?c110:7:./temp/~c110FZKhfy:e891522
lxxiiStaff. 6 December, 2007. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008

(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate), Section 911 - Space Protec-
tion Strategy. Washington, DC: The United States Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/F?c110:7:./temp/~c110FZKhfy:e891522
lxxiiiMurphy, Bill. May 28, 2004. Sandia-Designed Space Reactor Could Drive In-Orbit Sal-

vage, (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, Vol. 56, No. 11: 8.

http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN05-28-04/labnews05-28-04.pdf
lxxivHall thrusters generate thrust by turning a propellant gas such as xenon into plasma. It is

extremely efficient in terms of the total amount of thrust obtained per unit mass of fuel.
Dennis Wingo et al, Orbital Recovery System Overview, (London: Orbital Recovery Limit-
ed, August 2005,) pg. 1-8,
http://www.orbitalrecovery.com/images/orbital_sys_overview.pdf
lxxvPhipps, Claude, ORION: A Solution to the Orbital Debris Problem, (Tucson: University

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 42
Defense Concepts

of Arizona) http://www.seds.org/spaceviews/9707/articles.html
lxxvi Bekey, Ivan. May 1997. Orion’s Laser: Hunting Space Debris. Reston, VA: Aerospace

America, Volume 35, No. 5; 38-44.

http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/orions_laser_hunting_space_debris.shtml
lxxvii Ibid

lxxviiiMurphy, Bill. May 28, 2004. Sandia-Designed Space Reactor Could Drive In-Orbit

Salvage, (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, Vol. 56, No. 11: 8,

http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN05-28-04/labnews05-28-04.pdf
lxxixWingo, Dennis et al. August 2005. Orbital Recovery System Overview. London: Orbital

Recovery Limited. http://www.orbitalrecovery.com/images/coneXpress_01_lrg.jpg

lxxxGertz,
Bill. 30 March, 2007. China Has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons,
(Washington: The Washington Times. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070329-
114710-9929r.htm
lxxxiBennett,
John T. April 2007. Agency Chief Says U.S. Must Face Threat With ‘Balanced’
and ‘Integrated’ Solution, (Springfield, DefenseNews.com.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2671100&C=america
lxxxiiGertz,Bill. 30 March, 2007. China Has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons,
(Washington: The Washington Times. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070329-
114710-9929r.htm
lxxxiiiBaum, Michael E. (Lt. Col, USAF). Spring 1994. Defiling the Altar – The Weaponiza-

tion of Space. Maxwell AFB: Airpower Journal.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/baum.html
lxxxivPodhoretz, Norman. February 2008. Stopping Iran: Why the Case for Military Action

Still Stands. Washington, DC: Commentary Magazine.

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/printArticle.cfm/Stopping-Iran-br--Why-the-Case-
for-Military--Action-Still-Stands-11085
lxxxvShachtman, Noah. January 2007. Hypersonic Cruise Missile: America’s New Global
Strike Weapon. Popular Mechanics.
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/4203874.html?do=print
lxxxviBennett, John T. April 2007. Agency Chief Says U.S. Must Face Threat With

‘Balanced’ and ‘Integrated’ Solution. Springfield, DefenseNews.com.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2671100&C=america
lxxxviiIbid

lxxxviiiRandolph,
Monique (SSgt. USAF). Senior Leaders Testify about Air Force Space Pro-
gram. Washington: Department of Defense, April 9, 2007.
lxxxixStaff
May 2006. Annual Report to Congress – Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China, (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense.; 31-35,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf
xcWilliamsen, Joel. Spring 2008. Satellite Vulnerability to Direct Ascent KE ASAT: Apply-

ing Lessons Learned from NASA, Missile Defense, and Aircraft Survivability

43 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Programs.Wright-Patterson AFB: Aircraft Survivability Journal: 23.

http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/asnews/AS_Summer_2008.pdf
xciFadok, David A. (Major, USAF). February 1995. John Boyd and John Warden – Air

Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis. Maxwell AFB: School of Advanced Airpower Studies:
49. http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/saas_Theses/Fadok/fadok.pdf

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 44
Defense Concepts

FEATURES

http://www.rall.com
Since 1996, military and defense experts have advocated a
network-centric approach to interpreting warfare in the infor-
mation age. However, the following authors explain that a
people-centric understanding of conflict is also instructive.

Who is the Prey?: The Challenge of the Predator Drone Program

and High-Value Targeting
Sarah Catanzaro
Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and its Elu-
sive European Rapid Reaction Force
Alexander Justice Moore

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: AFRICOM: An Independent Review for

the Obama Administration
Daniel Lawner and Sarah Khederian

Taking the Offensive: The Utility and Limitations of Raiding

Adam Elkus

45 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Who is the Prey? The Challenge of the Predator

Drone Program and High-Value Targeting
Sarah Catanzaro
Eight years after the attacks of 9/11, determining an effective counterterrorist
strategy remains an urgent priority for the U.S. Government. Recently, policymak-
ers have advocated high-value targeting (HVT), an approach whereby the senior
leadership of terrorist organizations (i.e. operational commanders, important ideo-
logues, senior logisticians, and key financiers) are captured or killed. HVT has
gained popularity as an effective counterterrorism measure for disrupting Al Qa’ida
and its associates based on the logic that when key leaders are eliminated, their
organizations lose momentum and inspiration and will no longer maintain high
levels of performance. Thus, integrating HVT strikes with broader crackdowns
against terrorist groups may reduce the numbers of terrorist attacks and fatalities in
incidents.
Nevertheless, HVT strikes have failed to significantly decrease levels of terrorist
violence. In 2009, 87 suicide attacks killed approximately 1,115 civilians in Pakistan.
That same year, more than 1,600 civilians were killed by Taliban or anti-government
forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, evidence indicates that militant groups continue to
train and support Western recruits.iThese egregious levels of militant violence seem
to discredit arguments regarding the efficacy of drone strikes.
However, a methodical, comprehensive inventory of the most germane factors
to consider when planning HVT operations does not currently exist. While HVT
operations may be an effective tactic under certain circumstances or when used
against particular enemy groups, it is unlikely that such tactics are universally
effective in reducing the activity of violent extremist organizations. This paper will
explain why the strategy of HVT strikes is likely to fail in certain circumstances,
particularly when used against groups with:
1) A clear line of succession
2) Well-established bureaucratic structures or
3) Institutions that can perpetuate the organization’s policies and agenda.
This paper will also explore why a consideration of a particular enemy leader’s
positional authority and power is paramount to predicting the effects of HVT
operations.

Background:
Some scholars have examined the effects of high-value targeting on terrorist
organizations as a function of age, size, and type. For instance, based on an analysis
of a comprehensive dataset of 290 cases of “leadership decapitation” from 1945-

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 46
 Defense Concepts

2004, Jenna Jordan, a scholar at the University of Chicago, infers that as terrorist
organizations become older and larger, they become less vulnerable to the removal
of their leaders.ii Additionally, she contends that religious and separatist groups are
also less vulnerable to HVT operations than ideological organizations. The reason-
ing behind Jordan’s contention is as follows: she argues that ideological organiza-
tions are often dominated by an influential leader who articulates an appealing
vision for his group. In contrast, religious and separatist groups often have a strong
base of community support from which they draw motivation. Moreover, religion
and ethnicity are often integral to individual identity. Thus, members of religious
and ethnic organizations may have a more difficult time distinguishing between
“personal” and “social” missions. Jordan recommends that policymakers study trends
in organizational decline to better understand whether and how certain types of
organizations are more vulnerable to destabilization.
Based on a statistical study of the HVT strategy, the researcher Aaron Mannes
from the University of Maryland suggests that different organizations have different
vulnerabilities/sensitivities to high-value targeting.iii Similar to Jordan, he avers that
religious organizations can better survive the loss of a leader because they are
frequently more robust in terms of membership and financial resources. He warns
that religious organizations often have the capability to strike back against their
adversaries in response to a HVT strike; in fact, they may become substantially more
violent and radical in the aftermath of HVT strikes.
Other authors suggest that the specific personality traits of a leader must be
considered when assessing whether or not an organization will be crippled by HVT
operations. Patrick Johnston, a pre-doctoral fellow at Stanford University, argues
that operations should be designed to target groups led by charismatic leaders.iv He
contends that a charismatic leader establishes strong interpersonal bonds with his
followers based on mutual trust, positive support, informal interdependencies,
common bonds, open communication, high degree of autonomy, satisfaction, and
shared loyalty. By instilling a sense of belonging and a positive feeling of identifica-
tion with the group, the charismatic leader enhances his followers’ commitment to
the organization and can generate maximum participation in rebellion. Consequent-
ly, the removal of a charismatic leader will upset the cohesion and enthusiasm of a
group and lead to its disbanding, or at least to its increased vulnerability. To support
his argument, he highlights the example of the Indonesian Islamic terrorist group
Darul Islam, active since 1942, which immediately collapsed after its leader Karto-
swiryo was captured and executed by the Siliwangi Army in 1962. He also cites the
example of the Burmese peasant revolt of 1930-1931, which subsided after its leader
Saya San was hanged by British forces in November 1931.
One of the most sophisticated analyses of terrorist leadership targeting efficacy
is provided by Michael Freeman and Gordon McCormick, researchers at the Naval

47 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Postgraduate School.v These authors suggest that the nature of leadership within an
organization must be evaluated to determine how and when the HVT option is
appropriate. Freeman and McCormick argue that HVT operations will succeed when
the survival of a terrorist group is dependent on a leader’s charismatic attributes or
its survival is dependent upon the leader’s ideological influence on the group (in
particular, his ability to convince members of the legitimacy of its goals and tactics).
However, HVT operations will not be effective if the leader has already mentored
and groomed a cadre of potential successors and institutionalized his ideas and
beliefs by establishing customs and codes to guide the organization and/or councils
that oversee its functioning in his absence. Additionally, the authors maintain that
HVT strikes may work when the survival of the terrorist group is dependent on the
leader’s management skills and when decision-making responsibility is vested
solely in the single leader (i.e. there is a central leader who determines strategy and
tactics, guides recruitment, and provides resources to the group).
The conclusions drawn by these scholars do not appear to have significantly
influenced military doctrine for targeting enemy leadership. It would seem critical
that military policy needs to be devised in conjunction with the extensive data mined
from sociological, psychological, and computational studies that examine human
behavior under changing circumstances. Surprisingly, current analyses and under-
standings of the organizational structure and succession strategies for violent extrem-
ist groups appear incomplete. While it may seem intuitive that a group that relies
upon rigorous succession planning and management will be more immune to
leadership high-value targeting, hitherto there has been no published analysis that
has considered the succession strategy or the decision-making and governance
structure of the groups listed
on U.S. State Department’s
“...military policy needs to be devised in list of Foreign Terrorist Orga-
conjunction with the extensive data nizations. Without this data,
mined from sociological, psychological it is difficult to accurately
and computational studies that examine estimate the probability of an
effective succession. As a re-
human behavior under changing sult, successful outcomes
circumstances.” from HVT strikes are diffi-
cult to predict and calculate.
Current Trends:
Decapitation operations are currently perceived by many as an effective means
to reduce terrorist violence. Advocates of HVT strikes suggest that by exterminating
violent extremists who have attacked civilians, the U.S. can gain domestic support
in places like Pakistan, where the population is terrorized.vi Others maintain that
missile strikes force militants to devote more time to operational security (i.e.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 48
Defense Concepts

denying adversaries access to critical information). Al Qa’ida trainers dedicate hours

to instructing recruits on security measures for the convening of meetings, preparing
operatives to answer questions in case they are arrested, and finally, developing
measures to be taken to ensure successful escape from a raid by the security
authorities. Taliban leaders frequently execute suspected spies accused of acting as
informants for the U.S. If terrorist operatives encounter something unexpected
during the execution of a mission, they often abandon their plan out of fear that
operational security has been breached. Because of U.S. missile strikes, Al Qa’ida
has been forced to give up its traditional training facilities; now instructors must
move temporary training operations from one compound to the next.vii
In some circumstances Al Qa’ida officials may be forced to engage in more open
communication on cell phones and computers to gather information about the
ongoing military offensive.viii When terrorist groups are more transparent in their
operations, military and intelligence analysts can intercept their communication.
Supporters of HVT strikes also emphasize that these attacks can limit the capacity
of Al Qa’ida officers to liaise with each other and can estrange the top command
from lower ranks.ix
However, these outcomes will not occur if the leaders who are removed are
quickly and easily replaced. Moreover, leadership high-value targeting may even be
detrimental to the U.S. mission if the leaders who are eliminated are succeeded by
more aggressive and competent principals.

Overview of Current Decapitation Measures

Targeting
When plotting HVT operations, targets are selected and an appropriate response
is chosen on the basis of operational requirements, capability, and limitations.
Targeting methodology progresses through four basic functions: decide; detect;
deliver; and assess.x
· Military planners determine a target based on the assigned military objec-
tives. The objective outlined by the National Security Council associated
with HVT operations involves attacking terrorists and their ability to oper-
ate (National Security Council 2006).
· Next, planners acquire information on the target. Military commanders rely
upon a combination of informants’ tips, radio interceptions, and overhead
surveillance.
· Subsequently, commanders choose an appropriate application of force to be
delivered. To determine the most operationally sound package, the probabil-
ity of damage and arrival for a weapon system is considered.
· Finally, with whatever means available, an assessment of the effects of the
operation is completed to estimate the level of success or failurexi

49 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

When deciding who to target, military planners ostensibly select “strategic

individuals” whose elimination will disrupt the terrorist system. However, the
definition of a “strategic individual” remains vague. In a monograph published by
the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Lt. Com. Victor
Hyder of the U.S. Navy, defines a strategic individual as:

A single person widely identified on the world stage as the nucleus of the
system or the environment he influences and is subsequently given signifi-
cant diplomatic, informational, military, and economic value relative to vital
national interests and the desired end state.xii

Unfortunately, too much of a premium is placed on the individual, his reputation

within the organization, and his reputation internationally based on the crimes he has
inflicted against civilian society. Too little emphasis is placed on his rank and
position within the context of the larger mother organization. While a terrorist leader
may be respected and revered figure by the group, if he can be easily substituted by
one of his subordinates, his valence is more questionable.

“Unfortunately, too much of a premium is placed on the

individual, his reputation within the organization, and his
reputation internationally, based on the crimes he has inflicted
against society.”

Tactics
Targeted individuals have historically been eliminated through surgical strikes,
invasions (i.e. when military forces invade with orders to capture a leader), and
insurgencies (i.e. when military forces facilitate coups or insurgencies to remove
specific leaders).xiii However, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) are currently
used to annihilate terrorist leaders and operatives. UAVS, which have been opera-
tional since 1999, are controlled from the ground via satellite systems and onboard
cameras. UAVs have been flown in combat over Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia,
Serbia, Iraq, and Yemen, although the drone program in Pakistan has received the
most media attention and criticism. The MQ9-Reaper craft, designed by General
Atomics Aeronautical Systems, is the first hunter-killer UAV designed for long-
endurance, high-altitude surveillance. It can carry four Hellfire missiles (which
provide precision striking power against tanks, structures, bunkers and helicopters)
and two 500lb GBU-12 laser-guided bombs (used mostly against fixed armor).xiv
Predator and Reaper drones cost $4.5 and $17 million respectively, compared
to $100 million for a F-35 fighter that performs tactical bombing. Business informa-

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 50
 Defense Concepts

tion providers predict that the

worldwide UAV market will ex-
pand significantly in the next ten
years as militaries embrace UAV
systems and incorporate new poli-
cies regarding their applications.xv
In the February 2010 Quadrennial

http://www.wired.com
Defense Review Report, the De-
partment of Defense announced
plans to expand the unmanned air-
craft system program.xvi By 2012,
the Air Force intends to grow its
fleet of UAVs from 100 to 370
and expand its roster of UAV pi- U.S. military and intelligence operations use pilotless
lots and operation staffers to at drones in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan both for
least 1,100.xvii surveillance and to fire missiles at targets.

Actors
The CIA and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) both conduct HVT
operations. Tactically, they execute these operations through the drone programs
described above. The military version of the drone program operates in the recog-
nized war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq and targets enemies of American and allied
troops (most often, insurgents) stationed there. However, during a House Armed
Services Committee hearing in July 2007, James Clapper, Undersecretary of De-
fense for Intelligence, also admitted to the use of U.S. Special Forces in targeted
counterterrorism operations in Pakistan.xviii
The Pentagon’s roster of approved terrorist targets seems to be expanding
despite their announcement regarding declines in the number of Al Qa’ida and the
Taliban fighters. While it originally contained 367 names, 50 Afghan drug lords
were recently added in an attempt to limit the flow of drug money that is helping
finance the Taliban insurgency, but there is no precedent for killing individuals who
are not traditional military targets, such as drug lords.xix The Pentagon has divulged
some information about it taxonomy of targets: some people are approved for killing
on sight while others necessitate additional authorization; a target’s location must be
considered to limit collateral damage; and two “credible human sources” and
“substantial additional evidence” are required to prove the person is an enemy.xx
However, based on records of those killed, organizational features – such as succes-
sion strategy, the existence of a strong deputy or heir, and the presence of institutions

51 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

to perpetuate policy in the event of a strike – are not seriously considered when
selecting targets.
The CIA initialized a drone program to increase the number of U.S. personnel in
Afghanistan and crack down on suspected terrorists in the region. In 2002, President
Bush authorized the CIA to target and kill Osama bin Laden and specific individuals
associated with Al Qa’ida. In November 2002, top Bush Administration officials
publicly announced a successful MQ1-Predator (the predecessor to the MQ9-Reap-
er) strike against Aqed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a suspected Al Qa’ida operative
credited with plotting the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. Unlike SOCOM’s
mission, the CIA’s program currently focuses on terror suspects throughout the
world, including in countries where U.S. troops are not based (i.e. Al-Harethi was
eliminated in Yemen, although Yemen is not considered a battlefield or an enemy
state). Moreover, the CIA has also joined SOCOM and Pakistani intelligence
services in an aggressive campaign to eradicate local and foreign militants who have
taken refuge in some of the most inaccessible parts of the country.xxi
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, investigators from the New America
Foundation, report that the Obama administration has sanctioned at least forty-one
CIA missile strikes in Pakistan alone and that CIA attacks have killed between 760
and 1,050 people. Approximately 500 to 720 of the total killed were identified in
reliable press reports as militants. Only twenty leaders of Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, and
allied groups were eliminated, all of whom were killed since January 2008.xxii

Figure 1: Average Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010xxiii

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 52
Defense Concepts

When President Bush provided written legal authority to the CIA to hunt down
and kill the terrorists, he did not stipulate that the Agency should seek further
approval each time it plans to stage an operation. Consequently, the agency does not
provide information on how it selects targets. Nevertheless, reports of fatal air
strikes often emerge, exposing some information on the type of individuals targeted
in HVT operations. Such reports reveal that those eliminated by the CIA range from
Bin Laden’s family members to operational elements to paramilitary planners.
Drones have targeted little-known Pakistani Taliban figures that remain obscure
even amongst U.S. counterterrorism scholar circles. Strikes have also killed several
low level Al Qa’ida militants whose importance to Bin Laden is questionable at best.
In fact, only a handful of the drone strikes reported by Bergen and Tiedemann killed
Al Qa'ida leaders.xxiv Since the pipeline of militant recruits has not been blocked, the
opportunity cost of eliminating such minor figures, regardless of the group’s leader-
ship structure or succession strategy, is unclear. Despite the order of the U.S.
Government that force should only be applied when it is a military necessity, it
seems as if the CIA continues to broaden the definition of high value targets due to
pressure from congressional intelligence committees, greater confidence in the
technology, and reduced resistance from Pakistan.

Costs of Decapitation Strikes

Although HVT strikes represent a promising tactic, there are important grounds
for developing stricter criteria for selecting targets.

1. Civilian Casualties:
There is evidence that attacks kill innocent victims due to poor ground intelli-
gence. According to an analysis released by the New America Foundation, the
number of civilians killed in Predator and Reaper attacks could be as high as 320
innocents. In February 2002, a Predator reportedly followed and killed three suspi-
cious Afghans, including a tall man in robes who was thought to be Bin Laden;
however, authorities later discovered that the victims were innocent villagers. In
September 2009, a NATO air strike in Afghanistan killed between 70 and 125
people, many of them civilians who were mistaken for Taliban insurgent, who were
taking fuel from two stranded oil trucks.xxv

2. Geographical Dispersion:
Decapitation operations may also have deleterious effects if they disperse Al
Qa’ida and its associated cells, particularly to Pakistan’s densely populated urban
areas like Karachi.xxvi While cross-border strikes in Pakistan may induce limited
collateral damage, drone strikes and commando raids in more heavily inhabited

53 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

areas would result in additional civilian casualties and corresponding anger directed
against the governments in Islamabad and Washington. Thus, militant groups
attempting to hide important insurgents will most likely move to heavily populated
areas, hoping that their enemies will be discouraged from attacking and might suffer
heavily from bad public opinion if they do.

3. Inadvertent Fuel for Anti-American Propaganda:

Several counter-insurgency warfare experts point out that the HVT strikes have
already incited propaganda disasters. Al Qa’ida and the Taliban routinely claim that
those killed in UAV attacks are all civilians. It is impossible to obtain an accurate
breakdown of the death toll because militants live amongst civilians and are not
uniformed, so extremist groups can effectively inflame anti-American sentiment and
undermine the fragile Pakistani state by exaggerating civilian deaths. Bergen and
Tiedemann observe that the “inevitable civilian casualties are a superb recruiting
tool for the Pakistani Taliban.”xxvii In a similar vein, David Kilcullen, the former
Petraeus advisor and counter-insurgency theorist, has argued that “every one of
these dead non-combatants represents an alienated family, a new revenge fueled,
and more recruits for a militant movement.”xxviii
In Pakistani cities, large protests have been held decrying the drone program
since several Pakistanis perceive the program as an infringement on their sovereign-
ty and blame the U.S. for the violence in their country. Regardless of whether or not
several Pakistani civilians go on to join terrorist organizations, it is important to note
that a militantly anti-American Pakistan (a country already equipped with dozens of
nuclear weapons and a booming population) could evolve into a calamitous strategic
problem for the United States.xxix

4. Revenge Attacks:
Revenge also
plays an important
role in the upsurge in
deadly violence fol-
lowing a HVT opera-
tion. For example,
http://cpdweb.net

brutal assaults on
Pakistani govern-
ment strongholds sug-
gest that formerly
unaligned militant
Members of the National Trade Union Federation of Pakistan groups have joined
demonstrate in Karachi against U.S. drones on January 23, 2010

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 54
Defense Concepts

together against the Zardari administration.xxx Moreover, the insurgents in Pakistan

can use drone strikes to justify the attacks in the Punjabi heartland in Pakistan. For
example, Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the Pakistan Taliban, claimed that
the March 2009 attack on a Lahore police academy that killed 18 people was “in
retaliation for the continued drone strikes by the U.S. in collaboration with
Pakistan.”xxxi The December 30, 2009 suicide bombing attack at an American base
in Khost that killed seven CIA officers and contractors involved in overseeing U.S.
drone strikes in Pakistan was allegedly conducted to avenge the death of several
militant leaders. xxxii

5. Loss of Intelligence:
When militant leaders and foot soldiers are eliminated, U.S. forces lose a source
of information. Important intelligence could be gleaned by interrogating jihadist
operatives rather than killing them. Moreover, drone strikes may also destroy
important documents and communication devices containing valuable
information.xxxiii

Successful Succession?
It can be argued that an increase in the number of drone attacks would augment
the appeal of militant groups and anger many civilians. However, since neither the
military nor the political establishment has articulated an effective alternative, drone
strikes are a viable temporary tactic to pressure the Al Qa’ida leadership and its
allies. Nonetheless, for the reasons articulated in the prior sections, the author is in
support of carefully specifying and limiting the use of drone attacks. Decapitation
strikes lose much strategic efficacy if used non-specifically and if applied in circum-
stances where the next generation of mujahedeen is poised to take over. A surgeon
would not use the same operation to treat every disease; instead he would select an
organ- or disease-specific option. Likewise, the U.S. government should not apply
the same technology in all circumstances.

Leadership Succession:
Leadership succession is an important event for any organizationxxxiv since it
affects not only the members of the organization, but also the security and political
climate of the region. To external constituents, the leader of a militant group
represents the organization, thus succession may be viewed as a signal of the
organization’s future. In some cases, when there is no apparent successor nor are
there institutions charged with selecting one, succession can cause disruptive change
and difficult transitions as the organization seeks to regain stability. Factionalization
and in-fighting become increasingly probable in this scenario.xxxv After the death of

55 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Salamat Hashim in 2003 due to lingering illness, the Moro-Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) became so factionalized that it no longer resembled a functional and
coherent organization. Some factions remained strongly motivated by jihadist polit-
ical aspirations, while others were willing to accept secular government and social
pluralism.xxxvi
Unlike some corporations that are disturbed by CEO succession, terrorist organi-
zations are often highly idiosyncratic. Thus, most subordinates possess important
personal contacts and networks, the ability to garner the cooperation of the
organization’s membership, and knowledge of local conditions and the internal
operations as a result of their individual experiences.xxxvii Consequently, when an
established and knowledgeable group member is groomed as a successor they can
quickly gain credibility and be accepted by key stakeholders of the group.
Succession literature suggests that successors promoted from within an organi-
zation make few changes, thereby maintaining organizational stability. Moreover,
inside successors are related to better post-succession performance than
outsiders.xxxviii With regard to clandestine organizations like terrorist groups, succes-
sors are virtually always selected from insiders. Thus, terrorist groups with designat-
ed deputies or heirs are more likely to survive HVT strikes without experiencing
dramatic changes.
Furthermore,
succession decisions “With regard to clandestine organizations
in clandestine orga- like terrorist groups, successors are virtually
nizations rarely rest
in the hands of indi- always selected from insiders. Thus, terrorist
viduals who are un- groups with designated deputies or heirs are
familiar with the more likely to survive decapitation strikes
group and its inter- without experiencing dramatic changes.”
nal processes. Ter-
rorist groups with
executive bodies are probably capable of controlling the disruptive responses often
created by leadership succession by rational means. For example, they can select
someone to take over interim control of the group until a new leader is selected.
Councils or committees can also ensure that succession planning is integrated with
an analysis of the group’s mission, its strengths and weaknesses, and its opportuni-
ties and threats. They can develop and implement succession plans to ensure a match
between the leadership candidate’s characteristics and group strategy. Most impor-
tantly, they can legitimate and train the successor. At times, these assemblies may
even chose to utilize succession as a means to adapt to their changing
environment.xxxix

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 56
Defense Concepts

Succession is most traumatic if the group hesitates to announce the appointment

of its new leader. Without laws governing the order of succession or a legacy of
agnatic succession various commanders will vie for the top spot and competition
amongst their respective supporters may occur, creating latent tension. Without a
leader to clarify the group’s strategic future, thereby promoting unity and strength,
ideological disputes will occur and rifts may form. These power struggles may cause
the jihadist organization to fracture into smaller groups. The U.S. can seize on such
an event to manipulate the organization’s points of instability. From the above
considerations, emerges a general principle: terrorist groups characterized by a
clearly delineated order of succession and/or effective bureaucracies and institutions
will be more capable of managing leadership transitions. Such groups may be
resistant to HVT strikes; however, groups without such features will be less capable
of enduring HVT strikes.

Applications in Pakistan:
In recent years, several new terrorist groups have emerged in Pakistan, the
country in which the most rigorous and controversial HVT program is administered.
Moreover, several existing groups have reconstituted themselves in Federally Ad-
ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, a remote and mountainous territory
where the Pakistani government has ceded control over the Waziristan region to
tribal leaders aligned with Al Qa’ida and the Taliban.

Figure 2: Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004 -2010xl

57 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Leadership elements of Al Qa’ida, the Afghan Taliban, and other terrorist

groups have migrated to Pakistan's tribal areas and now work closely with a wide
variety of Pakistani militant groups also operating there. Currently, it is impossible
to determine how many groups are operating in the region. However, it is crucial to
recognize that the groups active in Pakistan are diverse; there are sectarian groups,
anti-Indian groups, secessionist groups, Afghan Taliban, Pakistan Taliban, Punjabi
Taliban, Al Qa’ida and its affiliates.xli While some of these groups are domestic
organizations, others are embedded in transnational networks. Each of these groups
has a unique organizational structure and thus distinct vulnerabilities to HVT strikes.
Because these groups have different motivations, goals, and purposes, they will
utilize different tactics and different organizational structures. Diversity in function
leads to diversity in form. Dr. Jerrold Post, a professor at the Elliot School of
International Affairs observes that “classifying groups according to purpose seems
to be a useful way to make predictions about the relationship between group
behavior and organizational structure. It is also possible to code organizations
according to the means by which they try to achieve their goals.”xlii Before expand-
ing the drone program and targeting more militant leaders, it is first necessary to
examine the morphology of each of these groups.

“Before expanding the drone program and targeting more

militant leaders, it is first necessary to examine the morphology
of each of these groups.”

Case Study:
The Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) was able to
survive momentary HVT after the death of its second emir, Nabil Sahraoui because
the group’s founding members had clearly set down a succession strategy in its first
official communiqué and charter. Moreover, the group was structured around an
executive council, which legitimated the new leader. Despite optimistic assessments
by the Algerian press that Sahraoui’s neutralization would establish peace and
stability in the region, violence continued unabated. Because the leadership gap was
immediately filled, the GSPC’s efforts were not affected by the death of their chief.
In fact, this HVT operation may have even strengthened organizational commitment
to Abdelmalek Droukdel, Sahraoui’s successor.
The origins of the GSPC date back to the 1930s (i.e. when Algeria was under
French colonial rule) with the foundation of the Algerian Ulama. The manifest
purpose of the Ulama was to provide a basic social structure for Muslims. However,
through its efforts to create political and economic equality in the colony, the

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 58
Defense Concepts

Figure 3: Hierarchy of the GSPCxliii

59 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Algerian Ulama quickly became embroiled in political involvement. By 1989, a

group of Islamist Algerians had formed the “Islamic Salvation Front” (FIS), a
political party whose agenda included the establishment of an Islamic state. Howev-
er, after the National Liberation Front (FLN), an opposing socialist political party,
dissolved the FIS, some elements reconstituted themselves as the militant Armed
Islamic Group (GIA). In 1996, Hassan Hattab, former emir of the Kabylie region of
the GIA, established the GSPC, which distanced and distinguished itself from the
GIA by condemning the latter’s attacks on Algerian citizens.xliv
Because the GSPC was derived from the FIS (a political party), it was organized
in a governmental manner with departments and agencies. Established as a bureau-
cracy with standardized procedures to guide the execution of its processes, the
GSPC was divided into nine zones with an emir (“commander”) in charge of each
zone; the founding members of the GSPC appointed the first regional chiefs. The
emirs communicated frequently, although they maintained relative freedom in their
geographic area. Moreover, the emirs formed a shura (i.e. a “council of notables”),
which served as an executive board to formulate strategy and policy for the group.
In the event of the deflection, capture, or death of an emir, the council would appoint
a new officer. The council was presided over by a chairman and the entire organiza-
tion was overseen by a single leader, the “emir of the group.”xlv
In addition to the executive council, a judicial committee offered a religious
opinion on the council’s compliance with dogma, a military committee determined
general strategies and tactics, and a media committee organized external communi-
cations and disseminated propaganda. The leaders of these committees were appoint-
ed by the regional commanders and served as advisors to the emir of the group.xlvi
Other elements of the GSPC were organized along functional lines, such as
internet services or support for insurgent operations in Iraq. The GSPC also built
connections throughout western and central Africa and reinvigorated connections in
Europe, where it formed self-contained cells in France, Italy, Spain, and Britain.
These cells collaborate on logistical issues, weapons procurement, communications,
and propaganda.xlvii
In addition to this formal division of powers and vertical command hierarchy,
the founders of the GSPC also stipulated an unambiguous succession strategy. If the
emir of the group was terminated, he would immediately be replaced by the chair-
man of the council. If the chairman of the council was also eliminated, the command-
er of the second zone, the Sahara and Sahel regions, would be selected.xlviii This
policy was activated when Sahraoui was killed.
On June 20, 2004, Sahraoui, who had been the emir of the GSPC since August
2003, and six other operatives were killed in a confrontation with the Algerian army.
Several members of the GSPC feared that chairman of the council, Abdelmalek

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 60
 Defense Concepts

Droukdel, was also dead. These fears were fueled when the Algerian president
congratulated the Algerian authorities on their progress in the battle against terror-
ism. To quell the anxiety of the GSPC’s membership, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the
chief of the second zone, momentarily assumed the leadership position. However,
their concern faded when Abou Omar Abd Al-Birr, the head of the media committee,
released a communiqué announcing that Droukdel was alive.xlix
On August 6,
“The leadership transition occurred seamlessly 2004, Abou Al-
Barra Ahmed, the
and the impact of the death of Sahraoui and head of the judi-
decapitation of the GSPC proved fleeting. In cial committee,
fact, it was not even necessary for the executive published a sec-
council to meet to discuss the nomination of the ond communiqué
in which he an-
new leader.” nounced the ap-
pointment of Droukdel as the new emir of the group.l Although Droukdel had
previously occupied the post of chairman of the council under his predecessor and
thus had already been designated as the successor to Sahraoui prior to his death, Al
Barra officially endorsed him in this communiqué to ensure his legitimacy amongst
the GSPC’s ranks.
The leadership transition occurred seamlessly and the impact of the death of
Sahraoui and HVT of the GSPC proved fleeting. In fact, it was not even necessary
for the executive council to meet to discuss the nomination of the new leader.
Droukdel automatically assumed the position of the new emir of the group. His
nomination was not contested; after Droukdel’s survival was confirmed,
Belmokhtar stepped down voluntarily and confirmed Droukdel’s position, quashing
any rumors of internal fighting within the group.li
Upon taking office, Droukdel immediately initiated conversations with other
Algerian groups to unite the Islamic movement in the country under one flag, that of
the GSPC. Faced with pressure from the Algerian army and allured by Droukdel’s
entreaties, which included offers to organize training and coordinate operations,
many groups joined the GSPC and its membership swelled.
Moreover, within one year of taking office, Droukdel led the first operation of
the GSPC outside Algerian borders. The raid on the remote Lemgheiti barracks in
Mauritania killed 150 soldiers. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi congratulated Droukdel for
his role in organizing this operation.lii
Additionally, some experts credit Droukdel with introducing new strategies of
violent action, including suicide bombings, to Algeria. On April 10, 2007, the new
organization claimed credit for two suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers that killed

61 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

23 people. This strike was the most aggressive and deadliest attack executed in
Algeria in years. Droukdel imported other Al Qa’ida tactics as well, including the
use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and satellite imagery for the
geolocalization and planning of attacks. Droukdel also promoted the use of multime-
dia technology as a new component in the ideological battle for the movement. For
example, he began filming operations and including them in sensational videos
distributed on the Internet.liii The video “Jahim Al-Murtadin” (The Apostates' Hell)
featured footage of the groups' brutal killings set to a soundtrack of jihad songs
performed by a male choir. The attack sequences were interspersed with statements
by Al Qa’ida commanders and footage from the GSPC training camps. liv
Some scholars have argued that although the alarming internationalization of the
Algerian insurgency was initiated in 2003, the strategic shift – from local to global –
really began under the leadership of Droukdel. According to U.S. and European
officials, Droukdel decided to intensify efforts to reach out to Al Qa’ida and other
extremist networks. The earliest contacts regarding a union occurred between
Droukdel and Al-Zarqawi, and were dated from 2004, almost immediately after
Droukdel became head of the group. From that time on, contacts with Al-Zarqawi
were ongoing. To bolster ties with Al Qa’ida, Droukdel dispatched several emissar-
http://www.nytimes.com

Harald Ickler, who was kidnapped by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, presents a photo
of his captors, including one of the group’s top operatives, Amari Saifi, right.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 62
Defense Concepts

ies to Iraq. In September 2006, Al Qa’ida announced that it had formalized its
alliance with Droukdel’s network.lv
Hence, the HVT of Sahraoui failed to degrade or destroy the capacity of the
GSPC to continue its attacks. Sahraoui was replaced by Droukdel, a commander of
arguably superior expertise and talent. In the year immediately after Sahraoui was
eliminated, the GSPC conducted 56 attacks. This case study demonstrates that HVT
strikes should not be regarded as an assured way to cripple a terrorist organization.
In contrast to the HVT strategy used against the GSPC, Algeria offered a
six-month amnesty to Islamic militants on the condition of surrender. The offer was
quietly extended indefinitely. This strategy effectively exploited fissures within the
group. Many GSPC leaders took advantage of the offer, each bringing their own
knowledge of GSPC activities while promising to encourage other militants to
follow their example. Consequently, infighting regarding the GSPC’s involvement
in the Iraq War was compounded by distress over difficulties fillings its ranks with
new recruits.lvi

Recommendations:
To determine the succession plan of various jihadist groups, analysts must first
develop a better understanding of their organizational structure. Some groups are
more bureaucratic in nature. They are characterized by a formal division of power,
a hierarchy among office, and formal and informal networks that connect organiza-
tional actors through flows of information and patterns of cooperation. On the
contrary, other groups utilize a network structure whereby they outsource certain
functions, harness volunteer labor, and adopt a minimalist model. Analysts should
also examine the governance and decision-making structure of terrorist groups.
While some groups are more consultative, others seem to be more oligarchic.
Although some groups make decisions through parliamentary processes, others
require consensus or unanimity. By comprehensively examining the mechanics of
militant groups, researchers can better determine what sort of protocol the organiza-
tion in question has in place for replacing its leaders and if future leaders will be
promoted, appointed, or elected.
The most effective way to determine the anatomy of a terrorist organization is to
analyze the terrorists’ own discourse. In recent years, jihadist groups have developed
sophisticated communication systems with the ability to react to political develop-
ments. Jihadist sites on the Internet that are used by terrorist organizations and their
supporters to spread their extremist message and to recruit funds and activists can
reveal important information about the group’s infrastructure. Similarly, printed
media from Arab countries as well as Arabic-language London dailies and maga-
zines and Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Turkey should also be scrutinized
for indications of the group’s configuration. Audio media, such as cassettes and

63 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

radio broadcasts and visual media from TV channels in the Arab world and jihadist
videos posted online should also be translated and analyzed. From these sources,
scholars can also glean information about emerging alliances or oppositions and
conflicts within the jihad camp. Writings and speeches by both prominent Islamic
terrorists like Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as well as other less
notorious jihadis can also provide powerful insights into the authority structure and
relationships that characterize their organization.
Social Network Analysis (SNA) can also be applied to analyze the structure of
Al Qa’ida and related terrorist organizations. SNA models individuals, places, and
objects as nodes of a graph and represents relations between each node as links.
Important subgroups can be identified as cliques on the graph and individuals in
particular positions of control or influence can be identified by their centrality on the
graph. Substructures of particular interest, such as communications chains can also
be discovered using SNA. Researchers can also use Dynamic Network Analysis
(DNA), which varies from traditional SNA in that it can handle large dynamic
multi-mode, multi-link networks with varying levels of uncertainty.

Figure 4: The Social Network of the Terrorist Group Responsible for the 1988
U.S. Embassy Bombing in Kenyalvii

Knowledge of a terrorist group’s design and succession strategy can be used not
only to determine if the group is an appropriate candidate for a HVT strike, but also
to develop measures that leverage and heighten the group’s dysfunctional structure,
behavior, and both internal and external competition. Equipped with an understand-
ing of the source of authority and legitimacy of leadership, other sub-lethal muni-
tions and tactics can be designed to undermine the influence of enemy leadership.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 64
Defense Concepts

First of all, terrorist group members who appear less committed to the
organization’s goals should not be removed, especially if they can be reliably
monitored. Some terrorist operatives may be galvanized by thrill, financial gain, or
attention-seeking. Others may furtively disagree with the group’s priorities. Because
terrorist leaders must delegate tasks to their subordinates, allowing less dedicated
members who are unlikely to perform well to remain in the organization can lead to
agency problems and organizational dysfunction.lviii
Effective information oper-
“Dissension among the leadership of ations can be used to in-
terrorist groups decreases cohesiveness crease internal dissension
and control within the organization..” in a terrorist group. Dr.
Jerrold Post suggests that
psychological operations can be used to “magnify tension, sow distrust, recast the
image of the leader or pretenders to the throne, or weaken the already stressed
climate and paralyze the group.”lix Propaganda can cause fissures in the enemy
camp by openly bringing up and playing upon contentious questions and issues
which the enemy wishes to ignore, such as the tolerability of suicide attacks.
Agency problems experienced by terrorist networks can be aggravated by
emphasizing the difference between affiliated groups. Publicly recognizing the
differences between associated groups or the disparity between peripheral groups
and the center may generate competition for authority between these cliques. For
example, jihadists in the North Caucasus republics (Chechnya and its neighbors)
recently denounced ultra-radical "Kharijites" in their midst for holding heterodox
positions.lx The disagreements between Salafi jihadists and Kharijites could be
exacerbated by U.S. information operations specialists. Nevertheless, the manipula-
tion of specific tribal rivalries and competitions requires a more sophisticated
understanding of the subtle points and positions that differentiate these groups.
Psychological operations can also be used to invalidate the legitimacy and
tarnish the reputation of key leaders within an organization. For example, the
Pentagon released a video allegedly discovered by U.S. forces in a hideout in the
Al-Yusufiyah neighborhood of southern Baghdad that portrays al-Zarqawi fumbling
with a U.S. M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), the standard weapon of the U.S.
Army. The video portrays him as a foolish and incompetent field commander.lxi
Psychological operations can also be designed to play up rivalry among leaders,
create fissures between working partners, or cast doubt over the loyalties of old
comrades. Dissension among the leadership of terrorist groups decreases cohesive-
ness and control within the organization. “Divide and conquer” is an old, highly
effective strategy.
Efforts should also be made to facilitate exit for operatives from the terrorist
group. As the Algerian example demonstrates, governments can implement national

65 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

reconciliation programs to demobilize hundreds of militants. Amnesty can be

offered in return for cooperation and information. The information obtained from
the defectors can be fed back into the group to create tension amongst the remaining
group members and foment internal dissension.lxii
Finally, the U.S. government should try to undermine public support for terrorist
groups. Policymakers must demonstrate to local populations that the militants’
means and goals are anathema to their own. Jihadist policy planners have empha-
sized the importance of maintaining connections between leadership and the civilian
population since Abdallah Azzam recognized these links in the 1980s. Abu Musab
al-Suri’s influential work argued that the loss of a connection between leadership
and the people was a key factor in the failure of historical jihadist movements.
The discourse of moderate Muslim clerics and former terrorists who have
renounced violence can be circulated to promote a counter-ideology to Al Qa’ida.
Several former radical Islamists have explained that Al Qa’ida’s ideology is un-
Islamic and have noted that warfare, as depicted in the Koran, is generally compati-
ble with the spirit of international law. For example, in his publication
“Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World,” Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr.
Fadl) suggests that most forms of terrorism are illegal under Islamic law and he
castigates Muslims who resort to theft or kidnapping. Dr. Fadl also insists that the
Koran forbids adherents to kill civilians, including Jews and Christians.lxiii By
endorsing scholars like Dr. Fadl, the U.S. can expose the sophistry of Al Qa’ida and
can outline the path back to moderation.
Information operations should also be used to create legitimacy for U.S. military
assistance to Muslim nations by stressing that nearly 7 million Muslims live in
America, where the government protects freedom of religion. As Col. David M.
Witty, a Military Transition team leader in the Iraqi National Counterterrorism Task
Force, asserts: “In the United States, Muslims are integrated into American society,
are respected, and enjoy a high standard of living.”lxiv Abroad, the United State has
offered aid and military assistance to Muslim societies and has opposed ethnic
cleansing attacks on Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.
To behead a terrorist organization, it is not necessary to guillotine its leader.
When the terrorist leader is faced with the destruction of his ability to launch or
control his agents, then the organization will be decapitated.

Sarah Catanzaro is a Program Manager at the Center for Advanced Studies, where
she directs the “Understanding Clandestine Organizations Program.” As an Honors
Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Univer-
sity and Recipient of the William Perry Award for Excellence in Interdisciplinary
Studies, she examined the relationship between Al Qa’ida and local jihadist groups.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 66
Defense Concepts

i Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann. 4 February, 2010. The Year of the Drone. Wash-
ington, DC: New America Foundation.
ii Jenna Jordan. When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation.

Security Studies 18, no. 4: 719. doi:10.1080/09636410903369068.

iii Mannes, Aaron. Spring 2008. Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Captur-

ing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity? The Journal of International Policy
Solutions 9: 40-50.
iv Johnson, Patrick. 2009. The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsur-
gency. Stanford University .
v Freeman, Michael, and Gordon McCormick. 28 February, 2007. Rethinking Decapitation

as a Strategy against Terrorism. Paper presented at the International Studies Association

48th Annual Convention. Chicago, Illinois.
vi Solomon, Jay, Siobhan Gorman, and Matthew Rosenberg. 26 March, 2009. U.S. Plans

New Drone Attacks in Pakistan. wsj.com, sec. Politics and Policy.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123803414843244161.html.
vii Associated Press. 9 November 2009. Al Qaeda Training Camps Go Local, Mobile . CBS

News. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/09/world/main5584584.shtml.
viii Anon. 2009. Offensive by Pak and U.S. drones has Shaken Qaeda. Indian Express. June

2. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/offensive-by-pak-and-us-drones-has-shaken-
qa/469521/.
ix Evans, Michael. 3 January 2009. Death from Above: How Predator is Taking its Toll on

al-Qaeda . The Times Online. January 3.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5435471.ece.
x Hyder, Victor. 26 May 2004. Decapitation Operations: Criteria for Targeting Enemy

Leadership. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies.
xi Ibid

xii Ibid
xiii Ibid
xiv Loo, Bernard. 2009. Military Transformation and Strategy. New York: Taylor & Francis.
xv Teal Group. 1 February 2010. Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total
Over $80 Billion In Its Just Released 2010 UAV Market Profile and Forecast. Teal Group
Corporation.
http://www.tealgroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62:uav-
study-release&catid=3&Itemid=16.
xvi Department of Defense. 2010. Quadrennial Defense Report. Washington, DC: The

White House.
xvii EAA. 18 February 2009. U.S. Military Expands UAV Fleet. Young Eagles.

http://www.youngeagles.org/news/archive/2009%20-%2002_20%20-
%20UAV%20Fleet%20Expands.asp.

67 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

xviii Scahill, Jeremy. 23 November 2009. The Secret U.S. War in Pakistan. The Nation.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091207/scahill.
xix Risen, James. 10 August 2009. U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban.

The New York Times, sec. International / Asia Pacific.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/asia/10afghan.html.
xx Anon. 2006. Special Operations Forces and Counter-terrorism -- What Roles? Strategic

Comments 12, no. 7: 1. doi:10.1080/1356788061272.

xxi Solis, Gary. 2007. Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict. Naval War College

Review 60, no. 2.

xxii Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 3 June 2009. The Drone War.

http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/drone_war_13672.
xxiii Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedmann. 24 February 2010. The Year of the Drone .

New America Foundation. Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative.

xxiv Ibid
xxv Mayer, Jane. 26 October 2009. The Predator War. The New Yorker.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer.
xxvi Daily Times Monitor. 9 April 2009. Extremists Relocating to Big Cities to Avoid

Drone Attacks. Daily Times - Pakistan.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C04%5C09%5Cstory_9-4-
2009_pg1_2.
xxvii Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 3 June 2009. The Drone War.

http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/drone_war_13672.
xxviii Kilcullen, David, and Andrew Mcdonald Exum. 17 May 2009. Death From Above,

Outrage Down Below. The New York Times, sec. Opinion.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html.
xxix Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 3 June 2009. The Drone War.

http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/drone_war_13672.
xxx Mayer, Jane. 2009. The Predator War. The New Yorker, October 26.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer.
xxxi Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 3 June 2009. The Drone War .
xxxii
Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 24 February 2010. The Year of the Drone.
Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper. Washington, DC: New America Founda-
tion.
xxxiii Ibid
xxxivKesner, Idalene F., and Terrence C. Sebora. 1 April 1994. Executive Succession: Past,
Present & Future. Journal of Management 20, no. 2: 327-372.
doi:10.1177/014920639402000204.
xxxv Datta, Deepak K., and James P. Guthrie. September 1994. Executive Succession: Orga-

nizational Antecedents of CEO Characteristics. Strategic Management Journal 15, no. 7

(September): 569-577.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 68
Defense Concepts

xxxvi Islam, Syed Serajul. May 1998. The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of

Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines. Asian Survey 38, no. 5: 441-456.
xxxvii Hoffman, Bruce. 1996. Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Securi-

ty Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era. Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2: 207.
doi:10.1080/02684529608432353.
xxxviii Helmich, Donald. April 1977. Executive Succession in the Corporate Organization: A

Current Integration. The Academy of Management Review 2, no. 2: 252-266.

xxxix Ocasio, William. June 1999. Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The

Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession. Administrative Science Quarterly 44, no. 2: 384-
416.
xl Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedmann. 24 February 2010. The Year of the Drone . New

America Foundation. Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative.

xli Shapiro, Jacob N., and C. Christine Fair. 1 January 2010. Understanding Support for Isla-
mist Militancy in Pakistan. International Security 34, no. 3: 79-118.
doi:10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.79.
xlii Post, Jerrold. Summer 1987. Prospects for nuclear terrorism: Psychological motivations

and constraints. Conflict Quarterly: 47-59.

xliii Kohlmann, Evan. May 2007. Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, and

Al-Qaida. Washington, DC: NEFA Foundation.

xliv Johnson, Thomas. November 2006. An Introduction to a Special Issue of Strategic In-
sights: Analyses of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). Strate-
gic Insights 5, no. 8.
xlv Guidere, Mathieu. 2007. Al Qa'ida a La Conquete du Maghreb. Paris: Editions du

Rocher.
xlvi Ibid

xlvii
Boudali, Lianne Kennedy. 2007. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global
Jihad. The North Africa Project. West Point: The Combating Terrorism Center, April.
xlviiiGuidere, Mathieu. 2007. Al Qa'ida a La Conquete du Maghreb. Paris: Editions du
Rocher.
xlix Ibid

l Ibid
li Ibid
lii Lecocq, Baz, and Paul Schrijver. 2007. The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes
and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1: 141.
doi:10.1080/02589000601157147.
liii Boudali, Lianne Kennedy. April 2007. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s

Global Jihad. The North Africa Project. West Point: The Combating Terrorism Center.
liv Kohlmann, Evan. May 2007. Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, and

Al-Qaida. Washington, DC: NEFA Foundation.

69 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefagspc0507.pdf.
lv Johnson, Thomas. November 2006. An Introduction to a Special Issue of Strategic In-
sights: Analyses of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). Strate-
gic Insights 5, no. 8.
lvi Steinberg, Guido, and Isabelle Werenfels. 2007. Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Ene-

my: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 3: 407.
doi:10.1080/13629390701622473.
lvii Carley, Katherine. 26 April 2008. Vulnerability Assessment on Adversarial Organiza-

tion: Unifying Command and Control Structure Analysis and Social Network Analysis. SI-
AM International Conference on Data Mining, Workshop on Link Analysis,
Counterterrorism and Security, Atlanta, Georgia.
lviiiShapiro, Jacob. 13 May 2008. Bureaucracy and Control in Terrorist Organizations.
Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School. http://www.utdallas.edu/epps/terrorism-and-
policy-conference/papers/Shapiro_Bureaucracy_Control_Terrorism_1.pdf.
lix Post, Jerrold. 2005. Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism. Joint Force Quar-

terly, no. 37: 105-111.

lx Alshech, E. 18 November 2009. The Split Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Jordan

and the Rise of a Takfiri Movement – A Historical and Doctrinal Analysis. MEMRI. The
Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor.
lxi Hernandez, Nelson. 5 May 2006. U.S. military airs video of a bumbling al-Zarqawi. SF-

Gate.
lxii Post, Jerrold. 2005. Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism. Joint Force Quar-

terly, no. 37: 105-111.

lxiii
Wright, Lawrence. 2 June 2008. A Reporter at Large: The Rebellion Within . The New
Yorker.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all
lxiv
Witty, David. 2008. Attacking al Qaeda’s Operational Centers of Gravity. Joint Force
Quarterly, no. 46: 98-104.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 70
Defense Concepts

71 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful

Security Regime and its Elusive European Rapid
Reaction Force
Alexander Justice Moore
Introduction
For scholars of international cooperation, the European Union is in many ways
an exemplary arrangement. A continent once regularly ravaged by war appears to
have crossed over into Immanuel Kant’s ‘perpetual peace.’i Initially conceived as a
venue for economic cooperation, the Union now works towards an array of common
goals in a variety of issue areas including security. The most prominent element of
EU security cooperation is known as the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).
Plans for this crisis-response unit were announced in 1999 and it has elicited close
attention ever since. For its proponents, the ERRF is a potential vehicle for
advancing EU solidarity and global credibility. In institutional theory terms, the
force promises a considerable ‘mutual gain,’ serving EU interests and humanitarian
values across the full spectrum of crisis contingencies. In addition to promoting
European values, enhanced EU military cooperation would likely also produce
tangible economic benefits through economies of scale, equipment standardization,
and capability specialization in time.ii But ten years after its conception, the ERRF
has yet to reach operational maturity.
The investigation below explains what some might view as a surprising lack of
progress by a uniquely integrated Europe. The security regimes literature usually
emphasizes transparency problems and the barriers they pose to security cooperation.
This study, however, finds that the European security regime’s unprecedented
success in sharing information and restraining military buildups has actually
undermined the ERRF development effort. Notable ERRF progress has only
occurred during periods of crisis-induced uncertainty. Lingering concerns about
future crises explains EU leaders’ ongoing rhetorical support for the force and
continuing, though slow and marginal, advances in its capabilities. Major gains are
unlikely in the absence of serious extended crises prompting European states to
question their security status quo.

The European Security Regime: Success Begetting Failure?

Today, the development of ERRF remains elusive. If one accepts that that ERRF
does promise a mutual gain for participants—in terms of an autonomous European
crisis response capacity and long-term financial savings, if not a dramatic
enhancement of physical security per se—this debility appears to reflect a traditional
collaboration problem, also known as a prisoner’s dilemma. In such a scenario,
states may, on the one hand, choose to collaborate, committing serious near-term
Vol. 5, Ed. 2 72
Defense Concepts

financial resources and political support to the ERRF. On the other, they may elect
to defect, prioritizing near-term state-level concerns over the potential long-term
advantages offered by this joint force. According to neoliberal institutionalist
thinking, such collaboration problems are best solved by providing information to
relevant parties. This information would ostensibly help each state understand the
benefits of cooperation as well as the intentions of the other actors. Parties would
thus be able to assuage fears that their own unilateral investments in the ERRF
would not be reciprocated by fellow EU members.
The theoretical literature on security regimes and collective security suggests
that such information sharing and cooperation is especially difficult in the security
realm. As a result, this literature largely focuses on the challenges involved in these
efforts. According to Robert Jervis’s seminal work on security regimes, the critically
important, competitive, unforgiving, and uncertain nature of security politics usually
obliges leaders to rely “on unilateral and competitive modes of behavior rather than
by seeking cooperative solutions…The result is that security regimes, with their call
for mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions, rarely seem attractive to
decision makers.” iiiThe literature, thus, creates a behavioral dichotomy in the
security realm: cooperation entails mutual restraint while competition involves
unilateral action. Because power-oriented theorists perceive competitive behavior
as more advantageous in the context of a worst-case scenario view of international
relations, they, are pessimistic about the likelihood of security regimes’ emergence
and resilience. As John Mearsheimer puts it:

Cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained by

the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of
cooperation can eliminate. Genuine peace, or a world where states do not
compete for power, is not likely, according to realism.iv

Nevertheless, however unlikely it may seem to realists, one region does exhibit
such genuine peace. In Europe, Jervis’s challenges have been successfully overcome.
Cooperation and restraint define state policies. A security regime, which Jervis
defines as “principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their
behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate,” developed in Western Europe
after World War II, chiefly because of the NATO alliance and its codification of the
United States’ role as security guarantor.v The European security regime included
both formal NATO members and friendly neutral countries such as Ireland who
gained implicit U.S. protection. With the end of the Cold War, this regime expanded
east. Some states joined NATO outright while others, ostensibly neutral countries
entered the Alliance’s less-stringent Partnership for Peace. Their differing legal
status within NATO belied implicit inclusion within the European security regime.

73 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

This legacy of institutionalized, sustained cooperation in the security realm might

suggest to some that establishing a joint European force should be a relatively
straightforward task. Instead, Europe’s institutionalized security regime is, in fact,
the very cause of ERRF paralysis.
The source of the ERRF’s problems is not a lack of information, assurance, and
restraint. Rather, it is an overabundance of them. Charles Glaser defines security
cooperation as “coordinated policies designed to avoid arms races, while
competition refers to unilateral military buildups, which are likely to generate arms
races, and to alliance formation” [emphasis added].vi Building the ERRF, however,
requires states to possess cooperative mentalities conducive to intense coordination
and to engage in the usually competitive behavior of military buildups. Such
cooperative action, if achieved, would defy categorization in the security regime
literature’s behavioral dichotomy. Among states without aggressive intentions,
military buildups are traditionally a fear-driven response to perceived threats.
Security regimes, however, ameliorate these concerns, and “fear of exploitation
gives way to increasing willingness to practice self-restraint and mutual
assistance.”vii The stronger the supranational regime, the greater the national
restraint and the less likely any military buildups are to occur. Cooperative action to
develop a regional security force, then, appears difficult and unlikely if not
unprecedented.

“If the status quo promotes restraint and curtails military

spending, why is Europe still discussing an ERRF? The answer
lies in the anxiety provoked by external shocks.”
As I demonstrate below, Europe’s established commitment to cooperation has
resulted in atrophied military capabilities and a lack of political will at the national
level to engage in the sort of short-term military buildups required by the ERRF. The
current security status quo—of intra-European cooperation underwritten by an
American security guarantee—suggests that continued ERRF debilities are not the
result of information failures, as neoliberals might assume. Member States know
exactly what the ERRF’s promised benefits are and exhibit remarkable transparency
in their security policies. Rather, by dramatically reducing Member States’ sense of
threat and increasing their confidence in the security regime, EU military
cooperation has become a victim of its own unique success.
If the status quo promotes restraint and curtails military spending, why is
Europe still discussing an ERRF? The answer lies in the anxiety provoked by
external shocks. Uncertainty following the Cold War’s conclusion, the Kosovo crisis,
and the September 11th attacks all cast doubt on the United States’ ability or
willingness to intervene on behalf of European interests. European concerns

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 74
 Defense Concepts

regarding a potential U.S. retreat from international affairs in the early 1990s,
America’s considerable reluctance to act in Kosovo, and recurring episodes
involving transnational terrorism after 9/11 each inspired brief periods of ERRF
progress. But the uncertainty triggered by these occasions never constituted a total
informational failure that seriously compromised regional security. Effective
“collective security allows states to develop a certain degree of immunity toward
isolated developments and changes in the strategic setting that would, under anarchy,
have far greater reverberations.”viii When these major shocks occurred, this
immunity conditioned Europe’s response, as it chose greater defense integration
with an eye towards crisis response over developing unilateral capabilities for major
inter-state warfare. Such policy prescriptions indicate that Europe’s sense of
insecurity was considerable but not fundamental. In each instance, Europe’s
inability to respond to crises was exposed, but at no point was its territorial security
threatened in ways that undermined the foundations of its security regime. If
Member States had truly lacked substantial information about the potential shift to
noncooperation by their neighbors or the United States, security regime theory
suggests that individual leaders would have pursued competitive, unilateral
strategies. Instead, leading European states pressed for more cooperation, not less.
These high-watermarks of ERRF institutional impetus, however, lasted only as long
as the crisis-induced uncertainty. Once it became clear that Europe’s status quo and
America’s security commitments would endure, cooperative action reverted back to
cooperative restraint. Commitments to the ERRF then faltered and though progress
slowed dramatically, it never stopped entirely.

“Crises have happened before, and they are likely to happen

again. With each of the three crises mentioned in this paper,
Europe was not only caught off-guard, but states were
rendered incapable of independent action.”
Crises have happened before, and they are likely to happen again. With each of
the three crises mentioned in this paper, Europe was not only caught off-guard, but
states were rendered incapable of independent action. It is only logical, then, that
European states would continue to pursue some measure of ERRF progress. And
indeed they have, though it remains far from a top priority. The cooperative
institutions established during periods of ERRF progress did not disband when
national political priorities shifted elsewhere. They continue working, as
organizations do, in line with their missions but constrained by limited resources and
political support. Where ERRF contributions have required minimal financial and
political investment, countries have made them. Rhetorical support for the ERRF

75 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

remains strong among key nations and its halting but undeniable progress suggests
that such sentiments are more than just ‘cheap talk.’ European leaders appear to
understand that while the U.S. security guarantee offers a considerable degree of
immunity from external shocks, this immunity is not absolute. When it comes to the
‘big-ticket’ items of a modern fighting force, the ERRF remains deficient. Looking
forward, Europe’s limited sense of vulnerability is likely to lead to limited ERRF
progress. Barring a massive shock or a sudden retreat of U.S. primacy, it is hard to
imagine a serious and sustained European commitment to a muscular, independently
capable ERRF.
The following analysis reveals a clear pattern of EU behavior. First, an external
shock prompts European uncertainty. Leading states respond with pressure for a
cooperative military buildup. However, this brief burst of progress subsides when
Europe’s security regime, and in particular America’s commitment to it, proves
resilient. European nations, finding the costs of cooperative action excessive in light
of this commitment, revert to cooperative restraint. Such restraint inspires policies
contrary to military buildups, depriving EU joint forces of critical capabilities. This
status quo persists until the next shock, when the cycle begins anew. After discussing
this behavioral pattern, I describe ERRF progress—or general lack thereof—since
EU uncertainty after the last external shock waned EU uncertainty waned. I then
draw on neoliberal and constructivist thinking to offer alternative explanations for
the largely, but not completely, stagnant state of the ERRF. Finding these competing
interpretations insufficient, I conclude with a pessimistic evaluation of near-term
ERRF prospects in lieu of unanticipated shocks.

The First Shock: The End of the Cold War

The demise of the Soviet Union caught the world off-guard. Concerned about
post-Soviet instability in Russia, the sudden opening of Eastern European society,
and the unification of a long-divided Germany, much of Western Europe continued
to see great value in the American security guarantee. However, many European
leaders and publics feared that without a
superpower opponent, the United States “... many European leaders
would revert to isolationism. This fear and publics feared that
inspired defense cooperation within the
Western European Union, an EU
without a superpower
predecessor. In 1948, the WEU made opponent, the United States
plans “involving the integration of air would revert to isolationism.
defenses and a joint command This fear inspired cooperation
organization.”ix Once the U.S. committed within the Western European
to underwriting European security in the
1949 North Atlantic Treaty, however,
Union, an EU predecessor.”

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 76
 Defense Concepts

progress in strictly European defense cooperation ceased until after the collapse of
the Iron Curtain. In 1993, the WEU instituted a military Planning Cell, established
a relationship with NATO’s Military Committee, and built early, yet promising, joint
frameworks for non-member observation, armaments research and development,
and collective security.x As the decade progressed, NATO and the U.S. security
guarantee did not wither as many predicted. Instead, NATO maintained its vitality
and even expanded to include former Soviet republics. European doubt of America’s
commitment eased gradually.
In 1997, efforts to unify existing European institutions into a broader, deeper
European Union were in full swing. The long-standing WEU and its more recent
security cooperation mechanisms would have provided valuable organizational
platforms for the EU to build upon. But formerly neutral states—Sweden, Denmark,
Austria, and Ireland chief among them—vociferously opposed integrating the
WEU’s security apparatus “with an open-ended protocol containing the collective
defence guarantee for those who wished to sign it. The formerly ‘neutral’ members
of the EU, particularly Sweden, had objected to integrating the WEU ‘lock, stock
and barrel’.”xi The partisan nature of this debate proves puzzling for security regime
theory, as both sides were part of the same European security regime—one formally
tied to the NATO apparatus and the other protected implicitly by its continued
existence. If both believed in cooperative security, why did WEU integration
discussions become so uncooperative?

“WEU members perceived mutual defense clauses and military

integration to be highly cooperative measures requiring
serious, sustained engagement with one another. The neutral
objectors, meanwhile, felt their obligations to the security
regime demanded national restraint, specifically avoiding the
‘competitive’ behaviors of military buildups and alliance
formation.”
The answer lies in the difference between cooperative action and cooperative
restraint. WEU members perceived mutual defense clauses and military integration
to be highly cooperative measures requiring serious, sustained engagement with one
another. The neutral objectors, meanwhile, felt their obligations to the security
regime demanded national restraint, specifically avoiding the ‘competitive’
behaviors of military buildups and alliance formation. These latter countries
interpreted the concept of military restraint in an extreme manner. Looking back to
1961, Kollias et al. find that Ireland, Denmark, and Austria’s defense spending “has

77 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

consistently been lower than the EU average.”xii By avoiding excessive Cold War
entanglements—and with them, commensurate military responsibilities—these
countries were able to apply a ‘neutrality dividend’ toward other political priorities.
When whatever specter of danger they faced diminished after the Cold War, this
dividend only increased. Today, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, and Austria possess,
respectively, the 33rd, 51st, 55th, and 37th-ranked economies in the world.
Comparatively, the percentages of GDP they devote to military expenditures vis-à-
vis the rest of the planet are disproportionately small, as they rank respectively, 106th,
125th, 146th, and 140th.xiii

Figure 1: EDA Participating States Defense Spending 2006xiv

These countries were able to evolve as military dwarves because of the ample
information they possessed on other states’ intentions—especially those of their
larger Western European neighbors and American security benefactor. Ireland, for
example, could engage in a policy of ‘disarmed neutrality’ because “NATO
implicitly guarantees the security of Ireland. Furher, during the Cold War…Ireland
was safely tucked away behind Britain.”xv Given the contentious history of Irish-
British relations, the UK’s de facto security relationship with the Emerald Isle
speaks to a remarkable advancement toward mutual assurance. Belfast’s awareness
of other countries’ intentions encouraged both restraint of its own military spending,
and total confidence that neglecting WEU security institutions would not inspire
retaliatory action from powerful neighbors. Had leading European states been more
sensitive about the security status quo’s resilience to external shocks, some measure
of political or diplomatic retaliation for shirking regional security commitments
would have been implemented as a predictable practice of statecraft. Instead,
objections from Ireland and similarly situated states led the EU “to dismantle the
operational institutions recently established by the WEU and build them up again
from scratch as the new EU Military Staff and the EU Military Committee.”xvi

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 78
Defense Concepts

Without sufficient fear and uncertainty to inspire cooperative action, small EU

states were able to derail efforts by leading Western European nations to improve
their joint military capability. Notably, the ERRF specifically was not yet a part of
this continental discussion. But because the EU, as an institution, lacked
mechanisms for military cooperation and the ability to respond to crises with joint
force, it found itself wholly incapable of responding to a major shock in its own
backyard.

The Second Shock: The Kosovo Crisis

Europe knew Slobodan Milosevic was a villain. In 1998, when he launched
another campaign of ethnic cleansing, this time in Kosovo, Europe should have had
an answer for his provocations. It did not. Without American military support,
Europe lacked the physical and organizational capacity to carry out a major,
coordinated humanitarian intervention—even one on its own continent. Europe’s
reliance upon the United States led its leading states to two conclusions, one political,
one practical. On the political side, a sense of “embarrassment” at their relative
weakness vis-à-vis the U.S. meant key European leaders felt acute pressure to work
together.xvii The readily apparent “capabilities gap thus added even greater impetus
to the convergence of British, French, and eventually German thinking on a
European security and defense policy.”xviii Before Kosovo, Europe could largely
assume that the U.S. would consistently come to its aid in regional matters. After
witnessing how close the United States came to not intervening, leading European
states felt uncomfortable with a status quo built upon their trans-Atlantic partner’s
resolve. Future crises were bound to demand forceful measures, and if Europe was
to respond appropriately, it would have to embrace cooperative action.
Figure 2: Kosovo Force Sectors in Kosovoxix
Practically, the lessons of Kosovo
indicated to Europe that the U.S. might
not always be an ideal partner in
peace-keeping and crisis-responses
activities. America’s military was
geared for large-scale, state-to-state
warfare. Domestically, popular
concerns about distant adventurism
and military casualties handcuffed U.S.
campaign planners and led to an over-
reliance on technology. In particular,
the Kosovo conflict underscored the
limits of precision bombing. While
‘smart bombs’ are great for smashing

79 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

traditional military infrastructure, they proved ill-suited for stopping small, low-tech
groups of armed thugs from victimizing civilians—a much more common foe in
situations calling for humanitarian intervention. In fact, the seventy-eight days of
NATO air strikes were the period of the “most egregious abuses,” inciting more
violent behavior among Serbs, not less.xx Going forward, Europe was not
excessively worried that America would neglect it in the event of an outside invasion.
It did, however, have legitimate doubts about the reliability and efficacy of future
U.S. involvement in lesser crises that involved European interests rather than
American ones. These concerns, political and practical, explain the EU’s response to
Kosovo: the ERRF.

“Pursuit of an independent intervention capability suggested

a course of cooperative action between EU states rather
than one of competitive action (balancing) versus the U.S.”

In June 1999, the European Council (EC)—a collection of each EU member’s

head of government—met in Cologne. There they declared their commitment “that
the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage…The Union
must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces,
the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to
international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”xxi The EC’s word choice
is curious, as it was far more concerned about NATO inaction than any potential
Alliance actions jeopardizing European interests. The EU reached a consensus
around seeking the ability to stand, at times, on its own. The proposed ERRF was
quickly judged by some observers as an exercise in balancing against the U.S., but
such realist-style behavior would presuppose that Europe perceived a threat
emanating from Washington—which it certainly did not. Pursuit of an independent
intervention capability suggested a course of cooperative action between EU states
rather than one of competitive action (balancing) versus the U.S.
That August, the EC met in Helsinki and produced the Headline Goal. It grabbed
both headlines and world attention. Europe’s leaders expressed an ambitious desire
to possess a force of 50,000 to 60,000 troopsby 2003. These fifteen brigades would
be deployable in less than 60 days with smaller units available in a week or less.
Once in the field, the ERRF would be sustainable for one year with the support of
ready reinforcements, intelligence capabilities, and naval and air assets. These
forces would be capable of performing the full spectrum of ‘Petersberg tasks’:
“humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peacemaking.”xxii These vague concepts are better
described as ‘peace support operations’ (PSOs), which fall into four categories:

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 80
Defense Concepts

warfighting, stabilization, state-building, and observation and separation.xxiii For

many, the idea of a highly trained, modern fighting force to defend European ideals
was appealing. But the Helsinki agenda proved too ambitious—politically,
financially, and practically. 2003 came and went, and the ERRF imagined at
Helsinki remained largely imaginary.
This disappointing outcome is a byproduct of an overly successful security
regime. The impetus for cooperative action waned along with post-crisis uncertainty.
However, even before the momentum died, much of this ‘action’ focused on
institution-building, not the development and acquisition of hard military
capabilities. The EU’s organizational preoccupation with acquiring acronyms over
arms was caused by concerns about the role of its security guarantor, the United
States. In the end, Europe’s leading states reverted to a strategy of cooperative
restraint—interested in a stronger ERRF, but unwilling to take the proactive
measures necessary to achieve its autonomous maturity.
The 1997 demolition of WEU defense institutions re-opened the question of
what European military cooperation should look like. In time, two factions with
competing visions, one led by Britain and the other by France, proposed solutions
to this institutional ‘vacuum.’ Initially, however, uncertainty in the midst of the
Kosovo crisis prompted an encouraging British-French statement at the December
1998 St. Malo Summit. There, the two states asserted that the

Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so,
in order to respond to international crises…In strengthening the solidarity
between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can
make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our
respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a
modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective
defence of its members.xxiv

But this joint statement, reflecting the later consensus at Cologne and Helsinki,
did not reflect a genuine, common understanding. It soon became clear that Britain
and France possessed dramatically different visions of the EU’s military future and
of cooperative action itself. France proceeded to emphasize the autonomy of a future
EU force from the Alliance and its American sponsor. Britain, meanwhile, worked
vigorously to convince Washington that a new European commitment to defense
spending “would not supplant Europe’s transatlantic link with the United States
through NATO but would enhance it.”xxv These divergent concepts stem from each
country’s unique history, which conditions its approach to the European security
regime. As Constantine Pagedas puts it, “While Great Britain is one of America’s

81 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

closest and most trusted allies, as well as one of the strongest supporters of NATO,
France has traditionally sought to enhance its own power and prestige in Europe
through the deliberate diminishment of NATO and U.S. influence on the
continent.”xxvi British tradition informed the UK’s position of enhancing the existing
security regime by adding independent capabilities and interdependent EU-NATO
institutions to direct them. French pride inspired a desire for independent EU
capabilities and institutions. France had nothing more to fear from the U.S. than
Britain (which is to say nothing at all), suggesting that its behavior was not intended,
as a realist might surmise, to balance against America. Paris perceived the
inconsistency of American commitments in the same manner as London and was
equally committed to advancing the European security regime. Their conflicting
visions of cooperative action were informed by different national histories, not
different perceptions of threat.
Aware that the
embryonic ERRF“The British vision of cooperative action—
had the potential to a European military buildup with U.S. support
both enhance and and input—was costly. The French vision of
diminish EU-NATO
cooperation, the cooperative action—a European military build
United States entered up that excluded the U.S. from its governing
the discussion. institutions—was even more so.”
Alhough Washington
welcomed additional
European defense spending, it demanded that the ERRF in no way duplicate
resources, decouple the EU defense structure from NATO, or discriminate against
non-EU NATO members. These actions, the U.S. believed, would foster competition
and undermine the European security regime. Britain, which so often aligns with
U.S. on foreign policy priorities, saw little conflict between its ERRF vision and
these U.S. conditions. Britain’s version of autonomy demanded the ability to
conduct operations where the Alliance was not engaged—essentially, instances
where the U.S. was not opposed to action per se but lacked the political will or
strategic interest to commit forces and resources. France, meanwhile, resisted each
American stipulation. For Paris, autonomy necessitated duplication of capabilities,
an independent planning apparatus, and the ability to proceed without interference
from non-EU NATO members like the U.S. and Turkey. The British vision of
cooperative action—a European military buildup with U.S. support and input—was
costly. The French vision of cooperative action—a European military buildup that
excluded the U.S. from its governing institutions—was even more so.
As time passed and the post-Kosovo sense of urgency faded, neither side was
willing to shoulder the costs of enhanced military capabilities alone. A neoliberal

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 82
Defense Concepts

would have been encouraged by the cautious institution-building process that began
in 2000, as joint EU-NATO working groups initiated discussions on intelligence
sharing, joint planning, and future “more permanent consultation
arrangements.”xxviiBut the main barrier to ERRF progress was not disputes between
British and French-led factions. Both parties eventually agreed on a shortcut to get
the ERRF up and running: borrowing NATO assets to fill in EU capability gaps. In
a telling response to the obstacles posed by insufficient capability, both sides
reverted to a strategy of indefinitely relying on NATO and implicitly American,
resources. However, once this issue was resolved, Turkey—a nation inside NATO’s
security apparatus possessing an ambivalent attitudes toward Europe—blocked
ERRF-NATO collaboration for it “wanted to have assured participation in the
planning of operations before agreeing to assured EU access to NATO assets.”
xxviiiNeoliberal emphases on information deficits can explain objections by Turkey

and Greece—traditional Mediterranean rivals—to EU-NATO cooperation, but do

not offer explanations for why leading states with an interest in cooperative action
did not press forward without their operation. On the contrary, shared confidence in
the security regime that diminished the impetus for ERRF progress does explain this
phenomenon. Unwilling to step outside the existing regime and engage in costly
forms of cooperative action or outright competition, Europe reverted to a status quo
of cooperative restraint Willem Van Eekelen calls the “Malaise in 2001.”xxix

The Third Shock: September 11th, 2001

The malaise was largely broken on a clear morning that September. Al-Qaida’s
attacks on New York and Washington underscored the importance of
counterterrorism efforts and gave new impetus for serious cooperation between the
EU and NATO. Cornish and Edwards assert that the ‘long-term effect’ of 9/11 was
the expression of “wide support…for the various procedures and initiatives which
had been put in train before the attacks.”xxx The new trans-Atlantic emphasis on
terrorism quieted—but by no means eliminated—neutral country complaints about
defense cooperation. Sweden, the most vociferously uncooperative of the bunch,
found itself on the outside of European security discussions, “excluded from talks
between the larger member states following 9/11.”xxxi After September 11th, Europe’s
leading powers increasingly turned to ‘mini-summits,’ making “no effort to hide or
downplay their desire to coordinate among themselves without the interference of
small Member States.”xxxii Quiet diplomatic exchanges hushed Turkish and Greek
objections.xxxiii In a time of particular sensitivity to their own security concerns, the
leading nations of Europe ensured that they would not be impeded by small-state
objectors as they had in 1997.

83 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Continued EU-NATO
negotiations resulted in the 2003
Berlin Plus arrangements, which
authorized ERRF access to NATO
planning, a NATO European
command option for ERRF

http://www.nato.int
operations, and Europe’s ability to
request NATO assets and
capabilities. Berlin Plus required
EU-NATO planning
cooperation—a stipulation that
cut to the core of the UK-France NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
debate. France, Germany, and European Union High Representative,
Belgium, and Luxembourg had Dr. Havier Solana mark the end of NATO’s SFOR
initially sought to establish a Operation and the establishment of the EU “Althea
multi-nationalized EU planning Operation.”
unit that would comprise “a core European defense grouping distinct from the EU's
collective endeavour.”xxxiv Britain, meanwhile, wanted planning for particular
operations to be directed by a leading ‘framework’ nation and supported by
‘seconded’ staff from other countries, with the whole operation closely tied to
planners at NATO headquarters. Planning, in the British model, would be much
more ad hoc and operational; in the French, more permanent and strategic.
Negotiations settled on the UK model, eliciting a “significant concession from those
EU governments which had long resisted the idea that the EU’s strategic ambitions
should somehow be tied to or dependent on NATO.”xxxv This concession was
“considered a triumph for those governments—particularly the British—which had
been uneasy about…an alternative, full-scope European strategic and operational
planning organization.”xxxvi
As of 2003, one could say that the UK and its supporters ‘won.’ The nations of
the EU agreed that ERRF would be closely linked to NATO for the foreseeable
future. The United States’ support for increased EU capabilities bolstered the British
faction and its model of cooperative action. France, meanwhile, found the costs of
excluding the U.S. from any collective security arrangement prohibitive and
conceded to Britain on this matter. Rather than investing its political and financial
resources in an autonomous EU force, France would pursue greater influence within
the existing security regime.xxxvii Political and strategic ERRF autonomy were only
important so far as the ERRF was capable of physical and tactical independence—
which it was not. If the EU wanted to act independently in a crisis, but had no way
of flying its personnel there, autonomous decision making became a moot point.
Going forward, the ERRF would depend on NATO capabilities. After four years of

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 84
Defense Concepts

institutional conflict, the EU now possessed a brand-new military bureaucracy. It did

not, however, have anything resembling an autonomous crisis response force
capable of the full PSO spectrum.
The sense of cooperative action that inspired institutional engineering was not
matched by similar cooperation towards a European military buildup. As part of its
planning process, the EU broke down the Petersberg tasks into 144 separate military
capabilities necessary to conduct them. In 2002, thirty of these requirements
remained unmet. Though “several countries had plans for meeting them…their
implementation would take them well beyond 2003.”xxxviii As an overall percentage,
114 successes out of 144 attempts sound impressive. But those left unachieved fell
disproportionately in the high-intensity realms of warfighting and stabilization.
Most of the satisfied 114 capabilities achieved simply codified what EU states could
already do, together or separately. Meanwhile, the elusive thirty included airlift,
sealift, air-to-air refueling, and intelligence capabilities. Such tasks are not only
difficult to learn and implement; they are also among the ‘big-ticket’ items of a
modern fighting force. Cornish and Edwards report that meeting these requirements
would cost the EU and its members $25 billion.xxxix The remarkable transparency of
EU defense cooperation suggests that these thirty shortcomings were not caused by
misperception or misconception; every nation had a good idea of what the others
possessed in terms of capabilities, and what they were likely to develop. With no
apparent reason to compete with one another and insufficient will for cooperative
action, the EU continued its pattern of cooperative restraint, allowing the United
States to maintain its primacy. At a May 2003 meeting in Brussels, the EC stated:

The EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg
tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls. These limitations
and/or constraints are on deployment time and high risk may arise at the
upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity, in particular when
conducting concurrent operations.xl

Reading this statement, one might have assumed that the EU was actually capable
of executing tasks for which it claimed operational capability. This assumption
would be incorrect. In fact, “the notion of becoming ‘operational’ referred primarily
to the organisational set-up of the PSC [Political and Security Committee], the MC
[Military Committee] and the EUMS [Military Staff].”xli Though these institutions
represented bureaucratic victories, they were not yet capable of achieving military
ones. Despite the EC’s assertion of operational capability, the functional value of the
ERRF as a joint force capable of warfighting and stability operations was overstated.
The EU had good reason to be proud of its 2003 peace-support operations in
Macedonia and DPR Congo—but these small-scale, low-intensity efforts were not

85 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

the sort of major humanitarian interventions envisioned at Helsinki. Thus, EU

Member States in 2004 faced a choice: change their policies in pursuit of their goals
or change their goals. They chose the latter.

The Status Quo: Cooperative Restraint

After the failures of 2003, the EU released Headline Goal 2010. This 2004 vision
shifted “the emphasis away from the full force” of 60,000 men capable of
warfighting and stability operations “to the component forces thereof.”xlii Julian
Lindley-French characterizes the practical difference between the two goals thusly:

Headline Goal 2010 decapitates the Helsinki Headline Goal and extends the
time required for the realisation of a force a third the size, by roughly three
times as long. Indeed, thirteen times 1,500 [the size of an ERRF
Battlegroup] equals 19,500, which is roughly one third of the original
Headline Goal…Helsinki Goal 2010 is, therefore a sub-division of a sub-
division.xliii

The ERRF vision thus shrank from fifteen brigades to thirteen battalion-sized
Battlegroups of roughly 1,500 men. A 2009 EU document declares that on “1
January 2007 the EU Battlegroup Concept reached Full Operational Capability.”xliv
Alhough the new Headline Goal is markedly less ambitious, since 2007, a six-month
rotation of Battlegroups has successfully placed two of its number ‘on call’ to
respond to crises. These smaller, lighter forces certainly have value. They are
well-suited for the sort of actions the EU has found itself undertaking: police
training, rule-of-law promotion, and disaster relief chief among them. In light of
September 11th, the 2010 goal also states that ERRF tasks “might also include joint
disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and
security sector reform.”xlv The past two decades suggest that crises can occur at any
time. EU institutions and Member States agree that “to respond rapidly to emerging
crises... [they] need to be ready.”xlvi This desire to enhance preparedness explains EU
progress—limited but real—in certain areas of ERRF capability.
Political support for continued, though circumscribed, ERRF progress appears
genuine. In 2008, French President Nicholas Sarkosy presented the acquisition of a
British carrier for the ERRF “a central plank of [his] plans for his EU presidency.”xlvii
Even the neutral countries have warmed up to the 2010 goal; Sweden now leads an
operational Nordic Battlegroup. Influential Swedish Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors
believes “there is so much to gain. It allows us to reach a greater depth in capability.
Such supportive rhetoric suggests awareness that future humanitarian, if not
existential, crises merit attention. In a later speech justifying Sweden’s military

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 86
 Defense Concepts

cooperation with the EU and defense modernization efforts, Tolgfors warned that “If
anyone were to act against a Baltic State—the way Russia acted against Georgia—
that would have fundamental security policy implications.”xlviii
The rhetoric of cooperative action, however, has been belied by the reality of
cooperative restraint when it comes to high-end asset acquisitions. Sarkosy’s carrier
ambitions elicited a curt response from the UK Defense Ministry: “We have no plans
to use an aircraft carrier in this way.” xlix The capability gap that needs to be
addressed through cooperative action most urgently is airlift capability, which is
currently provided only by a revealing stop-gap measure. The ERRF’s Strategic
Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) depends on leased, privately-owned Russian and
Ukrainian planes, with two “on full-time charter, two more on six days notice and
another two on nine days notice.” lReliance on private firms in the former Soviet
Union (Volga-Dnepr and ADB, respectively) for timely delivery of lift services
stands in stark contrast to the Helsinki vision of autonomous action, credible forces,
and Europe playing its ‘full role on the international stage.’ But continued access to
http://www.life.com

An Antonov AN-124-100 giant caro transport jet stands with its front cargo door open at the
Leipzig-Halle international airport March 23, 2006 in Leipzig, Germany. Two of the
Antonovs is stationed at Leipzig as part of the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS),
whereby NATO and the European Union will use the giant planes for military and
humanitarian missions.

87 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

NATO and U.S. resources provides a critical safety-net should SALIS fail or an
emergency demand use of an aircraft carrier. European awareness of America’s
ongoing commitment to its security regime continues to stunt EU progress toward
autonomous crisis-response capability.

Alternative Explanations
There are other possible means of explaining ERRF shortcomings besides a
robust security regime and dynamic between cooperative action and cooperative
restraint posited by the author. Notably, realist pessimism about the prospects for
genuine peace and security cooperation render this major theoretical school silent on
the subject of successful security regimes. For neoliberal institutionalists,
meanwhile, information is everything. When mutual gains are to be had, improved
awareness of those gains and of other players’ intentions can help achieve them.
According to this line of thought, greater public disclosure of state security policies
and stronger institutions would aid ERRF development. For example, a neoliberal
might suggest that the more ad hoc British model of EU military planning indicates
a resistance to more involved institutional cooperation. But at no point have EU
states questioned the benign intent of fellow members. I have found no evidence
suggesting that some states are predisposed to making sizeable individual
contributions, but elect not to do so based exclusively on their that other states will
fail to reciprocate.
Uncertainty after crises, rather than assurance, has thus far been the key to
progress. Inadequate information regarding American commitments did not spark
competition and balancing, but did incite calls for deeper, more active cooperation.
The British planning model ‘won’ only because proponents of an independent
strategic planning unit—France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg—found the
costs of this provision prohibitive and unnecessary, especially in light of the
endurance of post-9/11 U.S. commitments to Europe and NATO. Had anxiety
regarding American intentions persisted, perhaps the French faction would have had
a stronger case. The strength of the European security regime allows it to dispel
uncertainty with impressive speed. The myriad diplomatic and institutional conduits
of U.S.-European communication have been vital to the rapidity of this reassurance.
A neoliberal might also argue that if sufficient information is available, perhaps
the mutual gains of the ERRF are simply not worth its considerable short-term costs.
But these gains are hard to ignore. Though EU defense expenditures equate to 65%
of America’s, what Member States do spend is riddled with duplication and waste,
leaving Europe “only packing about 10% of the U.S. punch” [emphasis mine]. liJoint
forces and sustained cooperative action would almost certainly reduce waste,
promote economies of scale, and allow for national specialization. If EU states are,
contrary to much IR thinking, favoring other spending priorities over security-

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 88
Defense Concepts

related ones, such action demands an explanation. The enduring, reassuring nature
of the European security regime offers a potentially powerful account.
Rather than information, a constructivist interpretation of ERRF development
might instead emphasize the importance of identity and social roles. Initially,
Jennifer Mitzen’s insights regarding ontological security appear instructive. As
Mitzen puts it, states’ “first response to uncertainty is thus not necessarily
‘information search’, but to reduce psychological stress.”liiliii This stress can be
reduced by routinizing relations with other states, relations that individual states
may ultimately use to define their identities. Mitzen largely focuses on how states in
conflict can create identities contingent upon continued struggle. But European
identities—and indeed, the much discussed ‘European identity’—are predicated
upon peaceful relations. For Mitzen, Europe’s ability to learn from previous positive
interactions and pursue higher Maslowian needs would suggest its members’
internationalization of a healthy “basic trust system.”liv A “rigid or maladaptive basic
trust,”lv however, causes actors to perceive all disruptions as threatening. The
healthy-maladaptive dichotomy implies that the former is positive, the latter
undesirable.
What Mitzen does not consider is the potential of a healthy basic trust to
undermine state capacity for threat response. Enduring U.S. support has allowed
Europe to ‘bracket’ a wide array of potential threats, perhaps too wide. Generally
healthy ties with the U.S. have created a yawning gap in military capabilities. In
1999, Europe found itself unable to respond to a relatively predictable provocation
by Slobodan Milosevic. A decade later, the tenuous state of SALIS, ongoing NATO
dependence, and the stripped down Battlegroup model suggest more inability than
capability. If Europe has engaged in excessive bracketing, then its basic trust system
may be so rigid as to render it incapable of adapting to potential threats. In other
words, Europe’s trust system may be too healthy for the ERRF’s future viability.
This is not to say that European security absolutely demands a rapid reaction force,
only that the way Europe perceives and produces its ontological security is likely to
preclude major success in ERRF development. Overly healthy basic trust thus has
its downsides. Mitzen’s conceptualization is not necessarily inaccurate, but in light
of the unprecedented nature of European inter-state cooperation and basic trust, it
appears incomplete.

Conclusion
Barring a massive shock with ongoing effects or a sudden retreat of U.S.
primacy, it is hard to imagine a serious and sustained European commitment to a
muscular ERRF. Ironically, it is in just such instances that Europe would wish it had
a strong, capable joint force on hand. Despite the EU’s ability to articulate grand
integrative visions, the Union’s successful security regime favors cooperative re-

89 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

straint over cooperative action. Limited progress continues, but only in proportion
to the level of uncertainty perceived by Member States. Without renewed uncertain-
ty, the ERRF, already ten years in the making, is likely to remain inert for years to
come.

Alexander Justice Moore is a PhD student in political science at the University of

Minnesota. He holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University.

iKagan, Robert. 2003. Of Paradise and Power: America and Eur ope in the New World
Order. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
ii
Kollias, Christos, George Manolas, and Suzanna-Maria Paleologou. July 2004. “Defence
expenditure and economic growth in the European Union: A causality analysis” Journal of
Policy Modeling 26, No. 5: 553-569.
iiiJervis, Robert. Spring 1982. “Security Regimes” International Organization 36, No. 2,
International Regimes: 359.
iv Mearshimer, John. Winter 1994-1995. The False Promise of International Institutions”

International Security 19, No. 3: 9.

v Jervis, Robert. Spring 1982. “Security Regimes” International Organization 36, No. 2,
International Regimes: 359.
vi Glaser, Charles. Winter 1994-1995. “Realists as Optimists” International Security 19, No.

3: 51.
vii Kupchan, Charles and Clifford Kupchan. Summer 1991. “Concerts, Collective Security,

and the Future of Europe” International Security 16, No. : 134.

viii Ibid: 135-6.

ix Staff, Western European Union. “History of the WEU”

<http://www.weu.int/History.htm>
xVan Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies Press:
11.
xi Ibid: 27.
xii
Kollias, Christos, George Manolas, and Suzanna-Maria Paleologou. July 2004. “Defence
expenditure and economic growth in the European Union: A causality analysis” Journal of
Policy Modeling 26, No. 5: 553-569.
xiii Both rankings from Staff, 2009. Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.). “CIA World Fact-

book.” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>
xiv Staff, 2006. European Defense Agency, “2006 National Breakdowns of European De-

fense Expenditures”
<http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3027/2544647319_7edc746761.jpg?v=0>
xv Jesse, Neal G. “Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Compara-
tive Perspective.” International Political Science Review, 27: 7 (2006), pp. 17.
<http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/27/1/7>

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 90
 Defense Concepts

xviVan Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies
Press: 11.
xvii
Pagedas, Constantine. Fall 2001. “Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of Eu-
ropean Security” Mediterranean Quarterly: 114.
xviii
Ibid: 115.
xixPlanken, Stephan. 1999. “Timeline”
<http://planken.org/images/balkans/map_kfor_troops.gif>
xx Staff, 1999. Human Rights Watch. “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Human Rights De-
velopments” <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Eca-26.htm>.
xxi Staff, 4 June 1999. European Council. “European Council declaration on strengthening

the Common European Policy on Security and Defence” Quoted in European Union.
“Development of European Military Capabilities” June 2009.
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp>
xxii Staff, European Union. “Europa Glossary”

<http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm>
xxiii Ulriksen, Stale. August 2003 “Military Europe: Capabilities and Constraints.” NUPI,

<http://www.arena.uio.no/ecsa/papers/StaleUlriksen.pdf>
xxiv“Joint Declaration on European Defence.” 18 December 1998. British-French Summit,
St. Malo, France<http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/joint-declaration-on-
eu-new01795>
xxvPagedas, Constantine. Fall 2001. “Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of Eu-
ropean Security” Mediterranean Quarterly: 115.
xxvi
Pagedas, Constantine. Fall 2001. “Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of Eu-
ropean Security” Mediterranean Quarterly: 117..
xxvii Ibid.
xxviii
Van Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies
Press: 62
xxix
Van Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies
Press: 62
xxx Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards. 2005. “The Strategic Culture of the European
Union: A Progress Report” International Affairs, 81, No. 4: 816.
<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118735024/PDFSTART>
xxxi Eliasson. “Traditions, Identity and Security” pp. 10

xxxii Wivel, Anders. 2005 “The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests,

Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor” Journal of Common Market
Studies, 43, No. 2: 404.
xxxiii Anon. 30 May 2001. “Turkey drops veto on EU-NATO defence agreement” EurActiv

<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-drops-veto-eu-nato-defence-
agreement/article-110804>
xxxivAnon. December 2003. “EU operational planning: the politics of defence” Strategic

91 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Comments, 9, No. 10 <http://www.nsrf.com/Backgrounders/back_EU2.htm>

xxxv Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards. 2005. “The Strategic Culture of the European

Union: A Progress Report” International Affairs, 81, No. 4: 817.

<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118735024/PDFSTART>
xxxvi Ibid.

xxxvii Howorth, Jolyon. October 2002. “France, NATO and European Security: Status Quo
Unsustainable, New Balance Unattainable?” IFRI
<www.ifri.org/files/PEhiver2002howorth.pdf> AOriginally published in French: “La Fran-
ce, l’OTAN et la sécurité européenne: statu quo ingérable, rééquilibre introuvable” April
2002 Politique Etrangère; 1001-1016.
xxxviii Van Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies

Press: 66.
xxxix Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards. 2005. “The Strategic Culture of the European

Union: A Progress Report” International Affairs, 81, No. 4: 816.

<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118735024/PDFSTART>
xl Staff, 19 May 2003. European Council. “Press Release: 2509th Council meeting – Exter-

nal Relations - Brussels, 19-20 May 2003”

xli
Ulriksen, Stale. August 2003 “Military Europe: Capabilities and Constraints.” NUPI,
<http://www.arena.uio.no/ecsa/papers/StaleUlriksen.pdf>
xlii Lindley-French, Julian. December 2005: “Headline Goal 2010 and the Concept of EU
Battle Groups” Lecture:3.
<www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/lecture_lindleyfrench_dec05.pdf>
xliii Ibid.

xliv Staff, July 2009. European Union. “EU Battlegroups”

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1349&lang=EN>
xlv Staff, 18 June 2004 European Council. “Headline Goal 2010.”

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>
xlvi Staff, July 2009. European Union. “EU Battlegroups”

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1349&lang=EN>
xlvii
Pascoe-Watson, George. 18 June 2008 “French President Nicholas Sarkosy has plans to
use British aircraft carrier for EU navy when he takes over EU presidency” The Sun
xlviiiO’Dwyer, Gerard. 17 May 2009. “Interview: Sten Tolgfors” Defense News, 17 May
2009. <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4094490&c=FEA&s=INT>
xlix Ministry of Defence (Sweden), 3 July 2009. “Speech by the Minister for Defence Sten

Tolgfors at Almedalen on the Baltic Sea Co-operation”

<http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/12091/a/129883>
l Ibid

li Staff, 23 March 2006. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Strategic airlift agreement
enters into force” NATO Update <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/03-
march/e0323a.htm>
lii Howorth. “France, NATO and European Security” pp. 8.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 92
Defense Concepts

liii
Mitzen, Jennifer. “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security
Dilemma” European Journal of International Relations, 2006, Vol 12, No. 3, pp. 349.
liv Ibid. pp. 350.
lv Ibid. pp. 350.

93 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Quick Diagnostics for Outbreaks,
Epidemics, and Pandemics.
Cubit, designed and implemented
by TETRADYN, is a cutting edge
technology suite that incorporates
hardware and software to rapidly
assess, diagnose, respond, and catalog
the biothreats of today's pathogenic crisis

Multiplex PCR yields virtually instantaneous

"in-the-field" results of identified disease
outbreaks. algorithmic software uses results
to determine imminent threat trends,
indicates response requirements and
communicates test results to collaborative
institutions for analysis, such as mutation
tracking.

www.tetradyn.com
Defense Concepts

AFRICOM: An Independent Review for the

Obama Administration
Daniel Lawner; Sarah Khederian
On October 28, 2009, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (CADS), in
cooperation with Representative John Tierney, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, brought together a group of African embassy
representatives, U.S. civilian government personnel, U.S. military personnel, con-
gressional staff members, and representatives from non-governmental organizations,
think tanks and universities to discuss the challenges faced by and the future of the
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
The half-day event, held in the hearing room of the House Committee on the
Budget, consisted of speeches from nine distinguished individuals representing a
spectrum of highly informed perspectives on AFRICOM, ranging from enthusiasm
for the command’s potential to measured skepticism of its goals and activities to
stern warnings against U.S. military assistance for African nations. CADS intention-
ally recruited speakers with a diversity of viewpoints and expertise to highlight the
multitude of opinions on the controversial combatant command and the complexity
of the issues that it raises. Although the event was open to the public, the CADS
staff recruited an audience to represent a similar balance of opinions and areas of
expertise.
The conference was chaired by Mr. Lester Hyman, CADS Vice Chairman, and
was moderated by Daniel Lawner, CADS Program Director. Representative John
Tierney—in his capacity as chairman of the National Security and Foreign Affairs
subcommittee—graciously cooperated with CADS to make the event a success by
sponsoring the Center’s use of congressional meeting space and delivering the day’s
keynote remarks. The event would not have been possible without the generous
financial support of the Center’s donors and the hard work of the Center’s staff and
interns.

This paper is not a verbatim account of the day’s proceedings. It is a report

based on the speakers’ remarks. The paper’s authors sought to summarize argu-
ments and evidence that the speakers presented and capture their concerns and their
sentiments. The authors tried to offer a concise account in order to distill the day’s
main points into a form that is understandable to lay people and helpful for
policy-makers.

95 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

Representative John Tierney (D-MA) is the Chairman of

the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Chairman John Tierney, the event’s keynote speaker,
began the day’s discussion by voicing specific and practical
concerns related to the Command’s purpose and approach.
His comments were derived from his subcommittee’s inqui-
ry into AFRICOM in 2008. The questions the National
Security and Foreign Affairs subcommittee initially asked
were fairly fundamental. “At our first hearing over a year
ago,” Chairman Tierney recounted, “we asked the question, ‘What is AFRICOM?’
To a certain extent, we are still asking that question today.” Representative Tierney
divided his fundamental inquiry regarding the identity of AFRICOM into two
digestible questions, namely what is AFRICOM meant to accomplish and how can
the new organization effectively accomplish its goals?
Representative Tierney first addressed the widespread confusion surrounding
the “two alternate visions of AFRICOM.” While some consider AFRICOM to be a
reorganization of programs within the Department of Defense, others think that it is
a “new kind of command”—an experimental interagency project. Representative
Tierney contested the notion that AFRICOM could be treated as a basic reorganiza-
tion of existing programs. He observed that any significant shuffling of Defense
programs is a complex and ambitious task requiring robust oversight of issues such
as transition of responsibility for programs to staffing to the location of headquarters
and components. Potential second and third-order effects such as strong profession-
al militaries outsizing civilian institutions like police forces also demand attention.
The perception of AFRICOM as a “new kind of command” seemed even more
troubling to Representative Tierney. He noted that the comments regarding the birth
of an innovative interagency command promulgated during AFRICOM’s rollout
caused confusion amongst Africans and U.S. civilian agencies. Nevertheless, the
same language describing “a new and different approach” persists.
Representative Tierney underscored how important it is for the U.S. Govern-
ment to strike a proper civilian-military balance in its relations with Africa. He
stressed his concern that the U.S. military has taken the lead on traditionally
civilian-led foreign policy functions like diplomacy and development.

Locating a whole-of-government approach within a military command

presents a tension between the importance of representing U.S. activities in
Africa as peaceful and respectful of national sovereignty and the perception
that DOD is the lead agency for the U.S.’s relationship with Africa.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 96
Defense Concepts

His staff noted that personnel from lead civilian agencies often become over-
whelmed with the requirements of coordinating with the DOD. One civilian official
reported spending fully one-third of her time coordinating with DOD personnel
while her office was already stretched thin in resources and personnel. With the
seriousness of African security concerns—including violent extremism, ethnic
conflicts and HIV/AIDS—Chairman Tierney urged us to “ask whether the continent
of Africa is the right place to experiment with a new U.S. interagency model.”
Representative Tierney stressed the importance of the U.S. Government unify-
ing its message about AFRICOM’s goals, strategies, and its role in foreign policy.
He emphasize the continuing uncertainty about whether AFRICOM is designed to
be a purely military outfit or a venture to tackle broader security challenges. “Before
we are able to clearly and effectively communicate to Africans what our plans are
for AFRICOM,” he urged, “we need to figure them out for ourselves.”
In closing, Representative Tierney underscored how “the AFRICOM experi-
ence” might be instructive to future interagency efforts. The U.S. government can
learn lessons about cases where agency-specific expertise should be preserved. The
AFRICOM example also demonstrates how the National Security Council can
manage the interagency at an operations level. Ultimately, Representative Tierney
recognized the emergence of a new national security environment where failed
states are more dangerous than strong ones. He stressed the need to “show leadership
and foresight” in coordinating a broader policy toolkit while heeding the “troubling
implications for the civilian-military balance of U.S. foreign policy.”

Ambassador Princeton Lyman is Adjunct Senior Fellow at

the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and formerly
served as Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizational Affairs as well as Ambassador to both South
Africa and Nigeria.
Ambassador Lyman brought the audience back to a time
before AFRICOM’s creation by tracing the rise of Africa
as a priority for the foreign policy community and by re-
counting CFR’s arguments regarding Africa’s strategic rele-
vance to the United States. The Council’s 2006 report
entitled “More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa,”
presented security challenges of direct relevance to the United States and recom-
mended a devoted military command to deal with problems in Africa. Ambassador
Lyman frankly noted that AFRICOM “got off to a very bad start in part for trying to
do the right things but unfortunately in the wrong way.”
The “wrong way,” to which Representative Tierney also alluded, involved
presenting AFRICOM as a source not only of security assistance but of development,

97 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

“...most of AFRICOM’s programs education, health and other areas of

civilian assistance. The result was
are no different than those that Africans seeing AFRICOM as evi-
African countries had previously dence of the militarization of U.S.
implemented in a more efficient policy toward Africa. Another mis-
and coordinated manner..” take in AFRICOM’s rollout was the
discussion of establishing the AFRI-
COM headquarters on the African continent. This discourse stoked fears that the
U.S. might be planning military interventions in Africa and “provided fodder to
politicians who wanted to…conjure up conspiracy theories about what the U.S. was
about.”
Ambassador Lyman recognized the efficacy of AFRICOM’s recent efforts to
limit its responsibilities to traditional military assistance programs. Consequently,
nations like Nigeria and South Africa that are harshly critical of AFRICOM have
begun to cooperate in military-to-military programs. He explained that most of
AFRICOM’s programs are no different than those that African countries had previ-
ously implemented in a more efficient and coordinated manner.
Ambassador Lyman proceeded to explain some of the security issues in Africa,
distinguishing the issues that concern Africans from those that concern the United
States and examining AFRICOM’s role in addressing each set of challenges. He
began this analysis from the viewpoint of U.S. energy supplies in Africa:

Energy security is a major U.S. concern. We shouldn’t pretend that we’re

not concerned if there is danger to that supply. Africa now provides 15 to
20 percent of our oil imports. Let’s be honest about it; we’re concerned.
But Africa is also concerned because for the oil-exporting states the security
of those areas and those supplies are also important.

Ambassador Lyman, however, clarified that although the security of oil supplies
represents a joint security concern—and an important one—it is not just a military
problem and thus it should not necessarily be AFRICOM’s job to lead the effort.
With regards to terrorism, Ambassador Lyman questioned the efficacy of the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program (TSCTP), and asked “whether the United
States is (a) exaggerating the threats in this area, and (b) creating demands upon
these states that create problems for them greater than they had before.” In poor
states like Mali and Niger, counterterrorism programs have, in some cases, exacer-
bated tensions between ethnic groups. Ambassador Lyman ultimately questioned
the premise that AFRICOM should and would be able to address insecurity and
terrorism in the Sahel, especially when many of the terrorist groups have a purely
domestic agenda.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 98
Defense Concepts

In the Horn of Africa, where concerns regarding international terrorism are

salient due to the presence of the al Shabaab movement in Somalia, Ambassador
Lyman addressed the challenges of coordinating U.S. military activities. Specifical-
ly, he presented the example of the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
(CJTF-HOA), AFRICOM’s only major troop presence on the continent. CJTF-HOA
is charged with carrying out a “hearts and minds” campaign oriented toward
small-scale public works and was responsible for basic intelligence-gathering when
the Pentagon ordered airstrikes on Somalia. “For a while,” Ambassador Lyman
recalled, “you had the Pentagon and CJTF-HOA and AFRICOM saying, ‘Well,
that’s not us doing the bombing; that’s another part of the military.’ But if you were
a victim of the bombings, you don’t look up and say, ‘Don’t worry, it’s not
CJTF-HOA, it’s somebody else.’” In that case, kinetic military programs complicat-
ed the “hearts and minds” type of work which AFRICOM sought to conduct. This
example reveals the clash between the U.S. military units located in Africa that are
assigned different roles and responsibilities.
Alhough AFRICOM has been more successful when focusing on a narrower
traditional military assistance track, there is still political pressure coming from
officials who believe that “because security is such a complex issue and you’re
dealing with problems of development and governance,” all combatant commands
should be restructured as fully interagency organizations. This mindset, Ambassa-
dor Lyman pointed out, originated with the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, but
he questioned whether it has relevance in the African context.

“...kinetic military programs complicated the ‘hearts and

minds’ type of work which AFRICOM sought to conduct.
This example reveals the clash between the U.S. Military
units located in Africa that are assigned different roles and
responsibilities.

As a counter to this belief, he carefully distinguished between small-scale civic

action programs—building a school or digging a well—that a military outfit might
do well, and true development projects. Implementing real development efforts,
Ambassador Lyman explained, requires a long term focus on building stable and
effective institutions that would, for example, “have the capacity and the will to pay
for the teachers for the school and [ensure] that there is enough money to buy diesel
for the wells.” He clearly stated that long-term development is not the job of
AFRICOM (or any other combatant command) but of other agencies.
Finally, he closed with a recommendation to AFRICOM to “distinguish
between being an advocate and a participant.” Because of DOD’s heavy influence

99 Vol. 5, Ed. 2
 Defense Concepts

within the government, it is important for AFRICOM to be vocal about issues like
governance, development and health without insisting on leading these activities:

AFRICOM can be a very important advocate for these programs, but I think
it ought to be very careful about the degree that it gets involved with them
beyond its traditional roles—and very welcome roles in most African
countries—of working with and strengthening the security and defense
capabilities of African countries.

Louis Mazel is Director of the Office of Regional and

Security Affairs at the Bureau of African Affairs in the U.S.
Department of State.
Mr. Mazel presented the State Department’s perspective on
AFRICOM and the nature of its relationship with the State
Department. He stressed that the State Department Africa
Bureau supports AFRICOM’s mission of military-to mili-
tary engagement on-continent and that State has worked
closely with it by providing “policy guidance.” He also
insisted that the establishment of AFRICOM represents no
major change in U.S. policy toward Africa:

While AFRICOM’s structure and character differs from that of the unified
commands as historically implemented…the role of the U.S. military in U.S.
foreign policy on the continent basically has not changed.

He went on to argue that the State Department continues to take the lead on the
development and execution of U.S. policy in Africa. This leadership requires that
U.S. representation in Africa, through its embassies retains a civilian face. He
conveyed the State Department view that the creation of AFRICOM was “an
important and natural part of the evolution of our strategic vision in Africa.” At the
same time, the creation of AFRICOM will give Africa greater visibility within the
DOD. DOD officials will now regard Africa as a major strategic center of gravity,
thus, DOD will be more inclined to support U.S. foreign policy in Africa. In time,
the creation of AFRICOM will allow DOD to appreciate Africa’s importance as a
major supplier of important resources, a potential haven for terrorism and the source
of other security challenges like narcotics and human trafficking and piracy.
Mr. Mazel described his organization’s perception of AFRICOM as “an oppor-
tunity to strengthen and deepen the U.S. and African military relationships in such
a way that our combined efforts will generate more sustainable peace and security
on the continent.” He reiterated the State Department’s strong support of
AFRICOM’s military-to military security cooperation mission and repeated State’s

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 100

Defense Concepts

encouragement for AFRICOM’s contributions to defense sector reform and for the
formation of partnerships in peacekeeping, military professionalization, coastal and
border security and counterterrorism.
He then outlined some of the specific regionally-based AFRICOM efforts that
the State Department sees as especially valuable:

Ÿ In Liberia, the State Department considers AFRICOM to be strategically

positioned to help the country develop its maritime security capacity. The
State Department hopes that AFRICOM will continue to assist the profes-
sional development of Liberia’s U.S.-trained armed forces, currently in the
end of a contractor-led phase of security sector reform.
Ÿ In the Democratic Republic of Congo, State supports AFRICOM’s training
of the DRC’s military—Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du
Congo (FARDC)—so that it may be transformed into a “professional and
trustworthy provider of security for the people of that vast nation,” with
respect for human rights and sensitivity to sexual and gender-based vio-
lence.
Ÿ In South Sudan, State welcomes the involvement of AFRICOM in profes-
sionalizing and building the capacity of the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA).
Ÿ In the Gulf of Guinea, State is enthusiastic about the Africa Partnership
Station (APS), which aims to build maritime security capacity “to ensure
that nations can protect their vast fisheries resources, curb trafficking of
drugs, weapons, people and other illicit goods, and protect growing off-
shore oil resources.”
Ÿ Off the Horn of Africa, State supports AFRICOM’s efforts to help combat
piracy (33,000 vessels transit the Gulf of Aden each year) and to protect
humanitarian aid shipments, a major area of U.S. investment (80 percent of
World Food Program shipments into the Horn of Africa are U.S.-funded).

State also welcomes AFRICOM’s participation—as mentors and observers—in

the State Department-led Africa Contingency Operations and Training and Assis-
tance (ACOTA) program. He highlighted that the program has trained over 100,000
African peacekeepers and that “now six of the top 12 contributing countries to
international peacekeeping operations are African countries.”
Although Mr. Mazel communicated the State Department’s expectation that
AFRICOM will stay in its lane by attending to the military aspects of security
cooperation, he noted that AFRICOM must also be aware of and cooperate with
other U.S. government agencies. “We have recognized from the start that U.S.
security engagement with Africa requires a coherent and coordinated effort by all
relevant arms of the U.S. government including the Department of Defense.”

101 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

He then clarified how the State Department works with AFRICOM specifically.
Initially, the State Department offered input to AFRICOM’s theater security cam-
paign plan and the DOD’s global employment of forces. State has also sent and will
continue to send representatives from its African embassies to the security coopera-
tion meetings and conferences in Germany “to shape AFRICOM’s engagement on
the continent.”
Challenges to effective cooperation with AFRICOM still exist, however. These
challenges are primarily based on the “tremendous imbalances in personnel resourc-
es [between State and DOD].” AFRICOM has 1300 personnel in Stuttgart, more
than all of State’s political, economic and public affairs officers in Africa. The
challenge then for State is to “exert political and civilian oversight of DOD and
AFRICOM’s activities [in
Africa].” State’s primary
“Challenges to effective cooperation method to ensure such over-
with AFRICOM still exist, however. sight is to make certain that
These challenges are primarily based all of AFRICOM’s activi-
on the “tremendous imbalances in ties are military-to-military
and are coordinated with
personnel resources” between State and country teams. “No DOD
DOD—AFRICOM has 1300 personnel activities,” Mr. Mazel
in Stuttgart, more than all of State’s stressed, “are to be carried
political, economic and public affairs out in a country without the
full knowledge and concur-
officers in Africa.” rence of our chief of mis-
sion and other elements of
the country teams.”
He explained the necessity that AFRICOM defer to State’s authority specifical-
ly in the areas of counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and humanitarian activities.
Alhough AFRICOM has authorities and funding for counternarcotics programs,
State has the lead on international law enforcement programs in Africa through its
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL Bureau). Mr.
Mazel explained that the test “is to ensure that they follow the State lead in terms of
counternarcotics activities to be conducted particularly in West Africa.” Concerning
counterterrorism, he urged that those activities should be closely coordinated with
the country team and that the chief of mission must be fully aware of all initiatives.
On the humanitarian front, AFRICOM’s activities through the CJTF-HOA and
Africa Partnership Station must be coordinated with the country team to ensure that
USAID is “setting the focus and tone for community relations, humanitarian and
other development-type activities.” He then pointed out the importance of
AFRICOM’s humanitarian work being synchronized with host-country militaries so
that African populations can see their own militaries doing positive and productive

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 102

Defense Concepts

work. This observation is particularly applicable in countries where militaries have

played a historically problematic role.
Mr. Mazel elucidated “the strategies for ensuring closer State-AFRICOM coop-
eration,” which essentially boiled down to the more efficient and effective sharing
of information. On a practical level, Mr. Mazel recommended that the defense
attaché or senior defense officer be fully integrated into the country team so that he
may share information about AFRICOM plans and activities. In Washington, Mr.
Mazel cited successes on the State/AFRICOM coordination front: there is an AFRI-
COM liaison at the weekly Africa bureau meeting and General Ward and Assistant
Secretary Johnnie Carson maintain frequent communication. Additionally, AFRI-
COM participated in the Africa Bureau Chiefs-of-Mission Conference—General
Ward spoke and took questions for more than an hour—and State and AFRICOM
smoothly divvied up leadership responsibilities for various training-related pro-
grams at the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) conference.
“It’s all to say,” Mr. Mazel closed, “that we are making every effort through the
State Department to ensure that AFRICOM remains in its military-to-military lane,
that our foreign policy in Africa is led by State, and that we have a strong imprint on
AFRICOM planning for activities on the African continent.”

Dr. Patrick Cronin is Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific

Security Program at the Center for New American Security.
Dr. Cronin presented the results from the Stanley
Foundation’s 50th Strategy for Peace Conference roundta-
ble, entitled “African Security and the Future of AFRI-
COM,” which he had chaired. He began by highlighting
the issues that roundtable participants recognized as the
primary African security challenges, which differ from the
security threats that the United States encounters in other
regions. Some of the security challenges were more gener-
al and common—weak or absent institutions and weak
governance; the demographic explosion exacerbated by brain drain and “the digital
divide”; climate change; violent extremism—and some were more regionally
specific—ongoing conflicts, for example, in Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
He then recapitulated the group’s evaluation of AFRICOM’s potential to ad-
dress these issues. First, the group discussed whose security AFRICOM was
designed to protect. In Washington, the focus is on U.S. Security. Conversely, the
focus of our African partners is African security. For example, while the U.S. is
mostly preoccupied with issues of violent extremism and maritime security along
supply routes, Africans will be focused on more localized issues: law and order,

103 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

corruption, breakdown of services, population demographic issues like the youth

bulge and leadership transitions that may lead to instability. The persistence of this
divide begs the question: “Can AFRICOM help the United States government better
align its own security issues and concerns with those of African states in society?”
Part of the difficulty, Dr. Cronin explained, is the sheer number of security
challenges. Thus, it is important that policymakers organize and prioritize issues so
that they can actually create practical and targeted solutions. “Americans are
famous for our reductionism,” Dr. Cronin acknowledged. “It allows us to invent and
create solutions but it also means that you’re doing damage by oversimplifying, so
you constantly have to come back and make sure you’re doing the qualitative
assessment.”
Dr. Cronin
“He clarified the distinction between shared the group’s
AFRICOM’s focus on conflict prevention close examination of
and that of other combatant commands— the structure of AFRI-
Central Command or Pacific Command, for COM, the ways it is
unique, and the po-
example—which focus mainly on responding tential it holds to be-
to conflict and which use a primarily kinetic come a model for
approach.” other U.S. security
efforts. He returned
to a central theme of the day, which is whether AFRICOM is, in fact, a “different
kind of combatant command.” He clarified the distinction between AFRICOM’s
focus on conflict prevention and that of other combatant commands—Central
Command or Pacific Command, for example—which focus mainly on responding
to conflict and which use a primarily kinetic approach. AFRICOM’s focus on
conflict prevention required the creation of a platform so that the command could
maintain its attention to Africa as opposed to an approach based on the attitude that
“We’ll focus on it when we see a problem; we’re there for a day; now we’re gone
until the next problem.” This ongoing immersion requires the U.S. government to
build the relationships to support that continued involvement and to develop a
genuine understanding of situations on the ground.
With regard to its interagency nature, the Stanley group identified AFRICOM’s
potential as a model for the creation of “nested strategies”—the integration of
country teams, who in theory should be aware of everything that the U.S. govern-
ment and U.S. agents are doing in a specific country, into the military planning
process. This avoids the situation that Mr. Mazel implied where the military plans
operations in a country without the input or sometimes even knowledge of the
country team. “AFRICOM potentially knits together and creates linkages that didn’t
exist…but whether it can be successful in creating better whole-of-government
approaches remains to be seen. This is still a work in progress.”

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 104

Defense Concepts

Dr. Cronin and the “With regard to its interagency nature,

Stanley Group also
identified AFRICOM’s the Stanley group identified AFRICOM’s
potential for bolstering potential as a model for the creation of
African state security ‘nested strategies’—the integration of
institutions. He country teams, who in theory should be
stressed the importance
of African states be- aware of everything that the U.S.
coming contributors to government and U.S. agents are doing
security as opposed to in a specific country, into the military
detractors and stressed planning process.”
AFRICOM’s role in
that process. Specifically, AFRICOM has the potential to collaborate with and
bolster regional institutions—like the African Union—and can work on issues that
transcend national boundaries (whereas, for example, the State Department must
work with each country individually).
Dr. Cronin highlighted a number of recommendations from the group’s discus-
sions. The first recommendation was for AFRICOM to fill State Department and
USAID positions close to their initially promised levels (out of thirteen promised
positions, only four had been filled at the time of the conference). This guidance was
based on recognition that AFRICOM will face difficulties planning for complex
contingencies if it does not strengthen the civilian side of its organization. Moving
beyond their concerns regarding proper levels of civilian staffing, the group focused
on the necessity of examining the specific areas of expertise housed within the
command. They suggested identifying gaps, and ensuring that key areas—for
example, natural resource-related conflict—are covered.
Dr. Cronin then applied the theme of “reducing the problem set and prioritizing
efforts” to the group’s discussion of Somalia. By dividing the country into different
sub-regions, one can recognize that the territories of Somaliland and Puntland are
actually relatively operational. This approach allows policymakers to focus on the
problem areas. The group also explored the possibility of looking for ways to work
with civil society and businesses on the ground in a comprehensive and cost-
effective manner in addition to top-down solutions.
Discussion of Somalia led to conversation on maritime security and piracy. The
group identified piracy as an enduring and shared challenge, not just an issue du jour.
They discussed the need and the opportunity for the U.S. to work with other
international actors who share the same waterways. Piracy is also a challenge in the
Gulf of Guinea and the group acknowledged efforts underway to build indigenous
maritime security capacity as a longer-term solution to this problem.
Dr. Cronin closed by sharing the group’s lingering questions—the foremost
being whether AFRICOM will serve as a prototype to develop an improved U.S.

105 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

government model for interagency national security efforts and for conflict preven-
tion strategy. Other questions included:
Ÿ How does AFRICOM engage civil society?
Ÿ How does AFRICOM determine the political will of African partners in
leadership?
Ÿ How can AFRICOM be successful without a similar push to increase U.S.
government capacity?
Ÿ How can contractors become involved in AFRICOM’s initial planning
stages as opposed to just being an afterthought?
Ÿ Can AFRICOM address gaps in governance and institutions? How do you
balance when to intervene with when to resist intervention?
Ÿ What are and what will be AFRICOM’s metrics for success?
Ÿ How can AFRICOM leverage its relatively scarce resources to “build state
capacity and help secure the global commons?”

John Pendleton is Director of Force Structure and

Planning Issues of the Defense Capabilities and Man-
agement Team with the U.S. Government Accountabil-
ity Office.
Mr. Pendleton emphasized the absence of a standard for
interagency collaboration while postulating that AFRI-
COM may be a useful experiment and potentially an
effective template for interagency structuring and coordi-
nation. Mr. Pendleton insisted ultimately that “Africa
Command…is not the problem. It reveals the problems;
the difficult structural and organizational things that underlie the way we’re orga-
nized in the U.S. government…and perhaps the way we approach things.”
Mr. Pendleton recounted his participation in the National Security and Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee’s investigation of AFRICOM in 2008, focusing primarily on
issues surrounding the command’s mission, worries over militarization of foreign
policy, and the interagency command structure. He maintained that the query , as it
pertained to the interagency, concentrated more specifically on how the DOD “was
going to bring in the many, many often disparate views from all the different
agencies and partner nations.”
Assessing AFRICOM’s structure was difficult, Mr. Pendleton explained, be-
cause “there were really no criteria for what a good interagency command looked
like.” Furthermore, information provided by AFRICOM itself and DOD was un-
clear; Mr. Pendleton provided an example of this opacity when he recalled officials
from the DOD stating “we’re going to have this new type of command, it’s going to
be 25 percent interagency.” However, Mr. Pendelton explained, “Nobody could tell
me 25 percent of what, or what these folks were going to do.” Even after AFRICOM

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 106

 Defense Concepts

identified their desired levels of civilian support, challenges remained in

securing personnel commitments from thinly-staffed civilian agencies, espe-
cially because it was unlikely that an AFRICOM assignment would be per-
ceived as an attractive or career-enhancing position.
Mr. Pendleton pointed out that even if all of these agencies come together
in Stuttgart their approaches may be vastly different, and stakeholders in
partner nations may have divergent views as well. In this sense, “interagency
participation is a little bit of a red herring.” And focusing on creating civilian
staff positions in Stuttgart will not get to the root of the problem.
Mr. Pendleton briefly addressed the issue of the location of AFRICOM’s
headquarters. He praised AFRICOM’s decision to delay any discussion of
putting AFRICOM HQ on African soil as “pragmatic.” He insisted on the
importance of making a definitive decision on AFRICOM’s location when the
time comes. He underscored the need to communicate the decision effectively,
but also noted that in the interim, policymakers should avoid spending a lot of
resources on temporary facilities.
He explained that AFRICOM’s challenges are not unique to AFRICOM
but reveal larger challenges of “how we’re organized and approach national
security across the federal government.” He referenced the GAO’s September
2009 report on Interagency Collaboration for National Security in which he
found that national security efforts often lack a coherent unified strategy. He
was clear to point out that he was not necessarily referring to “a national
level…glossy document,” or a larger national security strategy. More specific
efforts like the TSCTP, he pointed out, lacked agreement on objectives. There
was “a lot of confusion, a lot of people going in embassies and not necessarily
doing what they needed to do.”
Mr. Pendleton envisioned an end-state where governmental organizations
have workforces that understand the capabilities and responsibilities of the
other agencies, allowing them to work in the “interagency ether.” He did not
necessarily recommend a full-scale restructuring like the effort that the Project
on National Security Reform (PNSR) insisted upon in their December 2008
report, Forging a New Shield. On the contrary, he simply identified the need
to set proper strategies and to build organizations that efficiently share
information.

“Mr. Pendleton pointed out that even if all of these agencies

come together in Stuttgart their approaches may be vastly
different, and stakeholders in partner nations may have
divergent views as well.”

107 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

Mr. Pendleton ended his remarks by noting that any reform on the same scale as
the establishment of AFRICOM’s will be a long process. It will probably take
around five years to create a mature organizational culture. He placed AFRICOM’s
challenges within the context of a “profound shift that’s happening right now while
the Department of Defense tries to figure out what its role is in the future.” The
DOD, Mr. Pendleton commented, is still trying to figure out the role of Stability
Operations within the larger organization.
Ultimately, Mr. Pendleton shared his feeling that DOD probably set its expecta-
tions for AFRICOM too high. “AFRICOM is not going to create whole-of-govern-
ment approach for Africa,” he said. But, he ended his remarks on an optimistic note:
“By working with other agencies, they can build a better-informed Department of
Defense plan.”

Lauren Ploch is Africa Analyst with the Congressional

Research Service.
Ms. Ploch examined some of the more successful
AFRICOM programs—the APS and the Natural Fire exer-
cise in Uganda—and shared the example of AFRICOM’s
humanitarian affairs branch, which implemented require-
ments for civilian project approval. She suggested that
these programs could serve as a positive model for inter-
agency collaboration. She also addressed the relationship
between AFRICOM and civilian agencies with respect to
funding and personnel levels.
Ms. Ploch began her speech with an anecdote of Cameroon’s military intercept-
ing a pirate vessel off the coast of the Bakassi Peninsula, between Nigeria and
Cameroon, to highlight the security concerns faced by West African coastal nations
and to provide an instance of AFRICOM training African militaries to independent-
ly address those concerns.
The Gulf of Guinea, with over 40 pirate attacks in 2008, is the second-most
dangerous waters in the world. Over a billion dollars are lost annually to oil theft in
Nigeria alone and African countries lose another billion in revenue as a result of
illegal fishing. Coupled with the 50 tons of cocaine transiting Western Africa each
year, Western Africa faces a multitude of serious maritime security challenges—
challenges which affect not only West African nations, but the United States and the
nations of Western Europe as well.
Ms. Ploch discussed some of the programs through which AFRICOM has
sought to build indigenous maritime security capacity to address some of these
concerns. First, AFRICOM has for the last several years been training Cameroon’s
rapid intervention battalion (BIR) and the Cameroonian Navy, through its naval
component, NAVAF. Her story of a Cameroonian vessel single-handedly capturing

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 108

 Defense Concepts

a pirate ship in the gulf was

particularly telling. Secondly,
she explained the work of the
Africa Partnership Station
(APS), “basically a floating
schoolhouse, as the Navy likes
http://www.army.mil

to call it.” She stressed the

interagency nature of the
effort—which is staffed by
personnel from the State De-
partment, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administra-
A Ugandan military officer talks with officers from tion (NOAA), USAID and a
AFRICOM as they prepare for exercise Natural Fire 10 number of NGOs. She also
in Entebbe, Uganda. emphasized its international
character—there were repre-
sentatives from 20 to 30 countries on board last fall’s European-led deployment.
In addition, she identified the Natural Fire 10 exercise in Uganda as an AFRI-
COM operation involving extremely complex issues—pandemic response, disaster
and emergency response, humanitarian aid delivery—that cross borders. “I raise
these activities,” she explained, “because people often ask me what AFRICOM is,
and it’s easy to throw back at them, well, it’s DOD’s combatant command for the
continent of Africa, but it’s easier to explain what AFRICOM does.” She also
pointed out that many of AFRICOM’s initiatives, including the APS and the Natural
Fire exercise, predated the creation of the command (natural fire was conducted by
CENTCOM and the APS was conducted by EUCOM).
Ms. Ploch then moved to the theme of whether AFRICOM would serve as a new
model for an interagency command within the context of a larger discussion of the
ideal capacities of U.S. military versus civilian agencies. “The timing of
AFRICOM’s announcement,” Ms. Ploch elaborated, “came at a time when there was
a bigger discussion ongoing about the appropriate roles of the civilian and the
military in agencies and their sizes and their funding.” She cited the State
Department’s 2009 budget requests for over 1,000 new personnel including 300 new
USAID positions as an example of State’s efforts to “right size what it sees as an
imbalance in staffing.”
She then explicated the resource disparities between AFRICOM and the State
Department, breaking them down into funds and personnel. In terms of funding for
security-assistance programs in Africa, the State Department controls $250 million.
While large portions of the programs are implemented by DOD personnel or by
contractors, they are “State Department-led, State-Department designed, they are
State Department programs. They are title XXII programs.” DOD, in comparison,

109 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

has only $50 million in their own DOD-led Title X security assistance programs.
The discrepancy that she mentioned—which Mr. Mazel also echoed in his
remarks—concerns the number of personnel.
Ms. Ploch elaborated upon the personnel involved with AFRICOM. She clari-
fied that AFRICOM does not have standing forces to draw from for an engagement.
They have only about 300 people at CJTF-HOA in Djibouti that they can draw for
only certain types of training exercises—contingent upon proper skill sets and only
in East Africa. Ms. Ploch predicted that the Pentagon and Congress would wrestle
with whether or not to devote standing forces to AFRICOM in upcoming years.
She then examined the issue of AFRICOM’s collaboration with other govern-
ment agencies, describing her experience with the Theater Security Working Group
(TSWG)—the same example Mr. Mazel had used to highlight AFRICOM/State
cooperation. “There had been a lot of skepticism as to why the State Department
was being allowed into the planning process, and it gave me the impression that this
was a rather unprecedented step that AFRICOM had taken.”
Ms. Ploch then spoke about Dr. Diana Putnam, the head of AFRICOM’s
humanitarian affairs branch, to provide an example of the level of AFRICOM’s
civilian oversight that has been executed. Dr. Putnam is a USAID employee and an
embedded anthropologist who—as chief of humanitarian affairs—has mandated
that all of AFRICOM’s humanitarian affairs activities must be approved by both the
ambassador and the USAID chief of mission in a given country. Each activity,
before it is carried out, must fit three-requirements: 1) it must meet U.S. foreign
policy objectives, 2) it must fit in with AFRICOM’s objectives, and 3) it must fit in
line with the mission’s strategic plan (the embassy’s plans and goals for activities
for the coming year). Dr. Putnam’s new regulations require that USAID and the
State Department, buy into AFRICOM’s humanitarian affairs activities, Ms. Ploch
pointed out.
Ms. Ploch cited the the chairman of the Kenyan parliament’s foreign affairs and
defense committee, who maintains that AFRICOM’s humanitarian affairs activities
in Northern Kenya have since been very well received. “We’ve found that the
Kenyan people see a tangible benefit to the U.S. military being in the area, which I
thought was interesting.”
To close, Ms. Ploch shared AFRICOM’s budget numbers: in 2010 AFRICOM
requested about $300 million, which doesn’t included CJTF-HOA’s costs. CJTF-
HOA requested about $250 million for operating expenses alone, and $60 million
for operations. “It’s challenging to figure out…how much benefit you get out of
$300 million plus $250 million plus $60 million in terms of increasing the stability
on the continent and building the capacity of African militaries. It’s [ultimately] an
open-ended question for Congress to deal with.”

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 110

Defense Concepts

Dr. Sandra Barnes is Founding Director of the African

Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania
Dr. Barnes discussed the historical background of
Africa and colonial rule relevant to U.S. foreign policy
toward Africa while emphasizing the danger of an imbal-
ance between African militaries and civil societies. She
advocated stepping back to establish long-term goals de-
vised to improve civil society in Africa.
Dr. Barnes began by discussing the impact of colonial
legacies on the structure of modern African states and their economies. She de-
scribed how in the European colonies, “control of political and economic institutions
and policies was centralized under the colonial governor, who had full authority
over administration, economic affairs and the maintenance of order.” The state had
full authority over extractive industries and trade relationships and colonial rulers
maintained a complete monopoly on economic, governmental, military and judicial
powers. In these states, the military was used by European rulers not to maintain
external security but to ensure social order—sometimes by force. These structures,
Dr. Barnes argues, were not dismantled after independence. Consequently, “the
decoupling of authority over the state’s primary economic resources and political
institutions has not taken place.”
This “monopoly at the center of the African state” has created huge economic
and political rewards for those with access to state institutions, thus creating intense
competition for political office and often leading to poor leadership because “only
the most ruthless are likely to succeed.” Dr. Barnes further argued that this kind of
governance demonstrates “the makings of ruling oligarchies which share the eco-
nomic privileges and resources of the state among a powerful coterie of people who
hold the highest offices.”
Within this vestigial system of colonial rule, African states are particularly prone
to military involvement in politics. Dr. Barnes offered some figures: “there have
been 80 successful military coups, 108 failed coups, [and] an additional 139 well-
documented coup plots… By the 1980s, more than half of African governments
were military in some ways in origin coups or handovers to elect the civilians.”
These military governments are often more authoritarian, repressive and undemocrat-
ic than the regimes they replace. They focus on expansion of the military and exploit
the assistance of foreign patrons to access training, technology and equipment.
The United States has served as one of these “foreign patrons.” When U.S.
policies are carried out through its military, its leaders must build and maintain
relationships with their African military counterparts, who become their primary
points of contact. Therefore it is the African militaries who are in the best position
to influence the decisions of U.S. military officials. Unfortunately, these decisions
can have deleterious effects on African populations.

111 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

In that vein, Dr. Barnes described the “history of U.S. support for military rules
and military action [as] sorely blemished.” Dr. Barnes cited the figure of $1.5
billion worth of weaponry sold from the U.S. to Africa between 1950 and 1989,
much of which went to brutal regimes in the DRC, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan. The
U.S., Dr. Barnes insisted, continues to back the same types of authoritarian military
regimes it did during the Cold War, in support of narrowly-defined and short-term
goals. These actions “can be self-defeating when it is not consistent with the
democratic ideals and practices that are central to U.S. foreign-policy rhetoric.”
Dr. Barnes offered three examples in support of her claim. The first example
that she provided was Equatorial Guinea, where the U.S. Government offered
military aid to build up the nation’s coast guard to President Nguema (who seized
power in a military coup). Although the U.S. had closed its embassy in 1996 to
protest President Nguema’s human rights record, tit subsequently reopened its
embassy when it was pressured by oil companies with an interest in the region. At
the same time, U.S. military spending in Equatorial Guinea has remained and
continues to stay at a constant level.
http://www.imf.com

While aid is increasingly going to countries with more executive accountability,

the U.S. continues to support countries with unlimited executive authority.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 112

Defense Concepts

Dr. Barnes’s second example focused on Mali. She pointed out that Mali’s
internal dissonant group, the Tuareg rebels who the U.S. claims have ties to al-
Qaeda, inhabit the areas surrounding oil deposits (similarly, Tuareg rebels in Niger
are situated near uranium mines and deposits). And while the U.S. has trained the
Malian and Niger militaries to combat these groups, Dr. Barnes questioned these
rebels’ connections to al-Qaeda, adding that governments may be using the “specter
of al-Qaida to gain U.S. support for their long-standing efforts to bring the Tuareg
finally under state control.”
Dr. Barnes’s third example focused on Somalia. She claimed that the presence
of U.S.-backed Ethiopian troops in Somalia served to further radicalize the Islamist
opposition movements, thereby exacerbating rather than ameliorating the threat. She
also stated that the Ethiopian intervention “curtail[ed] some nascent state-building
activities that [were] occurring in Somalia.” These examples, in which U.S. short-
term strategic interests were put above state development issues, emphasize the
inherent problems with both the direct and indirect U.S. influence that often sustains
military leadership in the region.
Dr. Barnes’s offered two main policy recommendations to halt the cycle of U.S.
assistance bolstering the power of military regimes. Her first was that U.S. policy in
the region should not revolve around “short term goals…based on the vague notion
of national security.” Secondly, Dr. Barnes emphasized that “it is naïve to think that
soft power, interagency cooperation, training programs in democratic processes or
practices will have effective, real reform.” Instead, she argued, the U.S. should look
into longer-term infrastructural development (taken from the Chinese approach in
Africa). This kind of development has a real impact on transferring economic power
from the state to the people, thus removing what she called the “structural straitjack-
et left over from the colonial era.”
Dr. Barnes continued her compelling reproach by questioning the future effica-
cy and even the necessity of AFRICOM, asking “can we truly justify the extraordi-
nary amount of money that goes into AFRICOM and near-invisible endeavors that
intensify the militarization of those states?” Finally, she concluded her remarks with
another thought-provoking inquiry, this time wondering whether it is possible for
the fulfillment of U.S. national interests and the enrichment of African lives to occur
simultaneously:

Is it possible then, to step back and rethink our long-term goals and priorities
and assess how better the U.S. can take part in building the kinds of
institutions and practices that improve the lives of the majority of African
people, improve the lives of people in civil society while doing no harm to
our own people and our own national interests?

113 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

Thomas Callahan is Director of Strategic Planning with the

Readiness and Stability Operations Unit at the Lockheed
Martin Corporation.
Mr. Callahan recognized the formation of AFRICOM
as part of a shift in overall Department of Defense approach
based on the notion that diplomacy and development are of
equal importance to defense in foreign affairs and to the
maintenance of a secure and stable Africa. Mr. Callahan
concluded by recommending further cooperation between
agencies through research and development agreements, the inclusion of other
layers in former military-to-military relations, and the establishment of proactive
support plans.
Mr. Callahan began by acknowledging that AFRICOM has a handful of effec-
tive initiatives, many of which were born out of EUCOM and thus actually predated
AFRICOM. He offered a handful of recommendations which he saw as necessary or
beneficial to AFRICOM’s success in the future.
First, Mr. Callahan noted the importance of recognizing that “AFRICOM and
the creation of AFRICOM and its duties occur in the context of a much larger
shift…in military doctrine in the U.S.” This, he stated, has come about due to the
increasing focus on new threats to U.S. security. A major aspect of this shift is the
recognition of “the importance of human security issues and the legitimacy of
governments. Not just from some abstract objective point of view on a list of
governments but from the subjective point of view of the governed.” In this new
framework, he argued, the State Department and USAID play a much more impor-
tant role than ever before: now, civilian efforts have a much more direct effect on
U.S. national security.
Secondly, as these changes take place in DOD culture, AFRICOM must also
evolve and must define the difference between “security” and “national security.” In
this way, AFRICOM officials must put themselves in the shoes of the Africans with
whom they’re working and determine what concerns Africans have regarding border
issues, food security, drug or human trafficking, political instability or ethnic
violence, etc.
Third, Mr. Callahan recommended that AFRICOM play a “catalytic role” in
working with U.S. civilian agencies as well as multilateral institutions and African
regional organizations. He recognized the political resources that DOD could bring
to bear as well as its obvious economic advantages. Additionally, the DOD has
technology and capabilities which would be extremely effective in a non-military
sphere. He gave the example of “remote mobile communications and global
visualization using various sensors to enable decision support,” which could poten-
tially facilitate the enforcement of illegal fishing on the West African coast. Mr.
Callahan articulated that while there are flaws in this system, it is emblematic of the

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 114

 Defense Concepts

kind of work that can be done: products are “developed using research and develop-
ment and DOD contracts over the years that [the] military-industrial complex
produces that can then be used in the developmental and diplomatic arenas to good
effect.”
Mr. Callahan’s fourth recommendation focused on logistical readiness for rapid
disaster response. He cited the example of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide when
humanitarian disaster was occurring, but the DOD was unable to respond logistically.
He stated that now, even “with forward-operating sites in Djibouti up here and
Ascension Island out there in the middle of the Atlantic, there’s got to be a lot more
capability so that material and transportation can be brought in as needed.”
Mr. Callahan’s final recommendation was to continue incorporating industry—
“the research-and-development pool”—into the State Department and AFRICOM
arena. With the shift in DOD culture (mentioned earlier) from hard to soft power,
Mr. Callahan argued “that soft power matters and things like appropriate technolo-
gies and remote communications and remote power sources and transportable
logistical factors – that these things do matter in any contingency operation.” And
while the DOD has been doing well at articulating its needs to R&D firms, Mr.
Callahan urged that the State Department and the civilian agencies in particular
should provide “incentive and direction” for the research and development industry
so that they can create useful, relevant technologies.
He concluded by reiterating this sentiment, stating that “I don’t think the State
Department has ever done cooperative research-and-development agreements with
industry or folks like that. That’s an area in which, I think, whole-of-government
solutions could be brought together in a faster way.”

COL Paul Daniels is Chief of Strategy with the United

States Africa Command.
Col. Daniels began by emphasizing that the priority
mission of AFRICOM is to safeguard American interests.
In order to do this, the U.S. must first define its interests in
the region. Col. Daniels added that he agreed with Dr.
Barnes’s assessment that U.S. policy in the region has been
short-sighted and that longer-term interests must be de-
fined. Col. Daniels then outlined the difficulty of this task
since the Obama Administration had not formally defined
U.S. policy in Africa at the time of the conference. He did, however, remark that
“President Obama’s July speech in Ghana, the administration’s preliminary review
of national security priorities, Sec. of State Clinton’s visit to Africa and Ambassador
Carson’s remarks before Congress all provide clear signposts” of a broader policy.
Col. Daniels then emphasized that though “the United States and our African
partners sometimes use different language to describe the threats and challenges to

115 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

be addressed in Africa, our concerns, our interests, are overwhelmingly shared

interests.” He articulated that these interests include the threat of extremism and
terrorism, failed states, humanitarian crises and maritime security – threats which
affect both the U.S. and its African partners.
In addressing these issues, Col. Daniels identified the fundamental question in
crafting DOD policy: “how do we use limited military resources to address the
threats to shared U.S. and African interests?” He also added as a side note that the
controversial issue of the “militarization of foreign policy” is akin to an urban
legend; AFRICOM’s funds are far more limited than those possessed by the State
Department or USAID.
In the allocation of mili-
“He argued that President Obama has tary resources, AFRI-
made it a clear priority to push for and COM has chosen a
reward better governments in Africa, and strategic approach con-
that these ‘improved’ governments are sisting of two distinct
the partners with whom both AFRICOM elements. To describe
and President’s Administration want the first “indirect” ele-
to interact.” ment, Col. Daniels chose
a quote from President Obama’s speech in Ghana: “We must start from the simple
premise that Africa’s future is up to Africans.” Col. Daniels clarified that the indirect
element focuses on “assisting our African partners [and increasing] their capabilities
and capacity to address security challenges on the continent.” Col. Daniels described
this component as a long-term effort, a sustained policy to build and develop African
states’ capacities.
The second element is more direct and has a short-term emphasis. Col. Daniels
stated that “in recognition that the indirect element is a long-term effort, [this
element] entails targeted, direct Department of Defense contributions in Africa’s
most troubled countries to mitigate the immediate threats posed by continued
instability.” In countering these threats, Col. Daniels articulated that an interagency
approach must be conceived to put forward a “whole-of-government approach
addressing these problems.”
In combining both the direct and indirect elements of AFRICOM’s strategic
approach, Col. Daniels addressed a concern that Dr. Barnes raised regarding U.S.
collaboration with military-led African governments. He argued that President
Obama has made it a clear priority to push for and reward better governments in
Africa. These “improved” governments are the partners with whom both AFRICOM
and the President’s Administration want to interact.
Through our relationship with these partners, Col. Daniels argued, regional
security can be obtained, especially as they assume a more active role in regional
peacekeeping. He stated that “the Command partners with states that have devel-

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 116

Defense Concepts

oped a degree of internal stability through improved governance and political and
economic liberalization that allows them to employ or even export their security
capacity for the greater good of their region and the continent as a whole.” This
peacekeeping approach, he added, can only be successful with effective multi-
national cooperation—this model has been proven successful in the DRC, where
many non-African states are involved in ongoing peacekeeping operations.
In the spirit of cooperation, Col. Daniels also reemphasized the importance of
interagency collaboration. In this regard, AFRICOM has been making improve-
ments: “Rather than the problematic historical model of DOD planning and then
asking for input on a plan, many agencies were involved from the very beginning.”
Col. Daniels concluded that, “Africa Command was a pilot case for more inclusive
planning…and we think this kind of planning will be directed to other commands to
plan in the same way…”

Daniel Lawner joined the CADS team as a researcher in 2007 and now directs the
Initiative for a Comprehensive Approach to National Security (ICANS) . A graduate
of Northwestern University, Dan conducted independent research on African history,
which culminated in a research grant for travel to the National Archives in London
and a paper entitled “Gateway to Africa: Exoticism, Commercialism and British
Perceptions of Colonial Zanzibar.”

117 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

Taking the Offensive: The Utility and Limitations

of Raiding

Adam Elkus

American participation in nation-building campaigns has heavily embedded the

interrelated concepts of counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations into the
framework of American strategy. The prewar failure to plan for stability operations
in Iraq may become as admonitory to future policymakers as the appeasement of
Hitler at Munich was to statesmen after World War II. Nevertheless, a contradictory
strain of American strategy is steadily emerging that advocates the use of standoff
firepower and strategic raids as an alternative to population-centric engagement.
COIN critics charge that population-centric strategies are wasteful, spotlight
America’s weaknesses, and are politically unsustainable. In turn, they argue that
various offshore raiding strategies draw on America’s chief strength: the disciplined
application of conventional military force.
What can broadly be considered raiding strategy deserves consideration as an
alternative to global counterinsurgency. However, its utility is limited and must be
bounded within a broader review of American grand strategy. This paper addresses
the utility and limitations of raiding and punitive expeditions. Both raiding and
global counterinsurgency are valuable approaches in pursuit of strategic goals but
should not be elevated to the centerpiece of national security policy--especially in
light of underdetermined grand strategy.

Raiding in Theory and Practice

Raiding has a long and distinguished role in strategy. Historian Archer Jones
states that the two foundational military strategies are raiding strategies used as a
“transitory presence in hostile territory to make a hostile incursion,” and persisting
strategies employed to put “significant portion of [opposed] territory under the
adversary’s control.” Jones, in turn, juxtaposes these strategies with methods of
force depletion: destroying the enemy’s forces directly (“combat strategy”) or
wearing down the opponent by depriving them of needed resources (“logistic
strategy”).i Combinations of both categories create comprehensive military strate-
gies.
Methods of raiding have differed throughout history. Some raids punish an
adversary by devastating civilian infrastructure, while others target the opponent’s
armed forces. Raids in war have featured highly mobile forces venturing deep into
the opponent’s operational and strategic depths. The Civil War, for example, finclud-
ed countless deep cavalry raids against railroads. The famous 1864 raid on Washing-
ton D.C. by Confederate General Jubal Early took on strategic importance, although

119 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

its long-term impact on the war’s outcome was marginal at best. General Robert E.
Lee sent the 2nd Corps under the Command of Jubal Early, a force of only 12,000
men toward D.C. While the Union army ultimately compelled them to retreat,
Early’s troops achieved some victories along the way causing confusion and conster-
nation amongst the Union army.

“ The modern idea of the ‘strategic raid’ has come to be equated

with rapid, decisive operations like the conventional campaign
of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. However, a true strategic
raid in the classical sense refers to a tactical or operational
mission against a target of strategic importance..”

Raids can be one-off events designed to achieve a single effect or sustained

confrontations designed to wear down an adversary through successive operations.
Some states extensively employ raiding to attrite terrorists and militant groups - the
U.S. and Israeli policies of targeted killings are examples of such an approach.
The modern idea of the “strategic raid” has come to be equated with rapid,
decisive operations like the conventional campaign of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
However, a true strategic raid in the classical sense refers to a self-contained tactical
or operational mission executed by self-sufficient elements against a target of
strategic importance. Leadership targeting, the bombing of strategic facilities, and
other such missions are commonly included under the classical category of the
“strategic raid.”ii The semantic confusion may be due to the fact that Donald
Rumsfeld and other advocates of military transformation marketed and designed
IRAQI FREEDOM as a high-tech variation on the classic punitive expedition.
However, punitive expeditions, because of their large scale, are not equivalent
to raids. Punitive expeditions are military campaigns, not transitory events. Still,
they are sometimes lumped together with raids because their objectives tend to be
very limited in scope. Punitive expeditions, a mainstay throughout military history,
were common occurrences during the “savage wars of peace” of the 19th century and
early 20th century. These military campaigns were mainly carried out to enforce writ,
open trading routes, and punish the periodic act of defiance against great power
authority.iii In the translated American 1862 edition of Antoine-Henri Jomini’s
Summary of the Art of War there is a section on “descents”—large naval punitive
expeditions with limited aims.iv Some have pointed to the 19th century counter-
raiding campaign against Barbary pirates as an early template for the Global War on
Terrorism.v Such analogies, however, are unpopular because they suggest a connec-
tion to colonial warfare and are consequently unpalatable to modern audiences.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 120

Defense Concepts

Some supporters of raiding propose a modern variation on the punitive expedi-

tion using a range of tactics and platforms. Bernard Finel, a Senior Fellow at the
American Security Project, proposes that the U.S. should “adopt a national military
strategy that heavily leverages the core capability to break states and target and
destroy fixed assets, iteratively if necessary. Such a strategy — which might loosely
be termed ‘repetitive raiding’ — could defeat and disrupt most potential threats the
U.S. faces.”vi This is a different concept than the 19th century punitive expedition,
but there are definite continuities.
Other supporters of raiding argue that air power and other forms of standoff
firepower constitute an American asymmetric advantage over all adversaries.vii
While airpower’s advantages have been heavily oversold in the past, Edward Lut-
twak is correct to note that air power can be used to disrupt and destroy an
opponent’s operational cadre.viii George Will, an opinion columnist, famously
proposed that the U.S. could combat terrorist organizations with rapidly deployable
special operations forces, drones, and cruise missiles based offshore. An offshore
approach would involve spo-
radic airstrikes that could “While airpower’s advantages have
target Taliban forces that been heavily oversold in the past,
have concentrated in geo- Edward Lutwak is correct to note
graphic regions prior to an
that airpower can be used to disrupt
attack.ix This is not a new
concept either; the idea of and destroy an opponent’s operational
controlling unruly regions cadre .”
through standoff firepower
was used by the British in the form of “air control” of tribesmen in post-World War
I Iraq. Suppression by airpower, however, had mixed results overall. Historian
James S. Corum suggests that while many people have been fascinated by the
Interwar Royal Air Force’s application of air control, it was never as efficient as
advertised.x
The military and CIA heavily rely on drones and special operations forces to kill
terrorists and militants in what has been called “The Gap” or “Global South.” It is
difficult to evaluate the efficacy of drone and direct action killings because of the
differing nature of the theaters of operation in which they are employed. Additional-
ly, the vagueness of American grand strategy and even in some cases regional
strategy makes it difficult to evaluate these approaches quantitatively. Thankfully,
the New America Foundation has facilitated future research into the Waziristan “air
control” operation by building up a database with information on drone strikes.xi A
combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology can be used to yield more
definitive conclusions about the efficacy of the controversial drone killings.
In a similar vein, Israel has extensively utilized tactical raiding coupled with
operational and strategic deep raids. Israel has also employed punitive expeditions

121 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

in Lebanon in 1982 and 2006, the West Bank in 2002, and Gaza in 2008-2009.
Historically, Israel also participated in the French and British punitive expedition
against the Suez Canal in 1956. Evidence indicates that the strategic payoff for these
operations has also been mixed. As Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff pointed out in
Foreign Policy, American strategic commentators may misinterpret Israeli
strategy.xii We should also be careful not to extrapolate Israeli success or failure
with raiding and punitive expeditions to analyze our own situation since Israel
enjoys advantages we do not when engaging in operations inside its own territory
and operating in neighboring regions. Control and isolation of the battlefield in an
environment such as 2008-2009 Gaza is unlikely to be replicated in any American
expeditionary contest.

Evaluating Raiding and Punitive Expeditions in American Strategy

What is the nature of the strategic problem we face? This is a question so broad
and contentious that it cannot be answered realistically in a single essay. A mushy
consensus view is emerging that is, while mostly unobjectionable, also analytically
limited. The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (JOE) notes in its section on
military operations that the United States will face a bifurcated future security
challenge with non-state actors assuming a higher prominence than before. The
document also echoes other assessments by arguing that trends such as persistent
urbanization and the growth of the global media will complicate military operations.
“Hybrid” enemies will use asymmetric weapons and strategies to contravene
America’s conventional advantage. Command and control warfare and physical
attacks against intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) and command “What is the strategic problem
and control networks will occur. States
and non-state actors with “anti-access” we face? This is a question so
weapons will threaten control of the glob- broad and contentious that it
al commons. The chief U.S. logistic chal- cannot be realistically answered
lenge will be deployment to distant
theaters of operations. Taken together,
in a single essay.”
these observations represent the conventional wisdom of American defense policy.xiii
While many of these statements are sound, the problem is that the analytical
implications of this consensus can be interpreted to support a baffling variety of
proposed operations, strategies, and force structures. Nor are the themes voiced in
consensus documents necessarily new. Discussions about urban warfare have been
ongoing since the early 1990s, with prominent Joint Urban Warrior exercises in
Chicago in 1998 and San Francisco Bay in 1999. The prolific irregular warfare
analyst Robert Bunker has edited nearly a decade’s worth of academic books dealing
with non-state threats. In Bunker’s volumes, researchers have accurately identified
emerging opposing force (OPFOR) operational and tactical concepts before they
became well known.xiv Chinese “anti-access” threats have also been extensively
Vol. 5, Ed. 2 122
 Defense Concepts

analyzed in RAND Corporation studies such as 2007’s Entering the Dragon’s Lair:
Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States.xv
If we look farther
back we can see an even
“Those who argue for an emphasis greater continuity of re-
on raiding and punitive expeditions search into what we con-
are wise to point out that COIN is sider modern threats.
Fifty years earlier, the
usually wasteful and does not utilize French strategist Gener-
America’s strategic advantages. The al André Beaufre used
United States is a maritime power that the concepts of
finds sustaining expeditionary forces in “exterior” and “interior”
far-off environments logistically difficult.” maneuver to address a
problem that many
American strategists
would find very familiar. Beaufre divides “indirect strategy” into “exterior” and
“interior” maneuvers. Both of these maneuvers are integrated parts of the indirect
campaign that should be used when resources are limited. The first maneuver
provides “maximum freedom of action” in the international arena while paralyzing
the enemy through psychological, economic, or diplomatic means like negotiations
and propaganda.xvi Once exterior cover has been obtained, interior maneuver is then
executed in the geographic area of question to achieve a policy-driven objective.
Beaufre argued that the enemy would respond by utilizing strategies ranging from a
short but violent attempt to affect a fait accompli to protracted guerrilla warfare.xvii
This concept, while inelegant, is eerily prescient in the context of present discussions
about American strategy and asymmetric warfare, as well as attempts to discuss
combinations of irregular and conventional warfare.
Those who argue for an emphasis on raiding and punitive expeditions are wise
to point out that COIN can be wasteful and may not utilize America’s strategic
advantages. The United States is a maritime power that finds sustaining expedition-
ary forces in far-off environments logistically difficult. COIN also does not allow
U.S. military forces to exploit our advantages in firepower, airpower, or large-unit
maneuver. It does not take a strategic genius to realize that COIN is difficult to
sustain politically as well, since domestic support is a perennial problem in democ-
racies. Critics of COIN protest that it is based on outdated theoretical models. Frank
Hoffman, for example, has noted that modern irregular conflict defies the often
simplistic 1960s Maoist revolutionary model involving guerilla war tactics. Howev-
er, American COIN theory heavily extracts from this model to describe the contem-
porary battlespace.xviii While “classic” COIN is still painfully difficult, modern
insurgency is likely to be more fractured and feature more protracted political
problems that proscribe a more limited American approach.xix Conversely, the

123 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

“whole of government” approach is more aspiration than reality, although civilian

and military policymakers have in recent years called for a more robust civilian
sector. It remains to be seen, however, whether these calls for change and policy
shifts will be successful in bolstering “whole of government” capacity in counterin-
surgency and what is generally referred to as “complex operations.”
However, even modern COIN thinkers agree that the American approach to
counterinsurgency needs to be dramatically overhauled. For example, Dr. David
Kilcullen, who was COIN advisor to Condoleeza Rice and to General David
Petraeus, argues that neither counterterrorism nor traditional counterinsurgency is
the appropriate framework to fight the enemy we facexx Mark Safranski observes
that Kilcullen’s own ideas for dealing with “accidental guerrillas” are a kind of
indirect strategy emphasizing low-visibility, low-cost engagement that uses foreign
proxies as the chief tool whenever possible.xxi Absent a few partisans of the
previous administration, most American defense thinkers seem to agree that non-
military tools such as policing, intelligence, and public diplomacy are a better means
of handling modern security problems than the direct application of military force.
Debate over counterinsurgency strategy seems to center more on the legacy of the
Iraq War and the current way forward in Afghanistan. It does not reflect a desire to
engage in yet more massive nation-building campaigns.
On the other hand, raiding and punitive expeditions also have their own prob-
lems. Projection of power requires intelligence. However, the intelligence provided
to strategists and policymakers is frequently inaccurate. The failure of the strategic
raid on the Dora Farms in 2003 and the accidental targeting of the Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade in 1999 illustrate this point. The problem of developing intelligence
from offshore will become more pernicious as forces must navigate and operate in
developed environments. While air strikes can be carried out from naval and air
platforms, projection of landpower requires forward basing and cooperation from
nearby states. This collaboration is easier said than done, as the fracas over Turkish
noncooperation at the northern front of the Iraq invasion revealed. The “anti-access”
challenge also requires, as Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. noted, a more robust long-
range strike capability and the enhancement of expeditionary warfare options for a
more assured advance.xxii More broadly, operational assumptions developed during
both the operational renaissance of the 1980s and early 1990s and the Rumsfeld era
should be challenged as the diffusion of military technology continues.
International norms have changed since the 19th century heyday of the punitive
expedition. While it is important to understand that the costs of a negative interna-
tional reaction to military operations are often overestimated, costs do exist. They
may not be apparent immediately but they manifest themselves later on when
multilateral cooperation is needed. Israel’s Operation CAST LEAD, which involved
a wave of airstrikes and a short ground offensive on the Gaza Strip with the aim of
stopping rocket attacks and arms smuggling into the territory, may have been

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 124

 Defense Concepts

successful. However, the Goldstone Report, which harshly condemned Israel for
killing civilians has lowered the Israeli Defense Force’s freedom of action in the
international arena. There are also thorny legal issues surrounding combat with
non-state actors that have not been resolved satisfactorily, as the dispute over the
Goldstone Report reveals.
The elephant in the room, of course, is planning for Phase IV (stabilization)
operations in the case of a punitive expedition that fully incapacitates a nation’s
government. What should be the protocol for such a situation if long-term occupa-
tion and stabilization is ruled out? The Powell “pottery barn” rulexxiii is not an
infallible law, but is one that many will expect the United States to uphold should a
punitive expedition unseat a “rogue state” government.
It is also difficult to reliably calibrate the level of force needed to accomplish
limited objectives. Here, raiding runs into the same problems as the now-defunct
doctrine of Effects-Based Operations (EBO)—problems of perception, mispercep-
tion, and knowledge of our enemy (especially in a vastly different cultural context)
make mirror imaging tempting. Political scientists endlessly dissected this issue
during the Cold War and developed sophisticated formal models of adversarial
behavior, but these calculations are likely to remain crude and impressionistic in
policy practice outside the context of the bipolar system.
Even if we could develop a metric for the requisite amount of force to be
employed, we would still encounter objections to raiding based on an awareness of
political affairs and bureaucratic infighting. Defense pundits discussing proposed
strategies seem to implicitly assume that the United States is a state with strong
executive planning organs and a political culture capable of digesting sophisticated
strategies; a kind of 21st century version of Moltke’s Prussia. Instead, we live in a
political culture more aptly chronicled by the creators of South Park. The executive
branch, though highly powerful, is not known for its ability to carry out long-range
planning. Moreover, the interplay of interest groups frustrates the execution of
strategy.

“Even if we could develop a metric for the requisite amount of

force to be employed, we would still encounter objections based
on an awareness of political affairs and bureaucratic infighting.”
A Global “Indirect Approach” Synthesis/Questions of Grand Strategy
As an academic exercise, we can devise a possible synthesis of the approaches
profiled here. As previously established, the current consensus on strategy among
both COIN advocates and those favoring a broad kind of raiding strategy is that
American power should be increasingly applied in an indirect fashion instead of
through massive occupations. This is broadly compatible with the ideas advocated

125 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

by some realists, like an “offshore balancing” grand strategy and the paring back of
strategic commitments.xxiv With some effort, both raiding and punitive expeditions
could be integrated with the “indirect” COIN theory put forth by those advocating a
more pared-down global counterinsurgency effort. A synthesis of “indirect ap-
proaches” could heavily emphasize the traditional (and largely nonmilitary) Special
Forces, police, and intelligence approaches to combating radicalism with high-end
combat assets utilized for the “repetitive raiding.” In order to operationalize
“repetitive raiding” capabilities, planners need to think strategically and operationally
about modernizing the concept of the “descent” and punitive expedition. Additional-
ly, the current drone/special operations direct action campaign needs to be subject
to a means-testing before it drifts into policy inertia.
Mark Safranski
argues quite percep- “...the lack of grand strategic foundations
tively that the lack in current American foreign policy may
of grand strategic
foundations in cur-
ensure that any kind of military doctrine
rent American for- —COIN or anti-COIN—could be used to
eign policy may justify purposes at variance with its original
ensure that any kind intent.”
of military
doctrine—COIN or anti-COIN—could be used to justify purposes at variance with
its original intent. It is also useful to point out that both partisans in the COIN and
anti-COIN debate seem to operate with an implicit framework that continuing global
military operations are likely in the near future. The strategy or political aims behind
such military operations, however, or the assumption that American participation in
military operations is a permanent feature of the security environment, has not been
explored in great depth. It is largely without dispute that 21st century operational
conditions are associated with certain forms of conflict. But it is one thing to point
out that slums in West Africa will be difficult for military forces to control and
another to spell out in convincing detail the political rationale that would put
American boots on the ground in Lagos.xxv
We are unlikely to break any new ground in policy discussions about military
operations without undertaking a review of the United States’ global posture,
commitments, and our process of determining “vital interests.” While a rich but
sometimes circular conversation ensues about military operations, tactics, and
strategies, discussions of the deeper, foundational issues that explain the prevalence
(or absence) of force in American grand strategy remain political landmines. One
unfortunate result of this inertia is that nearly everything is seen as a “vital interest”
that must be resolved through the application of military force. Bernard Finel
correctly responded to criticism of his article on “repetitive raiding” by noting that
while his military concept is narrow in application, we expect military operations to

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 126

Defense Concepts

solve too many of our foreign policy issues.xxvi Observers such as The Washington
Post’s Dana Priest have observed that one of the most important reasons for the
impoverishment of civilian capacity is the structure of regional commands that adopt
a role assumed more traditionally by diplomats.xxvii
The correct answers regarding counterinsurgency, raiding, and punitive expedi-
tions are likely to emerge when put in grand strategic context. It is our resistance to
having an honest conversation about these foundational issues that keeps us in a loop
of increasingly circular discourse over the use of force. These deliberations do not
comprehensively address the premises by which certain operational or strategic
approaches derive their explanatory power.xxviii Until we inquire on a more abstract
level, our strategic dysfunction is likely to continue regardless of whether our forces
hobnob with tribes in Anbar or raid from offshore.

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. His articles
have been published in Small Wars Journal, Athena Intelligence Journal, Defense
and the National Interest, Foreign Policy in Focus, SWAT Digest, GroupIntel, and
other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security.

i Jones, Archer, 1996. Elements of Military Strategy: A Historical Approach, Westport:

Praeger, xiv.
ii Stephens, Alan, 2007. “From the Decisive Battle to the Strategic Raid,” paper presented

to the United Service Institute of Sydney and Canberra

iii See Max Boot, 2002 The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American

Power, New York: Basic Books,

iv See Antoine-Henri Jomini, Capt. G.H. Mendell (trans), and Lt. W.P. Craighill (trans),

1984. The Art of War, New York: G.P. Putnam

v See Colonel Bradley E. Smith, December 2005 “America’s First Response to Terrorism:

The Barbary Pirates and the Tripolitan War of 1801,” Military Review
vi Finell, Bernard, February 2010. “An Alternative to COIN,” Armed Forces Journal

http://www.afji.com/2010/02/4387134
vii See Maj Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., September 2006. “America’s Asymmetric Advan-

tage,” Armed Forces Journal http://www.afji.com/2006/09/2009013

viii Luttwack, Edward, March/Aptril 2010 “In Praise of Aerial Bombing,” Foreign Policy

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/in_praise_of_aerial_bombing
ix Will, George F.1 Sept. 2009, “Time to Get Out of Afghanistan,” Washington Post

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083102912.html
x See Dr. James S. Corum, Winter 2000 “The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing The Histo-

ry,” Air and Space Power Journal.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/corum.htm
xi See the database at counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones

127 Vol. 5, Ed.

 Defense Concepts

xii See Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 20 January 2010 “A New Kind of War,” Foreign

Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/20/a_new_kind_of_war?page=0,0.
Also see Ariel Siegelman, March 2009 “From Lebanon to Gaza: A New Kind of War,” U.S.
Army Combined Center Counterinsurgency Colloquium, Vol. 2, no.1.2.
xiii Staff, February 2010 Joint Operating Environment 2010, Norfolk: U.S. Joint Forces

Command, 6-8.
xiv See, for example, Robert Bunker (ed), 2002 Non-State Threats and Future War, Lon-

don: Cass,
xv Roger, Cliff and Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter,

2007. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications
for the United States, Santa Monica: RAND
xvi Andre Beaufre, 1965. An Introduction to Strategy, New York: Praeger, 111.

xvii Ibid, 119

xviii See Frank G. Hoffman, Summer 2007. “Neo-classical Counterinsurgency?” Parame-

ters, 71–87.
xix See Steven Metz, 2007. Rethinking Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Insti-

tute
xx See Kim Sengupta, 9 July 2009“David Kilcullen: The Australian Helping to Shape a

New Counterinsurgency Strategy, . http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/david-

kilcullen-the-australian-shaping-operations-in-afghanistan-1737451.html
xxi Safranski, Mark, 29 May 2009. “The Kilcullen Doctrine,” Zenpundit

http://zenpundit.com/?p=3116
xxiiKrepinevich Jr., Andrew F. July-August 2009. “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: The

Erosion of American Power,” Foreign Affairs

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65150/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/the-pentagons-
wasting-assets
xxiii The Powell Pottery Barn Rule is American political jargon alluding to the “you break
it, you buy it” policy exercised by retail stores
xxiv See Barry R. Posen, 15 July 2008. "A Grand Strategy of Restraint and Renewal," testi-

mony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations. Available at
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/posen/A_Grand_Strategy_of_Restraint_and_Renewal_testim
ony_for_congress_july_ 15.pdf
xxv Metz, Steven 20 March 2009 “Trends, Threats, and Expectations”

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/trends-theats-and-expectations/
xxvi Finel, “An Alternative to COIN.”

xxvii See Dana Priest, 2003 The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America’s

Military, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003

xxviii An exception to this rule is Maj. Jeremy Kotkin, “The Shadow Course of Action: How

I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NSC-68,” Defense Concepts, January 2010, 66-79.

Vol. 5, Ed. 2 128

Defense Concepts

ABOUT DEFENSE CONCEPTS

Defense Concepts is a quarterly publication by the Center for Advanced

Defense Studies. Defense Concepts publishes informative, provocative
and comprehensive essays and reports on all aspects of contemporary
security issues. While some articles address traditional topics, such as
war and peace and diplomatic and military history; others address is-
sues of growing importance, such as environmental and demographic
challenges and the rise of global terrorist networks, that have not been
as salient in the media. Because it includes diverse perspectives from
globally recognized executives, leading academics, and political leaders,
Defense Concepts serves as a forum for leading thinkers and strategists
to discuss the critical issues of global security.

129 Vol. 5, Ed.