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1. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENR and Secretary

Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in

the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. Supervision

is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in accordance with

law.

FACTS:

Golden Falcon (GF) applied for FTAA before Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau -RO (MGB-RO) which

denied the same for failure to secure area clearances from the DENR. Pending appeal,(GF) applied for

quarry permit for the same area, MGB-RO denied. AMTC filed with the PENRO an application for

exploration permit covering the same area of GF’s application. Confusion of rights resulted from the

overlapping of AMTC and persons applying for quarry permits. Denial of GF’s application became final

15days after receipt of order on August 11, 2004. Hence, the area of (GF) application became open to

permit applications only on that date. MGB-RO Director endorsed the applications for quarry permit

which was converted to applications for small-scale mining permit. PENRO recommended to the Gov.

to approve the application and the latter approved and issued permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR

Sec. who decided in its favor, nullifying the gov.s ’issuance of small-scale mining permits agreeing with

DENR-MGB that the area became open for mining only on August 11, 2014 (15 days after the

MGBCO’s denial). Hence,the applications for quarry permit filed on Feb. 10, 2004 were null being filed

when the area was still closed for mining and that AMTC filed its application when the area was open

to mining applicants, hence, its application was valid.

ISSUES:

1.Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control.

2.Whether or not DENR and the DENR Secretary’s power of control are unconstitutional.

RULING:

Section 504 of the LGC to promote local autonomy at the provincial level; adopt measures for the

promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees; and exercise such other

powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the

provinces. DENR Sec’s act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of review under the RA 7076
and its IRR; Assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are not

unconstitutional.Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small scale mining in the provinces is

granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or LGC R.A. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of

1991 ; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of1995 Administrative autonomy may involved

evolution of powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following national policies or standards and

those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the allocation of powers

responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local officials are placed by the Constitution to

Congress under Article X Section 3 as the Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts) has

the power of supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs.

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2. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN

The doctrine in the law of corporations that holds that is a corporation enters into a contract beyond

the scope of its corporate powers is illegal.

FACTS:

From 2005 to 2006, the Municipality’s SB certain resolutions passed to implement a Redevelopment

Plan to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza.To finance this, Sangguniang Bayan initially passed a

resolution Resolution authorizing Mayor Eriguel to obtain a loan from Land Bank and mortgage a

2,323.75 square meter lot in Agoo Plaza as collateral and authorized the assignment of a portion of its

IRA and the monthly income in favor of Land Bank. The terms were approved and ratified through a

Resolution. Land Bank extended 4 million pesos loan in favor of the Municipality used to construct ten

(10) kiosks they rented out. SB approved the construction of a commercial center on the Plaza Lot

though a reso. Authorizing the mayor to obtain 2nd loan from Land Bank, in the principal amount of 28

million. Some residents objected to the 2nd project led by Eduardo Cacayuran claiming that the

conversion of Agoo Plaza into a commercial center, as funded by the loan are highly irregular and

violative of the law and detrimental to public interest and resulting in the desecration of the public plaza.

Petitioners request for the documents in relation to the projects in the plaza was not granted. The Land

Bank alleged that Cacayuran cannot question the validity of the contract since he is not a privy thereto.

ISSUES:

Whether the subject loans are ultra vires and therefore, illegal
RULING:

Generally, Ultra vires acts are committed outside the object for w/c the corp. Is created as defined by

the law of its of organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law. There are 2

types of Ultra vires acts, an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corp. Which are void. And

an irregularity in the exercise of a basic power under the legislative branch in matters not in themselves

jurisdictional, which is ultra vires only in the secondary sense which does not preclude ratification or

preclude the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice. Applying this principle,

it is clear that the subject loans are VOID being acts utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corp.

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3. LEGASPI v CITY OF CEBU

The tests for a valid ordinance are formal and substantive:

1. must be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact

2. must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,

3. must also conform to the following substantive requirements

C (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

U O (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

P D (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

P (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

G C (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

U (6) must not be unreasonable

FACTS:

1. In 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu issued Ordinance 1664, authorizing the traffic

enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the Traffic Code of Cebu City.

The vehicle immobilizer may not be removed without first paying all accumulated penalties for

all prior traffic law violations and an administrative penalty of P500.00.

2. Legaspi brought suit seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for

violating the due process clause and for being contrary to law. Legaspi left his car outside the
gate of his house to make way for the truck of a termite exterminator to unload his equipment;

that while waiting for the exterminator, the phone in his office rang and he went inside to answer

it; that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that the front wheel of his car had been

clamped. He paid fines without the benefit of hearing.

3. The RTC declared Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void for violating due process. CA reversed

the decision of the RTC as a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE:

W/N Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu

and complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality.


RULING:

1. Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity

with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes.

2. Petitioners aver they were not accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, and

impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to explain their side prior to the

immobilization of their vehicles. However, any vehicle owner may protest such action of a traffic

enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. Also, the ordinance permits the release of

a vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM, Chairman of the Committee

on Police, or Asst. City Prosecutor, even without payment of the fine. None of the petitioners

resorted to this, and their failure did not diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the escape

clause written in the ordinance.

3. The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the

transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. It was a fair and reasonable way to

enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade

liability by simply driving away. The lack of a hearing does not constitute a breach of procedural

due process, for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a

timely protest.

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4. UMALI v. COMELEC

April 22, 2014

Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not

only in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly

affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

FACTS:

Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution requesting the President to

declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into

a highly urbanized city (HUC). President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012,
proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified

voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991.”

COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution that only those

registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

ISSUE:

Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in

Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a

component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC).

HELD:

Entire province of Nueva Ecija. The upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan

City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the

province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan

City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight

powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once

formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete

terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s

severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s

5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”
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5. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Nowhere in Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,

does it provide a specific power for local government units to establish an early retirement program.

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and regulations,

designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the

incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package."6

This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested by

respondent Commission on Audit.

In response to the endorsement of the city audit team leader, respondent Commission’s regional

director agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to respondent Commission’s Office of

General Counsel, Legal Services Sector.

The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. Respondent Commission on

Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on

ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive

Orders by the city mayor.

ISSUE:

WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED ORDINANCE NO. 08, SERIES OF 2009, IN THE NATURE

OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAM REQUIRING A LAW AUTHORIZING IT FOR ITS

VALIDITY

RULING:
The Court agrees with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as the invalidity of Section 5

of the ordinance is concerned.

Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service Insurance System

(GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits – Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of

this program shall be entitled to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a

retiring government employee.

Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided under this

program at the rate of one and one-half (1 1/2) months of the employee’s latest basic salary for every

year of service in the City Government.9

Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of which is pegged on the beneficiary’s

years of service in the city government. The ordinance provides that only those who have rendered

service to the city government for at least 15 years may apply.75 Consequently, this provision falls

under the definition of a retirement benefit. Applying the definition in Conte, it is a form of reward for

an employee’s loyalty and service to the city government, and it is intended to help the employee

enjoy the remaining years of his or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.

Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or

retirement plan – other than the GSIS – for government officers and employees, in order to prevent

the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. x x x. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be

tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary

retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial assistance.71

The Court declares Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.


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6. KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG, INC. vs. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

The power of the cities and municipalities, such as the Municipality of Calamba, to adopt zoning

ordinances or regulations converting lands into non-agricultural cannot be denied.

FACTS:

Laguna Estate Development Corporation (LEDC) filed a request with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform

(now Department of Agrarian Reform) for the conversion of ten (10) parcels of land from agricultural to

residential land. Then Minister Conrado F. Estrella issued an Order granting respondent’s request

provided that certain conditions are complied with, one of which was that the development of the site

shall commence within two (2) years from receipt of the order of conversion. KASAMAKA-Canlubang,

Inc. filed a petition with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the revocation of the conversion

order, alleging that respondent failed to develop the subject parcels of land. Then DAR Secretary

Nasser C. Pangandaman issued an Order partially revoking the coversion order as to eight (8) out of

the ten (10) parcels of land. LEDC alleged that the eight (8) parcels of land in question are outside the

ambit of the CARL on the basis of zoning ordinances issued by the municipalities concerned

reclassifying said lands as non-agricultural.

ISSUE: Whether or not the undeveloped areas of the landholdings subject of the Estrella Conversion

Order could still be considered agricultural lands.

RULING:

NO. The undeveloped areas of the landholdings subject of the Estrella Conversion Order could not be

considered agricultural lands. The disputed lands have already been removed from the ambit of the

CARL on the basis of zoning ordinances of the concerned municipalities reclassifying said lands as

non-agricultural. The power of the cities and municipalities, such as the Municipality of Calamba, to

adopt zoning ordinances or regulations converting lands into non-agricultural cannot be denied.
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7. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEV’T. CORP. v DELA CRUZ

For lands to be covered by RA 6657, or PD 27, they shall be primarily devoted to Agriculture and that

the land must not be classified as other types of land including residential land.

Under RA. 7160, all government units may reclassify lands including the Municipality of Malolos.

FACTS:

A parcel of land was registered under Santiago, Dakila Property was tenanted by several tenants who

relinquished their tenancy rights to Santiago in exchange of home lots to be distributed them. Holy

Trinity remaining 208,050 sq.m. of the property from Santiago who subdivided the property into lots.

Holy Trinity erected an office in the lot, In 1998, SB of Malolos issued Reso. Reclassifying 4 of the 6

lots of Holy Trinity into residential lots. In 1999, Holy Trinity bought another land from Santiago bu the

heirs of Surio requested an investigation with the PARO for the sale of such Property. Dakila Property

was placed under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD. 27. DAR annulled the

sale of the land claiming that it was a prohibited transaction under PD. 27. Holy Trinity appealed to DAR

Sec. But was denied. Office of the Pres. Reversed the ruling of the DAR Sec.

ISSUE:

Whether of not the Dakila Property may be placed under the coverage of PD. 27

RULING:

NO. Under RA. 7160, all government units may reclassify lands including the Municipality of Malolos.

The Dakila Property are already converted to residential lots and therefore cannot be placed under the

coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD. 27.For lands to be covered by RA 6657, they

shall be primarily devoted to Agriculture and that the land must not be classified as other types of land

including residential land, which is apparent in this case. No evidence was shown that the land was

devoted to or primarily cultivated for agriculture. Wherefore, the Court grants petition for cirtiorari and

reinstates the decision of the Office of the President.


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8. JACOMILLE v SECRETARY ABAYA

A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal

disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

FACTS:

1. The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) to

supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants. An Invitation To Bid for

the supply and delivery of motor vehicle license plates for the MVPSP was published in

newspapers of general circulation, and stated that the source of funding in the amount of

P3,851,600,100.00 would be the General Appropriations Act (GAA). However, the GAA of that

year showed that only P187,293,000.00 was appropriated.

2. Petitioner instituted a taxpayer's suit alleging, among others, that he would be affected by the

government issuance of vehicle plates thru its MVPSP upon his renewal of the registration of his

vehicle; that not being a participant to the bidding process, he could not avail of the remedies

and procedure provided under the Government Procurement Reform Act.

3. The OSG stated that the issues presented had been rendered moot and academic as the gap

in the budget was already covered by the GAA 2014 in the amount of P4,843,753,000.00 for

“Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver’s Licensing Regulatory Services.”

4. JKG-Power Plates also averred that petitioner had no locus standi. The present case was not a

proper subject of taxpayer suit because no taxes would be spent; that the money to be paid for

the plates would not come from taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners who would pay

P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor

vehicle plate would only be P380.00.


ISSUES:

1. W/N the petitioner has locus standi.

2. W/N petitioner established a taxpayer’s suit.

RULING:

1. YES. Petitioner sufficiently showed that his case presents a matter of transcendental

importance. First, around P3.851 billion in public funds stood to be illegally disbursed; second,

the IRR of R.A. No. 9184 and R.A. No. 7718 were violated and the contract for MVPSP was

awarded to respondent JKG Power Plates despite the utter disregard of the said laws; third,

there was no other party with a more direct and specific interest who had raised the issues

therein; and fourth, MVPSP had a wide range of impact because all registered motor vehicles

owners would be affected.

2. YES. A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly involves the

illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to the assertion of JKG-

Power Plates, MVPSP clearly involves the expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle

registrants will pay for the license plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate

that the government shall bear the burden of paying for the project. Every portion of the national

treasury, when appropriated by Congress, must be properly allocated and disbursed.

Necessarily, an allegation that public funds in the amount of P3.851 billion shall be used in a

project that has undergone an improper procurement process cannot be easily brushed off by

the Court.
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9. PROVINCIAL GOV’T. OF AURORA v MARCO

April 22, 2015

The constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It

does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives. (NOTE: The CSC, as the central

personnel agency of the Government, may "establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and

professionalism in the civil service." Although it conceded that no law prohibits local elective officials

from making appointments during the last days of their tenure)

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the appointee remains entitled to his or her

salaries until the appointment is finally disapproved by the Civil Service Commission.

FACTS:

Governor Ramoncita P. Ong (Governor Ong) permanently appointed Marco as Cooperative

Development Specialist II, five (5) days before the end of her term. Marco's appointment, together

with 25 other appointments, accompanied by a certification stating that funds were available for said

position, were submitted to the Civil Service Commission. When newly elected Governor Bellaflor

Angara-Castillo assumed office, she revoked the appointments based on recall by the Budget

Officer. CSC ruled in favor of the validity of said appointments. Province filed petition to CA under

Rule 43, invoking the constitutional provision against midnight appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether constitutional provision against midnight appointments applies to appointments made by

local executives

RULING:

NO. The constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential

appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.


We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals that Governor Ong issued

Marco's appointment in accordance with Resolution No. 030918. Although his appointment was made

five (5) days before the end of Governor Ong's term, Marco was fully qualified for the position and

had undergone regular screening processes before the election ban.

Assuming without conceding that Governor Ong's 26 appointments were issued in bulk, this per

se does not invalidate the appointments. Unlike Resolution No. 010988, Resolution No. 030918 does

not prohibit appointments that are large in number.

Marco's appointment was valid. The Civil Service Commission correctly approved his appointment.

That the Province suddenly had no funds to pay for Marco's salaries despite its earlier certification

that funds were available under its 2004 Annual Budget does not affect his appointment.

NOTE:

Resolution No. 010988 (was superseded by Resolution No. 030918) - prohibited local elective

officials from making appointments immediately before and after elections. It likewise prohibited

"mass appointments," or those "issued in bulk or in large number after the elections by an outgoing

local chief executive and there is no apparent need for their immediate issuance."

Resolution No. 030918 (which applies in this case) - All appointments issued by elective appointing

officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved, except if the appointee is fully qualified for

the position and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban as shown in the

Promotion and Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.