That on or about the 1st day of July, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
THIRD DIVISION
August 31, 2016
G.R. No. 200157
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA", Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the 29 June 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB CR-HC NO. 00435, affirming the 22 December 2005 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros Occidental, in Criminal Case
Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, which found accused-appellant Joery Deliola y
Barrido guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in both cases.
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of Statutory Rape. The
accusatory portions of the Informations narrate:
Criminal Case No. 5214-69
That sometime in the month of June, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, 15 years old, with the use of a
bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the
accused being the uncle of herein victim who was less than eighteen (18)
years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one [MMM],3 a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to
the damage and prejudice.4
Criminal Case No. 5215-69
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, 15 years old, with the use of a
bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the
accused being the uncle of herein victim who was less than eighteen (18)
years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one [MMM], a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to
the damage and prejudice. 5
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY. 6 At the
joint pre-trial 7 of the
cases, the following stipulation of facts were admitted: (1) that the court has
jurisdiction over the case (2) the identity of accused-appellant as the accused
in the two criminal cases; (3) that accusedappellant is the uncle of MMM; (4)
that MMM, was 11 years old when the incidents giving rise to the present
criminal actions were allegedly committed; (5) that at the time of the
incidents on June and 1 July 2002, accused-appellant and Ml\1M were
neighbors; (6) that MMM was then a grade school pupil; and (7) that accused-
appellant was not attending school at the time of the submitted incidents
giving rise to these criminal actions. Trial on the merits ensued afterwards.
The Facts
The facts culled from the records and as summarized by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
When the crime was committed, MMM was 11 years old,8 while the accused-
appellant, MMM's uncle,9 was 15 years old. 10 The prosecution submits that
sometime in the first week of June 2002, at about three o'clock in the
afternoon, MMM went to the nipa plantation to defecate but before she was
able to do so, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, suddenly appeared. He
approached MMM, poked a knife at her neck, ordered her to bend over, and
took off her shorts and underwear. Fearing for her life, MMM obeyed the
orders of accused-appellant. MMM tried to resist but accused-appellant was
still able to force his penis inside MMM' s vagina. MMM felt pain and cried.
After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant put on his briefs and shorts then
left. When she got home, MMM immediately took a bath and noticed
bloodstain on her underwear. Afraid of accusedappellant's threats of killing
her, MMM kept mum and did not disclose to anyone the tragedy that
happened to her that day. 11
On or about the 1st day of July 2002, MMM was at the nipa plantation again
when accused-appellant suddenly arrived. He poked MMM's back with a
knife and threatened to stab her unless she followed accusedappellant' s
orders. MMM was fearful and was left with no choice but to submit to
accused-appellant's commands. She was directed to bend over and to lower
down her shorts and underwear. While MMM was bending over and half
naked, accused-appellant held the victim's waist and inserted his penis into
MMM's private part. MMM could not do anything but cry. Before leaving, he
again threatened to kill MMM if she would reveal what happened between
them. 12
MMM still remained silent about her ordeal. However, about two. weeks
after the second rape, MMM' s grandmother noticed that there was
something unusual in the way MMM was walking. This prompted her to
confront MMM. 13 Upon learning of what happened to MMM, the victim's
aunt, brought the former to the Municipal Health Office of Manapla, Negros
Occidental for examination, 14 and thereafter to the police authorities,
before whom the victim executed her sworn statement. 15
Dr. Edbert Jayme (Dr. Jayme), the Municipal Health Officer who conducted a
physical and internal examination upon MMM, testified as an expert witness
for the prosecution. Dr. Jayme's internal findings showed that the victim had
positive hyperemia of the vulva or congestion, redness, and swelling around
the area, which may have been caused by a blunt object such as the finger of
the human being or an erect penis. The victim was also found to have a
positive incomplete hymenal laceration at 3:00 and 7:00 positions, which was
similarly caused by a blunt object such as the finger of the human being or an
erect penis. 16 According to Dr. Jayme, the lacerations may have been
inflicted within two weeks prior to the examination since the lacerations were
fresh. 17 Dr. Jayme also found that the victim's vagina could admit two (2)
fingers with ease, which is unusual for an 11-year old. 18 A Medical Certificate
19 dated 12 July 2002 was issued by the Municipal Health Center of Manapla.
As lone witness for the defense, accused-appellant denied raping the victim
and claimed that he was fishing with his grandfather during the times MMM
was raped. 20 He testified that he is MMM's uncle and that he was only
fifteen years old when the alleged crime occurred.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On 22 December 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding accused-
appellant guilty of two counts of Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Cases Nos. 5214-69 and
5215-69, this Court finds accused, JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, AK.A. "JAKE
DELIOLA", Guilty of the crimes of Rape, as defined in A1iicle 266-A in relation
to Article 266-B, paragraph 5, subparagraph 1, of Republic Act No. 8353, as
his guilts had been established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable
doubt.
Taking into consideration the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority,
this Court, in Criminal Case No. 5214-69, sentences accused, Joery Deliola y
Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, the
same to be served by him at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City,
Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake
Deliola, is, further, ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine Currency, as
Exemplary Damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, this Court likewise sentences accused, Joery
Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y
Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, likewise, ordered by this Court to pay minor,
[MMM], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as Moral Damages,
and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine
Currency, as Exemplary Damages.
Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is remanded to the
custody of the Jail Warden of the Provincial Jail of Negros Occidental, until he
is finally committed to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Rizal.
In the service of the sentences imposed on him by this Court, accused named
shall be given full credit for the entire period of his detention pending trial.
21

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 2011, affirmed
the judgment of conviction of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision insofar as the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of accused-appellant Joery B. Deliola of the two crimes of
rape in Criminal Cases No. 5214-69 and 5215-69 is AFFIRMED. However, as
accused-appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido is a child in conflict with the law,
the pronouncement of his sentence is hereby SUSPENDED and the case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,6th Judicial Region, Branch 69, Silay
City, Negros Occidental, for appropriate disposition in accordance with
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Accused-appellant is CONDEMNED to
pay the victim MMM: 1) In Criminal Case No. 5214-69, the amounts of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 for moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 for exemplary damages; and 2) In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, the
amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 for moral damages and
P30,000.00 for exemplary damages. 22
Accused-appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution23 dated 27
February 2012, we required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs. However, both parties manifested24 that they are
dispensing with the filing of supplemental briefs and, instead, adopting their
respective briefs as supplemental briefs in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. His defenses of denial and alibi are
bereft of merit.
Statutory Rape
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Cod, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8353.25 define and punish Statutory Rape as follows:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.- Rape is committed-
1) by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman x x x:
xxxx
d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Art. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed when the prosecution proves that: (l) the
offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the offended party was deprived of reason or
consciousness; or whether it was done through fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and
that there was sexual intercourse.26
The two elements were proven in the present case. The age of MMM was
uncontested. In her Birth Certificate,27 presented and admitted in open
court, 28 it was indicated that she was born on 5 March 1991 and, thus, only
eleven years old when the crime was committed. The only controversy left
qefore us is whether or not accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the
victim.
Credibility of Witness
Accused-appellant tried to dispute MMM' s credibility by pointing out several
inconsistencies in her testimony. He argued that the victim testified that on
the alleged second incident of rape, on 1 July 2002, she felt no pain and her
vagina did not bleed. Accused-appellant maintains that such statement is
inconsistent with MMM's grandmother's claim that MMM was walking with
great difficulty and pain. Accused-appellant likewise argues that given the
tender age of the victim, she could have felt pain, if not suffered bleeding,
even on the second incident of rape.
We disagree. It is carnal knowledge, not pain nor bleeding, which is essential
to consummate rape. 29 It is also possible for physiological manifestations of
rape, such as pain, to appear only after the incident. More importantly, the
testimony of MMM's grandmother was just an observation on the victim's
manner of walking. It is baseless and unreasonable to put the victim's and the
grandmother's testimonies side by side and claim them to be inconsistent.
Moreover, as consistently held by this Court, discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and
not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair her
credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not coached or
rehearsed. 30
Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Jayme's findings are not conclusive
and that the non-intact hymen of the victim could be congenita This
argument is bereft of merit. The prime consideration in the prosecution of
rape is the victim's testimony, not necessarily the medical findings. Assuming
arguendo that the non-intact hymen of the victim is congenital, this Court has
consistently held that the absence of laceration in the hymen does not negate
rape. 31 Apart from the findings of Dr. Jayme, MMM was steadfast in
testifying that accused-appellant raped her twice. When a rape victim's
testimony is straightforward and consistent despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence.32 The victim's testimony alone, if credible,
is sufficient to convict.33
Accused-appellant likewise argues that the victim's claim that she was
penetrated from behind is contrary to human experience. We are not
persuaded.1âwphi1 As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, the animal in
man may come out when he commits rape such that it is not unlikely that in
the process of his immersion and transformation into another character, he
would prefer to mate in the way lower creatures do. 34
Accused-appellant further questions the fact that the v1ctnn did not attempt
to escape from her captor or even shout or call for help, and that she did not
report the alleged rape to anyone after its occurrence. However, as held in
the case of People v. Rosales: 35
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or victim
of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the usual
expectations of everyone. People may react differently to the same situation.
One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even instinctive, response to a
horrible and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another's may be
cold indifference. Yet, it can never be successfully argued that the latter are
any less sexual victims than the former. 36
Given the nature of the crime of rape, the credible, natural, and convincing
testimony of the victim alone may be sufficient to convict the accused, more
so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the
examining physician. 37
MMM's testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant as the person
who raped her is believable. We uphold the ruling of the trial court on the
credibility of MMM and the truthfulness of her testimonies, to wit:
[MMM], though a minor, thirteen (13) years old at the time she took the
stand, demonstrated to this Court her capacity of observation, recollection,
and communication. She showed that she can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known her perception to this Court as she clearly and capably related
the details of her sad and horrible experiences at the hands of the accused.
She withstood a thorough and exhaustive examination. There is no doubt that
she is a competent witness. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 451,
G.R. No. 116372 January 18, 2001; People vs. Rama, 350 SCRA 266, G.R. No.
136304, January 25, 2001). [MMM] gave a clear, straightforward,
spontaneous, frank and consistent narrative. It was a positive and credible
account she presented before this Court. There was not a motive ascribed or,
in the very least, suggested by the defense that might have raised doubt on
her credibility and on the credibility of the statements she made before this
Court.38
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of MMM's
testimony. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial
court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment
and demeanor on the witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts;
and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are
generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.39
Furthermore, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for
when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.40 No young woman
would admit that she was raped, make public the offense and allow the
examination of her private parts undergo the troubles and humiliation of a
public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all gory details, if she had
not in fact been raped.41
Denial and Alibi as Inherently Weak Defenses
In contrast to MMM's direct, positive and categorical testimony and
identification of her assailant, accused-appellant's bare denial and alibi could
not prevail. This Court has consistently held that: "denial is an intrinsically
weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability
to merit credibility. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that
alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove and for which reason it is generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper,
it is imperative that the accused establishes two elements: (1) he was not at
the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
commission.42 "Accused-appellant failed to establish these elements. His
claim that at the time of the alleged crime, he was at sea fishing with his
grandfather was uncorroborated. For some reason, he did not even present
his grandfather Clemente Gabayeron to testify in court. As opposed to MMM'
s convincing recital of facts, accused-appellant's denial and alibi will not
stand.
Time of commission
not an essential element
to establish rape
Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the Information43 stating that the first
crime of rape was committed "sometime in the month of June 2002" is not
sufficiently explicit and certain as to inform him of the date on which the
criminal act was alleged to have been committed.
Accused-appellant is mistaken. This Court has repeatedly held that it is not
incumbent upon the victim to establish the date when she was raped for
purposes of convicting the perpetrator.44 The date of commission is not an
essential element of the crime of rape; what is material is its occurrence.
Thus, there is no need to prove the exact date of comm1ss1on; an
approximation thereof will suffice.45
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that accused-appellant's
belated objection to the Information cannot prosper, to wit:
Moreover, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in the trial by cross-
examining the prosecution witnesses on the particular dates and
circumstances of the two offenses of rape as alleged in the informations
without prior objection to the validity or propriety of the informations. It is
now too late in the day for the accused-appellant to claim that any of the
Informations was defective. Objections relating to the form of the complaint
or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If the appellant
had found the Information insufficient, he should have moved before
arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of
the exact date of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information, on
the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. 46
Penalty and Damages
To determine the appropriate penalty, we refer to the pertinent law on the
matter. According to R.A. No. 9344,47 as amended:48
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - x x x
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth
anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
To reiterate, the law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of age on the day
of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth date. In A.M. No. 02-l-18- SC49
dated November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court likewise defined the age of
criminal responsibility as the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and one (1)
day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense
with discernment.
Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April 1987, 50 making him
15 years and 2 months old when the crime was committed. We are now left
with the question of whether or not accused-appellant acted with
discernment. In People v. Jacinto, 51 we explained that discernment is the
mental capacity of a minor to fully grasp the consequences of his act, known
and determined by taking into account all the facts and circumstances
presented by the records in each case.
That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he raped the victim
is demonstrated by the following surrounding circumstances: (1) the victim
was a helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured the consummation of the
offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust by penetrating the victim from
behind; and (4) he threatened the victim not to report what happened. Taking
all these facts into consideration, accusedappellant clearly knew that what he
did was wrong.
Considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
were alleged and proven during trial, 52 accused-appellant shall be criminally
liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape. However, given that accused-
appellant was only 15 years old and 2 months when the crime was
committed, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be
appreciated; thus, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed. 53 In accordance with the controlling jurisprudence on
the matter,54 for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the lower courts
and impose upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Although it is acknowleged that accused-appellant was qualified for
suspension of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A.
934455 provides that the same extends only until the child in conflict with the
law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years old. Nevertheless, in
extending the application of RA No. 9344 to give meaning to the legislative
intent of the said law, we ruled in People v. Jacinto, 56 as cited in People v.
Ancajas,57 that the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the
law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation
and reintegration in order that he/she may be given the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the community. 58 Thus,
accused-appellant is ordered to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in
a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities,
in accordance with Section 51 59 of R.A. 9344.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,60 we modify the award of damages of
the lower courts.1âwphi1 Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to indemnify
MMM, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, and ₱75,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape. The damages awarded shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid. 61
WHEREFORE, the 29 June 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB CR-HC NO. 00435 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.· Appellant JOERY
DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA," is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified Statutory Rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
Appellant is ORDERED to indemnify MMM the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count of rape, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages for each
count of rape, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.
All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Silay City, Branch
69 for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act
No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
January 11, 2017
G.R. No. 223528
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JEFFREY HIRANG y RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated March 9, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05129, which affirmed the conviction of
defendant-appellant Jeffrey Hirang y Rodriguez (Hirang) for violation of
Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208, otherwise known as the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
The Facts
Hirang, also known as Jojit and Jojie, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons, as
defined and penalized under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c),
and Section 3(a), (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9208, via an Amended Information2
that reads:
That on or about June 27, 2007, at Taguig City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruited, transported and provided in a large
scale minors [AAA],3 17 years old, [BBB], 17 years old, [CCC], 14 years old and
[DDD], 17 years old, for the purpose of prostitution by taking advantage of
their vulnerability as young girls through promise of a good time or "gimik" in
a disco and good food if they would simply accompany him in meeting and
entertaining his Korean friends and to induce their full consent further
promise them Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) to Ten Thousand Pesos
(Php10,000.00) each afterwards when in truth and in fact peddled them for
sexual favors and pleasure in consideration of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00) each and engaged' their services in prostitution as in fact he
already received Seven Thousand Pesos down payment from the Korean
national who engaged their services.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (Emphasis and underlining in the original)
Upon arraignment, Hirang entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on
the merits ensued. 5
Version of the Prosecution
The private complainants are minor victims of Hirang in his prostitution
activities. The following persons testified for the prosecution: victims DDD,
AAA, CCC and BBB, International Justice Mission (UM) Investigators Alvin
Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and Jeffrey Villagracia (Villagracia), National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator (SI) Menandro Cariaga (Cariaga), SI
Anson L. Chumacera and forensic chemist Loren J. Briones. 6
AAA was born on November 25, 1989. She was only 16 years old when Hirang
recruited her in August of 2006 as a sex worker, for which she was paid
₱1,000.00 per day, less Hirang's commission of ₱200.00. She was later
prodded to work as a sexy dancer and prostitute at the Catwalk Club along
Quezon Avenue. She joined her customers in their tables at the club, and gave
sexual services in hotels. She left the club after two nights, upon her live-in
partner's order. Still, Hirang sourced several other prostitution jobs for AAA.
He convinced AAA to work in a cybersex den in Muñoz, Quezon City. She
received ₱700.00 a month, less ₱200.00 commission received by Hirang. In
September 2006, Hirang made AAA work again as a sexy dancer at Philippine
Village bar in Puerto Galera. AAA had to quit her job when she got pregnant,
but resumed work for Hirang after she gave birth.7
CCC was born on December 19, 1992. She was 14 years old when she was
recruited by Hirang for his illicit activities. She met Hirang at the house of Ka
Lolet, her best friend's mother. She knew Hirang to be scouting young girls
who could be traded for sex. Sometime in June 2007, Hirang asked CCC to go
with him and meet some Koreans. 8
DDD, who was born on February 11, 1991, was 16 years old when she ran
away from home in 2007 and stayed at a friend's house in Sta. Ana, Taguig
City. As she was then in need of money, she accepted an offer from one Ate
Lolet, a pimp, that she be introduced to a male customer, with whom she had
sexual intercourse for ₱2,500.00. It was Ate Lolet who later introduced DDD
to Hirang.9
BBB was born on March 28, 1990. CCC is her younger sister. She was 17 years
old when on June 27, 2007, she visited CCC at Ka Lolet's house. There she saw
Hirang, who invited her to come with him in meeting some Koreans that
evening. Later in the evening, at around 8:00 p.m., BBB went back to the
house of Ka Lo let to meet Hirang. It was then on June 27, 2007 that Hirang
sold BBB, along with AAA, CCC and DDD, to his Korean customers for sexual
activities. Hirang told his victims that they would receive ₱5,000.00 after a
"gimik" 10 with them. At around 10:00 p.m., their group proceeded to meet
with the Koreans at Chowking restaurant, C-5 in Taguig City. Hirang instructed
the girls to tell the Koreans that they were 16 years of age, as this was their
customers' preference. 11
When their group arrived at Chowking, Hirang talked to a Korean and then
introduced the girls to him. The Korean handed money to Hirang and as the
latter was counting it, NBI agents arrived at the scene and announced a raid.
NBI agents arrested Hirang, while a social worker approached the girls and
brought them to the NBI for their statements. 12
The raid was conducted following a prior investigation conducted by IJM, a
non-profit organization that renders legal services and is based in
Washington, D.C. IJM's investigators Sarmiento and Villagracia gathered data
on human trafficking in Metro Manila, after information that Hirang was
selling minors for prostitution. Hirang was introduced by a confidential
informant to Villagracia, who posed as a travel agency employee having
Korean friends. Villagracia claimed to have Korean friends as they knew
Hirang to be transacting only with foreign customers. 13
Hirang and Villagracia first agreed to meet on June 20, 2007 at Chowking
restaurant along C-5 Road in Taguig City. Villagracia introduced Hirang to
Sarmiento, who introduced himself as Korean national studying English in
Manila. Hirang informed Sarmiento that he had with him AAA, who was good
in bed, only 15 years old and could perform any sexual position, for a fee of
₱20,000.00. Sarmiento, however, told Hirang that he and his other Korean
friends had other plans for the night. Hirang demanded a cancellation fee of
₱1,500.00 and scheduled another meeting with Sarmiento and the other
Koreans on June 26, 2007. 14
Thereafter, IJM submitted a report to the NBI-Field Office Division, and asked
for the agency's investigative assistance and operation against Hirang. On
June 26, 2007, IJM and NBI operatives agreed during a conference that they
would conduct an entrapment operation on June 27, 2007. Sarmiento reset
his meeting with Hirang to June 27, 2007. Hirang initially got mad, but was
appeased after Sarmiento promised to give a bonus of ₱20,0000.00. Cariaga
prepared the marked money to be used during the entrapment, and was
tasked to be the driver of poseur-customer Sarmiento. Several other NBI and
IJM agents served as back-up during the operation, in case any untoward
incident should happen. 15
On June 27, 2007, the entrapment was conducted with proper coordination
with local authorities. A social worker from the Deartment of Social Welfare
and Development and members of the media for the segment XXX of ABS-
CBN Channel 2 joined the operation. Villagracia secretly recorded his
conversation with Hirang. 16
Hirang introduced AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD to Sarmiento, who feigned his
desire to pursue the transaction. Hirang specified the sexual services that the
girls could offer, and assured Sarmiento that the girls could fulfill their
customers' sexual fantasies. 17 Sarmiento then handed to Hirang a fictitious
check amounting to ₱20,000.00, while Cariaga handed the ₱7,000.00 marked
money. As Hirang was counting the cash, he complained that the amount was
not enough as he charged ₱20,000.00 per girl, plus bonus. At this point,
Cariaga performed the pre-arranged signal with NBI operatives, who declared
the entrapment operation and arrested Hirang. An ultraviolet dust
examination later performed upon Hirang rendered positive result for
fluorescent powder specks. 18
Version of the Defense
Hirang and his mother Myrna Hirang (Myrna) testified for the defense.
Hirang claimed to be self-employed, selling longganisa and other wares for a
living. He denied dealing with sexual trade. It was upon the instigation of
Villagracia, who was introduced to him by his friend Jun Valentin (Valentin),
that he agreed to bring the girls for the supposed Korean clients. Hirang
described Villagracia as a drug addict who frequently visited Valentin's house
for pot sessions. Villagracia told Hirang that he knew of Koreans looking for
girls and were willing to pay ₱20,000.00 to ₱25,000.00 for each girl who must
be 13 to 14 years old. 19
On June 20, 2007, Hirang, Valentin and two girls went to meet up with
Villagracia at Chowking in C-5 Road, but the Koreans cancelled the
transaction. Villagracia was disappointed that the girls brought by Hirang
were already 23 years old. They agreed to meet again, but Villagracia
reminded Hirang to bring young girls next time. Hirang promised to do so, and
then received ₱500.00 from Villagracia.20
When they later talked again over the telephone, Villagracia advised Hirang
to convince the Koreans to hire the girls so that Hirang and Valentin could
receive the ₱5,000.00 commission per girl. Another Korean promised to give
a bonus of ₱10,000.00 if Hirang could provide young girls. Since Hirang
claimed to have no girls for the service, he went to the house of Ka Lolet with
whom he had previously transacted whenever he needed girls for sexual
services. Ka Lolet provided BBB, CCC and DDD, while Hirang personally talked
to AAA. Hirang and Ka Lolet agreed to give each girl ₱5,000.00, while a
₱5,000.00 commission for each girl would be divided among him, Ka Lolet,
Villagracia and Valentin.21
Hirang and Villagracia met again on June 26, 2007 at Valentin's house.
Villagracia reminded Hirang that the girls should be young. He also gave
instructions on the dresses that the girls should wear during their meeting.
On the evening of June 27, 2007, Hirang went to Ka Lolet's house and from
there, brought the girls to Chowking in C-5 Road on board a van provided by
Ka Lolet. One Korean national gave Hirang money for their food. As their
order was being served at the restaurant, NBI operatives approached Hirang
and arrested him. 22
In her testimony, defense witness Myrna claimed knowing Villagracia, as the
latter frequently talked to Hirang over the cellphone. There were times that
she answered Villagracia's calls, and the latter introduced himself as a friend
of Hirang with whom he had an arrangement. 23
Ruling of the RTC
On June 25, 2011, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station
rendered its Decision24 convicting Hirang of the crime of human trafficking.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, [HIRANG] is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Section 6 of [R.A.] No. 9208 and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos
(Php2,000,000.00).
SO ORDERED.25
Feeling aggrieved, Hirang appealed26 to the CA based on the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING [HIRANG'S] DEFENSE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
CONFLICTING AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [HIRANG'S]
RIGHTS UNDER [R.A.] NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS
WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE
VIOLATED.27
Ruling of the CA
The CA denied the appeal via a Decision28 dated March 9, 2015, with
dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2011 of the
[RTC] of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station in Criminal Case No.
135682 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.29
Hence, this appeal. 30
The Present Appeal
On June 13, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution notifying the parties that they
could file their respective supplemental briefs.31 However, both Hirang and
the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of
the Philippines, manifested that they would no longer file supplemental
briefs, as their respective briefs filed with the CA sufficiently addressed their
particular arguments. 32
Based on the parties' contentions as raised before the CA, the Court is called
upon to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Hirang for the crime charged; and
(2) whether Hirang should be acquitted in view of the failure of the arresting
officers to observe R.A. No. 7438.
Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms Hirang's conviction.
Hirang was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons under
Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b) and (c) of
R.A. No. 9208, which read:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person,
natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as
qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking
is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group;
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer
or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or,
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation
which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for
the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons"
even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is
over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.
(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the
use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in
exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.
In People v. Casio,33 the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons,
as derived from the aforequoted Section 3(a), to wit:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders";
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another"; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor
or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."34 (Citation
omitted and italics in the original)
The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and
transportation of the minor victims for sexual activities and exploitation, with
the offender taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through
the guarantee of a good time and financial gain. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was
committed in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution
witnesses who testified during the trial.1âwphi1 The young victims
themselves testified on their respective ages, and how they were lured by
Hirang to participate in the latter's illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the girls
to become victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise
of financial benefit, the girls agreed and, thus, joined him on June 27, 2007 in
meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes. Police
authorities personally, witnessed Hirang's unlawful activity, as they
conducted the entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang
transacted with the supposed customers and received payment therefor.
Hirang still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies were conflicting and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies
pertained to the supposed participation of Ka Lolet in the recruitment of the
victims, how the IJM agents came to personally know of Hirang, and other
incidents that involved prior surveillance and the entrapment operation itself.
It is evident, however, that the supposed inconsistencies in the witnesses'
testimonies pertained to minor details that, in any case, could not negate
Hirang's unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the Court
has ruled time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies
and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the
highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already
passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 35
Hirang argued that he was merely instigated to commit the offense, but even
such defense deserves scant consideration.1âwphi1 It has been established
by the prosecution that Hirang has been engaged in the illegal activities
leading young women to prostitution, and the police officers merely
employed means for his capture. Trafficking of women was his habitual trade;
he was merely entrapped by authorities.36 Entrapment is an acceptable
means to capture a wrongdoer. In People v. Bartolome,37the Court
distinguished between entrapment and instigation, as it explained:
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of
the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand,
entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or
their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an
offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of
committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the
offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses
and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In
instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to
be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has
been said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent" while entrapment is
a "trap for the unwary criminal."38
In this case, it was established during trial that Hirang had been recruiting and
deploying young girls for customers in the sex trade. The IJM personnel
approached him for girls precisely because of his illicit activities. Also, Hirang
was not first approached for prostitutes by police or government authorities,
but by investigators of IJM, which is a non-profit and non-governmental
organization. IJM only sought coordination with the police officers after
Hirang, Sarmiento and Villagracia had determined to meet on June 27, 2007
for the transaction with the purported Korean customers. Clearly, there could
be no instigation by officers, as barred by law, to speak of.
Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police
officers to inform Hirang of the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no
sufficient ground for the Court to acquit him. The CA correctly explained that
any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by his voluntary act of
entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.39 In
People v. Vasquez,40the Court held:
[T]he Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his
arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now
estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was
cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction. x x x.
41 (Citations omitted)
Given the foregoing, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse
Hirang's conviction for qualified trafficking under R.A. No. 9208. The RTC and
CA correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of
₱2,000,000.00, applying Section 10(c) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions
are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
xxxx
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (5,000,000.00)[.]
Damages in favor of the victims should, however, also be awarded. In line
with prevailing jurisprudence,42 each victim is entitled to ₱500,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. This is supported
by Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in A1iicle 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
35.
xxxx
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case
to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it
is worse, thereby justifying the award of moral damages. When the crime is
aggravated, the award of exemplary damages is also justified.43
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 9, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05129 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that victims AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD are each entitled to
₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE
SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK
LEO DELOS REYES, AND CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, MINOR, FOR HERSELF
AND AS REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners, v.
QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF
MANILA, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS
CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the
curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila,
and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey
Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain,
and desist from implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending
resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance
as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as
well as the right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a
nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila
started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through
police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were
respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,4
dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na
Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang
Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6,
2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466
entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of
the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below
Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other
Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City,
through Ordinance No. SP-2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance
Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00
P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation
Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
(SPARK)- an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a
free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of
the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness
doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d)
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila
Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or
detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly
determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that
the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment,
and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment
of the alleged curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions
indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the imposed
curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class,
they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth
of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night,
and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during
curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to
travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict
scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that
bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the
prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect
and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly
Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended,
given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition
of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall
be imposed on minors for curfew violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose
curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise
of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if
a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the
same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs,
installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular
visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children
and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can
impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and
education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew,
and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their
children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not
the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case.
Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety
of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to
the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of
actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentalitv of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept
of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of
settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable."25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and
prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies by which the grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors
of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[m]eanwhile that
no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of
'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the
courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax
its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the
courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by
the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of
their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances
violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to
travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also
claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors,
conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave
abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily,
out of malice, ill will or personal bias."31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial
function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail
the constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the next
question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this
Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While
this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional
Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set
out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of
paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct
resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving
the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be anactual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two
(2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in
the expanded setting — is the presence of an actual case or controversy."35
"[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution
as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In
other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."'36
According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded
jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by
merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims,
particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and
parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes
against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners
have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed
a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this
Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for
adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being
implemented until the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement.
The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely
speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination
of whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance
to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that
they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have
sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40
"'[I]nterest' in the question involved must be material — an interest that is in
issue and will be affected by the official act — as distinguished from being
merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person
is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2)
constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within
their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa)
has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43
because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this
Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as
alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is,
thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew
Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin
Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes
(Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and
therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper
subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury
as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew
Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as they have not
shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that
Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who
could have properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged violation of
his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances
based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative
of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no
legal personality to bring an action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the
capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e.,
the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal
interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on
the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the
alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing
requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number
of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of
legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when
those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound
discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability
of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile
curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked
to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear
their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to
determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the
interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching
significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural
rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this
case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of
parents to rear their children, this Court must first tackle petitioners'
contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not
containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing
authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the
questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were
already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities
apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical
appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded
that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of
the child, they submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law
enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is
improper, considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any
of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to
provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required
so that one may act accordingly.49The void for vagueness doctrine is
premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this
particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which
may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due
process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves
cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give
adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide
proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the
vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness
doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is
no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-
vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to
guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew
offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of
enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of
the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for
the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of
curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for
vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger
of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that
allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is
prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law
contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot
reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,51 it was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague
standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual
impressions and personal predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in
any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack
of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances
cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient
standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the
Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement
agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended,
provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be
determinedfrom the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
(Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances
because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances
inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630,54minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are
children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-
standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the essential
requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary
implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with
related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo,
who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove
that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply
presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority
age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities
to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state -
should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law
enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate
action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances
invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for
vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the
youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this
right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go
home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the
right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the
latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy
relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred
to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral
character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental
duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising
their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this
authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of
the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually
grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For
indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional
obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations]
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs,
and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching,
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of
young people into mature, socially responsible citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of
authority over one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme
Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation
has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of
our society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear
their children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The
qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the
upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to
parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court
in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by
minors. But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a] mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed
that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare
or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health
of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated,
these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents
in the exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not
exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v.
Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in
protecting minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the
duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a- vis other parties. Unable as
they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up
to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent
in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in
the moral development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting
role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that
"[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role,
may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that
make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.
Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and
others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid
parents in their role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later
discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State
interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of
juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of
parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability
and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm
by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental
decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply
only when the minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be
later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental
authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are
effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during
curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the
only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents'
prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours.73 In this respect, the ordinances
neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their
minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control
their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up
his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively
influence children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation
provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their
children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the
US court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that
a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's
upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their
children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal
behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents
who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the
streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no
less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which
justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for
violating the parents' right to rear their children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances
based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a
fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State
interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of
minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the
government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances
suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours.79
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth
doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of
their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council
(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the
given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases,"81viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type
of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept
by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot
be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines
itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him
or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely
"as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern
with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the
overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)]
cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,83
and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia
v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to
speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are
justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression."'85
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that
"[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on
vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to
violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the
basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth
analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On
the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88
under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right
embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of
every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens
to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they
desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise
their other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly,
association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94
as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech,
assembly, and association require one to move about, such movement must
necessarily be protected under the First Amendment. Restricting movement
in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be
exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights.
One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people
cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If,
for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of
assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk
the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom
of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved
with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify
restrictions even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the
freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this
right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96 may
impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are
provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of
juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest
of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities
within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the
curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming
victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the
second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal
system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special
protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 9775,99 RA 9262,100
RA 9851, 101 RA 9344,102 RA 10364,103 RA 9211,104 RA 8980,105 RA
9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly
authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal councils, to
set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may
prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local
conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the
parents or guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances
(as what respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through
their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis
- as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right
to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are
likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes
that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,108but the exercise of
these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always subject
to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or
guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a
certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their
affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and
the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to the right to
travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department
of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign
country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.114 These
limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors'
activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's
general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose
limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do
not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117 the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the
differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are:first, the
peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of
the parental role in child rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...sympathy,
and ... paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition
that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental
role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity
that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court
acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as compared
to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a
broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are
the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places,
and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse
influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power,
whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious
scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary
use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not
affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this
difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors'
exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable
grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to
determine the reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test
applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny
test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in
classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis
test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system
guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the
applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors
enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has
broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the
application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego
(Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews
implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict
scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no
less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those
rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,]
indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. x x x. Thus,
minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state
has a greater range of interests that justify the infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when
applicable, warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors
and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level
of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile
curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether
the state has a compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on
minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors
differently than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is
appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130
(Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the
peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the
State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with
the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under
the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect
class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden
of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State
interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the
means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally
declared policies.133This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the
State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute
compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give
way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State
has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on
adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this
compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the
late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As
denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in
imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their
proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead]
them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the
risk of committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth,
unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs
who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other
public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that
minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the
frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and
national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the
movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours,
protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there
is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth
spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of
society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious
activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information
gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance
subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own treatment of the
present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community,
in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-
shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would
materially assist its first stated interest—that of reducing juvenile violence
and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from many
sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey
of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of
Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On
the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that
keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a
safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less
wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at
night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping
decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale.
Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence.
"[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these
criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as
adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point.
Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community
clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for
children to come into contact with criminal influences,the City was directly
advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138
(Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of
Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective
pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles,
either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew
ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general welfare
clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have
not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns
on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling
State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew
Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now
proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances
are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the
cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny
test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the
fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing
legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights
may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling
interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more
narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must
be so narrowly drawn.141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to
regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in
any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the
present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure
minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their
other constitutional rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional
impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment
of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It
observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve
Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services
at the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from
attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches.
Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and
sisters from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned
services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even
attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently
do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance,
clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note
52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven
exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional
muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights,
travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious,
school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this
Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed
requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the
curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of
legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of
medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and
the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00
p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a)
minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended
a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d)
those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running
errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal
age having authority over them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities,
and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the
night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls'
Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that
their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly
restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances
protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night
from school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas
Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account
for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise
of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among
others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly
trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more
protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it
still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it
hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities
in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of
association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in
legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also
contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development,
yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during
Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from
attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night
without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149
This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise
their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to
engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their
concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in
these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to
prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew
hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to
protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming
prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely
hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the
Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance,
with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken
down since their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope
and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection
of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be
valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2)
ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It
provides the following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances
shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;
(a)
Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b)
Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass,
and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein
their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such
minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond
their control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c)
Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as
conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers
encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d)
When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going
to or returning home from the same place of employment activity without
any detour or stop;
(e)
When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an
adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f)
When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g)
When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school,
religious, recreational, educational, social, communitv or other similar private
activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that
supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or returning home from
such activity, without any detour or stop; and
(h)
When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and
was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working
student.152 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the
Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the
minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items
uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official and
extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other
legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free
expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance
in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during
the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free
exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In
relation to their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants
to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with
these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of
minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger
is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her
minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the
night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly
considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as
accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its
constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable
construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure
with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but only
complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself
prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but
primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on
these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by
law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully
understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was
observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State,
as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full
rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's compelling
interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court
finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably
justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional.
Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the
State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not
precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters
of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was
raised- to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA
9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parentis or
guardian under Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the
minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his
or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community
service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be
unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed
therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to
the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this
ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall
consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the
offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years
of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about
the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and
For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to
ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at
the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by
the Punong Barangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose
on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and
admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for
status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an offense or not
penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and
shall not be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local
governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to,
curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-
drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order
or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal,
harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism,
gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for
the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said
violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any
barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such
ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a
"child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for
intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for
children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that
curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not
considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what
they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors,
without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-
A.
"Penalty" 157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in
the form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p]unishment imposed by lawful
authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act."159
Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty,
confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a
person who has violated the law."160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all
the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal
consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt
appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs161
recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid
form of intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City
in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the
welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors
an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their
delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention.
In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance
with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the
opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote
their integration to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way
of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel
or warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines
admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while the
Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild
rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an
expression of authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence
in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall
not be considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and
admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and
are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be
clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for
the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his
future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and
fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor.
Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The
Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does
not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law
Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof,
administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he
belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words,
reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the
error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring
individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public
against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject
the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval
from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that
reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute
penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and
jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently
prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and
unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x
x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of
reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations,
portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably
conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and
hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service
programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not
constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed
the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently
shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile
crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of
the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this
interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate
exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights
during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to
achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to
include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of
enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and
thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as
constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal
provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict
with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be
struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares
Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila,
and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-
2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,VALID in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 218970, June 28, 2017
RICHARD ESCALANTE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
October 13, 2014 Decision1 and June 9, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35771, which affirmed the May 22, 2013
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela City (RTC),
finding petitioner Richard Escalante (Escalante) guilty of violating Section
10(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Escalante was charged with the crime of child abuse committed against AAA,
who was then a twelve (12) year old minor. When arraigned, he pleaded "not
guilty." Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented private complainant, AAA, and Leonora Abrigo
Mariano (Mariano), Records Custodian of Fatima Medical Center. Their
combined testimonies tended to prove that at around midnight of December
24, 2006, AAA accompanied his classmate Mark in going home. On his way
back from Mark's house, AAA was called by Escalante and was pulled into a
comfort room at the Divine School in Parada, Valenzuela City. Once inside,
Escalante pulled down AAA's shorts and sucked the latter's penis for about
ten (10) minutes. Shortly thereafter, he forcibly inserted AAA's penis into his
anus.
Four (4) days after the incident, AAA complained to his mother that he was
experiencing pain in his penis and had difficulty in urinating. He divulged the
incident to his mother, who then brought him to the Fatima Medical Center
for examination. In the course of the examination, it was determined that he
was afflicted with gonorrhoea, a sexually-transmitted disease and urinary
tract infection.4
Evidence of the Defense
The defense presented Escalante, his father Nicomedes Escalante, and their
neighbor Josephine Salada (Salada). Their combined testimonies tended to
establish that at around midnight of December 24, 2006, Escalante was in
Salada's house celebrating Christmas Eve; that the celebration started at
10:00 o'clock in the evening and lasted between 1:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock
the following morning; that he could not have been in the school because he
never left Salada's house as he was tasked with passing around shots of
liquor; and that Salada's house was only a thirty (30)-minute ride away from
the place where the incident occurred.
The RTC Ruling
In its May 22, 2013 Decision, the RTC found Escalante guilty of violating
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. It ruled that the totality of the prosecution's
evidence was sufficient to establish that he physically and sexually abused
AAA. The RTC did not give credence to Escalante's alibi as it found AAA's
identification of the accused as his assailant credible. It added that Escalante's
alibi was not convincing enough to prove that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the location of the crime. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused RICHARD ESCALANTE guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal for violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 in
relation to Sec. 3(b), No. 1 & 2, and in the absence of any modifying
circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The accused is likewise ordered to pay AAA the amount of Php50,000.00 as
moral damages and to pay a fine of Php15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, Escalante appealed before the CA. In his Appellant's Brief,6 he
contended that he was not positively identified by AAA as his abuser; that
AAA could not readily recognize him as the former testified that the place
where he was abused was dark; that more than three (3) years had passed
when AAA testified in court, making his recollection doubtful; and that AAA
only identified the supposed culprit by a mere photograph which had not
been authenticated and its origins as well as its processing were never
established.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, dated October 13, 2014, the CA affirmed Escalante's
conviction for the crime of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
It held that AAA's testimony was credible because there was no reason for
him to fabricate such a story, considering that he was only a child and it was
unlikely that he would place himself in such a humiliating experience. It
disregarded Escalante's alibi as he was positively identified and it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of
the incident.
Escalante moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in
its assailed Resolution dated June 9, 2015.
Hence, this appeal raising:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SOLE ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY DESPITE
REASONABLE DOUBT OWING TO THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
REALLY POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.7
Escalante averred that AAA merely pointed to a picture of him during trial. He
argued that he was not positively identified as the photograph used to
identify him was not authenticated and its origins were never established.
Moreover, he challenged the credibility and accuracy of AAA's testimony as it
was given after more than three (3) years from the date of the alleged abuse.
In its Comment,8 dated January 25, 2016, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) countered that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. At any rate, the OSG argued that
even if the petition be given due course, it is still without merit as Escalante's
conviction was proven beyond reasonable doubt. It explained that AAA had
positively identified Escalante as the assailant, and the fact that it was done
through photographs did not diminish the veracity of the identification. The
OSG pointed out that in spite of notice and warning, Escalante failed to
appear in court for identification, and his counsel did not object to the
manner of identification adopted because of his absence. At any rate, it
argued that in-court identification is not essential when there is no doubt as
to the identity of the accused as the person charged in the Information.
The OSG contended that the evidence on record sufficiently established
Escalante's guilt of the crime charged. It stated that his act constituted child
abuse as it amounted to sexual, physical and psychological abuse. The OSG
bewailed that Escalante's act was an assault on the dignity and intrinsic worth
of AAA as a human being.
In his Manifestation in lieu of Reply,9 dated August 3, 2016, Escalante averred
that he was adopting his Appellant's Brief before the CA as his Reply as all the
relevant issues had been extensively and exhaustively argued therein.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Only questions of law may be raised
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
before the Court.10 A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an
appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law and only in
exceptional circumstances has the Court entertained questions of fact.11
Although Escalante admits that his petition presents questions of fact, he
insists that his case is an exception to the general rule because the factual
findings of the lower courts are not supported by the records. A scrutiny
thereof, however, shows that none of the exceptions are present to warrant
a review.
Granting that exceptional circumstances exist warranting the Court to
entertain the present petition, the merits of the case still fail to convince.
Escalante was sufficiently and appropriately identified
In People v. Pineda,12 the Court laid down the guidelines in identifications of
accused through photographs, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series
of photographs must be shown, and not merely of that of the suspect. The
second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their
arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures
pertains to the suspect.13 [Emphases supplied]
The said guidelines are necessary considering that the out-of-court
identification of an accused is susceptible to suggestiveness. These
paramaters are in place to make the identification of the accused as objective
as possible.
In the case at bench, there is no reason to doubt AAA's identification of
Escalante. It is noteworthy that the identification was done in open court.
Further, the trial court adopted a similar manner with out-of-court
identifications through photographs. As culled from the records, AAA was
presented with several pictures in open court from which he was asked to
pinpoint who was his abuser. He was able to identify Escalante without any
leading question which clearly suggests that the picture identified was that of
the latter.
Thus, AAA's identification was objective enough to be credible because it was
done under court supervision and with the added parameters usually
observed in out-of-court identifications. Significantly, no objections were
raised over the manner in which Escalante was identified, which, it must be
noted, was only resorted to because he failed to appear in court for
identification.
Escalante's alibi fails to impress
In People v. Ramos,14 the Court explained that in order for alibi to prosper,
the accused must be able to establish that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the crime scene. It wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
However, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that
she was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime,
and (b) that it was physically impossible for her to be at the scene of the crime
during its commission. Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility
of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the
crime was committed. She must demonstrate that she was so far away and
could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.15
Escalante himself admitted that Salada's house was merely a thirty (30)-
minute ride away from the scene of the crime. Obviously, it was very possible
for him to be at the place at that time. Escalante's witnesses even testified
that they were not with him the entire time. He could have easily left Salada's
house and return without his absence being noticed considering the number
of people present and the proximity of Salada's house from the crime scene.
Thus, Escalante failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the crime scene at the time of the incident.
Further, AAA positively identified Escalante. Alibis and denials are worthless
in light of positive identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely
testify.16 The RTC and the CA found no cogent reason for AAA to fabricate
his allegations against Escalante.
Child Abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, not Section 10(a) thereof
It is axiomatic that when an accused appeals his judgment of conviction, he
waives his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the
entire case open for appellate review.17 The Court is tasked to render such
judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of its concomitant
authority to review and sift through the whole case and correct any error,
even if unassigned.18 This authority includes modifying the penalty
imposed—either increasing or decreasing the same.
Escalante was convicted by the RTC of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A.
No. 7610. The correct provision, however, should be Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, which imposes a higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: xxx
On the other hand, Section 10(a) thereof states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As can be gleaned from the above-mentioned provisions, Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 specifically applies in case of sexual abuse committed against
children; whereas, Section 10(a) thereof punishes other forms of child abuse
not covered by other provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Parenthetically, the offense
will not fall under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 if the same is specifically
penalized by a particular provision of the law such as Section 5(b) for sexual
abuse.
In People v. Larin,19 the Court stated that the elements of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3)
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. It further
ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is
abused for profit, but also in which a child, through coercion or intimidation,
engages in any lascivious conduct. Hence, the foregoing provision penalizes
not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms
of sexual abuse of children.20 [Emphasis supplied]
All of the foregoing elements are present in the case at bench.
First, in forcibly sucking AAA's penis and thereafter inserting it in his anus,
Escalante, without question exposed AAA to lascivious conduct. Second, AAA
is a child subjected to other sexual abuse. In Caballo v. People (Caballo),21
the Court ruled that a child who engages in sexual or lascivious conduct due
to the coercion or influence is a child subjected to other sexual abuse,
viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when
a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act
as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to
their development.22
In addition, the Court, in Caballo considered the age disparity between an
adult and a minor as indicia of coercion or influence. In the case at bench,
AAA was only twelve (12) years old at the time of the sexual abuse. The
records, on the other hand, disclosed that Escalante was twenty (20) years
old at the time of the commission of the crime. The disparity of eight (8) years
between them placed Escalante in a stronger position over AAA to exert his
will upon the latter. In addition, AAA testified in open court that he could not
resist because he feared Escalante as the latter was taller and bigger than
him.
Further, the fact that the sexual encounter between Escalante and AAA
occurred only once does not remove it from the ambit of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610. In Quimvel v. People,23 the Court expounded that sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 includes sexual maltreatment of the child,
whether habitual or not, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b)
of RA 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act
of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of. For it refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec.
5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse
against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront.
xxx

It is as my esteemed colleagues Associate Justices Diosdado M. Peralta and
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe reminded the Court. Ratio legis est anima. The
reason of the law is the soul of the law. In this case, the law would have
miserably failed in fulfilling its loft purpose of providing special protection to
children from all forms of abuse if the Court were to interpret its penal
provisions so as to require the additional element or contemporaneous abuse
that is different from what is complained of, and if the Court were to require
that a third person act in concert with the accused. [Emphases supplied]
Third, AAA's minority was sufficiently established. As shown by his birth
certificate, he was only twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged sexual
assault occurred. All in all, it is clear that Escalante, an adult with all his
influence and power over the minor AAA, coerced the latter into satiating his
sexual urges at the expense of his youth, innocence and purity. Surely, such
perverse actions warrant the harsher penalty under R.A. No. 7610 in
consonance with the State's policy to protect children from all forms of abuse
or exploitation.
Finally, even if the Information does not categorically state that Escalante was
being charged with child abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, he may
still be convicted for the said crime. It is doctrinal that it is not the title of the
complaint or information which is controlling but the recital of facts
contained therein. The information must sufficiently allege the acts or
omissions complained of to inform a person of common understanding what
offense he is being charged with—in other words the elements of the crime
must be clearly stated.24 A closer perusal of the allegation under the
Information discloses that it is sufficient to charge Escalante with sexual
abuse under the Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 as it
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about December 25, 2006, in Valenzuela City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully and unlawfully committed acts
of child abuse against AAA, (Complainant), 12 years old (DOB: March, 2,
1994), by kissing his neck down to his sex organ and forced the complainant
to insert his sex organ into the anus of Richard Escalante thereby subjecting
said minor to psychological and physical abuse, cruelty and emotional
maltreatment and which act debased, degraded and demeaned her (sic)
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
Contrary to law.25 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the present case, the Information alleged that Escalante kissed AAA's neck
down to his sex organ and forcibly inserted AAA's penis into his anus. Further,
the evidence on record proves that AAA was coerced into submitting to
Escalante's will as he was unable to put up any resistance out of fear. As
earlier stated, AAA's minority was satisfactorily established.
In the case at bench, both the Information and the evidence on record spell
out a case of sexual abuse punishable under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
Hence, the penalty imposed against Escalante should be modified
accordingly.
To recapitulate, Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, wherein a penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period is prescribed, contemplates any other
acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development. In contrast, Section 5(b) thereof specifically applies
to the commission of the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct to a
child subjected to other sexual abuse.
Based on the foregoing, Escalante should suffer the penalties imposed in
Section 5(b), not Section 10(a), of R.A. No. 7610. In Pinlac v. People (Pinlac),26
the Court categorically enumerated the penalties and damages to be imposed
on accused convicted under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on those who commit
acts of lasciviousness with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse. Notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a special law,
the petitioner in this case may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. In applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period. Thus, the CA correctly imposed the indeterminate
sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
The CA likewise correctly ordered petitioner to pay "AAA" the following
amounts: P20,000.00 in the concept of civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral
damages, and a fine of P15,000.00 pursuant to Section 31 (f), Article XII of RA
7610. In addition, this Court also orders petitioner to pay "AAA" P15,000.00
by way of exemplary damages.
In the case at bench, the imposition of a penalty similar to Pinlac is warranted.
In both cases, the accused performed oral sex on the victim minor. In Pinlac,
the accused had oral sex with the minor for two successive days. On the other
hand, Escalante had oral sex with AAA first and then inserted the latter's penis
to his anus.
WHEREFORE, the October 13, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 35771 is hereby MODIFIED, in that, petitioner Richard Escalante,
is found guilty of Child Abuse punishable under Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. 7610 and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also
ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity; P15,000.00
as moral damages; P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 fine
plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this decision until the same have been fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
January 11, 2018
G.R. No. 212448
AAA, Petitioner
vs.
BBB, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting
psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise known
as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004,
committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship
occurred or is occurring outside the country?
The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition2 for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify
the Resolutions dated February 24, 20143 and May 2, 20144 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468. The
assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the Information5 which
charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as
follows:
On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [BBB], being then legally married to [AAA], caused herein
[AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with a
certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his purported
paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter by his mother
mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of
[AAA], in violation of the aforecited law.
Contrary to law.
We briefly recount the antecedents.
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their
union produced two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on
October 1, 2009.6
In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he
acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008. This petition
nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents
reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until
March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents'
house in Pasig City.7
AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no
financial support, and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly
extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight
attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment
of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters
worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman
named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things
came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation
at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids.8 As can be
gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied
forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge
BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged
marital infidelity.9
The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB.
AAA was also able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who
continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was
archived.10
On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused
With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure
Order and Warrant of Arrest11 was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the
motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing
the case, the trial court reasoned:
Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable
cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime charged,
considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained
of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the
Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
xxxx
The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that since [AAA]
has been suffering from mental and emotional anguish "wherever she goes'',
jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court notwithstanding that the
acts resulting in said suffering had happened outside of the Philippines. To
the mind of the Court, with it noting that there is still as yet no jurisprudence
on this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the
act itself which had caused a woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish
must have occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for it to enjoy
jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use of the emphatic
word "causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes the
bringing about or into existence of something. Hence, the mental or
emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been brought about or
into existence by a criminal act which must logically have occurred within the
territorial limits of the Court for jurisdiction over the offense to attach to it.
To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory one of the basic
characteristics of our criminal laws - territoriality.
In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of (sic)
access to the woman's child/children" - it becomes clear that there must be
an act which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation", and it is such act which partakes of a criminal nature. Here, such
act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a certain Liesel
Mok" - which has been conceded to have been committed in Singapore.
Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written,
quashal of the Information must still be ordered following the underlying
fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At
best, the Court draws the attention of Congress to the arguments on
jurisdiction spawned by the law.12 (Emphasis in the original)
Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal of the case, AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the
instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in
danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law
because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women
have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any
consequence, as long as they are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues
that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense
charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not
only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of
Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of the case.
In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides:
Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women
and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant. (Emphasis ours)
As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order,
AAA directs us to:
Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
In his Comment13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of
the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a
criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party; and. that this
petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought before this
Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel
for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that the
petition was belatedly filed.
We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should
entertain the petition.
It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that
the instant petition was belatedly filed. The date erroneously perceived by
BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for Extension14 was filed - June 2, 2014 -
refers to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court and not the date
when the said motion was lodged before this Comi. The motion was in fact
filed on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the Rules
of Court to file the intended petition. Thus, considering the timeliness of the
motion, this Comi in a Resolution15 dated June 9, 2014, granted AAA an
additional period of thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014 to file a petition for
review.
In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting
the OSG's response to her Letter16 dated May 26, 2014 requesting for
representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for assistance in
filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name
before the lapse of the extension given her by this Court or on June 25, 2014.
We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be
better served by entertaining the petition if only to resolve the question of
law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et al., 17
where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a question
of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG's
participation, we recalled the instances when the Court permitted an
offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One
such instance is when the interest of substantial justice so requires.18
Morillo, 19 also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a
reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or
that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either
because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or
sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word
dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the
defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the
ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal
because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove
that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it
were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of
competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant
may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.20 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an
acquittal, which in limited instances may only be repudiated by a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the
accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.21
Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or
involved."22 "There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth
or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the c01Tect
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter."23
Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the
peculiar provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is a question of law. Thus, in Morillo,24
the Court reiterated that:
[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the
filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a
proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the
jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.25
(Citations omitted)
We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the
charge against BBB, much less weigh the evidence, especially as the case had
not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for
resolution concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a
given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived
of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under
R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit
relationship took place outside the Philippines.
The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that
there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score, prompting it to quash the
Information even as it maintained its earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that
probable cause exists in the case.26 Calling the attention of Congress to the
arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law,27 the RTC furnished copies of
the assailed order to the House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate
through the Committee on Youth, Women and Public Relations, as well as the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights.28
The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present
economic reality that a great number of Filipino families have at least one
parent working overseas. In. April to September 2016, the number of
overseas Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2 million,
97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas contract workers or those
with existing work contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas without
contract.29 It is thus necessary to clarify how R.A. No. 9262 should be applied
in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case of psychological abuse
brought against the husband when such is allegedly caused by marital
infidelity carried on abroad.
Ruling of the Court
There is merit in the petition.
"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse,
particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to
encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may
be committed against women and their children:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women
and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed
against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
xxxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or .unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
xxxx
As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out the essential
elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling
v. People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of
psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No.
9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:
(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a
woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's
child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional
anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody
of minor children or access to the children or similar· such acts or omissions.
xxxx
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological
violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children. Other
forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other subparts of Section 5.
xxxx
Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is
the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish
is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or
similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary
to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to
this party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is
not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental
or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence
inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital
infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which
psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the
circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit
relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on
the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential
and distinct element in the commission of the offense.
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the
Court explained that:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis
in the original)
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As
correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means employed by the
perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally
essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal
to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous
to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:
The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses
employed by the accused, as shown in the vouchers, might have been
perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal
action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and
damage are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case
appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in
Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a transitory
offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material
and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one
province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to
try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
case will exclude the others x x x[.]35
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law
contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may
manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material
and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged
with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or territory where the offense was in part committed.36
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive
conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to
Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that
the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of
the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present
scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents
of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise
jurisdiction over the case.
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information
relates to BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the
purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond
reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative
to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is
simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No.
9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is
conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing
the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the
same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond
the reach of Philippine courts.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
February 24, 2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.