1 PEOPLE v.
EBET (2) The incomplete entry in the police blotter must not
G.R. No. 181635 | November 15, 2010 | J. Peralta
FACTS:
● EBET was charged with crime of Robbery with Homicide.
● Prosecution: presented the testimonies of Evelyn and Joan
Parcasio, testifying as to the ff facts:
○ On the day of the incident, 3 men entered the house
of sps. Parcasio.
○ The wife (Evelyn) recognized one of them to be
appellant EBET, having been a constant visitor of her
husband.
○ EBET was seen holding a knife and standing at the
door of the house. The 2 other men wielded a knife
to Evelyn and their daughter, Joan, looking for the
husband (Gabriel).
○ Evelyn heard her husband shout for her and her
daughter to run, which they did. Thereafter, a
gunshot was heard.
○ Joan returned to the house after hearing the
gunshot. It was then that the men robbed her
belongings.
○ When the men left the premises, Evelyn saw her
husband bleeding to death due to multiple stab
wounds. The husband eventually died.
● Defense: presented EBET’s own testimony claiming that he
was in another neighboring house butchering a pig, at the
time of incident.
● Trial Court: found EBET guilty giving credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. CA: affirmed.
● EBET argues that
(1) prosecution witnesses failed to positively identify him;
(2) the testimony of Joan during the trial was contrary to
her earlier statement in the police blotter wherein she
denied knowing the identity of the perpetrator; and
(3) the trial court, in rejecting the defense of alibi, simply
adopted the general principle of alibi as a defense,
being inherently weak, but failed to point out any
inconsistencies and falsities to his testimony.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in giving full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. - NO
HELD:
(1) The testimonies of the witnesses clearly showed that the
EBET was categorically identified as one of the men who
took part in the perpetration of the crime.
During the trial, the witnessed positively identified EBET by
pinpointing him when asked to identify one of the perpetrators.
The SC found the testimonies of Evelyn and Joan Parcasio are
truthworthy, honest and straightforward. Prosecution's
testimonies have not been assailed. No motive was advanced by
the defense why the witnesses will falsely testify and implicate
the accused in the commission of such a heinous crime.
When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness
for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit. Denial, like alibi is inherently a
weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed
the crime.
overcome the positive and categorical identification of appellant
as one of the perpetrators.
The culprits, including EBET, were still on the loose when the
police blotter was made. This explains the reason why Joan, still
distraught over the sudden and unexpected death of her father,
hesitated to divulge the identity of appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the gory killing of her father. Notwithstanding the
entry in the police blotter, Evelyn and Joan Parcasio, on the day
after the crime was committed, executed their respective sworn
statements, positively identifying EBET as one of the culprits.
Thus, clearly, it is only the incomplete police blotter that appears
to be inconsistent. However, the said inconsistency has been
cured by the sworn statements and the testimonies given in open
court.
(3) There is no merit to the defense of denial and alibi presented
by EBET.
EBET failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be physically
present at the place where the crime had taken place and when
the crime was being committed. For alibi to prosper, it must
strictly meet the requirements of time and place. SC has always
upheld that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and
must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and
positively ascertained the identity of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.
ANTONIO LEJANO et. al. v. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Rule 133, Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt.
— In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral
certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
FACTS: (long because of the witness testimony which is important
because it was the basis for conviction of the accused-appellants)
· In 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters were
killed at their home in Paranaque
· The suspects were arrested, some of whom gave
detailed confessions.
o The court smelled a frame-up and eventually
ordered them discharged
· In 1995, NBI announced that it had solved the crime
and presented star witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its
informers.
o She pointed to several persons namely: Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada,
Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the
culprits and police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessory after the fact.
o The public prosecutors filed an Information for
Rape with Homicide relying on Alfaro’s
testimony.
· RTC tried 7 of the accused (Ventura and Filart were at
large)
· Prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with
the others corroborating her testimony.
o Other witnesses: medico-legal officer who autopsied
the bodies, security guards of the Subdivision
 where the victims resided, former
laundrywoman of the Webb household, and
Biong’s ex-gf and Lauro Vizcondo, Estrellita’s
husband.
· Alfaro's testimony
o Alfaro drove with boyfriend Estrada to Ayala
Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy
shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There,
Ventura introduced her to his friends: the
accused-appellants in this case.
o Webb approached and requested her to relay a
message to a girl, whom she later identified as
Carmela. Alfaro agreed. After using up their
shabu, the group drove to Carmela’s house
o Upon reaching their destination, Alfaro approached
Carmela’s house. When Carmela came out,
Alfaro gave her Webb’s message that he was
just around. Carmela replied, however, that she
could not go out yet. She told Alfaro to return
after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to
Webb who then told the group to drive back to
the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
o The group had another shabu session. After
sometime, they drove back. Carmela was at their
garden and told the Alfaro that she had to leave
the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro
to return before midnight and she would leave
the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the
kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked
o Alfaro waited for Carmela to leave and trailed her
where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro
believed was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked
for her group and relayed Carmela’s instructions
to Webb. They went back to the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro
told Webb of Carmela’s male companion, and
Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the night.
o After sometime, Webb decided that it was time for
them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya at
ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang
susunod" and the others responded "Okay,
okay." They all left the parking lot ito Carmela’s
house for the third time. They arrived before
midnight.
o When they arrived, Webb told the others again that
they would line up for Carmela but he would be
the first.
o Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian
gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura followed her. On entering the garage,
Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the
Vizcondes’ car and loosened the electric bulb
over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The group
went through the open iron grill gate and passed
the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the screen
door of the kitchen for them.
o As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro
decided to go out. As she was leaving, she saw
Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer looking for
something. Alfaro walked to her car. She found
her other companions milling around it.
o After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro
returned to the Vizconde house, using the same
route. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura
searching a lady’s bag. When she asked him
what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga
dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She did not find any.
o While she was at a spot leading to the dining area,
she heard a static noise. Out of curiosity, she
approached the master’s bedroom. As she
walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela
while she lay with her back on the floor. Two
bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at
the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket.
Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears
while Webb raped her
o Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she
immediately left the room. Shocked with what
she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the
others who were either sitting in her car or
milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and
turned on the engine but she did not know
where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came
out of the house just then. Webb suddenly
picked up a stone and threw it at the main door,
breaking its glass frame.
o They all rode in their cars and drove away. The
convoy of cars went to a house at BF Executive
Village. They entered the compound and
gathered at the lawn where the "blaming
session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and
those who remained outside the Vizconde house
learned what happened. The first to be killed
was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and finally,
Carmela.
o At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo
Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and
clean up the Vizconde house
· Defense presented the testimonies of the accused:
o Some denied any part in the crime and saying they
were elsewhere when it took place
o Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he
claimed that he was then across the ocean in the
United States of America. He presented the
testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary
and object evidence to prove this through (a)
the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration
checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second
immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive
identification; and (f) a documented alibi.
o Presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad
reputation for truth and the incredible nature of
her testimony.
· RTC: found all the accused guilty as charged
o Impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the
crime and the events surrounding it, the trial
court found a credible witness in her.
o Thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb,
Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for
their defense
o Compared to Alfaro’s testimony that other
witnesses and the physical evidence
corroborated.
· CA: affirmed
· Webb filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which the
Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from
Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still
under the safekeeping of the NBI.
 · However, NBI informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over
to the trial court.
o Trial record shows that the specimen was not
among the object evidence that the prosecution
offered in evidence in the case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness,
describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others
as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to
prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the
others in committing the crime
HELD:
1. NO. Alfaro’s testimony cannot be relied upon since
some facts narrated provided no logic as to the natural
course of things that should have occured. The accused-
appellants cannot be convicted through such faulty proof.
Ø Suspicious Details
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI as an "asset." She
supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and
other criminals. Some of this information led to the capture of
notorious drug pushers. Because of her talent, the task force gave
her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling,"
allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at
NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they
teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she
unexpectedly told Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the
NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force
(AKHAR) Section that she knew someone who had the real story
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro
promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When
this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she
told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
WHY WOULD ALFARO’S TESTIMONY BE UNRELIABLE? The
Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying
details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the
crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them. The
police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and
charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions
of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details that
the evidence of the crime scene provided. It would not be too
difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain
access to the documents. The NBI people had a stake in making
her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the
preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good
substitute witness.
Ø Quality of the testimony
Her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An
understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior
of people will help expose a lies which has an abundant presence
in this case.
1) Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed
twice the gang-rape of Carmela. And twice, they (including,
if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in
a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmela’s
house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the
house.
2) Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the
first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot
by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webb’s
messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at
her home?
3) When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the
second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out
and that Webb and his friends should come back around
midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela
to drive out in her own car. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy
on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she
was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had
to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to
come with his friends and harm Carmela.
4) According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s
house the third time around midnight, she led Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that
Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the
gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He
decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s
house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a
stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no
role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the
others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make
sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something
she did not see.
5) Alfaro went out of the house and quickly went to her
car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She
did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She
entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified
that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few
minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house,
knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela,
was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This
emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was
confused with her own lies.
Positive identification must meet at least two criteria: 1) the
positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth,
usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one
who knows her, its weight in gold and 2) the witness’ story of
what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw
runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony
fail to meet the above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a
spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been
hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one
paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Although
her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the
details that the investigators knew of the case. She took
advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her
testimony.
2. YES
Ø Webb’s U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through
(a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) the
second immigration check; and (d) alibi versus positive
identification; and e) a documented alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and
his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to
learn the value of independence, hard work, and money. Gloria
Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight
to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah
Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire
Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of
his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party
b. The two immigration checks
Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine
Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and
stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s
visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S.
Immigration where his entry into that country was recorded.
Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with
its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry
into the U.S.
c. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both
the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his
departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications
that confirmed his entry. When he arrived in Manila, Webb again
went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival
stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila
RTC and CA are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their
reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s
positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela
and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger
sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi
were fabricated. But not all denials and alibis should be regarded
as fabricated.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and
satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. This
was proven by the evidence that Webb presented.
Ø Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's
testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to
Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For,
if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S.
when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold
together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.
Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
OTHER ARGUMENT:
Ø The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to
outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due
process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court
either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen
taken from Carmela. When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule
governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet
have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine
precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after
the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come
up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the
matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime. After the trial
court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions
gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to
challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the
other accused.
They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely
as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision
in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals
court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their
appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime
passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack
of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed
put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the
semen specimen at some future time.
VERGARA v. PEOPLE
TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 160328. February 04, 2005]
NOTE: BP 22, Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer
pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or make
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee.
FACTS:
● Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR) granted Perpetual
Garments Corporation (PERPETUAL) a continuing credit
line in the amount of P750,000.00. The parties agreed
that for each availment from the line, PERPETUAL
would execute a promissory note and issue postdated
checks corresponding to the amount of the loan.
● Petitioner, in her capacity as Vice President and
General Manager of PERPETUAL, signed the credit
agreement and all the postdated checks.
● One of the checks issued and signed by petitioner was
Check No. 019972 for P150,000.00. When deposited
on December 15, 1988, the check was dishonored for
insuffiency of funds. On the same month, LIVECOR
verbally informed petitioner of the dishonor of the
check.
● On April 1, 1991, LIVECOR charged petitioner with
violation of BP 22.
● The prosecution claims that petitioner failed to pay the
full amount of Check No. 019972 or to make
arrangements for its full payment within 5 days from
notice of dishonor thereof in December 1988.
● Although petitioner made cash and check payments
after the dishonor, the same were treated by LIVECOR
as continuing payments of the outstanding loan.
● The payments were applied first to the interests and
penalties while the rest were applied to the principal,
pursuant to the terms of the agreement. As of
February 29, 1992, PERPETUALs total outstanding loan
is P610,656.95.
● Petitioner averred that she cannot be charged with
violation of BP 22 because she replaced Check No.
 019972 on May 25, 1989, with 6 checks, each for
P25,000.00 or for the total amount of P150,000.00.
● She claimed that from the time of dishonor up to
March 1992, PERPETUAL paid LIVECOR P542,000.00
thus covering the full amount of the dishonored check.
● On June 10, 1992, the trial court rendered decision
finding petitioner guilty of violating BP 22.
● CA affirmed RTC decision, hence the appeal.
ISSUE(S): WON petitioner was properly notified of the dishonor,
thus providing prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit?
HELD: NO
RATIO:
1. To hold petitioner liable for violation of BP 22, it is not
enough that she issued the check that was
subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It
must also be shown beyond reasonable doubt that she
knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the
check was issued.
2. The prima facie presumption arises when a check is
issued. But the law also provides that the presumption
does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the
check or makes arrangement for its payment within
five banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee.
3. BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the
amount indicated in the check and thus avert
prosecution. Even assuming that petitioner was
properly notified of the dishonor, still, the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds
would not arise.
4. There is more credence to petitioners allegation that
she replaced the bounced check with 6 checks, each
for P25,000.00, or a total of P150,000.00. For more
than 2 years after the dishonor, LIVECOR accepted the
payments made by PERPETUAL without complain.
5. In addition, it appears that it has been the practice of
LIVECOR to allow its client to redeem the dishonored
checks and replace them with new ones. testimonies
do not categorically prove exactly when petitioner
received the notice of dishonor. Hence, there was no
way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed
in Section 2 of BP 22 would start and end.
6. In Danao v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that: “if
there is no proof as to when such notice was received
by the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie
evidence provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot
arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning
the crucial 5-day period.
7. In the present case, no proof of receipt by petitioner of
any notice of non-payment of the checks was ever
presented during the trial. As found by the trial court
itself, (t)he evidence however is not clear when
Macasieb (private complainant) made the demands.
There is no proof of the date when DANAO received the
demand letter (Exh. F).Obviously, in the instant case,
there is no way of determining when the 5-day period
prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and
end. Thus, the presumption or prima facie evidence of
knowledge by the petitioner of the insufficiency of
funds or credit at the times she issued the checks did
not arise.”
8. The presumption that the issuer has knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only
after it is proved that the issuer had received notice of
dishonor and that within 5 banking days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for its payment. The prosecution is
burdened to prove these acts that give rise to the
prima facie presumption.
9. At any rate, even if the P25,000.00 dishonored check
be excluded from the P423,365.00 payments made by
petitioner, the remaining balance thereof is still more
than the P150,000.00 dishonored check subject of the
instant case. The records show that she paid
P423,354.00 to LIVECOR from Dec. 1988 to April 1,
1991.
10. Although petitioner has not yet fully paid the loan, it
cannot be denied that the previous payments fully
covered the value of the dishonored check. It would be
unjust to penalize her for the issuance of said check
which has been satisfied 2 years prior to the filing of
the criminal charge against her
PEOPLE v. DONALDO PADILLA
G.R. No. 172603 | August 24, 2007 | Carpio-Morales, J.
DOCTRINE:
Even when the defense evidence is weak, the prosecution should
not lean thereon but must stand and rely on the strength and
merits of its own evidence.
FACTS:
Donaldo Padilla was charged before the RTC of Las Piñas for
violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act).
Version of the Prosecution:
● The Las Piñas police conducted a surveillance for 2
weeks of the residence of Malou Padilla (spouse of
Donaldo) for alleged drug trafficking.
● Armed with a search warrant, SPO2 Mabini Rosale and
Police Inspector Virgilio Pelaez, with the other
operatives, proceeded to the house. They noticed a
Nissan Altima car speeding away.
○ They were informed by the Padillas’ helper
that the couple was on board the said car.
● In coordination with the president of the homeowners’
association, the policemen proceeded to search the
Padilla residence.
○ They recovered aluminum foils and
suspected shabu tubes.
● While the policemen were still at the Padilla residence,
the security guard of the village informed them via
radio that persons on board a red Toyota car wanted
to go to the Padilla residence.
● When the policemen arrived at the village gate, they
asked the driver, Jose Hidalgo, Jr., why he was going to
the Padilla residence and the latter replied that he had
an important transaction.
● The policemen heard sounds from the trunk,
prompting them to inquire from Hidalgo what they
were.
○ Hidalgo opened the trunk and at that
instant, Donaldo readily handed over to the
policemen a blue plastic bag, saying: “Ito
ang hinahanap niyo.”
● After taking the photograph of Donaldo while he was
inside the trunk, SPO2 Rosale opened the plastic bag
which has 3 heat-sealed transparent packets and 1
self-sealing packet all containing suspected shabu.
 ● The policemen at once arrested Donaldo.
● The items inside the 4 packets were tested in the PNP
Crime Laboratory. The test yielded positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense:
● After Donaldo, his brother Luis, and Hidalgo attended a
party at their cousin’s house, they brought Donaldo
home.
● When they arrived at the gate of the village at around
4AM, they were stopped by the security guard because
their car has no village sticker.
● Donaldo informed the guard that he would just be
brought home.
● The guard informed Donaldo that there were
policemen in his house who were armed with a search
warrant against his wife, and advised him to just wait
at the gate as the policemen were on their way.
● When the policemen arrived, Donaldo asked for the
search warrant. The policemen replied that it was in
the possession of their companions who remained at
his residence.
● Without permission, the police started searching the
car but found nothing.
● As Donaldo was contacting his wife, the policemen told
him that all of them would go to where she was, which
they did.
● When Malou asked for the search warrant, the
policemen showed her “bulky” documents.
● When asked if they found anything in their house, the
policemen claimed that they found shabu
paraphernalia, which they never showed.
● The policemen invited Donaldo, Malou, Donaldo’s
brother and Hidalgo to the police station.
● Col. Alcantara, who was supposedly the commanding
officer of the raiding team, informed Donaldo that they
found evidence against him and offered him to settle
the matter for P200,000.
● As Donaldo could not produce the amount, Col.
Alcantara asked him to choose who among them
would be charged. Donaldo volunteered himself. The
others were thus released hours later.
RTC convicted Donaldo.
● It found unbelievable Donaldo’s claim that the charge
against him came about because he could not raise the
amount demanded by Col. Alcantara. It was not even
shown that the latter was charged for the alleged
attempt to extort money from Donaldo.
● It also found the defense witnesses Luis Padilla and
security guard Romeo Placido to be biased.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has established Donaldo’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. - NO.
RULING:
In convicting Donaldo, the CA relied, in the main, on the weakness
of the evidence for the defense, focusing on the following:
● How unavailing Donaldo’s claim of extortion by the
police officers is in light of a failure to show that they
were charged administratively;
● The bias of defense witnesses Luis and Placido; and
● The untruthfulness of Donaldo’s claim that he was the
only one charged, given that the Information itself
charged him and Hidalgo.
The SC finds the tale of the prosecution not to be in accordance
with human nature and the experience of mankind.
● It would be absurd for Donaldo to go back to his house
hours after allegedly escaping from the raiding team,
to thus risk being arrested when, chances were, the
police officers would be, as they were, still waiting for
him.
● Assuming that Donaldo did attempt to go back and
that he was carrying 400 grams of shabu, it would also
be absurd for him not to flee again after being
informed by the guard that his house was being
searched by the police and that the latter were on
their way to the gate.
● If indeed Donaldo was hiding in the trunk, it would also
be absurd for him to create noises that would arouse
the curiosity of the police.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused, particularly if the evidence for the
prosecution is weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be
strong enough to pierce the shield of this presumptive innocence
and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. And where the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient
to overcome this presumption, the judgment of conviction must
be set aside.
The prosecution’s failure to present the search warrant, the
photograph of Donaldo allegedly taken while he was inside the
trunk, and the seizure receipt showing that crystalline substance
was indeed recovered from Donaldo, as well as the policemen’s
service of and implementation of the alleged search warrant at an
unholy hour further weakened their case.
Also, the CA’s finding that Donaldo’s claim that he was the only
one charge is belied by the Information which also charged
Hidalgo is not exactly accurate. The Information shows Donaldo
was the only one charged. Hidalgo, whose whereabouts were
unknown, was, merely alleged to have conspired with Donaldo.
Even assuming arguendo that the defense evidence is weak, the
prosecution should not lean thereon but must stand and rely on
the strength and merits of its own evidence. The prosecution
having failed to discharge the onus of establishing prima facie
Donaldo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the defense did not
even have to present evidence, the burden of evidence not having
shifted to it. Donaldo is ACQUITTED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO
G.R. No. 155733 | January 27, 2006 | J. Corona
FACTS: The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa
Delgado and Lucio Campo, but were never married. Five other
children were born to the couple who are full-blood siblings of
Josefa and natural children of Felisa. Felisa also had another son
with another man (Ramon Osorio) named Luis Delgado. Josefa
Delgado died on September 1972 without a will. She was survived
by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives.
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but
whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to
petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife
but were never married. Petitioners point out that no record of
the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a
baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the
sponsors referred to her as an unmarried woman. They never had
any children but took into their home Guillermina and Nanie. They
were never legally adopted but was known in the local dialect as
ampun-ampunan. Guillermina was alleged to be the illegitimate
child of Guillermo with another woman.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not mean that no marriage transpired and
that Guillermina was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate
child and such right had prescribed upon the death of Guillermo.
They maintain that Guillermo and Josefa were married on June 3,
1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until
the death of Josefa. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and friends to
have in fact been married. To support their proposition, they
presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia; 2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to
Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947; 3. Veterans Application for
Pension or Compensation filed with the Veterans Administration
of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein
Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself swore to his marriage to Josefa
Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 4. Titles to real properties in
the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to
Josefa Delgado.
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed
the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate
estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with
the RTC of Manila. This petition was opposed by the following: (1)
the sisters of Guillermo Rustia; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s
late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan
Guillermina Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory
that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were
barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-
blood relative Josefa Delgado. Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to
intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving
descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors, the motion was granted.
The RTC ruled that petitioner and her co-claimants are entitled to
the estate of the late Josefa Delgado and declared as the only
legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado. Similarly, the intervenor
Guillerma Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving
heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the
entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the
oppositors and the other parties hereto. As the estates of both
decedents have not as yet been settled, a single administrator
was appointed in the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela
Rosa. LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION were issued to CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of P500,000.00.
Upon appeal in the CA said court reversed the decision.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage between (1) Guillermo and Josefa and
between (2) Felisa and Ramon are proven?
HELD:
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their
reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the
original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record
of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness attesting
that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no
marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage
arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The
evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage
but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado
as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo
Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of
the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose
testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position,
confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as
husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was
no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried
("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every
intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed
to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society
and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be,
they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of
law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
presume marriage.
The marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may
overturn them. On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one
of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in
the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa
Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents)
chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of
the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad
Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo
natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently
overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado
and Ramon Osorio were never married.
(additional issue: As to who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado)
Since Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations
with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-
blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the
decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.
The SC ruled that succession should be allowed, even when the
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The
reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the
case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the
difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate
relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the
law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. The court
ruled that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers
and sisters should be applicable to them.
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia- Intervenor Guillerma Rustia
is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was
already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.
Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases: (2) when
the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in
any authentic writing. Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on
two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and
second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. There
was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an
illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative
father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any
judicial action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual
limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed. Therefore the right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of
Guillermo Rustia.
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES v. RADIO
MINDANAO NETWORK, INC
G.R. NO. 147039 January 27, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Radio Mindanao Network contracted with
DBP Pool and Provident Insurance Corp each under a Fire
Insurance Policy. When respondent’s radio station in Bacolod was
razed by fire, their claims under both insurance policies were
denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an expected risk
excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d), to wit:
6. This insurance does not cover any loss
or damage occasioned by or through or in
consequence, directly or indirectly, of any
of the following consequences, namely:
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy,
hostilities, or warlike operations (whether
war be declared or not), civil war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military
or usurped power
The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed
that the fire was caused by members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA). Hence,
respondent was constrained to file a civil case against petitioner
and Provident for recovery of insurance benefits..
RTC: in favor of respondent.
The only evidence which the Court can consider to determine if
the fire was due to the intentional act committed by the members
of the NPA, are the testimonies of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas
Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who were admittedly not
present when the fire occurred. Their testimonies were limited to
the fact that an investigation was conducted and in the course of
the investigation they were informed by bystanders that "heavily
armed men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline in
(sic) it and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting
"Mabuhay ang NPA". The persons whom they investigated and
actually saw the burning of the station were not presented as
witnesses. The documentary evidence particularly Exhibits "5"
and "5-C" do not satisfactorily prove that the author of the
burning were members of the NPA. Exhibit "5-B" which is a letter
released by the NPA merely mentions some dissatisfaction with
the activities of some people in the media in Bacolod. There was
no mention there of any threat on media facilities.
CA: Affirmed RTC. MR denied.
To recapitulate, defendants-appellants presented the following to
support its claim, to wit: police blotter of the burning of DYHB,
certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated National Police,
Bacolod City regarding the incident, letter of alleged NPA
members Celso Magsilang claiming responsibility for the burning
of DYHB, fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988, and the
testimonies of Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SFO III Leonardo Rochas.
We examined carefully the report on the police blotter of the
burning of DYHB, the certification issued by the Integrated
National Police of Bacolod City and the fire investigation report
prepared by SFO III Rochas and there We found that none of them
categorically stated that the 20 armed men which burned DYHB
were members of the CPP/NPA. The said documents simply stated
that the said armed men were ‘believed’ to be or ‘suspected’ of
being members of the said group. Even SFO III Rochas admitted
that he was not sure that the said armed men were members of
the CPP-NPA.
In fact the only person who seems to be so sure that that the CPP-
NPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col. Nicolas
Torres. However, though We found him to be persuasive in his
testimony regarding how he came to arrive at his opinion, We
cannot nevertheless admit his testimony as conclusive proof that
the CPP-NPA was really involved in the incident considering that
he admitted that he did not personally see the armed men even
as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt. Col. Torres was
presented as witness, he was presented as an ordinary witness
only and not an expert witness. Hence, his opinion on the identity
or membership of the armed men with the CPP-NPA is not
admissible in evidence.
Anent the letter of a certain Celso Magsilang, who claims to be a
member of NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person which is not
a party to the present action, is likewise inadmissible in evidence
under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The reason being
that an admission is competent only when the declarant, or
someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the
action.
Hence this petition by petitioner DBP Pool. Petitioner assails the
factual finding of both the trial court and the CA that its evidence
failed to support its allegation that the loss was caused by an
excepted risk, i.e., members of the CPP/NPA caused the fire.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred when it held that there were no
sufficient evidence showing that the approximately 20 armed men
who caused the fire at respondent’s property were members of
the CPP-NPA - NO.
HELD: Both the trial court and the CA were correct in ruling that
petitioner failed to prove that the loss was caused by an excepted
risk. The Court will not disturb these factual findings absent
compelling or exceptional reasons.
On weight and sufficiency:
Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight
and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance
and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade. Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders
that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may
be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such declarations
are sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis-à-
vis the other evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted
that there is a need for additional convincing proof, viz.:
The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that
the cause of the fire was the intentional burning of the radio
facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or
usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned the radio
facilities shouted "Mabuhay ang NPA" does not furnish logical
conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or that their act
was an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing
proof need be submitted. Defendants failed to discharge their
responsibility to present adequate proof that the loss was due to
a risk excluded.
While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1)
the police blotter; (2) the certification from the Bacolod Police
Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be considered
exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records,
nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of these documents
categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the
CPP/NPA. Rather, it was stated in the police blotter that: "a group
of persons accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be
CPP/NPA … more or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,"
while the certification from the Bacolod Police station stated that
"… some 20 or more armed men believed to be members of the
New People’s Army NPA," and the fire investigation report
concluded that "(I)t is therefore believed by this Investigating
Team that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed men
suspected to be members of the CPP/NPA where (sic) the ones
responsible …" All these documents show that indeed, the
"suspected" executor of the fire were believed to be members of
the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance
of evidence being the quantum of proof.
Other issues:
1. On res gestae
Petitioner: evidence on record established the identity of the
author of the damage; Reports of witnesses that the bystanders
they interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of
the CPP/NPA as an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res
gestae.
SC: Not convinced. While it may concede that these statements
were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it
cannot be said however, that these utterances were made
spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time
to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col.
Torres received the bystanders’ statements while they were
making their investigations during and after the fire. It is
reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted
down, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity
to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information, not
to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience
in disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It
cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances were
the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is
not remote. At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col.
Torres that these statements were made may be considered as
independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their
investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof
but to the fact that they had been thus uttered.
2. On burden of proof
Petitioner: Private respondent is responsible for proving that the
cause of the damage/loss is covered by the insurance policy, as
stipulated in the insurance policy.
SC: The "burden of proof" contemplated by the aforesaid
provision actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of
going forward). As applied in this case, it refers to the duty of the
insured to show that the loss or damage is covered by the policy.
The foregoing clause notwithstanding, the burden of proof still
rests upon petitioner to prove that the damage or loss was caused
by an excepted risk in order to escape any liability under the
contract.
Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The
party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable
judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden of proof never parts. For
the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial
of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but one
which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e. an "avoidance"
of the claim.
Particularly, in insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the
terms of a policy which insures against other perils or hazards,
loss from such a risk constitutes a defense which the insurer may
urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and from this it follows
that an insurer seeking to defeat a claim because of an exception
or limitation in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss
comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set up.
If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a contract of
insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to prove that the loss
arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which it is not
liable, or from a cause which limits its liability.
Consequently, it is sufficient for private respondent to prove the
fact of damage or loss. Once respondent makes out a prima facie
case in its favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
petitioner to controvert respondent’s prima facie case. In this
case, since petitioner alleged an excepted risk, then the burden of
evidence shifted to petitioner to prove such exception. It is only
when petitioner has sufficiently proven that the damage or loss
was caused by an excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift
back to respondent who is then under a duty of producing
evidence to show why such excepted risk does not release
petitioner from any liability. Unfortunately for petitioner, it failed
to discharge its primordial burden of proving that the damage or
loss was caused by an excepted risk.
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE
RIBBON COMMITTEE
FACTS:
1. In 2013, the Pork Barrel Scam arose -- the money was sourced
from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to
members of the House of Representatives and Senate.
2. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Blue Ribbon
Committee), the names of certain government officials and other
individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former
employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles.
3. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly
transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events,
among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
4. Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for
several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges
against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing.
5. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles'
anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was
issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other
whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead
point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.
6. A certain Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29,
2013, part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I
witnessed several personalities visit our offices and join us as our
special guests during our parties and other special occasions. 33.
These personalities who would either visit our office or join our
events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla,
Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife,
Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita
Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen
Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty.
Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.
7. The following day, the social news network Rappler published
an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with
Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy
Estrada, one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel
scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and Ong.
8. Ong supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel
controversy, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs.
Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet
cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan
of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting
Presiding Justice.
9. Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein
she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn
statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their
events and was asked to affirm these statements made
10. In a letter addressed to Chief Justice Sereno, Ong meticulously
explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on
his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the
decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the
Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but
acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
11. Ong surmised that the photograph was taken during the
birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or
2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier.
12. As to the Kevlar helmet cases, Ong said it was impossible for
him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo,
as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother,
Reynald L. Lim, a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.
13. Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing
the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee that the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-
Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L.
Francisco and other perpetrators was fixed through the
intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan
14. Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to
conduct an investigation motu proprio over members of the
judiciary and members of the legal.
15. Court En Banc required respondent to submit his comment
and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of
the affidavit of Luy.
a. Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the
Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had
made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.
16. On Sula's statement, Ong points out that Sula never really had
personal knowledge whether Ong is indeed the alleged "contact"
of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly
"knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her.
a. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely
on hearsay.
17. As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed
respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and
having a meeting with her at the conference room, Ong said that
at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial
photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual
conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the
robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned.
Ong stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking
about in her supplemental affidavit.
18.This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found
possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
committed by Ong, hence the case was redocketed.
19. The case was then placed under Justice Angelina Sandoval-
Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court.
a. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and
Napoles are second cousins. That he was in charge of
disbursements of her personal funds and those of her
office. He was also in charge of government
transactions of the corporation and kept records of its
daily business activities.
b. In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN
Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar
case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she
has a "connect" in that court who would help her.
c. When asked about his testimony before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar case,
Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the
Sandiganbayan is Ong
d. Benhur further testified that he kept ledgers showing
that Napoles spent a total of P100M in the
Snadiganbayan when she gave various amounts to
different people during the pendency of the case and
to Ong in particular after which, she was already
confident that she would be acquitted.
20. Sula’s testimonies were also examined by Justice Sandoval.
a. She agreed to the the testimony of Benhur Luy
21. In his defense, Ong denied that he ever met Napoles prior to
or during the pendency of the Kevlar case he also denied that he
received any money from Napoles
22. ustice Sandoval-Gutierrez evaluated and concluded that the
testimonies of Benhur Luy and Marina Sula
23. Ong did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of
Benhur and Sula and he failed to consider that his testimony is
likewise hearsay.
24. Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez then recommended that Ong be
found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all
in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of dismissal.
ISSUE: WON the credibility of the testimonies of Luy and Sula as to
the conduct of Ong should be given weight for his dimissal? [YES]
RULING: We concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment
on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's
claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his
association with Napoles.
Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about
her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew
that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was
understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may
have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and
also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her
office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the
Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN
Corporation.
Caneda v. Alaan ruling:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid
not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere
appearance of impropriety.
In this case, Ong’s acts have been less than circumspect. He
should have kept himself free from any appearance of
impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act
liable to create an impression of indecorum.
Previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid
association or socializing with persons who have pending cases
before their court.
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's
purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office remains
uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were
not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent
and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what
transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her
office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version.
Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO check for ₱25
.5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted Ong did not deposit any
money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present
documentary evidence saying that, as previously testified by him
before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were
shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam"
controversy came out.

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial
matters even before the administrative complaint was filed
against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of
Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent
found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government owned or -controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits
Xxx
Basically, the testimonies were insufficient for the dismissal of
Ong, rather, the basis was his conduct
PEOPLE v. COLLADO
GR No. 185719 | June 17, 2013 | J. Del Castillo | Tet Valeza
DOCTRINE
Mere allegations and self-serving statements will not overcome
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
accorded to police officers. There must be a showing of clear and
convincing evidence to successfully rebut this presumption.
FACTS
● Sps Marcelino and Myra Collado were charged with
the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and
maintenance of a den, dive or resort.
○ Marcelino was also charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs
● Other appellants (Cipriano, Latario, Ranada, Apelo,
Abache, Sumulong and Madarang) were charged with
possession of drug paraphernalia
Version of the Prosecution:
● PO2 Noble received information that Sps Collado were
engaged in selling shabu.
● PO2 Noble, SPO2 Cruz and PO1 Bitbit conducted a
surveillance on the couple’s residence. After
confirming the reported activities, SPO2 Cruz looked
for an asset who could introduce them to the Sps in
the ensuing buy-bust operation.
● A buy-bust operation team was formed and after
coordinating with the PDEA as evidenced by a pre-
operation report, the team proceeded to the residence
of the Sps. Collado
● PO2 Noble was introduced to Marcelino as a regular
buyer of shabu.
○ When Noble was handing over the marked
money to Marcelino, he motioned that the
money be given to Myra.
○ After she accepted the money, Marcelino
took from his pocket a small metal
container from which he brought out a
small plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance and gave it to PO2
Noble.
○ After PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged
signal, the backup team rushed to the scene
while PO2 Noble introduced him as a
policeman and arrested Marcelino.
○ Through a frisk, PO2 Noble was able to
confiscate the metal container that
contained another sachet of which
crstalline substance.
○ PO2 Noble wrote “MCC-RNN Oct. 9, 2004”
on both plastic sachets
● SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the
house of the Sps Collado where they found the other
accused gathered around a table littered with various
drug paraphernalia.
● A chemistry report on all the seized items yielded
positive results for methylamphetamine hydcohloride
(AKA Shabu)
RTC convicted all the accused of their respective crimes. It also
ordered all the shabu and paraphernalia be turned over and
delivered immediately to the PDEA for proper disposition.
CA affirmed the RTC with modifications.
ISSUE
WON the buy-bust operation conducted was valid.
HELD
Yes, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties by the police officers involved in this case.
● The arrest conducted on the appellants was an in
flagrante delicto arrest and is a valid warrantless
arrest.
○ Assuming arguendo however that the arrest
was invalid, they can no longer question its
validity because they did not object to it
before arraignment.
● Appellant also claim that Noble tried to extort money
from them in exchange for dropping the drug charges
against them.
○ People v. Capalad: To substantiate such
defense, the evidence must be clear and
convincing and should show that the
members of the buy-bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were
not properly performing their duty
○ Marcelino’s claim of extortion is not
substantiated by other convincing evidence.
● Appellants argue that the procedure laid down in Sec
21 of RA 9165 specifically the fact that the confiscated
drugs were not photographer and inventoried.
○ Court has consistently ruled that the failure
of the police officers to inventory and
photograph the confiscated items are not
fatal to the prosecution’s cause provided
that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized substance were preserved.
○ In this case, PO2 Noble, after apprehending
Marcelino and confiscating the sachets of
shabu immediately placed his markings on
them.
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA v. PEOPLE GR No. 210760 January 16,
2015 | Wenceslao
FACTS:
 · This is a case involving a crime of theft committed by
Kyle Zabala.
· Zabala is a jeepney driver who earns P200-P4000 per day
on an alternate day basis. He is also a mechanic.
· Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works at the Manila City
Hall. It is through his job that he was able to save P68,000
which was allegedly stolen by Zabala.
· Alas and Zabala are neighbors in Del Monte, Bulacan.
They treat each other as kumpares.
o He would ask Zabala, who is also a
mechanic, to repair his vehicle.
o Also, Alas allowed Zabala to follow him to
his bedroom to get cash whenever
spare parts are to be bought for the
repairs of his vehicle.
· On June 18, 2007, at about 4am, Alas left his house for
work and when he returned at around 11PM, he discovered
that his money amounting to P68,000 in an envelope kept
inside his closet was missing.
· During that time, there were only 5 persons living in their
house: Alas, his parents, his 9 year-old son and his aunt.
· He asked his parents and aunt but they did not know
where he kept the money.
· On the other hand, a witness named Marilyn Piñon
(girlfiriend of Zabala for 5 months, break na sila now haha)
testified that in the same day she and Zabala were together
at a store owned by the latter which was six to seven steps
from Alas’ house.
o She then saw Zabala climb the fense and
scale the tree in front of the
complainant’s house and enter the
house.
o When he returned to the store, Piñon
noticed that he had a bulge in his
pocket, which he later found to be a
plentiful of money.
o They subsequently went to Greenhills
where Zabala bough 2 Nokia mobile
phones which cost P8500 each.
· For Zabala’s defense, he testified that he was driving a
friend on the day the theft was committed and that Piñon
was just an acquaintance and not his girlfriend. (shet, ate girl
dineny ka)
· RTC convicted Zabala with the crime of theft. He
appealed to the CA attributing grave error to RTC’s
conviction.
· CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant through
circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the guilt of Zabala was proved beyond reasonable doubt
which is sufficient to convict him? NO.
HELD/RATIO:
SC reversed RTC and CA. The Court agreed with Zabala and
found that the evidence presented below does not constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to convict petitioner
pf theft. Thus, he must be acquitted.
DISCUSSION: {Evid issue}
The case is largely based on circumstantial evidence.
It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction and that direct evidence is not always
necessary. [DOCTRINE]
· This is but a recognition of the reality that in certain
instances, due to the inherent attempt to conceal a crime, it
is not always possible to obtain direct evidence.
· Bacolod v. People: The lack or absence of direct evidence
does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused
cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence.
xxx Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which
“goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in
issue, which if proved, may tend by inference to established
a fact in issue.”
· The Rules of Court recognizes circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction under Section 4, Rule 133.
(a) If there is more than one circumstance
(b) The facts form which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.
· Lozano v. People: Circumstantial evidence must
constitute a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of the other. It must exclude the
possibility that some other person has committed the crime.
APPLICATION: The prosecution in this case, failed to establish
that petitioner is guilty of theft by circumstantial evidence. They
failed to establish the corpus delicti.
(1) Nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas where
the money amounting to P68000 was allegedly kept.
(2) Evidence presented is insufficient to determine without
a reasonable doubt that the money was lost due to felonious
taking. Piñon’s testimony was insufficient to establish this
reasonable doubt.
(3) Piñon’s testimony fails to establish that Zabala’s pocket
indeed contained the stolen money, as she never actually
saw what’s inside the pocket. She never really testified that
the money stolen was used to pay for the mobile phones.
(4) The prosecution failed to prove or even allege that it was
impossible for some other person to have committed a
crime of theft against Alas. Alas himself admitted that there
were other persons inside the house but no one was ever
presented to prove their whereabouts.
This foregoing failed to establish and prove the rule circumstantial
evidence cases that the evidence must exclude the possibility that
some other person committed the crime. This failure of the
prosecution leads the Court to no other conclusion but that they
failed to establish that culpability could ony belong to Zabla and
not to some other person. HE MUST BE ACQUITTED.
AGILE MARITIME RESOURCES v. SIADOR
Facts:
Dennis Siador, son of Apolinario Siador, entered into a 7-month
contract of employment as ordinary seaman on board a vessel
owned by Agile Maritime.
Apolinario filed a complaint for death benefits, damages and
attorney’s fees against the Agile for the death of Dennis who fell
from the vessel and who died in the high seas while the vessel
was cruising towards Japan.
The body of Dennis was never recovered. Apolinario claimed that
Dennis’ employment was governed by the POEA-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and supplemented by the
International Transport Workers Federation-Total Crew Cost (ITF-
TCC) Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Under the POEA-SEC, in case of death of a seafarer, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to
US$50,000,00
ITF-TCC CBA, on the other hand, US$60,000.00 to the immediate
next of kin of the seafarer who lost his life.
As the sole heir of Dennis, Apolinario prayed for the
upgraded death benefits under the ITF-TCC CBA.
AGILE MARITIME: did not deny that the incident happened.
Based on the “Master’s Statement on S.A.R. Operation for
Mr. Dennis Siador”(Master’s Statement).
a. They claimed that another seaman saw
Dennis jump overboard. The man-
overboard alarm was sounded.
b. The captain immediately ordered a life ring
thrown into the water and put into motion
the vessel’s man-overboard maneuver
c. Another seaman saw Dennis floating on his
back, making no effort to swim towards the
life ring.
d. He then saw Dennis sink in the water and
disappear from sight despite the effort to
rescue him by a team led by the Chief
Officer. The rescue was called off after the
temperature dropped.
Agile notified Apolinario of Dennis’ death. Apolinario
demanded death benefits and damages. Agile refused.
This refusal led to the filing of the complaint.
LABOR ARBITER/Affirmed by NLRC: dismissed the complaint
found that Dennis — saddled by heavy personal and
psychological problems — took his own life by jumping
overboard.
1. CA: It reversed the labor tribunal’s dismissal of the
complaint and awarded Apolinario death benefits from
the CBA
a. It sustained Apolinario’s position that prior
to his death, Dennis had been suffering
from mental instability, and therefore could
not be considered to have intentionally
taken his life.
b. It cited the personal accounts of the Filipino
crew members on Dennis’ unusual behavior
days before the incident, which narrated
that Dennis appeared to be very disturbed,
anxious, depressed and restless.
c. These personal accounts are contained in
the “Statement on Mr. Dennis Siador”
(Crewmembers’ Statement) that the Master
of the vessel, prepared on the very day the
incident happened; the Filipino crew
members affirmed the statement through
their signatures.
d. CA opined that without the report of Dennis’
previous unusual behavior, it would have
been safe to presume that he willfully took
his life, but the report on record cannot be
disregarded.
ISSUE: Whether there is “ample and convincing evidence”
showing that Dennis took his own life and that his
death was not caused by his mental problems.
HELD: NO
BURDEN OF PROOF
· Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law.
o As a claimant for death benefits, Apolinario
has the burden of proving that the
seafarer’s death (1) is work-related; and (2)
happened during the term of the
employment contract.
· Unarguably, Apolinario has discharged this burden of
proof.
· In the usual course, such proof would have rendered
the petitioners automatically liable, except that the
same provision of the POEA-SEC allows an exemption
from liability for death benefits if the employer can
successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his
deliberate or willful act.
· That the death of the seafarer was due to his willful act
is a matter of defense that the employer has to prove.
In legal parlance, the employer carries the burden of
proof to establish its claim that it should not be held
liable.
· Whether it is the employer or the seafarer, the
quantum of proof necessary to discharge their
respective burdens is substantial evidence, i.e., such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.
· Since Apolinario has initially discharged his burden of
proof, the petitioners, in order to avoid liability, must
similarly establish their defense. If the petitioners are
able to establish their defense by substantial evidence,
the burden now rests on Apolinario to overcome the
employer’s defense. In other words, the burden of
evidence now shifts to the seafarer’s heirs.
BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
· In the present case, the LA, NLRC and the CA uniformly
found that Dennis jumped from the ship.
· Petitioners also cited the following personal
circumstances that may have driven Dennis to do what
he did: his dysfunctional family; the death of his
mother; the bitter parting with his father; and his
disappointment with his sister whose medical
education he supported, only to learn that she got
married and did not even invite him to the wedding
· Based on these facts and the legal presumption of
sanity, we conclude that the NLRC did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it affirmed the LA’s dismissal
of the complaint; we hold that the seafarer’s death
was due to his willful act, as the employer posited and
proved.
· With the company’s discharge of the burden to prove
its defense, the burden of evidence shifted to
Apolinario to rebut the petitioners’ case.
· By holding that willfulness “could not be presumed”
from Dennis’ act of jumping overboard, we observe
that CA cluttered its appreciation of the evidence,
 contrary to the rules on the burden of proof and the
burden of evidence that must be observed since the
issue before the CA was not the intrinsic correctness of
the NLRC’s ruling but the existence of grave abuse of
discretion
· Since the burden of evidence was shifted to Apolinario,
the reversal of the NLRC’s ruling could only be
premised on Apolinario’s successful proof by
substantial evidence of Dennis’ insanity or mental
illness. The CA, however, instead of proceeding in this
manner, imposed the burden of evidence on the
petitioners on the ground that “willfulness could not
be presumed when Dennis jumped overboard.”
· By doing so, the CA acted as if the petition before it
was part of an appellate process rather than an
independent civil action of certiorari that is limited to
questions of grave abuse of discretion.
APOLINARIO FAILED TO PROVE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
· According to Apolinario, the statements describing
Dennis’ actuations can only point to the conclusion
that Dennis was already mentally disturbed a few days
before he plunged into the ocean and drowned. Since
Dennis was no longer in his right mind, his act of
jumping into the open sea cannot be considered willful
on his part.
· The employer also showed by substantial evidence
what prompted Dennis to act as he did, without any
contrary evidence submitted by Apolinario to dispute
the employer’s evidence.
SHIFT IN THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF INSANITY
· Since the POEA-SEC requires the employer to prove
not only that the death is directly attributable to the
seafarer himself but also that the seafarer willfully
caused his death, evidence of insanity or mental
sickness may be presented to negate the requirement
of willfulness as a matter of counter-defense.
· Since the willfulness may be inferred from the physical
act itself of the seafarer (his jump into the open sea),
the insanity or mental illness required to be proven
must be one that deprived him of the full control of his
senses; in other words, there must be sufficient proof
to negate voluntariness.
· But Dennis’ strange behavior cannot be the basis for a
finding of grave abuse of discretion because portions
of the Crewmembers’ Statement itself rendered the
basis for a finding of insanity insufficient.
· To recall, a few hours before the accident, Filipino
crew members approached Dennis to ask him if
anything was wrong with him and Dennis simply
replied that everything was in order. No proof was
ever adduced as well showing that whatever personal
problems Dennis had were enough to negate the
voluntariness he showed in stepping overboard.
· Apolinario’s complaint must be dismissed not because
of doubt but because of the insufficiency of his
evidence to support his claim of insanity.
CANDELARIA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 209386 | 8 December 2014 |PERLAS-BERNABE J.
DOCTRINE:
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
The circumstances proved must be:
1) consistent with each other,
2) consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and,
3) at the same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilt.
Corollary thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence
must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with
innocence.
FACTS
1. In the morning of 23 Aug. 2006: Viron Transit Corp.
ordered 14, 000 liters of diesel fuel allegedly worth
P497,000 from Unioil, owned by Jessielyn Lao.
2. Mel Candelaria, a truck driver employed by Lao, was
dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel.
3. At around 5 pm, Viron informed Lao through a phone call
that it had not yet received its order.
4. Lao discovered that Candelaria, together with his helper
Mario Romano (also a Unioil employee), left the
premises at 12:50 pm of the same day on board a lorry
truck to deliver Viron’s diesel fuel.
5. When Lao called Candelaria, she did not receive any
response.
6. At around 6 pm, Romano returned alone to Unioil’s office
and reported that Candelaria poked a balisong at him.
This prompted Lao to report the incident to the Anti
Carnapping Section of the Manila Police District and to
Camp Crame.
7. After a few days, NBI agents found the abandoned truck
in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the diesel fuel.
8. Lao filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against
Candelaria.
9. Candelaria demurred to the prosecution’s evidence.
· He argued that there was no direct evidence that
linked him to the commission of the crime as Lao
had no personal knowledge as to what actually
happened to the diesel fuel.
· Moreover, the information relayed by Romana is
considered hearsay due to his untimely demise.
10. RTC convicted Candelaria of Qualified Theft. It ordered
Candelaria to indemnify Lao P497,000 as the value of
the stolen diesel fuel.
11. CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. It ruled that a finding of
guilt need not always be based on direct evidence, but
may also be based on circumstantial evidence, or
“evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from
which the facts in issue may be established by
inference.” However, it modified the amount which
Candelaria was directed to indemnify Lao to P14,000 in
the absence of any supporting documents to prove
that the diesel fuel was indeed worth P497,000.
ISSUE
Whether Candelaria is guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft based
on circumstantial evidence. – YES.
HELD
The RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the
attendant circumstances in this case, as duly established by the
prosecution’s evidence, amply justify Candelaria’s conviction.
These circumstances are:
(a) Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Lao’s
Unioil;
(b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was given the task of
delivering the same to Viron;
(c) Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company
premises on the same day onboard the lorry truck
containing the diesel fuel;
(d) at around 5 pm of the same day, Viron informed Lao
that its order had not yet been delivered;
(e) Candelaria failed to reply to Lao’s phone calls;
(f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office
sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him
with a weapon;
(g) Lao reported the incident to the MPD and Camp
Crame;
(h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found in
Laguna, devoid of its contents; and
(i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil since then.

Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a

congruent picture that the crime of Qualified Theft had been
committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same.

It is a gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was

admittedly placed under Candelaria’s custody and remains
unaccounted for. Candelaria did not proffer any persuasive reason
to explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general
denial, which, is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by
which it can be concocted.

Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not synonymous with

guilt, unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the
existence of a guilty conscience, especially when taken together
with all the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case.

The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends

upon the value of the thing stolen. To prove the value of the
stolen property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty, the
prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated
“estimate.” In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the
minimum penalty or fix the value of the property taken based on
the attendant circumstances of the case.

The value of diesel fuel in this case may be readily gathered from
price lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this
regard, the value of diesel fuel involved herein may then be
considered as a matter of public knowledge which falls within the
purview of the rules on discretionary judicial notice.

While it is true that the prosecution had only presented the

uncorroborated testimony of Lao, to prove that the value of the
diesel fuel stolen is P497,000, the Court – taking judicial notice of
the fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in August 2006 is within
the range of P37.60 to P37.86 per liter – nonetheless remains
satisfied that such amount must be sustained.