Section 7 - Right to Information
Section 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission
[G.R. No. 72119, May 29 1987]
Facts: The respondent CSC had denied
petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for
information on the civil service eligibilities
of JulianSibonghanoy and Mariano Agas
who were employed as sanitarians in
theHealth Department of Cebu City.
Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the
eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he
has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information,
petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel
the respondent CSC to disclose said
information.
The respondent CSC takes issue on the
personality of the petitioner to bring the
suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft
of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest
in the civil service eligibilities of
Sibonghanoy and Agas.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner
has legal standing to bring the suit. YES
Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his
case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern,
which, by its very nature, is a public right. It
has been held in the case of Tanada vs.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the
question is one of public right and
the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in
interest, and the person at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws.
It becomes apparent that when a
mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement
of personal interest is satisfied by
the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen,
and therefore, part of thegeneral
public which possesses the right.
The petitioner, being a citizen who as such,
is clothed with personality to seek redress
for the alleged obstruction of
the exercise of the public right.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr. [G.R. No.
74930, February 13 1989]
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners
the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru
the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the constitutional policy of transparency in
public records for the subject information On government dealings. Although citizens are
June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet afforded the right to information and, pursuant
received the reply of the Government Service thereto, are entitled to "access to official
and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General records," the Constitution does not accord them
Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent a right to compel custodians of official records to
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free in their desire to acquire information on matters
to do whatever action necessary within the of public concern.
premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest." Province of Cotabato vs. The Gov’t. of
the RP Peace, [G.R. No. 183591, October
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as 14, 2008]
citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS
records on behest loans given by the former
FACTS:
First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
and PDP-Laban political parties.
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
as regards the documents subject of this
Malaysia.
petition. His position is apparently based merely
Invoking the right to information on matters of
on considerations of policy. The judiciary does
public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
not settle policy issues. The Court can only
respondents to disclose and furnish them the
declare what the law is, and not what the law
complete and official copies of the MA-AD and
should be. Under our system of government,
to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and
policy issues are within the domain of the
the holding of public consultation thereon. They
political branches of the government, and of the
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
people themselves as the repository of all State
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO
power. The concerned borrowers themselves
enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
may not succeed if they choose to invoke their
right to privacy, considering the public offices
ISSUES:
they were holding at the time the loans were
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the
alleged to have been granted. It cannot be
legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
denied that because of the interest they
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the
generate and their newsworthiness, public
people's right to information on matters of public
figures, most especially those holding
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
responsible positions in government, enjoy a
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
more limited right to privacy as compared to
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
ordinary individuals, their actions being subject
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used
Code of 1991)
here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the
cover both steps leading to a contract, and
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
already a consummated contract, Considering
would be binding itself
the intent of the framers of the Constitution
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical
which, though not binding upon the Court, are
Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by
that government-owned and controlled
law;
corporations, whether performing proprietary or
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing
governmental functions are accountable to the
laws to conform to the MOA;
people, the Court is convinced that transactions
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro
entered into by the GSIS, a government-
Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
controlled corporation created by special
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
legislation are within the ambit of the people's
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
right to be informed pursuant to the
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication.
The failure of the respondents to consult the
local government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from
their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the
mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a
proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues
which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted
in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the
President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x
x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet
effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave
violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees
the right of the people to demand information,
while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom
to give information even if nobody demands.
The complete and effective exercise of the right
to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure
derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of
paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that the
right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to
the executory nature or commercial character of
the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by
law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among
other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the
BJE the status of an associated state or, at any
rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under
the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that
go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution
to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than
the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the
autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in
all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations
with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would
not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association – runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship
between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not
surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE
are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region.
But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision
just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing
laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the
MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of
a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying
an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in
effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of
the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as
stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself
to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in
light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s
authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the
required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
proposals as recommendations either to Congress or
the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the
birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and
its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization,
and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in
this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by
Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and
its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the
freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be
respected. What this freedom of choice consists in
has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD
proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form
part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-
cut procedure for the recognition and delineation
of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the
statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 requires all national
offices to conduct consultations beforeany
project or program critical to the environment
and human ecology including those that may call
for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality, is implemented therein.
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership
of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number
of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No.
3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and
in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and
the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R.
132601, October 12 1998]
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was
convicted for the rape of his common
law spouse’s ten year old daughter and
was sentenced to death penalty. He
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration raising for the first
time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “
The Death Penalty Law”, and the
imposition of death penalty for the
crime of rape. The motions were
denied with the court finding no
reason to declare it unconstitutional
and pronouncing Congress compliant
with the requirements for its
imposition.
RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8
of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of
RA 7659. The mode of execution was
changed from electrocution to lethal
injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations
to implement R.A 8177 and directed
the Director of Bureau of Corrections
to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition, injunction and TRO to
enjoin the Secretary of Justice and
Director of Bureau of Prisons from
carrying out the execution, contending
that RA 8177 and its implementing
rules are unconstitutional and void.
The Executive Judge of the RTC of
Quezon City and Presiding Judge of
RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded
to enjoin them from setting a date of
execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required
respondents to comment and
mandated the parties to mantain
status quo . Petitioner filed a very
urgent motion to clarify status quo and
to request for TRO until resolution of
the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment
on the petition dismissing the claim
that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing
arguments in support of his
contention. CHR filed a motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and appear
as Amicus Curiae alleging that the
death penalty is cruel and degrading
citing applicable provisions and
statistics showing how other countries
have abolished the death penalty and
how some have become abolitionists
in practice . Petitioner filed a reply
stating that lethal injection is cruel,
degrading , inhuman and violative of
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing
rules do not pass constitutional muster
for being an undue delegation of
legislative power
HELD:
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177
TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND
THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a
fundamental principle in our system of
government and each department has
exclusive cognizance of matters placed
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. A consequence
of the doctrine of separation of powers
is the principle of non-delegation of
powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is :
potestas delegata non delegari
potest.” (what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated). There are
however exceptions to this rule and
one of the recognized exceptions is “
Delegation to Administrative Bodies “
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction
with the Secretary of Health and the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections
are empowered to promulgate rules
and regulations on the subject of lethal
injection.
The reason for delegation of authority
to administrative agencies is the
increasing complexity of the task of
government requiring expertise as well
as the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its
attention.
Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential,
to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself – it must
set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate – and (b) fix a
standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or
determinable – to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of
his functions.
Considering the scope and the
definiteness of RA 8177, which
changed the mode of carrying out the
death penalty, the Court finds that the
law sufficiently describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the
standards which define the legislative
policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public
agencies which will apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the
legislative purpose may be carried out.
Chavez vs. Presidential Commisslon on
Good Government [G.R. No. 130716,
December
9, 1998]
Facts:
Petitioner, instituted a case against public
respondent to make public any negotiations
and/or agreements pertaining to the latter's
task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten
wealth. The respondents argued that the
action was premature since he has not
shown that he had asked the respondents
to disclose the negotiations and
agreements before filing the case.
Issue:
Does the petitioner have the personality or
legal standing to file the instant petition?
Held:
The instant petition is anchored on the
right of the people to information and
access to government records, documents
and papers- a right guaranteed under
section 7, article III of the Philippine
Constitution. The petitioner a former
solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and
because of the satisfaction of the two basic
requisites laid down by decisional law to
sustain petitioner's standing i.e
(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT
(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer,
citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses
and their cronies who committed
unmitigated plunder of the public treasury
and the systematic subjugation of the
countrys economy, alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were
several news reports[2] bannered in a
number of broadsheets sometime in
September 1997. These news items
referred to (1) the alleged discovery of
billions of dollars of Marcos assets
deposited in various coded accounts in
Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution
of a compromise, between the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on
how to split or share these assets.
A provision in the compromise agreement
provides:
xxx the FIRST PARTY shall determine which
shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and
which shall be assigned to/retained by the
PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from,
any form of taxes due the Republic of the
Philippines. Xxx
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision in the
compromise agreement exempting the
Marcoses from the taxes due to the
government in valid
RULING: The PCGG has a limited life in
carrying out its tasks and time is running
short. It is thus imperative that the Court
must hold even now, and remind PCGG,
that it has indeed exceeded its bounds in
entering into the General and Supplemental
Agreements. The agreements clearly suffer
from Constitutional and statutory
infirmities,to wit: 1) The agreements
contravene the statute in granting criminal
immunity to the Marcos heirs; 2) PCGG’s
commitment to exempt from all forms of
taxes the property to be retained the
Marcos’ heirs controverts the Constitution;
and 3)the government’s undertaking to
cause the dismissal of all cases filed against
the Marcoses pending before the
Sandiganbayan and other courts
encroaches upon judicial powers.
Republic Act No. 7438
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS
WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the
policy of the Senate to value the dignity of
every human being and guarantee full respect
for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested,
Detained or Under Custodial Investigation;
Duties of Public Officers.–
(a) Any person arrested detained or
under custodial investigation shall at
all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or
anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform
the latter, in a language known to and
understood by him, of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, preferably
of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately
with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation. If such
person cannot afford the services of
his own counsel, he must be provided
with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer.
lawphi 1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report
shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer, provided that
before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or
detained does not know how to read
and write, it shall be read and
adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer in
the language or dialect known to such
arrested or detained person,
otherwise, such investigation report
shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made
by a person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall be
in writing and signed by such person
in the presence of his counsel or in the
 latter's absence, upon a valid waiver,
and in the presence of any of the
parents, elder brothers and sisters, his
spouse, the municipal mayor, the
municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the
gospel as chosen by him; otherwise,
such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or
detained under the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, or under custodial investigation,
shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and
void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or
under custodial investigation shall be
allowed visits by or conferences with
any member of his immediate family,
or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or by
any member of his immediate family
or by his counsel, or by any national
non-governmental organization duly
accredited by the Commission on
Human Rights of by any international
non-governmental organization duly
accredited by the Office of the
President. The person's "immediate
family" shall include his or her spouse,
fiancé or fiancée, parent or child,
brother or sister, grandparent or
grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or
niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation"
shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation
of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting
counsel is any lawyer, except those directly
affected by the case, those charged with
conducting preliminary investigation or those
charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the
government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty
pesos (P150.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with light
felonies;lawphi1© alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty
pesos (P250.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with less grave
or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty
pesos (P350.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with a capital
offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall
be paid by the city or municipality
where the custodial investigation is
conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such
fee, the province comprising such
municipality or city shall pay the fee:
Provided, That the Municipal or City
Treasurer must certify that no funds
are available to pay the fees of
assisting counsel before the province
pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted and the
suspected person can only be detained by the
investigating officer in accordance with the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any
arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer, who fails to inform any
person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine
of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a
penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight
(8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or
both. The penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed upon
the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed
upon a public officer or employee, or
anyone acting upon orders of such
investigating officer or in his place,
who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person
arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation for the commission of an
offense if the latter cannot afford the
services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs,
prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any
member of the immediate family of a
person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, or any medical
doctor or priest or religious minister
chosen by him or by any member of
his immediate family or by his counsel,
from visiting and conferring privately
with him, or from examining and
treating him, or from ministering to his
spiritual needs, at any hour of the day
or, in urgent cases, of the night shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more
than six (6) years, and a fine of four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00). lawphi1©
The provisions of the above Section
notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or
prisoner may undertake such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act
No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed.
Other laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders or rules and regulations, or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days following its publication
in the Official Gazette or in any daily
newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.la
Section 8 - Right to Form Associations
Section 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
SSS Employees Association vs. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987,
the officers and members of SSSEA staged
an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances
to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS
members from transacting business with
the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to
work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as
a result of the strike. The complaint prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to enjoin the strike and that the
strikers be ordered to return to work; that
the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike
be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike
after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation
of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on
check-off of union dues; payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay
and holiday pay; conversion of temporary
or contractual employees with six (6)
months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other
regular employees of the SSS; and payment
of the children's allowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and
allegedly committed acts of discrimination
and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social
Security System (SSS) have the right to
strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on
Social Justice and Human Rights, provides
that the State "shall guarantee the rights of
all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec.
31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the
organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission that drafted
the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation
of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No.
180 where the employees in the civil service
are denominated as "government
employees"] and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under
R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the
civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and
are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike
staged by the employees of the SSS was
illegal.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in
the civil service are denominated as
“government employees” and that the SSS
is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161,
its employees are part of the civil service
and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission’s memorandum prohibiting
strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the subject matter but
instead it is the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council which is not granted
by law authority to issue writ of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the
resort of SSS before the general court for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin
the strike is appropriate.
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union [G.R. No. L-25246, September 12,
1974]
Facts:
Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the
Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of
Elizalde Rope Factory and was a member of
the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union.
Membership with the Union was mandatory
as provided for under a collective
bargaining agreement: "Membership in the
Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees
workers covered by this Agreement."
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of
Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the
employer was not precluded "from making
an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the
employees." On June 18, 1961, however,
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to — paragraph
(4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic
Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor
organization".
Being a member of the INC, a religion that
prohibits affiliation with labor
organizations, the Petitioner wrote a letter
informing the Union of his resignation.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter
to the Company asking the latter to
separate Appellee from the service in view
of the fact that he was resigning from the
Union as a member.
The CFI ruled in favor of Petitioner and
enjoined the company from dismissing him.
In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A.
no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the
ground that 1) prohibits all the members of
a given religious sect from joining any labor
union if such sect prohibits affiliations of
their members thereto; and, consequently,
deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful
associations or organizations guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes
obnoxious [to the] Constitution; 2) Impairs
the obligation of contracts; 3) discriminates
in favor of certain religious sects and
affords no protection to labor unions; 4)
violates the constitutional provision that no
religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right; 5) violates the equal
protection clause; and 6) the act violates
the constitutional provision regarding the
promotion of social justice.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the
Constitutional mandate to protect the
rights of workers and to promote their
welfare notwithstanding the fact that it
allows some workers, by virtue of their
religious beliefs, to opt out of Union
security agreements. Held:
NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all
counts. It must be pointed out that the free
exercise of religious profession or belief is
superior to contract rights. In case of
conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to
the former.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is
secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual
or religious or holy and eternal. It was
intended to serve the secular purpose of
advancing the constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion, by averting that
certain persons be refused work, or be
dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of
their right to work and of being impeded to
pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements.
More so now in the [1987 and past in
constitutions] [...] where it is mandated that
"the State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed and regulate the relation between
workers and employers.
We believe that in enacting Republic Act
No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with
the spirit of the constitutional provision. It
acted merely to relieve the exercise of
religion, by certain persons, of a burden
that is imposed by union security
agreements. It was Congress itself that
imposed that burden when it enacted the
Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and,
certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable,
could take away the same burden. It is
certain that not every conscience can be
accommodated by all the laws of the land;
but when general laws conflict with
scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought
to be granted unless some "compelling
state interest" intervenes. In the instant
case, We see no such compelling state
interest to withhold exemption.
In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency
of Atty. Marcial Edillon [A.C. No. 1928
August 3, 1978]
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion
A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978
Facts:
The respondent is a duly licensed
practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to
the Supreme Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues assailing the provisions of
the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions
of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the
IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization
of the IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edilion contends that the stated
provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues and that as a
consequence of this, compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he
is admitted personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and
properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes the above provisions of the Rules
of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void
and of no legal force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court
may compel the respondent to pay his
membership fee to the IBP.
Held:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized
Bar which every lawyer must be a member
of a distinguished from bar associations in
which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply
with the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar including payment of
reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only
compels him to pay his annual dues and it is
not in violation of his constitutional free to
associate. Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court concluded that the
provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A)
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.
The Supreme Court disbarred the
respondent and his name stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that
the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program —
the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision
does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State.
Section 9 - Eminent Domain
Section 9. Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just
compensation.
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of
Manila [G.R. No. 14355, October 31, 1919]
FACTS: Plaintiff sought to expropriate a part
of a private cemetery devoted for public
use to make an extension of Rizal Avenue.
Defendants contend that expropriation is
not necessary because it will disturb the
remains of the dead. Moreover, adjoining
and adjacent lots were offered to the city
free of charge for the planned public
improvement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a private property
devoted for public use can still be
expropriated.
HELD: Yes, private property devoted for
public use is still subject to expropriation,
provided this is done directly by the
national legislature or under a specific grant
of authority to the delegate. In addition,
there must be a necessity for the
expropriation. In the case at bar, evidence
shows that there is no proof of the need of
converting the cemetery.
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a
petition praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement namely, the extension of
Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such
expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged
(a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question
was a cemetery, which had been used as
such for many years, and was covered with
sepulchres and monuments, and that the
same should not be converted into a street for
public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the
lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the
authority to expropriate any land it may desire;
that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the
land in question; that neither the court nor the
owners of the land can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask
any questions concerning the necessities
therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers
of the land involved in expropriation
proceedings, and, when the value of the land
is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to
render a judgment in favor of the defendant
for its value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into
and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right
to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany, and
not follow, the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co.,
166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281;
Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc.
Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of
eminent domain must not be confused with
the right to exercise it in a particular case. The
power of the legislature to confer, upon
municipal corporations and other entities
within the State, general authority to exercise
the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts, but that general
authority of municipalities or entities must not
be confused with the right to exercise it in
particular instances. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must
comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed
by the general authority, is a question which
the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the
question whether the necessity for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is
purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and
propriety of the legislature in authorizing the
exercise of the right of eminent domain
instead of in the question of the right to
exercise it in a particular case. (Creston
Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have
the power of restricting the exercise of
eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes
designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St.
Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. [G.R. No. L-18841,
January 27, 1969]
FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant
PLDT entered into an agreement
with RCA Communications Inc.,
an American corporation, whereby
telephone messages coming from
the US and received by RCA’s
domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the
lines of PLDT, and vice versa.
The plaintiff through the Bureau of
Telecommunications, after having
set up its own Government
Telephone System, by utilizing its
own appropriation and equipment
and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT, entered into an agreement
with RCA for a joint overseas
telephone service.
Alleging that plaintiff is in
competition with them, PLDT
notified the former and receiving
no reply, disconnected the trunk
lines being rented by the same;
thus, prompting the plaintiff to file
a case before the CFI praying for
judgment commanding PLDT to
execute a contract with the Bureau
for the use of the facilities of
PLDT’s telephone system, and for
a writ of preliminary injunction
against the defendant to restrain
the severance of the existing trunk
lines and restore those severed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant
PLDT can be compelled to enter
into a contract with the plaintiff.
HELD:
“ x x x while the Republic may not
compel the PLDT to celebrate a
contract with it, the Republic may,
in the exercise of the sovereign
power of eminent domain, require
the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the
PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require,
subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by
the court.”
People vs. Fajardo [G.R. No. L-12172,
August 29, 1958]
Facts:
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur
when the municipal council passed the
ordinance that prohibits the constructionof a
building that blocks the view of the town plaza.
Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission
to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for
a permit to build a building beside the gasoline
station near the town plaza. His request was
repeatedly denied. He continued with
the construction under the rationale that he
needed a house to stay in because the old
one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine
and demolish the building due to its
obstructing view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn
forwarded the petition due to the question of
the ordinance’s constitutionality.
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
Held: No, petition granted.

Ratio:
The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that
limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an
arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city
council with a discretion which is purely
arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the
interest of a favored few, are unreasonable
and invalid. The ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured. All of the
authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of
police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the
interest of the general welfare, and the state
may eliminate structures offensive to the sight,
the state may not permanently divest owners
of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve
or assure the aesthetic appearance of
the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land
be fallow and not be used for urban purposes.
To do this legally, there must be
just compensation and they must be given an
opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts
the use of property that it can not be used for
any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain,
beyond regulation and must be recognized as
a taking of the property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin
Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of
discretionary character. — The municipal
council shall have authority to exercise the
following discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers,
prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue
permits for the creation or repair thereof,
charging a fee which shall be determined by
the municipal council and which shall not be
less than two pesos for each
building permit and one peso for each
repair permit issued. The fees collected under
the provisions of this subsection
shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this
case that the municipal council had either
established fire limits within the municipality or
set standards for the kind or kinds
of buildings to be constructed or repaired
within them before it passed the ordinance in
question, it is clear that said ordinance was
not conceived and promulgated under the
express authority of sec. 2243 (c)
Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi [G.R. No.
L-20620, August 15, 1974]
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into
a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga
with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When
Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease
in 1956, the AFP refused because of the
permanent installations and other facilities
worth almost P500,000.00 that were
erected and already established on the
property. She then instituted an ejectment
proceeding against the AFP. In 1959,
however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in
question.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation
should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking
should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that
just compensation should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the
property that year .
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private
property;
2. The entry must be for more than a
momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of
authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public
use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is
clear, therefore, that the “taking” of
Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent
domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as
lessee thereof.
Requisite number 2 is not present according
to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when
applied to possession or occupancy of real
property should be construed to mean “a
limited period” -- not indefinite or
permanent. The aforecited lease contract
was for a period of one year, renewable
from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary,
and considered transitory. The fact that the
Republic, through AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does
not alter the fact that the entry into the lant
was transitory, or intended to last a year,
although renewable from year to year by
consent of the owner of the land. By
express provision of the lease agreement
the republic, as lessee, undertook to return
the premises in substantially the same
condition as at the time the property was
first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that
the intention of the lessee was to occupy
the land permanently, as may be inferred
from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this “intention” cannot
prevail over the clear and express terms of
the lease contract.
The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the
instant case the entry of the Republic into
the property and its utilization of the same
for public use did not oust Castellvi and
deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property. Cstellvi remained as owner,
and was continuously recognized as owner
by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of
the lease contract from year to year, and by
the provision in the lease contract whereby
the Republic undertook to return the
property to Castellvi when the lease was
terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived
of all the beneficial enjoyment of the
property, because the Republic was bound
to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the
agreed monthly rentals until the time when
it filed the complaint for eminent domain
on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of
Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent
domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic
commenced to occupy the property as
lessee thereof, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s
property should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that
year. The lower court did not commit an
error when it held that the “taking” of the
property under expropriation commenced
with the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
“just compensation” is to be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint.
The Supreme Court has ruled that when the
taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to
the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint.
Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L—26400,
February 29, 1972]
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the
registered owner of a lot which, without
prior expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, was used by the
government. Amigable's counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had
been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca,
the Commissioner of Public Highways, for
recovery of ownership and possession of
the said lot. She also sought payment for
comlensatory damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was
premature, barred by prescription, and the
government did not give its consent to be
sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue
the government. YES
HELD: Where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale,
the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without
violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen. The only relief
available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should
have done years ago. To determine just
compensation of the land, the basis should
be the price or value at the time of the
taking.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case, dismissing
the plaintiff’s complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the petitioner is a rightful
owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government
used a portion of said lot for the construction of the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of
the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor
General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then
filed a complaint against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways, for the
recovery of ownership and possession of the lot.
Defendants argue that the: (1) that the action was
premature, the claim not having been filed first
with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the
right of action for the recovery had already
prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against
the Government, the claim for moral damages,
attorney’s fees and costs had no valid basis since
the Government had not given its consent to be
sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province
of Cebu that appropriated and used the area
involved in the construction of Mango Avenue,
plaintiff had no cause of action against the
defendants.
The court rendered its decision holding that it had
no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of
the lot on the ground that the government cannot
be sued without its consent; that it had neither
original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and
decide plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages,
being a money claim against the government; and
that it had long prescribed, nor did it have
jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Amigable, may properly
sue the government under the facts of the case.
Decisions:
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a
citizen.
Quoting the decision from Ministerio vs. Court of
First Instance of Cebu, “Where the government
takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process
of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.
Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995]
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772
directing newspapers to provide provide
free print space of not less than one half
(1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space”
which shall be allocated by the Commission,
free of charge, among all candidates within
the area in which the newspaper, magazine
or periodical is circulated to enable the
candidates to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public issues
and their platforms and programs of
government. Philippine Press Institute, a
non-stock, non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers asks
the Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground
that it violates the prohibition imposed by
the Constitution upon the government, and
any of its agencies, against the taking of
private property for public use without just
compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on
behalf of Comelec alleged that the
resolution does not impose upon the
publishers any obligation to provide free
print space in the newspapers. It merely
established guidelines to be followed in
connection with the procurement of
“Comelec space”. And if it is viewed as
mandatory, the same would nevertheless
be valid as an exercise of the police power
of the State- a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the
Comelec over the communication and
information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD: No. The court held that the
resolution does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To compel print media companies to
donate “Comelec-space” amounts to
“taking” of private personal property for
public use or purposes without the requisite
just compensation. The extent of the taking
or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is
not a case of a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory “donation,” measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in
non-urban areas, may be very substantial
indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use are the
necessity for the taking and the legal
authority to effect the taking. The element
of necessity for the taking has not been
shown by respondent Comelec. It has not
been suggested that the members of PPI
are unwilling to sell print space at their
normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space
lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it
has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been
granted the power of eminent domain
either by the Constitution or by the
legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use
is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of
“just compensation” (Article III, Section 9).
And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for “Comelec space” is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission
Sumulong vs. Guerrero [G.R. No. L-
48685, September 30, 1987]
Facts:
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing
Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately twenty-five (25) hectares in
Antipolo, Rizal including the lots of petitioners
Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing
with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333
square meters respectively. The land sought to
be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one
peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the
market value.
Together with the complaint was a
motion for immediate possession of the
properties. The NHA deposited the amount of
P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank,
representing the "total market value" of the
subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the
policy on the expropriation of private property
for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation."
 On January 17, 1978, Judge FACTS:
Buenaventura Guerrero issued a writ of
possession when the NHA deposited with the
Philippine National Bank the amount of P158, Petitioners inherited a piece of land
980.00. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that they had located at P. Burgos Street,
been deprived of the possession of their Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila,
property without due process of law, which was
however denied. Hence, the resort to the with an area of about four hundred
Supreme Court. ninety-two (492) square meters.
Issue: Whether or not PD 1224 is violative of
the due process clause since “socialized The parcel has been the birthsite of
housing'' for the purpose of condemnation
proceeding is not really for a public purpose. Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of the
Ruling:
Iglesia Ni Cristo. Because of that,
No. PD 1224 is not violative of the due the Naitional Historical Institute
process clause since “socialized housing'' (NHI) passed a resolution
for the purpose of condemnation proceeding
is really for a public purpose. declaring the land to be a national
The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise historical landmark which was then
of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing approved by the Minister of
conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and Education, Culture and Sports..
judicial trend has been summarized as
follows: The taking to be valid must be for
public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to
such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in Regional Trial Court: The
the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not Republic, through the OSG
anymore. As long as the purpose of the instituted a complaint for
taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. As just noted, the expropriation alleging that the land
constitution in at least two cases, to remove is a public purpose. RTC then
any doubt, determines what public use is.
One is the expropriation of lands to be ordered the Republic to take over
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost the property after fixing the
to individuals. The other is in the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of provisional market and assessed
utilities and other private enterprise to the value of the property.
government. It is accurate to state then that
at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies Court of Appeals: The petition for
the requirement of public use.
certiorari and prohibition was
dismissed.
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No.
106440. January 29, 1996.] ISSUE:

Whether or not the "public use"

requirement of Eminent Domain is
extant in the attempted
expropriation by the Republic of a
492-square-meter parcel of land so
declared by the National Historical
Institute ("NHI") as a national
historical landmark.
HELD:
Yes.
Eminent domain, also often
referred to as expropriation and,
with less frequency, as
condemnation, is, like police power
and taxation, an inherent power of
sovereignty. It need not be clothed
with any constitutional gear to
exist; instead, provisions in our
Constitution on the subject are
meant more to regulate, rather than
to grant, the exercise of the power.
Eminent domain is generally so
described as "the highest and the
most exact idea of property
remaining in the government" that
may be acquired for some public
purpose through a method in the
nature of a forced purchase by the
State.
It is a right to take or reassert
dominion over property within the
state for public use or to meet a
public exigency. It is said to be an
essential part of governance even in
its most primitive form and thus
inseparable from sovereignty.
The only direct constitutional
qualification is that "private
property shall not be taken for
public use without just
compensation." This proscription is
intended to provide a safeguard
against possible abuse and so to
protect as well the individual
against whose property the power
is sought to be enforced.
Petitioners ask:
. . . "(w)hat is the so-called unusual
interest that the expropriation of
(Felix Manalo's) birthplace become
so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain". . .
when only members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo would benefit?
This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves
little consideration, for what should
be significant is the principal
objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow
from, the exercise of the power.
The purpose in setting up the
marker is essentially to recognize
the distinctive contribution of the
late Felix Manalo to the culture of
the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
EPZA vs. Dulay [G.R. No. L-59603, April
29, 1987]
Fact: On January 15, 1979, the President
of the Philippines, issued Proclamation
No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of
land of the public domain situated in the
City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan,
Cebu and covering a total area of
1,193,669 square meters, more or less,
for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not
all the reserved area, however, was
public land which includes, four (4)
parcels of land with an aggregate area of
22,328 square meters owned by the
private respondent. The petitioner,
therefore, offered to purchase the
parcels of land from the respondent in
acccordance with the valuation set forth
in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 464, as amended. The parties failed
to reach an agreement regarding the sale
of the property. The petitioner filed with
the then CFI of Cebu for expropriation
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
possession against the private
respondent for the purpose of
establishing the Mactan Export
Processing Zone. The respondent judge
issued a writ of possession, order of
condemnation and order to appointing
certain persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought
to be expropriated. The petitioner
Objection to Commissioner’s Report on
the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has
superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court on the ascertainment
of just compensation through
commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the
maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
Issue: Whether PD 76, 464, 794
and 1533 have repealed the
Revised Rules of Court, such
that in determining just
compensation in expropriation
shall be based only in its
market value as declared by the
owner or by assessor, whichever
is lower.
Ruling:
PD 464 on just compensation is
unconstitutional and void. The
method of just compensation
provided by PD 464 is an
encroachment on judicial
prerogatives, contradicting the
Constitution which reserved the
power to determine just
compensation to the Court's
final determination. We are
convinced and so rule that the
trial court correctly stated
that the valuation in the
decree may only serve as a
guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just
compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own
judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount.
Just compensation means the
value of the property at the
time of the taking. It means a
fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of
the property and its
surroundings, its improvements
and capabilities, should be of action, if any, was barred by a prior
considered. The determination judgment or res judicata.
of "just compensation" in
eminent domain cases is a
judicial function. The ISSUES:
executive department or the 1. Whether a resolution has the same force
legislature may make the and effect of an ordinance for
initial determinations but when expropriation case.
a party claims a violation of 2. Whether Res Judicata can bar the right of
the guarantee in the Bill of the State or its agent to expropriate
Rights that private property private property.
may not be taken for public use HELD:
without just compensation, no First Issue: Resolution Different from an
statute, decree, or executive Ordinance
order can mandate that its own A municipal ordinance is different from a
determination shall prevail resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
over the court's findings. Much resolution is merely a declaration of the
less can the courts be sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
precluded from looking into the on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses
"just-ness" of the decreed
a general and permanent character, but a
compensation.
resolution is temporary in nature. An LGU
may exercise the power to expropriate
Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. private property only when authorized by
Realty Corp. [G.R. No. 127820, July 20, Congress and subject to the latter’s control
1998] and restraints. Thus, the following essential
requisites must concur before an LGU can
FACTS: exercise the power of eminent domain:
The Municipality of Parañaque filed an
expropriation case against Private 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over legislative council;
two parcels of land pursuant to Sangguniang 2. The power of eminent domain is
Bayan Resolution. The expropriation was exercised for public use, purpose or
allegedly “for the purpose of alleviating the welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and
living conditions of the underprivileged by the landless;
providing homes for the homeless through a 3. There is payment of just compensation;
socialized housing project.” Petitioner, 4. A valid and definite offer has been
pursuant to the resolution made an offer to previously made to the owner of the
enter into a negotiated sale of the property property sought to be expropriated, but
with private respondent, which the latter did said offer was not accepted.
not accept. Second Issue: Eminent Domain Not Barred
by Res Judicata
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed The Court holds that the principle of res
its Answer alleging that (a) the complaint of judicata cannot bar the right of the State or
petitioner was filed pursuant to a resolution its agent to expropriate private property. The
and not to an ordinance as required by the very nature of eminent domain, as an
Local Government Code; and (b) the cause inherent power of the State, dictates that the
right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res
judicata.
Sps Cabahug vs NPC [G.R. No. 186069,
January 30 2013
Facts:
Spouses Jesus and CoronacionCabahug,
registered owners of two parcels of land in
Barangay Capokpok, Tabango, Leyte were
among the defendants in a special civil suit for
expropriation earlier filed by the National
Power Corporation (NPC) before the RTC in
connection with its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection
Project. The suit was later dismissed when NPC
settled with the landowners through payment
of an easement fee equivalent to 10% of value
of their property in accordance with Section 3-A
of RA 6395.
Two documents denominated as the Right of
Way Grant in favor of NPC were executed by
Jesus Cabahug in consideration of the easement
fees. Cabahug granted respondent a continuous
easement of right of way for the latter’s
transmissions lines on the parcels of land. By
said grant, petitioner agreed not to construct
any building or structure whatsoever, nor plant
in any area within the Right of Way that will
adversely affect or obstruct the transmission
line of NPC, except agricultural crops, the
growth of which will not exceed three meters
high. However under paragraph 4 of the grant,
petitioner reserved the option to seek
additional compensation for easement fee,
based on a previous Supreme Court decision.
The Spouses filed a complaint for payment of
just compensation against NPC. They claimed to
have been totally deprived of the use of the
portions of land covered. They alleged that in
accordance with the reservation provided under
paragraph 4 of the grant, they have demanded
from NPC payment of the balance of the just
compensation for the subject properties. In its
answer, NPC averred that it already paid the full
easement fee and that the reservation in the
grant referred to additional compensation for
easement fee, not the full just compensation
sought by the petitioners.
The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses and
ordered the NPC to pay them full just
compensation based on the parcels of land
taken by the transmission lines less the amount
previously paid. It ruled that the NPC’s
easement of right of way which indefinitely
deprives the owner of their proprietary rights
over their property falls within the power of
eminent domain.
The CA reversed the decision since the spouses
had already accepted the payment of easement
fee. An action to allow the spouses to collect
again from NPC would amount to unjust
enrichment and is a violation of the contract
hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not NPC is liable for the payment
of the full market value of the affected property
2. Whether or not the 10% of the market value
of the property due to the owner of the
property subject to an easement of right of way
in accordance with RA 6395 is proper.
Held:
1. Yes. The power of eminent domain may be
exercised even if the title is not transferred to
the expropriator in an easement of right of way.
Just compensation is due where the nature and
effect of the easement is to impose limitations
against the use of the land for an indefinite
period and deprive the landowner its ordinary
use. In this case, the transmission lines not only
endanger the life and limb but restricts as well
the owner’s use of the land traversed thereby.
2. No. Since the easement falls within the
power of eminent domain, NPC’s utilization of
RA 6395 has been repeatedly struck down. The
determination of just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings is a judicial function. Any
valuation for just compensation laid down in
the statutes may serve only as a guiding
principle but it may not substitute the court’s
own judgment.
The petition is granted. The ruling of the RTC is
reinstated.
Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court
Section 10 — Non-Impairment Clause
Section 10. No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be
passed
Rutter vs. Esteban [G.R. No. L—3708,
May 18, 1953] .
Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter
sold to Esteban two parcels of land
situated in the Manila for P9,600 of
which P4,800 were paid outright,
and the balance was made payable
as follows: P2,400 on or before
August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or
before August 27, 1943, with
interest at the rate of 7 percent per
annum. To secure the payment of
said balance of P4,800, a first
mortgage has been constituted in
favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed
to pay the two installments as
agreed upon, as well as the interest
that had accrued and so Rutter
instituted an action to recover the
balance due, the interest due and
the attorney's fees. The complaint
also contains a prayer for sale of the
properties mortgaged in accordance
with law. Esteban claims that this is
a prewar obligation contracted and
that he is a war sufferer, having filed
his claim with the Philippine War
DamageCommission for the losses
he had suffered as a consequence of
the last war; and that under section
2 of RA 342(moratorium law),
payment of his obligation cannot
be enforced until after the lapse of
eight years. The complaint was
dismissed. A motion for recon was
made which assails the
constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 342
unconstitutional on non-impairment
clause grounds.
Held: Yes. The moratorium is
postponement of fulfillment of
obligations decreed by the state
through the medium of the courts or
the legislature. Its essence is
the application of police power. The
economic interests of the State
may justify the exercise of its
continuing and dominant protective
power
notwithstanding interference with
contracts. The question is not
whether the legislative action affects
contracts incidentally, or directly or
indirectly, but whether the
legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures
taken are reasonable and
appropriate to that end.
However based on the President’s
general SONA and consistent with
what the Court believes to be as the
only course dictated by justice,
fairness and righteousness, declared
that the continued operation and
enforcement of RA 342 at the
present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be
prolonged should be declared null
and void and without effect. This
holds true as regards Executive
Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater
force and reason considering that
said Orders contain no limitation
whatsoever in point of time as
regards the suspension of the
enforcement and effectivity of
monetary obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 342 is valid at the
time when action of the plaintiff was
instituted.
Ruling:
In its decision, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court decision
declaring the continued operation and
effect of RA 342 null and void. It was
further explained that the continued
operation of the law at the present time
is unreasonable and oppressive as the
reason for its enactment has been
accomplished. That at the present time,
the economy already recovered and
there’s no reason for the defendant not
to pay his remaining obligation.
The judgement included the order for
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
remaining balance including the
interests as well as an additional 12%
for lawyer’s fees. In failure to follow the
order, the mortgaged properties will be
sold to public auction.
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati
Bank & Trust Co. [G.R. No. L-2:
December 14, 1979]
Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6,
Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles
and Natividad Angeles. The latter
transferred their rights in favour of Emma
Chavez, upon completion of payment a
deed was executed with stipulations, one of
which is that the use of the lots are to be
exclusive for residential purposes only. This
was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then
acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez
and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May
5, 1963, Feati started construction of a
building on both lots to be devoted for
banking purposes but could also be for
residential use. Ortigas sent a written
demand to stop construction but Feati
continued contending that the building was
being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal
Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and
industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was
made and decided in favour of Feati.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution number 27
declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an
industrial and commercial zone is valid
considering the contract stipulation in the
Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Held: Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419,
December 18, 1986]
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract
stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the
Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal FACTS:
Council to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the This is a consolidated case,
Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states the petition arose from cases
that implied power of the municipality should involving prosecution of
be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give offenses under the BP 22 also
more power to the local government in known as Bouncing Check Law.
promoting economic conditions, social The defendant in these case
welfare, and material progress in the moved seasonably to quash
community”. This is found in the General the information on the ground
Welfare Clause of the said act. Although that the acts charged did not
non-impairment of contracts is constitute an offense, the
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
statute being unconstitutional.
absolute since it has to be reconciled with
The motions were denied by the
the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g.
respondent trial court, except
the power to promote health, morals, peace,
in one case, which is the
education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 subject of G.R No. 75789,
was obviously passed in exercise of police wherein the trial court
power to safeguard health, safety, peace declared the law
and order and the general welfare of the unconstitutional and dismissed
people in the locality as it would not be a the case. The parties adversely
conducive residential area considering the affected have come to the court
amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which for remedy. Those who question
results in the surrounding industrial and the constitutionality of the
commercial establishments. said statute insist the
following ground:
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas
is AFFIRMED. 1) It offends the
constitutional provision
Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is forbidding imprisonment for
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not debt;
2) it impairs freedom of
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
contract;
legitimate exercise of police power, i.e. “ the 3) it contravenes the equal
power to prescribe regulations to promote the protection clause;
health, morals, peace, education, good order or 4) it unduly delegates
safety of the general welfare of the legislative and executive
people.” This general welfare clause shall be powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in
liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to the sense that during its
give more power to local governments in passage the interim Batasan
promoting the economic conditions, social violated the constitutional
welfare and material progress of the people in provision prohibiting to a bill
the community. on Third Reading.
 2. The freedom of contract which is
constitutionally protected is freedom to enter
into “lawful” contracts. Contracts which
ISSUE: contravene public policy are not lawful.
Besides, we must bear in mind that checks
Whether or not BP 22 or the can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is
Bouncing Check Law is a commercial instrument which, in this modem
unconstitutional. day and age, has become
a convenient substitute for money; it forms
part of the banking system and therefore not
entirely free from the regulatory power of the
RULING: state.

No, the enactment of the Ganzon vs. Inserto [G.R. No. L-56450,
assailed statute is a valid July 25, 1983]
exercise of Police power and is
not repugnant to the FACTS:
constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt.
It may be constitutionally On November 28, 1956, Gelacio
impermissible for the Tumambing contracted the
legislature to penalize a services of Mauro B. Ganzon to
person for non-payment of debt haul 305 tons of scrap iron from
ex contractu, but certainly it
is within the prerogative of
Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of
the lawmaking body to prescribe Manila on board the lighter LCT
certain acts deemed pernicious "Batman. Pursuant to that
and inimical to public welfare. agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent
Acts mala in se are not only
his lighter "Batman" to Mariveles
acts which the law can punish.
An act may not be considered by where it docked in three feet of
society as inherently wrong, water. Gelacio Tumambing
hence, not malum in se, but delivered the scrap iron to
because of the harm that it defendant Filomeno Niza, captain
inflicts on the community, it
can be outlawed and criminally of the lighter, for loading which
punished as malum prohibitum. was actually begun on the same
The state can do this in the date by the crew of the lighter
exercise of its police power. under the captain's supervision.
The enactment of the said When about half of the scrap iron
statute is a declaration by the was already loaded, Mayor Jose
legislature that, as a matter Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan,
of public policy, the making arrived and demanded P5,000.00
and issuance of a worthless
check is deemed a public
from Gelacio Tumambing. The
nuisance to be abated by the latter resisted the shakedown and
imposition of penal sanctions. after a heated argument between
them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew
his gun and fired at Gelacio
Tumambing who sustained
injuries.
After sometime, the loading of the
scrap iron was resumed. But on
December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor
Basilio Rub, accompanied by
three policemen, ordered captain
Filomeno Niza and his crew to
dump the scrap iron where the
lighter was docked. The rest was
brought to the compound of
NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor
Rub issued a receipt stating that
the Municipality of Mariveles had
taken custody of the scrap iron.
Tumabing sued Ganzon; the latter
alleged that the goods have not
been unconditionally placed under
his custody and control to make
him liable. The trial court
dismissed the case but on appeal,
respondent Court rendered a
decision reversing the decision of
the trial court and ordering
Ganzon to pay damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a contract of
carriage has been perfected.
HELD:
Yes.
By the said act of delivery, the
scraps were unconditionally
placed in the possession and
control of the common carrier, and
upon their receipt by the carrier for
transportation, the contract of
carriage was deemed perfected.
Consequently, the petitioner-
carrier's extraordinary
responsibility for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the
goods commenced. Pursuant to
Art. 1736, such extraordinary
responsibility would cease only
upon the delivery, actual or
constructive, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who
has a right to receive them. The
fact that part of the shipment had
not been loaded on board the
lighter did not impair the said
contract of transportation as the
goods remained in the custody
and control of the carrier, albeit
still unloaded.
Before Ganzon could be absolved
from responsibility on the ground
that he was ordered by competent
public authority to unload the
scrap iron, it must be shown that
Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the
power to issue the disputed order,
or that it was lawful, or that it was
issued under legal process of
authority. The appellee failed to
establish this. Indeed, no authority
or power of the acting mayor to
issue such an order was given in
evidence. Neither has it been
shown that the cargo of scrap iron
belonged to the Municipality of
Mariveles. What we have in the
record is the stipulation of the
parties that the cargo of scrap iron
was accumulated by the appellant
through separate purchases here
and there from private individuals.
The fact remains that the order
given by the acting mayor to dump
the scrap iron into the sea was
part of the pressure applied by
Mayor Jose Advincula to
shakedown Tumambing for
P5,000.00. The order of the acting
mayor did not constitute valid
authority for Ganzon and his
representatives to carry out
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the order of respondent
judge violates the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Substitution of the mortgage with a
surety bond to ensure the payment of a
loan would in effect change the terms
and conditions of the mortgage contract.
Even before trial on the very issues
affecting the contract, the respondent
court has directed a deviation from its
terms, diminished its efficiency and disp
ensed with a primary condition.
Instant petition si GRANTED. Orders of
the trial court are SET ASIDE.
NDC vs PVB 192 SCRA 257 [1990]
FACTS:
The particular enactment in question is
Presidential Decree No. 1717, which
ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix
Group of Companies to be administered
mainly by the National Development
Company.
The law outlined the procedure for filling
claims against the Agrix Companies and
created a claims committee to process
these claims.
Especially relevant to this case, and noted
at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof
providing that “all mortgages and other
liens presently attaching to any of the
assets of the dissolved corporations are
hereby extinguished.”
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had
executed in favor of private respondent
Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate
mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three
parcels of land situated in Los Baños,
Laguna.
During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix
went bankrupt. It was the expressed
purpose of salvaging this and the other
Agrix companies that the aforementioned
decree was issued by President Marcos.
Pursuant thereto, the private respondent
filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims
Committee for the payment of its loan
credit. In the meantime, the New Agrix, Inc.
and the National Development Company,
petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the
decree, filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the
cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of
the private respondent. For its part, the
private respondent took steps to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage,
prompting the petitioners to file a second
case with the same court to stop the
foreclosure. The two cases were
consolidated
After the submission by the parties of their
respective pleadings, the trial court
rendered the impugned decision. Judge
Francisco Ma. Guerrero annulled not only
the challenged provision, viz., Sec. 4 (1), but
the entire Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the
grounds that:
(1) the presidential exercise of legislative
power was a violation of the principle of
separation of powers;
(2) The law impaired the obligation of
contracts; and
(3) the decree violated the equal protection
clause. The motion for reconsideration of
this decision having been denied, the
present petition was filed.
The Court granted the petitioner's prayer
for a temporary restraining order and
instructed the respondents to cease and
desist from conducting a public auction sale
of the lands in question.
The petitioners contend that the private
respondent is now estopped from
contesting the validity of the decree.
The Court, after noting that the petitioners
had already filed their claims with the
AGRIX Claims Committee created by the
decree, had simply dismissed the petition
on the ground of estoppel.
The petitioners stress that in the case at bar
the private respondent also invoked the
provisions of Pres. Decree No. 1717 by filing
a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee.
Failing to get results, it sought to foreclose
the real estate mortgage executed by AGRIX
in its favor, which had been extinguished by
the decree. It was only when the petitioners
challenged the foreclosure on the basis of
Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, that the private
respondent attacked the validity of the
provision. At that stage, however,
consistent with Mendoza, the private
respondent was already estopped from
questioning the constitutionality of the
decree.
ISSUE:
WON Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor
of Agrix is still entitled for payment without
prejudice to PD 1717.
HELD:
YES. A mortgage lien is a property right
derived from contract and so comes under
the protection of Bill of rights so do
interests on loans, as well as penalties and
charges, which are also vested rights once
they accrue. Private property cannot simply
be taken by law from one person and given
to another without just compensation and
any known public purpose. This is plain
arbitrariness and is not permitted under the
constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs
the obligation of the contract between
Agrix and the private respondent without
justification. While it is true that the police
power is superior to the impairment clause,
the principle will apply only where the
contract is so related to the public welfare
that it will be considered congenitally
susceptible to change by the legislature in
the interest of greater number.
BPI vs SEC [G.R. No. 164641, December
20 2007]
FACTS:
The Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
through its predecessor-in- interest, Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC),
extended credit accommodations to the
ASB Group with an outstanding aggregate
principal amount of P86,800,000.00,
secured by a real estate mortgage over two
(2) properties located in Greenhills, San
Juan. On 2 May 2000, the ASB Group filed a
petition for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments before the SEC.
Thereafter, on 18 August 2000, the interim
receiver submitted its Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan for the ASB Group. The
Rehabilitation Plan provides, among others,
a dacion en pago by the ASB Group to BPI of
one of the properties mortgaged to the
latter at the ASB Group as selling value
of P84,000,000.00 against the total amount
of the ASB Group’s exposure to the bank. In
turn, ASB Group would require the release
of the other property mortgaged to BPI, to
be thereafter placed in the asset pool.
ISSUE:
Does the requirement for SEC approval of
the Rehabilitation Plan impair the
obligations of contract? NO.
RULING:
NO. The Court reiterates that the SEC’s
approval of the Rehabilitation Plan did not
impair BPI’s right to contract. As correctly
contended by private respondents, the non-
impairment clause is a limit on the exercise
of legislative power and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial power. The SEC, through the
hearing panel that heard the petition for
approval of the Rehabilitation Plan, was
acting as a quasi-judicial body and thus, its
order approving the plan cannot constitute
an impairment of the right and the freedom
to contract.
Besides, the mere fact that the
Rehabilitation Plan proposes a dacion en
pago approach does not render it defective
on the ground of impairment of the right to
contract. Dacion en pago is a special mode
of payment where the debtor offers
another thing to the creditor who accepts it
as equivalent of payment of an outstanding
debt. The undertaking really partakes in a
sense of the nature of sale, that is, the
creditor is really buying the thing or
property of the debtor, the payment for
which is to be charged against the debtor’s
debt. As such, the essential elements of a
contract of sale, namely; consent, object
certain, and cause or consideration must be
present. Being a form of contract,
the dacion en pago agreement cannot be
perfected without the consent of the
parties involved.
Section 11. Free access to the courts
and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,

intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission

obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal

and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation
to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their
families.