V.

Cause

A. Different Categories

1. Proximate

2. Concurrent

a. Rule where there are concurrent causes

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of
two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination,
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either of them is responsible for the whole injury (Far Eastern Shipping
Company vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998).

b. Solidarity liability of joint tortfeasors

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is
solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they
become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code (Far Eastern Shipping Company vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998).

c. Article 2194 of the Civil Code

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi – delict is solidary.

d. Illustrative Cases

i. Far Eastern Shipping vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
Justice Regalado En Banc

Facts:

On June 20, 1980, MV/PAVLODAR, owned and operated

by FESC, arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British
Columbia at about 7 am. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Appellant Sene
Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilot’s Association
(MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel to Berth No. 4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage
and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel
Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel
lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the
Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was
ideal for docking maneuvers.
 When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by
the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino
ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about
2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow.
The left anchor with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did
not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A
brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew
members. When Gavino inquired what all the commotion was
about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he
ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the
pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.
Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
Gavino thereafter gave the “full astern” code. Beofre the right
anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
damage to the pier. The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the
Philippine Ports Authority the amount of Php 1,126,132.25.
The PPA filed a complaint for actual and exemplary
damages against FESC, Gavino, and the MPA.
The trial court ordered the defendants jointly and severally
do pay the PPA the amount of Php 1,053,000.00 representing
actual damages and the cost of the suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the court a
quo except that if found no employer-employee relationship
existing between MPA and Gavino. This being so, it ruled instead
that the liability of MPA is anchored not on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, but on the provisions od Custom Administrative Order No.
15-65.

Issues:

i.i. Who should be negligent – the master of the

ship, the harbor of the pilot, or both?

i.ii. Who should be held responsible for the resulting

damages?

Held:

i.i. Both the pilot and the master were negligent.

The Supreme Court started by saying that in a collision
between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a
presumption of fault against the moving object.

i.i.i. Negligence of the Pilot. A pilot, in maritime law, is a

person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out
of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert who’s supposed to
know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know
because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform
his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people
and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.
Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found
that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground
and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he
should’ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings.
As can be gleaned from the logbook, Gavino ordered the
left anchor and two (2) shackles dropped at 8:30 am. He ordered
the engines of the vessel stopped at 8:31 am. By then, Gavino
must have realized that the anchor did not hit a hard object and
was not clawed so as to reduce the momentum of the vessel. The
vessel continued travelling towards the pier at the same speed.
Gavino failed to react. At 8:32 am, two tugboats began to push the
stern part of the vessel from the port side but the momentum of
the vessel was not contained. Still Gavino did not react. He did not
even order the other anchor and two (2) more shackles dropped to
arrest the momentum of the vessel. Neither did he order full –
astern. It was only at 8:34 am, four (4) minutes, after the anchor
was dropped that Gavino reacted. But his reaction was even
haphazard because instead of arresting fully the momentum of the
vessel with the help of the tugboats, Gavino ordered merely “half –
astern”. By then, it was too late. The vessel’s momentum could no
longer be arrested and, barely a minute thereafter, the bow of the
vessel hit the apron of the pier.
i.i.ii. Negligence of the Master. In compulsory pilotage, the
pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The master,
however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there
is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or
if the pilot is drunk. Based on Capt. Kavankov’s testimony, he
never sensed any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and
they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the
pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right beside the pilot
during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the
pilot was seeing and hearing.
The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of
the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of the FESC.

i.ii. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court

of Appeals holding Capt. Gavino, FESC and MPA, but only to the
extent of 75% of the latter’s reserve fund, jointly and severally
liable to pay the cost of port’s rehabilitation.
It ruled that where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the cause and recovery may be had against any or all of
the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the
case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that
the duty owned by them to the injured person was not the same.
ii. Ruks Konsult and Construction vs. Adworld Sign and Advertising
Corporation and Transworld Media Ads
G.R. No. 204866 January 21, 2015
Justice Perlas – Bernabe First Division

Facts:

Adworld filed for damages against Transworld when

Transworld’s billboards structure collapsed against Adworld’s
billboard structure, which was misaligned and its foundation
impaired.
In its answer with counterclaim, Transworld averred that
the collapse of its billboard structure was due to extraordinary
strong winds that occurred instantly and unexpectedly and
maintained that the damage caused to Adworld’s billboard
structure was hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise filed a third –
party complaint against Ruks, the company which built the
collapsed billboard structure in the former’s favor. It was alleged
therein that the structure constructed by Ruks had a weak and
poor foundation not suited for billboards, thus prone to collapse,
and as such Ruks should ultimately be held liable for the damages
caused to Adworld’s billboard structure.
Ruks denied liability, it contended that when Transworld
hired its services, there was already an existing foundation for the
billboard and that it merely finished the structure according to the
terms and conditions of its contract with the latter.
The Regional Trial Court declared Transworld and Ruks
jointly and severally liable to Adworld in the amount of Php
474,204.00 as actual damages. The RTC ruled that Transworld
and Ruks knew that the foundation was weak yet they did not do
anything to remedy the situation, thereby making them both
negligent.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It
found that Transwrold failed to ensure that Ruks will comply with
the approved plans and specification of the structure, and that
Ruks continued to install and finish the billboard structure despite
the knowledge that there were no adequate columns to support
the same.

Issue:

Whether Ruks is jointly and severally liable with Transworld

for damages sustained by Adworld.

Held:
Yes. Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of
the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the
case, it appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the
 duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding
that Transworld’s initial construction of its billboard’s lower
structure without the proper foundation, and that of Ruk’s finishing
its upper structure and justly merely assuming that Transworld
would reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2) successive
acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages
sustained by Adworld. Neither of them took positive step to
reinforce the foundation. They merely rely on each other’s word
that repairs would be done.
Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence and as joint
tortfeasors, they are solidarily liable to Adworld. Joint tortfeasors
are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort or
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also
wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in
causing a single injury.
Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage.

3. Remote

a. Definition
In the law of negligence with respect to injury or accident, a cause
which would not according to experience of mankind, lead to the event
which happened (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition).
That cause which some independent force merely took advantage
of to accomplish something not the natural effect thereof (Aquino, Torts
and Damages, 2005 p. 251).

b. Rule in Remote Causes

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause (Manila electric Company vs.
Remoquillo, G.R. No. L-8328, May 18, 1956).

c. Illustrative Cases

i. Manila Electric Company vs. Sotero Remoquillo

G.R. No. L-8328 May 18, 1956
Justice Montemayor En Banc
 Facts:
Efren Magno went to the 3 – story house of Cayetano
Peňaloza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street,
Manila, to repair a “media agua’ said to be in a leaking condition.
The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story.
Standing on said “Media Agua,” Magno received from his son thru
that window a 3’ x 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking
portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company (Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media
agua” and 2 ½ feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from
the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgement in
their favor. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed the
judgement. Hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether the exposed electric wire of the company was the
proximate cause of the death of Efren Magno

Held:
No. The death of Magno was primarily cause by his own
negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the
“media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company
by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city
and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the
“media agua”.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion.
The principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was
not the electric wire evidently a remote cause, but rather the
reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its
contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.
When Magno was called by his stepbrother to repair the media
agua, it is presumed that due to his age and experience, he was
qualified to do the job. Magno could not have been entirely a
stranger to electric wires and danger lurking in them.

ii. Consolacion Gabeto vs. Agaton Araneta

G.R. No. L -15674 October 17, 1921
Justice Street En Banc

Facts:
 On August 4, 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano
took a carromata to go to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma, Iloilo City.
When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started
in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta stepped
out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the
horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had
called the carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, denied
having heard the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of
the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order
that the carromata might pass on. Owing, however, to the
looseness of the bridle on the horse’s head or to the rottenness of
the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse’s
mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he
did, in order to find the bridle and fix such bridle.
The horse, being free from the control of the bit, became
disturbed and move forward and pushed Pagnaya until the
carromata struck a police telephone box causing it to crash and
frightened the horse to such extent that he set out at full speed up
the street causing the death of Gayetano, who did not alighted
prior as the latter jumped or fell from the rig. The widow of
Gayetano filed a complaint to recover damages from Araneta.
Judge Southworth awarded damages to the plaintiff in the
amount of Php 3,000.00, from which judgment the defendant
appealed.

Issue:

Whether the act of Araneta stopping the horse was the

proximate cause of the accident which led to the death of
Proceso Gayetano.

Held:
No. The mere fact that the defendant interfered with the
carromata by stopping the horse in the manner stated would not
make him liable for the death of Gayetano; because it is admitted
by Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the carromata and went
to the horse’s head to fix the bridle. The evidence is furthermore
convincing to the effect that, after Pagnaya alighted, the horse
was conducted to the curb and that an appreciable interval of time
elapsed – same witnesses say several minutes – before the horse
started on his career up the street.
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by
Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the
accident that recently ensued to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his
post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily
responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot
be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the cation
of the horse thereafter.
iii. Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO) vs. Angelita
Balen and Spouses Lariosa
G.R. No. 173146 November 25, 2009
Justice Nachura Third Division

Facts:

In 1981, ANECO installed an electric post in Purok 4, Ata-

atahon, Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte, with its main distribution line of
13,000 kilovolts traversing Angelita Balens (Balens) residence.
Balens father, Miguel, protested the installation with the District
Engineers Office with ANECO but his protest just fell on deaf ears.
On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa and Celestino
Exclamado were electrocuted while removing the television (TV)
antenna from Balens residence. The antenna pole touched
ANECOs main distribution line which resulted in their
electrocution. Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa
suffered extensive third degree burns.
Balen and Lariosa lodged a complaint for damages against
ANECO with the RTC of Butuan City.
The RTC rendered judgement in favor of the respondents
and ordering ANECO to pay damages. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Ruling. It declared that the proximate
cause of the accident could not have been the act or omission of
respondents, who were not negligent in taking down the antenna.
Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the proximate cause of the injury sustained

by the respondents was ANECOs negligence in installing
its main distribution line over Balens residence.

Held:

Yes. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the

protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
by reason of which such other person suffers injury.
The Supreme Court quoted the Court of Appeals finding on
ANECOs negligence:
One of the test for determining the existence of
proximate cause is the foreseeability test. Where the
particular harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time of
the defendant’s misconduct, his act or omission is the legal
cause thereof. To be negligent, the defendant must have
acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have failed to act in such a way
that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that
certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably
subjected to a general but definite class of risk which made
 the actors conduct negligent, it is obviously the
consequence for the actor must be held legally
responsible.
Thus applying the aforecited test, ANECO should
have reasonably foreseen that even if it complied with the
clearance requirements under the Philippine Electrical
Code in installing the subject high tension wires above
Miguel Balen’s house, still a potential risk existed that
people would get electrocuted, considering that the wires
were not insulated.
Clearly, ANECOs act of leaving unprotected and
uninsulated the main distribution line over Balens residence was
the proximate cause of the incident which claimed Exclamados life
and injured respondent Balen and Lariosa.

4. Intervening Cause

a. Definition
In tort law, that which will relieve if liability for an injury, is an
independent cause which intervenes between the original wrongful act or
omission and the injury, turns aside the natural sequence of events, and
produces a result which would not otherwise have followed and which
could not have been reasonably anticipated (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th
Edition).

b. What is an efficient intervening cause?

An efficient intervening cause is a new and independent force
which breaks the causal connection between the original wrong and
injury, and itself becomes direct and immediate cause of an injury (Black’s
Law Dictionary, 5th Edition).

c. When is an intervening cause regarded as the proximate cause?

An intervening cause will be regarded as the proximate cause and
the first cause as too remote, where the chain of events is so broken that
they become independent and the result cannot be said to be the
consequence of the primary cause (Aquino, Torts and Damages, 2005, p.
290).

d. Illustrative Case

Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
Justice Feliciano First Division

Facts:

At about 1:35 AM of November 15, 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was

on his way home from a cocktails – and – dinner meeting with his boss,
the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails
phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken “a shot or two” of liquor. Dionisio
was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of
 General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far
from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
his car headlights suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on “bright”
and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2 ½ meters away
from his car. The dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction was parked
on the right hand side of General lacuna Street facing the oncoming
traffic. It was parked askew partly blocking the oncoming traffic. No lights
or early warning devices were installed near the dump truck. It was driven
home by Amando Carbonel with the permission of his employer, Phoenix
in view of the work scheduled to be carried out he following morning.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his
car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck.
As a result, Dionisio suffered physical injuries, permanent facial scars and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio’s injuries was his own recklessness in driving
fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without
his headlights on and without curfew pass.
The trial court rendered judgement in favor of Dionisio and
ordered Phoenix and Carbonel jointly and severally liable to pay Dionisio
damages. On appeal, the IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether Dionisio’s negligence was an efficient intervening or
independent cause which produces his own injury.

Held:
No. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one who which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under particular circumstances, the
defendant may be negligence among other reasons because of the failure
to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason.
Dionisio’s negligence, although later in point of time than tha truck
driver’s negligence and therefor closer to the accident was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an
“intervening cause” was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the
petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk that the
truck driver had created. Dionisio’s negligence was not of an independent
and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in
fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident,
nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.

B.