ARTICLES 2-3 ESSENTIAL/FORMAL REQUISITES

REPUBLIC VS. CA 236 SCRA 257

FACTS:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court
Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.Defendant Cardenas personally
attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage license.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital
status before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila.

Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of
a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the
certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

ISSUE:
Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

HELD:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by
the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the
marriage void ab initio.

It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to
refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.
Facts:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two children were born out of the marriage. Frederick,
their son went to his father’s residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.

The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him when she started
spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation was granted by
repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage citing psychological incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for the first time
that there was no marriage license during their marriage.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Ruling:
The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent.
The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor
private respondent ever resided in Carmona.

The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November
15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Under
Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, are
void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the Court. It is
mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at
the time their marriage was solemnized.
JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.

Facts:

Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Carmelita N.
Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination, duress, and intimidation employed by the
respondents Carmelita and her father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a
minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license presented
before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila. Actually, it
was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20, 1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no.
2770792 was nowhere to be found.

On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of Jaime and claims that they were
first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer
Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties based on the petitioner’s
allegations that no marriage license was presented before a solemnizing officer. And that without the said marriage
license, being one of the formal requisites of marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning. This was based on the
3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trail court in favor of the
marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said license with due effort as testified by certain Perlita
Mercader because the former Local Civil registrar had already retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that Marriage License No. 2770792, as
appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to declare the marriage void from the beginning

Held:

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. In
the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we can not easily accept that absence of the
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: ​Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped in a male
body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful – he (she) now
has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and
his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these
changes, among others, so that he can marry his American fiancé.

The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that Silverio’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him; that
there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no
harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary,
granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the
realization of their dreams.

Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be changed on the
ground of gender re-assignment.

HELD:​ No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing legislation.

Issue on the change of first name

In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR
CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the
change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is
procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon
which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name
may only be grounded on the following:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.

Issue on the change of sex

This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the local civil registry. Not
with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error
involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a
male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?

No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.

But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.”
ARTICLE 4 EFFECT RE. ABSENCE, DEFECT OR IRREGULARITY THEREOF

COSCA V. PALYPAYON JR. 237 SCRA 249

FACTS:

Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same Court while Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is
the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint
was field with the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents , among others, illegal solemnization of
marriage. Complainants alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6 marriages even without the requisite marriage
license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. The respondent Judge
did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly
had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.

HELD:
[i]The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license
except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that , while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly , criminally
and administratively liable.

* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriage, and what we are
providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsible. The Revised Penal Code provides that “priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the
provisions of the Marriage Law.” This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.

RESPONDENT JUDGE LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR. IMPOSED A FINE WITH STERN WARNING
ARANES VS OCCIANO A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is the
Presiding Judge of the MTCt of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that respondent judge solemnized her
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She
was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations
which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner

HELD:
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law
and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People
vs. Lara, the Court held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. The lost contacts when the school
year ended. When Lucio received a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant communication took place
between them. They later became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines
and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August
30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991,
Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992 and
to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in
Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second
marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner
does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago.
Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

Second Digest:
FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card
from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back
to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil
case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage
with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE: ​Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second
marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not
need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence,
he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Restituto Alcantara vs Rosita Alcantara

FACTS: ​Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita Alcantara alleging that on
December 8, 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a “fixer” who could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got
married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on March
26, 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage
license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In
1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Restituto prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring
their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite; that Restituto has a mistress
with whom he has three children; that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: ​Yes. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. Restituto cannot insist on
the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the
absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage
contract between the parties reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties
to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact
that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Restituto, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, the Supreme Court
still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul the marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the
absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not
affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption
with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
NOLLORA VS REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011

FACTS: ​While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two years has
another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second
marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001. Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and
Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000. Atilano admitted
having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented
Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992.
And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.

Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know Jesusa and
only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the one lawfully married to Nollora because
she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first
marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert,
she and he also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.

RULING: Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their
marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence
of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the
lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage. Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim
religion as his sole defense. Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up
to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .

In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim
solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's
religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. His second marriage did not
comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have
more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic
Law and only in exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted to
have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives, and should any of them
objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the
proposed marriage, the Court shall subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162,
Muslim Personal Laws)

Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both of his marriage contracts
do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is
not an essential requirement for marriage, his omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false
declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions. It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a
law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, he recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim
rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. VS. ALBIOS

FACTS: ​Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong
City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to
acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately
after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent summons to the husband
but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire
American citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

HELD: NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of
a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. None of these are
present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

Syed Azhar Abbas vs Gloria Goo-Abbas

FACTS: ​In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said
he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani).
He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.

Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.

To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.

To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the
solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued
to Abbas.

Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its
number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else.

The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no
diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license
was issued in another municipality).

ISSUE:​ Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.

HELD: ​Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage
license.

The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrar’s certification enjoyed probative value
as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. There is a presumption of
regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it
stands to favor Abbas.

The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage
license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio.” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. [G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013, CARPIO, J.]

DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.

FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the relationship.
Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Sally filed criminal
actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with
Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during
the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44
registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office
because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.

ISSUES:

Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license
Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner
HELD:

YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was
issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which
made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the
general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and
non-existent.

YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art. 148. In
cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more in accord with the evidence on
record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.
The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to
Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive
title “married to Benjamin” while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

3. NO.

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the
petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally
just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Raquel Kho vs. Republic of the Philippines and Veronica Kho

FACTS: ​In May 31, 1972, Raquel Kho’s parents called a clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer to instruct him
to arrange the necessary papers for the intended marriage of their son, Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972,
the two were married at 3 in the morning at a church.

Claiming that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a marriage license and had not
seen nor signed any papers in connection to the procurement of a marriage license, and considering the ONE DAY
difference between the time the clerk was told to obtain the papers to the actual moment of the marriage, no marriage
license could have been validly issued, Raquel Kho filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage.

The RTC ruled that the marriage was void due to the lack of the requiresite marriage license and ruled in favor of
Raquel Kho. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the RTC and ruled in favor of Veronica Kho. Raquel
Kho filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES

1. Whether the issues presented by the petitioner in the petition for review on certiorari are factual in nature and
whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to delve into these issues;

2. Whether the certification issued by the local civil registrar which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage
license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search;

3. Whether the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidences of the lack of a marriage licence and
giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent; and

4. Whether the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring the marriage a nullity for the
absence of the requisite marriage license.

RULING

1. No, the issues in the petition are not factual in nature. However, the rule that a question of fact is not appropriate for
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not without exceptions, which are the
following:

(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;

(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

(f) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, when beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evience on which they are based;

(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and
(j) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.

In the case, of the RTC and CA on the issue on whether there was a marriage license obtained by petitioner and
respondent are conflicting. Hence, it was proper for the Supreme Court to review these findings.

2. No, in a previous case (Nicdao Carino vs. Yee Carino), the Supreme Court considered the certification issued by the
local civil registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.

In the present case, the petitioner was able to present a certification issued by the civil registrar attesting that the Office
of the local civil registrar “has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued between the parties.”

3. Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidences of the lack of a marriage licence and
giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent because the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to prove the
absence of the subject marriage license.

Article 58 of the Civil Code (Note: at the time of the marriage, the Family Code was not effective yet) makes explicit
that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the local civil registrar. In addition, Article 80(3)
of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without a marriage license is void.

4. Yes, the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring the marriage a nullity for the
absence of the requisite marriage license because the petitioner has successfully overcome the presumed validity of the
marriage by presenting the certification of the civil registrar which was sufficient to prove the absence of the marriage
license. In addition, the respondent was not able to prove that the marriage as valid as it is she who alleges such
validity.

Based on the certification issued by the civil registrar and the respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached
is that no valid marriage license was issued. Hence, the marriage performed is null and void.

*The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside.

ARTICLE 21: One or Both Parties is/are Foreigners

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2,
2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1,
1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree
of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church,
Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming
that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: ​Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal
capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the
Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a
foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either:
(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence
that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
ARTICLE 26 (2) Marriages Between a Filipino and a Foreigner/s

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for
thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of
Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to
the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely
married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended
the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and
dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the
certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusband’s last name
as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was
already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted
thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue: ​Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts: ​This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were
blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years
she was naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the States – that his
wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the
trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the
respondent and allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art.
26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue: ​WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Held: Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations
that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.

“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.”

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the
U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme
Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and
injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results
or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010

FACTS: Petitioner Corpuz, a naturalized Canadian citizen married respondent Sto. Tomas but subsequently filed for
divorce in Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Two years later, Corpuz fell in
love with another Filipina. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on
his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office
informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial
recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.

Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of
marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further
that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code
which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grant aliens the right to institute a petition for
judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD​: No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens BUT the
foreign divorce decree obtained by such alien, may be proven in court and recognized according to our rules of
evidence. Thus, it serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of the alien, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
FACTS:
-------------------------------------
2nd Digest:
FACTS: ​Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. He returned to Philippines on April
2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took
effect on January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's
Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists
under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court. Gerbert
subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied
since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the
remedy.

ISSUE:​ Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree

HELD: The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The
legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital status of the Filipino spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption of
evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with confirmity to the alien's national law. The Pasig City
Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial order recognition.
Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be void.
Fujiki v Marinay

FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

ISSUES & RULING:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

HELD:
No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
“does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

Yes. “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact.” Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor
of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, GR No. 215723, 2016-07-27
Facts:

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese
national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.[4] Their union bore two children, Masato Koike,
who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.[5]

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce[6] before the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate[7]
and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.[8]

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage[9] on file with the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition[10] for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code[11] before
the RTC

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.[12] On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign
documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"[13] and "Family Register of
Michiyuki Koike"[14] both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the
Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled
"Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the
Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification[15] issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that
the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil
Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan
2000"[16] and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"[17] were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on
divorce.[18]

In a Decision[19] dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of
foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and" the national law of
the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven

The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official
records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the
law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009,"
presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan... adding too that the testimony of Doreen
relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she
was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the
laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce.

since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and law.[23]

Doreen's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in a Resolution[25] dated November 28, 2014

Issues:

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce.
Ruling:

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:... the law confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.[26]

This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.

Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven.[30] Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.[31]

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent
laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the
RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition
for review.

The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.[32] In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from
judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)

It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after
all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.[35]

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent
factual issues in accordance with this Decision.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, – versus – MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 221029
24 April 2018
Facts:

On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese
court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.

The petition alleged, among others, that:

Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHIDO MINORO;
Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered
by the Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan
should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not
afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless
Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipino family rights and duties, together with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband
because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law
should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to
her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.

Issue: Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable judgment against
his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code.

Ruling: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse...

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse
is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without
a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.

There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino
who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign
laws, both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based merely on superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable judgment against his or her
alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
ARTICLE 34: Marriages Exempt from Marriage License Requirement/Effect on Falsity of Affidavit of
Cohabitation Required Under Article 34, Family Code

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL,
ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death
on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years exempts them from
obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant
suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit
of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the
only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation
period is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are
not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, respondent. A.M. No.
MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001

Facts:

Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were
born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda
Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together
as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code.

Issue:

Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

Ruling:

No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation
for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground
for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
De castro vs De Castro G.R. No. 160172
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the execution of a sworn
affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31,
1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that
he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint
for the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid.
Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from
a marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING: ​Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which
the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started living together five months
before the celebration of their marriage. That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity,
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an
Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
Carlos vs Sandoval

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of
inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo
Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August
1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that
the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo
Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents
as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings
nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have
applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions:
(1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not
be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence,
can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is
to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the
right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule
never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although
the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like
any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a
cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015SERENO, C.J.
ARTICLE 36-38

Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals

Note: This was the first case where the term “psychological incapacity” was discussed by the Supreme Court.

FACTS: ​Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got
married. The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to their son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was
marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarreled
about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went
to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised
to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a
military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least
have his wife come home, filed a petition to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity.
Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort
constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The
prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is however denied by the lower and
appellate court.

ISSUE​: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD: ​No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term “psychological
incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some
resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit
the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC
also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife
is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required
to decree a nullity of marriage.
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their
marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsoi’s
mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night
of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and
then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother, uncle and nephew as they
were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15,
1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that
she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that
Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up to this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had
observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband
only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance
of a normal man

Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies
with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided
him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage

HELD: ​The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the
marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children basedon the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and
fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Republic v. Molina

Facts : ​On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year
of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend
more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage which was affirmed by CA.

Issue :​ Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality constitute psychological incapacity?

Ruling : ​There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a
“difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons;
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down
for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical.

The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes.

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220,221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven be evidence and included in the text of
the decision. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from the 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective
in 1983.

The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
Dedel v CA
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage
between the accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and
effect

Ruling:

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage
were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City,
in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro
of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.
Republic vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano

FACTS: ​This is a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage between Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

In October 1986, Lolita and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines
where Lolita gave birth to their child. Later, she and Toshio were married before a judge. However, one month after
their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan. Despite his promise to return, he did not come back. Moreover, he also
stopped giving financial support and stopped all communication with his family. Consequently, Lolita filed for
declaration of nullity of her marriage.

The trial court declared the marriage null and void, holding that respondent spouse failed to fulfill his obligations as
husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. This failure was considered to be a sign of immaturity and that his
behavior could be traced to his mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.

Upon appeal, CA affirmed, concluding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family. Moreover, it ruled that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. CA and Molina and
Santos vs. CA, because in those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed marriage.”

Republic, as represented by the Solicitor-General, appealed.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his
marital obligations

HELD:​ SC ruled in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.

The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity outlined in
Santos:

“It must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
“medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Was respondent able to successfully prove Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities?

The Court found that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it
was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. There was no evidence to show that his
behavior was caused by a psychological order. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar
was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect
from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. AS we ruled in
Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

On issue of “Mixed Marriage”

In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot
be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens
to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the
basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should
apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca, this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.

Petition granted. Decision of CA reversed and set aside.

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne Reyes

FACTS: Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A
child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying, insecurities and
jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did
not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage that he learned about her child
with another man.

He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to
establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been
satisfied.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.

RULING: Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion
of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled
her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage.

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

First, ​that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second​, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified that was
sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her psychological incapacity
was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent;
Fifth​, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth​, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the
Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that
are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh​, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remains
unchanged.