Religious Diversity and Democratic Institutional Pluralism

Religious Diversity and Democratic Institutional Pluralism
Author(s): Veit Bader

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 265-294
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RELIGIOUSDIVERSITYAND
DEMOCRATICINSTITUTIONALPLURALISM
VEITBADER
Universityof Amsterdam
Strictseparationof churchfroma presumed 'religion-blind'and strictly 'neutral'state still is the

preferredmodel in liberal, democratic,feminist, and socialist political theory.Focusing on the
full, reciprocalrelationshipsbetweensociety-culture-politics-nation-stateand (organized)reli-
gions, this article makesa case infavor of 'nonconstitutionalpluralism' in general, associative
democracyinparticular.Associativedemocracyrecognizesreligiousdiversityboth individually
and organizationally;it stimulateslegitimatereligious diversity; it preventsa hidden majority
bias; and it provides a legitimaterolefor organizedreligions in theprovisionof a wide rangeof
services, includingeducation,on one hand, and in thepolitical process, on the other hand. That
organized religions should be informed,heard, and consulted in contested issues should be a
crucial componentof democraticparticipation.Thisalso mighthelppreventthe developmentof
religiousfundamentalism.
Keywords: secularism; state-religion relationships; religious diversity; religious minoraties;

types of institutional pluralism; nonconstitutional pluralism; associative
democracy
Debates on the relationshipsbetween religion and society, politics and

the statein recentpoliticalphilosophyin the United States show two charac-
teristics.First,thereis a focus on limitationsof religious argumentsin public
debate and political decision making. The more or less radicalexclusionof
religiousreasonsandarguments frompublicdebateandpoliticsin political
liberalism has been extensively criticized as morally arbitrary,unfair,and
AUTHOR'SNOTE:Myspecial thanksto myfriend and colleague TonKorver.Withouthis contri-

butionI would not have succeeded to cut backoverly long draftsof the article into manageable
proportions. Thanksalso to Rainer Baubock,Ewald Engelen, TariqModood, BhikhuParekh,
Pieter Pekelharing,Melissa Williams,and two anonymousrefereesfrom PoliticalTheory.More
elaborateand muchbetterdocumentedversionsof this article (Bader2000) have beenpresented
at the ENCS conference in Bremen:Recasting European and CanadianHistory (18-21 May
2000) and at the workshop 'ReligiousPluralism'in Amsterdam(30 June 2001).
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 31 No. 2, April 2003 265-294
DOI: 10.1177/009059170225 1012
C)2003 Sage Publications
265
266 POLITICALTHEORY/ April 2003
practicallycounterproductive(Greenawalt1995; Bader 1999; Parekh2000;

Murphy2001). The consequencesof an emerging,broadened,andpluralized
perspectiveon publicreasonfor mutualunderstanding,decision making,and
democraticlegitimacy,however, have not been clearly spelled out yet, and
the institutionalrequirementsof public debateanddemocraticdecision mak-
ing under 'nonideal' conditions of serious inequalities have not been ade-
quately dealt with.
Second, we find a predominantlylegal discoursefocusing on the constitu-
tional relationshipbetween state and churches.Secularistinterpretationsof
liberal democraticconstitutionsand strictor formal neutralityas a guiding
meta-legal principle have been criticized (Smith 1995) and proposalshave
been put forwardto replace them by 'priorityfor democracy'(Bader 1999,
612-19) and by 'relational', 'substantive', or 'positive neutrality'
(McConnell 1992; Laycock 1990; Monsma 1993; Bader 1999). In response,
the hard core of a liberal understandingof the church-staterelationshipis
gettingever more minimalist:somethinglike 'voluntarism'and "separation-
ism minimallyunderstood"(Rosenblum2000a, 179-83;Eisenach2000,135;
Shah 2000, 137). The almost exclusively legal discourseis weakeningand a
plea for a moremultidisciplinaryapproachwith a morecomparativeperspec-
tive can be heard more often (Rosenblum 2000b; Marquandand Nettler
2000; Robbers 2001). Yet two main obstacles prevent the elaborationof a
political theory of the complex relationshipbetween religions and societies,
cultures,politics, nations, and states from becoming both empiricallymore
adequateandmorallymoresatisfying. (1) It still looks as if thereareonly two
options thatreally matter:'accommodationism'or 'structuralpluralism',on
the one hand,and 'separationism'or 'civil libertarianliberalism',on the other
hand(Rosenblum2000a, 179-83; McConnell2000, 100 ff). (2) The debateis
still too focused on the state-churchrelationshipinstead of addressingthe
full, reciprocal relationshipsbetween society-culture-politics-nation-state
and (organized) religions.
We begin at elaboratinga typology of different institutionaland policy
arrangementsfor the purposes of a more complex practicalevaluation of
existing and alternativeways of institutionalizingreligion (section I). As
standardsof evaluation, we use the interrelatedsecond-orderprinciples of
'priorityfor democracy','relationalneutrality',and 'fairnessas evenhanded-
ness' explicated in earlier articles: (1) Priorityfor democracy takes into
account, first, that constitutionalprinciples and public morality of liberal
democracies-under conditionsof reasonablepluralism-should be as free-
standingas possible with regardto competingsecularand religious founda-
tions; andsecond, thatthey cannotbe fully antiperfectionist(see also Tomasi
2001). Priorityfor democracyreplaces 'second-ordersecularism'in orderto
Bader/ DIVERSITYAND INSTITUTIONALPLURALISM 267
exclude culturalpractices incompatible with liberal democracyminimally

understood (versus all religious and secularist fundamentalisms)(Bader
1999,609-19). (2) Relationalneutralitytakesinto accountthat'strict'or 'for-
mal' neutrality,in the real world of inequalities,neglects structuralmajority
bias andhides this fromview. In regardto socioeconomic, legal, andpolitical
chances, neutralityis an importantprincipleif understoodgradationallyand
in an inequality-sensitive,relationalway (Bader1998, 436 ff; 2002b) prohib-
iting moralparticularismand precludinginjustice:sex, gender, 'race', 'eth-
nicity', state-membership,and religion should not matterwhen it comes to
the distributionof resourcesand rewards.'Second, in regardto culturaland
religious diversityandinequality,neutralityis not only impossible (therecan
be no completely neutral state) but also undesirable. Fairness cannot be
achievedby a 'hands-off'approachthat,in the end, would literallystrippeo-
ple and institutionsof all culturalparticularities,histories, religious tradi-
tions, and practices.The laudablemoral intuitionof neutralityand fairness
has to be reconceptualizedas fairness as evenhandedness(Carens 2000;
Bader forthcoming)."Theeliminationof all ideological and religious refer-
ences would not neutralizethe existing ideological tensions and conflicts"
(GermanSupremeCourt 1975, 41 BVerfGE29).
Insteadof tryingto abstractfromparticularity,we shouldembraceit, butin a way thatis

fair to all different particularities.Now being fair does not mean that every cultural
claim... will be given equalweight, butratherthateach will be given appropriateweight
underthe circumstancesand given a commitmentto equal respect for all. Historymat-
ters,numbersmatter,the relativeimportanceof the claim to those who presentit matters,
and so do many other considerations.(Carens 1997, 818)
We providea moralevaluationof two models: 'nonestablishmentandpri-

vate pluralism'and 'nonconstitutionalpluralism'.We attemptto makea case
for the latteras the most promisingoption of democraticinstitutionalplural-
ism (an option very much neglected not only in the United Statesbut also in
the English debates) (sections II and III). In the conclusion, we try to refute
some realist objections to democratic institutionalpluralism (section IV).
Our overridingintent is to bring to the fore and stimulate debates about
'nonconstitutionalpluralism', because we are convinced that this model
enables us to achieve higherdegrees of relationalneutralitywhile remaining
fully compatiblewith priorityfor liberal democracy.It recognizes religious
diversityboth individuallyandorganizationally,it stimulatesreligiousdiver-
sity, and it preventsa hiddenmajoritybias. Moreover,it providesmodes of
representationof organizedreligions in the political process, enablingpre-
liminaryanswersto the institutionalrequirementsof public debateanddem-
ocratic decision making undernonideal conditions. Of course, our claim is
not that organizedreligions should as such be representedin the legislative,

executive, and adjudicativepowers of the state. What we argue for is that
organizedreligions may claim a legitimaterole in regardto being informed,
heard,andconsultedin contestedissues. This role shouldbe a crucialcompo-
nent of democraticparticipation.What we advocateis a form of associative
democracyin which the strengthsof both individualand associationalfree-
doms arecombinedandin which religious associations,amongothers,play a
morecrucialsocietal andinstitutionalizedpolitical role. This also mighthelp
preventthe developmentof religious fundamentalism.
AND
I. A TYPOLOGYOF INSTITUTIONAL
POLICYARRANGEMENTS
Whatpoliticalphilosophersminimallyshouldlearnfrom a criticalsociol-
ogy of religion is the following: (1) Most modem societies are normally
understoodto be 'secular', but contraryto predominantmythology,we can-
not detect any inevitable decline of religious beliefs and practices,nor any
inevitableprivatizationof religion in modem societies; and the institutional
differentiationof 'Western'state-societies into relatively autonomoussub-
systems should not be misconceived as strict or 'complete separationof
churchandstate'.Insteadof one 'necessary'or 'optimal'Americanpatternin
the relationshipbetweenchurches,state,andnations,we find the coexistence
andcompetitionof differentpatternsthatcan be inductivelygeneralizedinto
many empiricaltypes (see Martin1978, 59). Church-staterelationshipsare
institutionallyhighly diverse. (2) This diversity is also characteristicof the
variety of contradictoryconstitutional,legal, administrative,and cultural
arrangementsandpolicies in statesthatall sharethe sameprinciplesof liberal
democracy. Different states, or states in different epochs, or different
branchesand levels (central,provincial,local) of contemporarystatesgrant
or forbid legal or administrativeprivileges to religions like tax exemptions,
gatheringtithes,exemptionsfromcompulsorymilitaryservice (withor with-
out alternativecompulsorycivil service), exemptionsfrom certaingenerally
applicable laws or directives (antidiscriminationin employment, Sunday-
closing, workinghours,educationalstandards,prohibitionof drugsandalco-
hol, zoning and building requirements,parking requirements,etc). They
allow or forbidsubsidiesto religious organizationsfor education,charitable,
and welfare activities. They interpretand apply religiousfreedoms differ-
ently, and they balance competing rights of individual and collective reli-
gious autonomy,or of free exercise versus antidiscrimination,in different
ways.
Bader / DIVERSITYAND INSTITUTIONALPLURALISM 269
This huge complexity of actual institutionalarrangementsand policies

has to be reduced-for the sake of practicalevaluation-into a set of rele-
vantoptions. Ourconstructionof institutionalandpolicy models is not based
on inductive generalizationsbut ratheron normativeconsiderations(how
institutions and policies ought to look), which, together with moral and
constitutional/legalprinciples,inform-implicitly or explicitly-actual pol-
icies and invite thinking aboutalternativedesigns. Even as normativemod-
els, they areideal types:no actuallypredominantpolicy model in anycountry
fits completely (because therearealways rivalor competingnormativemod-
els at work), let alone any actual institutional setting or policy (see also
MonsmaandSoper 1997, 10). However,predominantmodels tendto approx-
imate specific ideal types, andourempiricalreferencesaremeantto indicate
these approximations.
The typology is constructedaroundtwo axes: 'establishment'(subdivided
into constitutional,legal, administrative,political, and cultural)and institu-
tionalized monism or pluralism(see Table 1).3
1. 'Strongestablishment'of one monopolisticchurchis per definitionconstitutionaland/

or legal establishment.It always implies administrativeand political monism aimed at
religio-national cultural monism, though obviously, de facto establishment can be
achieved only to a certain degree and may even have completely counterproductive,
unintendedoutcomes. Recent models approximatingversions of strongestablishment
are Greece, Serbia, and Israel. Such establishmentis clearly incompatiblewith mini-
mally requiredinstitutionaldifferentiationandwith the most minimalistinterpretations
of religious freedomsandequaltreatment.It is thusat odds with principlesof relational
neutrality,fairness in all versions, and priorityfor democracy. 'Strong establishment'
has been the point of historical departurefor 'dis-establishment', 'pluralestablish-
ment', and 'nonestablishment'.
2. 'Weakestablishment'means constitutionalor legal establishmentof one state-church
thathas to be compatiblewith dejure andde facto religious freedomsandreligiousplu-
ralism.It may be compatiblewith some administrativerecognitionof religious plural-
ism and differentdegrees of de facto institutionalizationof otherreligions, and it may
also recognize a certainreligious pluralizationof the culturalnation.RecentEuropean
models approximatingthis ideal type are England, Scotland, and the Scandinavian
states. 'Weakestablishment'is compatiblewith, but does not fully express,priorityfor
democracy; it can be guided by principles of relational neutrality and fairness as
evenhandedness though such arrangementsmay differ widely and be empirically
contested.
3. 'Constitutionalpluralism'or 'pluralestablishment'existsonly in Finland,a nondenom-
inationalstate with two state churches(the large LutheranChurchof Finlandand the
small OrthodoxChurchof Finland)(Ahonen2000). It requiresthe constitutionaland/or
legal recognition of more than one organized religion. It aims at administrativeand
political pluralismwith the intentionof pluralizingthe religio-culturalnation.It was
discussed as an option in some Americanstates in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenthcentury.4Recently in England,therehave been proposalsto end the "uniquerela-
Table 1:
Typical Institutional and Policy Models
Constitutional Legal Administrative
Monism Strongestablishment Legal monism Administrative Pol

(SE) monism
Institutional Weakestablishment Legal monism Some administrative Res
pluralism (WE) pluralism pl
Pluralestablishment Legal pluralism Administrative Pol
(PE) pluralism
Nonconstitutional
plu- Restrictedlegal Administrative Pol
ralism(NCP) pluralism pluralism
Strict Nonestablishmentand Strictlegal Strictadministrative Str
separationism privatepluralism separation separation tio
(NEPP) (intended)
tionship between the Churchof England and the British state so as to create a plural
religion-state-link"(Modood 1996, 3) by requiringthe new constitutionalestablish-
ment of organizedminorityreligions. It would be compatiblewith, althoughnot fully
expressive of, priorityfor democracy.It may be explicitly guidedby principlesof rela-
tional neutralityand fairness as evenhandedness.
4. 'Nonconstitutionalpluralism' (NCP) combines constitutional dis-establishment or
nonestablishmentwith restrictedlegal pluralism (e.g., in family law), administrative
institutionalpluralism (de jure and de facto institutionalizationof several organized
religions), institutionalizedpoliticalpluralism,5andthe religio-culturalpluralizationof
the nation. NCP is a variety of democraticinstitutionalpluralismdefined by two core
aspects of power-sharingsystems: (1) the existing pluralityof organizedreligions must
notjust be-more or less formally-recognized, it must also be integratedin the politi-
cal processes of problem-definition,deliberation,presentationof decision alternatives,
and decision making.NCP requiresspecific informationrightsfor organizedreligions
andcorrespondinginformationdutiesby stateagencies regardingcontestedissues, par-
ticipationin publicforaandhearings,inclusionin advisorycouncils, andcorresponding
consultationrightsand duties to listen, and so on. (2) This recognitionand integration
has to be combinedwith a fair amountof actualdecentralizationandde facto autonomy
to decide on specific issues. On the nation-statelevel, the models of the Netherlands
after the constitutional reforms of 1983, Belgium, India, Australia, and Germany
approximatethis ideal type, though,obviously, this is not an uncontestedpolicy model
in these countries.6With regardto specific fields like education,health care, and other
welfareservices, organizedreligions(amongother 'secular'nonstateserviceproviders)
play an important,officially recognized and subsidized role in most countries (see
Monsma and Soper 1997; see also note 3). NCP expresses the principleof priorityfor
democracymorefully thanthe othermodels of religious institutionalpluralism,andit is
explicitly guidedby principlesof relationalneutralityandfairnessas evenhandedness.
5. Nonestablishmentand privatepluralism (NEPP) declares strictlegal separationof the
state from all religions as well as strict administrativeand political separation.It is
opposed to legal, administrative,and political institutionalizationof religions. Reli-
gious pluralismis allowed only in 'civil', not political, society or the state. It cannot,
however, preventde facto administrative,political, and culturalpluralism.It may or
may not contest existing religio-nationalestablishmentsor aim at religious pluraliza-
tion of the nation.The model of the United States approximatesthis type, thoughwe
must stressthe inevitabledistancebetween 'model andmuddle'.Any 'completesepara-
tion of state', let alone of politics or culture,from religion in the United Stateswouldbe
a radicalliberalor libertarianutopia,not an accuratedescriptionof the existing stateof
affairs.NEPP clearly expresses priorityfor democracy,but it is predominantlyguided
by principles of difference-blindneutralityand a 'hands-off' conception of fairness
(Carens2000). The crucialdifferencewith NCP is thatinstitutionalpluralismis strictly
relegatedto the so-called privatesphereof civil society andis not allowed to spill over
into political society or the state, particularlynot into decision making.
The second, third, and fourth model represent different forms of demo-
cratic institutional pluralism; the fourth and fifth option represent two forms
of constitutional nonestablishment. For the purpose of practical evaluation,
the most important dividing line runs between the three versions of demo-
cratic institutional pluralism, on one hand, and NEPP on the other hand, both
because constitutionalaspects may not be as importantas legal theorists

think and because the administrative,political, and culturalaspects of these
three varietiesof democraticinstitutionalpluralismshow importantoverlap
and cannotbe neatly distinguishedfrom each other.
If one comparesthe English and Americandebates (Bader 1999, 597 f)
with this set of institutionalmodels, it is remarkablethat in the English
debate,NCP is lacking.As a consequence,proponentsof institutionalplural-
ism are forced to choose between eitherweak establishmentor pluralestab-
lishment. Or they have to accept 'secularconstitutionalreform'inspiredby
the Americanmodel, giving little or no roomto institutionalizereligiousplu-
ralism at all. This undulylimits institutionalimaginationand neglects inter-
esting options preferablefor normativereasons.Institutionalpluralismdoes
not require 'formal', 'official' constitutionalrecognition. In the American
debate, NCP is also largely neglected. The aversion of predominantliberal
and republican theories against, and the limited practical experience of
Americandemocracywith, forms of institutionalpluralismhelps to explain
this fact. The effect has been that NCP, the other importantvariety of
nonestablishmentcompatiblewith the FirstAmendment,has neverbeen seri-
ously discussed.
Ourclaim thatNCP is preferableis, as alreadymentioned,based on three
general arguments.First,recognizing that 'strict'religious neutralityof the
state is not only an unachievablebut an undesirableutopia, and taking into
account the actual religious bias of existing states as well as the unequal
chances of organizedreligions (see Bader 1999; Eisenach 2000), the most
importantissue is, How to achieve higherdegreesof relationalneutralityand
more evenhandednesswith regard to existing majority and minority reli-
gions? We hope to show that the principlesof religious freedom and of fair
andevenhandedtreatmentof religions canbe betterimplementedby an insti-
tutional option combining constitutional nonestablishmentwith different
formsof legal, administrative,political, andculturalpluralism.Second,insti-
tutionalpluralismwith regardto organizedreligions has two mainvirtues.It
recognizes religious diversity both individually and organizationally.The
cause of diversity,of course,is in muchbettershapeonce it is backedby insti-
tutions.7NCP also strengthensreligiousminoritiesin theiroppositionagainst
enforced assimilation(Walzer 1997, 69 if; Spinner-Halev2000, 7, 20, 44).
By providingresourcesandopportunitiesfor religious minoritiesto organize
andmobilize, it directlyhelps to redressseriousinequalitiesamongreligions.
Third,contraryto liberalandrepublicanfears,NCP may also help to prevent
the developmentof religious fundamentalismin politics.
Bader/ DIVERSITY AND INSTITUTIONALPLURALISM 273
Practical evaluations here are complex and difficult. Practical reason

itself is complex, containingmoral,ethical,prudential,andrealistarguments
often pointingin divergentdirectionsandrequiringdifficultartsof balancing
and hardtrade-offs.We focus on moral evaluationonly (sections II and III).
To reducethe complexity further,we restrictour evaluationto a roughcom-
parison of NCP and NEPP. A final difficulty rises from the complexity of
contexts.Forthe institutionalizationof religiouspluralism,muchdependson
whetherit takes place in states with deeply rooted liberal democratictradi-
tions or in deeply divided societies, in situationsof crisis or in normalsitua-
tions. Constitutional,legal, and political histories, the variety and size of
(organized)religions, andparticularly,thepower-relationsbetweenreligious
majoritiesand minoritieshave an obvious impact (Bader 2002c).
Such overwhelming complexity spells disaster for theories of
contextualizedmorality and practical evaluation.If contexts clearly make
such a difference, no workable productive middle ground for theorizing
seems to be left between the scylla of abstract,universalistmoralprinciples
as in traditionalliberal moral philosophy and the charybdisof generalized
statementslike 'it all depends', 'it is all politics', 'adhocery'.If we clearly
recognize thatnot all institutionaloptions arefeasible in all contextsandthat
no 'optimal'or 'best' institutionalmodel can exist fitting all contexts, situa-
tions, and requirements,no space seems left for discussing the advantages
and disadvantagesof these models. The result would be a disappointing
reproduction of the traditional divide between universalism and
particularismor betweenmoralphilosophyandthe social sciences. Ourstrat-
egy to tackle this dilemma is twofold. First, as social scientists, we should
never be content with statementslike 'it all depends'. Instead,we have to
spell out, 'dependsuponwhat'?This requiressome inductivegeneralizations
and some strongerexplanatorytheoretical statements.Second, as political
theorists,we shouldattemptto close this gapby demonstratinghow ourinter-
pretationsof universalprinciples are informedby our institutionalmodels
and by discussing how these models respond to the same general require-
ments: how they balance competing moral and legal principles, how they
respondto minimal requirementsof social cohesion and political unity, and
so on. In such a way, the advantagesand disadvantagesof institutionaland
policy options can be clarified, and the choice of a contextually adequate
institutionaland policy mix can be made in a more reflexive way.
In ourmoralevaluationof NCP andNEPPwe focus primarilyon religious
freedoms (liberal tradition)(section II) but also provide some insight on
democracy, political citizenship (democratic tradition) and substantive

equality (section III).
II. RELIGIOUSFREEDOMS
Moral and legal principles,like religious freedom, do not exist in a vac-

uum. They have to be balancedwith otherprinciples,like nondiscrimination
or equal opportunity(moral pluralism). And religious freedom itself turns
out to be a complex, underdeterminedconcept implyingmanyfreedoms,and
their contested understanding,interpretation,and applicationis influenced
by divergentunderstandingsof the positive, negative,or neutralrelationship
between religions and liberal democracy (McConnell 2000, 91-100). The
inevitablebalancebetween competingprinciplesalso depends on historical
facts and societal contexts leading to a range of morally permissiblepaths
(contextualizedmorality).Yet not anythinggoes. Interpretationsandinstitu-
tional optionshaveto be compatiblewith the core of religious freedom,how-
ever contested this core may be (see below).
One of the most broadly recognized, carefully phrased, and balanced
articulationsof such a core is article9 of the InternationalCovenantof Civil
and Political Rights.8
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedomto changehis religionof belief andfreedom,eitheralone or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private,to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching,practiceandobservance.(2) Freedomto manifestone's religion or beliefs shall
be subjectonly to such limitationsas areprescribedby law and arenecessaryin a demo-
craticsociety in the interestsof public safety,for the protectionof public order,healthor
morals, or for the protectionof the rights and freedoms of others.
It is plain that "freedom of religion is not an un-differentiatedor uni-

dimensionalconcept,butis a constellationof overlappingandsometimescon-
flicting claims for specific freedoms"(Galanter1966, 217 if). Together,these
claims spell an enormouscomplexity.Two questions,however,enable some
complexityreduction.They arethetraditionalandintertwinedquestionsabout
freedom from (negative) and freedom to (positive freedom)?; and about
whose freedom is involved (individual,parental/familial,associational).
The freedomto believe-or the freedomof individualconscience andthe
freedom to practice religion in worship, ritual, teaching, observance
(whethercollectively or individually,in 'private'or in 'public' spaces)-and
the freedomof religionsfromillegitimatestatecontroloften conflict. Positive
freedom is compatible with and may even call for aid (see section IV),
whereasnegativefreedomfromillegitimatestatecontrolseems to require'no
aid' or 'no interference'(Galanter1966, 288 if; HarvardLaw ReviewNote
1987, 1632 if). As with all othernegativefreedoms,however,the freedomof
individual believers and of religious practices from persecution requires
some state involvementfor two reasons. First,it is not only directedagainst
state interference,but also against all forms of illegitimate interferenceby
otherreligions as well as by "secular"groupsand organizations(Shue 1995,
13). The state has the obligationto protect all religions from such interfer-
ence. Second, religious freedomprotectsnot only individualfreedomof con-
sciousness and religious practicebut also collective practices of organized
religions. These associational or collective freedoms often contradictindi-
vidual religious freedoms, particularly in cases of deeply illiberal,
antidemocratic,fundamentalist,or totalistic religions. Such conflicts have
for long been the subjectof legal debatesaboutchurchautonomyversuspub-
lic prerogatives,scrutinyor interference.
The cases range from conflicts about churchproperty,internaldecision-
making processes and authority,appropriateforms and degrees of public
accountabilityand scrutinyin cases of tax exemptionandpublic subsidies,to
cases in which the nomos of religious groups, that is, their normativeuni-
verses, laws, and customs, conflicts with state-enforcedprivatepersonallaw
(particularlymarriageand divorce law) or with criminal law (Glendonand
Yanes 1991;McConnell 1992). Theoreticalpositionsandpolitico-legalstrat-
egies include (1) complete deference or "full autonomy" (Swaine 2001,
320 if) to the nomos ('ecclesiastical law' andcustoms), decision makingand
authorityof religions as defendedby radicallibertarians(on the assumptions
of voluntarinessor free, informedconsent by adults:free entry,free exit) and
by traditionalistcommunitarians(on the completely opposite assumptionof
protectinggiven communitiesandtheirculture);(2) internallyhighly differ-
entiated ways of balancing associational freedoms or collective autonomy
with individualreligious freedomsand otherhumanrights; (3) radicalpoli-
cies of 'liberal-democraticcongruency'(insensitive,universalistliberalindi-
vidualismor insensitive democraticuniversalism).Both 'absolutist'associa-
tional autonomy or 'absolutist free exercise' and 'absolutist individual
freedoms'or unrestrictedliberal-democraticcongruencyarecounterproduc-
tive (Robbins 1987, 148; Rosenblum1998, 79; 2000a, 166). The absolutism
of the first position reduces the moral and legal constraintsof humanrights
and 'priorityfor liberaldemocracy'practicallyto zero. The absolutismof the
secondpositiontriesto impose thicknotionsof liberalautonomyanddemoc-
racy in a self-contradictoryway on all associations. If, in contrastto these
absolutepositions, one recognizes the need to balance individualand asso-
ciational autonomy (Selznick 1992, 288; Etzioni 1996, 191), one cannot
expect easy answers or one universalformulaapplicableto all cases.
The U.S. SupremeCourthas been very reluctantto interferewith church
autonomy,guided by a mixtureof libertarianassumptions,free exercise, and
suspicionof all stateinterventionin the 'private'sphere.In cases of property
disputes, this has resultedin unconditionaldeference to ecclesiastical law,
decision proceduresand practices as interpretedby church authority.This
rule has not been upheld in cases of tax exemptions and subsidies for
churches and related charitable and service institutions not living up to
antidiscriminationrules in labor and employment,to minimal educational,
health, and social service standards,or to rules of financial accountability.
"Certainsocial values suchas equalopportunityandracialnon-discrimination
are now viewed as partly enforceable by the state on institutionslinked to
churches"(Robbins1987, 141, 148). The enforcementis basedon the assump-
tion of the public trusttheorythat accepting public money gives the state a
specialmandateto investigate,anda greaterregulatorymandate.Even so, the
extent,degree,andtype of regulationandinterferenceareclearlycontested.9
In such matters,four argumentshave to be taken seriously:(1) Some dis-
tinctionbetween 'religious'issues and 'economic'issues is neededto prevent
an imperialisticuse of the FreeExerciseClauseto cover "allmannerof enter-
prises [e.g., of the Unification Church,Scientology] with the shield of the
FirstAmendment,therebyequatingwith freedomof worshipthe rightto pur-
sue profitableactivitieswithoutpublic accountability"(Robbins 1987, 148).
All these distinctions,however,are contested. (2) We clearly have to distin-
guish between activities and decisions centralto faith (like rules, decisions
and control over membershipof religious associations), and other, more
peripheral or nonrelated, 'secular' ones (like work and employment in
church-linkedinstitutions).Yet this distinctionis not easy to draw.10(3) One
of the explicit aims of tax exemptionsis
encouragingdiverse, indeed often sharplyconflicting, activities and viewpoints.... Far

from representing an effort to reinforce any perceived "common community con-
science",the provisionof tax exemptionsto nonprofitgroupsis one indispensablemeans
of limiting the influence of governmentalorthodoxyon importantareas of community
life. (JusticePowell, quotedin Kelley 1987, 121)
Theparamountdangerof publicscrutinyandinterferenceis theimpositionof

conformityto standardsthatareactuallysecularistbutpresentedas 'public',
'neutral',or 'purelyprofessional'.This dangeris particularlygreatif norms
and standardsare set andinterpretedby stateagencies like the InternalReve-
nue Service. (4) New religiousminoritiesdependupon such exemptionsand
subsidies,andthey areparticularlyvulnerableto interference(Robbins1987,

145).
The fairly strong argumentin the tax exemption and subsidy cases that
acceptingpublic money legitimizes public scrutinyandsome degreeof inter-
ference is absentin the hardercases in which the nomos of religions, which
do not accept public money allegedly conflicts with rightsof their members
guaranteedby civil and criminal lexfori. The AmericanSupremeCourthas
not only allowed racist and sexist exclusion from membershipbut also a
fairly high amountof illiberal and antidemocratictreatmentof membersof
religious associations.11Radical libertariansand traditionalistcommuni-
tarianscome to the same conclusion here. For radicallyindividualistliberal
universalists(feminists among them) and for moderatelibertarians,liberal
democrats,and liberalcommunitarians,religious freedoms are constrained
by the equalreligiousfreedomsof otherbelieversandby all othercivil, politi-
cal, andsocial rights,not only of others,butalso of theirown members.A lib-
eral-democraticstatehas the dutyto protectindividualbelieversagainsttheir
'own' religious group, associations, and leaders. Religiously legitimized
practices of caste, bondage, and slavery are surely incompatible with the
most minimalistinterpretationof modernfreedom and equality,and radical
libertarianand contractarian'consent to slavery' argumentsare almost uni-
versally regardedas null and void. Women's (and gays' and lesbians') indi-
vidualhumanrightsapparentlyconflict with freedomof traditionalreligious
practices as interpretedby religious organizationsand leaders, as well as
absolutist Free Exercise lawyers. Practices of sati (immolation of widows
following their husband'sdeath), domestic violence, strangerrape, marital
rape, sexual abuse,genital mutilation(Nussbaum 1997), as well as enforced
collective suicide conflict with minimalist interpretationsof a universal
humanrightto life andto bodily integrityas well as of moderncriminallaw,
even if this interpretationis the result of a very late, still incomplete moral
learning process. Here, criminal law should step in: priority for liberal
democracymust be strongenough to legitimize public scrutinyand interfer-
ence to sanction these practices effectively.
Does the same hold for cases in which conflicts with moderncivil law are
the issue, for example, religiously legitimated practices of discrimination
againstwomen in 'religious private,personallaw', particularlyin marriage
and divorce law? (see Nussbaum 1997, 115 ff; Rudolphand Rudolph2000;
Reitman1998, Oliveira1995). Unreconstructedradicalliberalindividualists
try to avoid the "apparent dilemma for the modern liberal regime"
(Nussbaum 1997, 98):
If the governmentdefersto the wishes of the religious group,a vulnerablegroupof indi-

vidualswill lose basicrights;if the governmentcommitsitself to respectingequalhuman
rightsof all individuals,it will standaccusedof indifferenceto the libertyof conscience,
(Nussbaum2000, 14, 168, 187)
or of neglect of associationalreligious freedoms.Many feminists insist on a

rigorouslyindividualistic,secularistinterpretationof humanrights,particu-
larly religious freedom. They fiercely attackall 'grouprights', particularly
any associationalor collective autonomyfor religions, andthey proscribeall
separatecodes or systems of religious law,while insistingon a "uniformcivil
code".12This strategy'solves' the problemby denyingit. The upshotof such
a strategyis, of course, that it will work in favor of majoritiesand majority
religions. Religious freedom,sadly enough,does not fall fromheaven.It has
to be achieved,andits importancecan be weighed againstthe backgroundof
the elementary observation that religious organizations are an important
resourcefor minoritiesin their strugglefor a fairplace in the space of rights,
individualrights included.Some form and degree of associationalreligious
freedom and communal autonomy is required in particularfor religious
minoritiesif only to protectthem from "intrusiveinterference"by statesand
majorityreligions. How does one achieve a more sensible balance between
protectionof vulnerableindividualsand groups (minoritieswithin religious
minorities)and outside protectionof vulnerablereligious minorities?How
does one avoid the "perilsof multiculturalaccommodation"in family and
divorce law (Shachar1998, 2000)?
Drawingon the distinctionsbetween 'religious'and 'economic' activities
in tax exemption and subsidy cases, Shachar(1998) distinguishesbetween
"demarcatingfunctions"of family law (crucialfor the internalreproduction
of the "nomos" of groups,particularlycontrolof membershipandthe role of
women in it) and its "distributivefunctions."13In her "intersectionistjoint
governance approach,"she proposes to delegate jurisdiction about the
demarcatingfunctions to 'inside' courts of religious groups and reserves
jurisdiction about property matters to state courts, explicitly permitting
inputs"fromtwo legal systems-a group'sessential traditionsandthe state's
laws-to resolve a single dispute"(p. 299).
Suchbalanced,limitedforms of legal pluralismpresuppose(1) notionsof
differentiated,delegated,andlimitedautonomyor 'sovereignty'elaboratedfirst
andmost clearly in the traditionof institutionalpluralism;14 (2) a criticismof
the individualistsocial ontology of traditionalliberalism-"the individual-
state-marketframework"(Glendon and Yanes 1991, 546 f); and (3) a full-
fledged moralandlegal recognitionof the importanceof associationalauton-
omy in general,of associationalfreedomsof religion, in particular.This has
also been most clearly spelled out by institutionalpluralists (Figgis 1914,

67 ff, 87 f; also Hirst2000; GlendonandYanes1991,534 if; McConnell1992,
724 f; Miller1985, 272 ff, 349 ff; Skillen 1994,249 f; Swaine2001,305,320).
Yet institutional pluralism was originally illiberal and antidemocratic-
the most vivid defense of church autonomy can be found in the Catholic
tradition-and even liberal and democraticinstitutionalpluralismis often
thoughtto be incompatiblewith voluntarismand 'separationism'minimally
understood(Rosenblum1998, 2000b). We claim that a moderatelylibertar-
ian versionof democraticinstitutionalpluralismprovidesexcellent opportu-
nities to combine the strengthsof both traditions.We referto this alternative
as associative democracy.15
How consonantis associative democracywith voluntarismand minimal
separationism?First, how to understandvoluntarism?Radical libertarians
proceed on the assumptionof free and informedconsent by adults to enter
religious associations,on the one hand,andfree exit, on the other.Moderate
libertarians can avoid these fictions of voluntarinessand still rescue the
attractivefeaturesof a libertarianapproach.16Enteringandremainingin reli-
gious associationsareonly rarely 'free' andvoluntary.Most people areeither
borninto or raisedin religiouscommunities"7-andthis "involuntary"mem-
bership may be constitutivefor their culturalpractices and self-definitions
(Eisenberg 1995)-and they remain membersbecause they are used to it.
Membershipbecomes 'nonvoluntary'only if exit is legally proscribedor
socially impossible or harsh.Still, entryand stay aremattersof degree,andit
is plausible that the absence of strong establishment,together with high
degrees of religious diversity, results in higher degrees of voluntarism
(Handy1976; Miller 1985;Moore 1994;Eisenach2000; Rosenblum1998,4,
84). Most people also agree that guaranteeingfull exit rights is a necessary
but not sufficientconditionfor providingactualexit options. Exit from reli-
gious associations may be extremely difficult (see generally Warren2001,
99), particularlyin cases of encompassing religions (social ostracism), and
it may even be legitimatefor certain minoritiesto make it very costly (see
Spinner-Halev2000, 77 ff). Finally, there may be some trade-offbetween
exit andvoice, andmoderatelibertariansstresshigh degreesof free entryand
exit, minimizing 'democraticcongruency' (requirementsof some internal
associationaldemocracy).'8
Second, there is the issue of how to conceptualize separationismmini-
mallyunderstood.Like most Americanpoliticaltheorists,NancyRosenblum
thinksthatwe have to chose between "structuralpluralism"and "civil liber-
tarianliberalism."Her central charges against all varieties of institutional
pluralismare not only thatthey trespassacross the voluntaristconcernwith
individualfree exercise (2000a, 182 f) but thatthey also rejectkey elements
of separationism(p. 180): they inevitablypass the thresholdfor impermissi-

ble establishmentof religion and are accused of "one way protection"(pro-
tection of churchesfromthe state)and"absolutistFreeExercise"(neglecting
or trumping"Establishment"issues). Her understandingof separationismis
"thatreligions must go without official recognition and imprimaturin the
formof guaranteedrepresentationor access to governmentpower,legaljuris-
diction over membersor authorityover theircivil status"(1998, 10). Though
clearly recognizing that things are different in other democracies,
Rosenblumdoes not distinguishdifferentmodes of public or official recogni-
tion of religions and meshes claims to some form of guaranteedrepresenta-
tion with more or less full-fledged establishment.We claim thatrecognized
cultural pluralism, political pluralism, administrativepluralism, and even
restrictedlegal pluralismcan go together with nonestablishment,and that
official recognitionand grouprepresentationin the political process can be
very flexible. It ranges from some representationand some (e.g., informa-
tion) rights in the phases of deliberationand preparationof alternativesfor
decision making (e.g., of the majorreligions in religious councils regarding
specific issues and fields) to guaranteedrepresentationin decision making
andto some representationin executiveadministrationandthejudiciary.Dis-
cussions of flexible and contextuallylegitimateforms of democraticinstitu-
tional pluralismare blocked if all are accused tryingto give "religiona con-
trolling place in public arenasand public law."19
Associative democracy as the most open and flexible variety of demo-
cratic institutionalpluralism allows us to make use of three considerable
advantages of institutional pluralism: (1) Actual religious freedoms for
minoritieshave to be continuouslyfought for. Theirguaranteeshouldnot be
left to law and Supreme Courts, let alone to political majoritarianism
(McConnell 1992, 693,721 f, 728,734). Publicandpoliticalpressureby reli-
gions helps remind 'benevolent'religious majorities(includingjudges) of
discriminatorypractices;andsome form of political or formalrecognitionof
religions provides them with additional political and legal resources. (2)
Institutionalizationof religions enlargesthe possibilities and meansof mini-
mal, legitimate state supervisionand control to guaranteeessential human
rightsof dissentersand of minoritieswithin minorities.It is muchmorediffi-
cult to minimally supervise highly individualizedreligious practices and
loosely organized'invisible' sects comparedwith more organizedsects like
Bhagwan,HareKrishna,andScientology or with churches.(3) If religionsdo
not choose an isolationist strategy,but ratheracceptpublic money and other
privileges and want to participatein public deliberation,decision making,
and implementation,associative democracy combines two policy options.
Public scrutinyand accountabilityis more legitimate-even from a libertar-
ian view-and morepracticable.Minimalstandardsof associationallaw like

financial accountabilityas well as minimal liberal moral and legal require-
ments like nondiscriminationhave to be applied.Also, minimal standardsof
internaldemocracyare more legitimate.
Such a minimalistpolicy of liberal-democraticcongruencyshouldbe dif-
ferentiatedaccordingto differenttypes of areasand activities. Forexample,
imposingfemale or gay priesthoodon Catholicchurches(overrulinginternal
decision rules and authority)is clearly less legitimatethan askingfor a criti-
cal scrutinyof discriminatoryselectioncriteriafor teachers(or for studentsor
forjanitors)in publicly subsidizedreligious schools, or for living up to mini-
mally requirededucationalstandardsand teaching practices, or forbidding
discriminatoryselection practices in church-linkedservices or other eco-
nomic enterprises.20 Associative democracyprovides a more importantrole
for religions in discussing and even deciding about such criteriaand stan-
dardsas well as in theirimplementation(Hirst 1994, 56 if). It helps to make
themmorerelationallyneutralby challengingsecularistor religiousmajority
bias maskedas 'neutral''publicrules'or 'modernprofessional'requirements
(priorityfor democracyversus secularism).It not only makesthem subjectto
minimalist and differentiatedpolicies of liberal-democraticcongruency,it
also enlargestheir opportunitiesto influence these policies.
Religions, obviously,have to be free to accept or reject options of greater
orlesser official recognitionandinstitutionalization.Even if theyfollow (like
the Amish, Hutterites,Mennonites,Chassidim)fairly isolationist strategies,
social, legal, political, and culturalchanges are sure to have an impact on
them. Isolationiststrategiescannotresult in full-scale isolation, even where
separationismis the official creed. Clearly,processes of unintendedcultural
change have to be distinguishedfrom policies of liberal-democraticcongru-
ence. Moreover,wanting to be left alone inevitably means asking for many
legal exemptionsandprivileges:makinguse of a modem legal systemhas an
inevitable impact on conservative religions (Rosenblum 1998, 103 ff;
Swaine 2001, 318; Tomasi2001, 43 ff). The starkchoice between isolation-
ism and the exertionof influence (includingthe possible unintendedconse-
quence of learningthe rules and virtues of the democraticgame) cannotbe
evaded.21 Also, the choice of whetherto apply for and accept public money
may prove to be a vexing one, as the latter entails monitoring and thus
accountabilityand organization.This explains the resistance of many reli-
gious associationsto formal institutionalizationand the necessity for states,
administrations, and majority religions to prevent an all-or-nothing
dilemma.22
Flexible arrangementsare clearly the most conducive for achievingreli-
gious freedomsand,at the same time, a modicumof legal, cultural,political,
and administrativepluralism.In this perspective,NCP is preferableto NEPP

as it combines the advantagesof institutionalpluralismwith a moderatelib-
ertarianunderstandingof voluntarism.
III. DEMOCRACY,CITIZENSHIP,
EQUALITY
Political citizenshipin the modernunderstandingis equal for all citizens
irrespectiveof their 'race', sex, gender,ethnicity,class, andreligion. Demo-
craticprinciples and the correspondingpolitical rights seem to precludenot
only strongestablishmentandreligious second-class citizenship,but also all
group rights and all forms of institutionalpolitical representationof orga-
nized religions, notablyof illiberalandantidemocraticreligions. In the latter
case, the tensions betweenthe "demandsof faith"andthe "obligationsof citi-
zenship"are strongandthe idea of "protectionof the Statefrom the Church"
seems to be particularlyappealing,precludingnot only strongestablishment,
butalso weak establishment,pluralestablishment,andNCP.23Only the com-
plete, and completely unrealistic, separationof state and civil society by
NEPP seems compatiblewith moderndemocracy.
The idea, inheringin separationismanddisestablishment,is thatthe repre-
sentationof particularinterestsandgroupsshouldremainconstrictedto civil
society and not spill over into the domain of the state. Of course, interest
groupsmay form lobbies and may try to influence political parties.But such
'politicalpluralism'is supposedto preventor forestall-for fear of 'mischief
of faction' (see criticism by Cohen and Rogers 1995)-the political
institutionalizationof particularinterests,not to recognizeor formalizeit. All
existing liberal-democraticpolitical systems, however, actually recognize
the existence and role of groups and organizationsat least to some degree
(e.g., in drawing the boundariesof constituencies, equal representationof
small states in federalsenates, guaranteeof some minorityrights),andmany
explicitly supplementterritorialgrouprepresentationwith forms of social or
functional (e.g., 'neocorporatist') group representation(Lijphart 1984).
Also, these forms of representationhave been extendedto include represen-
tation of ascriptiveminorities (e.g., women, ethno-nationalminorities;see
Williams 1998; Kymlicka1995) andorganizedreligions (Lehmbruch1996).
Especially in regardto the correctionof inequalitiesanddisadvantages,NCP
presentsa more promisingavenuethanNEPP,which, like all difference-and
inequality-blindsystems, tends to perpetuatethe existing state of affairs.
NCP, then, tends to tackle the actual political and cultural hegemony of
entrenchedreligious majoritiesand of aggressive secularism.In doing so, it
contributesto a viable religious diversity in civil and in political society.
Finally,it tends to contributeto a relationallyneutralstateby addingimpor-

tant political resources and opportunitiesfor religious minorities. Differ-
ences and inequalitiesare, thus, "broughtonto the political stage" (Phillips
1996, 26) more effectively. Associative democracy has the advantageof
keeping the type, scope, degree, and mode of political institutionalization
and representationmoreflexible, open, andrevisable,morein line with mod-
eratevoluntarism(Bader2002c). Not the least of its strengthsis the space it
allows for a thoroughdiscussion of substantiveequality.
The positive freedom to believe and practice, emphasized by an
accommodationistreading of the Free Exercise Clause (McConnell 1992;
Sherberv. Verner1963), asks for more than the minimally requiredliberal
democraticscrutinyfor the sake of safeguardingindividualfreedoms.It asks
for some materially 'equal treatmentof religions', eitherbent on correcting
inequalities (invokingjustice-based arguments,as we do) or on providing
assistance and aid to promote the flourishing of varieties of religious life
(invoking state-perfectionist arguments about the good religious life;
Glendonand Yanes 1991; Parekh2000). Libertariansandradicalindividual-
istic liberalsdeny any such duty:equaltreatmentof religionsmeans equality
before the law, and the absolutepriorityof negative individualfreedomdis-
countsany more substantivenotionof equality.Aid to religionsis none of the
state'sbusiness. Only the strict,formalneutrality(Lemonvs. Kurtzman)and
the strong separationismof NEPP is compatible with equality,because all
other options are said to be inherentlyunfaireither to other religions, or to
nonbelievers.In all cases, however, where constitutionaldis-establishment
has been fairly recent and has been antedatedby a long history of strong
establishmentandactualpredominanceof one or moreChristianchurches,a
policy of formallystrictequal treatmentof religions is, accordingto libertar-
ian conceptions of justice, both unfairand harsh. Such a policy neglects all
legal, administrative,political, and materialadvantagessuch churcheshave
builtup and continueto use to preservetheirpredominance.Libertarianjus-
tice, surely,demandssome restitutionor redress.
Furthermore,statepolicies in modernwelfare statesaffect the diversityof
believers and nonbelieversin many direct and indirectways (Lugo 2001).
These policies cannotbe strictlyneutral,eitherin thejustificatorysense of a
'secularpurpose', or with regardto their 'directandindirecteffects'. This is
obvious in religion as well as otherfields like health (abortion,euthanasia)
and education (curricula,pedagogy, financing, prayer in public schools).
What,then, would an absolute libertarianhands-offpolicy of nonregulation
and nonsubsidy prescribefor the long and strenuous 'meantime'between
now and the realizationof its radicalutopia?When guidedby more substan-
tive notions of equality(Bader 1998, 447 if) and of equal freedomsfor reli-
gions, justice-basedargumentshave to balancelibertiesfromand libertiesto

(Robbins 1987, 135; McConnell 1992, 692 ff). They thus have to take
inequalitiesinto accountand find ways to combine 'involvement'and 'rela-
tionalneutrality'.The requirementsof the lattercannotof coursebe deduced
in a general way. Such generalityis actuallyprecludedby an essential con-
straint.We referhereto the circumstancethatall policies addressingserious,
state-inducedor state-guaranteedinequalitiesamongstreligionshavebothto
be evaluated in terms of effectiveness and democratic legitimacy, and in
termsof avoidableviolationsof equalitybeforethe law (Bader1998,462 ff).
Religious equality does not as such require disestablishment,if only
becauseconstitutionallaw has its limits andbecause all institutionallyplural-
ist options may deliveron the promise of substantivereligious equality.All
the same, the nonestablishment options express evenhandedness more
clearly.In comparisonwith NEPP,again,NCP sharesthe advantagesof flexi-
ble and democratic institutionalpluralism. It gives minority associations
moreresources,basedon official recognitionandopportunitiesfor participa-
tion in the realms of information,public deliberation,decision making, and
implementation.It helps to detecthiddensecularistor religiousmajoritybias
in the distributionof materialbenefits and, especially, in the cultural and
symbolic impregnationof state ceremonies,rituals,and practices.Finally,it
makes the ideal of fair and evenhandedjudgment a practicalnecessity.
IV CONCLUSION:REFUTINGSOME
REALISTOBJECTIONSAGAINSTNCP
Religious institutionalpluralism must be compatible with the minimal

requirementsof liberal-democraticconstitutions;in short, it must supple-
ment, not replace representativedemocracy.Still, such pluralismopens up a
vast arrayof trickyproblems(see Bader2002c), and it may have unintended
consequencesthatcan proveinseparablefromthe institutionalizationof plu-
ralismas such. Will NEPPnot be preferableto NCP,then,if only by default?
We think not for threereasons.
First, statescannotinstitutionalizereligionsin the abstract.Which associ-
ations,for example,canrightlyclaim recognitionas religions?And once rec-
ognized, which aredeservingof public monies?Which arepivotalenoughto
be deservingof representationin the political process? These arehardques-
tions, without generally applicable answers. For one, a purely subjective
'self-definition'will not do, as it will invitethe strategicuse of religiousiden-
tities for otherreasons.Foranother,the statecannotgrantinstitutionalrepre-
sentation to all religions, regardless of size and coverage. Thresholds are
needed, yet thresholds are not neutral, and they may have to be adjusted
upwardsmerelyto keep a system of representationworkable.And finally,the
mode of institutionalrepresentationitself has to be chosen, with the choice
having effects on the possibilities of being and getting represented.Which
religious organizationsshould be represented-constitutionally, legally, or
de facto?-on which level of governance,in which fields, concerningwhich
issues and decisions?
We claim thatNCP allows for open and context-specificanswersto these
issues insteadof resolving the matterby denying it. NCP allows for flexible
strategies,for example,by distinguishingbetweenthe levels of thresholdsof
representationandof financing.NCP, since it does not requireconstitutional
and sometimes not even legal status,enables the comparativelyeasy adapta-
tion of arrangementsandpracticesof institutionalrepresentationand is thus
bettersuitedto accommodatechanges in thereligious andsocietallandscape.
Such flexibility is particularlyimportantbecause religious associationsand
membership-compared with ascriptivecategories like 'race' or sex-can
show muchhigherdegreesof voluntarismandactualexit optionsand,conse-
quently,may be much more fluid.
Second, recognitionhas a price. Institutionalizedsystems of representa-
tion are inherently characterized by conservative tendencies and
exclusionary effects. Recognized religions will defend their privileges by
holding newcomers at bay, therebyaddingto the negative effects of thresh-
olds on new religious minoritiesand their organizations.As a consequence,
the gap between institutionalizedreligions and the actual religious state of
affairsis widening (a fact well knownin the aftermathof the Dutchhistoryof
pillarizationfrom the 1950s onward).For obvious reasons, administrations
also experience difficulties in recognizing such changes and adaptingtheir
policies accordingly,therebycontributingat least unwittinglyto institutional
inertiaand longer time lags. Again, NCP does not discardthis problembut,
once again relying on the mechanisms of an associative democracyand its
positive premiumon associative participation,it provides betteropportuni-
ties to check the relativestrengthsof religious membershipsandaffiliations.
Also, it providesmechanismsto scrutinizethe democraticlegitimacyof rep-
resentationsand to make appropriaterevisions if needed.
Third,thereis the dangerof divisive effects. Boundariesaroundcultures,
identities,and loyalties may be hardened,in particularif religious education
and religious political partiesreceive institutionalbacking. Again, however,
context and experience matter.The demandfor separatereligious schools,
for example, is more often than not a response to either a fairly complete
monopolizationof the public educationalsystem by majorityreligions (the
United States in the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom), or to an
aggressive liberal purificationof the school system (the Netherlands,Bel-

gium, Germanyin the nineteenthcentury).
The historicalexperiencewith separatereligious schools (viz., the Catho-
lic schools in countrieslike the UnitedStates [see Miller 1985,261 ff; Handy
1976, 179 ff, 218; Eisenach 2000, 38, 87 f], the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands)shows thatthey regularlycontributeto, insteadof detractfrom,
the integrationof the respectivereligiouscommunitiesinto the commonpol-
ity. The same may occur with the more recent policy of 'institutionalizing
Islam'in the educationalsystem in the Netherlands.The low thresholdfor the
establishmentof Islamic schools in the Netherlands-compared to France,
Germany,or the UnitedKingdom-may help to preventthe developmentof a
'fundamentalist'Islam and its spilloverinto the political system. Indeed,the
development of religious political parties corroboratessuch expectations:
acting in a competitive political environment,these parties undergo the
transformationalpressuresof liberal-democraticinstitutionsand,eventually,
contributeto integratinghuge masses of believersinto the democraticpolity,
and even to liberalize and democratize the associated national churches
(Kalyvas 1996; Rosenblumforthcoming).The upshot is that once states do
not apply aggressive policies of enforced assimilationbut ratherengage in
evenhandedaccommodationistpolicies and allow religious minoritiescon-
siderableautonomy,includingthe freedomto voluntarilyintegrateinto com-
mon public institutions, the chances will be minimized that minorities
develop into 'isolated'groups living from cradleto gravein separateinstitu-
tions. On this score too, NCP providesan interestingalternativeto NEPP-
even in the United States, where any serious discussion of these mattershas
so farbeen blockedby the ritualinvocationof the mischief of faction.Repub-
licans andunitaryliberalsreally concernedwith the divisive effects of plural-
ism should also learnfrom these experiences.
The price for our cautiously general plea for NCP is that we could not
specify its differentvarieties, associative democracy amongst them. Obvi-
ously, urgentquestions like which religions should be representedin which
ways, in which fields, regardingwhich issues, cannotbe answeredin a gen-
eral way as if therewere one institutionalblueprintfor all states. We wantto
end with some food for thoughtand furtherresearchregardingthe modes of
representation in the political process.
(1) The focus of traditionaldebates about minority representationhas
been the political process, narrowlyunderstoodas decision making,imple-
mentation,andadjudicationin the state,thatis, on 'voice' (e.g., some guaran-
teed seats in legislativechambersfor religions) andon 'muscle' (some power
sharingin executiveandjudicial bodies). But it is obvious thatin the case of
religions,almostno one is claimingthatminorityreligions shouldparticipate
in legislative, executive, and adjudicative power sharing at this level, because

majority religions, as a rule, lost their rights and privileges long ago, and
rightly so. Decision making, however, follows on issue definition, informa-
tion, and the elaboration of decision-making alternatives. And in all these
regards, organized religions may claim a legitimate role. Religions should,
for example, be given specific information rights and corresponding infor-
mation duties by (central, provincial, local) state agencies with regard to con-
tested issues ('ear'). Again, they should be given rights and opportunities to
participate in public fora and public hearings (e.g., on morally contested
issues like abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering). They should be
included in advisory religious councils, composed of the relevant organized
religions, which can give their opinions on all subjects of their interest
(Parekh 2000, 331), whether unanimously or in majority and minority opin-
ions (advisory and consultation rights and duties: 'listen to voice'). Indeed,
even reserved seats for organized religions in legislative committees with a
capacity to participate (but not vote) could be discussed and explored.
(2) Associative democracy opens opportunities for organized religions to
provide a wide variety of services like education, health care, and care for
elderly, and it enables a wide variety of divergent service providers (religious
ones amongst them) to participate in public, democratic standard setting
and in critically scrutinizing service provision. Cooperation in such public-
private forms of governance may contribute to trust and to a two-way redefi-
nition of cognitive and normative frames, allowing criticism of both secular-
ism, masked as 'neutral' and 'public', and the imposition of illiberal and
antidemocratic religious particularism.
NOTES
1. See Bader(2002b) for a very shortexplicationof the epistemological,meta-ethical,soci-

ology, andhistoryof knowledge aspectsof this concept of relationalneutrality.See Melissa Wil-
liams's ongoing researchproject 'reconstructingimpartiality'.Hernotion of 'embeddedimpar-
tiality' is very close to my concept.
2. Monsmaand Soper (1997) providerich materialin all these regards:(1) divergentinter-
pretationsof religious freedoms:U.S. strictseparationism,particularlyin primaryand second-
ary education, stresses negative freedoms and nonintervention,whereas most othercountries,
constitutionallymost outspokenthe Netherlands(pp. 64 f, 81) and Germany(pp. 165 ff, 178),
try to find more sensible balances between negative andpositive freedoms.In Monsma/Soper's
view, they "havea farmore expansive and,we contend,approximateunderstandingof religious
freedom"(p. 202). (2) The degree of actualguaranteeof 'free exercise' by constitutionalprovi-
sion, legislation, and culturalattitudesand assumptions:Contraryto widespreadexpectations,
constitutionalprotectiondoes not always protectreligious minorities(United States,Australia
[p. 202] when popularsentimentand the elected branchesof governmentfail to do so. But insti-
tutionallypluralistmodels also have difficulties in this regard(the Netherlands[p. 65 ff], Ger-

many [p. 169 ff for Muslims:the lack of a centralizedorganizationalstructurecauses difficulties
to recognize them as 'KorperschaftenoffentlichenRechts']). (3) Degree of actualneutralityin
primaryand secondaryeducation:strict separationismhas a secularistbias, tending to violate
stateneutrality(p. 32 ff), all othermodels (particularlythe Dutch [p. 67ff] andGerman[p. 178])
have recognizedthis; they all providesubsidies on a moreor less equalfooting to privateschools
(Australia[p. 102 ff]). (4) Degreeof actualneutralityin welfareservices:comparedto education
in the United States, one finds an "almostcomplete about-face,finding many formsof coopera-
tion and supportto be constitutional"(p. 36) and the same is true,in much more consistent and
principledway, for the Netherlands,Germany,and, more pragmatic,Australia.
3. In their comparativestudy of church-staterelationsin five democracies,Monsma and
Soper (1997) have constructeda similar model, guided by the same second-orderprincipleof
relationalneutralityandthe intentto defend institutionalpluralismagainststrictseparationism.
They distinguish three basic types: the strict church-stateseparationmodel, the established
churchmodel, andthe pluralistor structuralistmodel. In our view, our typology has the follow-
ing advantages:(1) Ourconstructionof the basic types is more explicitly focused on constitu-
tional characteristics.Their 'establishedchurchmodel' is a hybridcombiningtwo dimensions:
formalandinformalestablishment(e.g., in the case of Germany)and "onlyone particularestab-
lished church"(England)or "a system of multiple churchestablishment"(Germanyfiguringas
"informalmultiple establishment"(pp. 11, 189 f). (2) Our model is multidimensionaland
explicitly invites to discuss the relationsbetween constitutional,legal, administrative,political
and culturalaspect. (3) Our model explicitly distinguishesthe three relevanttypes of institu-
tional pluralismfrom institutionallymonist types (Monsma and Soper's 'establishedchurch'
model blurs the differences between strong, weak, and plural establishment)and from strict
separationism.(4) We focus more explicitly on evaluationof institutionaldesigns and policies,
whereas Monsma and Soper use their model mainly "to classify the five countriesin terms of
these threemodels."Nevertheless,their comparativestudy allows "some generalconclusions"
(IX) and "to learn from each other".
The focus of Esbeck's (1994, 3 ff) six types of strategies: strict separationists,freewill
separationists, institutional separationists, structural pluralists, nonpreferentialists, and
restorationistsis doctrinal, not institutional, and restrictedto recent positions in the United
States.
4. At least six states-New Hampshire(till 1817), Connecticut (till 1818), New Jersey,
Georgia, North Carolina,South Carolina-and, dependingon definitions, also Massachusetts
(till 1833) had establishedchurches.Pluralestablishmenthas also seriouslybeen discussed (see
Miller 1985, 18-22, 37 f, 44 f [threeoptions for Virginia];see also Handy 1976, 145).
5. Institutional pluralism needs no 'constitutional recognition' as the example of
neocorporatismshows clearly (neocorporatismhas been 'constitutionalized'only in Austria).In
the Netherlands,building on the tradition of pillarization, a whole variety of institutional
arrangementsis used, particularlyon so-called lowerlevels. Moreor less officially,butatleast de
facto recognizedreligious organizationsare actualplayersin political contestationand institu-
tionalizedbargainingby differentdepartments,mainly on a local level, andin differentfields of
policy making and implementation(for furtherelaboration,see Bader 2000, 2002c).
6. The 'GeneralAssessment' PatrickHarvey Bill in Virginia(1784) proposing 'some tax
aid to all religion'representsan early version of nonconstitutionalpluralism(Miller 1985, 10 f,
26-31). The New SouthWalesChurchAct of 1836 is an Australianexample of attemptedplural
establishment(Monsma and Soper 1997, 91 f).
7. Tomasi(2001, 42, 56) also claims to present"institutionalremedies"to protectcultural
diversityagainstthe unintended,indirect,and long-termspillovereffects of politicalliberalism.
Unfortunately,this claim is not substantiated(apartfrom some remarkson nonstatistsystems of

service provision [pp. 16, 113-18], Catholic subsidiarity,and a more Tocquevillianideal [p.
127]).
8. In our view, this articleis much clearerthanthe First Amendmentphrasing.See note 2,
along with Monsma and Soper (1997), for Dutch, German,and Australianversions.
9. Cases: EEOC v. SouthwestBaptist Theol. Sem; Bob Jones Universityv. United States;
GoldsboroChristianSchools;Amos. See for divergentpositions Pfeffer (1987), Kelley (1987),
Robbins(1987), McConnellandPosner(1989), Rosenblum(1998,79 ff), Spinner-Halev(2000,
chap. 7), Cole Durham2001, 701 ff).
10. I agree with Rosenblum'sstrategythat differentcases should be treateddifferently,for
example,Brownv. Dade ChristianSchools (1998, 96 ff) Amos (1998, 8 9ff; 2000a, 165 ff), and
Jaycees (2000a, 174-79).
11. Defended by HarvardLaw Review Note (1987, 1758 ff). For obvious reasons (holo-
caust), the BVerfGin Germanyis much more interventionist,strikes a differentbalance (as in
cases of free speech-more like in India [see Jacobsohn2000]-gives more weight to 'liberal'
and to 'democraticcongruency').
12. See Okin (1997) and Galenkamp,Tamir,and MacKinnon, discussed by Nussbaum
(2000, 174 ff). In 1997, Nussbaumdefended such a strictlyindividualisticconcept of religious
freedom (1997, 125). In 2000, she criticizes this as 'secularhumanistfeminism' (2000, 174 ff),
remains'neutralaboutestablishment'(2000, 208), allows some legal pluralismin personallaw,
but still virtuallyneglects associationalfreedoms (2000, 188 ff, 229).
13. For similar strategiesto split the issues and areas, see Reitman (1998), Bader (1998),
Rudolphand Rudolph (2000), and Nussbaum(2000, 217).
14. All varieties of a "jointgovernanceapproach"discussed by Shachar(2001) also share
this core of the institutionalisttradition:"dividing and sharing authority"(p. 89). See also
Swaine (2001, 324 ff), "semi-sovereignty."
15. Comparedwith Shachar's(2001, 118 ff) "transformationalaccommodation"approach
supposedto avoidthe disadvantagesof the otherjoint governanceapproaches(federal,temporal,
consensual,and contingentaccommodation),our approachlooks-prima facie-similar to the
contingentaccommodationmodel in which
the state yields jurisdictionalautonomy to nomoi groups in certainwell-defined legal
arenas,but only so long as their exercise of this autonomymeets certainminimal state-
defined standards.If a groupfails to meet these minimal standards,the state may inter-
vene in the group's affairs.(P. 109)
We place this minimallyrequiredstate intervention,however,within the frameworkof associa-
tive democracy,and this enables us to resolve the main difficulties mentionedby Shachar:(1)
Who defines the minimal standards?How are they defined, interpretedand applied (p. 115 f)?
Associative democracyprovidesfor excellent ways andmeans to challengemajoritybias hiding
as 'modern' or 'neutral'. (2) Intervention"requiresa complex regulatoryregime" (p. 110,
inspections of actual performanceand compliance). Associative democracy combines self-
regulationand self-scrutinywith public scrutinyand gives associations an importantrole not
only in standardsettingbut also in controlregimes.(3) Given the power asymmetries,"itis hard
to see how this (analyticallyattractive)model of mutual 'mirror-imagepolicing' can be applied
in practice"(p. 112). Associative democracyexactly tries to redressthese power asymmetries
(and does so much more effectively than Shachar'spreferred"transformationalaccommoda-
tion" model). (4) It "relegatesindividualgroupmembersto a more passive position"(whistle-
blowers). Associative democracynot only providesimportantexit options for minoritieswithin
minorities, it also enables organizedvoice inside religious associations. (5) The most crucial
interestsof "at-riskgroupmembers"would not be "maximized."In ourview, the combinationof

actualvoluntarism,real exit options, and criticalpublic scrutinydoes a lot to protectvulnerable
minorities. Shachar'stransformationalaccommodation,vice versa, encountersdifficulties to
explain why traditionalistleadersshouldnot choose to ostracize,exclude, excommunicatecriti-
cal voices inside (124 f, but see 139, 143), andit sharesthe problemwith associativedemocracy
how to respondto the trade-offbetween (threatof) exit and voice pointed out by MarkWarren
(2001, 96 f).
16. See Swaine (2002), Spinner-Halev(2000), Rosenblum (1998, 2000b), Hirst (1994,
2001) for differentvarieties.Proposalsof indirectfinancingof competingreligious and secular
associationsin education,healthcareandothersocial servicesby way of a balancedvouchersys-
tem (Hirst 1994;Bader2001, 197,200) also increasevoluntarismandfree choice of clients con-
siderably(see also MonsmaandSoper 1997,42 f, for an amendmentof SenatorJohnAshcroftof
Missouri to a welfare reformbill in 1996).
17. Parentalreligiousfreedomsto transmitandimplantreligiousviews in the nextgeneration
also have to be balancedwith individualreligious freedomsof kids andmaturingpeople because
both 'absolutist'parentalfreedoms(defendedby conservativereligions, see the Mozert(vs. 'ex-
posure') and Yodercases) and 'absolutist'statepaternalism,roughshodoverridingparentalpow-
ers, are morally indefensible options.
18. Rosenblum(1998, 101), rightly,privileges the 'realconditions'of exit aboveentry.Hirst
(1994, 2001) also hopes thatfree exit options increasethe voluntarismof stay,increasechances
for voice inside associationsandconsequentlystimulatesloyalty.See also Tomasi(2001), Bader
(2002a).
19. Even defendersof plural and weak establishmenthave by now understoodthat such a
'controlling place' for 'churches' is really incompatible with minimalist interpretationsof
separationism.
20. Nussbaum's(2000) 'principleof moralconstraint'(p. 190 f) in its morerestricted'politi-
cal use' eventuallylegitimizes very strongand deep policies of liberal-democraticcongruency
because the 'full list of fundamentalrights'is includedin the 'protectionof the centralcapabili-
ties' (p. 202), constituting a 'compelling state interest'. Consequently, not much
'accommodationism'is left. The moreexpansive 'social use' of the principleof moralconstraint
eventuallylegitimizes thickperfectionistandpaternalisticpolicies (see pp. 82 if, 88,92, 194 ff).
Ourprincipleof moralconstraintis more minimalistand differentiated.As a firstrule, the gen-
eralprinciplesof nondiscriminationhavethe rightof way relativeto possible exceptions.Princi-
ples arenot averages;noraretheyprobabilities.A secondrule allows for varietyof standardsand
criteria.Varietymay be admissible,andeven called for,in termsof activities (core activitiesmay
commandmore autonomythan peripheralones), in terms of profit and not for profitor status
(privateversuspublic, minoritiesversusmajorities,small versusbig), or in termsof open versus
protectedmarkets,and, of course, membersversus nonmembers.
21. See McConnell (2000), Kalyvas (1996), Rosenblum (1998, 108 ff; forthcoming);and
Tomasi (2001) for this 'irony of democracy'.
22. For the 'costs of institutionalization'and the inevitable 'dialectics of institutionali-
zation', see Bader (1991, 240 ff; 2002c).
23. 'Two way protection', for Gutmann(2000), Rosenblum(2000b), and Phillips (1996),
seems to demand nonestablishment and private pluralism (NEPP), but in our view,
nonconstitutionalpluralism(NCP) would not necessarilybe ruled out by Rosenblumand Phil-
lips, if it would be seen as a viable option.
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VeitBader is a professorof sociology and of social and political philosophyat the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam.His main research areas are theories of societies, social move-
ments, and collective action; theories of moderncapitalisms; ethics of migrationand
incorporation;and associative democracy.His books include Inequalities(1989); Col-
lective Action (1981); Racism, Ethnicity,Citizenship(1995); and Associative Democ-
racy:The Real ThirdWay (2001) (with Paul Hirst).

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Religious Diversity and Democratic Institutional Pluralism

Author(s): Veit Bader

Strictseparationof churchfroma presumed 'religion-blind'and strictly 'neutral'state still is the

Keywords: secularism; state-religion relationships; religious diversity; religious minoraties;

Debates on the relationshipsbetween religion and society, politics and

AUTHOR'SNOTE:Myspecial thanksto myfriend and colleague TonKorver.Withouthis contri-

practicallycounterproductive(Greenawalt1995; Bader 1999; Parekh2000;

exclude culturalpractices incompatible with liberal democracyminimally

Insteadof tryingto abstractfromparticularity,we shouldembraceit, butin a way thatis

We providea moralevaluationof two models: 'nonestablishmentandpri-

not that organizedreligions should as such be representedin the legislative,

This huge complexity of actual institutionalarrangementsand policies

1. 'Strongestablishment'of one monopolisticchurchis per definitionconstitutionaland/

Monism Strongestablishment Legal monism Administrative Pol

because constitutionalaspects may not be as importantas legal theorists

Practical evaluations here are complex and difficult. Practical reason

democracy, political citizenship (democratic tradition) and substantive

Moral and legal principles,like religious freedom, do not exist in a vac-

It is plain that "freedom of religion is not an un-differentiatedor uni-

encouragingdiverse, indeed often sharplyconflicting, activities and viewpoints.... Far

Theparamountdangerof publicscrutinyandinterferenceis theimpositionof

subsidies,andthey areparticularlyvulnerableto interference(Robbins1987,

If the governmentdefersto the wishes of the religious group,a vulnerablegroupof indi-

or of neglect of associationalreligious freedoms.Many feminists insist on a

also been most clearly spelled out by institutionalpluralists (Figgis 1914,

of separationism(p. 180): they inevitablypass the thresholdfor impermissi-

ian view-and morepracticable.Minimalstandardsof associationallaw like

and administrativepluralism.In this perspective,NCP is preferableto NEPP

Finally,it tends to contributeto a relationallyneutralstateby addingimpor-

gions, justice-basedargumentshave to balancelibertiesfromand libertiesto

Religious institutionalpluralism must be compatible with the minimal

aggressive liberal purificationof the school system (the Netherlands,Bel-

in legislative, executive, and adjudicative power sharing at this level, because

1. See Bader(2002b) for a very shortexplicationof the epistemological,meta-ethical,soci-

tutionallypluralistmodels also have difficulties in this regard(the Netherlands[p. 65 ff], Ger-

Unfortunately,this claim is not substantiated(apartfrom some remarkson nonstatistsystems of

interestsof "at-riskgroupmembers"would not be "maximized."In ourview, the combinationof

Ahonen, P. 2000. A minoritystate-churchin a liberaldemocracy.Presentedat ECPRCopenha-

Pfeffer, L. 1987. Religious exemptions. In Church-staterelations, edited by T. Robbins and

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