STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Paragraph 16 of RCA's answer below aversn
CASE DIGESTS That the Presieent of the Philippinesl, thru the Executve
SET A
ENDENCIA v. DAVID
G.R. No. L-6355-56 | August 31, 1953
FACTS:
A joint appeal was flee from the eecision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila eeclaring Secton 13 of Republic Act No. 590
unconsttutonall, ane oreering the appellant Saturino Daviel, as Collector of
Internal Revenue to refune to Justce Eneencia ane Justce Jugo the income
tax collectee on their salary as Associate Justce of the Court of Appeals
ane Presieing Justce of the Court of Appealsl, respectvely. Citng the
eoctrine laie eown in the case of Perfecto v. Meerl, it was hele by the lower
court that the collecton of income taxes from the salaries of Justce
Eneencia ane Justce Jugo to be a eiminuton of their compensaton ane
therefore was in violaton of the Consttuton.
Accoreing to the Solicitor Generall, the eecision of the Court in
the case of Perfecto v. Meer was not receivee favorably by Congress as the
Congress hae immeeiately afer the promulgaton of the case enactee
Republic Act No. 590 which provieee that “No salary wherever receivee by
any public ofcer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be consieeree
exempt from the income tax.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the enactment of the Congress of Republic Act
No. 590l, partcularly secton 13l, may justfy ane legalize the collecton of
income tax on the salary of jueicial ofcers.
RULING:
NOl, it eoes not justfy ane legalize the collecton of income tax
on the salary of jueicial ofcers. The rule is recognizee that the legislature
cannot pass any eeclaratory act of what the law was before its passagel, so
as to give it any bineing weight the with the courts. The collecton of
income tax on the salary of a jueicial ofcer is a eiminuton thereof ane so
violates the Consttuton. The Court further hele that the interpretaton
ane applicaton of the Consttuton ane of statutes is within the exclusive
province ane juriseicton of the Jueicial eepartmentl, ane that in enactng a
lawl, the Legislature may not legally proviee therein that it be interpretee in
such a way that it may not violate a Consttutonal prohibitonl, thereby
tying the hanes of the courts in their task of later interpretng saie statutel,
specially when the interpretaton sought ane provieee in saie statute runs
counter to a previous interpretaton alreaey given in a case by the highest
court of the lane.
RAMOS v. CIR
G.R. No. L-22753 | December 18, 1967
FACTS:
Whether Rice ane Corn Aeministraton [RCA] shoule be hele
answerable — from June 14l, 1962 when the Natonal Rice ane Corn
Corporaton [NARIC] ceasee to exist ane RCA was createe — for an
obligaton createe by agreement confrmee in a partal juegment of the
Commission of Ineustrial Relatons [CIR] reneeree on February 16 1953l,
eirectng NARICl, to pay 25% aeeitonal compensaton for overtme workl,
night workl, ane work reneeree on Suneays ane legal holieays by its
laborers ane employees.
Secton 259 of the Revisee Aeministratve Coee states that "in
the absence of special provisionl, persons regularly ane permanently
appointee uneer the Civil Service Law or whose salaryl, wagesl, or
emoluments are fxee by law or regulaton shall notl, for any service
reneeree or labor eone by them on holieays or for other overtme workl,
receive or be paie any aeeitonal compensatonn . . . ." The special
provision contemplatee in the status just mentonee is paragraph 32l,
Secton 7-I of Commonwealth Act 246l, otherwise known as the Buueget Act.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
Secretaryl, has authorizee uneer certain limits the payment of
extra hours of work on oreinary eays ane on Satureaysl, Suneaysl,
ane legal holieays uneer the provisions of the saie
Commonwealth Act No. 246 which the Presieent has authority
to eo uneer the provisions of saie law.
ISSUE:
W/N Presieent is allowee such.
RULING:
The facts prove the consistent aeministratve interpretaton by
the Ofce of the Presieent as to what mayl, uneer the lawl, be grantee RCA
workers ane employees for overtme work ane work on Suneays ane
holieays. Anel, the Presieent of the Philippinesl, from tme to tmel,
authorizee such payments. Not a mater of rightl, such compensaton was
given upon authority of Secton 7-I (32) of the Buueget Act. It woule seem
incongruous if saie employees ane laborersl, formerly of NARICl, were
allowee to recover uneer the partal juegment reneeree on February 16l,
1953 in CIR Case 746-V insttutee by NARIC Workers' Union against NARIC
here in eisputel, ane at the same tme reap the benefts uneer the aforesaie
Buueget Law. Afer alll, they are no longer NARIC workers ane employees but
workers ane employees of RCA which operates by law "uneer the Ofce of
the Presieent of the Philippines."
While executve constructon is not necessarily bineing upon
courtsl, it is enttlee to great weight ane consieeraton. Reason for this is
that such constructon comes from the partcular branch of government
callee upon to implement the partcular law involvee.
ORENCIA v. ENRILE
G.R. No. L-28997
FACTS:
Pettoner is alleging that he is the eeputy clerk of court of the
Clerks of Court Division of the Lane Registraton Commissionl, ane he has
been performing functons of Assistant Chief of saie eivision ane has been
consieeree ane recognizee as such untl RA 4040l, increasing the salaries of
Assistant Chiefs of Divisionsl, among othersl, was implementee where he
was lef out while co-assistant chief of the nine other eivisions of the Lane
Registraton Commission were so recognizee ane exteneee increasee
compensaton. Responeents flee their answerl, ane afer usual
aemissions ane eenialsl, interposee a eefense that Pettoner is unqualifee
for the positon of Assistant Chiefl, ane being a new positon createe uneer
RA 4040l, the same can only be flee by a qualifee person; that
Responeentl, being a lawyerl, is more qualifee than Pettonerl, who
is only a high school graeuate with secone graee civil service
eligibilityl, ane praying that the petton be eismissee.
ISSUE:
W/N the Pettoner shoule be recognizee as the eeputy clerk of
court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Lane Registraton Commission.
RULING:
For Responeent ofcialsl, the answer was not in eoubt. Since
there was a new legal provision to be construeel, one which aemiteelyl, to
follow the approach of counsel for Pettonerl, has an ambiguous aspectl,
they chose to follow the principle that a public ofce is a public trust.
Certainlyl, such a contemporaneous constructonl, one moreover eictatee by
the souneest consttutonal postulatel, is enttlee to the highest respect
from the jueiciary.
PEOPLE v. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-19190 | November 29, 1922
FACTS:
Defeneant authorizee an extension of creeit in favor of
Concepcionl, a co-partnership. Defeneant’s wife was a eirector of this co-
partnership. Defeneant was foune guilty of violatng Sec. 35 of Act No.
2747 which says that “The Natonal Buank shall notl, eirectly or ineirectlyl,
grant loans to any of the members of the Buoare of Directors of the bank
nor to agents of the branch banks.” This Secton was in efect in 1919 but
was repealee in Act No. 2938 approvee on January 30l, 1921.
ISSUE:
WON eefeneant can be convictee of violatng Sectons of Act
No. 2747l, which were repealee by Act No. 2938.
RULINGn
In the interpretaton ane constructonl, the primary rule is to
ascertain ane give efect to the intenton of the Legislature. Secton 49 in
relaton to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 proviees a punishment for any person
who shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defeneant contenes that the
repeal of these Sectons by Act No. 2938 has servee to take away basis for
criminal prosecuton. The Court holes that where an act of the Legislature
which penalizes an ofense repeals a former act which penalizee the same
ofensel, such repeal eoes not have the efect of thereafer eepriving the
Courts of juriseicton to tryl, convict ane sentence ofeneers chargee with
violatons of the ole law.
DE JESUS v. CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 9337 | December 24, 1914
FACTS:
In 1907l, Pettoner bought from an original owner a piece of
lane in Manila which was uneer the Torrens system. Apparentlyl, the
original owner incorrectly eeclaree the size of the lane. Sol, from 1901 –
1907l, the original owner was paying lesser taxes than he shoule have ane
same for Pettoner from 1907 – 1910. Upon fneing out that he was not
paying the correct amount of taxesl, Pettoner paie the taxesl, feesl, ane
interest of P2l, 096.49 for the unpaie balance of the years 1901-1910.Soon
aferl, he protestee ane flee an acton to recover the same amount.
Pettoner was awareee P1l, 649.82. Pettoner contenes that the
supposee taxes from before 1910 were not actually taxes because
they hae not yet been assessee. Taxes may not be eue ane payable untl
they are assessee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not pettoner shoule stll pay the taxes which were
not assessee before.
RULING:
No. If a statute neees interpretaton or constructonl, the
influence most eominant in that process is the purpose or intent of the Act.
We have hele that the general purpose of the Lane Registraton Act (No.
496) was to create an ineefeasible ttle ane one free from all chargesl, liens
ane incumbrances except those preservee against it by special menton in
the eecree of registraton or by provision of law. Secton 39 of that Act
emboeies that purpose in express law. It eeclaresl, in efectl, that every
owner of registeree lane shall hole the same free ane clear from any ane
all liens ane incumbrances except those set forth in the eecree of
registraton ane those mentonee ane exceptee in that secton.
This being the purpose of the statutel, the exceptons namee in
secton 39 will not be enlargee beyone the actual signifcaton of the wores
usee or exteneee beyone the limits which the wores themselves actually
set.
SY KIONG v. SARMIENTO
G.R. No. L-2934 | November 29, 1951
FACTS:
Pettoner is the owner of a euly licensee grocery store ane an
importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail eealers for
purposes of retail. Sometme in September 1948l, the Treasurer of the City
of Manila assessee against him the sum of PhP 566.50 which represents
the allegee eefciency municipal license tax eue from him on his gross sales
if flour to bakeries afer eeeuctng the sales maee to retail eealers for
purposes of resale.
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ISSUE:
W/N the sales of flour maee by the pettoner to bakeries to be
manufacturee into breae are retail or wholesale.
RULING:
The Oreinance uneer which the municipal license tax in
queston has been assessee eoes not contain any eefniton of what is retail
gross sale. Saie oreinance merely proviees that the retail gross sales of a
grocery store shall be subject to a license fee to be fxee by the City
Treasurer in accoreance with certain scheeule therein specifeel, but is
silent as to what are consieeree "retail gross sales". The Natonal Internal
Revenue Coee eoes not also furnish any leae as regares the nature of a sale
for purposes of taxaton. It eoes not give any eefniton nor patern as to
how a sale to a bakery or a manufacturer shoule be consieeree. This is a
loophole that our Congress has not foreseen.
If there is an express provision of the law on the materl, there is
no room for jueicial interpretaton. Our euty is to apply the law. Buutl, as we
have alreaey pointee outl, such is not the situaton obtaining in the
Philippines. Our law on the point is silentl, ane being silent we eo not feel
justfee to extene the force ane efect of American statutes to our
juriseicton. To eo so woule be to incorporate into our statutes some
legislatve mater by jueicial ruling which is certainly beyone our province
to eo.
The sale of the flour to bakeries to be manufacturee into breae
ane to be resole to the publicl, in the absence of any express provision of
law on the materl, shoule be treatee as a sale at retail ane shoule subject
the veneor to the retail tax law.
ROBLES v. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING
G.R. No. L-12560 | September 30, 1958
FACTS:
Pettoner ane Responeent Company enteree into a contract by
virtue of which the later eeliveree the possession of certain mining
propertes over which it hae control to Pettoner who was to extractl, mine
ane sell ores from saie propertes upon payment of certain royaltes. Upon
violaton of the terms of agreementl, the company flee a complaint for
unlawful eetainer. Pettoner flee a moton to eismiss the complaint on the
groune that the Justce of Peace was without juriseicton in taking
cognizance of the case for unlawful eetainer involving mineral lane.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 1l, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court incluees any kine of
lanel, inclueing mineral lanes
RULING:
Yes. Any lane spoken of in this provision obviously incluees all
kines of lanel, whether agriculturall, resieental or mineral. It is a well-known
maxim in statutory constructon that where the law eoes not eistnguishl,
we shoule not eistnguish.
PEOPLE v. SUBIDO
G.R. No. 21735 | September 5, 1975
FACTS:
Appellant Abelareo Subieo was foune guilty of libel of the Court
of First Instance of Manila. Appellant has taken an appeal to the Court of
Appealsl, which moeifee the saie juegment striking out the penalty of
arresto mayor ane lowering the ineemnity from P10l,000.00 to P5l,000.00.
Appellant contenes that the lower court requiree the subsieiary
imprisonment only in case when he will not be able to pay the ineemnity
ane not the failure to pay the fne.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court’s eecision inteneee subsieiary
imprisonment to apply only to failure to pay ineemnity ane not the fne.
RULING:
 No. A careful scrutny of the eecision of the trial court reveals
that the clause “with subsieiary imprisonment in case of insolvency” is
separatee by a comma (l,) from the preceeing clause”is hereby sentencee
to three months arresto mayor with the accessory penaltes of the lawl, to
pay a fne of fve huneree (P500.00) pesosl, to ineemnify the ofeneee
partyl, Mayor Arsenio Lacsonl, in the sum of ten thousane (10l,000.00)
pesos.” The use of a comma (l,) in the part of the sentence is to make “the
subsieiary in case of insolvency” refer not only to non-payment of the
ineemnityl, but also to non-payment of the fne.
REPUBLIC v. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES
G.R. No. | August 22, 2012
FACTS:
The instant case arose from two cases flee by the Republic
seeking expropriaton of certain propertes in the name of St. Vincent ee
Paul Collegesl, Inc. (St. Vincent). Due to St. Vincent's refusal to honor the
oreer of expropriatonl, the Republic flee an urgent moton for the issuance
of a writ of possessionl, which was eeniee by the lower court. The lower
courtl, howeverl, moeifee its Oreer ane requiree the Republic to
immeeiately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to one huneree
percent (100%) of the value of the property sought to be expropriatee. The
Republic movee for reconsieeraton but it was eeniee by the lower court.
Seeking to avail the extra oreinary remeey of certorari uneer Rule 65 of
the Rules of Courtl, the Republic flee with the CA a moton for aeeitonal
tme of ffeen (15) eays within which to fle its petton.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erree in eenying the petton of certorari for
being flee out of tme.
RULING:
Yes. In the more recent case of Domeom v. Saneiganbayanl, we
rulee that the eeleton of the clause in Secton 4l, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-
12-SC eie notl, ipso factol, make the fling of a moton for extension to fle a
Rule 65 petton absolutely prohibitee. We hele in Domeom that if absolute
proscripton were inteneeel, the eeletee porton coule have just simply
been reworeee to specifcally prohibit an extension of tme to fle such
petton. Thusl, because of the lack of an express prohibitonl, we hele that
motons for extension may be alloweel, subject to this Court's soune
eiscretonl, ane only uneer exceptonal ane meritorious cases. Ineeeel, we
have relaxee the proceeural technicalites introeucee uneer A.M. No. 07-7-
12-SC in oreer to serve substantal justce ane safeguare strong public
interest.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147589 | June 26, 2001
FACTS:
Pettoners challengee the Comelec’s Omnibus Resoluton No.
3785l, which approvee the partcipaton of 154 organizatons ane partesl,
inclueing those herein impleaeeel, in the 2001 party-list electons.
Pettoners sought the eisqualifcaton of private responeentsl, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was inteneee to beneft the marginalizee
ane uneerrepresentee; not the mainstream politcal partesl, the non-
marginalizee or overrepresentee. Unsatsfee with the pace by which
Comelec actee on their pettonl, pettoners elevatee the issue to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N politcal partes may partcipate in the party-list electons.
RULING:
Yes. Politcal partesl, even the major onesl, may partcipate in the
party-list electons. Uneer the Consttuton ane RA 7941l, private
responeents cannot be eisqualifee from the party-list electonsl, merely on
the groune that they are politcal partes. Sec. 5l, Art. VI of the Consttuton
proviees that members of the HoR may “be electee through a party-list
system of registeree natonall, regionall, ane sectoral partes or
organizatons.”
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
Furthermorel, uneer Sectons 7 ane 8l, Art. IX(c) of the
Consttutonl, politcal partes may be registeree uneer the party-list system.
For its partl, Sec. 2 of RA 7941 also proviees for “party-list system of
registeree natonall, regionall, ane sectoral partes or organizatons or
coalitons thereofl, x x x.” Sec. 3 expressly states that a “party is “either a
politcal party or a sectoral party or a coaliton of partes.””
While the enumeraton of the marginalizee ane
uneerrepresentee sectors is not exclusivel, it eemonstrates the clear intent
of the law that not all sectors can be representee uneer the party-list
system. It is a funeamental principle of statutory constructon that wores
employee in a statute are interpretee in connecton withl, ane their
meaning is ascertainee by reference tol, the wores ane the phrases with
which they are associatee or relatee. Thusl, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limiteel, qualifeel, or specializee by those in immeeiate
associaton.
PRASNIK v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-8639 | March 23, 1956
FACTS:
Pettoner seeks to aeopt four chileren which he claims to be his
ane Paz Vasquez’ chileren without the beneft of marriage. The Solicitor
General opposee this statng that Art.338 of the Civil Coee allows a natural
chile to be aeoptee by his father refer only to a chile who has not been
acknowleegee as natural chile. It maintains that in oreer that a natural
chile may be aeoptee by his natural father or mother there shoule not be
an acknowleegment of the status of the natural chile for it will go against
Art. 335.
ISSUE:
WON the Civil Coee allows for the aeopton of acknowleegee
natural chileren of the father or mother.
RULING:
The law intenes to allow aeopton whether the chile be
recognizee or not. If the intenton were to allow aeopton only to
unrecognizee chilerenl, Artcle 338 woule be of no useful purpose. The
rights of an acknowleegee natural chile are much less than those of a
legitmatee chile. Conteneing that this is unnecessary woule eeny the
illegitmate chileren the chance to acquire these rights. The trene when it
comes to aeopton of chileren tenes to go toware the liberal.The law eoes
not prohibit the aeopton of an acknowleegee natural chile which when
comparee to a natural chile is equitable. An acknowleegee natural chile is a
natural chile also ane following the wores of the lawl, they shoule be
allowee aeopton.
SET B
SPS. PASCUAL v. SPS. BALLESTEROS
G.R. No. 1186269 | February 15, 2012
FACTS:
The instant case involves a parcel of lanel, ownee by the
following personsl, (1) the spouses Albino ane Margarita Corazon Marianol,
(2) Angela Melchor (Angela)l, ane (3) the spouses Melecio ane Victoria
Melchor (Spouses Melchor). Upon the eeath of the Spouses Melchorl, their
share in the subject property was inheritee by their eaughter Lorenza
Melchor Buallesteros (Lorenza). Subsequentlyl, Lorenza ane her husbane
Antonio Buallesteros (responeents) acquiree the share of Angela. On August
11l, 2000l, Margarital, sole their share in the subject property to Spouses
Pascual ane Francisco. Consequentlyl, the responeentsl, claiming that they
eie not receive any writen notce of the saie sale in favor of Spouses
Pascual ane Franciscol, flee with the RTC of Laoag City a Complaint for legal
reeempton against the pettoners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that right of reeempton by the responeents
uneer Artcle 1623 of the Civil Coee was seasonably exercisee.

RULING:
Yes. Buoth the leter ane the spirit of the New Civil Coee argue
against any atempt to wieen the scope of the writen notce by inclueing
therein any other kine of notce such as an oral onel, or by registraton. If
the intent of the law has been to incluee verbal notce or any other means
of informaton as sufcient to give the efect of this notcel, there woule
have been no necessity or reason to specify in the artcle that saie notce
be in writngl, for uneer the ole lawl, a verbal notce or mere informaton
was alreaey eeemee sufcient.
Time ane tme againl, it has been repeateely eeclaree by this
Court that where the law speaks in clear ane categorical languagel, there is
no room for interpretaton. There is only room for applicaton. Where the
language of a statute is clear ane unambiguousl, the law is appliee
accoreing to its express termsl, ane interpretaton shoule be resortee to
only where a literal interpretaton woule be either impossible or absure or
woule leae to an injustce.
LAND BANK v. CA
G.R. No. 118745 | July 5, 1996
FACTS:
Involves the DAR l, the Lanebank of the Philippinesl, ane some
laneowners regareing some valuaton ane payment of compensaton for
the laneowners’ property. Aeministratve Oreer No. 9 (AO No.9) was issuee
in grave abuse of eiscreton because it permits the opening of trust
accounts by the Lanebankl, in lieu of eepositng in case or bones in an
accessible bank eesignatee by the DAR. DAR ane Lanebank merely
“earmarkee”l, “eepositee in trust”l, or “reservee” the compensaton in their
names as laneowners eespite the clear maneate that before taking
possession of the propertyl, the compensaton must be eepositee in cash or
in bones.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erree in eeclaring as null ane voie DAR Aemin.
Oreer No. 9 insofar as it proviees for the opening of trust accounts in lieu
of eeposits in cash or in bones.
RULING:
NO. Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657 proviees for the proceeure for
acquisiton of private lanesl, it is explicit that the eeposit musty be maee
only in “cash” or in “LBuP bones”. Nowhere eoes it appear nor can it be
inferree that the eeposit can be maee in any other form. There is no
ambiguity in Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expaneee constructon of
the term “eeposit”.
The conclusive efect of aeministratve constructon is not
absolute. Acton of an aeministratve agency may be eisturbee or set asiee
by the jueicial eepartment if there is an error of lawl, a grave abuse of
power or lack of juriseicton or grave abuse of eiscreton clearly conflictng
with either the leter or the spirit of a legislatve enactment. In this regarel,
it must be stressee that the functon of promulgatng rules ane regulatons
may be legitmately exercisee only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into efect. The power of aeministratve agencies is
thus confnee to implementng the law or putng it into efect. Corollary to
this is that aeministratve regulatons cannot extene the law ane amene a
legislatve enactmentl, for setlee is the rule that aeministratve regulatons
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. Ane in case there is a
eiscrepancy between the basic law ane an implementng rule or regulatonl,
it is the former that prevails.
SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORP. v. CA
G.R. No. 180462 | February 9, 2011
FACTS:
In 1999l, the government projectee a shortage of some 500l,000
metric tons of sugar eue to the efects of El Nio ane La Nia phenomena. To
fll the expectee shortage ane to ensure stable sugar pricesl, then Presieent
JosephEjercito Estraea issuee Executve Oreer No. 87l, Series of 1999 (EO
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
87)l,4 facilitatng sugar importaton by the private sector. Secton 2 of EO 87
createe a Commitee on Sugar Conversion/Aucton to eetermine
proceeures for sugar importaton as well as for collecton ane remitance of
conversion fee. Uneer Secton 3 of EO 87l, sugar conversion is by aucton
ane is subject to conversion fee to be remitee by responeent Sugar
Regulatory Aeministraton (SRA) to the Buureau of Treasury.
On 3 May 1999l, the Commitee on Sugar Conversion/Aucton issuee the
Buieeing Rules provieing guieelines for sugar importaton. Uneer the Buieeing
Rulesl, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working
eays from receipt of notce of the bie aware ane the 75% balance upon
arrival of the importee sugar. The Buieeing Rules also proviee that if the
importer fails to make the importaton or if the importee sugar fails to
arrive on or before the set arrival eatel, 25% of the conversion fee is
forfeitee in favor of the SRAl, to witn
G. Forfeiture of Conversion Fee
G.1 In case of failure of the importer to make the importaton or
for the importee sugar to arrive in the Philippines on or before
the Arrival Datel, the 25% of Conversion Fee Buie alreaey paie
shall be forfeitee in favor of the SRA ane the importee sugar
shall not be classifee as Bu (eomestc sugar) unlessl, upon
applicaton with the SRA ane without objecton of the
Commiteel, the SRA allows such conversion afer payment by
the importer of 100% of the Conversion Fee applicable to the
shipment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sugar corporatons are enttlee to
reimbursement of Php. 38l,637l,000.00 in conversion fee.
RULING:
Plainly ane expresslyl, paragraph G.1 ieentfes two situatons
which woule bring about the forfeiture of 25% of the conversion feen (1)
when the importer fails to make the importaton or (2) when the importee
sugar fails to arrive in the Philippines on or before the set arrival eate. It is
wrong for the RTC to interpret the forfeiture provision in a way eepartng
from its plain ane express language. Where the language of a rule is clearl,
it is the euty of the court to enforce it accoreing to the plain meaning of
the wore. There is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretaton.
CECILLEVILLE REALTY v. CA
G.R. No. 120363 | September 5, 1997
FACTS:
Private responeent Herminigileo Pascual was requestee by
pettoner Cecilleville Realty to vacate the property he is occupying; in
which the responeent insists he is enttlee to because he is helping his
mother Ana Pascual cultvate the lane. An ejectment suit was insttuteel,
ane was grantee by the MTC fneing that there was no tenancy relatonship
between pettoner ane private responeent.
ISSUE:
WON private responeent may occupy a substantal part of the
property in his capacity as a member of the family of tenant Ana Pascual.
RULING:
Petton is impressee with merit. Uneer Sec 22l, Par 3 of RA 1199l,
as ameneee by RA 2263l, "The tenant shall have the right to eemane for a
home lot suitable for ewelling with an area of not more than 3% of the
area of his laneholeing." The law is clear ane unambiguous - only a tenant
grantee the right to have a home lot ane the right to construct thereon.
Herel, pettoner eoes not eispute that he is not pettoner's tenantl, thusl,
uneer the lawl, he is not enttlee to a home lot.
VICTORIA v. COMELEC
229 SCRA 269 | 1994
FACTS:
 Uneer the LGCl, the positon of vice-governor shoule be
occupiee by the highest ranking Sanggunian memberl, ane for purposes of
successionl, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be eeterminee on the basis of
the proporton of votes obtainee by each winning caneieate to the total
number of registeree voters in each eistrict.
In the Electonsl, pettoner caneieate Victoria from the 2ne
eistrict garneree 32l, 918 votes ane responeent caneieate Calisin from the
1st eistrict garneree 28l, 335 votes. The COMELEC issuee a resoluton
certfying responeent as 1st in the oreer of ranking with pettoner as 2ne
ranking member pursuant to the provisions above.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proporton of the the votes obtainee to the
number of registeree voters of each eistrict shall be factoree to the
number of voters who actually votee in eetermining the ranking in the
Sanggunian.
RULING:
For purposes of successionl, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
eeterminee on the basis of the proporton of votes obtainee by each
winning caneieate to the total number of registeree voters in each eistrict
in the immeeiately preceeing local electon."
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
eeterminee on the basis of the proporton of the votes obtainee by each
winning caneieate to the total number of registeree voters in each eistrict.
In such a casel, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart
from the wores.
MATABUENA v. CERVANTES
G.R. No. 28771 | March 31, 1971
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitatee with responeent. During this
perioel, Felix Matabuena eonatee to Responeent a parcel of lane. Later the
two were marriee. Afer the eeath of Felix Matabuenal, his sisterl, Pettonerl,
sought the nullifcaton of the eonaton citng Art.133 of the Civil Coee
“Every eonaton between the spouses euring the marriage shall be voie.”
The trial court rulee that this case was not coveree by the prohibiton
because the eonaton was maee at the tme the eeceasee ane Responeent
were not yet marriee ane were simply cohabitatng.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibiton applies to eonatons between live-in
partners.
RULING:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory constructon that
what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is
writen. Since the reason
for the ban on eonatons between spouses euring the marriage is to p
revent the possibility of uneue influence ane improper pressure being
exertee by one spouse on the otherl, there is no reason why this prohibiton
shall not apply also to common-law relatonships.The courtl, howeverl,
saie that the lack of the eonaton maee by the eeceasee to
Responeent eoes not necessarily mean that the
Pettoner will have exclusive rights to the eisputee property because the
relatonship between Felix ane Responeent were legitmatee by marriage.
COMMENDADOR v. VILLA
200 SCRA 80 | 1994
FACTS:
These four cases have been consolieatee because they involve
practcally the same partes ane relatee issues arising from the same
incieent.
1. The pettoners in G.R. Nos. 93177 ane 96948 ane the private
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
responeents in G.R. Nos. 95020 ane 97454 are ofcers of the Armee Forces
of the Philippines facing prosecuton for their allegee partcipaton in the
failee coup e’ etat that took place on December 1 to 9l, 1989.
2. The charges against them are violaton of Artcles of War (AW) 67
(Mutny)l, AW 96 (Coneuct Unbecoming an Ofcer ane a Gentleman) ane
AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relaton to Artcle 248 of the Revisee Penal Coee
(Mureer).
3. Pre-Investgaton Panel ane a Court Martal were formee. During their
triall, pettoners invokee their right to peremptory Challenge. The same
was eeniee by the Court Martal on the groune that the right was
eiscontnuee when martal law was eeclaree uneer a Presieental Decree.
The Court realizes that the recogniton of the right to peremptory challenge
may be exploitee by a responeent in a court-martal trial to eelay the
proceeeings ane eefer his eeservee Punishment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not GCM No. 14 has a legal groune eenying the
pettoners their right of peremptory challenget
RULING:
It is a basic canon of statutory constructon that when the
reason of the law ceasesl, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratone legisl,
cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressee in the maxim rato legis est
animan the reason of law is its soul. Applying these rulesl, we hole that the
witherawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became
inefectve when the apparatus of martal law was eismantlee with the
issuance of Proclamaton No. 2045l, As a resultl, the ole rule emboeiee in
Artcle 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatcally revivee ane now again
allows the right to peremptory challenge.
CIR v. TMX SALES
205 SCRA 184 | 1992
FACTS:
Private responeent TMX flee its quarterly ITR ane was
consistently paying income taxl, however they suferee losses so that when
it flee its annual ITR for the year eneee December 31l, 1981l, it eeclaree net
loss amountng to P6l,156l,525.00. Thereaferl, TMX flee with the Appellate
Division of BuIR a claim to refune in the amount of P247l,010.00 representng
overpaie income tax. This was not actee upon by the Commissioner of BuIRl,
sol, TMX flee for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) against
Commissioner of BuIR to pay the saie overpaie income tax. Commissioner of
BuIR averree that the pettoner is barree from claiming consieering that
more than two years hae alreaey elapsee between the payments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is enttlee to a refune
consieering that two years has alreaey elapsee since the payment of the
tax.
RULING:
Yes. Petton of CIR is eeniee. Sec. 292l, par. 2 of the Natonal
Internal Revenue Coee statee that “in any casel, no such suit or proceeeing
shall be begun afer the expiraton of two years from the eate of the
payment of the tax or penalty regareless of any supervening cause that
may arise afer payment.” This shoule be interpretee in relaton to the
other provisions of the Tax Coee. The most reasonable ane logical
applicaton of the law woule be to compute the 2-year prescriptve perioe
at the tme of the fling of the Final Aejustment Return or the Annual
Income Tax Returnl, where it can fnally be ascertainee if the tax payer has
stll to pay aeeitonal income tax or if he is enttlee to a refune of overpaie
income tax. Since TMX flee the suit on March 14l, 1984l, it is within the 2-
year prescriptve perioe startng from April 15l, 1982 when they flee their
Annual Income Tax Return.
PEOPLE v. PURISIMA
G.R. No. 42050 | November 20, 1978
FACTS:
 Several informatons were flee before several courts charging
the accusee of Illegal Possession of Deaely Weapon in violaton of
Presieental Decree #9. The counsel of the eefense flee motons to quash
the saie informatons afer which the responeent-courts passee their own
oreers quashing the saie informatons on common groune that the
informatons eie not allege facts consttutng ang ofense penalizee untl
PD#9 for failure to state an essental element of the crimel, which isl, that
the carrying outsiee of the accusee’s resieence of a blaeeel, pointeel, or
blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion ofl, connectee withl, or
relatee to subversionl, insurrectonl, or rebellionl, organizee lawlessness or
public eisoreer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not informatons flee by the people sufcient in
form ane substance to consttute the ofense of “Illegal possession of
eeaely weapon” penalizee uneer Presieental Decree No. 9
RULING:
No. The primary rule in the constructon ane interpretaton of a
legislatve measure is to search for ane eetermine the intent ane spirit of
the law. Legislatve intent is the controlling factor. Buecause of the problem
of eetermining what acts fall uneer P.D. 9l, it becomes necessary to inquire
into the intent ane spirit of the eecree ane this can be foune among others
in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events
which justfy the promulgaton of the eecree ane the stf sanctons statee
therein.
The intent of the law is to be ascertainee from the wores usee in
its constructon. (If legislatve intent is not expressee in some appropriate
mannerl, the courts cannot by interpretaton speculate as to an intent ane
supply a meaning not foune in the phraseology of the law.)
QUIMPO v. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 33092 | August 31, 1981
FACTS:
Quimpol, an owner of a buileing in CDOl, was assessee P20k for
1969l, P400 annual realty tax payable in 4equal installments. Quimpo was
able to pay the frst 3 monthly installments but was not able to pay the last
installment.-On August the following yearl, he wantee to pay P124.00 (P100
tax eue + P24 penalty) to Meneozal, the City Treasurer of CDOl, but
Meneoza requiree him to pay P196 (P100 + P96 penalty basee on City
Charter of CDO). Quimpo consignee P124 with Clerk of Court then
insttutee maneamus with eamages against Meneoza in CFI
ISSUE:
WON the basis for computng the tax penalty shoule be the tax
payable for the saie year or only the installment unpaie
RULING:
Construee togetherl, the above provisions yiele no other
conclusion but that the taxes are eue ane payable 'on the frst eay of June'
from which eate 'such taxes together with all penaltes accruing thereto
shall consttute a lien on the property subject to such taxaton. It is true the
taxpayer is given the opton to pay in two installments with the respectve
eates for the payment thereof 'at not later than the thirty-frst eay of May
ane the thirteth eay of October of each yearl, respectvely.' Then comes the
crucial ane eecisive provision. 'At the expiraton of the tme for the
payment of the real estate tax without penaltyl, the taxpayer shall be
subjectl, from the frst eay of eelinquencyl, to the payment of a penalty at
the rate of two per centum for each full month of eelinquency that has
expireel, on the amount of the original tax euel, untl the tax shall have been
paie in full or untl the property shall have been forfeitee to the city ... .
The law is specifc ane maneatory. It calls for applicaton as thus woreee.
There is no room for interpretaton. The penalty is to be basee 'on the
amount of the original tax eue.' The fact that the frst installment was
maee on tme eoes not beneft the taxpayer at alll, thereafer the secone
installment were not paie on tme. In efect thenl, the opton thus granteel,
to pay in two installmentsl, must be strictly compliee withl, otherwise the
operaton of the plain statutory commane that the tax eue ane payable on
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
June 1st becomes unavoieable ane eelinquency is to be computee from
such a eate.
We rule for the pettonerl, following the general rule in the
interpretaton of tax statutes that such statutes are construee most
strongly against the government ane in favor of the taxpayer. Moreoverl,
simple logicl, fairness ane reason cannot countenance an exacton or a
penalty for an act faithfully eone incompliance with the law. Since
pettoner is allowee by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal
installments eue ane payable on four specifee eates ane having paie the
frst three (3) installments faithfully ane religiouslyl, it is manifest injustcel,
sheer arbitrariness ane abuse of power to penalize him for eoing so when
he fails to pay the fourth ane last installment.
EBARLE v. SUCALDITO
156 SCRA 803 | 1987
FACTS:
The pettonerl, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga eel Sur
ane a caneieate for reelecton in the local electons of 1971l, seeks
injunctve relief in two separate pettonsl, to enjoin further proceeeings of
his criminal casesl, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70l, 2-71l, 4-71l, 5-71l, 6-71l, ane 7-71
of the responeent Fiscal's ofce of the saie cityl, all in the nature of
prosecutons for violaton of certain provisions of the Ant-Graf ane
Corrupt Practces Act ane various provisions of the Revisee Penal
Coee. Principallyl, the pettoner relies on the failure of the responeents City
Fiscal ane the Ant-Graf League to comply with the provisions of Executve
Oreer No. 264l, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BuY WHICH COMPLAINANTS
CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION
OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BuE GUIDEDl," preliminary to their criminal
recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.
RULING:
No. It is plain from the very woreing of the Oreer that it has
exclusive applicaton to aeministratvel, not criminal complaints. The very
ttle speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mentonl,
not even by implicatonl, of criminal "ofensesl," that is to sayl, "crimes."
While "crimes" amount to "irregularitesl," the Executve Oreer coule have
very well referree to the more specifc term hae it inteneee to make itself
applicable thereto. Clearlyl, the Executve Oreer simply consolieates these
existng rules ane streamlines the aeministratve apparatus in the mater of
complaints against public ofcials. It is moreover signifcant that the
Executve Oreer in queston makes specifc reference to "erring ofcials or
employees ... removee or otherwise vineicatee. If it were inteneee to apply
to criminal prosecutonsl, it woule have employee such technical terms as
"accusee"l, "convicteel," or "acquitee." While this is not necessarily a
controlling parameter for all casesl, it is here material in construing the
intent of the measure.
FELICIANO v. AQUINO
G.R. No. 10201 | September 23, 1957
FACTS:
Responeent was proclaimee as electee mayor. 4 eays afer
proclamatonl, pettoner insttutee quo warranto proceeeings challenging
pettoner's eligibility conteneing that he was not 23 years ole at the tme
of his electon. Responeent counteree that age requirement only refers to
the age of tme of assumpton of ofcel, ane appealee the existence of a
semi-colonl, convertee into a commal, in the 1951 Revisee Aeministratve
Coee eoes not require him to possess the remaining qualifcatons at the
tme of electon but rather at the tme of assumpton of ofce.
ISSUE:
WON the proclamaton of responeent as mayor is correct.
RULING:
The primary rule of statutory constructon that punctuaton
marks cannot be eisregareee unless there is reason to the eo the contrary.
Punctuaton marks are aies of law in interpretng the language of a statute
ane can never control against the intelligible meaning of writen wores. No
reason is shown whyl, afer plainly ane unequivocally requiring that
caneieates for all other electve ofces shoule possess the age qualifcaton
"at the tme of the electon"l, ane that the law shoule sueeenly change the
requirement in case of municipal oreers. Decision of the lower court is
afrmeel, ane the electon of responeent is eeclaree unlawful ane illegal.
SET C
DE LOS SANTOS v. MALLARE
28 Phil 289
FACTS:
Eeuareo ee los Santosl, the pettonerl, was appointee City
Engineer of Buaguio on July 16l, 1946l, by the Presieentl, appointment which
was confrmee by the Commission on Appointments on August 6l, ane on
the 23re of that monthl, he qualifee for ane began to exercise the eutes
ane functons of the positon. On June 1l, 1950l, Gil R. Mallare was exteneee
an ae interimappointment by the Presieent to the same positonl, afer
whichl, on June 3l, the Uneersecretary of the Department of Public Works
ane Communicatons eirectee Santos to report to the Buureau of Public
Works for another assignment. Santos refusee to vacate the ofcel, ane
when the City Mayor ane the other ofcials namee as Mallare's co-
eefeneants ignoree him ane paie Mallare the salary corresponeing to the
positonl, he commencee these proceeeings.
ISSUE:
WONl, only ofcers ane employees in the classifee service
shoule be brought within the purview of Artcle XII of the Consttuton.
RULING:
Secton 1 of this artcle oreainsn "A Civil Service embracing all
branches ane subeivisions of the Government shall be provieee by law.
Appointments in the Civil Servicel, except as those which are policy-
eeterminingl, primarily confeental or highly technical in naturel, shall be
maee only accoreing to merit ane ftnessl, to be eeterminee as far as
practcable by compettve examinaton." The frst clause is a eefniton of
the scope of Civil Servicel, the men ane women which secton 4 protects. It
seems obvious from that eefniton that the entre Civil Service is
contemplateel, except positons "which are policy-eeterminingl, primarily
confeental or highly technical in nature." This theory is confrmee by the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on November 30l, 1936 to
implement Artcle XII of the Consttuton. Commonwealth Act No. 177
explains Civil Service almost in the ieentcal wores of that artcle of the
organic law. As a contemporaneous constructonl, this Act afores an ineex
to the meaning of Civil Service as conceivee by the framers of the
Consttuton. "The principle of contemporaneous constructon may be
appliee to the constructon given by the legislature to the consttutonal
provisions eealing with legislatve powers ane proceeure. Though not
conclusivel, such interpretaton is generally conceeee as being enttlee to
great weight."
The rules of the constructon inform us that the wores use in the
consttuton are to be given the sense they have in common use.
GARCIA v. HIPOLITO
2 Phil. 732
FACTS:
Secton 143 of the Coee of Civil Proceeure proviees that the
eefeatee party shall notfy the juege before the eneing of the term that he
"eesires to prosecute a bill of exceptons." It is allegee by the appellees that
such notce was not given in this case. No evieence was presenteel,
howeverl, at the hearing to prove this allegaton. In the absence of such
evieencel, we can not presume that it was not eone. The presumpton
woule rather be to the contrary. Anel, in this casel, it is strengthenee by the
fact thatl, when the appellees were notfee of the presentaton of the bill
of exceptons on July 28l, they maee no objecton to it on this grounel, ane
by the further fact that the court allowee it on August 5 without suggestng
that such allowance was improper for the reason statee.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
Within ten eays afer the notfcaton above mentonee saie
secton 143 requires the appellant to present to the juege his proposee bill
of exceptons. There is nothing in the secton which requires that this
shoule be eone euring the term at which the case was triee.
ISSUE:
Die the Commission intene to say that the partes might
consent to or the juege oreer an extension of this perioe of ten eaysl, or eie
they intene to have it reae is if there hae been insertee afer the wores
"allowance be the juege" the following clausen "Ane the juege shall have no
power for any cause whatever to extene this perioe of ten eaysl, ane any
agreement of the partes to that efect shall be voiet"
RULING:
In the interpretaton of a statute it is proper to consieer the
physical coneitons of the country which must of necessity afect its
operaton in oreer to reach an uneerstaneing as to the intent of the
legislature. The courts can not eisregare the plain provisions of a
maneatory statute upon grounes of expeeiency or hareship resultng from
its enforcementl, which properly aeeress themselves to the legislature
alonel, as a reason for the amenement or repeal of the statute.
It will be notcee that this perioe of ten eaysl, as well as the
subsequent perioe of fve eaysl, has to eo With what may be callee the
mechanical part of the appeall, the preparaton of the papers for
transmission to the Supreme Court. The rights of the partes as to the
removal itself have alreaey been fxee by the notce of the intenton to
prepare a bill of exceptonsl, which notce must be enteree of recore in the
clerk’s ofce. If the perioe for the performance of that act correspones to
the tme for appeall, or for suing out a writ of error foune in most other
laws of American originl, it of course can not be exteneee by oreer of court
or consent of partes. Buut that perioe is entrely eistnct from this perioe of
ten eays allowee for preparing the papersl, afer the right to remove the
case has been securee. It can notl, thereforel, be saie that an extension of
this tme is an extension of the tme to appeal.
MANILA LODGE NO. 761 v. CA
G.R. No. L-41001
FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enactee Act No. 1360 which
authorizee the City of Manila to reclaim a porton of Manila Buay.
Subsequently Act No. 1657 ameneee the former act which states that the
City of Manila was authorizee to sell or lease the set asiee for hotel site.
The City of Manila sells the lane to Manila Loege No. 761 then the later
sole the lane to Tarlac Development Corporaton. The City of Manila flee a
petton for re-annotaton of its right to repurchasee. The TDC then flee a
complaint that the City of Manila was estoppee from repurchasing the
property.
ISSUE:
The property subject of the actonl, pursuant to the provisions
of Act No. 1360l, as ameneee by Act No. 1657l, was patrimonial property of
the City of Manila ane not a park or plaza.
RULING:
It is a careinal rule of statutory constructon that courts must
give efect to the general legislatve intent that can be eiscoveree from or is
unravelee by the four corners of the statutel, ane in oreer to eiscover saie
intentl, the whole statutel, ane not only a partcular provision thereofl,
shoule be consieeree. It isl, thereforel, necessary to analyze all the
provisions of Act No. 1360l, as ameneeel, in oreer to unravel the legislatve
intent.
It is not necessaryl, thereforel, that a plaza be alreaey
constructee of- laie out as a plaza in oreer that it be consieeree property
for public use. It is sufcient that it be inteneee to be such In the case at
barl, it has been shown that the intenton of the lawmaking boey in giving
to the City of Manila the extension to the Luneta was not a grant to it of
patrimonial property but a grant for public use as a plaza.

U.S. v. DE GUZMAN
30 Phil 416
FACTS:
Responeent De Guzman hae an agreement with the fscal that
he will be a witness against his coaccusee in a mureer pursuant to Art 34
ane 35 of General Oreers No. 58. Howeverl, at the tme of the triall, De
Guzman eeniee knowleege of saie mureer ane maintainee that he was
maee to enter into saie agreement eue to fear of a certain police ofcer.
The solicitor general holes to the eischarge of the eefeneant pursuant to
Art 34l, 35 ane 36 of the saie oreers. Art 36 of saie oreinance states that his
being a state witness as provieee in Art. 34 ane 35 shall amount to an
acquital of the eefeneant eischargeel, ane shall be a bar to future
prosecuton for the same ofense.
ISSUE:
WON responeent can be brought to trial base on his behaviour
as witness of the government with respect to Art 34l, 35 ane 36 of General
Oreers No. 58.
RULING:
YES. Where the meaning of a statute or any statutory provision
is not plainl, a court is warrantee in availing itself of all legitmate aies to
ascertain the true intenton; ane among them are some extraneous facts.
The object sought to be accomplishee exercises a potent influence in
eetermining the meaning of not only the principal but also the minor
provisions of a statute. To ascertain it fully the court will be greatly assistee
by knowingl, ane it is permitee to consieerl, the mischief inteneee to be
removee or suppresseel, or the necessity of any kine which ineucee the
enactment. If the statute has been in force for a long perioe it may be
useful to know what was the contemporary constructon; its practcal
constructon; the sense of the legal profession in regare to it; the course
ane usages of business which it will afect.
OLIVA v. LA MADRID
G.R. No. L-23196 | October 31, 1967
FACTS:
Plaintf was the owner of a parcel of lane which he mortgagee
as security for the payment of a loan. Having eefaultee in the payment of
the loanl, the property was foreclosee ane sole to Responeent. Howeverl,
uneer RA 720l, the lane coule be reeeemee two (2) years afer the salel,
Feb. 4 1963. No reeempton was maee within that tme. On May 31 1963l,
Plaintf oferee to repurchasel, claiming that uneer C.A. No. 141l, he was
enttlee to repurchase the lanel, not two (2)l, but fve (5) years afer the ttle
was sole because he was a holeer of a free patent ane torrens ttle.
ISSUE:
W/N the perioe of reeempton is governee by Sec. 119 of C.A.
No. 141 of Sec. 5 of RA 720.
RULING:
It shoule be notee that the perioe of two (2) years grantee for
the reeempton of property foreclosee uneer Secton 5 of Republic Act No.
720l, as ameneee by Republic Act No. 2670l, refers to lanes "not coveree by
a Torrens Titlel, a homesteae or free patentl," or to owners of lanes "without
torrens ttlesl," who can "show fve years or more of peacefull, contnuous
ane uninterruptee possession thereof in the concept of an ownerl, or of
homesteaes or free patent lanes peneing the issuance of ttles but alreaey
approveel," or "of lanes peneing homesteae or free patent ttles." Plaintfl,
howeverl, hael, on the lane in questonl, a free patent ane a Torrens ttlel,
which were issuee over 26 years prior to the mortgage consttutee in favor
of the Buank. Accoreinglyl, there is no conflict between secton 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 ane secton 5 of Republic Act No. 720l, as
ameneeel, ane the perioe of two (2) years prescribee in the later is not
applicable to him.
Moreoverl, the legislatve history of the bills3 which later became
saie Republic Act No. 2670l, ameneing Republicl, Act No. 720l, shows that
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the original proposal was to give homesteaeers or free patent holeers a
perioe of ten (10) years within which to reeeem their property foreclosee
by rural banks; that this proposal was eventually foune to be unwisel,
because its efect woule have been to eissuaee rural banks from grantng
loans to homesteaeers or free patent holeers — which were sought to be
liberalizee — saie perioe of reeempton being too longl, from the viewpoint
of saie banks; ane thatl, consequentlyl, the proposal was given upl, with the
specifc intent ane uneerstaneing that homesteaeers or holeers of free
patent woule retain the right to reeeem within fve (5) years from the
conveyance of their propertesl, as provieee in the general lawl, that is to say
the Public Lane Actl, or Commonwealth Act No. 141. It isl, thereforel, our
consieeree view that plaintf herein has the right to repurchase the
property in queston within fve (5) years from the eate of the conveyance
or foreclosure salel, or up to February 4l, 1966l, ane that having exercisee
such right ane teneeree payment long before the eate last mentoneel,
eefeneants herein are boune to reconvey saie property to him.
MANILA JOCKY CLUB v. GAMES AND AMUSEMENT BOARD
G.R. No. L-12727 | February 29, 1960
FACTS:
The authorizee racing eays specifcally eesignatee ane
eistributee in Secton 4 of RA 309 the basic law on horse racing in the
Philippines ameneee by RA 983 are as followsn (1) Philippine Ant-TBu
Society for 12 Suneaysl, (2) PCSO - 6 Suneays (3) White Cross - 4 Suneays (4)
Grane Derby Race of PATS - 1 Suneay (5) Private Ineivieuals ane enttes -
29 Suneays. Howeverl, RA 1502 increasee the sweepstakes eraw ane races
of the PCSO from 6 to 12 Suneaysl, but without specifying the eays on
which they are to be run. To accommoeate these aeeitonal racesl, GABu
resolvee to reeuce the number of Suneays assignee to private ineivieuals
ane enttes by six. Appellants protestee that the saie increase shoule be
taken from the 12 Satureays reservee to the Presieentl, for charitable relief
OR shoule be assignee to any eay of the week besiees Suneayl, Satureay
ane Legal Holieay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aeeitonal sweepstakes races must be
insertee in club races as eebatee in the House of Representatves in the
votng of HBu 5732/RA1502.
RULING:
No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502l, as it was fnally
enacteel, which woule ineicate that such an uneerstaneing on the part of
these two members of the Lower House of Congress were receivee the
sancton or conformity of their colleaguesl, for the law is absolutely eevoie
of any such ineicaton. In the interpretaton of a legal eocumentl, especially
a statutel, unlike in the interpretaton of an oreinary writen eocumentl, it is
not enough to obtain informaton to the intenton or meaning of the
author or authorsl, but also to see whether the intenton or meaning has
been expressee in such a way as to give it legal efect ane valieity. In shortl,
the purpose of the inquiryl, is not only to know what the author meant by
the language he useel, but also to see that the language usee sufciently
expresses that meaning.
The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the
increasel, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes eraws ane races. If the
intenton of Congress were to authorize aeeitonal sweepstakes eraws only
which coulel, aemiteelyl, be insertee in the club racesl, the law woule not
have inclueee regular races; ane since regular sweepstakes races were
specifcally authorizeel, ane it woule be confusingl, inconvenientl, if not
impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all
on the same eay (ane it has never been eone before)l, the conclusion
seems inevitable that the aeeitonal sweepstakes eraws ane races were
inteneee to be hele on a whole eayl, separate ane apart from the club
races.
CASCO PHIL. CHEMICAL CO. v. GIMENEZ
7 SCRA 347
FACTS:
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609l, otherwise
known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Lawl, the Central Buank of the
Philippines issuee on July 1l, 1959l, its Circular No. 95. fxing a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactons. To supplement the
circularl, the Buank later promulgatee a memoraneum establishing the
proceeure for applicatons for exempton from the payment of saie feel, as
provieee in saie Republic Act No. 2609. Several tmes in November ane
December 1959l, pettoner Casco Philippine Chemical Co.l, Inc. — which is
engagee in the manufacture of synthetc resin gluesl, usee in boneing
lumber ane veneer by plywooe ane harewooe proeucers — bought foreign
exchange for the importaton of urea ane formaleehyee — which are the
main raw materials in the proeucton of saie glues — ane paie therefor the
aforementonee margin fee aggregatng P33l,765.42. In Mayl, 1960l,
pettoner maee another purchase of foreign exchange ane paie the sum of
P6l,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
ISSUE:
whether or not "urea" ane "formaleehyee" are exempt by law
from the payment of the aforesaie margin fee.
RULING:
It shoule be notee thatl, whereas "urea" ane "formaleehyee"
are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetc resin glues.
Hencel, "urea formaleehyee" is clearly a fnishee proeuctl, which is patently
eistnct ane eiferent from urea" ane "formaleehyee"l, as separate artcles
usee in the manufacture of the synthetc resin known as "urea
formaleehyee". Pettoner contenesl, howeverl, that the bill approvee in
Congress containee the copulatve conjuncton "ane" between the terms
"urea" ane "formaleehyee"l, ane that the members of Congress inteneee to
exempt "urea" ane "formaleehyee" separately as essental elements in the
manufacture of the synthetc resin glue callee "urea" formaleehyee"l, not
the later as a fnishee proeuctl, citng in support of this view the
statements maee on the floor of the Senatel, euring the consieeraton of
the bill before saie Housel, by members thereof. Buutl, saie ineivieual
statements eo not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less eo
they ineicate the intent of the House of Representatves
Furthermorel, it is well setlee that the enrollee bill — which
uses the term "urea formaleehyee" insteae of "urea ane formaleehyee" —
is conclusive upon the courts as regares the tenor of the measure passee
by Congress ane approvee by the Presieent. If there has been any mistake
in the printng ofhe bill before it was certfee by the ofcers of Congress
ane approvee by the Executve — on which we cannot speculatel, without
jeopareizing the principle of separaton of powers ane uneermining one of
the cornerstones of our eemocratc system — the remeey is by
amenement or curatve legislatonl, not by jueicial eecree.
TINIO v. FRANCES
98 Phil 32
FACTS:
Sergio Nicolas appliee for a parcel of lane in Nueva Ecija ane was
approvee in 1917. In 1943l, the fnal proof was approvee by the Director of
Lanes who issuee a patent in his favorl, but because Sergio Nicolas eieel, he
was substtutee by his heirsl, representee by his wieow. In 1947l, the heirs
transferree their rights to the homesteae to the eefeneantsl, with approval
by the Secretary of Agriculture ane Commercel, ane securee the issuance of
a homesteae patent in their favor. In 1953l, heirs of the eeceasee Sergio
Nicolas wantee to annul the sale of a homesteae ane to recover the lanel,
together with the fruits of the lane as eamages.
ISSUE:
WONl, the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas
over the parcel of lane was valie.
RULING:
NO. The legislatve policy or intent is to conserve the lane which
a homesteaeer has acquiree uneer the Public Lane Lawl, as above stateel,
for him ane his heirs. The legislatve policy is so strone ane consistent that
the original perioe of fve years from the issuance of the patentl, within
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which perioe conveyance or sale thereof by the homesteaeer or his heirs
was prohibitee is now exteneee to 25 years if no approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture ane Commerce is securee. Provision has also been insertee
authorizing the repurchase of the homesteae when properly sole by the
homesteaeer within fve years from the eate of the sale. (Sec. 119l, C. A.
No. 141.) This legislatve intent ane policy is also sought to be carriee out in
Secton 20l, as may be seen from the fact that transfer of homesteae rights
from a homesteaeer can only be justfee upon proof satsfactory to the
Director of Lanes that the homesteaeer cannot contnue with his
homesteae through no fault of his own.
PASCUAL v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. L-15816 | February 29, 1964
FACTS:
It appears that several years before 1954 one Valente Ramos
(now eeceasee) leasee from the government Lots Nos. 672 ane 674 of the
Caeastral Survey of Ramosl, Tarlac. On June 22l, 1954l, Eeuareo Pascual flee
with the Ofce of the Director of Lanesl, pursuant to the provisions of
Secton 102 of Commonwealth Act No. 141l, a petton for the cancellaton
of the lease contract aforesaie on the groune that Ramos hae failee to pay
the rentals on the lanes for seven years ane the taxes thereon since 1947l,
ane on the further groune that he ane his successors-in-interest hae not
cultvatee the property nor introeucee improvements thereonl, in violaton
of the terms ane coneitons of the lease.
ISSUE:
WONl,
RULING:
It is well setlee that the contemporaneous interpretaton given
by aeministratve ofcials to a law they are boune to enforce or implement
eeserves great weight (Maerigal vs. Rafertyl, 38 Phil. 423; Government etc.
vs. Municipality of Buinalonanl, 32 Phil. 364). In the present casel, it appears
that the trial court reversee not only the eecision of the eirector of Lanes
ane of the Secretary of Agriculture ane Natural Resources but that of the
Ofce of the Presieentl, without the recore eisclosing in our opinionl, that
the same are clearly erroneous ane unfouneee. To the contraryl, they
appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the law invokee by
appelleel, namelyl, to give priority or preference to the actual occupant of
public lane which appellee is not.
ARABAY INC. v. CFI OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE
G.R. No. L-37684 | September 10, 1975
FACTS:
A petton for review of the eecision of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga eel Nortel, Buranch IIl, eismissing the complaint of
the herein pettoner Arabayl, Inc.l, for annulment of a tax oreinance of the
Municipal Council of Dipologl, Zamboanga eel Nortel, ane for refune of the
taxes it hae paie thereuneer. On December 17l, 1965 the Municipal Council
of Dipolog enactee Oreinance No. 19 ameneing Secton I of Oreinance No.
53 series of 1964.
ISSUE:
(1) whether or not the questonee tax provision imposes a sales tax; ane (2)
if it imposes a sales taxl, whether the Arabayl, Inc. is enttlee to a tax refunel,
consieering that Dipolog is now a city.
RULING:
It is setlee rule in this juriseicton that for purposes of Secton 2
of the Local Autonomy Actl, supral, a municipal tax oreinance which
prescribes a set rato between the amount of the tax ane the volume of
sales of the taxpayer imposes a sales tax ane is null ane voie for being
beyone the power of a municipality to enact. In our viewl, the questonee
secton of Oreinance No. 53 of the Municipal Council of Dipolog levies a
sales taxl, not only because the character of the oreinance as a sales tax
oreinance was aemitee by the partes belowl, but as well because the
phraseology of the saie provision reveals in clear terms the intenton to
impose a tax on the sale of oill, gasoline ane other petroleum proeucts.
Thusl, the oreinance provieesn "There shall be chargee for the selling ane
eistributon of refnee ane manufacturee oils ... basee on the monthly
allocaton actually eeliveree ane eistributee ane inteneee for sale ... by the
Company or supplier to any person ... whether as eealer ... or as operator
of any staton ... the following tax payable monthlyn ..." It is quite evieent
from these terms that the amount of the tax that may be collectee is
eirectly eepeneent upon or bears a eirect relatonship to the volume of
sales which the owner or supplier of the itemizee proeucts generates every
month. The oreinance in queston therefore exacts a tax basee on sales; it
follows that the Municipality of Dipolog was not authorizee to enact such
an oreinance uneer the local Autonomy Act.
In our opinionl, a reasonable ane practcal interpretaton of the
terms of the proviso in queston results in the conclusion that Congressl, in
exclueing gasoline from the general eisability imposee on municipalites
ane municipal eistricts to exact any kine of taxes on artcles subject to
specifee tax uneer the Tax Coeel, eeliberately ane intentonally meant to
put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type
or form of taxes the later may eeem proper to levy on gasoline inclueing a
sales tax or one in that form. There is afer all no clearly eemonstrable ane
convincing reason why the law woule allow municipal impositon of taxes
on gasoline ane yet withhole such power if the impositon is in the form of
a sales taxl, when it was a known fact at the tme of the enactment of the
Local Autonomy Act in 1959 — ane this stll is true to this eay — that
gasoline is of no proftable use to the companies which own it unless
turnee over to the consuming public whichl, perforcel, must pay for the right
to obtain that commoeity.
BENGZON v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
62 Phil 912
FACTS:
Juan Buengzonl, the pettoner was appointee justce of the peace
for the municipality of Lingayenl, Pangasinanl, on March 7l, 1912. Having
reachee the age of sixty-fvel, he ceasee to hole this positon on January 14l,
1933l, by reason of the provisions of Act No. 3899. On that eatel, actng
pursuant to instructons receivee from the Juege of First Instance for the
eistrictl, he turnee over the ofce of Justce of the peace to the auxiliary
justce of the peace of the municipality. Subsequently the pettoner
aeeressee communicatons to the Secretary of Justcel, the Governor-
Generall, ane the Insular Aueitor applying for gratuity uneer Act No. 4051l,
but all of these ofcials aevisee him that he was not enttlee to the benefts
of the Act. Accoreinglyl, on March 7l, 1934l, the instant complaint was flee
with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Governor-General steppee outsiee the
bounearies of his legislatve functonsl, when he atemptee to veto one
secton of Act No. 4051
RULING:
While contemporaneous constructon is not eecisive for the
courtsl, yet where a constructon of statutes has been aeoptee by the
legislatve eepartment ane acceptee by the various agencies of the
executve eepartmentl, it is enttlee to great respect. It is our uneerstaneing
that it has been the practce of the Chief Executve in the interpretaton of
his consttutonal powers to veto separate items in bills analogous to that
before usl, ane that this practce has been acquiescee in previously without
objectonl, so that it woule require a clear showing or unconsttutonality
for the courts to eeclare against it. Sincel, thereforel, legislatve intent ane
executve purpose is evieentl, it eevolves upon the jueiciary to give
eiferental atenton to the attuee assumee by the other two branches of
the Government.
Viewee from another eirectonl, there can be no eoubt that Act
No. 4051 is an appropriaton bill. That is manifest from its provisionsl, ane
partcularly from secton 10 by which the necessary sum to carry out the
purposes of the Act was "hereby appropriatee out of any funes in the
Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriatee." It hasl, howeverl, been faintly
suggestee that by an appropriaton bill is meant a general appropriaton
bill. We are shown nothing substantal to support this allegaton. Unlike in
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other consttutonsl, the wore "general" was omiteel, ane we presume
intentonallyl, from the Organic Act ane the Consttuton. Uneer such
coneitonsl, the courts woule not be authorizee to insert a wore ane by so
eoing amene the law.
YRA v. ABANO
52 Phil 380
FACTS:
Maximo Abano is a natve of the municipality of Meycauayanl,
Buulacan. At the proper agel, he transferree to Manila to complete his
eeucaton. While temporarily resieing in Manilal, Abano registeree as a
voter there. Shortly afer qualifying as a member of the bar ane afer the
eeath of his fatherl, Abano returnee to Meycauayan to live. From May 10l,
1927l, untl the presentl, Abano has consieeree himself a resieent of
Meycauayan. When the 1928 electons were approachingl, he maee an
applicaton for cancellaton of registraton in Manila which was eatee April
3l, 1928l, but this applicaton was rejectee by the city ofcials for the reason
that it was not eepositee in the mails on or before April 4l, 1928.
Nevertheless Abano presentee himself as a caneieate for municipal
presieent of Meycauayan in the 1928 electons ane was electee by popular
vote to that ofce.
ISSUE:
WONl, Responeent is eligible to hole a municipal ofce for the
reason that he was not a "qualifee voter in his municipality"
RULING:
The Commitee of the Philippine Assembly reachee the
conclusion that the wores "qualifee elector" meant a person who hae all
of the qualifcatons provieee by law to be a voter ane not a person
registeree in the electoral list. So also the Executve Buureau has been of the
opinion that the term "qualifee" when appliee to a voter eoes not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registeree voter. So also the
Executve Buureau has been of the opinion that the term "qualifee" when
appliee to a voter eoes not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registeree voter
It is not at all easy to eisregare the forcible argument aevancee
by counsel for the appellant to the efect that when the law makes use of
the phrases "qualifee elector" ane "qualifee voter" the law means what it
says. It is conteneee that it woule be an absureity to hole one a qualifee
elector who was not eligible to vote in his municipality. At the same tmel,
the contemporaneous constructon of the law by two eepartments of the
Government — one the legislatve branch responsible for its enactmentl,
ane the other the executve branch responsible for its enforcement —
while not controlling on the Jueiciaryl, is enttlee to our respectul
consieeraton. For the oreerly ane harmonious interpretaton ane
aevancement of the lawl, the courts shoulel, when possiblel, keep step with
the other eepartments. The eistncton is between a qualifee elector ane
the responeent is suchl, ane a registeree qualifee elector ane the
responeent is such although not in his home municipality. Registraton
regulates the exercise of the right of sufrage. It is not a qualifcaton for
such right. It shoule not be forgoten that the people of Meycauayan have
spoken ane their choice to be their local chief executve is the responeent.
The will of the electorate shoule be respectee.
SET D
CHUA v. CSC
206 SCRA 651 | 1992
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6683 provieee benefts for early retrement
ane voluntary separaton from the government service as well as for
involuntary separaton eue to reorganizaton. Deemee qualifee to avail of
its benefts are those enumeratee in Sec. 2 of the Act. Pettoner Lyeia Chua
believing that she is qualifee to avail of the benefts of the programl, flee
an applicaton with responeent Natonal Irrigaton Aeministraton (NIA)
whichl, howeverl, eeniee the same. A recourse by pettoner to the Civil
Service Commission yieleee negatve resultsl, citng that her positon is co-
terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature ane thus
exclueee by the enumeratons uneer Sec.3.1 of Joint DBuM-CSC Circular
Leter No. 89-1l, i.e. casuall, emergencyl, temporary or regular employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pettoner is enttlee to the benefts grantee
uneer Republic Act No. 6683.
RULING:
Yes. Pettoner was establishee to be a co-terminous employeel,
a non-career civil servantl, like casual ane emergency employees. The
Supreme Court sees no solie reason why the later are exteneee benefts
uneer the Early Retrement Law but the former are not. It will be notee
that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extenes its benefts for early retrement to
regularl, temporaryl, casual ane emergency employees. Buut specifcally
exclueee from the benefts are uniformee personnel of the AFP inclueing
those of the PC-INP. It can be arguee thatl, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is the eoctrine of necessary
implicaton which holes that “what is impliee in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressee”. The Court believesl, ane so holesl, that
the eenial by the responeents of pettoner’s applicaton for early
retrement benefts uneer R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable as pettoner hae
flee an applicaton for voluntary retrement within a reasonable perioe ane
she is enttlee to the benefts of saie law.
PEOPLE v. MANANTAN
115 Phil 657 | 1962
FACTS:
Guillermo Manantan was chargee with a violaton of Secton 54l,
Revisee Electon Coee. Howeverl, Manantan claims that as "justce of
peace"l, the eefeneant is not one of the ofcers enumeratee in the saie
secton. The lower court eeniee the moton to eismiss holeing that a justce
of peace is within the purview of Secton 54.
Uneer Secton 54l, "No justcel, juegel, fscall, treasurerl, or assessor of any
provincel, no ofcer or employee of the Armyl, no member of the natonall,
provinciall, cityl, municipal or rural police force ane no classifee civil service
ofcer or employee shall aie any caneieatel, or exert any influence in any
manner in a electon or take part thereinl, except to votel, if enttlee theretol,
or to preserve public peacel, if he is a peace ofcer.".
Defeneant submits that the saie electon was taken from Secton
449 of the Revisee Aeministraton Coee whereinl, "No juege of the First
Instancel, justce of the peacel, or treasurerl, fscal or assessor of any
province ane no ofcer or employee of the Philippine Constabularyl, or any
Buureau or employee of the classifee civil servicel, shall aie any caneieate or
exert influence in any manner in any electon or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the wores
"justce of peace" was omitee revealee the intenton of Legislature to
excluee justces of peace from its operaton.
ISSUE:
W/N the justce of peace inclueee in the prohibiton of Secton
64 of the Revisee Electon Coeet
RULING:
Yesl, it is inclueee in Secton 54. Justces of the peace were
expressly inclueee in Secton 449 of the Revisee Aeministratve Coee
because the kines of jueges therein were specifeel, i.e.l, juege of the First
Instance ane justce of the peace. In Secton 54l, howeverl, there was no
necessity therefore to incluee justces of the peace in the enumeraton
because the legislature hae availee itself of the more generic ane broaeer
terml, "juege."l, which incluees all kines of jueges.
A "justce of the peace" is a juege. A "juege" is a public ofcerl, whol, by
virtue of his ofcel, is clothee with jueicial authority. This term incluees all
ofcers appointee to to eeciee litgatee questons while actng in that
capacityl, inclueing justces of the peacel, ane even jurorsl, it is saiel, who are
jueges of facts.
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The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habeneus est" is likewise
invokee by the eefeneant-appellee. Uneer the saie rulel, a personl, object or
thing omitee from an enumeraton must be hele to have been omitee
intentonally. Howeverl, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly
establishee. In the case at barl, the legislature eie not excluee or omit
justces of the peace from the enumeraton of ofcers preclueee from
engaging in partsan politcal actvites. In Secton 54l, justces of the peace
were just callee "jueges". Alsol, the applicaton of this rule eoes not
proceee from the mere fact that a case is criminal in naturel, but rather
from a reasonable certainty that a partcular personl, object or thing has
been omitee from a legislatve enumeraton. In the case at barl, there is no
omission but only substtuton of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict constructon is not
the only factor controlling the interpretaton of such laws; insteael, the rule
merely serves as an aeeitonall, single factor to be consieeree as an aie in
eetermining the meaning of penal laws.
Alsol, the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the ofcers within
its purview. Justces of the Supreme Courtl, the Court of Appealsl, ane
various juegesl, such as the jueges of the Court of Ineustrial Relatonsl,
jueges of the Court of Agrarian Relatonsl, etc.l, who were not inclueee in
the prohibiton uneer the ole statutel, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been
erroneously appliee by CA ane lower courts because they were not able to
give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justces of
peace".
ROLDAN v. VILLAROMAN
69 Phil 12 | 1939
FACTS:
Responeents were chargee of mureer. During the triall,
Responeent Cuevas became ill ane hae to be confnee to a hospital. Juege
Roleanl, the Pettonerl, eeniee the Responeents for postponement of the
trial on the groune of illness of Cuevas. The court also compellee the
counsel of the accusee to present evieence ane their witnesses ane
oreeree to arrest the accusee. Responeents then insttutee a certorari
proceeeing in the Court of Appeals against the Pettonerl, impugning the
eecision of the juege for proceeeing with the case in the absence of
Cuevas. The CA then issuee a writ of preliminary injuncton oreering Juege
Rolean from contnuing with the trial.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA has juriseicton over the case.
RULING:
No. The CA resolutons eenying the motons of the Solicitor-
General rely principally upon the eecision reneeree in the case of Mujer vs.
CFI of Lagunal, which hele that the phrase “in aie of its appellate
juriseicton” only refers to its proximate anteceeent ane to “all other
auxiliary writs ane process.” This ruling is in conjuncton with the rule of
interpretaton that a qualifying phrase shoule be uneerstooe as referring to
the nearest anteceeent. Moreoverl, the rule in the interpretaton appliee is
in fact the general rule in the interpretaton of qualifying or coneitonal
phrases foune in a lawl, but this rule is subject to the excepton that where
the intenton of the law is to apply the phrase to all the anteceeents
embracee in the provisionl, the same shoule be maee extensive to the
whole.
MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE
234 SCRA 255 | 1994
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlunsoe enactee Oreinance No. 3353
prohibitng the operaton of casino followee by Oreinance No. 3375-93
provieing penalty therefor. Pettoners also atack gambling as intrinsically
harmful ane cite various provisions of the Consttuton ane several
eecisions of this Court expressive of the general ane ofcial eisapprobaton
of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family ane the proper
upbringing of the youth.
ISSUE:
WON Oreinance 3353 ane 3375-93 valie.
RULING:
No. Cagayan ee Oro Cityl, like other politcal subeivisionsl, is
empoweree to enact oreinance for the purposes ineicatee in the Local
Government Coee. It is expressly vestee with the police power uneer what
is known as the General Welfare Clause. The ratonale of the requirement
that the oreinances shoule not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the natonal government. Local councils
exercise only eelegatee legislatve powers conferree on them by Congress
as the natonal lawmaking boey. The eelegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the later. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can uneo the acts of Congressl,
from which they have eerivee their power in the frst placel, ane negate by
mere oreinance the maneate of the statute.
NPC v. ANGAS
208 SCRA 542 | 1992
FACTS:
The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specifee lots
situatee at Limogaol, Saguiaranl, Lanao eel Sur was for the purpose of the
eevelopment of hyero-electric power ane proeucton of electricity as well
as the erecton to such subsieiary works ane constructons as may be
necessarily connectee therewith.
Afer a series of hearings were helel, on 15 June 1979l, a
consolieatee eecision was reneeree by the lower courtl, eeclaring ane
confrming that the lots mentonee ane eescribee in the complaints have
entrely been lawfully coneemnee ane expropriatee by NAPOCORl, ane
oreering the later to pay the laneowners certain sums of money as just
compensaton for their lanes expropriatee "with legal interest thereon untl
fully paie.
Thereaferl, the lower court eirectee the pettoner to eeposit
with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as aejuegee in the joint eecision
eatee 15 June 1979. NAPOCOR compliee with saie oreer ane eepositee the
sums of money with interest computee at 6% per annum. On 10 February
1981l, another laneowner (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol) flee with the trial
court an exparte moton prayingl, for the frst tmel, that the legal interest
on the just compensaton awareee to her by the court be computee at 12%
per annum as allegeely "authorizee uneer ane by virtue of Circular 416 of
the Central Buank issuee pursuant to Presieental Decree 116 ane in a
eecision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowee in the juegment
of the courtsl, in the absence of express contractl, shall be computee at 12%
per annum." On 11 February 1981l, the lower court grantee the saie moton
allowing 12% interest per annum.
ISSUE:
W/N Central Buank Circular No. 416 implieely repealee or
moeifee Art. 2209 of the Civil Coee.
RULING:
Artcle 2209 of the Civil Coee is the applicable law.
Sufce it to state that repeals or even amenements by
implicaton are not favoree if two laws can be fairly reconcilee. The Courts
are slow to hole that one statute has repealee another by implicatonl, ane
they will not make such an aejueicaton if they can refrain from eoing sol, or
if they can arrive at another result by any constructon which is just ane
reasonable. Buesieesl, the courts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in
oreer to eeciee that it repeals another by implicatonl, nor will they aeopt
an interpretaton leaeing to an aejueicaton of repeal by implicaton unless
it is inevitable ane a clear ane explicit reason therefor can be aeeucee.
In this casel, Central Buank Circular No. 416 ane Art. 2209 of the
Civil Coee contemplate eiferent situatons ane apply to eiferent
transactons. In transactons involving loan or forbearance of moneyl, gooes
or creeitsl, as well as juegments relatng to such loan or forbearance of
I-Manresa 2018 – 2019
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
moneyl, gooes or creeitsl, the Central Buank circular applies. It is only in such
transactons or juegments where the Presieental Decree allowee the
Monetary Buoare to eip its fngers into. On the other hanel, in cases
requiring the payment of ineemnites as eamagesl, in connecton with any
eelay in the performance of an obligaton other than those involving loan
or forbearance of moneyl, gooes or creeitsl, Art. 2209 of the Civil Coee
applies. For the Courtl, this is the most fairl, reasonablel, ane logical
interpretaton of the two laws. We eo not see any conflict between Central
Buank Circular No. 416 ane Art. 2209 of the Civil Coee or any reason to hole
that the former has repealee the later by implicaton.
GARCIA v. SSS
G.R. No. 170735 | December 17, 2000
FACTS:
Pettoner Immaculaea L. Garcial, et.al. were eirectors of Impact
Corporaton. Impact Corporaton startee encountering fnancial problems.
Impact Corporaton flee with the Securites ane Exchange
Commission(SEC) a Petton for Suspension of Payments. The company is
eirectee to pay all the enttlee workers unpaie wagesl, unpaie 13th month
pay ane to remit to the Social Security System loan amortzatons ane SSS
premiums previously eeeuctee from the wages of the workers.
The Social Security System (SSS)l, through its Legal ane Collecton
Division (LCD)l, flee a case before the SSC for the collecton of unremitee
SSS premium contributons withhele by Impact Corporaton from its
employees. Pettoner avers that uneer the aforesaie provisionl, the liability
eoes not incluee liability for the unremitee SSS premium contributons.
ISSUE:
WON pettoner can be maee solely liable for the corporate
obligatons of Impact Corporaton pertaining to unremitee SSS premium
contributons ane penaltesl, therefore.
RULING:
Clearlyl, a simplistc interpretaton of the law is untenable. It is a
rule in statutory constructon that every part of the statute must be
interpretee with reference to the contextl, i.e.l, that every part of the statute
must be consieeree together with the other parts ane kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. The liability imposee as
contemplatee uneer the foregoing Secton 28(f) of the Social Security Law
eoes not precluee the liability for the unremitee amount. Relevant to
Secton 28(f) is Secton 22 of the same law.
Pettoner Immaculaea L. Garcial, as sole surviving eirector of
Impact Corporaton is hereby ORDERED to pay for the collectee ane
unremitee SSS contributons of Impact Corporaton. The case is
REMANDED to the SSS for computaton of the exact amount ane collecton
thereof.
FINMAN GENERAL INSURANCE v. CA
213 SCRA 493
FACTS:
Pettoner flee this petton alleging grove abuse of eiscreton on
the part of the appellate court in applying the principle of “expresso unius
exclusio alterius” in a personal accieent insurance policy since eeath
resultng from mureer ane/or assault are implieely exclueee in saie
insurance policy consieering that the cause of eeath of the insuree was not
accieental but rather a eeliberate ane intentonal act of the assailant in
killing the former as ineicatee by the locaton of the lone stab woune on
the insuree. Thereforel, saie eeath was commitee with eeliberate intent
whichl, by the very nature of a personal accieent insurance policyl, cannot
be ineemnifee.
ISSUE:
WON pettoner is correct that eeath results from assault or
mureer eeemee are not inclueee in the terms “accieent” ane “accieental”.
RULING:
 NO. The terms “accieent” ane “accieental” as usee in insurance
contracts have not acquiree any technical meaningl, ane are construee by
the courts in their oreinary ane common acceptaton. Thusl, the terms have
been taken to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitouslyl, without
intenton ane eesignl, ane which is unexpecteel, unusuall, ane unforeseen. It
is well setlee that contracts of insurance are to be construee liberally in
favor of the insuree ane strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the
wores of an insurance contract shoule be interpretee in favor of its
benefciary.
SET E
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM
G.R. No. 78742 | July 14 1989
FACTS:
A petton alleging the consttutonality of PD No. 27l, EO 228 ane
229 ane RA 6657. Subjects of the petton are a 9-hectare ane 5-hectare
Ricelane workee by four tenants. Tenants were eeclaree full owners by EO
228 as qualifee farmers uneer PD 27. The pettoners now contene that
Presieent Aquino usurpee the legislature’s power.
b. A petton by laneowners ane sugar planters in Victoria’s Mill
Negros Occieental against Proclamaton 131 ane EO 229.
Proclamaton 131 is the creaton of Agrarian Reform Fune with
inital fune of P50Buillion.
c. A petton by owners of lane which was placee by the DAR
uneer the coverage of Operaton Lane Transfer.
e. A petton invoking the right of retenton uneer PD 27 to
owners of rice ane corn lanes not exceeeing seven hectares.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the aforementonee EO’sl, PDl, ane RA were
consttutonal.
RULING:
The promulgaton of PD 27 by Presieent Marcos was valie in
exercise of Police power ane eminent eomain. The power of Presieent
Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 ane EO 228 ane 229 was authorizee uneer
Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Consttuton. Thereforel, it is
a valie exercise of Police Power ane Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valie. The carrying out of the regulaton
uneer CARP becomes necessary to eeprive owners of whatever lanes they
may own in excess of the maximum area alloweel, there is eefnitely a
taking uneer the power of eminent eomain for which payment of just
compensaton is imperatve. The taking contemplatee is not a mere
limitaton of the use of the lane. What is requiree is the surreneer of the
ttle ane the physical possession of saie excess ane all benefcial rights
accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. A statute may be sustainee
uneer the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject
ane the methoe. Subject ane purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valiel,
however what is to be eeterminee is the methoe employee to achieve it.
BONIFACIO v. JUDGE DIZON
G.R. No. 79416 | September 5, 1989
FACTS:
An ejectment suit was flee against private responeent Pastora
San Miguel by laneowner Olimpio Buonifacio. During the peneency of the
casel, Olimpio eiee ane was succeeeee by his heirs. Pettoners (heirs of
Olimpio) movee for a moton to quash the eenial of petton for ejectmentl,
ane conteneee that an ejectment case survives the eeath of a party.
ISSUE:
WON the compulsory heirs inherit the favorable juegment
obtainee by the eeceeentl, thereby investng the formerl, all rights conferree
by the juegment to the eeceeent.
RULING:
I-Manresa 2018 – 2019
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
A reaeing of Secton 36 (1)l, R.A. 3844l, howeverl, proviees that
ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorizee not only when the
laneowner-lessor eesiree to cultvate the laneholeingl, but also when a
member of his immeeiate family so eesiree. The law is clear ane
unambiguous thenl, that the right of cultvaton as a groune for ejectment
was not a right exclusive ane personal to the laneowner-lessor.
GARCIA-PADILLA v. MINISTER ENRILE
G.R. No. 61388 | April 20, 1983
FACTS:
The case is an applicaton for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of 14 eetainees. Sabino Paeilla ane 8 others out of the 14
eetainees were then having a conference in the eining room at Dr. Parong’s
resieence. Prior theretol, all the 14 eetainees were uneer surveillance as
they were then ieentfee as members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines. engaging in subversive actvites. They were arrestee ane later
transferree to a facility only the PCs knowl, hencel, the present petton of
Josefnal, mother of Sabinal, for writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests eone against Sabino et al were valie.
RULING:
Yes. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
raises a politcall, not a jueiciall, queston ane that the right to bail cannot be
invokee euring such a perioe. PD 1836 ane LOI 1211 have vesteel, assuming
a law is necessaryl, in the Presieent the power of preventve arrest incieent
to the suspension of the privilege of the writ. In aeeitonl, howeverl, it
shoule be notee that the PCO has been replacee by Preventve Detenton
Acton (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provieee for in the saie eecreel, a
PDA consttutes an authority to arrest ane preventvely eetain persons
commitng the aforementonee crimesl, for a perioe of one yearl, with the
cause or causes of their arrest subjectee to review by the Presieent or the
by the Review Commitee createe for the purpose.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146710-15 | March 2, 2001
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegatons of wrong eoings
involving bribe-takingl, illegal gamblingl, ane other forms of corrupton were
maee against Estraea before the Senate Bulue Ribbon Commitee. On
November 13l, 2000l, Estraea was impeachee by the Hor anel, on December
7l, impeachment proceeeings were begun in the Senate euring which more
serious allegatons of graf ane corrupton against Estraea were maee ane
were only stoppee on January 16l, 2001 when 11 senatorsl, sympathetc to
the Presieentl, succeeeee in suppressing eamaging evieence against
Estraea. As a resultl, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as
the entre prosecuton panel walkee out ane Senate Presieent Pimentel
resignee afer castng his vote against Estraea.
On January 19l, PNP ane the AFP also witherew their support for
Estraea ane joinee the crowe at EDSA Shrine. Estraea callee for a snap
presieental electon to be hele concurrently with congressional ane local
electons on May 14l, 2001. He aeeee that he will not run in this electon.
On January 20l, SC eeclaree that the seat of presieency was vacantl, saying
that Estraea “constructvely resignee his post”. At noonl, Arroyo took her
oath of ofce in the presence of the crowe at EDSA as the 14th Presieent.
Estraea ane his family later lef Malacañang Palace. Erapl, afer his falll, flee
petton for prohibiton with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
responeent Ombuesman from “coneuctng any further proceeeings in
cases flee against him not untl his term as presieent enes. He also prayee
for juegment “confrming Estraea to be the lawful ane incumbent Presieent
of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to eischarge the
eutes of his ofce.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pettoner enjoys immunity from suit.
RULING:
 The principle of nonliabilityl, as herein enunciateel, eoes not
mean that the jueiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-
General; that he mayl, uneer cover of his ofcel, eo what he willl, unimpeeee
ane unrestrainee. Such a constructon woule mean that tyrannyl, uneer the
guise of the executon of the lawl, coule walk eefantly abroael, eestroying
rights of person ane of propertyl, wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures.
The cases flee against pettoner Estraea are criminal in
character. They involve pluneerl, bribery ane graf ane corrupton. Buy no
stretch of the imaginaton can these crimesl, especially pluneer which
carries the eeath penaltyl, be coveree by the allege mantle of immunity of a
non-sitng presieent. Pettoner cannot cite any eecision of this Court
licensing the Presieent to commit criminal acts ane wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hole that
immunity is an inoculaton from liability for unlawful acts ane omissions.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public ofcials are not acts of the State ane
the ofcer who acts illegally is not actng as such but stanes in the same
footng as any other trespasser. Ineeeel, a critcal reaeing of current
literature on executve immunity will reveal a jueicial eisinclinaton to
expane the privilege especially when it impeees the search for truth or
impairs the vineicaton of a right. These consttutonal policies will be
eevaluee if we sustain pettoners claim that a non-sitng presieent enjoys
immunity from suit for criminal acts commitee euring his incumbency.
TAMAYO v. MANILA HOTEL CO.
101 Phil 810
FACTS:
Two huneree sixty-fve (265) employees of the Manila Hotel Co.l,
who hae to be eismissee ane paie the value of their accumulatee leave
uneer secton 286 of the Aeministratve Coeel, as ameneee by Republic Act
No. 611l, when the hotel was leasee to a private concern on June 30l, 1954l,
brought the present acton to recover from the company an aeeitonal
amount for accruee leave allegee to be eue them uneer the same secton
of the Aeministratve Coeel, as later ameneee by Republic Act No. 1081l,
approvee on June 15l, 1954l, that is to sayl, ffeen eays before they were
separatee from the service.
ISSUE:
Whether this later amenement applies retroactvely to
employees whose length of service prior to its approval woule give them
an accumulatee leave in excess of fve monthsl, the limit fxee by law before
the last amenement.
RULING:
Artcle 4 of the new Civil Coee proviees that laws shall have no
retroactve efect unless the contrary is provieee. As Republic Act No. 1081
eoes not proviee that it is to have retroactve efectl, it can only be given
efect from the eate of its approval.
As a mater of factl, this is the constructon that has been placee
upon that Act by the eepartment of the Government chargee with its
enforcement. Thusl, when the Commissioner of Civil Servicel, on August 10l,
1954l, passee upon the claim of the present plaintfs against the Manila
Hotel managementl, he rulee that "the accumulaton of the aeeitonal fve
months' total vacaton ane sick leave (to the original fve months allowee
uneer Republic Act No. 611) shoule begin only from June 15l, 1954."
It is a rule of statutory constructon that "courts will ane shoule
respect the contemporaneous constructon placee upon a statute by the
executve ofcers whose euty it is to enforce it ane unless such
interpretaton is clearly erroneous will oreinarily be controllee thereby.
SET F
EMETERIA LIWAG v. HAPPY GLEN
G.R. No. 189755 | July 4, 2012
FACTS:
I-Manresa 2018 – 2019
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
The controversy stems from a water facility in Happy Glen Loop
Suenivisionl, where for almost 30 yearsl, the resieents of the subeivision
reliee on this facility as their only source of water. Sometme in September
1995l, Marcelo Liwag sole Lot 11l, Bulock No. 5 to Hermogenes ane when he
eieel, Emeteria Liwag subsequently wrote a leter to the Happy Glen Loop
Homeowners Associaton eemaneing the removal of the overheae water
tank from the lane. The Associaton refusee to comply ane flee before the
HLURBu an acton for specifc performancel, confrmatonl, maintenance ane
eonaton of water facilitesl, annulment of sale ane cancellaton of the TCT.
ISSUE:
WONl, the term ‘open space’ as eefnee in P.D. 1216l, as an area
reservee exclusively for parksl, playgorunesl, recreatonal usesl, schoolsl,
roaesl, places of worshipl, hospitalsl, health centersl, barangay centers ane
other similar facilites ane amenitesl, incluees areas reservee for water
facilites.
RULING:
The basic statutory constructon principle of ejusdem generis
states that where a general wore or phrase follows an enumeraton of
partcular ane specifc wores of the same classl, the general wore or phrase
is to be construee to incluee or to be restrictee to things akin to or
resemblingl, or of the same kine or class asl, those specifcally mentonee.
Applying this principle to the afore-quotee Secton 1 of P.D. 1216l, we fne
that the enumeraton refers to areas reservee for the common welfare of
the community. Thusl, the phrase other similar facilites ane amenites
shoule be interpretee in like manner.
Herel, the water facility was uneoubteely establishee for the
beneft of the community. Water is a basic neee in human setlementsl,[35]
without which the community woule not survive. We therefore rule thatl,
basee on the principle of ejusdem generis ane taking into consieeraton the
intenton of the law to create ane maintain a healthy environment in
human setlementsl, the locaton of the water facility in the Subeivision
must form part of the area reservee for open space.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING v. COA
G.R. No. 183517 | June 22, 2010
FACTS:
On December 31l, 1983l, Eligia Romerol, an ofcer of pettonerl,
optee to retre uneer Republic Act No. 1616 ane receivee a total of
P286l,780.00 as gratuity benefts for services reneeree from 1955 to 1983.
Ms. Romero flee a July 16l, 2001 requestl, seeking from pettoner payment
of retrement eiferentals on the strength of Secton 6 of Executve Oreer
No. 756. Saie provision states that “any ofcer or employee who retresl,
resignsl, or is separatee from the service shall be enttlee to one month pay
for every year of service computee at highest salary receivee inclueing
allowancesl, in aeeiton to the other benefts provieee by lawl, regareless of
any provision of law or regulatons to the contrary.”
Confrontee with the queston of whether the computaton of Ms. Romero’s
retrement benefts shoule incluee the allowances she hae receivee while
uneer its employl, pettoner sent queries to responeent ane the Ofce of
the Government Corporate Counsel regareing the applicaton of Secton 6
of Executve Oreer No. 756.
On the other hanel, on July 4l, 2003l, COA Assistant Commissioner ane
General Counsel Raquel R. Habitan issuee the frst assailee rulingl, the 6th
Ineorsement eatee July 4l, 2003l, fneing the eenial of Ms. Romero’s claim
for retrement eiferentals in oreer. Taking appropriate note of the fact
that the Reserve for Retrement Gratuity ane Commutaton of Leave
Creeits of pettoner’s employees eie not incluee allowances outsiee of the
basic salaryl, saie ofcer rulee that Executve Oreer No. 756 was a special
law issuee only for the specifc purpose of reorganizing pettoner
corporaton. Although it was subsequently aevertee to in Executve Oreer
No. 877l, Secton 6 of Executve Oreer No. 756 was eeterminee to be
inteneee for employees retreel, separatee or resignee in connecton with
pettoner’s reorganizaton ane was not meant to be a permanent
retrement scheme for its employees.
ISSUE:
WON Commission gravely abusee its eiscreton amountng to
lack or excess of juriseicton in issuing the assailee rulings which is contrary
to setlee jurisprueence.
RULING:
It is a rule in statutory constructon that every part of the statute
must be interpretee with reference to the contextl, i.e.l, that every part of
the statute must be consieeree together with the other partsl, ane kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. (LBuP v. AMS
Farming Corp.l, GR No. 174971l, Oct. 15l, 2008) Buecause the law must not be
reae in truncatee partsl, its provisions must be reae in relaton to the whole
law. The statute’s clauses ane phrases must notl, consequentlyl, be taken as
eetachee ane isolatee expressionsl, but the whole ane every part thereof
must be consieeree in fxing the meaning of any of its parts in oreer to
proeuce a harmonious whole. (Mactan-Cebu Internatonal Airport
Authority v. Urgellol, GR No. 162288l, April 4l, 2007) Consistent with the
funeamentals of statutory constructonl, all the wores in the statute must
be taken into consieeraton in oreer to ascertain its meaning. (Smart
Communicatonsl, Inc. v. The City of Davaol, GR No. 155491l, Sept. 16l, 2008)
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at benchl, we fne it
well worth emphasizing at the outset that Executve Oreer No. 756 was
meant to reorganize pettoner’s corporate set-up. Secton 4 (1) of
Executve Oreer No. 756 specifcally authorizee pettoner’s Buoare of
Directors to “ reorganize the structure of the Corporatonl, in accoreance
with its expaneee role in the eevelopment of Philippine traeel, with such
ofcers ane employees as may be neeeee ane eetermine their compettve
salaries ane reasonable allowances ane other benefts to efectvely carry
out its powers ane functons.”
It eoesn’t help pettoner’s cause any that Secton 6 of Executve
Oreer No. 756l, in relaton to Secton 3 of Executve Oreer No. 877l, was
further ameneee by Republic Act No. 6758l, otherwise known as the
Compensaton ane Classifcaton Act of 1989. Maneatee uneer Artcle IX Bul,
Secton 5[34] of the Consttutonl, Secton 4 of Republic Act No. 6758
specifcally extenes its coverage to government ownee ane controllee
corporatons like pettoner. With this Court’s ruling in Philippine
Internatonal Traeing Corporaton v. Commission on Aueit to the efect that
pettoner is inclueee in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6758l, it is
evieently no longer exemptee from OCPC rules ane regulatonsl, in keeping
with saie law’s intent to eo away with multple allowances ane other
incentve packages as well as the resultant eiferences in compensaton
among government personnel.
BATANGAS POWER CORP. v. BATANGAS CITY
G.R. No. 152675-152771 | April 18, 2004
FACTS:
Secton 11.02 of the BuOT Agreement provieee that NPC shall be
responsible for the payment of all taxes that may be imposee on the power
statonl, except income taxes ane permit fees. On October 12l, 1998l,
Buatangas City sent a leter to BuPC eemaneing payment of business taxes
ane penaltes. BuPC refusee to pay. In the alternatvel, BuPC assertee that the
city shoule collect the tax from the NPC as the later assumee responsibility
for its payment uneer their BuOT Agreement. In view of the eeaelockl, BuPC
flee a petton for eeclaratory relief with the Makat RTC against Buatangas
City ane NPCl, praying for a ruling that it was not boune to pay the business
taxes imposee on it by the city. It allegee that uneer the BuOT Agreementl,
NPC is responsible for the payment of such taxes but since NPC is exempt
from taxesl, both the BuPC ane NPC are not liable for its payment.
On February 27l, 2002l, the Makat RTC eismissee the petton for
injuncton. It hele thatn (1) BuPC is liable to pay business taxes to the city; (2)
NPC’s tax exempton was witherawn with the passage of R.A. No. 7160
(The Local Government Coee); anel, (3) the 6-year tax holieay grantee to
pioneer business enterprises starts on the eate of registraton with the BuOI
I-Manresa 2018 – 2019
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
as provieee in Secton 133 (g) of R.A. No. 7160l, ane not on the eate of its
actual business operatons.
ISSUE:
WON whether NPC’s tax exempton privileges uneer its Charter
were witherawn by Secton 193 of the Local Government Coee (LGC).
RULING:
Yes. It is a well-setlee rule in statutory constructon that “a
general law cannot repeal a special law.” Howeverl, in the case of NPC v. City
of Cabanatuanl, the Court recognizee the removal of the blanket exclusion
of government instrumentalites from local taxaton as one of the most
signifcant provisions of the 1991 LGC. Specifcallyl, we stressee that Secton
193 of the LGCl, an express ane general repeal of all statutes grantng
exemptons from local taxesl, witherew the sweeping tax privileges
previously enjoyee by the NPC uneer its Charter.
Consequentlyl, when NPC assumee the tax liabilites of the BuPC
uneer their 1992 BuOT Agreementl, the LGC which removee NPC’s tax
exempton privileges hae alreaey been in efect for six (6) months. Thusl,
while BuPC remains to be the entty eoing business in saie cityl, it is the NPC
that is ultmately liable to pay saie taxes uneer the provisions of both the
1992 BuOT Agreement ane the 1991 Local Government Coee.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226 | February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo was convictee with Buigamy for marrying
a secone tme without frst obtaining a jueicial eeclaraton of nullity of
marriage. The City Prosecutor chargee him afer he flee a complaint for
jueicial eeclaraton of nullity for his marriage with Lucia on the groune that
no marriage ceremony actually took place. Afer his convicton at the RTCl,
the jueicial eeclaraton of nullity of marriage was grantee ane his marriage
with Lucia was eeclaree voie ab inito. The Court of Appeals afrmee the
convicton of Morigo ane stressee that a subsequent eeclaraton of nullity
of marriage coule not acquit Lucio.
ISSUE:
WONl, pettoner commitee bigamy.
RULING:
No. The law abhors an injustce ane the Court is maneatee to
liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accusee ane weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumpton of innocence to ensure that
justce is eone.
In the instant casel, no marriage ceremony at all was performee by a euly
authorizee solemnizing ofcer. Pettoner ane Lucia Buarrete merely signee a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valie marriage ane thusl, neees no jueicial
eeclaraton of nullity. Such act alonel, without morel, cannot be eeemee to
consttute an ostensibly valie marriage for which pettoner might be hele
liable for bigamy unless he frst secures a jueicial eeclaraton of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
PHIL. PETROLEUM CORP. v. MUNICIPALITY of PILILIA
G.R. No. 90776 | June 3, 1991
FACTS:
Philippine Petroleum Corporaton is a business enterprise
engagee in the manufacture of lubricatee oil base stocks which is a
petroleum proeuctl, with its refnery plant situatee at Malayal, Pilillia Rizall,
coneuctng its business actvites within the territorial juriseicton of
municipality of Pilillial, Rizal ane is in contnuous operaton up to the
present. PPC owns ane maintains an oil refnery inclueing 49 storage tanks
for its petroleum proeucts in Malayal, Pilillal, Rizal. Uneer secton 142 of
NIRC of 1939l, manufacturee oils ane other fuels are subject to specifc tax.
Responeent municipality of Pilillial, Rizal through municipal council
resoluton no. 25-s-1974 enactee municipal tax oreinance no. 1-s-1974
otherwise known as “The Pililla Tax Coee Of 1974” on June 14l, 1974 which
took efect on July 1l, 1974. Sectons 9 ane 10 of the saie oreinance
imposee a tax on businessl, except for those which fxee taxes are provieee
in the local tax coee on manufacturersl, importersl, or proeucers of any
artcle of commerce of whatever kine or naturel, inclueing brewersl, eistllerl,
rectfersl, repackers ane compouneers of liquors eistllee spirits ane/or
wines in accoreance with the scheeule foune in the local tax coeel, as well
as mayor’s permit sanitary inspecton fee ane storage permit fee for
flammablel, combustble or explosive substancesl, while secton 139 of the
eisputee oreinance imposee surcharges ane interests on unpaie taxesl, fees
or charges. Enforcing the provisions of the above mentonee oreinancel, the
responeent flee a complaint on April 4l, 1986 eocketee as civil case no.
057-T against PPC for the collecton of the business tax from 1979 to 1986;
storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor’s permit fee ane sanitary
permit inspecton fees from 1975 to 1984. PPCl, howeverl, have alreaey paie
the last namee fees startng 1985.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality may valiely impose taxes on
pettoner’s business.
RULING:
No. While secton 2 of PD 436 prohibits the impositon of local
taxes on petroleum proeuctsl, saie eecree eie not amene sectons 19 ane
19 (a) of PD 231 as ameneee by PD 426l, wherein the municipality is
grantee the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturersl, importersl,
proeucers of any artcle of commerce of whatever kine or nature. A tax on
business is eistnct from a tax on the artcle itself. Thusl, if the impositon of
tax on business of manufacturersl, etc. in petroleum proeucts contravenes a
eeclaree natonal policyl, it shoule have been expressly statee in PD No.
436.
The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is
oreainee by the present consttuton. To allow the contnuous efectvity of
the prohibiton set forth in PC no. 26-73 woule be tantamount to restrictng
their power to tax by mere aeministratve issuances. Uneer secton 5l,
artcle X of the 1987 consttutonl, only guieelines ane limitatons that may
be establishee by congress can eefne ane limit such power of local
governments.
The storage permit fee being imposee by Pilillia’s tax oreinance is a fee for
the installaton ane keeping in storage of any flammablel, combustble or
explosive substances. In as much as saie storage makes use of tanks ownee
not by the Municipality of Pilillia but by pettoner PPCl, same is obviously
not a charge for any service reneeree by the municipality as what is
envisionee in secton 37 of the same coee.
REPUBLIC v. IAC AND SPOUSES PAASTOR
G.R. No. 69344 | April 26, 1991
FACTS:
The Buureau of Internal Revenue commencee an acton to collect
from the spouses Pastor for eefciency income taxes with surchargel,
interestl, ane costs. The Pastors aemitee that there was income tax
eefciency on their part but eenying liability since they hae availee of the
tax amnesty uneer PD 23l, 213 ane 370 ane hae paie the corresponeing
amnesty taxes evieencee by the Government’s Ofcial Receipt. The BuIR
appealee alleging that the private responeents were not qualifee to avail
of the tax amnesty uneer PD 213 for the benefts of that eecree are
available only to persons who hae no peneing assessment for unpaie taxes.
The BuIR further arguee that tax exemptons shoule be interpretee
strictssimi juris against the taxpayer. The spousesl, in responsel, allegee that
PD 213 contains no exemptons from its coverage ane that nothing uneer
the leter of instructon can be construee as authority for the BuIR to
introeuce exceptons ane coneitons to the coverage of the law.
ISSUE:
May the Spouses Pastor’s tax amnesty tax payments estop the
government from collectng the eefcienciest
RULING:
I-Manresa 2018 – 2019
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
The court rules in the afrmatve. The Government is estoppee
from collectng the eiference between the eefciency tax assessment ane
the amount alreaey paie by them as amnesty tax. The Appellate Court
correctly eismissee the appeal holeing that the payment of eefciency
income taxes by the Pastors ane the acceptance thereof by BuIRl, operatee
to eivest the later of its right to further recover eefciency income taxes
from the Pastors pursuant to the existng eefciency tax assessment against
them. The rule is that in case of eoubtl, tax statutes are to be construee
strictly against the Government ane liberally in favor of the taxpayer
strictsimi juris for taxes are not to be presumee beyone what the
applicable statutel, in this case PD 213l, expressly ane clearly eeclares. The
Appellate Court’s ruling is enttlee to the highest respect ane may not be
eisturbee except uneer exceptonal circumstances.
BASCO v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649 | May 14, 1991
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusements ane Gaming Corporaton (PAGCOR)
was createe by virtue of P.D. 1067-A eatee January 1l, 1977 ane was
grantee a franchise uneer P.D. 1067-Bu also eatee January 1l, 1977 "to
establishl, operate ane maintain gambling casinos on lane or water within
the territorial juriseicton of the Philippines." The operaton was consieeree
a success for it provee to be a potental source of revenue to fune
infrastructure ane socio-economic projectsl, thusl, P.D. 1399 was passee on
June 2l, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully atain this objectve. It is reportee that
PAGCOR is the thire largest source of government revenuel, next to the
Buureau of Internal Revenue ane the Buureau of Customs. Buut the
pettonersl, are questoning the valieity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that
the same is "null ane voie" for being "contrary to moralsl, public policy ane
public oreerl," monopolistc ane tenes toware "crony economy"l, ane is
violatve of the equal protecton clause ane local autonomy as well as for
running counter to the state policies enunciatee in Sectons 11 (Personal
Dignity ane Human Rights)l, 12 (Family) ane 13 (Role of Youth) of Artcle IIl,
Secton 1 (Social Justce) of Artcle XIII ane Secton 2 (Eeucatonal Values) of
Artcle XIV of the 1987 Consttuton.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 1869 is valie
RULING:
Yesl, PD 1869 is valie. In Yu Cong Eng vs Trinieael, the Court rulee
that every law has in its favour the presumpton of consttutonality ane
valieity. In the case at barl, PD 1869 thus has in its favour the presumpton
of consttutonality ane in oreer for it to be nullifeel, it must be shown that
there is a clear ane unequivocal breach of the Consttutonl, not merely a
eoubtul ane equivocal one. Since pettoners were not able to overturn
such presumptonl, it is to be conclueee that PD 1869 is valie. Thereforel,
since pettoners were unable to overturn the presumpton of
consttutonality of PD 1869l, the same is to be consieeree valie.
UNITED HARBORS v. ASSOC. OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LINES
G.R. No. 133763 | November 13, 2002
FACTS:
To secure the payment of nightme ane overtme pay of its
membersl, Unitee Harbor Pilots Associaton of the Philippinesl, Inc. (UHPAP)
flee the present petton against the Associaton of Internatonal Shipping
Linesl, Inc. (AISL) ane Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) through invoking PPA
Aeministratve Oreer (AO) No. 03-85. The PPA issuee PPA A.O. No. 03-85
which aeopts the provisions of Customs Aeministratve Oreer (CAO) No. 15-
65 on the payment of aeeitonal charges for pilotage service reneeree on
Suneays or Holieaysl, practcally referring to nightme ane overtme pay.
Howeverl, Presieent Fereinane E. Marcos issuee Executve Oreer
No. 1088 which fxes the rate of pilotage fees on the basis of the vessels
tonnage ane proviees that the rate for eocking ane uneocking anchoragel,
coneucton ane shifing ane other relatee special services is equal to 100%.
This resultee to the PPA’s issuance of PPA Resoluton No. 1486 eisallowing
the overtme premium or charge collectee by Harbor Pilots uneer Secton
16 (c) of PPA Aeministratve Oreer No. 03-85l, for services reneeree euring
holieays which became the basis of AISL’s refusal to pay UHPAPs claims for
nightme ane overtme pay.
ISSUE
Whether or not E.O. No. 1088 ameneee or superseeee the
provisions of PPA A.O. No. 03-85 on nightme ane overtme pay.
RULING:
No. There is nothing in EO No. 1088 that reveals any intenton
on the part of Former Presieent Marcos to amene or superseee the
provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 on nightme ane overtme pay as albeit the
general repealing clause provieee by Secton 3 of EO No. 1088l, the same is
maee eepeneent upon its actual inconsistency with other previous oreersl,
rulesl, regulatons or other issuance. There is no inconsistency between EO
No. 1088 ane the provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 as EO No. 1088 proviees
for uniform ane moeifee rates for pilotage services reneeree to foreign
ane coastwise vessels in all Philippine portsl, public or private; while the
subject mater of the provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 is the payment of the
aeeitonal charges of nightme ane overtme pay.
Plainlyl, EO No. 1088 involves the basic compensaton for
pilotage service while PPA AO No. 03-85 proviees for the aeeitonal charges
where pilotage service is reneeree uneer certain circumstances. This Court
aeheres to the rule that every statute must be so construee ane
harmonizee with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprueence. E.O. No. 1088 ane PPA AO No. 03-85 shoule thus be reae
together ane harmonizee to give efect to both.
PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PAREDES
G.R. No. 101724 | July 3, 1992
FACTS:
Two leters of complaint were flee on October ane December of
1986 questoning the issuance to Governor Pareeesl, when he was stll the
provincial atorney in 1976l, of a free patent ttle for a lot in the Rosario
public lane subeivision. He misrepresentee to the Buureau of Lanes that the
lanes subject herein are eisposablel, thereby ineucing the approval of his
applicaton for free patent. On August 1989l, an informaton for violaton of
RA 3019 Ant-Graf ane Corrupt Practces Act was then flee in the
Saneiganbayan afer an ex parte preliminary investgaton. A moton to
quash the informaton was flee by Pareees conteneing that he is chargee
for an ofence which has alreaey prescribee. The crime was commitee on
1976l, perioe of prescripton was 10 yearsl, therefore it has prescribee in
1986. Now the moton to quash was being assailee.
ISSUE:
Whether Pareees may no longer be prosecutee for his violaton
of RA 3019 in 1976.
RULING:
Yes. Bueing a special lawl, the computaton of the perioe for the
prescripton in RA 3019 begins to run from the eay of the commission of
the crime ane not the eiscovery of it. Aeeitonallyl, BuP 195l, which was
approvee in 1982l, ameneing RA 3019 by increasing from 10 to 15 years the
perioe for the prescripton or extnguishment of a violatons of the Ant-
Graf ane Corrupt Practces Actl, may not be given retroactve applicaton
for it woule be prejueicial to the accusee. To apply BuP 195 to Pareees
woule make it an ex post facto law for it woule alter his situaton to his
eisaevantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that hae alreaey
been extnguishee uneer the law existng when it was commitee. It woule
eeprive Pareees of the substantve beneft of the shorter 10-year
prescriptve perioe uneer RA 3019 which was an essental element of the
crime at the tme he commitee it.
TUPAS v. CA
G.R. No. 89571 | February 6, 1991
FACTS:
I-Manresa 2018 – 2019
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD
Pettoners receivee a copy of the RTC ane then they flee their
respectve moton for reconsieeraton 14 eays later. The moton was
eenieel, insteael, of fling the petton for review with the court of appeals
with the remaineer of the 15 eay reglementary perioe l, that isl, a eay afer
they receivee the oreerl,pettoner flee the saie petton 14 eays afer. The
petton was eeniee by the Court of Appeals on grounes of
tareiness.Pettoner flee a moton for reconsieeraton. They allege that
they shoule not be prejueicee by the mistakes of their counsel because
they are laymen ane not familiar with the intricacies of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the responeent court was correct in eecieing
that the appeal has been tareily maee.
RULING:
Rules of proceeure are inteneee to ensure the oreerly
aeministraton of justce ane the protecton of substantve rights in jueicial
ane extrajueicial proceeeings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantve
law ane aejectve law are contraeictory to each other orl, as has ofen been
suggesteel, that enforcement of proceeural rules shoule never be permitee
if it will result in prejueice to the substantve rights of the litgants. This is
not exactly true; the concept is much misuneerstooe. As a mater of factl,
the policy of the courts is to give efect to both kines of lawl, as
complementng each otherl, in the just ane speeey resoluton of the eispute
between the partes. Observance of both substantve ane proceeural rights
is equally guaranteee by eue processl, whatever the source of such rightsl,
be it the Consttuton itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
The moton was eeniee with fnality by the Court.The Court
foune that the pettoners have not shown that their counsel was
exceptonally inept or motvatee by bae faith or excusably mislee by the
facts. There is no reason why we shoule not apply the rule that clients
shoule be boune by the acts of their counsell, inclueing his mistakes
The Court stateel, “
Now pettoner wants us to nullify all of the anteceeent proceeeings ane
recognize his earlier claims to the eisputee property on the justfcaton
that his counsel was grossly inept. There woule be no ene to litgaton if
this were allowee as every shortcoming of counsel coule be the subject of
challenge by his client through another counsel whol, if he is also foune
wantngl, woule likewise be eisownee by the same client through another
counsell, ane so on."
JOINT MINISTRY OF HEALTH v. CA
G.R. No. 78254 | April 25, 1991
FACTS:
Ermita Meeical Center was issuee a certfcate of accreeitaton
as an in-house meeical clinic to service only Buuileers ane Heavy Equipment
Services Corporaton (BuHESCO)l, but was revokee by the Commitee on the
groune that it violatee the Rules ane Regulatons establishee by the later.
The revocaton was maee pursuant to the Rules ane Regulatons
promulgatee by the Commitee on June 1l, 1983l, covering all euly licensee
ane registeree hospitalsl, meeical clinics ane laboratories eesirous of
ofering their services to private employment agenciesl, recruitment enttes
ane manning agencies in the meeical examinaton of workers being hiree
for overseas employment.
The private responeent challengee the saie revocaton through
calling the atenton of the Court to a leter from the Director of the
Natonal Printng Ofce which states that their recores show that the
Omnibus Rules implementng the Labor Coee issuee on February 16l, 1976
by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor ane Employment Rules
ane Regulatons for the Accreeitaton of Meeical Clinics ane the Coneuct of
Meeical Examinaton for Overseas Employment issuee on June 1l, 1983
were not submitee to the Ofce for publicaton in the Ofcial Gazete.
ISSUE:
Whether or not responeent’s revokee accreeitaton was invalie.
RULING:
Yes. As eeclaree by the Court in the case of Tañaea v. Tuveral, all
statutesl, inclueing those of local applicaton ane private lawsl, shall be
publishee as a coneiton for their efectvityl, which shall begin ffeen eays
afer publicaton unless a eiferent efectvity eate is fxee by the
legislature.

The evieence provieee by the private responeent showee that

the Rules ane Regulatons issuee by the Commitee have never been
publishee. In the absence of any refutaton of this evieencel, the Court must
concluee that the saie Rules ane Regulatons have ineeee not come into
force ane cannot be usee as a basis for the resoluton of the petton. Thusl,
the petton was eeniee for lack of statutory basis making the revocaton of
responeent’s accreeitaton invalie.

MACEDA v. MACARAIG
G.R. No. 88291 | May 31, 1991
FACTS:
Commonwealth Act 120 createe NAPOCOR as a public
corporaton to uneertake the eevelopment of hyeraulic power ane the
proeucton of power from other sources. RA 358 grantee NAPOCOR tax ane
euty exempton privileges. RA 6395 revisee the charter of the NAPOCORl,
tasking it to carry out the policy of the natonal electrifcaton ane provieee
in eetail NAPOCOR’s tax exceptons. PD 380 specifee that NAPOCOR’s
exempton incluees all taxesl, etc. imposee “eirectly or ineirectly.” PD 938
eatee May 27l, 1976 further ameneee the aforesaie provision by integratng
the tax exempton in general terms uneer one paragraph.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC has ceasee to enjoy ineirect tax ane euty
exempton with the enactment of PD 938 on May 27l, 1976 which ameneee
PD 380 issuee on January 11l, 1974.

RULING:
Nol, it is stll exempt. NAPOCOR is a non-proft public corporaton
createe for the general gooe ane welfarel, ane wholly ownee by the
government of the Republic of the Philippines. From the very beginning of
the corporaton’s existencel, NAPOCOR enjoyee preferental tax treatment
“to enable the corporaton to pay the ineebteeness ane obligaton” ane
efectve implementaton of the policy enunciatee in Secton 1 of RA 6395.

From the preamble of PD 938l, it is evieent that the provisions of PD 938

were not inteneee to be interpretee liberally so as to enhance the tax
exempt status of NAPOCOR.

It is recognizee that the rule on strict interpretaton eoes not apply in the
case of exemptons in favor of government politcal subeivision or
instrumentality. In the case of property ownee by the state or a city or
other public corporatonsl, the express excepton shoule not be construee
with the same eegree of strictness that applies to exemptons contrary to
the policy of the statel, since as to such property “excepton is the rule ane
taxaton the excepton.”

I-Manresa 2018 – 2019

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – ATTY. RIZA RACHO-BALDOVINO, PHD