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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I, DIGESTS

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27,

Nov. 10, 2015 (Digest on RA 6770)
Posted on August 31, 2016

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015

(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition,
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter
of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts
from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the
usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself
concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.
Follow

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this provision,
Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated
rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power.
Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation
of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such
as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of
powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case
can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is
hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770-
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the
CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent
proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to
resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be
raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to
determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

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