Anda di halaman 1dari 5

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts:

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly
Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services
and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the
conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no
guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.
They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed
aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.

Issues:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section
26 (2) of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1
and 2 of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of
the Constitution.

Discussions:

Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not
only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are
required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected
as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.”

Rulings:

R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the
House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain
any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to
the House revenue bill.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power
when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural
classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject
of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of
assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule,
the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK,
INC. (ECN), petitioners
vs
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.),
STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO),
respondents.

FACTS:

On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001. Petitioners
Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an undue
delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all
electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law. The universal
charge to be collected would serve as payment for government debts, missionary electrification,
equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy, environmental
charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three
years. The universal charge shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will
then be managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC

HELD:

No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the regulatory
power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory
duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot
be considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power thru regulation.

Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative parameters
provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from
the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is tasked of executing a
subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass both the completeness
test and the sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety
finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed
complete and sufficient in form.
Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010

FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list organization,
manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
They submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
obtain the number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was
amended: the nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn;
Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were
retained.

Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on
the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of nominees and the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved the amendment of the list of
nominees with the new order as follows:

1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva

2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales

3. Armi Jane Borje

The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales
took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.

Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official
second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari assailing Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its
nominees.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;

3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act; and

4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of polls.

RULING: The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s case is not an election protest nor
an action for quo warranto. Election protest is a contest between the defeated and the winning
candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who obtained the
higher number of votes entitling them to hold the office. On the other hand, a special civil action for quo
warranto questions the ineligibility of the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari
against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7
of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus are based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different. Forum
shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively to obtain a favorable judgment.

The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued Resolution No.
7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of
Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and
enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shal be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
system shall not be considered resigned.

The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite meaning, there is no
room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of
nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to the
COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an organization can substitute another person in
place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee fies; (2)
when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it
provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as statutory ground for
substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to
implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant
or modify it. An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and
the IRR, the law prevails.

The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was
declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its
nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the COMELEC.